DoD News Briefing - Rear Adm. Craig Quigley, DASD
Quigley: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.
We have several announcements. I think one thing that's probably on all of your minds is an update on the Cuban aircraft situation, so let me start with that, if I could. And I'll have two or three other announcements after that and then take your questions.
So let's start with our involvement in today's search for the Cuban aircraft. The Cuban -- the aircraft was a Cuban An-2 Colt that took off at approximately 8:45 this morning from Pinar del Rio. At 9:00 Havana Center reportedly lost contact with the aircraft and called the Miami center of the FAA and reported a hijacking was in progress. The FAA Miami center contacted the North American Air Defense Command, NORAD, and shortly before 10:00 NORAD launched two Florida Air National Guard F-15s from the 125th Fighter Wing. They were launched from Homestead Air Reserve Base south of Miami. They flew to the 24th parallel, at the outer edge of what we call the Air Defense Identification Zone, to assist in any way they could.
An AWACS aircraft from the 964th Airborne Air Control Squadron at Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma was diverted from a training mission over the U.S. to proceed to the scene as well. These aircraft did not make visual or radar contact with the aircraft before it splashed down.
At about 10:20 a KC-135 tanker from MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, was launched in support of the F-15s.
Tyndall Air Force Base is launching two F-16s to relieve the two F-15s at this time. The F-16s belong to the 148th Fighter Wing of the Minnesota Air National Guard, operating this week from Tyndall.
The Coast Guard, as I'm sure you know, was also asked to respond, and they immediately dispatched the cutter Monhegan, a 110-foot patrol boat home-ported in Key West, Florida, to the scene where the aircraft was seen on FAA radars. The Coast Guard cutter Nantucket, another 110-foot patrol boat from Key West, has also been diverted to the scene.
A Coast Guard C-130 from Air Station Clearwater, three HH-65 Dolphin helicopters, and one HU-25 Falcon Jet, from Air Station Miami, are also en route or on the scene, and they are all flying out of Miami.
And again, the Cuban aircraft is an Antonov An-2. It's a passenger aircraft. And there are reportedly at least 14 people on board, as many as 18. That's very unclear, in my mind.
The Coast Guard believes it went down in international waters about 60 miles southwest of Marquesas Key, at the end of the Florida Keys island chain, or about 30 miles north of the Cuban coast. And they have yet to locate the aircraft. The search is continuing.
And that -- I tried to be as current as I could be, till just before I walked out.
Q: Just clarify one thing you said, Admiral. You said that the -- neither the F-15s nor the AWACS made any visual or radar contact with the plane --
Q: -- and then you used the term "before it splashed down." Do you know for a fact that the plane went down into the water, or could it have just disappeared from the radar by flying very low?
Quigley: Well, I think that the -- with all of the search assets that are ongoing right now, the plane would have -- would have appeared somewhere northerly of the point where it was last detected on radar. So the working assumption is that indeed it went down in the water, Jamie. And that's where search efforts are focused now.
Q: Is this plane equipped with floatation landing gear, so that it could possibly float on the water?
Quigley: I don't know.
Some other -- Barbara?
Q: Do you have any idea why NORAD didn't see the plane on its radar?
Q: Did NORAD see the plane at all?
Quigley: Not that I --
Q: Did -- I mean, has anybody been tracking this? Could -- is it on anybody's radar that you know of, other than Havana's?
Quigley: I don't know about other agencies besides DOD, John. But on the DOD aircraft that were sent up, we did not have it visually or on radar.
Now FAA's center in Miami, I -- Coast Guard, perhaps -- I can't speak for them. I don't know.
Q: Was there any radio traffic that you are aware of emanating from this plane that your agencies may have inadvertently scooped up?
Quigley: Not that I'm aware of, no.
Q: Is this last known location of the plane -- is it inside or outside the Air Identification Zone that you described?
Quigley: It is outside. It is south of that point.
Q: But it didn't get to the point where it would have crossed over into the zone.
Quigley: Right. Right.
Q: What is the Air Identification Zone?
Quigley: It is an area that -- within which, closer to the continental United States from that area, we take particular interest in having a clear understanding and an identity of aircraft that are flying in airspace that we consider more sensitive than others. It's still international airspace, but it's something that's clearly close, and we just want to make sure we know who's out there and what their intentions are.
