SEN. LEVIN: (Strikes gavel.) The committee will come to order. The committee meets this morning to continue our hearing from last Thursday with Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and General Ron Kadish on the Defense Department's missile defense programs in the F 2002 amended budget request.
General Kadish, before we begin, I want to congratulate the BMDO team that was involved in last Saturday night's successful intercept test. That test, as you've pointed out, is just one of many tests which are needed to determine whether an operationally effective system is feasible, but it was an important test, and we congratulate you for it.
Protecting and defending the American people must be our goal in all that we do. In my judgment, we should be mighty cautious before ripping up an arms control treaty in order to try to meet the highly unlikely threat of North Korea using a missile against us -- unlikely because they could use a truck more cheaply and with greater accuracy and without a return address; unlikely because if they launched a missile against us, it would lead to their immediate destruction, and we are told that regime survival is their number-one goal.
So in order to meet a highly unlikely threat, if you rip up an arms control treaty and you start a new kind of arms race or Cold War with Russia and China, America could well be less secure. Protecting and defending America from that state of affairs must also be one of our goals.
No one I know of is willing to give Russia or anyone else a veto over our actions. But Russian reaction to a unilateral breach of an arms control agreement is relevant to our security and could leave us a lot less secure. That is an issue that Congress hopefully will grapple with.
Long before the administration submitted this budget request that's before us, it notified the world that it would rip up the ABM Treaty if Russia refused to modify it. Congress will hopefully find a more moderate course than that.
SEN. JOHN WARNER (R-VA): Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, you know you and I have been here many years together, and I rarely try to challenge you on an opening statement, but I really believe that the terminology "ripping up" is not supported by the record of our president. I feel -- and I have talked with him one on one several times -- he is pursuing, first, a course of orderly consultations with our allies. He has had some initial discussions -- perhaps they could be classified as preliminary negotiations -- with the president of Russia on the subject of the treaty.
He's due to meet with him again.
I feel very strongly that he is pursuing an orderly process consistent with the ABM Treaty at this point in time, and that we in Congress should give our president, in his role as commander in chief and chief architect of not only foreign policy but of those policies that relate to the armed services and our weapons programs, give him a chance. And hopefully we can work with him and structure a partnership. To the extent that Congress can back a president it is more likely that president can succeed throughout history.
I remember very well when I was secretary of the Navy the early negotiations on the ABM Treaty, the presentation, the action by the Senate and the Congress, and they were narrow margins. But nevertheless, President Nixon did succeed in having negotiated that document and signing it. Treaties are the law of the land. And I find our president is doing the best he can.
But I join my distinguished colleague, General Kadish, in saluting you and many others in the program for the test over the weekend. I note very carefully the observations by the secretary of Defense, yourself and others, I think, putting into proportional balance the significance of this test, but making clear that it's but a step in a long process; it's not the decisive one, but certainly we're pleased that it did add a constructive step forward in this program and that it's subject to evaluation of the vast quantity of test analysis that has to be done with this particular test. We'll have to await all of that analysis, but it looks like it's a step forward.
I'm just hopeful that we can work out, as I say, the partnership with the president. I think we're making good progress.
I'd like to bring to the attention of my colleagues here today -- I went back to do some research on this. During last Thursday's hearing there was concern expressed that the president was asking the Congress to vote for a ballistic missile defense budget request even though all the programs in that budget request have not gone through, quote, "the compliance review process," end quote, which process, to an extent, determines whether the activities are compliant or non- compliant with the ABM.
In the many years that I've been here, there's never total clarity among the lawyers on this subject, so the issue of judging compliance is often subject to conscientious difference of opinion of lawyers, but we do our best in the compliance process.
This concern here in the committee was picked up and, properly, I think, reported in the press, and I just wanted to go back and point out the following. I think it's important to note for the record that this process that this administration is following is consistent with the steps taken by the BMDO office for many years. I hope you can assert that in your testimony, General.
I point to our distinguished former chairman, now ranking member of the Committee on Strategic Forces, Senator Allard, who pointed out last Thursday that the BMD programs have never been fully vetted through the compliance review process, either when the BMD budget is submitted to the Congress or when the Congress has approved the BMDO budgets. You, Senator, noted an excellent example on Thursday, the certification that last year's integrated flight test under the Clinton administration, test number five, was compliant with the ABM Treaty. That was issued on June 30th, 2000, the compliance analysis. The test took place on July 8, just eight days later, clearly indicating that the test had to start, the preparations, long before the compliance letter was in hand. In fact, most of the time, the compliance review group continues to review test plans as these plans are refined until shortly before the test is conducted.
In other words, every time we've voted -- that is, the Congress -- on a BMDO budget in the pasta years, we have voted without fully knowledge that each of the test activities contained in the BMDO budget request would be ABM Treaty compliant. Therefore, it seems to me we're following a consistent pattern. That pattern may be changed under this administration. Perhaps Secretary Wolfowitz wants to attest to that this morning, or others, but I just point that out.
So I welcome you, Mr. Secretary, once again, and General. And I'm hopeful -- again, I'm going to strive as best I can to see that Congress gives our president every opportunity to discharge his constitutional responsibilities with regard to this treaty, and hopefully, the Congress will form a partnership in the near future, because I must say that this particular piece of legislation that the Armed Services Committee is entrusted each year to prepare, the annual authorization bill, is a crossroads at which these issues will be met.
And we have had an authorization bill for 30-plus years now, and I'm absolutely desirous, as is the president, to have another one this year. But these issues have to be -- with due respect to my colleagues who have different views, have to be worked out ahead of time. Otherwise, this bill could be held up or just stalled on the floor. And this bill covers the entire armed services of the United States, all aspects. This missile defense portion of the bill, the authorization, is a vital part of it, and I just -- hopefully we can reconcile such differences that we may have, hopefully before the time of a mark-up in this committee and indeed debate on the floor, such that this bill can be passed by the Senate eventually.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you very much, Senator Warner.
And again, Secretary Wolfowitz, we are very anxious to mark up this budget, but we need the justification material, which is not yet in, from two of the services. And we've been very impatiently awaiting that material. It's essential for our mark-up, because we absolutely share the goal that Senator Warner just set forth of trying to mark up our bill as quickly as possibly, so we can get an authorization bill to the floor.
Secretary Wolfowitz, you have a statement.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Let me be very brief, Mr. Chairman. I know you want to get to questions.
I don't have an extended opening statement, but let me just make a brief comment about events that have taken place since we met last week. As you know, last Saturday we conducted a successful test intercept of an intercontinental ballistic missile over the Pacific Ocean. And General Kadish has a short film clip of that intercept, which, if you -- it's very short. I'd ask your indulgence to show it to the committee.
SEN. LEVIN: We'd be happy to see it.
GEN. KADISH: (To staff.) If you could roll the -- this will show the interceptor launch out of Meck Island in the Kwajalein Islands. The intercept kill vehicle's on top, out of the silo. You'll see the shroud remove itself on launch. This prototype booster accelerates rather rapidly. It is not the booster that we intend ultimately to use, but it's only for the test program at this point.
You can see the booster climbing for altitude with the kill vehicle attached. And this year we did get separation of the kill vehicle, which is very encouraging. (Laughter.)
The booster goes through a series of maneuvers. It's a rather short but important set of maneuvers that make sure it stays on the test range. If we had a longer trajectory to test, we would not necessarily have to do these types of maneuvers to dissipate the energy, and they're characteristic of solid state boosters. So you can see it maneuvering, almost changing direction a number of times in order to stay on the particular test range. (Pause.) And that's one of those maneuvers.
SEN. WARNER: You might talk a little bit about the guidance that it's receiving and where and how that comes to it. I understand that, but I think others might --
GEN. KADISH: The ground gives it -- it has autonomous guidance, but it gets at least one update from the ground to tell it where to go in space. And then the kill vehicle, after it launches, will take an immediate set of star shots in order to confirm its position, and then get ground updates from the same communication system that the booster did.
So the whole idea here is, is the booster to get the kill vehicle in a position to be separated and launched toward the target complex, and that's a major part of the integrated part of the system.
SEN. : What's its altitude at --
GEN. KADISH: The altitude of the intercept is about 140 miles, 220 kilometers. And you'll see this next series of different phenomenology that confirmed the actual intercept. This is an infrared picture and a series of infrared pictures all showing that the impact of the hit-to-kill on the warhead was successful. We lost all telemetry at the same time that we were expected to lose on this successful intercept, and so we're very confident that we hit very accurately.
This is a radar trace, the interceptor coming through, and you can see the debris that resulted from the intercept, picked up by the radar. And this is the final shot.
So it built our confidence, but there is a long way to go in the test program, and we'll be, hopefully here over the next year showing you many more of these types of films.
That's all I have.
SEN. LEVIN: General, thank you. If you could just -- before Secretary Wolfowitz begins, just -- you made a comment after the test that it was going to be a number of weeks or months before you had the final analysis of the test results. Could you just briefly tell us, is there anything we should expect, other than what we've seen, that it was a successful hit?
GEN. KADISH: Each test has a number of objectives that we were after, all the way from whether the communication system works properly to the radar traces, and we compare that to the truth data that we get from other sensors on the test range. And in that process, we may discover that there was an anomaly with one of the elements that didn't quite work properly. And we have backups to make sure the test can come out successfully in certain points. So what we want to do is compare that truth data to the actual telemetry data to see if there were any anomalies, and that takes us a number of weeks to accomplish. So right now, the initial data indicate we had a fairly good test.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Thank you. That successful test is another step forward on the long road to developing and deploying effective defenses to protect the American people from limited ballistic missile attacks, but it is an important step. It underscores the point General Kadish and I made to this committee last week, that missile defense is no longer a problem of invention, it is a challenge of engineering, and it is a challenge America is up to.
To build on the success of this test we will need successive tests that push the envelope even further, that are even more operationally realistic. And we need to begin testing the many promising technologies which were not pursued in the past but which have enormous potential to enhance our security. This inevitably means that our testing and development program will eventually encounter the constraints imposed by the ABM Treaty. We are seeking to build defenses to defend the American people. The treaty's very purpose is to prohibit us from developing such defenses.
If we are to build on this weekend's accomplishments, we must move beyond the AMB Treaty. We are working to do so on two parallel tracks. First, with a robust research and development testing program; and second, through discussions with Russia on a new security framework that reflects the fact that the Cold War is over and the U.S. and Russia are not enemies.
To succeed, we need Congress' help in both areas. First, we need your support to fully fund the president's budget request for development and testing of missile defense. The ability to defend the American people from ballistic missile attack is clearly within our grasp, but we cannot do so unless the president has Congress' support to expand and accelerate the testing and development program. This weekend's test shows the potential for success. Let us not fail because we did not adequately fund the necessary testing or because we artificially restricted the exploration of every possible technology.
Second, we need your support for President Bush's efforts to achieve an understanding with Russia on ballistic missile defense. The president is working to build a new security relationship between the U.S. and Russia, one whose foundation does not rest on the prospect of the mutual annihilation of our respective populations.
He will meet with President Putin shortly in Genoa, and he has invited Putin to his ranch in Crawford, Texas, and he has accepted an invitation to visit President Putin in Russia. Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary Powell are engaged in discussions with their Russian counterparts as well.
So a very important dialogue is under way, and we are optimistic about the prospects for reaching an understanding with Russia. But Congress can have a significant impact on the outcome of those discussions. If Congress shows the same resolve as the president to proceed seriously with development and testing of defenses to protect our people, our friends and allies and our forces around the world, it will significantly enhance the prospects for a cooperative outcome. Conversely, I would urge Congress not to give the Russians the mistaken impression that they can somehow exercise a veto over our development of missile defenses. The unintended consequence of such action could be to rule out a cooperative solution and leave the president no choice but to walk away from the treaty unilaterally, an outcome that none of us, surely, wants.
As we proceed with robust testing, we will work to achieve an understanding with Russia to move beyond the ABM Treaty. We have established a process that will identify issues raised by our program at the earliest possible moment. The department's ABM Compliance Review Group has been directed to identify ABM Treaty issues within 10 working days of receiving the plans for new development or treaty events. That process is already underway.
The secretary and I will be informed of whether the planned testbed, the use of Aegis systems in future integrated flight tests or the concurrent operation of ABM (and/in ?) air defense radars in next February's test are significant treaty problems. I've attached to my testimony fact sheets prepared by the Ballistic Missile Defense Office on each of these three cases, and I would like to submit them for the record.
SEN. LEVIN: They will be made part of the record.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: This process will permit us to take them into account as early as possible as we pursue our negotiations with Russia on a new strategic framework. We will keep Congress informed as the process unfolds. But if we agree that cooperation in setting aside the constraints of the ABM Treaty is preferable to a unilateral withdrawal from the treaty, then we need Congress' full support for missile defense research and testing.
We look forward to working with the committee to build on this weekend's successful test and to ensure that we can defend the American people, our friends and allies and our deployed forces from limited ballistic missile attacks.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SEN. LEVIN: Last week -- General Kadish, do you have an opening statement? (No opening statement.)
At last week's hearing, I said that we would first call on members who were able to come to the hearing but were not able to participate, so I will first recognize those committee members who attended last Thursday's hearing but did not have a first six-minute round of questioning. We will then follow our normal early-bird order of recognition and begin a new six-minute round of questioning.
Under that announcement which I made last week, I would first call upon Senator Akaka.
SEN. DANIEL K. AKAKA (D-HI): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to add my word of welcome to Secretary Wolfowitz and General Kadish and also your staffers, staff people who are here.
The national missile defense is among the most important issue that's facing the Congress and the American people today. As Vice Admiral Dennis McGinn said recently at the Naval War College, and I quote, "Whatever money we spend on national missile defense against a ballistic missile threat to this nation is a high opportunity cost, and we should do it very, very carefully."
Today's hearing is an effort by this committee to study the issue very carefully, and I commend the chairman and members of this committee for the dedication that's shown here, ensuring that Congress does their job before committing great amounts of scarce funds to an expanded program.
Let us remember that we are designing a system to meet future as well as present threats. The system may not be fully deployed until the year 2010 or 2020. We need to consider whether the major threats we face 10 or 20 or even 30 years down the road will be delivered in a way that a missile defense program protects us, or will our missile defense system be the defensive equivalent of France's Maginot Line, something our adversaries will be able to easily evade?
This is a much more difficult question and one which argues for more caution in our current approach to setting priorities for defense spending.
I ask the chairman to place my full statement in the record, and if it pleases the chairman, I'll proceed with questions.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you. It will be made part of the record.
SEN. AKAKA: Mr. -- Secretary Wolfowitz, Secretary Rumsfeld has decided that a midcourse system alone is not sufficient to provide global protection. But many boost phase systems, such as an airborne or space laser, will only be able to destroy an ICBM booster. The warhead is built to survive reentry and cannot be affected by a laser.
Are you concerned about knocking out a booster to prevent a warhead from hitting U.S. territory, only to send that warhead falling on some other territory, such as Canada, Japan, or Europe, where we have American troops and allies present?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Senator, I'm more concerned at the moment that we don't have the capability at all. I would like to develop it. When we develop it, we will also have much more knowledge about exactly the kind of question you raise.
I think it's almost certain that a missile launched by a hostile country will do much more damage if it hits the place that it's aimed at than if it's knocked off course somewhere on the way. And I would prefer to knock it off course as early as possible, so that if the problems that you're raising arise for the country that launches the missile, not for our friends or our allies, and certainly not for ourselves.
It's a -- but it's a valid question. It's one that one would have to look at it in the operational context of a successful capability, and we're unfortunately a long way from that capability.
But I tell -- I'll tell you -- give you a "for instance." During the Gulf War, when we were subjected to ballistic missile attack, and our ally -- our friend Israel was subjected to ballistic missile attack, our pilots flying over western Iraq watched missiles rising from the launch pad with big, bright signatures, but no capability to shoot them down.
If one of those missiles had had a chemical warhead on it, I would have much preferred to have it land in Iraq than to land on Israel or land in Saudi Arabia.
SEN. AKAKA: Mr. Secretary, one of the criticisms of the old national missile defense schedule was that it required a deployment decision to be made before any operational testing. The BMDO has stated that the focus of missile defense is no longer on deployment but on testing.
Does the new plan put off a deployment decision until after all the developmental testing is complete and operational tests have begun?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I'll let General Kadish answer that question.
