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Press Availability on Joint Intelligence Operations Centers

Presenters: Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Warfighter Support Lt. Gen. Jerry Boykin
April 12, 2006
Press Availability on Joint Intelligence Operations Centers

Additional Presenters:  Deputy Director, National Intelligence Customer Outcomes Lt. Gen. Ronald Burgess Jr., Director Defense Intelligence Agency Lt. Gen. Michael Maples, Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff Rear Admiral David Dorsett

 

            LTG BOYKIN:  Thanks for giving us this opportunity to talk to you and explain to you what the JIOC, the Joint Intelligence Operation Center is and what it will do for our nation, for the department, and for the intel community as a whole.

 

            The Secretary signed an execute order on I believe the 31st, is that right?

 

            VOICE:  The 3rd --

 

            LTG BOYKIN:  Third of April, I'm sorry.  The 3rd of April directing each combatant command to activate a Joint Intelligence Operation Center, a JIOC, as well as one at the DIA level, and that's Mike Maples' task, and Mike will be here in a few minutes to talk about that.

 

            The reason for this is because as a result of the A, the end of the Cold War, but more importantly, the events of 9/11, the Secretary recognized that the threat had changed, the environment had changed.  His first step towards reorganizing intelligence within the department was the creation of the USDI, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Dr. Steve Cambone. 

 

            Then as a result of the standup of USDI Steve Cambone directed a study called Taking Stock of Defense Intelligence which went out to all of the combatant commands, all of the combat support agencies, all of the stakeholders in the intelligence business at least within the department, and asked them what are your problems today and what are your requirements for the future.  We compiled a huge amount of data, came back and started analyzing that to determine primarily what the future requirements were for the warfighters.

 

            A second effort started about the same time and that was called the Reform of Human Intelligence, Reform of HUMINT.  We brought these two efforts together in about January of '04 into a single program which we called Remodeling Defense Intelligence, RDI.  This JIOC is one of the results of this effort called Remodeling Defense Intelligence.

 

            This has been thoroughly coordinated with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.  That's why Ron is here today.  In fact some of the most valuable input we got into this ExOrd or Execution Order, came from Mike Hayden himself who really had some good vision on this and gave us a lot of good thoughts about how this JIOC should function and how it should be organized.

 

            What we're trying to do is move towards operationalizing intelligence.  In other words taking intelligence from being purely a staff function to being both a staff function when appropriate and an operational concept, so we're operationalizing intelligence.

 

            What we're doing is reinforced by several other things.  One is the QDR.  There's verbiage in the QDR that sort of reinforces what we're doing here.  There's also verbiage in the Strategic Planning Guidance, as well as in Ambassador Negroponte's National Intelligence Strategy.  He reinforces in that the concepts for what we will do with the JIOC.

 

            Now I do not mean to be pedantic, but I'm a Virginia Tech ag major.  That helps me sometimes to draw pictures because I learned that way.  But just for the purposes of being clear in terms of what we're doing, if you will permit me for just a minute to go through a rather simple but I think helpful diagram here as to what this is all supposed to produce.

 

            First of all we have the combatant commanders and they produce requirements.  We're talking about requirements for a variety of things, part of which is what are their intel requirements.  That goes to their J2 and Jack Dorsett and Ron Burgess were both J2s and they can talk extensively about how that comes to them. 

 

            But the J2s then produce concepts.  Now in today's environment with what we're doing, we're going to call these ICPs, Intelligence Campaign Plans.  That's another way of helping to operationalize intelligence.

 

            Then these are going to go to the JIOC and this is where they are translated into actions.

 

            Now in every theater I think what you're going to find is this guy here, the J2, is also the head of the JIOC.  He's the head of this center here.  So he's developing an ICP and then he's turning it into action here within the JIOC. 

 

            Now ultimately the JIOC configuration is going to be a JIOC at DIA, so you've got a DoD JIOC.  Then you've got a JIOC at each of your theaters.  Count them off.  The only thing that will be not strictly according to the Unified Command Plan will be that there will be a JIOC at U.S. Forces Korea.

 

            Is that classified?  Okay, good.

 

            Some of this stuff is classified, so I brought these two here so they can kick me in my bad leg here whenever I get into the classified area.

 

            So there will be one at DoD, and then nine COCOMs plus U.S. Forces Korea.  So there will be a total of ten JIOCs out in the theaters and one here in the department.

 

            What happens here is we tie them all together through what's called horizontal integration.  The concept behind this whole configuration is, as one JIOC gets overloaded let's say with an analytical task, and let's just take CENTCOM.  Let's just say CENTCOM because of what's going on in the CENTCOM AOR says, you know, our analytical effort is dedicated to Iraq and Afghanistan right now.  We are now concerned about piracy off the Horn of Africa.  We need some analytical support.