Q: Is it the limits of our more sophisticated equipment, or are we able to look beyond that zone but we don't care until it's --
Quigley: Well, it's kind of a combination answer, depending on what assets you have deployed at any given point in time. But the zone itself remains fixed. And it's simply a series of latitude and longitude points and describing a boundary line, if you will, within which we care a little more -- I'll put it that way -- about what aircraft are flying within that area.
Q: Have you heard anything about whether, you know, this is a hijacking or a defection attempt?
Q: If I recall correctly, the Colt is a Soviet design aircraft that's been, among other things, used to transport special operations troops. Do you have any information as to whether the design of the aircraft would foster low visibility on radar?
Quigley: No, I don't think so. It's an older design airplane, and it's used by many nations around the world. It is, indeed, a Soviet design. It's a biplane design. And from what I have seen, pictures of it in Jane's All the World's Aircraft and what have you, I don't think anyone would describe it as a very stealthy airframe. It's used for a variety of purposes by a variety of nations around the world.
Q: This is probably the same question again, but what evidence do you have that there actually is a plane? You have the communications from Havana Central. What else?
Quigley: I don't know. We were responding to a call from -- that came from the FAA Miami Center. They had enough confidence in that to go take a look and ask for assistance in locating the aircraft. Again, it was never on any of our radars, but going back to Jamie's questions, I don't know if it was on the FAA or Coast Guard or another radar. But not on any DoD ones that I'm aware of.
Q: Were the F-15s that were scrambled, were they armed?
Quigley: I don't know.
Q: And what is the procedure for intercepting an unauthorized aircraft approaching the United States? Do they escort the plane? Do they attempt to radio contact it? Is there -- I mean, what's the procedure that those fighter jets would employ if they were encountering an unauthorized aircraft?
Quigley: You try to ascertain as much information as you can, Jamie, as the actual intercept is in progress. I mean, you also pay attention to the speed, the altitude, the intent. What do you know about its origin? What type of plane is this? Can we bring them up on radio to speak to them and ask them their intentions? What does their airport of origin say about their origin? Were they legitimate? If they say they were taking off from a given airfield, does that airfield acknowledge that as being truthful? So you try to bring together as much information from as many different sources as you can, considering that this is all done in a compressed time frame, because you've got aircraft and they're moving at a fairly good clip, in all cases.
So you try to get that all together and make an intelligent assessment of the circumstances that you have facing you. You then make the best judgment that you can as to the way ahead, based on that evidence.
Q: Did the communication from the Havana Center include any information about who was on the plane or what kind of fuel situation the plane was in?
Quigley: I don't know.
Q: Where was the plane originally headed?
Quigley: I don't know that, either.
Q: Was IFF a player here?
Quigley: Not that I'm aware of, George. No.
Q: Are you assuming, Craig, that this was like a little regional airliner in Cuba? I mean --
Quigley: It's been described to me as a state-owned cargo sort of an airplane. It wasn't a military aircraft, although many nations use it in that sense. But this one was not a military airplane. It was owned by the government of Cuba for commercial purposes, I can only assume.
Q: What's the weather in the search area?
Quigley: I don't know.
Q: Do you have any evidence that any Cuban aircraft took off after this plane? Any MiGs? Any other Cuban military aircraft?
Quigley: No. Again, not that we had seen, in the limited movement that we had south in participating in the search before we're figuring that the aircraft is in the water.
Q: So is the F-15s -- have they encountered other Cuban aircraft in the area, searching?
Quigley: No. Have not.
Q: If the wreckage is found, will the U.S. military have any role in attempting to salvage it?
Quigley: Well, it will depend on what we're asked to provide. It would depend on what the rescuers find, that's right. If the U.S. Coast Guard is there, if a commercial vessel is there, I mean, what do you find, what condition is it in, and what could we contribute to such an effort? So we'll just kind of have to let that play out for now.
Q: Do you happen to have any ships in the area?
Quigley: Coast Guard vessels, but no Navy vessels anywhere nearby, no.
Q: Have there been other incidents in which Cuban aircraft, either military or civilian have penetrated U.S. airspace unauthorized? Or maybe you could take that question. It seems to me there have been some incidents in the past where planes have flown from Cuba, and I'm just wondering if there was any way to provide us a little background on that.
Quigley: Yeah. We'll have to do a search on that and see what we come up with. Okay, on to other topics.
