Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to meet with this subcommittee today to discuss a topic of great importance to the American people and to our national security: nuclear deterrence.
During the Cold War, nuclear deterrence occupied center stage, and our strategy was focused on deterring the significant nuclear and conventional threat from the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. Now that the Cold War is over, the role of nuclear deterrence has been reduced, but the need for deterrence in today's world is still critical. Our nuclear posture contributes substantially to our ability to deter any future hostile political leadership with access to nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction from aggression against the United States, its forces abroad, and its allies and friends.
Although the prominence of nuclear weapons in our defense strategy has decreased since the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons remain important as one of a range of responses available to deal with threats or use of weapons of mass destruction against U.S. interests, and as an important disincentive to nuclear, biological and chemical proliferation. They also provide a hedge against the uncertain futures of potentially hostile nuclear powers, and serve as a means to uphold existing U.S. security commitments to our allies.
Nuclear deterrence has always been a controversial subject, fostering much debate over the years. While the end of the Cold War has fortunately decreased the intensity of this debate, the issues of nuclear force posture and nuclear deterrence continue to be debated by individuals and groups who question the need for nuclear weapons in today's world, and, in some cases, call for the complete elimination of these weapons.
Such calls are indicative of the continuing American and global interest in a deliberate process to further reduce, and ultimately eliminate, nuclear weapons. I emphasize the word deliberate, which is a prudent strategy in today's changing world where the dangers and risks of coercion and aggression, many potentially involving the use of weapons of mass destruction, are very real. We disagree with the nuclear abolitionists on timing, not ultimate goal; the United States has embraced the commitment to ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons for many years.
When we signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1968, we subscribed to Article VI, which calls for the parties to undertake "to pursue negotiations in good faith relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." In 1995, when the NPT was indefinitely extended, we reiterated this pledge to work toward the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in the context of general and complete disarmament.
The United States has made substantial progress in fulfilling our NPT commitment. The nuclear arms race has been halted, and in fact has been reversed. We have reduced our nuclear stockpile, through both the START I cuts and reciprocal unilateral initiatives, while fully preserving U.S. security interests. We have also made steady progress in pursuing and achieving stabilizing, agreed nuclear force
reductions through the arms control process. START I has entered into force; we are hopeful that the Russian Duma [parliament] will ratify START II so it can enter into force; and we are committed to negotiating START III as soon as Russia ratifies START II. Thus, lifting the threat of nuclear destruction and limiting the spread of nuclear weapons has been and remains an essential element of the president's foreign policy agenda.
However, we are not yet at the point where we can eliminate our nuclear weapons. For the foreseeable future, we will continue to need a reliable and flexible nuclear deterrent -- survivable against the most aggressive attack, under highly confident, constitutional command and control, safeguarded against both accidental and unauthorized use, and capable of inflicting a devastating retaliatory response should deterrence fail. We will need such a force because nuclear deterrence remains an essential element to deal with the gravest threats.
As stated in the secretary's 1998 report to Congress, the United States must retain sufficient strategic nuclear forces and theater nuclear systems to help deter any hostile foreign leadership with access to nuclear weapons from acting against U.S. vital interests, and to convince such a leadership that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile. We believe that these goals can be achieved at lower force levels and are accordingly taking the lead in additional strategic arms reductions.
To summarize the topics I will develop in more detail:
- Since the end of the Cold War, we have already made dramatic progress in reducing U.S., Russian and other countries' nuclear arsenals and potentials. We have also taken important steps to ensure safety, security and nondiversion of nuclear weapons and fissile materials.
- While some reductions have been unilateral, we have vigorously pursued stabilizing, agreed nuclear force reductions with Russia in the arms control process and have made great progress in this regard in recent years.
- The president has recently promulgated a new policy directive on nuclear weapons employment, which is the first revision in presidential guidance since 1981.
- While eventual elimination of nuclear weapons is an ultimate goal, we will continue to need a reliable, flexible and effective nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future.
- Assuring the safety and reliability of our nuclear forces and the nuclear stockpile remains a supreme national interest of the United States.