 

            The way we're setting this thing up is that the DoD JIOC, which again, this is DIA.  This is inside of DIA, it's not all of DIA.  It's inside of DIA.  DIA would then have the capability to go over here let's say to TRANSCOM and say TRANSCOM, you have some extra capability, capacity within your analytical organization, so TRANSCOM you come down here, virtually -- not moving people, but virtually in most cases -- and support the analytical efforts.  So it's kind of like a traffic cop here.

 

            The other thing, though, that this does is it takes ODNI, national intel requirements or national foreign intelligence requirements -- you guys are late Mike.  Noted.  [Laughter].

 

            The DoD JIOC, Mike Maples, and he can talk more about this, will be able to take requirements from Mary Margaret Graham from the national community, national level requirements, and have those fulfilled at the COCOM level.  That capability is really hit and miss.  It's very spotty today.  We don't really do that today so we're talking now about giving the DNI an unprecedented level of access to these combatant commands out here which is a very positive move for the DNI.

 

            So that's the concept for the big picture organization and structure.

 

            If we look at the actual JIOC here, and these are purely my words and I'm not an intel professional so you can challenge me and these guys will bail me out.  But I believe the heart of intel in the COCOMs today should be, and under our concept will be, this thing called the analyst.

 

            One of the challenges the analyst has today is he has databases out here.  These are all databases.  And there's tons of them.  Does anybody want to even guess how many databases?  Ron, do you have any idea?  Nobody even knows how many databases there are out there.  You may have 100 SIGINT databases, for example, or 50 geospatial databases, but these are all separate, by the way.

 

            So this analyst here is drawing from all these databases and frankly, it's an impossible task for him to get all the available information.  He doesn't have enough hours in the day to go to all these databases and pull everything together, and then he doesn't have a mechanism whereby he can put them sort of all into one big picture, one all-source analytical picture.

 

            So part of what we're going to do is we're going to build as part of the IT architecture, we're going to build these databases into something that is a single source database for him.  That's a challenge, but it can be done because we have done it in Iraq with what we call JIOC Iraq and we are getting nothing but positive feedback from Iraq.  About analysts that are taking things that would routinely take them five hours, is now literally taking them five minutes, and I just got more vignettes from the Army this morning.

 

            So we're giving this analyst a capability here to bring these databases together into an all-source analytical base and do true all-source analysis.

 

            I know you have a question on that so we'll come back to that at the end and I'll let one of these guys answer it.

 

            This guy, and I say guy, this is a group of people.  This is your JIC or your JAC.  They're putting a puzzle together.  They're trying to solve a puzzle.  What we want them to do is we want them to talk to a group over here called collectors.

 

            In the Cold War paradigm in order for this analyst, who by the way, this analyst is under a chain of command that's not the same chain of command as these collectors, and each of these collectors which could be HUMINT, in other words your case officers out there in the theater; they could be SIGINT, and that's a variety of different things; it could be geospatial; it could be even Special Operations.  It could be your Special Ops folks there.  It could be MASINT, Measures and Signatures Intelligence; it could be open source intelligence.  It's a variety of collectors here.

 

            We want this guy to talk to this guy.  Right now every one of these collectors is under a separate chain of command.  Every one of them.  That's what a theater has to deal with.  Heretofore this has been considered to be a staff function, not operations.  So you've got all these chains of command out here, you've got these analysts under a separate chain of command, and somebody decided for this analyst in most cases what he wanted, or what he really wanted.  Not what he said he wanted.

 

            So what we're trying to do is create a situation where the analyst is talking to the collector and there's no filter in the middle here.  He's telling him what he wants.  And consequently what you want the collector to do is talk to the analyst by providing him with what he wants.  Unfiltered.  No filters here.  Unfiltered.

 

            In between here the person that you want to do this is called your Ops Officer which has traditionally been called a collection manager.

 

            Now what does he do?  He sets priorities, he does your ICP, he allocates resources and assets, and he keeps this flow going.  The flow of from the analyst to the collector saying this is what I need, and from the collector to the analyst saying this is what I've got for you.

 

            This sounds so simple, but the fact of the matter is it doesn't work today because, again, you've got disparate, separate chains of command.

 

            Now we're not saying, let me be clear on this.  We're not saying that all of this will be under the chain of command that goes back to the J2.  But what we are saying is the J2 won't know the difference because he will have the authority and the ability to task these assets to meet the requirements of this analyst over here.

 

            And the analytical work that's done within each of these is only done to ensure that they got what they were told to get.  In other words, an analyst in the back of an aircraft that does a photographic pass across a target, he looks at it and says yep, we got it, let's go home.  Or no we didn't, make another pass.  That's the only analytical work we expect to be done here as part of this.

 

            This is the JIOC.  The theaters have the flexibility to put all or part of their analysts in this cell here. They can keep some analysts outside, not in the JIOC. 

