Thank you, Mike. There are two things in my resume you didn't mention. One is that I used to work for Mike Armstrong [Chairman and CEO, ATT] because he was on the Board of Trustees at Johns Hopkins when I was a mere Dean, so I considered him one of my bosses.
In a way, more importantly, I consider myself a product of the Mike Mansfield Graduate School of East Asian Studies. I had the privilege of being Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs for Secretary of State George Schultz from 1982 to 1986. I think that was Mike's third four-year term as U.S. Ambassador to Japan where we named the embassy in Tokyo the Bar None Ranch because Mike was always saying that there is no relationship in the world as important as the U.S./Japan relationship, "bar none." And that was true some 15 years ago; I think it's still true today.
That is why, in fact, the President of the United States is in Japan as we speak. As the old Soviets would have said, "no accident comrade," that even though we have a deeply preoccupying war on terrorism to fight that takes up 24 hours of the President's day, he has taken time to visit East Asia, starting with Japan, to visit our two strong allies in the region, Japan and Korea, and also to visit China, one of the most important countries in the world.
The President understands, and we in his Administration understand, that the future of East Asia, in many ways, holds the key to, I think, the future of the world. Strengthening those relationships between the United States and our friends and allies in East Asia and foremost Japan is the key to preserving peace and security for the coming generations.
So that's why I agreed on a holiday morning to come and talk to the U.S.-Japan Business Council. I salute what you're doing. I think, as I said, as Mike Mansfield said, there is no relationship in the world as important, or more important than this one.
Before I say a few things about Japan and East Asia I'd just like to share with you a couple of observations about the remarkable work that our American men and women in uniform have been doing -- doing in cooperation with coalition partners from, I even lose count of the number, I think some 18 nations.
As a matter of fact, two interesting facts that might amuse you is, first of all, there are more Americans in uniform deployed today in the State of Utah than in the country of Afghanistan providing security for the Olympics. More significantly, there are more non-American, non-Afghan forces deployed in Afghanistan today either as part of our Operation Enduring Freedom or as part of the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul than there are Americans. I frequently hear complaints of, why aren't you taking advantage of all these offers of help? We are taking advantage of these offers of help, quite substantially.
What has been achieved to date is remarkable. It's all the more remarkable if you stop to think of what the reaction would have been if Secretary Rumsfeld had gone up to Congress last June and said we need more money in our defense budget because we have to prepare to fight a war in Afghanistan, with basing forces in places like Qarshi Khanabad in Uzbekistan, in Jacobabad in Pakistan, and I know what the reaction would have been. Congress would have said, you people in the Defense Department will do anything to justify a bigger budget; we couldn't possibly be going to war in Afghanistan. Yet just a few weeks after September 11th, I think the precise time, in fact, was on September 20th, the President gave the direction to [Commander of Central Command] General Franks to begin planning a campaign in Afghanistan. Twenty days after that, we were at war in Afghanistan with a plan that had been put together at enormous speed.
One of the things that impresses me about speed, too, within about three weeks, we were reading reports in the press about how we were bogged down, we were getting nowhere, we were in a quagmire. There was talk about instant analysis. And about a week after that, we started putting our first Special Forces people on the ground in Afghanistan. The speed with which those brave men, many of them literally going into battle on horseback, were able to turn the situation around was remarkable.
I'd like to just share with you one of my favorite documents from the war so far. It is the dispatch that we received from one of those Special Forces captains who was up in the northern part of Afghanistan with a commander named General Dostam. He sent a message to General Franks on October 25th. He said, "I'm advising a man on how to best employ light infantry and horse cavalry in the attack against Taliban T-55 tanks, mortars, artillery, personnel carriers and machine guns -- a tactic which I thought had become outdated with the invention of the machine gun. The Mujahadin have that every day we've been on the ground. They have attacked with ten rounds of ammunition per man, little water, and less food. I observed one sniper who walked ten-plus miles to get to the battle. He was proud to show me his artificial right leg from the knee down.
"We have witnessed horse cavalry charging Taliban strong points the last several kilometers under mortar, artillery and sniper fire. There is little medical care if injured, only a donkey ride to the aid station which is a dirt hut. The Mujahadin are doing very well with what they have but we couldn't do what we are doing without the close air support. Everywhere I go the civilians and Muj soldiers are always telling me they are glad the USA has come. They all speak of their hope for a better Afghanistan once the Taliban are gone. Better go. General Dostam is finishing his phone call with a congressional staffer and we're off to battle."