Let me now turn to how we have transformed our nuclear deterrent, both qualitatively and quantitatively; what our future strategy involves; and why nuclear deterrence remains an important element of our national security.
Since the end of the Cold War, our nuclear deterrent posture has dramatically changed. Under the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiative, we decided to:
- Eliminate our entire inventory of ground-launched nonstrategic nuclear weapons (nuclear artillery and Lance surface-to-surface missiles);
- Remove all nonstrategic nuclear weapons on a day-to-day basis from surface ships, attack submarines and land-based naval aircraft bases;
- Remove our strategic bombers from alert;
- Stand down the Minuteman II ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] scheduled for deactivation under START I;
- Terminate the mobile Peacekeeper and mobile small ICBM programs; and
- Terminate the SRAM-II nuclear short-range attack missile.
In January 1992, the second Presidential Nuclear Initiative took further steps which included: limiting B-2 production to 20 bombers, canceling the entire small ICBM program, ceasing production of W-88 Trident SLBM [submarine-launched ballistic missiles] warheads, halting purchases of advanced cruise missiles, and stopping new production of Peacekeeper missiles.
The 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, which was the first comprehensive post-Cold War review of U.S. nuclear policy and force posture, eliminated even the capability to deploy nuclear weapons (bombs and cruise missiles) on Navy surface ships. The NPR also established the strategic nuclear force structure which the United States will deploy under START II. Also in 1994, further reflecting the changed international situation, the U.S. and Russia agreed to no longer target their strategic ballistic missiles against one another on a day-to-day basis.
As a result of these significant changes, the U.S. nuclear stockpile has decreased by more than 50 percent since 1991. The most dramatic transformation in the U.S. nuclear deterrent has been in nonstrategic nuclear forces, or NSNF, which have unilaterally been reduced to one-tenth of Cold War levels. As a result, the only nuclear weapons remaining in the U.S. stockpile are those carried by our strategic triad of ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers equipped with gravity bombs and air-launched cruise missiles, as well as our nonstrategic bombs and nuclear-tipped sea-launched cruise missiles.
There has been a significant associated financial benefit. U.S. spending on strategic nuclear forces has declined from 7 percent of the total DoD budget in 1991 to less than 3 percent today. We have no development or procurement programs for a next-generation bomber, ICBM, SLBM or strategic submarine. The programs we do have are designed to sustain the safety, reliability and effectiveness of our remaining forces, and to ensure the continued high quality of our strategic forces.
In response to unilateral nuclear reductions made by the United States, Russia made similar pledges in 1991 [and] 1992 to reduce its nonstrategic nuclear forces. However, while it has reduced its operational NSNF substantially, it has made far less progress on these eliminations than the U.S.
Consequently, the Russian nonstrategic arsenal (deployed and nondeployed) is probably about 10 times as large as ours. However, Russian officials recently stated that the 1991-1992 NSNF pledges would be fully implemented by the year 2000, which would reduce the Russian advantage to about three or four to one.
Russian spending on strategic forces has also declined substantially since the end of the Cold War. Russia does have some new strategic systems under development—for example, a new single-warhead ICBM (the SS-X-27), a new SLBM (the SS-NX-28) and a new strategic ballistic missile submarine -- but Russian development programs are much fewer in number and their pace is slower than in the past.
While these new systems are intended to replace currently deployed systems that will reach the end of their service lives over the next decade or that will be eliminated under START II, fiscal realities suggest that, even with these replacement programs, significant declines in Russia's strategic forces are still to come.
In addition to the unilateral nuclear reductions we have made, the United States places great emphasis on achieving stabilizing verifiable, agreed reductions in nuclear forces through arms control treaties and agreements. The U.S. and Russia have made great progress in this regard in recent years.
START I, which entered into force in December 1994, will reduce each side's deployed strategic weapons from well over 10,000 to 6,000 accountable weapons by December 2001. The START II Treaty, signed in January 1993, was ratified by the U.S. Senate in January 1996, but has not yet been ratified by the Russian Duma.