Secretary Cohen is currently in Seoul, South Korea, for the next few days, where he'll be conducting the Security Consultative Meeting, and will have meetings with President Kim Dae Jung, Foreign Minister Lee, and Minister of Defense Cho. Secretary Cohen will also meet with U.S. troops on the peninsula, at Kunsan Air Base.
After the visit to Seoul, the final stop on his trip will be Japan, where he will meet with Prime Minister Mori, Foreign Minister Kono, Minister of State for Defense Torashima, and also meet with members of the Diet to discuss a number of bilateral and regional issues; specifically, to talk about the direction of our U.S.-Japanese alliance in a strategic sense.
As of this morning, the U.S. Olympic team has a total of 18 medals in the 2000 Olympic Games at Sydney. I would like to highlight the military contribution to this medal count by announcing that Nancy Johnson, wife of Staff Sergeant Kenneth Johnson of Fort Benning, won a Gold Medal in the women's 10-meter air rifle event. We'll keep you updated on that as the games continue.
Q: What's a 10-meter air rifle? (Pause.) (Laughter.)
Quigley: Well. It's --
Q: A very long gun.
Quigley: The goal is to accurately put rounds in a target at 10 meters. And the gun used is an air rifle, Pam. So.
Quigley: Next, we are pleased to welcome to our briefing today a group of 19 television broadcasters and executives from 17 different countries, who will be in the U.S. for three weeks under the auspices of the Department of State International Visitor Program. They are in this country to learn about television broadcasting in the U.S. and will be meeting with professional counterparts, visiting television studios and companies, and attending various media events. Welcome to you all.
Finally, following today's briefing, Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera, Secretary of Education Richard Riley and Chief Executive Officer of the Ad Council Peggy Conlon will join forces here in the briefing room to announce their campaign to encourage youth to stay in school and complete their high school education. The campaign will be accomplished through a series of powerful public service messages that will be previewed during today's announcement. And again, that will immediately follow this briefing here.
And with that, I'll take your questions on other topics. Pam?
Q: In Japan there's news reports that the USS Kitty Hawk over objections of this Japanese town conducted night maneuvers which involved guns and loud noises, and now this Japanese village is severing its ties as a friendship city with the United States. Could you explain the circumstances of this and whether it's unusual for a carrier battle group to do these kinds of maneuvers despite protestations from the local public?
Quigley: The first I've heard of that. I'll have to take the question and see what I can find. A carrier battle group does its operations well at sea. So I don't know --
Q: Yeah. It said something about the Kitty Hawk. There might be something lost in translation, but they mentioned the Kitty Hawk.
Quigley: Yeah, I'd -- what was the source of your information?
Q: Kyodo News Agency --
Quigley: We'll just have to take that one. I've not heard anything about that, I'm sorry.
Q: I'd like to get straight on the time line of former Deputy Secretary Deutch and his use of his home computer for classified information from the Pentagon as distinguished from that he put on his home computer from the CIA. According to congressional documents, the CIA notified the Pentagon in June of '98 that there was a problem with Deutch putting his secrets from the Pentagon on his home computer. And I understand that Secretary Cohen wasn't aware of it, or didn't initiate any action till February of 2000. Why the big gap, and when did the IG formally launch an investigation, and were any of this stuff that Deutch put on his home computer from the Pentagon penetrable? In other words, could a bad guy get into his system and extract secrets?
Quigley: There were a couple of memos from June and July of 1998 where the CIA had indicated to us -- they had asked for our assistance at that point in their ongoing investigation, to have -- assist in any sort of interaction between Dr. Deutch's use of computers, personal computers while he was the director of Central Intelligence, and if there was an overlap during any of his time while he was undersecretary or deputy secretary here at DOD. During those initial conversations in June and July of 1998, we were apprised that at some point in time, when CIA was completed with its IG investigation, we would probably want to do a damage assessment of our own, based on --
Q: (inaudible) -- who's telling you that at this point?
Quigley: This is the CIA IG.
Q: Telling you -- suggesting that you do your damage assessment?
Quigley: Right. Suggesting that when they provide us the findings of their investigation that we will probably want to do a damage assessment of our own, based on the findings that they had gotten to date.
Time has passed now, and we received the full-blown findings of the CIA IG in February of this year, along with the journal that had been kept, a running journal, by Dr. Deutch, over a period of time, and that provided us an opportunity then to take a look in a very comprehensive way at what CIA's investigators had been working so hard on for this, roughly, year and a half.