GEN. KADISH: There are no procurement or deployment activities in the current program, but there are decision points to offer to the secretary and others to decide whether we have enough information to proceed with the procurement and deployment program. But right now that is not part of the plan, and our intention at this point is to test as robustly, as rapidly as we can all the systems that are under development so that we can be in a position to actually provide that information to the decision-makers.
SEN. AKAKA: General, I would like to mention and discuss countermeasures. In space, a warhead and simple decoy, such as a traffic cone, look the same. Is that correct?
GEN. KADISH: They theoretically can be made to look the same. But you have to define "look" in what visible or IR spectrum, and there's a number of ways that you would want to look at them in the spectrums that we deal with.
SEN. AKAKA: It is my understanding that the flight test on Saturday used a single balloon decoy. How many decoys are you planning to use in future tests? If it is just a few decoys, is this a realistic test when an enemy could use multiple cheap decoys, such as simple traffic cones, to deceive us?
GEN. KADISH: The countermeasure and the decoy problems will be addressed as we build our tests to be more complex in these areas. And ultimately, I'm hoping that we have -- I couldn't give you the exact number of decoys, but a lot of decoys, and see how the system performs. In fact, in the world of development, we like to actually test what we call the edge of the envelope so that we can actually break the system and find out how many decoys it could handle or not handle. And that would be my intention, if we can afford to do that in the long run.
But again, that's the issue of having a layered system because countermeasures that work in the mid-course, like the test we did on Saturday, don't work in boost phase, and those that work potentially in boost phase don't work in the mid-course. So having a layered system, then, greatly complicates the countermeasure problem for our adversary and simplifies it for us, to a large degree.
That doesn't mean we wouldn't aggressively pursue overcoming midcourse countermeasures, but it certainly would help us to have a layered system.
SEN. AKAKA: Thank you very much for your responses.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator Akaka.
SEN. JEAN CARNAHAN (D-MO): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for extending this hearing on this most important subject.
The committee is tasked with the responsibility of authorizing funds for our nation's defense programs. As we address this year's defense budget, we will need to address some fundamental questions that I believe concern the American people.
First, are we spending the available defense funds in a way that maximize our national defense? We need to strike the right balance. The president has requested a huge increase in missile defense, but his request for procurement and readiness are modest. We are actually cutting funds for non-missile defense science research. Even if one supports the concept of missile defense, we all need to ask, "At what cost; and what other defense priorities will be sacrificed?" And second, we need to make sure our budget is geared toward addressing the most imminent and realistic threats to the United States. I believe that the average American is genuinely and appropriately concerned about the possibilities of a terrorist attack with a deadly virus or some other devastating lethal attack.
Of course, we must also address the serious threat of an accidental missile launch or missile attack by a rogue nation. Again, the difficulty is striking the right balance.
I hope that this hearing will bring us closer to answering these questions. I'm encouraged by the successful results of last weekend's flight test, but I believe that we must remain cautious in our enthusiasm. As General Kadish commented on Saturday night, this success was only one stop on the journey; we've got a long road ahead in all of the missile defense activities that we have ahead of us. I agree that we have a long road ahead, and I hope that today General
Kadish and Secretary Wolfowitz will be able to help us as we proceed along that road.
My first question is to General Kadish. I understand your organization intends to accelerate its testing schedule, with close to two dozen flight tests before the 2004 deployment date. Are you at all concerned that this schedule is so condensed that you may not have sufficient time between each of the tests to evaluate the performance of the system's components? And what primary factors will you be reviewing to measure the success of this program?
GEN. KADISH: Senator, that's a good question. Whenever we accelerate a test of this magnitude, the intercontinental ranges, and I think you saw how complex it was on Saturday to (pull ?) off, but when we decide to increase the number of tests, we will also at the same time put in the management practices to deal with that acceleration. So to some degree, having a lot of time between tests gives us the luxury of having a lot of time to do data reduction and data analysis.
As we squeeze that time between tests, we have to make the management changes as well as invest in some equipment to do the data analysis quicker. In addition to that, as we get more experienced with our test, doing high ops-tempo testing, we will be looking at finer-grain type of elements of the system, and we should be able to reduce that data quicker.
So I am confident that as we increase the number, we won't lose any of our fidelity of analysis, but we will be able to accelerate that as well. And if we can't, we're going to have to look very seriously at slowing the test program down. But I don't think we should slow down the test program based on our ability to analyze data at this time.
SEN. CARNAHAN: Secretary Wolfowitz, legal discussions on missile defense have recently focused on two important documents; the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the 1999 Cochran-Inouye National Missile Defense Act. At the last hearing we learned that the president has requested funds for missile defense programs that may violate the ABM Treaty. Would you once again explain how missile defense development proposed in the president's defense budget might bump up against our commitment to the ABM Treaty?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: By the way, I would point out this is not the first budget that has done that. The '01 budget actually includes money that the Clinton administration asked for to begin the construction of a radar in Shemya, Alaska, which it is, I think, the consensus of virtually all lawyers, and that's a hard consensus to find, that that would have been or would be a violation of the ABM Treaty.
In the '02 budget, as best we can determine at this point, there are three events that raise questions about the treaty. I discussed them at some detail in my last testimony and they are addressed in the attachments to this testimony. Each of the three, the test bed in Fort Greeley, Alaska -- the test bed in Alaska, part of it at Fort Greeley; and the two test events of non-ABM radars in some of our missile shots raise issues under the treaty that we still don't have full review by the lawyers as to whether they're compliant or not compliant. They are in the gray zone on the boundaries of the treaty and, therefore, one can't say with clarity whether they violate the treaty or not.
SEN. CARNAHAN: Before withdrawing from the treaty, the United States would be required to announce its intentions to do so at least six months in advance. Is the administration prepared to make this announcement, if it is determined that the U.S. missile defense policies conflict with the treaty's provisions?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I don't think the president has made a decision. It's certain that we will comply with the treaty, and that means we would certainly -- if we were to do something in violation of the treaty, we would only do it after it withdrawing. And withdrawal, as you correctly point out, requires six-months notification.
But as I've said, and I've said it repeatedly, what our goal is to get to a situation where we can move forward cooperatively with the Russians beyond the constraints of the treaty, and not to find ourselves in a situation where we're forced either to constrain our program and limit our ability to protect the American people or, alternatively, to withdraw from the treaty -- withdraw from the treaty unilaterally. We would like to find a cooperative approach with the Russians and, Senator, I'm optimistic we can do so.
SEN. CARNAHAN: One final question. The 1999 Cochran-Inouye National Defense Act mandated a dual-track approach toward national missile defense. First, it authorizes, as soon as technologically possible, the deployment of a national missile defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attacks, with funding subject to the annual authorization of appropriations and the annual appropriation of funds for national missile defense. And second, the law authorizes that the United States continue negotiating reductions in Russian nuclear forces.
Does your budget request seek funds for programs designed to address more than a limited ballistic missile attack?
In other words, do you feel that you need additional statutory authority to plan and design and build the layered missile defense that you have proposed?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: All we're seeking in the missile defense area this year is -- are the -- is the money we're requesting under the authorization.
But on the other side of that act, the Cochran-Inouye act, the part you refer to about negotiated reductions, that is part of the framework of issues that we are discussing with the Russians. We are pursuing further reductions in nuclear forces, but we are also in fact proceeding -- reducing our nuclear forces in areas where we think we have systems that we don't need. We're in this year's budget proposing to remove four Tridents, some 30 B-1s, and 50 Peacekeeper missiles. And I believe, at least for the Peacekeeper missile reduction, we would require congressional authorization.
SEN. CARNAHAN: Thank you very much.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator Carnahan.
We'll now begin our next round. Secretary Wolfowitz, the administration has expressed an interest in the option of having an early emergency deployment capability focused on having a small number of test interceptors and linking them to an upgraded radar called -- that already exists at Shemya, called COBRA DANE. And this is something that General Kadish mentioned in his briefing to the committee on June 13th.
My questions start with relative -- are relative to Fort Greely. As well as being part of a testbed, do you intend that Fort Greely have operational capability, even if primitive or rudimentary?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: It's too early to make that determination, Senator. It would depend, I think, really and principally on two things: number one, how the tests proceed, what operational -- what operational capability we think we could acquire -- and we won't know that until we've done further testing -- and then, secondly, the question of where we are with respect to potential threats. It is envisioned much more as a kind of rudimentary emergency capability that one would have available if two conditions are met: if the testing and development goes well, and if the threat proceeds rapidly. If the threat doesn't proceed rapidly, or if the testing doesn't go well, then we couldn't turn it into an operational capability.
But the philosophy here is, since we need a much operationally realistic testbed, let's do it in a way that makes that investment convertible to operational capability, if and when we decide to go forward.
SEN. LEVIN: When would you expect that the -- or the earliest date for that convertibility to an operational capability?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I'd better let General Kadish make the predictions about dates. Are you willing to, General?
SEN. LEVIN: Well, if all the tests, you say, go well, that would have that capability -- and I want to know at what point would it have that capability.
GEN. KADISH: Well, I think the clearest declaration of a capability, if it was directed, would be when we actually had the physical assets on site.
SEN. LEVIN: When would that be?
GEN. KADISH: And at this point, the planning is ongoing. But sometime in the calendar year '04 to '06, and I'd put a two-year window in there because of the nature of the uncertainty that we have.
SEN. LEVIN: All right. You want this testbed at Fort Greely to have the -- an operational capability. Is that correct? You want that option?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Yes, and a very rudimentary one. And I think it's worth emphasizing, Senator, if we didn't have a treaty issue, the Russians would look at that, and they would laugh.
This is not something that should make any Russian planner stay awake at night for even a single minute. It is a very rudimentary capability.
SEN. LEVIN: I don't think they're laughing about what you're proposing. From what I gather, they're not laughing at all, unless you think that's just pretense.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: No, it's because of the larger treaty issues. But what I'm trying to emphasize is this capability that we are talking about at Fort Greeley isn't -- it may disturb a North Korean planner, but it is not in any way a capability that threatens Russian missiles at all.
SEN. LEVIN: But they do view it as a serious possible violation of a treaty, is that correct?, with broader implications. Is that a fair statement, that they view it that way?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: That is a fair statement, and I'm trying to make a distinction, which I think is a relevant one, between the broader implications of the treaty, which we take very seriously, and the actual military implications of this deployment, which are quite modest.
SEN. LEVIN: I want to be really clear though on one point. You do intend now that the Fort Greeley activity have, as soon as possible, an operational capability, albeit rudimentary. That is your current intent, is that correct?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Not necessarily. I mean, if --
SEN. LEVIN: Well you do intend that the tests work well, and the threat from North Korea is here and now.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: But North -- you know, the general said four to six years. There are some people, and I can't say I'm quite this optimistic, there are people who think the North Korean regime might collapse within that timeframe.
SEN. LEVIN: But that's not where you're coming from. You believe the North Korean threat is basically here and now, is that not correct?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I think it is moving along rapidly, yes, Senator.
SEN. LEVIN: All right. And you do want the tests to succeed, is that not correct?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: That's correct.
SEN. LEVIN: Given those two facts, what you believe and what you hope, is it not a fair statement to say that you want the Fort Greeley activity to have a operational capability, albeit rudimentary, as soon as possible? Is that not a fair statement?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I think that's a fair statement. I just get -- I'm not a lawyer. I don't know what intent means, but I would like --
SEN. LEVIN: Your intent!
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I would like that development to give us an option for a rudimentary operational capability, yes.
SEN. LEVIN: And to give it to us as quickly as possible.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Yes, Senator.
SEN. LEVIN: All right. And so you're then going to have your review group tell us whether or not, since that is your intent for that activity, that activity then would violate, yes or no -- we don't know yet -- the ABM Treaty. And we're going to have a compliance review group decision on that issue I assume when?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Soon.
SEN. LEVIN: Within weeks?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I hope within weeks, yes.
SEN. LEVIN: All right.
Now, is it correct that no test interceptors would be launched from Fort Greeley?
GEN. KADISH: That's our current state of planning right now because of safety considerations. However, I'm going to ask our people to look hard at that particular issue over time, yes, Senator.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you. My time is up.
SEN. WARNER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary and General, again, I think the opening statements by both clearly are a step forward in this debate and a constructive and positive step forward, and I congratulate you.
I've gone back, listened to you carefully, then re-read your testimony with regard to the caption "We need Congress' support for President Bush's efforts to achieve an understanding with Russia on ballistic missile defense." To me, that clearly indicates the course on which the president is pursuing, namely, consultation, negotiation and working towards an understanding. You've also used the term "a new strategic framework."
Now, let's go back to the treaty itself. Those two generic terms that you use -- "understanding" and "new strategic framework" -- they do not preclude, I presume, the option of a series of amendments to the treaty; is that correct?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I don't think we preclude anything at this point, Senator.
SEN. WARNER: So that is still an open option?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: It is.
SEN. WARNER: Because I refer to the president's statement to offer Russia amendments. I'm reading from that speech that he gave down at the college in South Carolina, the University of South Carolina. "To make this possible, we will offer Russia the necessary amendments to the ballistic missile treaty."
That's clearly -- I just want to say, you have not at this time ruled out as a possibility for either the understanding or the new strategic framework an amended treaty?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: As I say, Senator, I don't think we've ruled out anything. But I do think --
SEN. WARNER: But we're coming into this question of ripping up the treaty. It seems to me the option of amending it is on the table.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: It is, Senator.
SEN. WARNER: It is?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Yes.
SEN. WARNER: I just want to dispel that because we are moving, as the senator said, on two tracks; the track the president is doing -- consultation and then negotiation with Russia; at the same time the track under the '02 budget of testing and the like. And as I say, this committee, in its authorization bill, will be the first station in which this issue stops as to whether or not we can obtain from the Congress the support that you expressed a request for on behalf of the president to work as a partner. And I'm hopeful we can clarify these things, and I think you've moved forward today in that clarification.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Senator, I would hope that whatever understanding we reach with the Russians, though, goes beyond --
SEN. WARNER: Oh, I do too.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: -- the old notion that we have to stay awake nights worrying about small changes in the nuclear posture of either side. We don't do it with countries with whom we are clearly and openly friends, and that is the relationship we would like to get into with Russia.
SEN. WARNER: I know there are some who desire -- and I fully appreciate that -- completely taking the treaty and agreement with Russia to drop it and start over with an entirely new framework. But at this point in time, to allay fears that we're trying to rip it up, you say the amending process, which could achieve that and go beyond it, amendments could clearly take us beyond the ABM Treaty, I mean, the amendments can be very broad in their scope -- but that option is on the table?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: As I say, I don't think the president has ruled out anything.
SEN. WARNER: That's clear.
Now, the president, I would presume, and just looking ahead, if for some reason these negotiations with Russia do not meet the goals that he has laid down, he would come back to the Congress, would he not, in a consultative process?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I'm certain we will be consulting closely with the Congress throughout the coming months.
SEN. WARNER: So that would be, again, a partnership with the Congress as we work our way?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I believe it must be, Senator.
SEN. WARNER: Well I think that's very reassuring.
Now, I raise this question of the amendments because my understanding President Putin has indicated that Russia is now open to revising, though not abandoning the ABM Treaty.
Is that a correct statement?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I've heard different statements. I think that is correct, Senator, yes.
SEN. WARNER: Good. So that, I think, lends great hope to the negotiations thus far, preliminary though they may be with Russia, are producing fruitful comments.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I think that's the indication we've gotten from comments that we've heard directly from him and comments he's made to other people, and some comments he's even made in public.
To what extent can you also address this issue that in this process that we're undertaking with Russia, it does not provide a basis for other nations in the world to say that they should begin to suddenly augment precipitously their strategic systems, build more because we're going through a process that makes the world more unstable than stable. Clearly, if we reach a new framework agreement with Russia, that should send to the world a message that it would be a more stable situation and would not provide a basis for them moving out unilaterally in their own security interests and substantially augmenting their missile capability. Was that a correct assumption?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I think that is correct, Senator. And I think as far as those countries, the small number of what some have referred to as the walking wounded that pursue these ballistic missile offensive capabilities because they think it will secure advantage, I would think this demonstration of our ability to move forward on missile defense and move forward cooperatively with the Russians might help to begin to discourage them from those investments. And that would also make the world a more stable place.
SEN. WARNER: So clearly, a part of the case that the president is making in his consultations and negotiations is to ensure that the defenses will increase rather than detract from global security.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Absolutely, Senator.