 

            I've done my pedantic piece I guess for today, but I hope that helps a little bit to understand what our organizational structure is and what the relationships are.

 

            I just outlined for you in kind of crude terms what the principles are for the JIOC, what we're trying to achieve.

 

            Ron?

 

            LTG BURGESS:  Thanks, I'll take just a couple of minutes.  First of all again, like General Boykin, thank you for being here today.  I wanted to take just a couple of minutes and talk to you about some of the cooperative efforts that have gone on between the Director of National Intelligence and the Department of Defense to improve the quality and the timeliness of the intelligence that's required.

 

            A fundamental tenet of our National Intelligence Strategy which General Boykin alluded to is to continuously strive to improve our intelligence system.  Whether that be in support of the President of the United States, in support of our troops deployed around the world, or those working here to protect the homeland.

 

            On behalf of Ambassador Negroponte, Director Negroponte, I'm glad to be here to say a few words about that and about how we have worked together.

 

            Sitting here represent the cross-leveling of our respective organizations of how we have worked together to pull together in what we think is a careful and cooperative way to develop an intelligence organization which will support the combatant commands that are out there and we think will greatly add to our ability to understand, detect and respond to a very different problem set that we face here in the 21st Century.

 

            We think this is exactly what we were asked to do in terms of cooperation from both the 9/11 Commission, the WMD Commission, and both the President and the Congress as they stood up this Director of National Intelligence.

 

            As a former J2 in a combatant command and as a former J2 on the Joint Staff, I think I've got a pretty good understanding of the need for integrated and better focused intelligence activities that are closely linked with actual operations.  The JIOC concept gets us to that linkage that we need to see.

 

            As we've seen in Afghanistan and Iraq and elsewhere as we've fought the Global War on Terrorism, modern battlefields require very rapid and decentralized intelligence activities that we need to assess and react to the fleeting opportunities that we have to get a target that is presented to us.

 

            We must be able to bring national operational and tactical capabilities together quickly to address these and the JIOC is one way of getting at this.  We see this concept as a way and a crucial element in allowing us to do that.

 

            Additionally we think that the implementation of the JIOC concept supports the WMD recommendation as well as the DNI's National Intelligence Strategy that has been laid out, specifically a cooperative effort to bring together more depth and accuracy to intelligence analysis to improve the focus of our collection efforts to help our military target and penetrate difficult targets that are out there and transform ourselves to stay ahead of rapidly evolving threats.

 

            JIOCs have the potential we think to improve intelligence support to the combatant commanders and improve the overall integration of both national and military intelligence capabilities.  They will also serve as the means, as General Boykin talked about, through the level that they will go, a means by which the President and the DNI can leverage military intelligence capabilities in support of national priorities.

 

            We think the JIOC will do exactly what it is we've laid it out to do.  We just have to continue to develop it.

 

            LTG MAPLES:  I don't have a statement.

 

            The only thing I would make is that we do have the JIOCs that are being formed at each of the combatant commands.  Those JIOCs have a little bit different flavor, as General Boykin has pointed out, in the integration of functions for the combatant commander.  The combatant commander is given the authority to integrate his operations, his planning and his intelligence functions to bring them together more closely.  And some of the combatant commands are already there in doing that.  That same process has been worked very well in both OIF and OEF as well.

 

            The Defense JIOC brings together intelligence capabilities both from the national level and from the Department of Defense in order to more rapidly respond to the requirements both from a national level and the needs of the combatant command, and also has an enterprise role, I think, from the defense level.  That is bringing together the capabilities of all of the JIOCs with respect to information technology, the sharing of information, the analytic tools that are being used, so that we're all on a common basis and that we can more rapidly access those databases General Boykin talked about, but that we also have a common means of moving that information and tagging the data so that it can be read and used more effectively throughout the organization.  So a little different kind of flavor I think at the defense level.

 

            LTG BOYKIN:  The guy that knows more about what's in that order and specifically what's classified and what's not classified is the J2 of the Joint Staff, so Jack?

 

            RADML DORSETT:  Just a couple of quick comments.

 

            When the Secretary of Defense issued the order to create the Joint Intel Operation Centers, he ordered these [inaudible] organizations.  He also ordered or provided responsibilities to those organizations and clarified responsibilities between various echelons within DoD and even helped clarify with the help of the DNI's staff and General Hayden in particular, the relationships between the Director of National Intelligence and the DoD elements.  I think that's a fairly important element there.

 

            The other thing that flows from this Executive Order is the assignment or the need for processes to be established.  some of those processes, to put this in context, that will evolve here with the creation of JIOCs is that DoD intelligence, specifically out at the theater level, the combatant command level, will transition from what has been a production and analytical focus to all sources and operationally focused.  It’s very significant because in the past there's been great accusations from operational commanders that intel was just too ineffective for their uses.