When START II enters into force, it will further reduce each side's deployed strategic weapons from 6,000 to [between] 3,000 [and] 3,500. More importantly, START II will bring about more stabilizing strategic force structures by requiring elimination of MIRVed [multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles] ICBM launchers and elimination of heavy ICBMs (i.e., the Russian SS-18).
As mandated by Congress, the U.S. is maintaining its strategic forces at START I levels until Russia ratifies START II. Accordingly, DoD is taking steps to maintain this option through FY [fiscal year] 1999. The FY 99 budget request contains an additional $57 million beyond what would have been previously anticipated in order to sustain our forces at START I levels. This force structure consists of:
- 500 Minuteman III and 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs with multiple warheads;
- 18 Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarines, each carrying 24 Trident SLBMs;
- At least 71 B-52 bombers, each equipped to carry up to 20 nuclear-armed cruise missiles; o21 B-2 bombers, each equipped to carry up to 16 nuclear gravity bombs.
In accordance with direction included in the FY 1998 Defense Authorization Act, we are examining a number of options for maintaining START I levels beyond FY 1999 if necessary.
At the March 1997 Helsinki summit, Presidents [Bill] Clinton and [Boris] Yeltsin made commitments to promote START II ratification and to set a course for further strategic arms reductions once START II enters into force.
First, although the original START II treaty called for these reductions to be completed no later than Jan. 1, 2003, the presidents agreed to extend the START II reductions deadline to December 2007, allowing five more years to accomplish required eliminations and thus reducing the near-term costs of treaty implementation.
Second, the presidents agreed to deactivate by December 2003 those systems slated to be eliminated under START II, by means of warhead removal or other jointly agreed measures, thus enabling the sides to gain security benefits from the treaty in roughly the same time frame that was originally envisioned.
The presidents also agreed to commence negotiations shortly after START II ratification to conclude a START III Treaty that would set a limit of 2,000 to 2,500 deployed warheads to be reached by December 2007. Finally, they agreed that START III would be the first strategic arms control treaty which includes measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and destruction of strategic nuclear warheads. However, President Clinton made clear that the United States will not negotiate START III until Russia ratifies START II.
In September 1997, Secretary [of State Madeleine] Albright and Russian Foreign Minister [Yevgeniy] Primakov signed several legally binding documents which codify the Helsinki commitments on START II: a protocol extending the deadline to December 2007 for achieving treaty limits, and letters stipulating each side's agreement to deactivate by December 2003 the systems slated for elimination under START II.
In addition, a joint agreed statement was issued which records the agreement that downloading Minuteman III ICBMs from three re-entry vehicles to one can occur any time before the revised START II deadline of December 2007. After Russia ratifies START II, these documents will be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent.
If START II and its protocol are adopted, the U.S. strategic arsenal will be modified by the end of 2007 as follows:
- The 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs will be eliminated, and each Minuteman III missile will be armed with only one rather than three warheads;
- The SSBN [ballistic missile nuclear submarine] force will be reduced from 18 to 14 boats, all equipped with the D-5 missile;
- The number of strategic bombers will not change, but the cruise-missile capacity of the B-52 fleet will be reduced to stay within treaty limits.
Assuming Russia ratifies START II and we successfully negotiate a START III Treaty, once the START I, II and III reductions are completed, the United States and Russia will have reduced their strategic arsenals by roughly 80 percent from Cold War levels and, of even greater importance, greatly enhanced strategic stability by eliminating multiple-warhead ICBMs.
The department's Cooperative Threat Reduction "Nunn-Lugar" program is a key component of our nuclear arms control and nonproliferation strategy. Through the CTR program, the U.S. is providing assistance in the form of equipment, services and technical advice to Russia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. This assistance is based on hard-nosed considerations of national and international security.
Through CTR assistance, we attack the threat of unsecured nuclear weapons and WMD proliferation at its root -- by helping to dismantle and consolidate former Soviet weapons -- and we thus ensure that the requirements of the hard-won treaties negotiated in recent years are met. The CTR program is working in these countries to reduce the threat of theft and/or diversion of WMD and associated materials through support for safe and secure removal of nuclear warheads to Russia, destruction of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and related infrastructure, safe storage of warheads destined for destruction and of the fissile material removed from them.