SEN. WARNER: Now General Kadish, the proposed budget request includes a greatly expanded testbed that will enhance test realism and allow for a larger number of tests. The expanded testbed will allow the BMDO office to implement many of the recommendations made by former Director of Operational Test and Evaluation Philip Coyle. He's due to appear before this committee shortly. And those tests will help meet the demands of some BMD critics that BMD programs be thoroughly tested prior to deployment to assure operational effectiveness.
Do you generally agree with my opening statement on this question?
GEN. KADISH: Yes, Senator.
SEN. WARNER: Therefore, what would be the impact on the test program should Congress elect to cut the BMD budget by, say, a billion or just 2 million, slash it?
GEN. KADISH: Well, we have to reevaluate what type of testing we would be able to accomplish. And obviously, it would be less. And the ability to prove our systems, our models and simulation, hinges on our robust testing program, in addition to making it more operationally representative.
SEN. WARNER: Well, such failure to authorize the president's request would really go contrary to what Philip Coyle projected, would it not?
GEN. KADISH: In my view, yes.
SEN. WARNER: I thank you for this.
My time is up, Mr. Chairman.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator Warner.
SEN. JOSEPH LIEBERMAN (D-CT): Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary, General, welcome back.
I wanted to come back to some of the items we discussed last week. Last week I said that I thought the program that you laid before us for missile defense was generally consistent with the National Missile Defense Act of 1999, which was adopted with support, I believe, of 97 members of the Senate, but I expressed my concern about the availability of resources generally to the Pentagon, and worried about your capacity to both carry out this program in a way that doesn't affect other priority items in the department.
I did note -- Secretary Wolfowitz, perhaps you did, too -- that Bill Kristol and Bob Kagen have an article in this week's Weekly Standard in which they call upon you and Secretary Rumsfeld to resign in protest over the failure of the administration, and particularly the folks at OMB, to adequately fund defense priorities.
It's an editorial worth reading for the details if not the ultimate recommendation. (Laughter.) I presume you have no intention to resign.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I don't want to get into a discussion of intent. (Laughter.) No, I have not plans to resign, Senator.
SEN. LIEBERMAN: Well, you've been very consistent about that. (Laughs.) Thank you.
I do think, in seriousness, and we have to keep coming back to this, that -- and again, I express the hope that I've expressed earlier that this committee on a bipartisan basis will be advocates for adequate levels of funding for the Pentagon generally.
And I want to come to a direct question about Russia and ask you to speak a little bit more on the questioning that's been along those lines. Last week, when you were here, you expressed not only a commitment to attempt to negotiate modifications in the ABM Treaty consistent with the ballistic missile defense program you and General Kadish outlined, but I thought you expressed a certain degree of optimism about the ability to reach those modifications with the Russians. To some extent, you've done that this morning. After the hearing last week, in response to your testimony, there was an interview with the minister of defense in Russia, Sergei Ivanov, and I guess at best, he would -- his -- as I read the interview, I would describe his frame of mind as puzzled by the optimism expressed here. At worst, I'd say he disagreed with it. And of course today, we see on the front page of the papers Mr. Putin and Mr. Jiang embracing in friendship, and one of the items that draws them together is their opposition to our missile defense initiative and even agitated by what has pleased and delighted us here, which is the successful test on Saturday.
So, why are you optimistic about our ability to negotiate the necessary modifications with the Russians on the ABM Treaty to allow this program to go forward?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: If I might very briefly before I answer that last question just, in opening you talked the balance among different things, and I would just like to point out that our adversaries, the countries that we worry most about are investing heavily in the offensive capability. It is the one Iraqi capability we underestimated during the Gulf War. It is in many ways one of the biggest weaknesses in our overall defense posture, and I think our adversaries have discovered it. And I think that's -- if one looks -- I think we've done a careful job of balancing. It is a very bit increase. It may not be as big as Bill Kristol or Bob Kagan would like -- it frankly isn't as big as I would like, but it is the largest in 15 years, and it's a 7 percent real increase. It's substantial.
To come now to your main question, my reasons for optimism rest most fundamentally on the fact that I think we have fundamentally different relationship with Russia. But we haven't yet gotten to the point of really developing that or elaborating it in ways that I think are important. I think their concerns about the ABM Treaty rest very heavily on a broader significance of the treaty, as I think -- I don't want to put words in the chairman's mouth, but it seems to me that was one of the points he was making when I said that from a military point of view, from a Russian military planner's point of view, what we're doing is insignificant.
I think what they're looking for is a framework of relations with the United States, and I hope it's one that addresses the real security needs of this era. I don't think the Russians have to lay awake nights worrying about our attacking them with nuclear missiles. And I don't think we need to waste a lot of time worrying about them attacking us. I think what we have is very substantial common interests in mutual stability in Europe and mutual stability in Asia.
And I must say, I take with a certain amount of salt the agreement with the Chinese. I don't object to it. I think good relations between Russia and China contribute to stability in Asia. But I don't think the Russians have discounted the possibility that China could be a problem for them.
I think working together on stabilizing those critical areas of the world is where is the cornerstone of strategic stability today, if I might use that phrase, it is not in the old pattern of mutual annihilation. And I think when they see that we're not only saying things, we're doing them; we're bringing down our offensive nuclear forces, we're not waiting for protracted years and years of negotiations in Geneva before we remove a single warhead; that our whole posture is one they should be comfortable with. And I think as we deepen those discussions, we'll begin to make some progress. And I think the fact that they are -- shown great interest not just in kind of traditional arms control negotiations between the Foreign Ministry and the State Department, but very serious interest in discussions between Defense Minister Ivanov and Secretary Rumsfeld suggest to me that they are viewing this in a broad context of security.
SEN. LIEBERMAN: My time's up. Thank you.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
SEN. JAMES INHOFE (R-OK): Oh, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The opening sentence of our chairman has, I think, kind of set the tone for one thing that we all agree with, and that is, if I recall it right, he said protecting and defending the American people is our number one objective.
Do you consider that to be our number one objective?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I think that's why we're all serving in the Defense Department --
SEN. INHOFE: That's right.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: -- and I think what everyone in this committee agrees with.
SEN. INHOFE: I think we all do, and I think that's very significant. When you look at the threats that are out there -- I notice that Senator Roberts is not here, but there is a new subcommittee that he chairs on the new types of threats that are coming, the emerging threats. Yet the one that we're facing right now is one that is really not emerging, it's here and it's one that we've been dealing with for a long time.
I'd like to just briefly respond to a couple of the arguments you keep hearing against moving forward with our missile defense system; one being that it might precipitate an arms race. I would suggest -- and I want to say this for the record; I think there's already an arms race as far as China is concerned. We don't know the exact number, but China has made a very large purchase, and they say approximately 240 of the SU-27s and the SU-30s, vehicles that are air-to-air and air-to-ground superior to anything that we have. They currently, it's my understanding, have purchased some of the rapid-firing artillery systems, platforms, that are better than our Paladin is, and they're spending a very large percentage of their -- amount of money on this arms race.
But there's something else that I think is significant to bring out and that is couldn't it be argued that by having a missile defense system not only are you defending yourself, but you're also allowing us to reduce our nuclear weapons?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: It's certainly true that we can do both at the same time, Senator; I mean, that is fundamental. And I do think to some degree, if we were to think about very low levels of offensive forces, it would be, frankly, impossible to contemplate, I think, if we didn't have the security that we had some ability to defend against limited missile attacks. But I think the main point is that there is plenty of room to bring down our offensive forces; we're doing so. That ought to be a strong signal, particularly to Russia and to anyone else who thinks about it, there is absolutely no reason to respond to a limited American missile defense capability by building up their offensive nuclear forces.
We're being --
SEN. INHOFE: No, I guess what I'm saying, though -- I want to make sure it's clear -- that if we had a system in place to defend ourselves against an incoming missile, wouldn't that allow us to reduce our nuclear capability in terms of offensive weapons?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: In some circumstances, it might. I mean, the reason I'm hesitating, Senator, is, I don't think, in any case, we would want to in the foreseeable future -- I mean, one could imagine a world of complete disarmament, and that might be a wonderful world, but in the foreseeable future, I don't think we'd want to give up our --
SEN. INHOFE: I wasn't suggesting complete disarmament, believe me.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: -- we would want to give up our deterrent capability.
SEN. INHOFE: Sure.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: And these calculations of how one substitutes for another are complicated.
SEN. INHOFE: Yeah. No, and as far as one substituting for another, the other argument that I -- that we hear all the time is the suitcase threat, the terrorist threat. And we know that's a very -- it's a very real threat. But I think it's important for the record to reflect that we are currently -- maybe not through the Department of Defense -- we are currently addressing this threat, the suitcase threat, the -- in the case of the Oklahoma City bombing of the Murrah Federal Office Building, that was pickup truck. We have gone back -- and we have been doing it right here in Washington -- to see what could be done, what could be placed to keep something like this from happening again.
So we are doing that very actively, and I think it's important to talk about that. It's -- I always liken it to an insurance policy. You know, you -- there's a risk out there, so you insure your house. That doesn't mean you don't insure your car. And so we need to do both, and I think it's very significant that we talk in those terms.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: If I might, Senator, on that point --
SEN. INHOFE: Yeah?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: -- I mean, I think they're both serious threats.
SEN. INHOFE: Yeah.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: We need to work on protecting ourselves from both. What is different about the two, as far as I can see, is that, number one, we have some capability to defend against that terrorist threat. We've intercepted people at the border. We have counterintelligence means to disrupt terrorist cells. We work on it constantly.
We don't have any means of protecting this country from a ballistic missile attack -- not a single one.
And secondly, we have no treaty that prohibits us from protecting ourselves against terrorist attack, and I can't imagine signing one. And I think we need to think about that in thinking about the anachronism of this treaty that had a purpose during the Cold War but, I think, has long since outlived that military purpose.
SEN. INHOFE: Thank you very much. It's a very good answer.
Just for minute, could you describe some of the advantages of a sea-based system? And then we can kind of go into -- as to how we might be able to move toward that.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: You always have to qualify these things by "if it works." But if it worked, if we could develop the capability to intercept from the sea, I think there are at least three benefits that you get from it. I started to say "advantages," but that -- I think one needs to get away from the mind-set that one system is better than another system. In fact, one of the advantages of developing sea- based capability is it allows you to introduce another method of interception, another point at which you can intercept, another complication for any attacker. So the more different things that work, the better off you are, number one.
Number two, by being mobile and deployable, you could locate it in a crisis situation closer to wherever the relevant threat is. And that, one could imagine, could be useful.
And finally, because it's mobile and could be located in a crisis situation, depending on where the crisis is, it might provide you with boost intercept capability. And I think, of all the phases at which you'd like to be able to intercept, for reasons I said to Senator Akaka, boost phase is the place I'd most like to be able to get things.
SEN. INHOFE: Yeah, I think you made that very clear.
My time has expired. I did want to ask, Mr. Chairman, if -- anything you would like to suggest to us?
Now, this is our fourth test, I believe. The first one was a success, we had a couple that weren't, and you haven't really talked too much about what are we going do next time, where do we go from here. Is there anything you want to share with us that you haven't already?
GEN. KADISH: Well, Senator, I think we're going to go --
SEN. INHOFE: Maybe more sophisticated decoys or --
GEN. KADISH: Right. As a result of the data analysis. A lot will depend on the internal data analysis to see if we want to proceed and replicate the same test for reasons of less-than-perfect performance. And then we'll be looking at complicating it. But those decisions will be taken over the next month and a half.
SEN. INHOFE: Good.
Thank you very much.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
SEN. MARK DAYTON (D-MN): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, in a recent commentary, the Washington Post stated that two of the most important conditions for success in building and deploying a missile defense system -- and I guess I'd like to ask you if you would agree that these represent two of those important conditions for success -- is, one, that it prove the technology before deployment; and secondly, that it reach agreements with Russia and other nations that ensure the defenses will increase rather than detract from global stability.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Well certainly I think the general proposition you want to prove technology before you deploy, as General Kadish has said, there is always a judgment to be applied as to the level of -- what the level of demonstration you require to achieve a certain level of capability. But clearly, there's no point in deploying things that don't work.
Secondly, I think the way you said it was reaching agreements with other nations to assure that it increases stability rather than decreases it. In that general way, I think I would agree with it, but
I mean, I'd certainly point out that I don't expect to get Iraq or Iran or North Korea to agree to our deployment of ballistic missile defense. I think some of the stability we would hope to achieve in the world is precisely from demonstrating to them that their large investments in their offensive missile capabilities will come to naught.
SEN. DAYTON: Fair enough.
Regarding Russia and this pact that we have with them, in your testimony today you indicate that one of the possible violators of the ABM Treaty would be the systems integration test which is scheduled for next February. And the treaty requires a six-month notification if we're going to unilaterally withdraw from it. So if I do the arithmetic, that says to me that if you determined, through what your outlined procedure is today, that this test will violate next February the ABM, that by next month, August, the administration will have to notify Russia and the world of its intention to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. Is that the kind of timetable that we're looking at here, prospectively?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I believe we're -- these are a series of tests that we'll be conducting. I don't believe we're going to have a -- if there were a determination this is a treaty problem, I imagine we would just wait a little while. But I -- (to General Kadish) -- is that the plan, General?
GEN. KADISH: Yes, sir.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: So it's a series that begins next February. It's a series that raises issues. We I don't think would consider that if it is a treaty issue, that we would proceed with that particular test and force the issue by next February.
SEN. DAYTON: There's another reference to the missile defense testbed construction beginning next spring as another possible violator of the treaty, which again, going to six-month notification, would require that notification occur sometime in the fall. And I guess, without quibbling over a particular month or another, it seems that this reflects the kind of very accelerated timetable that this testing is proceeding under as it relates to the ABM Treaty.
And I guess it leads into my question. You referenced the president's intention to meet with President Putin this week and reciprocate visits, which I think is commendable. You also talked in your testimony last week about moving beyond the ABM Treaty and setting up this new agreement that reflects a new strategic framework. In the history of arms control negotiations and agreements, I'm not aware of any major agreement that has proceeded on the kind of accelerated timetable that this would require. And I guess I'm wondering, are you aware of such -- a timetable such as this having been met in the past? And if not, what makes you think it can be achieved this time?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Well, I mean the history of arms control agreements are mostly these protracted negotiations between two heavily armed, essentially hostile adversaries, the United States and the Soviet Union. And you're right, those negotiations took forever. I participated in a lot of them, and it was reminiscent of root canal work. And we're certainly not going to reach an agreement early if we approach it in that way.
But the premise on which we're proceeding is that Russia is not the Soviet Union. This is not a potential adversary; it's, in fact, a country that we would like to bring into closer partnership with us. It's a potential friend, maybe even a potential ally. And I think that's the way we want to move forward.
I must say if someone envisions a negotiation like the old ones with the Soviet Union, and that we won't in any way encounter constraints of the ABM Treaty during the time of a protracted negotiation like that, I think, Senator, that really is giving the Russians a veto over our program. And that's the dilemma we're caught in here. I think everyone agrees we need to move forward missile defense. We don't want to give the Russians a veto. I think everyone agrees also we'd like to achieve a cooperative outcome, and I think that forces a fairly rapid schedule.
I would emphasize too, by the way, though I hope this isn't where we end up, that even in the worst case, if we say these are important things, we have to proceed with them, we don't yet have an agreement but we need to withdraw, that certainly shouldn't be the end of negotiations. In fact, most of the negotiations that you refer to didn't begin from a treaty, they began from an American program. In fact, the ABM Treaty itself grew out of a vote in this body to move forward with the Safeguard ABM system.
SEN. DAYTON: I would agree with you, Mr. Secretary, we certainly don't want to give Russia a veto. On the other hand, what seemed to be an agreement that the improvement or at least the retention of global stability is the sine qua non in this arrangement and so, as you say, you are in a delicate situation. But it would seem that if the actions diplomatically of this administration are such that cause Russia to respond adversarially rather than cooperatively, that that would seriously undermine even the military intent of this undertaking.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: That's a fair point, Senator, but I -- I mean, we're doing more -- in addition to trying to achieve an agreement with the Russians, we're doing a lot of things that they can observe that I think ought to discourage them from any kind of precipitous or dangerous reaction. And I come back to what I think is really very fundamental, and that is the reductions in our own offensive nuclear forces. We're already taking some without any protracted negotiations. We didn't even negotiate a week to remove 50 MIRVed MX Missiles from our force, nor to remove four Trident submarines with nearly 800 nuclear warheads.