There is another dispatch and it's in the same spirit. If you stop and think what happened, what turned that war around, it was literally brave men on horseback calling in strikes from B-52 bombers that were built 50 years ago, long before they were born, using the miracle of modern communications, not only to communicate with congressional staffers back in Washington, D.C., but, more importantly, to communicate with those bombers and to bring in those strikes with extraordinary precision.
There's been a lot of talk and there's a lot of work going on in our Department about transforming the military. Sometimes people think that transformation is either killing some program that they think we shouldn't be spending money on or spending a lot of money on some program that they think we should be. There are those aspects to it. But as Secretary Rumsfeld has frequently pointed out, transformation is often about taking old things and using them differently, using them in new ways, and using them in ways that modern communications makes possible.
Secretary Rumsfeld was asked at one of his press briefings whether the reintroduction of the horse cavalry was some fundamental Pentagon plan, and he said yes, it's all part of our transformation plan.
It has been, so far, and I'm going to knock on wood and emphasize so far, we have achieved a great deal of success. Success that has benefited, I believe, not only our country and those countries that are threatened by terrorism, but has clearly benefited the Afghan people. But even in Afghanistan, the battle continues. It continues to be difficult. Just Saturday one Australian soldier was killed; the first American killed in actual combat was killed after the Taliban was defeated. There are a lot of terrorists left in Afghanistan and we also have a great deal of work to do to assist this new struggling government to ensure the long-term stability of that country. It's a big challenge and we need partners.
That brings me to talking about Japan, because Japan is a key partner. Over the past ten years we have witnessed extraordinary changes in Japanese security attitudes and Japanese policy. During the Persian Gulf War Japan contributed an enormous amount of money, some $13 billion which was key to our ability to conduct the liberation of Kuwait.
But I think the Japanese people were aware that no matter how much money Japan contributed, it would never be enough when other countries were putting lives on the line. Since then, there's been a slow and steady evolution in Japanese security attitudes. One of the things that has impressed me over the many years that I've had the pleasure of working with Japanese officials and with the Japanese government is things may be sometimes slow but they are usually steady in one direction. Slow and steady progress in one direction over time goes to something quite impressive.
It began with peacekeeping deployments in Cambodia and the Golan Heights as well as various disaster relief and humanitarian missions. Then in 1997, the U.S. and Japan issued a new set of defense guidelines for our security cooperation in peacetime, in defending Japan against armed attack and responding to regional contingencies. Under those guidelines Japan will provide a variety of rear area, search and rescue, and other support for U.S. forces in a regional contingency as well as continuing to take the leading role in its own defense.
Following September 11th we saw another dramatic advance in Japan's security policies as the government of Japan put together a comprehensive package for cooperation with the United States and the rest of the world in combating terrorism. That support includes airlift. Indeed one-third of Japan's C-130 fleet is engaged in supporting Operation Enduring Freedom, as well as Japanese ships providing at-sea refueling for U.S. and British naval vessels in the Indian Ocean.
These are not things that Japan did because it was obligated to do so by treaty. In fact our security treaty with Japan says nothing about Japan defending the United States or responding to attacks against the United States. But these were actions of a close and trusted friend. They were actions that Japan took on its own initiative because Prime Minister Koizumi recognized that fundamentally the attacks of September 11th were security issues for Japan just as much as they were for the United States and the rest of the world.
We welcome the courage that he showed in putting together his seven point plan of action for military, economic, law enforcement and other cooperation and the leadership he has demonstrated in delivering on that plan. And we welcome the support that the Diet gave him in passing the legislation that made Japan's support possible.
We also welcome very much the leading role that Japan has taken in supporting post-Taliban reconstruction in Afghanistan. The Tokyo summit that was convened last month began the important process of economic support for that reconstruction effort.
Next month Japan will again make new security contributions to peace and security in the region when a 680-member battalion of engineers begins its deployments to East Timor to help keep the peace and rebuild that battered land. In taking these steps, Prime Minister Koizumi is demonstrating to the region and to the world just how much Japan has to offer if people will put aside the difficulties of the past and instead focus on the possibilities of the present and the opportunities of the future.