 

            The other thing is in the order there's a transition from stovepipe intelligence, from disciplines -- human intelligence, signals intelligence -- to an all source, fully synchronized capability.  I think the way most of the JIOCs are going to execute that is they're going to integrate people that have previously been in either separate buildings or separate cubicles, separate decks and floors, and bring them into large operational intelligence spaces where all functions are performed simultaneously.

 

            The other thing is that there was very little planning done previously, up to this date.  Intelligence was not done for being very effective or efficient in planning.  So there's an entire new process to do intel campaign plans that's already been in the works basically for the last year, where the Secretary has formally documented that as an Execute Order.

 

            The other thing that's a significant process change is that instead of focusing on what we call the intel cycle where you would direct activity, collections would occur, you would exploit the imagery that was collected, then you would do more analysis and ultimately you would issue a report.  In the past that cycle has been measured basically in days, at least in a day and a half to three days.  The Joint Intelligence Operation Centers will measure their intel operation cycle in minutes and hours.  Some process changes need to occur, but that really is a significant change I think.

 

            The final two items I would say, the Chairman is very intent on making his Joint Intelligence Operations Centers fully integrated with operational activity, with the operation sides of the house.

 

            In the past intelligence has been done behind doors, feeding operations and plans but not as integrated.  So that's a significant action that was in the order.

 

            Finally, this integration, I want to reemphasize this, integration between DoD intelligence and other national agencies.  The national intelligence community.  It's designed to bring people together to share information and to produce better product, basically.

 

            QUESTION:  General Boykin, I think you said that this would give DNI unprecedented access to DoD assets.  Can you give us an example of some of the types of things DNI would not have been able to get before that they'll now be able to achieve.

 

            LTG BOYKIN:  When I say DoD access I'm talking about those assets that are down at the COCOM level.

 

            LTG BURGESS:  I think the best example to pick is there are times, under an old process that was there, a combatant command or someone at the pointy end of the spear, as I refer to them would come in and say I need you to turn national collection on this, and at the national level we would go through a process and have a discussion and decide whether or not that fell within the priorities to do that.

 

            Now with what we have set up that we will have set up in the Defense JIOC with tactical, operational and strategic being collocated, they will come in with their requirement, but we will have a discussion very quickly because there will be some give and take, if you will, where if it requires national collection we can turn that, but the national side will now have access and visibility into what the collectors that belong at the lower echelons are doing and what they're doing with their collection assets, and we can recommend to them no, you would actually be better served by turning one of your own assets and doing this as opposed to tweaking the national system. But it will be that interface that will allow us to have that insight and to have that discussion.

 

            LTG BOYKIN:  Particularly in the area of ISR what you'll find is there are some assets that are actually under the combatant command.  Small airplanes, UAVs, whatever. 

 

            The DoD JIOC that Mike will run will have a Joint Functional Component Command for ISR, JFCC/ISR, Major General Welsh.  When the DNI comes in and says I need something in theater X, his DoD JIOC actually has the capability to look at not only the national system, but as Ron said, to go all the way down to the UAVs that are being flown out of that theater and determine whether they can meet his requirement.  That system does not really exist today.

 

            LTG MAPLES:  Just to clarify, it will be integrated even more because in addition to being the Director of the Defense JIOC I'm also the Commander of the Joint Functional Component Command for ISR, of U.S. Strategic Command.  So I wear both hats which enables me with authorities in both areas to link the two together.  General Welsh is my deputy and [inaudible] on the JIOC side as well.  But I will wear both hats so I have the authorities in both realms.

 

            QUESTION:  General, can you talk a little bit about what's going on in Baghdad, and one of you talk about, you said you already had vignettes to talk about how this has benefited.  When was the Baghdad JIOC set up?  And what in practical terms has this meant for the folks on the ground there.

 

            LTG BOYKIN:  We started August of last year building a mechanism, a system.  And by the way the reason we started in Iraq was because General Abizaid said at a combatant commanders conference, if we're going to build a JIOC, let's start where the real fight is, let's build the first one in Iraq.  So we said okay, we did.  And largely driven by the IED problem there and a way of trying to solve that problem.

 

            So what we did is we built an architecture there that allows an analyst to sit at a single work station and bring in different classifications and different types of intelligence.  In other words he can get geospatial intelligence on the same screen that he gets SIGINT on the same screen that he gets human intelligence reports from either the case officers or the tactical HUMINT teams.  And he can tap into all these databases.  Some of them go back to the very highest classifications.  You have to go into the JWIC system.  So he can get it all there.  He can do all-source analysis.

 

            I stood there and watched a staff sergeant in Iraq.  In fact you can explain what he said better -- let me ask Jim to give you the vignette that this guy gave us and showed us how he did it.