When Secretary Cohen received that information in February of this year, the results of the CIA investigation, he immediately turned around and tasked our own people here within DOD to take further action, and that takes two parts. On the one hand, he tasked our IG to take a look at the physical handling of the computers -- the hard drives, the floppy drives, the hardware, if you will -- on which Dr. Deutch would have used information -- processed e-mails, done work, what have you; track them down, try to find out where they had been, how they had moved, over time. On this side, he had tasked then our assistant secretary for Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence to take a look at the products that would have been on that hardware -- the actual information they contained.
And what did we find? Again, basing -- with a running start from the very professional work being done by the CIA's investigation -- what did we find? Do we have a sense of possible compromise? If so, what would be the damage assessment from that compromise? -- and then tasked, further, the general counsel to bring both parts of that effort together and, ultimately, to forward it to him, to Secretary Cohen, when both parts of the work had been completed.
That is where we are today. We're getting closer to completion, although I don't have a date certain to give you. But the general counsel is in the process of pulling together both of those parts and will then forward it up to Secretary Cohen.
Q: Well, let me just follow on that. The red flag was waved by the CIA in June of '98, and there was no action for 18 months. What -- that seems, for a place that puts out memos every day about breaches of security, that seems to me that there was a reluctance on the part of the IG to investigate this, or a reluctance on the part of the top executives of the Defense Department. How can you go from a warning in June of '98 to doing nothing until February of 2000?
Quigley: We saw very little value of reinventing the wheel. The CIA had already started down this road, had asked for our assistance to provide them information that was relevant to their investigation, from DOD records and files. Rather than largely duplicating their effort, we felt that the best course of action was to let that professional investigation proceed, like I say. And eventually we received the comprehensive package in February of this year and immediately Secretary Cohen turned that around and took the actions that I just described.
Q: Was there any reluctance by the IG, or acting IG, Mancuso or Deputy Secretary Hamre to investigate one of its own after the CIA had sounded its warning?
Quigley: No. I think the record does not support that at all.
Q: How about the other question about penetrability? Any evidence that somebody could get into Deutch's home computer and get defense secret information from it?
Quigley: Well, that's one of the elements that the assistant secretary for C3I is looking at as part of their effort in this -- is the possibility of compromise.
I don't want to go into the findings. I have tried to be complete on the process that's ongoing, but I'm not ready to get into the findings yet until they've been presented to Secretary Cohen.
Q: Is there any evidence that that could have been done, or are you not ready to say?
Quigley: I'm not ready to say. That's going to be part of the findings.
Q: Can I follow up on two points? I don't understand what would have been duplicated when the CIA, if I remember correctly, was investigating Dr. Deutch's activities while he was DCI. What would have been duplicated if you had been investigating his activities while he was deputy and undersecretary?
Quigley: Part of their efforts -- and again, when they had asked for our cooperation in June and July of 1998 -- was to provide access to relevant records over here, in DoD, where there had been an overlap. That would have been the very information upon which we would have focused an effort of our own. We were not going to take a look at activities in his capacity as head of CIA. Our activities would have been focusing on the time spent here in DoD, and that was the exact area that the CIA investigators asked for our help to facilitate their own investigation. So it would have been a near carbon copy of the effort.
Q: So that included his computers? They investigated what was actually on his computers that he used while he was at DOD?
Quigley: Yes, yes.
Q: But you know, in that period, Hamre had warned that there was hackers that were penetrating your uttermost secrets, and he sounded the alarm about it, and yet you did nothing and just waited on CIA. It doesn't compute for me.
Quigley: I'm not sure how we could have advanced the time line, George. Again, we would have been -- you would have been doing the exact same process that the CIA investigators were already well into by that point. I'm just not clear what value that a second, overlapping investigation would have brought to the effort.
Q: Well, the CIA has its IG, you have your IG, and your IG didn't do anything.
Quigley: Well, we did. I mean, the -- our folks here in the Pentagon were asked to help and assist in the CIA investigation, and they did that for a period of considerable time, to provide the information that I described. But for us to have initiated something at that point would just -- would have been duplicative.
Q: Well, let me just go back over something, then. I mean, during that whole 18 months you knew there was a problem, and yet Deutch maintained his industrial security clearances in this building. And if I remember correctly, it was on that very point that the secretary was quite annoyed in February and said he wanted to know, I believe, you know, why this had gone on for so long. And that's one of the reasons he put his own investigation into place. So it still doesn't really answer the question which Cohen raised, which was you waited 18 months to pull his DOD clearances knowing that there was a problem.