The CTR program is not motivated by altruism. These activities are undertaken to reduce real threats to U.S. security: the threat of excess offensive weaponry, the threat of unsecured nuclear weapons and materials, and the threat of CW and BW capabilities.
The CTR program has notified $1.9 billion to Congress. The FY 98 notification, currently being staffed, will bring that total to $2.2 billion. Over $1.6 billion has been obligated for this program, and our spending rates have increased steadily since the program's inception in FY 92. Early in the program, there was criticism of CTR for its slow obligation rates. Indeed, it took time for the U.S. and Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian and Kazakhstani governments to define the assistance, sign the necessary agreements and begin the work.
It is a complicated process, but we have learned a great deal from our experience. We better understand the challenges of doing business in countries undergoing a transition from communism to capitalism. The projects funded by CTR are, for the most part, now moving smoothly.
Progress does not equal victory, however -- not yet. CTR has much work left to do, and this work remains just as important today as it was when first conceived, seven years ago. Our projects can be categorized by our five program objectives:
- Assist Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus to become nonnuclear weapon states, and eliminate Strategic Nuclear Arms Reduction Treaty (START)-limited systems and weapons of mass destruction infrastructure.
- Assist Russia in accelerating strategic arms reductions to START levels.
- Enhance safety, security, control, accounting and centralization of nuclear weapons in Russia and fissile material in the states of the former Soviet Union to prevent their proliferation and encourage their reduction.
- Assist the former Soviet Union to eliminate and prevent proliferation of chemical and biological weapons capabilities.
- Encourage military reductions and reforms and reduce proliferation threats in the former Soviet Union.
We have achieved important goals under each of these objectives, and have ambitious plans for future activities in each case.
CTR's bottom line is impressive. In 1991, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus together had 3,300 strategic and roughly 2,600 tactical nuclear warheads on their soil. They would have been respectively -- by far -- the third, fourth and seventh largest nuclear powers in the world. Today, in what is probably the greatest nonproliferation achievement the world has seen, these three states are completely free of nuclear warheads. In addition, START I eliminations are well ahead of schedule. CTR assistance has specifically helped deactivate 4,700 warheads, and destroyed 252 ICBMs, 252 ICBM silos, 37 bombers, 80 SLBM launchers and 114 nuclear test tunnels.
Much more is still to be done. We must continue to encourage the dismantlement of excess nuclear warheads in Russia and the reduction of its weapons-grade material, and to help ensure the safety and security of the warheads and fissile material that remain. We must continue to help the states of the former Soviet Union fully implement their START I reductions, and look forward to doing the same with START II. While the CTR program assists the recipient states, it is fundamental to U.S. national security, ensuring the reduction in weapons of mass destruction that would otherwise be arrayed against us or pose a serious proliferation threat.
In view of all of the reductions we have already made and the steady progress of arms control, the question of why we need a nuclear deterrent at all following the Cold War is relevant.
The Clinton administration answered this question in the Nuclear Posture Review. The NPR recognized that with the demise of the Soviet Union, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the embarkation of Russia on the road to democracy, the strategic environment has been fundamentally transformed. Conventional forces can and should play a larger share of the deterrent role. Nevertheless, nuclear weapons continue to play a critical role in deterring aggression against the U.S., its overseas forces, and its allies and friends. This is the case because the positive changes in the international environment are far from irreversible, and the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction in the hands of rogue states has grown.
The NPR reaffirmed that we need not only a strategic nuclear deterrent, but also flexible, responsive nonstrategic nuclear forces. Maintaining the capability to deploy nuclear forces to meet various regional contingencies continues to be an important means for deterring aggression, protecting and promoting U.S. interests, and reassuring allies and friends. As stated in the NATO Strategic Concept, the U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Europe provide an essential political link between the European and North American members of the alliance.
Russia has made great progress toward the creation of stable market democracy, and we do not regard it as a potential military threat under its present or any reasonably foreseeable government. We have made wise investments in the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and we share with the current Russian leadership (and most other Russian centers of influence) a determination not to let our relations return to a state of hostility in which these weapons would again be a threat.