 

            VOICE:  In addition to those intelligence databases an important feature is it combines the operational reports that are typically being generated by MNFI all the way down to battalion level.  So when you combine the operational reporting and the intelligence reporting you're able to see, for instance, how do I say this unclass.

 

            There was an event that he was able to monitor --

 

            LTG BOYKIN:  That's why I didn't brief it.  You know the classifications better than I do.

 

            VOICE:  An event over time, and was able to kind of go back in time and look and see what the patterns were in a specific area.

 

            The key thing though, he's able to notice a change, detect a change quicker and provide that information to the operational arm, if you will, go to out and find more information give a better update, a better ground truth of what's going on in that event.

 

            LTG BOYKIN:  Let me just be blunt, and I'll blow the security.  What are they going to do, send me to Iraq?  [Laughter].  If there's an IED event they have the capability on a single screen in a matter of minutes to do backtracking, for example, to see what kind of SIGINT activity was there, what kind of motor vehicle activity was there based on UAV shots or whatever.  And essentially backtrack that back to a target.  That's one thing they can do, and they can do it in minutes.

 

            Now heretofore, to get SIGINT data alone they had to leave their intel cell and go to another facility that was skiffed only for SIGINT.  So they had to get up and go to another place and then come back and manually overlay that.

 

            QUESTION:  Separate buildings?

 

            LTG BOYKIN:  Separate building.  Separate facility altogether.

 

            QUESTION:  It's like 24.

 

            LTG BOYKIN:  Yeah.

 

            QUESTION:  Can I ask a couple of clarifications?  When you're using the term all source, do you mean all source in the whole intelligence community?  So CIA and [inaudible], or do you mean all sources of the military's --

 

            LTG BOYKIN:  We mean all source.  Now that's a real challenge because you have the issue of originator control.  It's a real challenge to get all source, but Dana, we don't do all source analysis today.  This is a step towards bringing us to all source analysis.

 

            QUESTION:  So your analyst right there, when you drew all the databases, you mean databases that aren't owned by DoD as well?

 

            LTG BOYKIN:  A lot of them are, and some of them are not.  We want access to CIA databases -- The only thing we can control right now is what's within the department, but our vision is and the reason we're asking the DNI to front a lot of this for us is we want to access the databases that come from other organizations as well.  Where appropriate.  Those things that cross the line into being domestic intelligence and so forth, then that's different altogether.

 

            But for example, biometric data which is actually stored here in the United States.  We need that kind of access.

 

            QUESTION:  But those are issues you're still working out?

 

            LTG BOYKIN:  That's correct.

 

            QUESTION:  When you go to your first diagram, and you got down COCOM J2, JIOC, actions.  In actions did you mean analytical tasking as well as collecting?

 

            LTG BOYKIN:  Both.  That's what we're trying to say.  It's all part of intel operations.

 

            QUESTION:  Will there be a JIOC level classification that could be seen as a way to share or not to share?  When something is -- You could classify something at a JIOC level that can't be pushed down or --

 

            RADML DORSETT:  But there are some classifications that that analyst's boss might get access to that the analyst wouldn't.  So there's still going to be a method to control the flow of information to the people who have the need to have access to that.  But the key is to build the infrastructure and develop the processes so that you can get access to the information when you need it.

 

            LTG BOYKIN:  I think Mike gave you a window into something very important there when he talked about data mining and data tagging.  Some of this is an issue of as the data is collected that it's tagged correctly so that they know whether it needs to go to that analyst or not.  How we build those software programs is very critical so that it's tagged up front and that analyst gets it if he needs it.

 

            QUESTION:  Can you talk about how all this is applied to NORTHCOM and whether -- All the bells ring when you talk about it.  So what can and --

 

            LTG BOYKIN:  I'll tell you Dana, Steve Cambone personally went out and sat down with the Commander of NORTHCOM to ensure that the concept of a JIOC at NORTHCOM was not inconsistent with what we know to be the law and the policy.  And what they concluded was that there are situations where NORTHCOM may be involved in an event, for example, that is transiting from one COCOM to the other.  For example, from PACOM into the U.S. territorial waters.  It goes from being a PACOM threat or responsibility to being a NORTHCOM responsibility.  Now PACOM needs to be able to hand that off to someone.  If they can hand that off to a like organization, that being a JIOC, it's easier than handing it off to sort of a traditional J2 organization.

 

            What they don't do, NORTHCOM does not collect.

 

            We can't tell you what the NORTHCOM JIOC is going to look like exactly, I don't think.  Jack probably knows more about it than I do, but all I want you to know is Steve went out there and sat down with them and looked them in the eye and said I want to make sure that we know what we're talking about when we talk about a JIOC from NORTHCOM because you don't collect intel.  They said we do not collect intel.

 

            QUESTION:  But they [inaudible], force protection collection, right?