Quigley: Well, you're talking about the industrial clearances here. And there is a very specific process that needs to be followed in removing those clearances except in clear evidence of grave danger to the national security of the United States. And at that point we simply did not see that. And so in February of this year, when Dr. Deutch voluntarily relinquished his industrial clearances, that followed the August 1999 recision of his special compartmented information -- SCI -- clearance by the director of Central Intelligence and DoD rescinding his Washington Headquarters Services clearance as well, which left only the industrial one. And again, he voluntarily rescinded that in February of this year.
Q: Do you have any answer yet, though, to Cohen's own questions when this came up as to why this went on for so long in this building before something was done? I mean, I do believe --
Quigley: What -- what went on?
Q: This whole period of DoD not addressing it. I think I do remember in February he raised that very point himself. When he was asked, he said this should have been dealt with sooner.
Quigley: I don't recall that. I'd have to go back and check the record.
Q: So you're very clear that there was no resistance by the IG into digging into this situation.
Quigley: Crystal clear.
Q: Would you concede that there was a double standard in the fact that they put Mr. Lee in jail on the first suspicion of espionage, and here's a deputy secretary of Defense with secrets on his home computer and nothing happens at all?
Quigley: No, sir. I do not concede that at all. The allegation against Wen Ho Lee was that it was a conscious effort on his part to compromise classified information. The allegations against Dr. Deutch from the beginning have been lax handling. There's a world of difference, in my mind. I do not equate the two.
Q: You said that the Pentagon did not want to start the investigation earlier because it would duplicate what the CIA was doing. But you started the investigation in February 2000, which is still an investigation that would duplicate what the CIA is doing. So what would have been the difference, whether you started 18 months earlier or whether you start in February?
Quigley: The difference was the receipt of the formal, comprehensive package, Toby, from the CIA investigators, which showed us clearly exactly what their findings had been and allowed us a running start, if you will, on our own efforts. So you're way down the road based on the receipt of their professional efforts for the period of several months.
Q: And what is the reason why, when their IG had completed his report in August 1999, that you did not receive the formal documents until February? What is the reason for -- the reason that you didn't get them sooner?
Quigley: I'm not sure, but I think one of the contributing reasons was the great sensitivities and highly classified nature of a lot of the materials that the CIA investigators had found. Just because an individual has a clearance or an authorization to -- clearance and access within the scope of one individual's employment within the federal government does not automatically equate that to another element of the federal government.
And I think that we certainly wanted to proceed very cautiously here and make sure that we were all kind of working from the same set of assumptions and not to perhaps further compromise any highly sensitive and classified material during that same time frame. Ultimately that was resolved in the package being turned over in February of this year by the CIA to us, but again, in a very tightly controlled manner, limited number of copies, because of the highly sensitive and classified nature it contained -- information.
Q: So are you saying that the CIA did not want to turn over that information to you until you had a group of people that could receive it?
Quigley: I think that one of the contributing things was their very appropriate caution to make sure that the proper controls were in place for turning over their product to the Department of Defense.
Q: But I am reading you correctly, that you're saying that the CIA held up turning over the documents to the Pentagon?
Quigley: I'm not necessarily calling that a bad thing. (Light laughter.)
Quigley: I'm saying that I think that they were appropriately cautious before handing over such a highly sensitive volume of information to another agency to proceed on an investigation of its own.
Q: Well, just to follow that, didn't their caution, as you describe it, mean that if there were weaknesses in security in this building that they had found out about, that no one was addressing those weaknesses during the entire 18 months? If nobody was -- either saw their report or was briefed on what they were finding as they were investigating, then any kind of weaknesses in security in this building were going unaddressed during that time. Is that right?
Quigley: Yeah, but that's a wonderful thing to have in hindsight, Dale. We may -- we may wish that were the case today. I don't think that was the case at the time.
There's always a great deal of enthusiasm to speed things up. Generally, that's not an advantage. It's generally an advantage to take your time and resist the pressure to speed things up, to make sure that you don't do more harm than good by either overlooking something that's a very important element of the work you're trying to uncover, making sure that the information that is shared is shared in an appropriate way. I mentioned the classification and the highly sensitive nature of a lot of the equipment. And you're talking about a tremendous amount of material here. So I think a little extra time was certainly appropriate.