Nevertheless, Russia still possesses substantial strategic nuclear forces and an even larger nonstrategic nuclear stockpile. Because of significant degradation in its conventional military capabilities, Russia appears to be placing even more reliance on its nuclear forces. Russia's new National Security Concept, promulgated in December 1997, states that "Russia retains the right to use all available forces and means, including nuclear weapons, if armed aggression launched against it threatens the very existence of the Russian Federation as an independent, sovereign state." It also states that "the main task of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is to ensure nuclear deterrence, which is to prevent both a nuclear and conventional large-scale or regional war, and also to meet its allied commitments. To accomplish this task, the Russian Federation should have a potential of nuclear forces which can guarantee that planned damage will be caused to any aggressor state or a coalition of states."
We cannot be so certain of future Russian politics as to ignore the possibility that we may once again need to deter the nuclear forces of a hostile Russia should the current policy of democratic reform be replaced by a return to aggressive authoritarianism. We do not believe that such a reversal is likely and we are working hard to avoid it. Nevertheless, it is prudent to maintain a secure and capable nuclear force as a hedge against it happening.
Even if we could ignore a future threat from Russia, there is a range of other potential threats to which nuclear weapons are a deterrent. China has a significant nuclear capability, and its future political orientation is far from certain. In addition, the number of rogue states with actual and potential WMD programs is considerable. We do not regard these states as undeterrable, either in their incentives to acquire a WMD capability or to use it.
We believe that the knowledge that the United States has a powerful and ready nuclear capability poses a significant deterrent to proliferators. If any nation were foolish enough to attack the U.S., its allies or friends with chemical or biological weapons, our response would be swift, devastating and overwhelming. As [then Defense] Secretary [William J.] Perry said in 1996, we are able to mount a devastating response without using nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, we do not rule out in advance any capability available to us.
The U.S. nuclear deterrent also helps to discourage the spread of nuclear weapons among our allies and friends. The extension of our deterrent to those nations has removed any incentives they might have to develop and deploy their own nuclear forces, as many are technically capable of doing.
The Quadrennial Defense Review, completed last spring, examined U.S. nuclear strategy and force posture and reaffirmed the continuing need for a robust and flexible American nuclear deterrent. In the QDR, nuclear forces were examined as an integral part of an overall review of defense issues. This review followed a path which led from the threat to strategy to force structure considerations, and finally to resource issues.
Last November, the president signed a new decision directive on nuclear weapons employment policy guidance. This directive was the first revision of such guidance in over fifteen years, although U.S. nuclear plans have been updated regularly through changes to subordinate documents and through presidential decisions such as the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives and the Nuclear Posture Review. The directive takes account of the changes in our policy and force posture brought on by the end of the Cold War, and builds on the conclusions of previous policy reviews, such as the NPR and QDR, to lead us to where we are today.
The directive describes, in general terms, the purposes of U.S. nuclear weapons, and provides broad presidential guidance for developing operational plans. It also provides guidelines for maintaining nuclear deterrence and U.S. nuclear forces.
The directive indicates that the United States must maintain the assured response capability to inflict "unacceptable damage" against those assets a potential enemy values most. It also posits that we must continue to plan a range of options to ensure that the U.S. can respond to aggression in a manner appropriate to the provocation, rather than being left with an "all or nothing" response. The new guidance also continues our policy that the U.S. will not rely on "launch on warning", but will maintain the capability to respond promptly to any attack, thus complicating an adversary's calculations. However, the new guidance eliminates previous Cold War rhetoric including references to "winning a protracted nuclear war."
The directive reaffirms that the United States should have a triad of strategic deterrent forces to complicate an adversary's attack and defense planning. It also notes that our deterrent forces and their associated command and control should be flexible and survivable, to ensure that the U.S. will be able to make an adequate and appropriate response.
While the directive does not address arms control issues per se, analysis undertaken in accordance with the new guidance shows that the U.S. strategic deterrent can be maintained at the 2,000 [to] 2,500 strategic weapon level envisioned for START III as agreed in the 1997 Helsinki accords.