We're taking more than a thousand nuclear warheads out of our force with this budget alone, and it didn't take a week of negotiations with the Russians.
I mean, you go back 10 years, when President -- previous President Bush in I believe it was September -- I think it was even September 27th of 1992 -- 1991, announced that we were going to make major reductions in both our tactical nuclear forces and our strategic nuclear forces and that we hoped the Russians would reciprocate. Within 10 days -- and no negotiations, no first-class tickets to Geneva, not even any coach tickets to Geneva, within 10 days, President Yeltsin and President Gorbachev, who was still the president at the time, responded positively. We did more arms control in those 10 days than in 20 years of negotiating with the Old Soviet Union.
So I think it really is a different era, and we have a different view of Russia. I hope they realize that we have a different view of Russia, and I hope they have a different view of the United States.
SEN. DAYTON: That's a very good point, sir. And I wish you success with that undertaking.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Thank you.
SEN. DAYTON: Thank you, my time's expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you very much, Senator Dayton. Senator Sessions.
SEN. JEFF SESSIONS (R-AL): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And with regard to the treaty, I do salute you and the president and others for the consistent message you've sent to the world that we want to work and be responsive and listen and cooperative, but that we do have a primary responsibility, which is defending the United States from missile attack, which you just noted we have no defense to whatsoever. And we also know that more and more nations are developing a missile attack system, the capability of reaching the United States. And I am glad that, Mr. Wolfowitz, that you're there having served on the bipartisan commission that evaluated this problem and reached the conclusion that we did need to deploy a national missile defense system before you became assistant secretary of defense (sic).
One of the objections that's been raised is that there's been this huge increase in spending on national missile defense. There's been a 56 percent increase in spending for ballistic missile defense. I believe that refers primarily to the -- going from President Clinton's $5 billion that he planned to spend on ballistic missile defense to 8 billion that this administration proposes in its new budget. I would like to talk about those numbers a little bit. Under the numbers as I calculate them, President Bush in his defense budget including the supplemental this year has proposed a $38 billion increase in defense over the last year's budget. And that's a significant increase for sure, but it does show that the $3 billion increase that's alleged here is not as big as some would say.
I'd like to ask a little further, General Kadish, of the $3 billion increase from 5 to 8 that's being proposed here, a lot of that is involved with other missile systems that many on this committee strongly support, like the Patriot and the theater -- THADD -- the theater missile defense that's been going on for years and we've been building. Can you tell us pretty much where the numbers come out there, how much of that 3 billion is not in ballistic missile defense but in the theater and the Patriot-type missiles that all of us agree need to be built?
GEN. KADISH: Senator, I'd like to get you the exact figures for the record, but as I recall, all but about 800 million to a billion of it is in the theater or dual-use type of systems like SBIRS.
But I'd like to be precise and answer the question for the record.
SEN. SESSIONS: So we're really talking about, in terms of ballistic missile defense, no more than half of the 3 billion, maybe less, actually going into the development of a ballistic missile defense program?
GEN. KADISH: Under the old definitions, that's heading in the right direction, but we're trying to define this as a system now, a layered system.
SEN. SESSIONS: I know you see it correctly as one system, not just a series of systems, but many here say, well, we approved theater, we approved the Patriot, but we don't approve ballistic. And when you look at those numbers, that's not much. If you take 1-1/2 billion out of the 30 billion increase President Bush has proposed, we're talking about 5 percent or less of his increase going to missile defense, and that is not a reckless spending, in my view.
Am I far wrong from that, Mr. Wolfowitz? Do you see it that way?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I see it that way, and we can try to get you precise numbers. I do know that just the PAC-3 increase alone is 857 million and the Navy area-wide alone is 396 million. So that's 1.3 billion that is exclusively for shorter-range systems. We're trying to get away from this national theater, but there is shorter-range, there's longer-range.
I think to understand precisely what General Kadish said a few minutes ago, there's a large chunk of that that is applicable to short-, intermediate- and long-range. You improve better radars, you do airborne laser. There are a whole variety of things that will intercept missiles of a variety of ranges.
So I think it's probably roughly correct that there is between 1 and 2 billion that is exclusively for shorter-range, including the two programs I mentioned, and between 1 and 2 billion that is exclusively for longer-range, and the rest is dual-applicable. We'll get you the exact numbers.
SEN. SESSIONS: And this would represent less than 1 percent of the total defense budget of 300-plus billion dollars?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: One billion would be one-third of 1 percent.
SEN. SESSIONS: And you had concluded, the president and the secretary of Defense, and really the president announced it during the campaign, that he considered having a national defense system to be a national priority.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: It is, Senator, and it's a defense priority. The threats that we're talking about, if they were effective and we had no ability to cope with them, could render all of the rest of our investment in defense capabilities useless. And that's why hostile countries, I think, are investing so much money in their own offensive capabilities.
SEN. SESSIONS: So hostile countries are investing in attack missiles; missiles that eventually, as they improve them, can reach the United States and, oddly, they're the ones that are opposed to us building a national missile defense. And our allies, Israel and Taiwan and Japan and other countries, are very interested and supportive -- or at least are interested and quite -- and generally supportive of what we're doing. Isn't that correct?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I think you find, Senator, that the closer they are to the threat, the more supportive they are.
SEN. SESSIONS: Well, I'm not surprised that a nation like some of our adversaries would be opposed to this because we would be denying them a capability of intimidation and even attack that they presently think they can have in the years to come.
And so, my time is out. I just would like to say that I thank you for the courage to confront this issue openly, to talk about it plainly, and to recognize that the treaty does contemplate completely that we would not have a national missile defense system. There's no need to try gimmicks to get around it. Let's confront it. Let's work with the Russians and our European allies and others and see if we can't improve, establish a way to get around that and build what we need to build for America.
Thank you for your work.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Thank you, Senator.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator Sessions.
SEN. BEN NELSON (D-NE): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I want to thank the secretary and general for being here today and to extend my congratulations on a successful test.
Mr. Secretary, I first would like to get your take on the Russia- China agreement that was just announced here in the last day or so regarding either "The" ABM Treaty or "an" ABM Treaty. Is there any authority for them to do that -- for Russia to do this under the existing treaty, to add unilaterally? Or is this a separate treaty arrangement without regard to our treaty with the former Soviet Union and others? I guess the question really is, is this sort of a tacit or de facto veto of what we're attempting to do with the missile defense system as it relates to our treaty with the former Soviet Union, which is in question. And finally, were we aware that this was going to -- this treaty -- or this agreement, if not a treaty, between Russia and China was imminent?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Senator, we were definitely aware that they were likely to sign a treaty of friendship during this meeting. I have to confess, I haven't yet seen, and I don't know that we have exact text of what they signed. It seems to me that --
SEN. BEN NELSON: But it's outside of the agreement that we have with the former Soviet Union, which is in question?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Well, I think it has no direct bearing on the ABM Treaty. I think what it does indicate is, at least if one thinks about what the Russians are doing here, first of all, they have a -- I think it's a 12,000-mile border with China. They have good reason to try to have good relations with that country. Secondly, we know that in relationships like this countries try to use their relationship with another country to get some leverage in another negotiation, and this clearly is intended to get some leverage with us. And we know outside of that arrangement and, frankly, much more disturbing, that the Russians are selling a number of military systems to China that, frankly, I think some day they may come to regret.
But I think the overall -- there is no direct connection to the ABM Treaty, and I think we can reach the kind of understanding we're hoping to reach with the Russians consistent with their having a treaty of friendship with China.
SEN. BEN NELSON: So you don't see this as a de facto veto of our efforts to move forward without regard to an agreement with Russia?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I don't think it is a veto. I think it probably is, among other things, intended by the Russians to give them more negotiating leverage, but it certainly doesn't give them a veto.
SEN. BEN NELSON: At least it may be in part sending a message?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: It may be, yes.
SEN. BEN NELSON: And I want to thank you for your patience, or at least your appearance of patience, when I keep trying to bore in on some definitional things so I know whether we're moving from development to deployment. I'm really trying to figure out whether there is a difference or it's a matter of shades of gray. I get a little concerned when we begin to lump all defense systems together, theater as well as intercontinental, as layered because I'm not sure where one shade of gray begins and the other ends. And maybe that's the fair way to do it, but it's a harder way for a person such as myself to analyze where we are.
And I was taken by General Kadish's comment about that there's a long road ahead. At least on a road, if I'm looking at a map, I know from Point A to Point B the points in between. And I cannot determine for myself right now the points in between from development to deployment. Sometimes I think we're definitional unencumbered here and it makes it more difficult for somebody such as myself.
Is it a definitional difference or is there a real difference? I need to know whether Fort Greeley is a testbed becoming an operational facility, not whether the decision has been made to do that, but is it a very short step, is it a very short shade-of-gray difference from being a testbed to an operational entity?
That's what I'm really trying to get my arms around as we go through this. I applaud the test, I think it's exceptional, that it was successful, but I'm still concerned about not knowing the difference between development and deployment.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Well, let me -- we can come to the treaty part of it, or try to, if you like, in a minute, but I think the important thing when we're engaged in a weapon system development for us -- and the general can elaborate on this -- there's a very important difference between the development stage and the deployment stage. And there are very important hurdles that you have to cross to get to the point of a deployment, and when you do a deployment, you have multi-year plans for how you're going to spend the money and what the total system is going to look like at the end, whereas, when you're doing a development, by definition you're feeling your way. You do one test to see where you go with the next text.
SEN. BEN NELSON: Is that -- excuse me. Is that pretty much where we are right now with this missile defense system?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: It is. But I think if I take an example from a different arena, maybe you'll realize that it's not an effort to be obscure that is causing the obscurity here. We had a system in development called JSTARS, which gave us this remarkable ability to track moving vehicles on the ground. And we had no deployment plans for it. It wasn't far enough along. It hadn't been proven out. And then suddenly Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and we needed emergency capability to track vehicles on the ground, and a decision was made that even though JSTARS hadn't met the requirements that we would normally impose to do a multi-year procurement, we would send it to a war. We sent it to the war and it had a great deal of operational capability.
SEN. BEN NELSON: In a theater layer.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Right. Well, and what we're talking about in Alaska is something like that. It is a testbed. It will be used to improve our knowledge of how a system works. But it is a testbed, designed with the thought in mind that if it works as well as we hope it will work, it could have a rudimentary operational capability.
SEN. BEN NELSON: So the theater capability that we're looking at right now for this testbed could develop into intercontinental capacity; is that fair to say?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I'd put it just slightly differently, but I think the idea's the same; that this developmental capability could become, with very little modification, an operational capability.
SEN. BEN NELSON: My time's expired. Thank you very much. Appreciate you both being here.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator Nelson.
SEN. JIM BUNNING (R-KY): First of all, I'd like to ask that my opening statement be put into the record.
SEN. LEVIN: It will be.
SEN. BUNNING: Thank you.
And I congratulate you, General, and Secretary, for the successful test that we had last Saturday. It is a step in the right direction, obviously. To succeed is better than failing. And to move one step forward in the missile defense program is very important at this point in time.
Question for Secretary Wolfowitz. Russia is actually located a lot closer to a large number of countries that are developing ballistic missile technology they're closer than we are to. It would seem to me that the threat to their nation is at least as great as the threat to ours.
If that is the case, then it would seem to be in their national interest to develop national missile defense also. Do you feel that a limited national -- defense is in Russia's national interest, as well as ours?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I do, absolutely, Senator.
And if you'll indulge me for a minute, we had talks with the Russians nine years ago. In the summer of 1992, Dennis Ross led a delegation to Moscow that met with Foreign Minister Mamedov. And one of the things they addressed specifically was this subject of the threat of third countries to both of us. And the impression our people had at the time was that there was a great deal of Russian interest in the possible danger to themselves from these capabilities.
And at one point in the discussions, the subject came up. The Russian side said, "Well, what would you Americans do if you had a missile defense capability in space and one of these third countries launched a missile at us?" And the American side said, "Well, if we could, we'd shoot it down." And this was the moment at which people were falling asleep in this hot room, and they suddenly woke up. The Russians were, I think, quite surprised, pleasantly surprised, that in this new world, we would see the threat to them from third countries as something we would like to help them defend against.
And when you talk about a new strategic framework with Russia, we don't just mean amendments to the ABM Treaty; we mean a different kind of approach to the whole subject. And I think it would include, Senator, along the lines of your question, every effort to work cooperatively on improving missile defenses, because it is not in the interest of the United States -- and let me repeat this -- it is not in the interest of the United States for Russia to be vulnerable to limited missile attack from any direction. And I don't believe it's in the interest of Russia for the United States to be vulnerable to limited missile attack.
And I believe that we have more to do, working together, to cooperate in dealing with that than in trying to work around the edges of a 1972 treat between two hostile adversaries.
SEN. BUNNING: I'd like to follow up. Would you characterize the fiscal year '02 testing program as being the first step in developing a missile defense system that is more concerned about being successful than being in compliance with an outdated treaty, 1972 -- this is the year 2001 -- that does not take into account modern threats?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I think this is the first time that the secretary of Defense -- General Kadish, I guess, should be the witness here -- when Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said, "I want you to develop THE best possible development program, to move as rapidly as we can, to explore these technologies, and to be in a position to deploy," I think it was the first time he -- "and don't worry about the ABM Treaty; if there are ABM Treaty issues, you, through your compliance review group, will bring them to me, but I'll resolve them" -- I think it was the first time you had that guidance. Isn't that correct, General?
GEN. KADISH: Certainly during my tenure, yes.
SEN. BUNNING: Well, let me ask the general a follow-up, then. The Clinton administration designed its ballistic missile program around the goal of ensuring compliance with the ABM Treaty. As a result, it only pursued technologies that would not violate the treaty, rather than pursuing technologies that had the best chance of working.
Perhaps, unlike the previous administration, I actually want to see a missile defense system that works. The current RDT&E program pursues a number of different technologies that the previous administration did not.
Do you believe that the structure of the current program provides the most likely chance of developing a system or group of systems that actually defend the American people?
GEN. KADISH: I do, Senator, and that's the basic thrust of the multi-layered system approach, because we have to consider mobile systems, sea-based and others, in order to achieve that, which do have treaty implications.
SEN. BUNNING: Okay --
MR. WOLFOWITZ: But Senator, in fairness, the last administration did submit in its last budget a request for money for the Shemya radar which, as a matter of fact, would have been a violation of the ABM Treaty. So they were prepared, at least in that area, to move forward. But what I think constrained the program artificially was a variety of technologies that General Kadish is pursuing that I think were kept off the table because of their treaty implications.
SEN. BUNNING: One last question, and it's about Alaska and the radars and the ground-based interceptors and radars in Alaska. Please, please explain to me -- and I know you've tried to explain to many others -- the advantage gained for the program by that placement? I mean, is it specifically to counter North Korea, or is it specifically to develop and test a technology?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Let me try, since I'm not the technician, and then the technician can correct it. But as I have understood their explanations, and they make sense to me, in order to move beyond the kind of rudimentary capability that was demonstrated in the test Saturday night that we saw in the filmstrip, in order to begin to introduce the sort of real-world complications that I think it was Senator Akaka referred to, with multiple decoys, multiple angles, longer ranges -- in other words, to be more realistic, you need a different testbed, a more dispersed testbed.
Alaska allows us that geometry. It also puts it in a place where that testbed could ultimately begin to be the basis of an operational capability, and it's the philosophy if we're going to spend this much money on a testbed, let's have it be in a place where it could also become operational, rather than deliberately put it somewhere where it can't be operational and then have to reproduce that whole expenditure somewhere else.
GEN. KADISH: And I would agree wholeheartedly with that. That's exactly why we chose to do it this way. Instead of building it twice, we build it once.
SEN. BUNNING: My time has expired. I want to thank you both for your straightforward answers, and God speed.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator Bunning.
SEN. CLELAND: Mr. Secretary, on you on track for deploying a national missile defense system by 2004?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Senator, I'm not sure what "on track" means. You may not have been here when General Kadish explained, with this testbed in Alaska, if things worked well, we would expect to have in the time frame 2004 to 2006 some rudimentary capability to set up an operational system. But it's rudimentary, it's not something that I would call a national missile defense system. It's not a long-term procurement plan.
SEN. CLELAND: Will that violate the ABM Treaty?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: That would surely violate the ABM Treaty.
SEN. CLELAND: How much will that system cost?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: What is the testbed, General?
GEN. KADISH: The testbed itself, or a larger system?