Q: Can you think of a precedent when a chief executive -- in this case, the number two executive of the Defense Department -- is suspected, wittingly or unwittingly, by the CIA of breaching security, and you subcontracted the investigation -- the Department of Defense subcontracted the investigation of one of its own to the CIA? I can't think of any precedent where the Department of Defense would subcontract an investigation of a security breach in its own tent to the CIA. I mean, I -- can you think of a precedent for that being done?
Quigley: No, I wouldn't characterize it the way that you have just done. The CIA --
Q: (Off mike) -- the CIA.
Quigley: Yeah, the CIA's efforts were focused on his time as the director of Central Intelligence --
Quigley: -- as they should have been. Where there was an overlap into his previous service here at the Pentagon, they asked for our cooperation, and we gave that.
Q: Why would there have been an overlap? I don't understand.
Quigley: If you're the director of Central Intelligence, there are legitimate needs for you have to access to DoD classified information as well. And if there were documents or e-mails or any other form of record that would contribute to the CIA's investigation, they did not have possession of those materials, necessarily, unless they were found on the computers.
But if there was information here that would be relevant to their work, that's what they asked us to assist them -- and we agreed. We had --
Q: I'm saying something different, though, Craig. What I'm saying is that the CIA of course would come to you for any help you could give them in relation to their own investigation of what Dr. Deutch or did not do while he was at the CIA.
My question is, why would you subcontract the investigation of what Dr. Deutch did on his computer in the way of breaching security while he was at DOD as the number-two executive?
Quigley: I understand --
Q: In other words, it would seem to me that you would have to get right on that, order the IG of your own department to say, "What happened here, what damages have been done, and is it something that we have to plug immediately, and could the bad guys have found out," rather than wait for the CIA to tumble in with its own report on -- "Oh, by the way, we looked into your problem, too." Why didn't you investigate your own problem as soon as you heard about it?
Quigley: Well, again, go back to the memos I referred to in June and July of 1998, where the CIA was giving us a heads-up --
Quigley: -- that when we had a chance to assess their investigative work, they felt that we would want to do an investigation of our own, more finely focused, if you will. But that was based -- okay, we accept that at face value. But we did not have access at that point, in June and July of 1998, that the CIA investigators had. We wanted to --
Q: (Off mike) -- computer and say, "Hey, Doctor, while you were at DoD" --
Quigley: We were not in possession of his home computer. CIA was in possession of his home computer.
Q: But you could send an IG guy to co-investigate it.
Quigley: Well, you've got dueling investigations again, and we just didn't feel --
Q: It's your department, Craig.
Quigley: Well, yeah, but there's no reason to do it twice. The CIA has a very professional inspector general that knows how to do this. We had confidence that they were able to find out the information during that period of time. We had no computers to check.
Q: Well, it seems to me that the CIA would have to take care of its worries about its own CIA, and DOD would have to have a parallel look at what it has to worry about within its own department. It doesn't compute to me that you say, "Well, we'll just wait for the CIA report," and let the damage that might have been done to DOD be untilled by the inspector general.
Quigley: Well, this was all about a potential compromise of classified information on computers that we did not have in our possession. It's not clear to me how we would have proceeded without reinventing a lot of the effort that CIA investigators were doing at the very same time frame.
Q: In hindsight now, are you satisfied with the procedure you have outlined? Is this now, in fact, standard procedure in a security investigation that crosses -- that goes across agencies? Is this the way you handle it with everybody, no matter how low level they are?
Quigley: I don't think there is such a thing as a standard procedure. I think you have to take a look at the process and what you know each and every time and make a human value judgement as to the best way ahead. I don't think anyone would subscribe that there is a single best way to proceed in all cases.
Q: To what extent, then, was part of this because of the very extraordinary sensitivity of the information Dr. Deutch had access to and was dealing with? Did that play a role in how this was handled?
Quigley: I don't understand your question.
Q: Was part of the reason you handled it the way you did was because, I believe you have said, there was some extraordinary sensitivity of the information he had access to?
Quigley: No, I don't think that was an element of our approach. Our approach was focused on the period of time that he served in the Defense Department, using as a starting point the CIA investigation that we received in February of this year.