The United States very warmly welcomes the evolution taking place in Japanese security policy that started ten years ago and continues to this day. As that evolution proceeds it will involve much more deliberation as the Japanese people determine at their own pace and in their own sovereign manner, how much of a role Japan should play in international security matters.
For our part, as a friend and ally, we will support those decisions, we will work with other nations in the region to gain their understanding of Japan's policies. Likewise, as a friend and ally, we will share our frank views of matters that cause us concern. Today one concern facing the region as a whole is the condition of the Japanese economy.
Let me be blunt. I think bluntness and frankness is a quality of friendship. Economic recovery in Japan is every bit as important to the security of Japan, the security of the United States, and the security of the region, as are the contributions of the self defense forces that I just described. Japan's importance to the region has always been built upon the strength of its democratic institutions and the strength of an economy that has provided a market for trade and capital for investment and funds for economic assistance. But as Japan continues to struggle with deflation and a growing overhang of non-performing loans and non-performing assets, its influence gradually declines and its ability to assist declines with it.
Unlike many countries, however, Japan has all the tools it needs to put its own economic house in order. Japan's debts are largely to itself. It is not beholden to the IMF or to outside creditors. The question for Japan is not whether it has the means to restore itself to vibrant economic growth, the question is whether it has the will.
Prime Minister Koizumi has again shown leadership in setting out a reform agenda and in confronting vested interests that it seeks to contribute to economic growth. We hope those efforts will be successful because an economically strong Japan will be a Japan that can make its full contribution to the peace and security of this vital region and indeed to the whole world.
Let me also say something briefly about some other key parts of Asia, starting with Korea.
In his recent State of the Union Address, President Bush emphasized the seriousness of the threat posed by North Korea and the seriousness with which we must address it. North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction while its citizens starve. We have serious concerns over the menace posed by North Korea's development and proliferation of those weapons. The regime remains the world's number one exporter of ballistic missiles and related technology.
There is also no question that the most immediate and pressing threat on the Korean Peninsula itself comes from North Korea's large conventional force posture. We are determined to work with South Korea to address our shared concerns over this threat.
We support South Korea's efforts to engage the North and we believe that North/South reconciliation is a force for peace on the Korean Peninsula. We remain committed to the trilateral U.S./Japan/Korea process that we have as the primary vehicle for coordinating our respective approaches to the DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea]. The door to dialogue is open. We stand by all offers to meet with the North any time, anywhere, without preconditions for substantive discussions. It is up to North Korea to take advantage of that offer and to enter into positive discussions with South Korea and with the United States to address our concerns.
Turning to China, the United States seeks a constructive relationship with China. China is not an enemy, but it is not a strategic partner, either. We wish to develop areas in which our interests converge. That includes military to military contacts, but we want to ensure that those contacts are beneficial to the United States, that they are reciprocal, transparent, and consistent with our law.
We also speak frankly about areas where we have concerns, such as proliferation where China, unfortunately, has been part of the problem. China has not lived up to its November 2000 pledge not to assist any country in the development of Missile Technology Control Regime-class missiles, or to implement a comprehensive system of missile-related export controls. We will continue to pursue this matter.
We will also continue to uphold our commitment to ensure that Taiwan has adequate means for its own defense in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act and the three U.S./China communiqués.
Finally, let me conclude these short remarks with a brief comment about Southeast Asia, an area that is close to my heart and, I think, an area that is potentially increasing in importance as we think about the long term in this campaign against terrorism.
Clearly there is a threat, a terrorist threat, in the region. Some states understand that threat and are doing something about it. Some states still don't quite realize the danger that really exists to them or to the region in international terrorism, let alone the threat that emanates from that region to the rest of the world.
We not only have a current problem but a very real concern that Southeast Asia could become a haven for international terrorists as they are forced out of their current locations. We need to work with the countries of Southeast Asia to find ways to address the common threats from international terrorism and terrorist groups. In doing so, I believe, the instrument of economic assistance and economic support will be crucial.
That brings me back again, in conclusion, to the importance of this U.S./Japan relationship, to its solid foundation on the strong economies of our two countries, and to the hope that it will continue to be the most important relationship in the world, bar none.
Thank you very much. [Applause.] Questions?