SEN. CLELAND: How much will this system, this rudimentary system deployed between 2004 and 2006 that violates the ABM Treaty, how much will it cost?
GEN. KADISH: I'd like to be precise for the record, but as I remember the number, the physical emplacement of the testbed is about $750 million out of the budget for the development program.
SEN. CLELAND: I'm not talking about the development program, I'm talking about the total system here that you're going to deploy that will violate the ABM Treaty, that you're going to deploy this rudimentary system between 2004 and 2006. You can't tell me it's going to cost just $750 million. It's got to be more than that.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Senator, that's why it is a very rudimentary capability. If you wanted to turn it into a full national missile defense capability, it would be more money, more time, and a whole different set of decisions.
SEN. CLELAND: We're spending $3 billion just to test out this rudimentary system here. I mean, next year it will be more money and money after that. I mean, what's the total cost of this system to deploy it that will violate the ABM Treaty? Do you know?
GEN. KADISH: I'd have to get you the actual number. I don't know off the top of my head. But the number was in '02, not the total cost nor the life cycle or any of the other ways we defined it that I just referred to. So $700 million is in '02 alone.
SEN. CLELAND: Well, it seems like before we walk down this road here over the next few years, the next four or five years, we ought to have a sense of the total cost of this system. Can either one of you share that with us?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: We'll get you something for the record, Senator.
SEN. CLELAND: You don't know now?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I don't know the out-year costs.
SEN. CLELAND: Well, I think the cost is pretty obvious as to the fallout from what this -- (word inaudible) -- will do. In violating the ABM Treaty, the fallout has already produced an amazing picture. We've driven the Russians and the Chinese into the arms of one another. And the rationale, according to the New York Times, these -- the Russians and the Chinese, they "Join to Oppose Missile Shield for the U.S." And one Russian commentator pointed out that it was, quote, "an act of friendship against America."
It was a chilling picture for me because the last "act of friendship" between Russia and China against America that they got involved with, I was a part of; it was called the Vietnam War. I almost got killed by a Russian 122-mm rocket in 1968. So this is a chilling photograph for me. I think it should be chilling for all of us to understand the impact of what we're doing here. We have a cost associated with this effort, and this is just phase one, if you might want to indicate it, of that cost. Politically, I think it makes the world less secure.
It is painfully obvious what the Russians are going to do, not only the pact here. But two years ago, I sat in a meeting with Senator Levin and Senator Lugar, one of the authors of the Nunn-Lugar program, by which this administration is underfunding that program by over $100 million, I might add -- and sat in the presence of the former director of the Russian rocket forces. And two years ago, he told us that if you deploy a national missile defense system, we won't build more rockets, we will just MIRV our warheads; we'll go from eight warheads per missile to 12. I think that makes the world less secure.
It is painfully obvious the Chinese, not only with this friendship pact with the Russians, but they're going to go on their own and build more missiles. It seems to me that makes the world less secure.
So I think there is a price exacted here, whatever the actual total in dollars, to us.
Now, in testimony last Thursday, General Kadish stated that your missile defense proposal has no milestones by which to measure progress. At the Frontier Institute last Friday, Secretary Rumsfeld said, quote, "We don't have a proposed architecture. All we have is a series of very interesting research and development and testing programs." End of quote. In FY 2001, the entire Department of Defense, the entire DOD, Department of Defense, budget is $9 billion for basic research and development; $9 billion for basic research and development in all of DOD.
You're now proposing to spend 8 billion on missile defense research and development alone. How can you, Mr. Secretary, justify spending 8 billion on missile defense if you have no milestones, requirements, or architecture in mind? If you don't know where you're going, how can you know what it will cost?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Senator, I think that's the essence of development programs. We're not setting up an architecture until we know what we can do, and we don't think we should spend enormous amounts of money on architectures until technology has been proven.
We are pursuing a great deal of research and development -- I think the total in this year's budget is $47 billion -- of which this is a very important piece. But it is -- and it's -- I don't know if you were in the room when this subject was discussed -- a good deal of that $8 billion that you referred to is either exclusively theater missile defense or dual-use theater and long-range missile defense. The portion that is exclusively for long-range missile defense is a very small fraction of that 8 billion and, I think, a very necessary fraction.
GEN. KADISH: Senator, I might add that when we refer to specific major defense procurement milestones, it is true we don't have those right now. But that doesn't mean that we don't have plans and developing criteria to move forward in a very disciplined way in our development program. We do and will have those. How they lead to specific procurement and deployment milestones, however, is yet to be determined.
SEN. CLELAND: My time is up. But the chiefs have identified some 32 billion in unfunded requirements, and part of that is still making up the precision weapons inventory that we expended in the Balkan war.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator Cleland.
SEN. WAYNE ALLARD (R-CO): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would first of all like to thank the ranking Republican, Senator Warner, for his comments at the start of the hearing.
And I'd also like to congratulate General Kadish and everyone that was involved with -- which appears to be a very successful Saturday evening. I know that you were all under a great deal of pressure. And I can think back two years ago, where you had a -- or two tests back, where you had a failure due to a fogging-over of the optical system from the cooling equipment. It seems to me like you learned something from that.
GEN. KADISH: We certainly did.
SEN. ALLARD: And the last failure that we had here, where you had a failure of, you know, a system that we've been using over and over, just proved to us again that we are dealing with a machine, and even the best-designed machines sometimes surprise you.
And as you'd indicated in your comments, this is a long journey, and it's step by step. But at least I'm pleased that we completed this step still standing up. And I think that if this had been a failure, that probably we'd have had a great deal more attendance at this committee meeting today. So I want to congratulate you on where you've stepped forward this last weekend.
During Thursday's hearing, I had a question regarding the tests and the ABM compliance review. And I stated that the compliance review group certified a test in June 30th of 2000. Then, I believe, I made a misstatement in that I said that the test itself took place on June 8th of 2000. I want to correct that for the record, and -- because the certification actually took place on June 30th, with the test taking place on July 8th.
And so then I want to restate my question for the record. Does the process to determine the compliance of program activities during this budget cycle differ significantly from the process used in past years?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I believe it does, Senator, in that in past years, the process was they would assess events and frequently sort of go down to the wire back and forth with the developers, and the fundamental premise was, if anything was ultimately decided to violate the ABM Treaty, they wouldn't do it. Since we've told General Kadish to proceed differently, to proceed with the most aggressive possible development, and -- that means we've asked them to surface compliance issues much earlier in the process. So we're trying now to change the process so instead of last-minute determinations, we get notification well in advance of six months of the actual event.
SEN. ALLARD: So in other words, have we deviated from the same budget process as the compliance vetting procedures as we've done in the past?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I don't think we -- no, we haven't.
SEN. ALLARD: Yeah, and that's the question.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: No. We're applying the same compliance standards. We're just trying to apply them much earlier because we realize that we are consciously in a zone where we may have --
SEN. ALLARD: Bringing it up appropriately for discussion.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Right. Correct.
SEN. ALLARD: But your fiscal budget for 1999 and the fiscal budget for the year 2000 budget request, that was not certified by the compliance review group before the president submitted it, was it?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I don't believe any of the previous budgets were. And the budget for last year included an event that I don't think anyone disputes would be a treaty-violating event, and that would have been the construction of the radar in Shemya in Alaska, which we decided not to proceed with.
SEN. ALLARD: Thank you.
It's been suggested that because Department of Defense can't say for certain now whether the testing activities you plan are compliant with the ABM Treaty, the Senate cannot approve the budget. But my understanding is that compliance determinations are almost never, almost never made well in advance of a test or other activity, and that it is virtually impossible to do so because the plans often change right up to the time of the test. Now, my question is, is that a fair description, characterization of the process?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Senator, that is a fair description of the process. And obviously, if you get within the six-month limit and you're under the treaty, it's law and we will follow it. And therefore, if at the last minute we discover a compliance problem, we will fix the event to comply. But we have simply for the first time now tried to make sure the compliance process surfaces these problems earlier. And as I pointed out, and I don't mind repeating it, last year's budget included events that would have been judged to be noncompliant and there was never any issue about that.
SEN. ALLARD: General Kadish, your organization prepared information for another senator, not in this committee, regarding compliance determinations for various tests that have occurred over the years, and I'd like to highlight some of those for the record.
For example, you conducted integrated flight test one, or IFT 1, which was the first test of the exoatmosphere kill vehicle, on January 16th, 1997, but compliance wasn't certified until December 20th of 1996. Another example, you pointed out that the Technical Critical Measurements Program, or TCMP, flight 2A, was not certified until September 14th -- I mean February 14th, 1996, just eight days before it occurred.
Also, on the Risk Reduction Flight Test 1 for what was then the national missile defense program was certified three days before it occurred in 1997, and then the second risk reduction flight was certified just two days before it was conducted, a month later. And then another example is a test of the NMD prototype radar was not certified until August 31st of 1998, less than three weeks before it occurred.
The first test of the Navy theater-wide missile was certified November 2nd, 1999, for a November 20th flight. The IFT number three for the national missile defense system, which was the first and successful intercept attempt, was certified on September 28th, 1999, just four days before the test. The IFT-4 was certified 12 days before the test took place on January 18th of 2000. The certification of IFT-5 was issued eight days before that test last summer, but the certification actually had to be modified on July 7th, the day before the test, because of changes in the test plan. And isn't it the case that the certification for Saturday night's test was also modified one day before, on Friday, July 13th, because of changes in the test plan?
And I'd like to follow that up, that first question up with a second question. It seems then it's not unusual at all to be uncertain about whether a planned test activity conflicts with the ABM Treaty until shortly before the test occurs. Would you agree with that?
GEN. KADISH: I would agree with that, Senator, under the process we have been using, and I believe those dates are correct. I'd have to check them in detail, but even Saturday's flight had a modification, as you pointed out.
SEN. ALLARD: Well, I hope I've stated those dates and those situations correctly. If for some reason we disagree, please let me know; I'll correct that for the record.
I want to thank you for the response and, Mr. Chairman, I see my time's expired.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator Allard.
SEN. REED: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Again, General Kadish, congratulations on your successful intercept over the weekend.
And Mr. Secretary, if I could just pursue for a moment a response that you gave to Senator Allard with respect to compliance prior to, immediately prior to a test event. You said that if the -- at that late period, if it was noncompliant that, in your words, "fixed the event" to comply. Is that your approach to all these potential tests going forward, that you would endeavor to fix the event to comply in all cases?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: If you're under the ABM Treaty, you have no choice. And in fact, frankly, it's not the right way to go about optimally pursuing a development program. It means that you come up with something you say may be the optimal test program and the lawyers say, whoops, it doesn't comply, then you have to drop it. That's why we're trying to alert the senior decisionmakers early and well in advance of six months before the event if we think we see something that will definitely raise a compliance issue. But once you're within that six-month window, if you're still within the treaty, then you have no choice.
SEN. REED: I think, as a matter of if you were to sketch out a decision tree that the president would face or Secretary Rumsfeld, one, you could fix the test to comply; you could violate the treaty; or you could simply postpone the treaty for six months plus a day. Those to me are the three options.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: And we've ruled out -- we are not going to violate the treaty.
SEN. REED: So as we go forward, you'll have -- the real choice you will have when these events are scheduled and you discover they're noncompliant or you think they're noncompliant is to fix it or to postpone the event, or announce that you're withdrawing from the treaty. Is that a --
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I think that's correct, yes.
SEN. REED: Thank you.
General Kadish, last year I understand the Defense Department cancelled the Navy theater-wide Block-1 program in order to pursue the more capable Block-2 variant.
And I gather the decision was driven not only by technical shortcomings with Block-1, but because the planned quantity of 40 Block-1 ships and 80 Block-1 missiles was insufficient.
The proposed budget we're discussing today adds $410 million to the '02 budget for Navy theater-wide, yet this effort is apparently focused once again on deploying a Block-1 version of the system. Could you explain the funding? Will it go to Block-1? If so, why, since apparently it was a decision previously to step away from that system?
GEN. KADISH: Well, Senator Reed, there was -- to the best of my knowledge, there was no formal decision to step away from Navy Theater Block-1. There was an analysis that we did under the approach of where we were trying to procurement and development at the same time that it might be more economical and beneficial to go beyond Block-1 in that framework. Now, under this layered approach that we are pursuing for these classes of missile, the development of the Block-1 and the completion of the Aegis LEAP intercept program that underlies that are certainly a viable part of our development program, and we want to aggressively pursue that. That does not mean that we will actually procure these types of systems. It depends on the development program and the results of the test.
SEN. REED: But you're pursuing Block-1 for potential deployment -- for a potential deployment.
GEN. KADISH: To the degree Aegis LEAP intercept program represents a Block-1, we are. I know I cut that fine, but that's an important distinction.
SEN. REED: That's not only fine, that's metaphysical. (Laughter.)
Let me -- I guess my -- is it fair to say though that there were technical questions raised about the capability of this system and also questions raised about the availability of sufficient platforms that caused you to serious reevaluate Block-1 last year, but now you're aggressively moving towards a Block-1 potential deployment?
GEN. KADISH: In both of those cases, we were pursuing our current test program. And what I'm saying is the decision to pursue that from a procurement program will not be taken until we get sufficient test data.
SEN. REED: Let me move to the THAAD system, which is a system I believe has great potential. I'm strongly supportive. A fundamentally sound system, I believe, but plagued by tests, which some people ascribe to a mentality that put the schedule ahead of really looking at quality control and important fundamentals. And last year, I understand the Defense Department considered accelerating THAAD but decided not to since it felt the program was at a prudent pace with acceptable tactical risks. Again, the proposed budget add $224 million to THAAD program for '02 for program acceleration. Once again, are we in a situation where experience told us to slow down, but politics are telling us to speed up?
GEN. KADISH: No, Senator. What we did in that particular case is that the monies to, quote, "accelerate THAAD," unquote, is designed to by more test hardware early on and take a risk that we will be successful. We do not intend to change the structure of our current program from a very risk-handling approach where we're very deliberate in our ground tests and redesign of THAAD, but instead provides the money to more aggressively test the program and take the idea that should it be successful, we would have test assets to actually put in an emergency situation and thereby accelerate that capability if we should deem it capable.
But there's no intent to speed up or eliminate or cut corners in that program, and that is something that I'm going to watch very carefully that we do not do across the broad spectrum of our efforts. We can't afford it.
SEN. REED: Let me, if I may, just briefly, SBIRS-low is being transferred from the Air Force responsibility to your responsibility in BMDO. The current estimate, a life cycle costs about $20 billion or so. That's an estimate. And also, you've indicated how critical it is to your national missile defense plans. Do you have a good idea at this point of how much SBIRS-low will cost?
GEN. KADISH: We have a generalized estimate that you point out. It varies to some degree up to $20 billion. I think that we have to get through the next few years of the competition and design activity to really nail that down. And so I think we're 18 months to two years out from really understanding what the long-term costs will be, and only then it'll be just an estimate based on where we are.
SEN. REED: My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, general.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator Reed.
SEN. SUSAN COLLINS (R-ME): Mr. Secretary, you testified that the administration is pursuing two parallel tracks, that first you're pursuing an accelerated research, development and testing program, and second, the administration is engaged in discussions with Russia on a new security framework. If the Senate were to significantly reduce the money in this budget for missile defense, what would be the impact on the president's attempts to achieve a new strategic framework with Russia? Would it lessen the chances of success, in your judgment?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Senator, I think it would lessen it substantially because I do think our ability to reach an understanding with Russia is going to depend on considerable part on their sense that we are moving forward, we're ready to move forward together. We'd like to do it in a way that's cooperative. But if they feel that if they drag their feet we move forward at all, they might well prefer to drag their feet.
SEN. COLLINS: Thank you. Mr. Secretary, Senator Inhofe raised a common criticism of missile defense that I want to pursue further with you, and that is that critics of missile defense repeatedly contend that the United States faces a far greater threat from the so-called suitcase terrorists than from ballistic missile attacks from a -- attack from a rogue nation. It's my understanding that last year the United States spent about $11 billion on counterterrorism programs and that this is about twice the amount that was dedicated to pursuing missile defense. Is the administration continuing a significant investment in counterterrorism programs while continuing the accelerated research and development of missile defense? In other words, isn't this a false choice, and, in fact, we are pursuing aggressively counterterrorism measures while pursuing the research for a missile defense?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I think it is, senator, and I don't have a sufficiently good crystal ball to say which is the more likely one, and I'm -- frankly, I've spoken to a lot of intelligence analysts; I don't think their crystal balls are perfect, either. I do know that the countries hostile to the United States are investing a lot of money in both efforts. And probably if you looked at their budgets, they're investing more in ballistic missiles just because it's an expensive program. I think they understand that it's one of our weaknesses. It's the one, as I said, the one Iraqi capability that we underestimated during the Gulf War. But I think it is a false choice. I think we have to pursue efforts in both directions. But I think before you came I was pointing out to me what -- these are both threats, they should both be taken seriously. But when I think about it, what is different about the two is, number one, we have some capability against the terrorist threat today.