 

            RADML DORSETT:  Let me answer it this way.  NORTHCOM is still evaluating the relationships that they will need with various agencies, the type of JIOC they need to have.  It's different than a JIOC you'd have in CENTCOM or PACOM where you're looking at foreign adversaries outside the continental U.S., so the structure is going to be different.

 

            The NORTHCOM Commander and staff are very intently investigating what those relationships should be with the interagency.  They've developed some already.  But with the establishment of the JIOC I think there's still some work to be done.

 

            This Execute Order just went out a week ago, basically a week and a half ago. So the answers aren't there yet.  I'd prefer not to go any deeper in the answer than that, because I think they still need to evaluate what their relationships will be, and precisely what they're going to do.  Although they've been engaged in this development of the JIOC, I don't think all the answers are there yet.

 

            QUESTION:  So [inaudible], for instance, the role of [CIFA] in force protection or just generally [inaudible]?

 

            RADML DORSETT:  I do not.

 

            LTG BURGESS:  For example, I would use this as an example.  I was the J2 at U.S. Southern Command.  So I'm sitting there, U.S. Southern Command is in the middle of Miami, Florida.  I had CI folks, I had some [CIFA] as a prelude to what it has become today.  We did not do actionable collection outside our base perimeter, if you will.  I did a lot of liaison through the local law enforcement, whether it be the Miami police, FBI, Secret Service, DEA, others out there to pick up on threats, and then we would pass our requirements to them because outside the base, inside domestic territory, my collection scope was very limited in terms of what I could do with my assets.

 

            QUESTION:  But that has evolved since 9/11 quite a lot, right?  So is this evolving more now with the JIOC, NORTHCOM's JIOC?

 

            RADML DORSETT:  I can't speak to NORTHCOM.  I can speak to my experience at PACOM.  And what the JIOC will do with PACOM or EUCOM or CENTCOM for that example is it will give them access and visibility to what is occurring in the counterintelligence and HUMINT fields across their theater of operations.

 

            In the past much of the counterintelligence activities were done by the services.  Now what's happening is the combatant commanders will get visibility, and I've already seen that change out in Pacific Command, they're given visibility on a broad array of counterintelligence activities.  So this gives you visibility and it gives the commander an opportunity to weigh into those CI activities.

 

            I would expect the same thing will happen with NORTHCOM, again because it's a unique issue I really don't know.

 

            VOICE:  If you're talking [CIFA] and Talon, that's a whole separate issue and there's new Deputy Secretary of Defense guidance out on that which we can info you on.  It kind of reaffirms the original Wolfowitz memo on how Talon will be used.  Then says it's only used for foreign intelligence threat, nexus types of reports from Talon.  So there are distinct directives and guidelines on that. I can get you a copy of those if you'd like.

 

            QUESTION:  Is this all source intelligence capability just now in the Baghdad [inaudible]?  Is this what General Zaner's whole operation there --

 

            LTG BURGESS:  Yes, that's why we're --

 

            RADML DORSETT:  It's not matured to the extent that we want it to, but yes.  The capabilities are there, they are executing it there.  In fact as we've developed this JIOC concept over the last two years bits and pieces of this have already been implemented around almost all of the combatant commands.  But it's mostly the processes.  In some cases it's organizational structure.  EUCOM and CENTCOM and PACOM have actually modified their organizations to do more operations and intelligence activities and to bring these various disciplines of intelligence together.  In fact at PACOM where I was they are actually modifying the floor layout, getting rid of spaces like this and cubicles and opening it up so there can be much greater dialogue and you can increase the speed of your activities across the intel discipline.

 

            QUESTION:  General Zaner's operation, is that considered the JIOC in Iraq?  The one that he operates out of Camp [Slater]?

 

            LTG BOYKIN:  No, that's not considered the JIOC.  The JIOC has been built in, help me out, Jim.  One division, one Marine regiment, MNFI --

 

            SR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  One BCT and one [inaudible].  The initial fielding was a slice.

 

            LTG BOYKIN:  Right.  And as of this morning, I just found out from the Army this morning, they have gotten approved for the fielding to the rest of the units there.

 

            SR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  I think it's important, sir, to also identify the JIOC in Iraq is a flat network as opposed to an organization.  There is a difference.  It's a capability that enables intelligence operations.  The organization that this is the focus of is not completely different --

 

            LTG BOYKIN:  That's the difference, Eric, between a tactical JIOC and a theater level operational JIOC.  That really is more of an analytical IT architecture as opposed to a physical place with a structure around it which would be at the COCOM level.

 

            So you can build JIOCs at whatever level you want.  You can go all the way down to whatever cutting edge you want, but the lower you get the more it's going to be an IT architecture versus an organization.

 

            RADML DORSETT:  Most of these processes we've talked about are being employed by Rick Zaner in his organization but you wouldn't call that a JIOC at this point.  They haven't called themselves a JIOC.