A: I think it is one of the biggest challenges of our time, and probably as much as we're preoccupied with the war on terrorism and it seems to sometimes dominate everything, we'll make a big mistake if we lose sight of this, in a sense I think even bigger challenge, which is to ensure that as China becomes a more and more powerful country, and it seems to me that that is inevitable and not undesirable. But to be desirable, it is critical that China see its place in the world as that of a peaceful competitor not one that takes that potential enormous power and converts it into a military force and uses it to intimidate its neighbors.
In saying that, I'm not saying that China will or predicting that China will. Indeed, to the contrary. I hope that all strong countries have learned from some of the bad lessons of history that the way to success as a country is not through war, but through providing for the prosperity of your own citizens. But at the same time I think any historical realism has got to recognize that when a country like China begins to achieve its full potential, that there can be temptations, I think, to abuse that new-found power and I think it is absolutely critical to work with China--and not just the United States working with China, but working with China with all of the countries of the region to convince that future Chinese leadership those future Chinese generations, that the Chinese future lies in a peaceful relationship with the rest of the region.
It's, again, a reason why I think this relationship between the U.S. and Japan is so important. We're not going to do it by ourselves. We can do it, I think, in partnership with others. I think there is so much in Japan's history that teaches constructive lessons about what course is good for your country and your people and conversely, unfortunately, what course can lead to disaster. I think the United States and Japan share essentially common objectives in that relationship and I think, frankly, I'm very optimistic. But I don't think that that optimism will be realized if we just sort of sit back and assume it will happen automatically.
A: I think multilateral cooperation in the region is extremely important and very valuable, but I think we also have to recognize that any model like the NATO model just isn't on, it's not going to work, it might not even be desirable. Therefore I think you have to approach it in a different way.
I guess first of all you have to recognize that as desirable as multilateral cooperation is, it's not a substitute for strong bilateral cooperation. Sometimes people talk as though we'll replace the U.S./Japan security relationship with something else. I think that's not the way to go. I think the way to go is to build those other relationships on a foundation of strong U.S./Japan bilateral cooperation.
I think there are a variety of things that can be done. I think the trilateral cooperation between the U.S./Japan/South Korea, particularly in addressing the problems of the Korean Peninsula, is a foundation on which we will build stronger relationships in the future. And someday when the Korean Peninsula is peacefully unified--and I believe that will happen; it may take longer than any of us want but it's going to happen some day--that that trilateral cooperation in achieving the result will endure and be a foundation for further cooperation.
I think APEC and in some ways even perhaps potentially more important are the relationships that the ASEAN countries have built with their security partners. At a minimum it provides a very valuable forum for dialogue. Sometimes people dismiss that and say oh, it's just a talk shop. Wasn't it Winston Churchill who said talk-talk or jaw-jaw is better than war-war?
Talking doesn't always solve problems if they're too deep-seated, but certainly it's a way to deal with misunderstandings and I think it's a way to persuade China specifically of the importance of a peaceful relationship with the whole region.
Finally, I would add to the list a number of interesting initiatives that have been taken over the last five or ten years along the lines of the so-called Track 2 dialogues, where under the guise of meeting with academics like I used to be, government officials can get together and talk about matters that might still be difficult to do on a government-to-government basis.
I was privileged to participate in an initiative that actually came out of the Japan Institute of International Affairs called the Trilateral Forum. It brought together U.S., Russian and Japanese experts to talk about security problems in the region. There is another dialogue that is bringing together Japanese, Chinese and Americans; and yet another one that is attempting, I think with more difficulty, to bring together U.S., Japan, Russia, China and the two Koreas.
Maybe there's an analogy here. Secretary Rumsfeld has talked about the fact that, unlike ten years ago during the Gulf War, we had one single grand coalition. Today we have flexible coalitions--it's one coalition to deal with Afghanistan and another coalition the Philippines and yet another one if we're talking about Bosnia or Somalia. NATO has the advantage of one giant alliance that works in a very systematic, methodical way. You can't do that in East Asia. You need flexible alliances, flexible coalitions. But I think the more we can wrap a variety of different countries into this umbrella of cooperation, I think the more we can achieve the sort of results I was talking about in answering questions about China.
Q: You just mentioned Russia in your statement right now. I was wondering what is your vision of the United States/Russia relationship, Russia under Mr. Putin, and how that might affect Japan.