We intercepted people coming in from Canada during the millennium event. We have aggressive counterintelligence programs that disrupt efforts when we can. They're not 100 percent perfect or we wouldn't have had the Cole catastrophe. But we are actively engaged in -- we have some ability to protect ourselves. We have no ability to protect ourselves against ballistic missiles.
And secondly, and this is the reason we have no ability -- or part of the reason we have no ability to protect against ballistic missiles, we have a treaty prohibiting us from doing so. There is no treaty prohibiting us from working against terrorist attacks, and we would never contemplate signing one.
SEN. COLLINS: General, I'd like to switch gears and ask you a couple of questions about the Arrow weapon system, which is being developed jointly by the United States and Israel, and would provide Israel with a capability to defend against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.
Last year, Congress provided $95.2 million for the Arrow program. Could you tell me what you've proposed for funding for the Arrow this year, and whether or not you'll be supporting the Arrow System Improvement Plan, which the Congress initiated last year?
GEN. KADISH: In the Fiscal Year '02 budget, if I recall the numbers correctly, we complete the purchase of the Arrow third battery and finish our commitment there. And I think that the dollars associated with that, and interoperability type of activities, amount to somewhere around $50 million.
We've also proposed a $20 million addition over and above those activities for further allocation to either the ASIP program, the improvement program, or for other activities that might be deemed beneficial. So we've added basically $20 million to our commitment for '02.
SEN. COLLINS: It's my understanding that there is also cooperation underway with Israel in examining the possibility of intercept in the boost phase over the course of the last several years, and that Israel has proposed a new joint boost-phase launcher intercept program. Do you have a judgment of the feasibility of the Israeli program, and does your office intend to work with Israel on the boost-phase launcher intercept program?
GEN. KADISH: We have been in discussions with Israel over that particular effort, and I believe, if I'm not mistaken, we have sent a report to Congress, I think last year, over the feasibility assessments that we put together for that. And I could provide that for the record, if you like.
We will continue those discussions. But I think subject to the secretary's further comments, that will be basically a Fiscal Year '03 decision as we deliberate through those budget issues at this time.
SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator Collins.
SEN. EDWARD KENNEDY (D-MA): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And welcome, Mr. Secretary.
General Kadish, we are glad to see you here. I think as maybe the members of the committee know, General Kadish was the commanding officer up at the Hanscom Base up there, in terms, and had some very, very important responsibilities in areas of intelligence, advance research, a whole wide range of areas, and has many, many friends up there. Did an outstanding job.
Mr. Secretary, you're fortunate to have the general.
I want to get back to the point about sort of where we are and where we're going. We want to congratulate you on the success of the missile last Saturday. And we all understand we still have a long ways to go, but that's an important benchmark. And we all take pride -- I certainly do -- in the work that's being done on theater defense. That's been impressive. We've followed that -- I have -- closely because Raytheon is from my own state of Massachusetts and we're always interested in the progress as well as some of the problems they have up there.
But I want to get back to the questions of sort of where we are and where we're going and where we've been in terms of the -- sort of the research and get some idea now about how we're going to make judgments about the research program.
We had the secretary of Defense on June 28th appear before the committee to present the 2002 budget. When I asked about the details about ballistic missiles, he said not been briefed on the BMD proposal, not yet made any decisions -- this is the end of June; we're now into mid-July -- been briefed on it, not made decisions about it, even though we now have been provided with the budget information. We're told it's for a proposed program; the actual content of the program will be decided later. Now, that's the secretary of Defense before the committee as recently as three weeks ago.
So now we have your own response to others about the fact that a lot of this is going to be in theater defense, others on ballistic defense. In General Kadish's statement today, he said, "I cannot tell you today exactly what the ballistic missile system will look like, even five years from now." The -- well, that's -- he says -- he continues here. Evidently, General Kadish, you also said at a press conference last Friday that you have internal plans that are -- you're working on at the present time that are spelling out how these resources are going to be made.
What has -- what have we spent, what has DOD spent during the whole "Star Wars" on ballistic? Thirty billion, $40 billion, some have estimated to $60 billion roughly.
General, do you know? Well, if it isn't that figure, are we in the ballpark.
GEN. KADISH: About $5 billion a year for the last 15 --
SEN. KENNEDY: I'm sorry?
GEN. KADISH: About $5 billion a year on average.
SEN. KENNEDY: Okay. Well, it's $45 billion or $50 billion now been expended on this to date. We're not starting new here; we've spent $45 billion or $50 billion. I think we want to disabuse ourselves that we're suddenly starting new now with all of this. I mean, we've spent $45 billion -- or the DOD has spent $45 billion or $50 billion to date on this; already we've spent that. Now you're asking for $8 billion more. And even though you spent $45 billion or $50 billion, evidently you're not able -- or to give the committee a clear idea why we would expect that this would be either more effective than what has been spent in the past, other than, I hear that maybe we're looking along some different areas or different lines.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: If I might, Senator, I mean what we've spent in the past has already produced results. I would complain that it hasn't produced results as fast as I think this country might in the past have been capable of. We produced Polaris submarines in five years with a crash effort; we got to the Moon in 10 years with a crash effort.
I would say this has not been a crash effort. But it has produced important results. You referred to one of the most important ones a few minutes ago, which is our ability now, finally, 10 years after the Gulf War, to have hit-to-kill capability against a primitive SCUD missile. I would have thought, given the fact that Saddam Hussein almost brought Israel into that war and had success in killing Americans with SCUD missiles, that we might have moved faster. But we have moved. And this budget includes a substantial amount of money -- $857 million -- to accelerate the acquisition and deployment of that PAC-3 system which would protect ourselves in the Persian Gulf, could protect Israel and other allies, can protect us in Korea.
SEN. KENNEDY: And we're not talking -- at least I'm not talking -- I'm talking about the other, the PAC-3, and I've been a strong supporter, many of us have been, in terms of the theater missile. We're trying to ask in terms of the outer space, the ballistic missile defense, the amounts that we're going to be spending on this. And quite frankly, for every technology, for the most part, we've seen countertechnologies, the serious questions with all the billions that we spend on the stealth technology, whether that's really going to work any more because of new breakthroughs. It's rare in terms of it, and I'm not going to spend much of my time here now going out -- thinking in terms of technology that's developed that there hasn't been countertechnologies that have been developed. I mean, the moon example --
MR. WOLFOWITZ: No technologies --
SEN. KENNEDY: -- the moon example is not really clear, because that's a different situation on it.
But to come back to this question about we have spent the $45 billion, we're being requested at $8 billion, and we want to have, again, some idea as to how the $8 billion is going to expended, because we have had the testimony by the secretary of defense before the committee three weeks ago where he indicated that he was now prepared to give that to us. And my question is, which has been repeated by others here -- and perhaps we're going to get the same answers -- can you give us any more indication or assurance that it is going to be any more successful than -- what it's going to be and what the time lines are going to be in terms of expenditures?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Senator, the secretary has been briefed in detail now. We have submitted detail. And I'm -- was trying to explain in my previous response that that detail includes a great deal of money on systems like PAC-3 -- $857 million on PAC-3 alone -- that have now been demonstrated to be successful. I think before you came, senator, we showed a film strip of the successful test Saturday night. And believe me, I wouldn't say that that test demonstrates a capability, but it certainly demonstrates a very big advance in what we can do. And you don't get to this kind of very successful -- I mean, very demanding technological challenge overnight. But I think the record shows that we are making serious progress, demonstrable progress on shorter-range missiles, and I think we clearly are in reach of doing something with the long-range systems.
So, yes, we can give you great detail on the plan for that expenditure. And I think it's a very convincing story that General Kadish and his team put together.
SEN. KENNEDY: Well, my time is up, but you're going to give us, then, how that $8 billion is going to be expended --
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Yes, senator. Yes.
SEN. KENNEDY: Thank you.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you --
SEN. KENNEDY: Has it been made available to the committee?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I believe it is --
SEN. KENNEDY: The $8 billion, expenditures, how you're going to expend that $8 billion.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Sorry, the general says at the end of this week. So --
SEN. KENNEDY: It hasn't been, then, expended.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: The --
SEN. KENNEDY: You haven't given it to the committee. I mean, I --
MR. WOLFOWITZ: My understanding is we will be submitting it at the end of this week.
SEN. KENNEDY: Which means you haven't yet given it to the committee.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Correct, senator. Yes.
SEN. KENNEDY: Good. Well, that's going to be --
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Apologies. (Laughs.)
SEN. KENNEDY: Thank you.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Thank you.
SEN. LEVIN: First, about your statements, general, that your predecessors did not have the same instructions that you did relative to ABM, I just want to read General Lyles' testimony when he said "There's nothing that we would do differently" -- the question from Senator Robb was, "If you did not have an ABM Treaty, are there things that you would be doing or could be doing less expensively now?"
General Lyles: "In all honesty, Senator Robb, there's nothing that we would be doing differently."
Do you disagree with General Lyles?
GEN. KADISH: No, sir, I --
SEN. LEVIN: General Ralston said, "I would like to add, as I understand it and General Lyles has said, there is nothing today in the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty that is constraining what we are doing in our national missile defense program or our theater missile defense program."
Do you disagree with that?
GEN. KADISH: No. No, Senator.
SEN. LEVIN: Okay. So this is really the first time where we may be facing that issue. The difference, of course, between what President Clinton did last year and what you're doing this year is that President Clinton never made the decision that if he couldn't modify the treaty, that he would walk away from it. That decision was never made by President Clinton. He said there would be four factors which he would consider before making that decision; whereas this president, this administration has said if Russia refuses the changes we propose, we will give prompt notice under the provisions of the treaty that we can no longer be a party to it. That's a huge difference.
SEN. WARNER: Could you give a citation of what you just read?
SEN. LEVIN: That's the Citadel speech, September 1999, of Governor Bush, then a candidate. "If Russia refuses the changes we propose, we will give prompt notice under the provisions of the treaty that we can no longer be a party to it." Totally different set of circumstances from what it was in the previous administration, which said we might give notice, we might not, we're going to look at four factors, including whether or not we're more secure by pulling out of that treaty, including the effect on arms reductions, including the cost effectiveness, including the operational effectiveness; all factors would go into it.
You've given us three sheets of paper with the outline of the three activities which you apparently indicate could bump up against the ABM Treaty this year. One is called the "Missile Defense System Testbed"; the other one "Aegis SPY-1, Tracking a Strategic Ballistic Missile"; the other one, "Systems Integration Test 2." First of all, we'll make those part of the record, those three documents.
But my question is this, to either one of you: Could you identify on those three sheets of paper which of those activities will, in a matter of months, not years, likely conflict with the ABM Treaty's limits? Since you've now informed us that in a matter of months, not years, it's likely that the activities that are in the budget request for 2002 will "conflict with" -- as the administration's statement last Wednesday -- "bump up against" -- your statement last Thursday -- can you just identify for us, on these three sheets, now, which of these specific activities are likely to either conflict with or bump up against the treaty under your budget request?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Senator, we identified all three of these because all there of them have the potential of raising serious ABM Treaty compliance problems.
SEN. LEVIN: Can you just identify, for instance, in the testbed document? Because some of these, a lot of this, you say it's not likely to happen, inside these documents.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: That's why we need a compliance review --
SEN. LEVIN: I know, but specifically will you do this for the record? Will you tell -- since there's a lot in these documents which say you don't see any compliance problem, it's hard for me to sort out which will and which won't.
And the specific question -- you can do this for the record -- is, on these three sheets of paper, which of these activities will in all likelihood, if you're funded in 2002 as requested, conflict with or bump up against the ABM Treaty? That's my question for the record.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Okay, we'll work with your staff to make sure we have the question right, and we'll answer it for the record.
SEN. LEVIN: Will you also be giving us the Compliance Review Group results promptly after you've received them?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I'll do my best. They --
SEN. LEVIN: But what would constrain you? There's no treaty that prohibits you from doing that. (Light laughter.)
MR. WOLFOWITZ: (Laughs.) These are advisory opinions from the secretary of Defense's lawyers to the secretary of Defense, and I assume that we will share them with you. But --
SEN. LEVIN: Let us know, would you, promptly, if you're not going to promptly share those with us?
Secretary Wolfowitz, you said today that the developmental activity at Fort Greely could be made an operational capability with little modification. What specific modifications would be needed to convert Fort Greely from a developmental or a test capability to a rudimentary operational capability?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I think I will let General Kadish answer that.
SEN. LEVIN: General Kadish?
GEN. KADISH: Well, sir, we're -- we still have a lot of planning to do to implement this vision of the testbed. And the ongoing activities in the coming months and certainly through '02 would define it, and probably we'd be in a better position to answer that when we knew exactly the configuration we want to test and to put that together.
But I guess I would answer in a general way. It is that if we have a test activity that represents an operationally realistic configuration where everything is hooked up right and that we could launch out of Fort Greely if we wanted to test the -- a particular segment and it was safe enough, then by definition you have a capability there to launch. And then if you have confidence in the system based on all the other testing that we're going to do to actually use it in combat, that would be a decision that would have to be taken by the department.
SEN. LEVIN: But the question was not the decision, but what specific modifications were needed to be made to convert Fort Greely from your proposed developmental test facility to a rudimentary operational capability?
GEN. KADISH: And I guess the answer to that is we don't know in detail what those would be. But in general, it would be command and control activities to inform people to actually do the combat alert- type of activities. So over time, we will define exactly what that is. But I can't tell you specifically today what it will be.
SEN. LEVIN: My time's up. Thank you.
SEN. JOHN W. WARNER (R-VA): Mr. Chairman, I'd like to defer my spot at this time to a colleague, and then I'll follow back in sequence with my wrap-up. But I'd like to make one unanimous consent request that Secretary Wolfowitz be -- provide for the record statements that President Bush has made subsequent to September 24th 1999, which is The Citadel speech to which our chairman referred, and at which time he stated if Russia refuses the changes we propose then we'll give prompt notice.
I think he has made a series of statements about the framework that he's desiring to achieve, and I think those statements should be examined in parallel with the one on The Citadel. So will you provide that for the record?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: We will do that, Senator. I appreciate --
SEN. WARNER: It will be put in the record at this juncture. So I'll step back for Senator Allard to take my position, if that's agreeable.
SEN. LEVIN: All right. Senator Allard.
SEN. ALLARD: I thank Senator Warner for yielding. I'd like to pursue this issue on the THAAD radar and direct my question to General Kadish. I understand that the THAAD radar was present at Kwajalein this weekend when you conducted your missile defense test. Did that radar participate in the test?
GEN. KADISH: No, it did not, Senator.
SEN. ALLARD: And since you have identified the THAAD as part of the terminal defense element of your overall ballistic missile defense system, isn't it potentially useful to have at least the THAAD radar or the BMC-3 participate in tests like the one conducted this weekend?
GEN. KADISH: Eventually it would be, Senator.
SEN. ALLARD: And is such participation permitted by the ABM Treaty?
GEN. KADISH: At this time, it is not, and I believe one of the situations that has been provided by the secretary's testimony of using our X-band radar at Kwajalein to do a theater-level test, which is the opposite of what you're describing, is in fact on the table for a treaty compliance issue. So concurrent use of these assets is an issue with the treaty.
In regard to the THAAD, we haven't, at this point in time, done sufficient planning, although we have for use of the (GBRP ?) such that we would want to propose using the THAAD in these types of tests. But our intent over time and certainly over the next year is to plan in detail how we would exploit those types of resources.
SEN. ALLARD: And I am further told that several years ago the THAAD radar was at Kwajalein for testing when an operational ICBM test was conducted, and I'm told that the THAAD test manager saw this as a wonderful opportunity to characterize the performance of the THAAD radar, but that his proposal to do so set off such a minor panic in the Pentagon -- set this off a minor panic in the Pentagon because this would have violated the ABM Treaty. And, I guess, is this an example of the kind of opportunity you have to forego on development and testing because of the constraints of the ABM Treaty?