Q: I want to be clear on something. The CIA is investigating for his time when he was at the CIA, and not for his time at DOD at all. And DOD has now picked it up and is going back to look at Deutch when he was USD A&T and then when he was DEPSECDEF. Is that right?
Quigley: Yes, although there is some overlap.
Q: And the overlap is only because CIA sometimes deals with DOD intelligence.
Quigley: For instance, Dr. Deutch, remember, remained a member of the Defense Science Board after he had left the Pentagon. So in that capacity, I mean, he would have a need to retain access to some of the Pentagon programs that the Defense Science Board would be looking at.
Q: Okay. So I guess this is back on George's question, which is you have two distinct time periods. So it wouldn't have been dueling investigations. It seems to me they'd be separate investigations, because one is him as CIA chief and one is him as USD A&T. And with regard to your point on -- that DOD didn't have possession of the computers, correct me if I'm wrong, but what I remember is that Deutch had DOD computers and they were then transferred to his own personal use when he left DOD.
Quigley: I believe at least one went with him to CIA.
Q: So DOD doesn't retain any kind of ex officio control of those computers? It can't come and say, These were DOD property and by our good graces you have them, and we -- give us them back?
Quigley: I don't think that's an action we would have taken in the midst of a CIA investigation into the same computers. It doesn't make sense.
Q: All right. So then can you go back to the first point, which is two distinct time periods. I don't -- can you explain how you would see those as dueling investigations when you're dealing with one man who is CIA director, and then another man who was -- had several top roles at DOD at different times?
Quigley: When you go back to the June-July 1998 timeframe, when we were advised at that point that there may be something that we want to -- that we would want to follow up on a possible damage assessment once the results of the CIA investigation were known to us, keeping in mind that this was an investigation that was ongoing by CIA at that point, they were in possession of the relevant computers at that point. And the -- I don't know how we would have proceeded at that point knowing that the investigators at CIA were already marching down this same road. And that --
Q: Let me address that. You have your own experts in this building -- I mean, if there's something very technical, like the footprint of a warhead when it hits, so that you know its killing capacity. It just would seem to me that this was not an antagonistic witness, so to speak. You could send your experts to borrow the computer, to go to the CIA and get the computer. If there were any interest in the DOD finding out what went wrong in its own house, I don't see you can hold out the excuse that, well, we didn't have access to the computers. You were welcome to look at those computers. You could have taken your experts over there. I don't get it.
Quigley: There was an enormous amount of information, I understand, on those computers that DOD has no equities in. The CIA does. And to ask them at that point to segregate, Please put all the DOD information in this pile so we can take a look at it while you guys go ahead and retain the CIA information, just didn't seem like an efficient way to move forward.
Q: Who made the decision in this building not to proceed with the DOD investigation? Who made that final decision?
Quigley: I don't know that there was a suggestion by anyone to initiate a DOD investigation in the summer of 1998.
Q: Why not?
Q: But, I mean, is it just the dog didn't bark, or was there a decision not to do this, or did nobody just bother?
Quigley: I don't know.
Q: There was a warning flag. We all agree on that.
Quigley: That's right. And the warning flag was clearly placed in people's minds that when the CIA investigation is made available to the DOD, we may want to take a close look at the damage assessment. That is precisely what we did in February of 2000.
Q: It's a warning that nobody did anything about for 18 months in this building.
Quigley: Different subject -- (laughter) -- an update on the Cuban aircraft. There is a merchant ship alongside the wreckage of the aircraft 180 miles south of Key West. There are reports of 10 people recovered: one dead and nine alive. Coast Guard assets are en route. And I don't have anything further at this point.
We need to end this portion --
Q: What were -- could we have the numbers again? Ten alive, you said?
Quigley: Ten people recovered: one dead, nine alive.
Q: That's from the Coast Guard.
Quigley: And that's from the Coast Guard.
Q: Ten bodies recovered, in other words.
Quigley: No -- yes. Ten human beings recovered: one dead, nine alive.
Q: Anything more on the merchant ship? Is it a U.S. --
Quigley: I don't have the name of it, Pam. No, I'm sorry. That's from Coast Guard headquarters in Miami, I believe.
Q: (Off mike.)
Quigley: Don't know that either. Just have "merchant ship".
Secretary Riley has another meeting soon and cannot stay with us very long. I'd like to move on to that phase of this, if I could, and introduce Major General Gil Meyer, who I'm sure you all know, that will kick off the second part of this.
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