A: I think increasingly we should be thinking about Russia as a potential ally. I think we're finally getting over the idea of Russia as a potential enemy. Of course history takes a lot of changes and a lot of things can happen, but I think a Russia that is a normal country is a Russia that I think has much more in common with us and with our democratic allies in terms of security interests than it has in conflict. I think we've seen that dramatically in the war on terrorism where we have been able to cooperate in ways that seemed almost inconceivable even just a year ago.
That, of course, I think requires some adjustments on Russia's part, at least attitude changes. It's, I think, a precondition of U.S./Russian successful cooperation that Russia come to accept the fact that, for example, the Balkan countries are rightfully independent countries and that if Russia wants to be a part of Europe it needs to accept and support that independence. And I think over the last ten years there's been a significant change in Russian attitudes on that matter.
Similarly with respect to the countries of Central Asia where we are now engaged, I think on the one hand we want to go very far to assure Russia that we're not seeking in any way to build up a threat to Russia by our new relationships with the countries of Central Asia. But equally it's important, I think, for Russia's long term security not to try to reestablish an imperial hold over those countries.
And now sort of turning more immediately to the vicinity of Japan, I think we all have an interest, Japan included, maybe Japan foremost, in helping to stabilize that huge resource-rich and people-poor part of Russia that is the Russian Far East. I think one of the reasons why I put a lot of energy into the initiative, this trilateral forum, is I believe there is great potential for all three of our countries in cooperating in that regard. Obviously the issue of the Northern Territory remains an obstacle to cooperation. I'm not enough of a diplomatic genius to say how to solve it, but it seems to me very clear that the solution is in all of our long term interests and perhaps Russia's more than anyone's. I think we have to work at it, stay at it, be patient, but I think we need to recognize that one of the areas of, I think, potential instability in the Far East is the Russian Far East, if things go wrong.
Q: Sir, my name is Brian Moss. I'm with Gulfstream Aerospace.
In the opening part of your remarks you made reference to additional budgetary requests or what have you. Within that context can you give us any insight into where you might expect to be investing or growing certain areas of the operation? Is it manpower? Is it training? Is it equipment/procurement, R&D, etc.? Can you give us any insight on that, sir?
A: I can give it a try. One thing that is worth mentioning and is very rarely reported, you hear, no doubt if you've read anything about our defense budget request, you would know that we asked for some $48 billion more than we had last year. That's a huge number, and it's pointed out it's bigger than most countries' defense budgets. We can go through that litany. What is rarely pointed out is that some, and I'm probably going to get the numbers wrong here, but some $6 or $7 billion of that is just to cover inflation. Another very large amount, approximately $10 billion, I can't give you the exact figures because my memory's not that good on it, is simply to cover additional costs of health care. There's another large chunk in there for pay raises because, for a number of years our military pay did not keep up with civilian pay, and that's obviously important. And there's another slug of money that we had to put in, some $7 billion, because of past practices of underestimating procurement costs and operations costs. By the time you're done and add in the cost of the war, most of that $48 billion is gone into what we call "must-pay" bills.
The reason we've been able to get some new investment is not so much because we have more money as because we've been able to redirect from some of the things we're doing into other areas.
To answer your question, I think now that we have the basic pay and quality of life accounts up to where they should be, we've got to sustain that. I can't say often enough that people are the most important part of our organization. Attracting good people and retaining them is a key. But now that those accounts are where I think they ought to be we're planning on a gradual increase in the procurement/investment account from approximately $70 billion today to over $90 billion by the end of our five year plan in fiscal year '07. And the Quadrennial Defense Review, which was published on September 30th, but was basically completed before September 11th, identified six key areas of investment, several of which have turned out to be exactly the kinds of investments that we've seen the value of in Afghanistan. We are putting a big effort into trying to shift money into these transformational capabilities, sometimes at the expense of funding more traditional kinds of investments.
The Army, for example, has killed some 12 programs for upgrading older systems in order to have money for its new lighter Army they call Army transformation.
There is quite a bit in missile defense, although the big increase came last year. In fact there's a very slight decrease in missile defense this year. I think it will probably remain about level at that $8 billion level.