GEN. KADISH: Without the constraints or thinking about the constraints, we would be able to exploit that, and that's my -- our intent, at this point in time.
SEN. ALLARD: I'd like to pursue the ABM Treaty and security issues. We have heard from several colleagues about their concerns that U.S. missile defenses will spur the proliferation of missile and weapon missile defense technologies and lead to the buildup of offensive forces that would reduce U.S. security. Since concerns are based in part on a belief that the ABM Treaty has inhibited the growth of these forces, or such concerns are based on that, how many warheads did the Soviet Union have in 1972 when the ABM Treaty was signed? Do you know that?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I'd be dredging in my memory. I don't believe they had substantially MIRV'd their force at that time. Thousands less than they do today, that's for certain.
SEN. ALLARD: Yes. And then when we looked at it 10 years later, do you have any idea how many warheads the Soviet Union had?
If you can't give me a specific figure, was it dramatically increased, moderately increased?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I think dramatically increased throughout the '70s, Senator. We can get you those exact numbers for the record, obviously.
SEN. ALLARD: So in your view, did the ABM Treaty accomplish its goal of preventing or slowing down the Soviet offensive buildup?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I don't know if that was its goal. It certainly didn't accomplish it, if that was the goal.
SEN. ALLARD: And since 1972, how many nations have ballistic missile capabilities?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I believe we now estimate it -- I'm sorry, let me get it exactly.
SEN. ALLARD: I think it was 28 or 29 that you mentioned.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Twenty-eight is the number that I remember, yes.
SEN. ALLARD: Yes. How many nations have or are seeking to achieve ballistic missile capabilities today?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Beyond the ones that already have --
SEN. ALLARD: Yeah, the 28.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I'd have to get you that for the record. I think there are -- in experimental programs, there are quite a few.
SEN. ALLARD: I think it would help us to better understand what's happened worldwide and the dynamics out there if you could describe the ongoing Chinese strategic modernization, and express in your view is this modernization effort a response to U.S. ballistic missile defense programs.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Absolutely not. It's been under way for some time and I think it has its own dynamic, partly motivated by growing Chinese military budgets, partly motivated by, I think, their growing sense of their position in Asia.
And if I might say in answer to your previous question, it does seem to me, it's my own personal sense that one of the reasons that countries like Iraq and Iran and North Korea are investing so much in ballistic missile defenses is precisely because they realize that they can't match us in other areas of military capability. And this, as I -- sorry to bore you, but I've said repeatedly this is the one Iraqi capability that proved in the Gulf War to be more serious than what we had estimated it to be. I think they're investing not in spite of the ABM Treaty but to some extent because of the ABM Treaty.
SEN. ALLARD: I'm going to ask, Mr. Wolfowitz, your view on Russian security. Would Russian security be enhanced by proliferating missile and WMD technologies?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: No, it wouldn't. And again a point that I think was observed in an important way earlier, I think Russian security would be enhanced if they can reduce their vulnerability to limited missile attack. I also think our security will be enhanced if they can reduce their vulnerability. And I think the same goes for the United States. We're in a different era. It's not an era where it's our goal to keep Russia vulnerable; and it shouldn't be their goal to keep us vulnerable.
SEN. ALLARD: Also, as we all know, MAD, or mutual assured destruction, was the only means by which we deterred the Soviet Union from a missile attack against the United States. While mutually assured destruction worked in a bipolar world, today the world has changed and is a more chaotic and dangerous place, and that's why we must have an updated approach, I believe, to deterrence, both offensively and defensively.
And I believe that Admiral Mies said it best on July 11th in front of the Strategic Subcommittee, when he said, and I quote: "Missile defense would not be a replacement for an assured retaliatory response, but rather an added dimension to complement our existing deterrent capabilities and an insurance policy against a small-scale ballistic missile attack. It would also serve as an element of our strategy to dissuade countries from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles," close quote.
My question: Will the concept of mutual assured destruction remain a part of the administration's deterrent strategy?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I've never been fond of the "mutual assured destruction" term, but if the -- yes, certainly nuclear deterrence will remain part of our deterrent strategy, but the reliance exclusively on retaliation as our deterrent is something we're trying to move away from. Retaliation is always, I think, going to be part of deterrence, the potential of retaliation.
SEN. ALLARD: Mr. Chairman, my time's expired again. Thank you.
SEN. LEVIN: Senator Allard, thank you.
SEN. BEN NELSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, following up your exchange with the chairman, as I understood it, the concept of Alaska becoming operational is when -- the mental intent that it become operational, replacing the testing crew with operational personnel. Was that what was your answer to the chairman's question?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I'd have to refer back to General Kadish, but what I hear General Kadish saying is I think it is essentially, if everything worked well experimentally, it would be essentially a software change to turn it into an operational capability. It's a little more than just change of mental intent. There would have to be definitely command and control changes, probably some communications changes. But I think it's what you would call in the area of software.
SEN. BEN NELSON: In terms of Alaska and the Treaty, is that when, in your opinion, the treaty would be abrogated, and up until that point, with regard to the Alaska facility, it would not?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I don't think I need to be a lawyer to say that if we crossed that line and turned it into operational capability, we would definitely be --
SEN. ALLARD: Yes, I understand.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: -- in violation of the treaty. But the lawyers come in --
SEN. ALLARD: My question is, up to that point.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: And that's where you get into questions of intent and verification and what can and can't be verified by national technical means. And you know, it isn't simply that lawyers have a way of making problems complicated. This is a genuinely complicated problem, because in the -- what is it now -- 29 years since the treaty was signed, we've had a lengthy, I would actually say a tedious record of going over these issues with the Russians. You've got to look at that record. You've got to examine it. You've got to weigh American positions, Russian positions. We're in a difficult zone. So I'm hoping that when the lawyers look at this, they'll give us at least some more clarity than I have right now.
SEN. ALLARD: Well, thank you.
General, I want to congratulate you on your test over the weekend.
Now, let me ask you: I would like to see you be very successful as you proceed with the various tests. By reading the press, I get the impression that you're going to have these tests scheduled quite frequently. And I'm a little bit concerned that we might be sacrificing something of our success in the future with the number of tests. Would you comment on that? And the frequency of those tests.
GEN. KADISH: I think our goal has always been in a test program to test frequently and often and move rapidly through our development program, because we build a whole series of technical milestones and specifications we want to check out. So the sooner we get it done, not only does the technology develop, but we save a lot of money, even though these tests are expensive. So it is not our intent to test without the discipline required to do testing, I think is the basic thrust of your question.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Senator -- and I share the congratulations to General Kadish on his success, but I sort of worry that people have got to understand, I think, that if a program never suffers from test failures, then it's probably been too conservative of a program. If you look at the history of our developments, the Corona satellite program which put satellites in orbit suffered 11 straight test failures in its initial testing. The Polaris, which is one of our most successful systems, failed 66 out of 123 flights. I've got a number of other examples in my testimony. A successful development program has to include testing failures. So I would like to see them pushing aggressively. And if and when they fail, we may not show you the film strip of it, but I do think they will be learning things.
SEN. BILL NELSON: Hopefully the successful testing of a man- rated system does not occasion all of those failures, although we have seen those in the past, unfortunately -- for example, with the Space Shuttle.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: And that one is a -- obviously, when you get to the point of putting people's lives at risk with a test, you have got to go up to a higher standard. And even then, as you point our, you can have a failure.
SEN. BILL NELSON: Well, under that theory, then, why did we wait over a year for this test to occur from the last one?
GEN. KADISH: We are dealing with prototype hardware. And over time we expect and intend and are working very hard at making this hardware more like the system we want to actually use. So it's going to get better. But basically, in the last three years, to do four tests and have two successes out of the four is a major achievement. But we learned from our failures. And the reason why it took us a year to come to this point is because we took the two failures that we had and learned from those and went back and took the time to fix everything. And those types of failures we experienced, unfortunately from my point of view, were more related to quality problems, if you will, process problems, not the fundamental design and the hardware. So in order to bring wring those types of process problems out, you have to put more discipline in the program, make sure that people do the right thing and are, in fact, rewarded for telling us when something is wrong. And that took us time. Once we are confident we have that -- those processes in place, which I have right now, then I expect that we'll be able to do things more rapidly without those types of problems occurring.
SEN. BILL NELSON: What was the reason for the failure a year ago?
GEN. KADISH: The reason for the failure a year ago we believe was a circuit card that failed, that did not send the right signal vehicle to separate from the booster. And the reasons for those types of failures have to do with foreign object damage, those types of things that --
SEN. BILL NELSON: Right. It was a failure that had nothing to do with the actual design of the new system of the kill vehicle to home in on the target.
GEN. KADISH: Correct. Correct.
SEN. BILL NELSON: So why did it take a year what would normally be a pedestrian kind of failure for what you're trying to test? Why would it take a year?
GEN. KADISH: Because it indicated that -- that was a failure in something we did not expect, because, as you correctly point out, it actually worked on all the other flights, and it's something we know how to do. That indicated to us that we needed to go back and look at every piece of the hardware in the test program and not leave any stone unturned and make sure that the smallest detail in our program was looked at to ensure the type of discipline I talked about earlier. That took time. And we took the time to do that. Now that we've gone through that and have adjusted people's expectation to this rigorous way of doing it, it is my opinion we can move faster in our test program, especially given if you have successes you want to turn up the complexity and the challenges Secretary Wolfowitz points out to test the edges of the envelope, or you may want -- you may fail doing such things.
SEN. BILL NELSON: When is the next test scheduled?
GEN. KADISH: Our next test is currently scheduled for the end of October or early November time frame of this year.
SEN. BILL NELSON: And the next one after that?
GEN. KADISH: It will be in the February time frame.
SEN. BILL NELSON: And you feel comfortable with that kind of interval to build on either the success or failure of each of those tests.
GEN. KADISH: That's correct. And when you have a success and you analyze the data that supports that and find that there are minor or no glitches, it gives you even more confidence in your next test schedule.
SEN. BILL NELSON: When in this regime of testing is your first major full-up with many different targets that are not actual targets, that are decoys? When does that occur?
GEN. KADISH: We haven't taken the decision of how we're going to add complexities to the test in final detail yet. So I think that'll occur over the next couple months. But certainly over the next 18 months we're going to be adding complexity. But it won't be until we build the full testbed capability where we want -- where we will have the ability to put more targets in flight almost simultaneously rather than just one, and fire more interceptors than just one, and then put more decoys in to get the different geometries that we'll convince ourselves as well as our critics that we have an operationally viable system. So that's why the testbed is so important to us.
SEN. BILL NELSON: And we --
SEN. WARNER: Senator, I've got to interrupt. We've got but a fraction of minutes left to the conclusion. The chairman suggested that we now adjourn the hearing. You could come back and resume your questioning. Would that be inconvenient?
SEN. BILL NELSON: Oh, do we have a --
SEN. WARNER: Yes, we're --
SEN. BILL NELSON: Oh, we have a vote. I did not know that, Mr. Chairman.
SEN. WARNER: So if it's agreeable to you --
SEN. BILL NELSON: So -- we were engaged in the conversation.
SEN. WARNER: Yes. Good questions, and I was listening, but, you know, we're --
SEN. BILL NELSON: Mr. Chairman, may I just conclude by asking one simple question?
SEN. WARNER: Yes. Yes.
SEN. BILL NELSON: When do you expect that full-up test bed under your present regime?
GEN. KADISH: Between fiscal year four and six.
SEN. BILL NELSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SEN. WARNER: Thank you. We'll stand adjourned until --
SEN. BILL NELSON: Thank you for telling me there was a vote. (Laughter.)
SEN. WARNER: Right. Thank you.
SEN. LEVIN: (Strikes gavel.) We will be back in session.
Let me ask this question of both of you. It has to do with when that testbed becomes operational. You said, Mr. Secretary, that you hope it's -- it is your intent and your hope that it become operational as quickly as possible. It's your hope, I guess everybody's hopes, that the tests succeed, and it's also, it seems to me, then, the question comes back as to what is the change which would need to be made to make that a operational system?
General Kadish said before that there are some changes that would need to be made. You characterized those as software changes, I believe, Mr. Secretary.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: That's my understanding from hearing the general speaking, yes.
SEN. LEVIN: All right. Is that a difficult thing to do, to make those software changes? I mean, does that have to be tested or is it something that we assume could be done quite readily?
GEN. KADISH: Well, if we -- I hesitate to say it's only a software change, because those things are monumental, in our business. But the issue is that I wouldn't expect the changes to be difficult to implement. However, in keeping with the philosophy of making sure we test like we use it in this testbed, we would have to at some point start testing those command relationships and making sure when you turn the switch the right thing happens.
So what I said earlier about having detailed plans to do that, I would expect us to start thinking about how to do that over the next year to 18 months and even beyond that, and that plans will change over time, based on what we discover. So that's why it's difficult for me to say precisely right now exactly what it will take to turn it operational.
SEN. LEVIN: But it will take that?
GEN. KADISH: It will at least take that.
SEN. LEVIN: All right. And it's our intent to have that tested so that it is ready when the other elements of an operational system are ready to go as well?
GEN. KADISH: Well, again, this is where it gets imprecise because, if you will recall last year, Senator, we were doing things concurrently and you questioned me very closely on why the high risk on a concurrent program. This program doesn't have that now. We wait to make that decision to actually produce the system that we intend to deploy based on more concrete test data and performance in the program.
So at some point over the next the three to four years, I would expect, based on the progress of our testbed testing, to take to the secretary and the decisionmakers options every year as to whether or not we want to start one of those coccurrent programs. And in that regard, we would use what we know in the testbed, and that testbed capability then could provide only an interim capability on our way to a larger system.
SEN. ALLARD: But the interim capability, which has been called a rudimentary capability -- is that the way you're using it, basically?
GEN. KADISH: That's the best term we've come up with to date.
SEN. ALLARD: All right, but the words "rudimentary" or "primitive" or "interim" all are intended --
GEN. KADISH: Not the final system.
SEN. ALLARD: But they're all intended to describe a system which has operational capability and is intended to have minimum or modest operational capability. Is that accurate?
GEN. KADISH: That's one of the things it would do, yes.
SEN. LEVIN: All right.
GEN. KADISH: There are two primary functions -- testbed first, and then the residual capability it gives you.
SEN. LEVIN: But that residual capability, that operational capability, is one of the purposes here. Is that not correct?
GEN. KADISH: That's correct.
SEN. LEVIN: All right. And you have said, Mr. Secretary, that it is your intent that that be achieved as quickly as possible. Is that correct? Just as long as -- I just want to be real clear here.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Yes.
SEN. LEVIN: Okay. Will -- I want to talk about the COBRA DANE radar for a few minutes. In your point paper that was provided to this committee, you said that an upgraded COBRA DANE radar, quote, "may have some ABM radar capability," close quote, but in any operational system, we anticipate that a new X-band radar at Shemya would be required to provide needed discrimination, even with all possible upgrades to COBRA DANE.
So are you then saying that COBRA DANE will provide that contingency capability as early as '04?
GEN. KADISH: If I understand the question, I believe the answer would be yes, because it's an early-warning radar, and it only functions as an early-warning radar. And one of the issues, as you know, is the countermeasure problem for any midcourse system that we need X-band for. So the capability is very basic and, as we've been describing it, rudimentary.
SEN. LEVIN: But COBRA DANE will provide useful contingency capability?
GEN. KADISH: That's what our belief is today.
SEN. LEVIN: Mr. Secretary, this is a bit unrelated to the series of questions that I went to keep pursuing here, but I've been troubled by it, because a number of times in the last few hearings -- I think at least twice -- it's been stated that you were on a commission that concluded that we needed to deploy a national missile defense system, and you have not said that that was not accurate.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: That's not what the commission concluded.
SEN. LEVIN: Because I think it would have been useful for you, when that statement is made, as it has been repeatedly here, for you to say, when it's your turn to respond to the question, that in fact that is not what that commission recommended. I would just ask you in the future that you clarify that --
MR. WOLFOWITZ: That's a fair point, Senator.
SEN. LEVIN: In your statement today, Mr. Secretary, you -- on page 3 you make the following -- at the top you make the following statement -- well, first let me go to the bottom of page 2. "The department's ABM compliance review group has been directed to identify ABM Treaty issues within 10 working days of receiving the plans for new development of treaty events." That process is already under way. When did that begin?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: This new procedure, I think, was instituted by Undersecretary Aldridge within the last week or two.