 

            LTG BOYKIN:  He's very involved in it but his headquarters is not the, this is the center of the JIOC.

 

            QUESTION:  Can you talk a little bit more about integrating operations into the J3 or representatives to be part of this?  And also for the task as the need comes up?

 

            RADML DORSETT:  I think we're going to have an evolutionary movement.  The Chairman's intent is to really break down barriers between J2/J3.  There's a future end state where they are comprehensively integrated in their activities.  Still two different organizations, two different functions.  And clearly you'd only have the J3 directing what type of intel you produce.  You're given the requirements.  But you want to have freedom for analysis, but a much closer operation.

 

            Where we're seeing the early stages of increased cooperation and coordination between the two, the intel and the outside analysis, at the theater level is in the management of ISR resources where you'll have the J3 people who schedule reconnaissance aircraft working in the same spaces with analysts, collection managers, and that's occurring in, I'm not sure if it's all, but in many of the combatant commands right now.

 

            At the Defense JIOC level, the Joint Force Component Command for ISR, collocated with the JIOC, the rest of the JIOC, that's going to occur at the national level.  In fact we're already starting to do that.  So that's where the earliest more comprehensive integration is occurring for the JIOCs I think.  But I think these processes are going to take time to evolve, to figure out how you do the rest of that.

 

            LTG BOYKIN:  Can you stand another diagram?

 

            QUESTION:  I can.

 

            LTG BOYKIN:  You won't write me up as being pedantic and thinking that I'm still an instructor in the Ranger Department, right?  [Laughter].  You've got to promise.

 

            QUESTION:  I promise.

 

            QUESTION:  As long as it's green ink and not yellow.

 

            LTG BOYKIN:  Here's black.  [Laughter].  I can do it in purple so it's joint, but -- [Laughter].

 

            When I came in the Army, Mike came in, when all these folks came in the service we looked at operations as being maneuver or strike.  Really, that's it.  Maneuver could be a sea kind of maneuver.  It could be a blue water kind of thing or it could be crossing the line of departure out of Kuwait headed for Baghdad.  These were operations.

 

            Then you had some supporting functions.  You had logistics.  You had communications.  You had intel.  You might have had, for example, special operations over here.  You had a bunch of supporting functions but they were all designed to enable maneuver and strike.

 

            Where I think we're going is we're going to a concept that says there are different types of operations and what we ultimately want to reach is we want to reach the level of saying operations includes maneuver, strike, information operations.  After all, we do call it information operations.  Special operations.  What did we do in Afghanistan?  We took the country back with special operations.  There were no conventional forces there.  In fact the whole idea was to get them occupied long enough to build up our conventional forces and go in and take the country back, and before anybody knew it we had the country.  So that was special operations.  There was no maneuver.  Strike was actually in the supporting role, if you stop and think about it.  It was supporting the special ops.

 

            Then intel ops.  We consider all of this ops.  And I would even add one which it would be reconstruction ops.  Okay?

 

            So ultimately we reach a point where these are all considered operations.  And at any given time they can switch roles, meaning maneuver could actually be supporting special operations or intel operations.

 

            If we ever reach the point where this is the new paradigm, where this is all operations and not just operations with supporting functions or enablers, but this is all operations, and depending on where you are in the phases, one could be preeminent over the other and one could be supporting the other.  Then you no longer need a JOC or Joint Operations Center, or a JIOC.  You just need an ops center, period.

 

            The functions that we're describing here in the JIOC along with the functions that are described in the operational centers that exist today, would all be embedded within this and you'd no longer have a JIOC.

 

            Now where is that model extent today?  Special Operations.  They've been doing it that way for years.  How did they get Saddam Hussein?  How did they capture Saddam?  Well, here's their ops center.  Here's the analyst.  Here's the collector.  The collector happened to be SEALS and Special Forces and reconnaissance flights.  It happened to be the very operators that had to do the capture, but they were collectors up to the point that they were ready to turn into the capturing force.

 

            An analyst putting this puzzle together was telling this guy what he needed.  These people would saddle up, go out and capture Mohammed, interrogate him, and come back and give them a direct feed as to what Mohammed told them based on the questions this guy said ask Mohammed when you catch him.  Until they finally had the puzzle put together and they found Saddam Hussein.

 

            That's the way SOF has been doing it for a long time.  Tom Matthews and I  came out of the SOF community as did Ron Burgess.  That's the way we've operated for a long time.  So there's nothing new there.  It works.  And ultimately I think on the big picture that's where the department will wind up.  It may be ten years from now.  But the JIOC should go away and just become part of the ops center, is my view.

 

            QUESTION:  What's the biggest stumbling block to that?

 

            LTG BOYKIN:  Culture.  I think you need to ask Mike Maples a question before we get out of here because he has absolutely done nothing.  Came late.  Has done nothing since he's been here.  [Laughter].