Because nuclear deterrence will remain an indispensable part of our national security policy for the foreseeable future, the U.S. nuclear deterrent must remain credible; its weapons systems and nuclear warheads must be safe, reliable and effective.
Currently, our nuclear weapons are safe, secure and under responsible custodianship. Moreover, we place high priority on maintaining and improving safety and security. Our nuclear safety record is extraordinary; although a few accidents have occurred over the past 50 years, no accident has ever resulted in a nuclear detonation, and the last accident of any kind occurred almost 20 years ago.
Because of changes in our posture and technical improvements made since the end of the Cold War, the likelihood of a nuclear accident has decreased significantly. Our strategic bombers are no longer on day-to-day alert; our surface ships and attack submarines no longer carry nuclear weapons. The Army and Marines have eliminated their nuclear weapons.
Older weapons with less modern safety features have been removed from the stockpile; technical safety mechanisms have been improved. And detargeting means that our nuclear-tipped missiles are no longer aimed at targets in any country. The number of nuclear storage sites has decreased by 75 percent and weapons have been consolidated. As a result of all these changes, our nuclear weapons are much less exposed to accident environments.
In recent years, several defense observers, including some in Congress, have expressed concerns that deterioration in Russia's early warning and nuclear command and control systems raises the risk of inadvertent nuclear war resulting from a ballistic missile launch based on faulty warning information. Although the degree to which this is viewed as a significant problem varies, these same experts, in response, have called for reducing the alert status of U.S. and Russian nuclear forces.
While we continue to believe that the most direct means to achieving increased stability and security is via the negotiated, verifiable reductions of START II, an interagency working group has been examining a range of measures that the U.S. and Russia might take cooperatively or in parallel to address such concerns. A number of options have been studied, and we are continuing our examination, but we have made no decisions yet on proposing to proceed with specific approaches.
The department places top priority on maintaining the high quality, reliability and effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent forces (including their communication and command systems), and the people who operate them.
In conjunction with President Clinton's decision to conclude a "zero yield" Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the president stated that he is pledged to maintain high confidence in the safety, reliability and performance of the nation's nuclear stockpile as a matter of supreme national interest of the United States.
He also established a new annual process for certifying whether the stockpile is safe and reliable, and six concrete, specific safeguards that define the conditions under which the United States could enter into a CTBT.
One of these safeguards calls for the conduct of a science-based program, utilizing modern experimental facilities and computer simulations to ensure a high level of confidence in the safety, reliability and performance of nuclear weapons in the enduring stockpile. Consequently, the Department of Energy has established an aggressive, well-funded Stockpile Stewardship Program designed to ensure our weapons remain safe, reliable and effective in the absence of nuclear testing. The Department of Defense fully supports this program. Today, we have high confidence in the safety and reliability of our nuclear deterrent, and the Stockpile Stewardship Program is designed to provide the tools to assure this in the future.
Our objective is a safe, stable world. While successive U.S. administrations have embraced the objective of nuclear disarmament as our ultimate goal, the path to this goal is not clearly marked in a still uncertain security environment. What is clear is that the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament will be reached only through realistic, methodical moves forward, as genuine security permits, with each step building on those before it.
We have made dramatic reductions in our nuclear deterrent forces and weapons, as a result of unilateral initiatives and formal arms control treaties. Such stabilizing, verifiable agreed reductions will continue to be a primary objective of the United States. However, for the foreseeable future, we will continue to need a reliable and flexible nuclear deterrent -- albeit at lower force levels -- to provide our ultimate guarantee against the gravest threats.
Because nuclear deterrence will remain an indispensable part of our national security policy, the U.S. nuclear deterrent must remain safe, reliable and effective. Today, we have high confidence that this is so. In connection with the CTBT, the president established concrete safeguards to ensure the continued safety, reliability and effectiveness of our nuclear forces and weapons in the future. We are committed to full implementation of these safeguards. ...
Published by the American Forces Information Service, a field activity of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Washington, D.C. Parenthetical entries are speaker/author notes; bracketed entries are editorial notes. This material is in the public domain and may be reprinted without permission.