SEN. LEVIN: Okay.
And then at the top of the next page, you say the following: that "the secretary and I will be informed of whether the planned testbed use of Aegis systems in future integrated flight tests or concurrent operation of ABM and air defense radars in next February's tests are significant treaty violations." And then you made reference to those three fact sheets that are made part of the record.
You say here you're going to be informed as to whether they are "significant" treaty violations. Are you going to distinguish between significant treaty problems and just treaty problems? Is that word "significant" supposed to tell us that you will say that if it's a treaty problem or a treaty violation, in your judgment or the judgment of that compliance review group, that then there's going to be another test? Is it a significant violation?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: It doesn't say "significant violation." It's "significant problem," and I have to read in the mind of the authors who gave me that phrase. I think what it means is if it's a prospective violation, it is a significant problem. You can't guarantee because of the way these things change and alter over time that there are no treaty problems, but it certainly better mean -- it's what I took it to mean -- that if there is any serious prospect of a violation, that this is going to surface it early.
SEN. LEVIN: And that's --
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I would consider --
SEN. LEVIN: A violation is a violation. You're not trying to distinguish between a serious and a -- a violation.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Not at all.
SEN. LEVIN: All right. And then the next sentence, which I found to be a really interesting sentence, I must tell you. "This process will permit us to take them" -- and I assume that is referring to the treaty problems --
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Yes.
SEN. LEVIN: -- "into account as early as possible as we pursue our negotiations with Russia on a new strategic framework." What do you mean by "take into account"?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I mean that it becomes part of the considerations that the secretary and the president have to make in their discussions with the Russians. It becomes something we have to take into account in our consultations with you and other members of the Congress. It becomes something we have to take into account in moving forward with the program.
I mean, there are different ways to go with these issues, depending on the character they raise, and so there's not a -- until you see the form in which the issue specifically arises, it's hard to say exactly which way you'll go with it.
SEN. LEVIN: See, what I'm struggling with is whether or not the administration, the president, has decided that if modifications cannot be agreed to with Russia, that the decision has already been made to withdraw from the treaty. That's what I'm trying to figure out. Has it?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: (Pause.) I think -- I think there is a decision that at some point, and I'm not sure -- I think the point is the crucial question -- that at some point if we can't get modifications that allow us to proceed with missile defense, we will withdraw from the treaty. And the question is at what point, and I don't think there has been a decision about what point.
SEN. LEVIN: So that point, even if all of this testing worked out this year, may not come this year?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I guess the most I can say is this phrase that there seems to be agreement within the administration on, we're talking about months and not years. I mean, I think you yourself would say at some point you would withdraw from the treaty.
SEN. LEVIN: I might. Not would. And that's the whole difference. You just put your finger right on it.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Okay.
SEN. LEVIN: Now, I read this before in the -- Senator Warner very appropriately asked for later comments of the administration, that if Russia refuses the changes we propose you will prompt notice under the provisions of the treaty that we can no longer be a party to it. What you're telling us is that may or may not be the situation now because it may not be such prompt notice. Now you're saying that "at some point". And that's fine with me, by the way, because that begins to show a little complexity in how to approach probably the most significant security decision we're going to make, which is if we can't modify the treaty, whether we're going to, in fact, withdraw from it. And what I'm trying to see is to whether or not there is, in fact, that beginnings of flexibility, that opening to considering the ramifications of withdrawal, the impact on our security of withdrawal from a treaty as just being factors to be considered.
I was glad to hear your answer to Senator Warner's question about if, in fact, the modifications cannot be agreed to, whether you would come back to Congress in a consultative process, and your answer was yes. That to me means that what you do in that circumstance is subject to consultation. That to me means you have not made a final decision that no matter what the circumstances are, no matter what the fallout is, no matter what the reaction is, no matter what the actions which we could then expect from Russia and China are, no matter what anything, that you're going to promptly withdraw from the treaty. That's a -- instead, if you're going to be consulting with us -- and I would welcome that, I got to tell you -- before you make the decision that you're going to withdraw, I view that as progress. I don't want to look to see something that isn't there. But I took a little bit of heart from your answer -- (laughs) -- to Senator Warner's question. Because it's different, you know, it's a different kind of a spirit to say that if Russia refuses the changes we propose we will consult with Congress and come back to you as to what then, what actions we're going to do. If those actions are already decided, if you've already decided that if Russia doesn't agree to the changes that you're then going to give prompt notice under the provisions of the treaty that you're withdrawing from it, that puts us in a very different position.
So you can comment on that or not. But I'm going to -- I'd welcome. I don't want to characterize --
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Let me say a great deal of complexity has been added to the president's position since the Citadel speech that you quoted that from, and even last year in May when he made his statement about a new approach to nuclear weapons and deterrence and talked in quite elaboration about the importance of a new approach of offensive retaliatory forces as well. I mean, that already is a very major layer of complexity added to what we're trying to present. And when we talk about a new framework with Russia, we're talking about something that actually goes beyond missile defense and beyond nuclear weapons, and to incorporate a much broader view of security and one that I think is appropriate to this era. So we are very much trying to take a lot of people's views into account, certainly the Congress', certainly our allies, but certainly also the Russians. And I do think that -- I made a comment earlier which I think you may have taken as dismissive, that I didn't think this rudimentary capability in Alaska would keep a Russian military planner awake even for a minute.
I don't believe it would, but I in no way mean to dismiss the importance of the ABM Treaty as something that unfortunately became the centerpiece of U.S.-Soviet relations. We'd like to have a different centerpiece for U.S.-Russian relations, and that's what we're working on constructing. And it's going to take work, and we need to work with the Congress in doing it.
SEN. LEVIN: Well, that's more than welcome. But the complexity, again, that I'm referring, the layer of complexity that I'm referring to, is the question of whether to withdraw. And the question that I'm trying to figure out the answer to is whether or not that decision has been made to promptly withdraw from this treaty in the event -- or just the decision made to withdraw from this treaty, in the event that the modifications cannot be made.
And if in fact there's true consultations that are going to take place on that question before the decision is made, that puts us in one situation. If in fact the decision has been made that there's going to be a prompt withdrawal in the event modifications can't be achieved, that seems to me to put us in a very different situation in looking at your budget request.
And so I guess I'll try the question again. Is it your judgment that the decision has been made, in the event modifications cannot be achieved, to promptly withdraw from the ABM Treaty?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I'm not -- I mean, I think we are at the point, as the phrase is said, that it's a matter of months, not years, before we reach that point. Now I don't -- does that --
SEN. LEVIN: Reach the point of deciding whether or reach the point of withdrawing?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Reach the point of deciding that we would have to.
SEN. LEVIN: Reach the point later on of deciding? You have not now decided? Look, you know, this is a very important little conversation we're having here, to me. I don't know -- I can't speak for others, but to me it's a very important conversation, and it's not something which is splitting hairs; it's something which is -- goes to the heart of a very important issue. Is that -- because we have a responsibility, as do you, to defend this country's security and to protect and defend America. And we want to, it seems to me, make sure we don't create a greater problem by addressing the problem over here, in a North Korean threat, create a bigger problem with a larger number of nuclear weapons on Russia or Chinese soil. The response can leave us less secure if we don't do this right. I think most of us would like to see a new framework. I really believe that we'd like to see a new cooperative framework. There's no difference in that regard.
The question is how best to achieve it and whether it's best to achieve it by telling Russia we're going to withdraw if there's no modification, or to tell Russia we may withdraw if there's no modification, depending on how we perceive our security circumstances at the moment that we think we have something that might be workable. And those are very different issues and very different ways to phrase an approach.
So I don't want to -- unless you'd like to comment further on what I just said, I'll just go on to a couple other questions and then turn it over to Senator Warner.
Do you want to add anything?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I don't think I can add.
SEN. LEVIN: Okay.
In the statement which was given to the media last Wednesday, the following sentence appears from -- the administration made this following statement: "As we have informed our allies and Russia, we expect our RDT&E efforts will conflict with the ABM Treaty limitations in a matter of months, not years." When was Russia informed that we expect our RDT&E efforts to conflict with the ABM Treaty limitations in a matter of months? When did we notify them?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I'm not sure, senator. I'd have to get that for the record.
SEN. LEVIN: I'd appreciate that. (Pause.)
SEN. WARNER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Wolfowitz, I listened very carefully to your response to Senator Reed. And your responses to his question about the violation of a treaty -- the treaty, ABM Treaty -- were very succinct, very clear, and consistent with what you have said in two days of testimony, but tightly packaged in one response. And I wrote it down as best I could quickly. You simply said, "We will not violate the ABM Treaty." Isn't that correct?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: That's correct, senator.
SEN. WARNER: Fine. (Laughs.) I mean, to me, that puts to one side very many concerns of others. And secondly, you have indicated that you would further consult with the Congress if the option -- well, let me put it this way. It would be my hope that at some point in time this statement could somehow be embraced by the administration -- I've just sort of put it together -- that the United States will continue its consultations with our allies, negotiations with the Soviet Union. And, indeed, I support the president having indicated that withdrawal is an option, that he as commander in chief of our forces must consider, should he be unable to structure a new framework and/or the option, as we discussed early, of amendments, but that in his final decision he would have further consultation as necessary he deems with allies and with the Congress before exercising the treaty provision of withdrawal. Now, it would be my hope that somehow words would be crafted along those lines. I'll just leave it at that.
Further, General Kadish, the legitimate concern has been made that we, the United States, prove the technology before deployment. And I guess I have been around weapons systems about as long as anybody up here in the Congress -- 30 years plus. Clearly, a deployment decision of a new weapons system or new defense against a weapon would only be done after the full test, evaluation, all the various steps and benchmarks are taken, then it's certified to the secretary of Defense. Am I not correct in that?
GEN. KADISH: That's the way we normally do our major procure programs.
SEN. WARNER: Yes.
GEN. KADISH: However, there is precedent -- and I think it's embedded in some of our thinking here -- that we may want to take decisions a little bit earlier and take some risks in this. No defense system is ever perfect even if it's fully operational --
SEN. WARNER: I understand.
GEN. KADISH: -- tested. So we may want to do some things concurrently that would advance the capability with a little bit of risk. But somehow --
SEN. WARNER: Well, I don't think that's any significant departure, in my judgment, from what we have done, because I think there is (sic) several concerns that, one, we would be foolishly throwing money at this system were we to deploy it without having gone through the normal sequence of benchmarks prior to certification that this system can be deployed, and that we would take it without pursuing, which I fervently believe our president will do, consultation with allies and negotiations with Russia and the like -- all of these things. So I just -- I think the testimony today has gone a long way to clearly lay a foundation of fact that this administration is proceeding in a prudent manner with regard to reaching at some future point in time a deployment decision. And it has met my satisfaction. I hope it has met those of others.
Mr. Chairman, I will submit a series of questions for the record -- but we are way over our time estimates here, and you and I have other commitments -- with regard to several questions on the treaty itself and the necessity --
You know, I just don't think the general public fully understands that this treaty constrains the United States from developing missile defenses cooperatively with other allies and, indeed, Russia. Am I not correct on that?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: That's correct, senator.
SEN. WARNER: I mean, that's a such a fundamental proposition because I think basically the world wants to see a greater framework of security against the threat of these missiles, and that at some point in time our president, not unlike what President Ronald Reagan did, would offer to share technology and to allow this greater security to not only benefit the United States and our allies but Russia and, indeed, some others. So I think those fundamentals have to be pointed out, and do it in very simple, plain, good old-fashioned American English language. And I intend to do just that.
But I commend both of you today. I think this hearing has been a very significant step forward in meeting the challenge of -- legitimate concerns of others with regard to what this administration is doing to protect our fundamental security against an ever-growing threat of missile technology. And I'm glad that you said today very clearly, Mr. Secretary, that unless we come to grips with a defense against the threat of missiles, whether they're ballistic or intermediate, it renders almost useless the entire inventory of weapons that we now have and seriously impairs the ability of our nation to help other nations when their security could be challenged by a common enemy, because a threat against our nation, should we employ forces to save another nation, could be seriously put in jeopardy if we were threatened then with retaliation by some nation against us should we do that by use of this missile.
We also have to understand that many nations are putting their limited resources behind acquiring this capability, because those limited resources do not enable them to have the conventional forces and other forces to promulgate their foreign policy, even though that foreign policy be antithetical to our own.
This is a very simple, less costly means by which to enter the world of politics in foreign policy, and we've got to prepare ourselves to defend against it.
I thank both of you.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Thank you, Senator.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator Warner. Just one question, and then I'll give a very brief closing comment.
General Kadish, today, I guess, you prepared these three sheets for us, or the department prepared these three sheets for us, and they're now part of the record. When you told the committee on June 13th that none of the recommended activities would cause a violation of the ABM Treaty in FY 2002, were any of those activities on these three sheets included in the recommendations at that time?
GEN. KADISH: I think they were all being developed and subject to the normal look by the lawyers on the compliance review. And as I stated and qualified that, it was all subject to compliance and process --
SEN. LEVIN: Have there been any changes in your proposed activities since June 13th?
GEN. KADISH: Oh, yes, Senator, lots of changes.
SEN. LEVIN: Since June 13th?
GEN. KADISH: Yes, sir. And that's part of the problem we have -- is that there's always changes to this process, and as stated earlier in the hearing, it wasn't until Friday the 13th we got a modification to our latest test. So that's what's so difficult for us to be precise -- at least for me -- to be precise on this, because planning at very low levels in our organization on construction projects could change a date by months. That have -- has treaty significance.
SEN. LEVIN: All right. You gave us a booklet on June 13th laying out what your program was, and what I would appreciate your doing for the record is telling us in what specific ways these three sheets differ from that presentation which you made to us on June 13th.
GEN. KADISH: We'll attempt to do that, Senator.
SEN. WARNER: Mr. Chairman, might I also ask unanimous consent that -- I have obtained clearance, security clearance, on the June 13th testimony which further amplifies General Kadish's reply to your questions and the questions of others, and I'd ask unanimous consent that that could be placed in today's record. I presume this would be an appropriate juncture.
SEN. LEVIN: It would be. It would be very helpful, as a matter of fact. We appreciate that.
The -- first, let me say, relative to Senator Warner's comments about a formulation of a position, that I commend it to you. It's something I've been urging for quite some time, which is that the president, rather than saying he's going to withdraw from the treaty if modifications are not agreed to, state that he consider the option to withdraw in that event. It's a very significant statement, and it's significantly better, I believe, both in terms of trying to obtain an agreement but also in terms of working with Congress.
This is really what the position has been of the Congress for some time, at least in the Senate. Senator Warner, Senator Cohen, Senator -- then-Senator Cohen, Senator Nunn, and I talked about getting ourselves in a position to have a capability so that a president could determine whether or not to withdraw, based on nature of the threat, based on whether not overall we'd be more secure with a withdrawal, based on operational effectiveness, based on impact on arms reductions, based on cost-effectiveness.
Those factors were put into a bill that the four of us worked on in the early '90s so that the president would be in a position to decide whether or not -- whether or not -- to exercise the treaty provision relative withdrawal. And that formulation that Senator Warner just made about the president stating that if modifications were not available and were not achievable, that then he would consider that option it seems to me is consistent with the position that we've wanted each president to be in since we've started down the road of research and development of a missile defense.
And in terms of wanting another framework, I think every one of us would like to see a new framework, but we also would like to see a new framework in place before the old one is destroyed unilaterally, before it's torn down. And that is going to take some real effort, and it's worth trying for. But it's very different from saying we're going to tear down the old before we have a new one, to say we would like to get to a new one and here's why. That's a matter of persuading folks that it's in their interest and our interest to be able to defend against that rogue state or that accidental launch. And both of those are useful. But it also means that we don't want to do it in a way which could put us in a less secure position that would actually add to our insecurity because of a unilateral action which then precipitates a response on the part of Russia and China to overcome what they consider to be a threat to their security.
We may not understand why it's a threat to their security, but if they feel that way, they're going to act, they're going to respond, if they feel threatened by our unilateral action. And we should at least factor that into our thinking; not be stymied by it, not give anyone a veto, just be aware of what that response is and consider whether or not, given what the likely response might be, that we would be left in a more or less secure position.
Thank you. You both have been very helpful. These have been long hearings, helpful hearings. We'll keep the record open for 24 hours for those of our colleagues that have additional questions. There's material that you're going to be submitting for the record.
And we will stand adjourned.
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