 

            QUESTION:  How does the new improved DHS fit into this, or do they in any particular way?  Do they bring new -- that's my question.  The Defense HUMINT Service.

 

            LTG MAPLES:  Defense HUMINT is also a DIA function.  In addition I've been appointed as the Defense HUMINT Manager, so I also [provide] Defense HUMINT that is [inaudible] with all the other elements of ISR as part of the Defense JIOC.

 

            We also have a Defense HUMINT Management Office which looks at Defense HUMINT management across not only what we have at the defense level in DIA currently, but what all the services are doing in Defense HUMINT as well, with respect to training and standards of Defense HUMINT and the management, the global force management of our HUMINT assets.  So as we look at the allocation of HUMINT resources, then we've got the ability -- and they, by the way, will be collocated with the JIOC [on JS] and CISRs.  We're all together

 

            We will also then be able to plug directly into the National Clandestine Service that is operating at the national level.  So we've got a parallel structure there in place.

 

            So the answer is it will be integral to the Defense JIOC and the use of HUMINT resources to support a combatant commander.

 

            QUESTION:  Can you tell us to what extent you've been able to get agreement from the CIA to be able to get into their databases and what have those negotiations [inaudible]?

 

            LTG BURGESS:  Right now at the combatant commands, still closely linked either at the combatant command or actually physically with the body sitting at the Defense JIOC, the DNI rep will be present and the DNI rep will do the reaching out to the national community.  And we think since across the intelligence community, as you look at it right now with the preponderance of the intelligence actually being within DoD, that that will be very transparent.

 

            CIA has been a part of the discussion on JIOC since we started it before October of this last year.  They have had an opportunity through us to chop and participate in the discussions.  They will be a participant.  The question, it's not a matter of a question.  It will be a matter of a cultural shift a little bit as we work our way through that.  But I think if you look right now at where we have operations going on in terms of Afghanistan and Iraq, you will see that that linkage is already very tight and so we think that sets a good template, if you will, for where we are morphing with the JIOC construct and the Defense JIOC.

 

            LTG BURGESS:  So that all IT enterprises --

 

            LTG BURGESS:  You've got two parallel things going on.  Within the intelligence community you have Dale Meyerrose as the CIO, the information officer doing his thing.  That applies to the 16 members of the intelligence community doing what he's got.  But you also have parallel working the program manager for the information sharing environment, now Ambassador MacNamara.  It used to be Mr. Russack who was doing that, stood up by the President working under the umbrella, if you will, of the DNI, ensuring that whatever IT structures we put in place we move from what we in the intelligence community used to describe as a need to know culture to a need to share culture.  That is where we horizontally integrate using that word where everybody can pass data back and forth.

 

            Now that doesn't mean -- I'm being very honest because it ties into some of the stuff we talked about, and General Boykin talked about a particular analyst.  It doesn't mean that an analyst is necessarily going to be able to get out there among all the databases and surf to his heart's content.  There are still going to be certain things that are restricted to those that are operationally engaged in a given point or that have the requisite need for that level of information.  What we want this to do, though is to take that down and flatten it as much as possible so that we do away with as much of that as we can.

 

            QUESTION:  The cultural shift, you're saying there will have to be a cultural shift also in the CIA to get them to be willing to share information with DoD?

 

            LTG BURGESS:  It goes both ways.  Having stood on both sides of the fence, it's actually a cultural shift on both sides.

 

            A strength, as I tell audiences as I talk to them, and I get asked this question because I do a lot of talking around the country on intel.  A strength of our intelligence community, the IC, is the conservative nature.  It's also something we've been lambasted on by different folks.  But we can be slow to change.  That's a strength and a weakness.  We don't blow like a reed in the wind with everything that's going on, but at the same time we have to be smart enough to adapt to new processes that are out there and as I've talked to the members of the IC, I think they are very adaptive where they're moving and everybody understand that we have to figure out how to get the information to where it's needed to do something with it.

 

            QUESTION:  If you could share in terms of a system that's in place to allow information to be shared, and then a conscious decision by people using that system to share information, where are you there?  Do you have the system in place to get information from the CIA into DoD and it's just a matter of getting people to understand how that works?  Or do you still need to agree on what kind of a system you're going to have?

 

            LTG BURGESS:  That has moved and there is a way to move the data though it is not where it needs to be yet.  It is clearly a work in progress.

 

            LTG BOYKIN:  That's probably a good closing line, that this is a work in progress.

 

            LTG MAPLES:  That may be on an architecture standpoint, but we've got CIA embedded with DoD operations at every level.

 

            LTG BURGESS:  And vice versa.

 

            LTG MAPLES:  So Lance can reach straight into CIA for information and products, and they're supporting DoD operations [inaudible].

 

            LTG BOYKIN:  But this whole thing is a work in progress.