There is some $5 billion in different accounts for advanced communications capabilities including one thing that is still in the experimental stage but has the potential to be truly revolutionary and that is the development of laser communications through space that would allow us to take basically broadband communications through space. What sometimes is not understood, I think, is that if you want to talk about things like advanced unmanned aerial vehicles or unmanned combat aerial vehicles, the obstacle is not building the airplane or putting the gear on it, it's having enough band width to be able to communicate all the data that has to go back and forth. So there's a lot of emphasis on advanced communications.
Then, finally, I think you mentioned Secretary Rumsfeld has a very big push on trying to train as we fight. We always fight joint and we frequently train as single services. We frequently in peacetime organize under a single component command then as soon as a war starts we form a joint task force. So there's a considerable push to try to develop more joint training, joint experimentation and standing joint task forces.
In some ways, I suppose, we've been talking jointness for a long time, and there's a great deal more joint activity, I would say in the Defense Department today than when I first worked there 20 years ago. But the kind of joint operation that we see today in Afghanistan where you have Air Force operators viewing Predator videos somewhere in the United States, communicating to a Navy pilot about a target in Afghanistan is a degree of interconnection that I think is revolutionary and it's not just a matter of having the gear, it's a matter of having the right ways of talking across services and common procedures and common ways of operating.
In some ways I think the enormously high quality of the American military can be attributed to the great success we've had over the last 20 years in training. I will never forget going with Secretary Cheney into Iraq shortly after the Gulf War and meeting with the 2nd Armored Division and this one very tough looking 28-year-veteran of the military, a senior sergeant major was asked by Cheney if it was tough. The guy said, oh, it was tough, but not nearly as tough as the National Training Center. When you have training like that you know that you're doing something right.
Q: It seems fairly obvious that one of the keys to the war on terrorism is limiting access to weapons of mass destruction. How do we assure ourselves regarding the security or control of nuclear weapons located in or which were located in the former Soviet Union?
A: That is a real challenge. There is, I remember going back more than ten years ago, shortly after the failed coup in the Soviet Union which was August of 1991. Secretary Cheney, now Vice President Cheney, came back from a meeting in the White House and said President Bush would like some suggestions from us about what could be done to take advantage of this opportunity to move things forward. And we very consciously said, look, one of the problems is that the Soviet Union, I guess it was still the Soviet Union but just barely, has all these tactical nuclear weapons located some of them around the periphery in very unstable parts of the country and one of the best ways we could encourage them to get these under better central control would be to take an initiative ourselves to say that we're getting rid of large numbers of ours. And within about ten days of that President Bush came out with the Nuclear Initiative that took most of our nuclear, tactical nuclear weapons out of commission and proposed major reductions in our strategic nuclear forces.
The Russians and the Soviets, both Gorbachev and Yeltsin, came back within a little more than a week with very forthcoming commitments of their own, and I do believe that that initiative did pull Soviet weapons out of a number of places that shortly afterwards became independent and did begin the process of getting them under control.
Since that time I think as you may notice there's been a lot of money, U.S. money, invested in the Nunn/Lugar program to provide incentives for the Russians now to consolidate weapons, to dismantle weapons. I think, though, that you need to find ways both to make those funds more effective and perhaps even to redouble those efforts. There is, for reasons I can't tell you exactly, despite the promise to dismantle those tactical nuclear weapons, there remain huge numbers of tactical nuclear weapons in the Russian inventory. I don't think they need them, I don't think they're hoarding them for some strategic purpose, but it's hard to get visibility into exactly what's there or to get clear enough commitments about how to get rid of them. We're making progress but I think there needs to be more progress.
I think, finally, that in some cases the focus perhaps should be less on dismantling, which can be a very long and slow process and a little bit more on how to secure them during the time that they're being dismantled. We have a program for assisting the Russians in demilitarizing a large number of their chemical weapon stocks. It's going to take some five years to build the plant to do it, and another five years beyond that before the work is finished. That's a long time. In the meantime those stocks I think are not under sufficiently secure control. So I think we need to look at both.
At the end of the day, and this is a real problem, but I think I do have to say at the end of the day I worry much more about those countries that are developing these weapons for deliberate hostile use--I worry about both. But I think the reason the President made the statements he did in the State of the Union message is we've had enough demonstration from September 11th to take people seriously when they say they're developing these things to use and we really have to keep a lot of attention on that--do both problems at the same time.
Thank you very much.