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Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Interview With CNN International

Presenter: Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz
November 05, 2002

(Interview with Maria Ressa, CNN International)

Q: I'm Maria Ressa, at the Pentagon with Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz.

Mr. Wolfowitz, how would you characterize the threat of al Qaeda in Southeast Asia?

Wolfowitz: I think it's important to start by recognizing it's a worldwide threat. I mean, we think there are al Qaeda in some 90 different countries, including here in the United States. And any time we start to talk about a particular place, sometimes people think that we're zeroing in on them. I know the Indonesians are particularly sensitive about what they think as somehow being singled out. They're not being singled out.

But it is also true that Southeast Asia has one of the largest populations of Muslims in the world, nearly a quarter of a [billion], I think, if you count all of those countries. It's actually, overall, one of the most moderate Muslim populations in the world in terms of their religious views and their attitudes toward other religions. I was Ambassador to Indonesia for three years, and I know just how wonderfully tolerant Indonesians are, and how proud they are of the tolerant traditions of their country. But that doesn't prevent a few hundred or a few thousand extremists from slipping in, especially in a democratic country, and finding places to hide.

I think it's, we can see it from their web sites, that al Qaeda views this as a major target for disruption and recruitment and for conducting terrorist attacks. In fact, the people who planned the original World Trade Center bombing, excuse me, carried out the original World Trade Center bombing in 1993, then moved on to Manila where they had a base for a year and a half and were on the verge of some more horrendous acts when they got captured.

Q: For our American audience, should they be concerned? I know you're concerned about not pinpointing countries, but should they be concerned about events in Southeast Asia? Does that have any effect on them at all?

Wolfowitz: Yes, they should. They should also be concerned about events in Yemen, events in Iraq, events in Iran, events in the United States, events in Europe. This is a worldwide struggle. It's going to take a long time to root these people out and to eliminate the source of support. and clearly Southeast Asia is one of those places. Each one is a little bit different. I think the Philippines is different from Indonesia; both of them are different from, let's say, Singapore and Malaysia.

Ironically, for many years Americans complained that the government of Indonesia was too authoritarian. We wanted to see democracy in Indonesia, which I devoutly wanted myself. Now we have democracy and some people are saying, 'Well, why are they so concerned about civil liberties? Why don't they just lock them all up and put them in jail?'

In many ways Indonesia and the Philippines have the same challenge that other democratic countries have, which is how to get the right balance between law enforcement and civil liberties, and they're working on it.

Q: I'm going to bring you back again to the threat in particular. Since the worst terrorist attacks since September 11th happened in that area, operational capabilities of [the south] link to al Qaeda, obviously still there. Governments in the region doing different things in the war on terror. There seems to be, and you can tell me if you disagree, some sort of denial, different levels of denial among the countries of Southeast Asia. How are you handling that?

Wolfowitz: I think you're right. I think again, unfortunately, it's Indonesia particularly that is in a bit of denial, but I believe that the horrible bombing in Bali has been something of a wakeup call. I still think there are a few too many Indonesians who haven't quite heard the call yet. But certainly the government itself, I believe, understands what the challenge is and understands that the target isn't just Australians and Americans. In many ways, the prime target is Indonesian democracy. This is not the kind of government that al Qaeda wants to see governing the Muslim world. They'd like to create the kind of economic misery, the kind of divisions between Indonesia and the West that can lead to ultimately turning Indonesia into the worst kind of Islamic state. They have a very long way to go if they're going to succeed, because that's not the way Indonesian people are. But they, I think, are prepared to kill hundreds of thousands of people to try to achieve that goal.

Q: In the weeks before the Bali bombing, the U.S. was working very quietly behind the scenes to try to get Indonesia to take care of the problem that was there. How would you describe the situation in Indonesia now?

Wolfowitz: I think much more serious, much more focused. The Parliament itself is looking at new legislation. The government, I think, has been more outspoken about the kinds of problems they face. But there's still a public opinion, which I've encountered that entertains some of the most absurd notions, like the absurd notion that somehow we did this to ourselves. And unfortunately, the terrorists have one advantage, which is they do this with a small number of people and then they go and hide, and we're not completely sure who did it. But I think anybody looking at the evidence of everything that's been happening over the last ten years, and particularly the last 18 months, would have to say this has all of the earmarks of an al Qaeda operation. And if you go and look at some of their web sites, which are pretty horrendous things... I can't say I've looked at them because my Arabic isn't quite that good, but I've seen translations of articles that just openly boast about, "We did the attack on the Marines in Kuwait; we did the attack on the Synagogue in Tunisia; we did the attack on those awful, corrupt nightclubs in Bali, and it's all a wonderful thing and it's all in the name of Islam."

Well, it's a hijacking of Islam. It's a distortion of Islam. And this is the one thing that gives me some confidence, ultimately, is that whatever skepticism there is in Indonesia, whatever failure to understand the real problem, and there is a certain amount of it, the people in Indonesia are incredibly decent people and their vision of Islam is so completely different from this extreme version that the terrorists peddle, that I believe in the long run -- hopefully in the short run as well -- it's going to be a huge asset in the fight against terrorism.

Q: But presently is there enough being done to dismantle the network that exists there?

Wolfowitz: One can always probably do more. One of the challenges in a democracy is how much can you do before you start to infringe on fundamental civil liberties. There's no question there are things we don't do in this country that might help in fighting terrorism because there's a limit to what we think is appropriate consistent with our Constitution. Indonesia has had a much more, it's had very recent experience with the abuse of that kind of authority. So I think there are people who think pretty cautiously in thinking about what authority to give the government.

It's hard, I think it's almost inappropriate for an outsider to start judging where to strike that balance, but I think what we can do as Americans or as the international community is number one, to try to give them as much information as we possibly can about the nature of the threat; and secondly, to do everything we can to bolster their democracy in other ways, through economic assistance, through political support, and frankly also through this admittedly controversial idea of rebuilding ties with the Indonesian military. We don't do that because we're under illusions that the Indonesian military is just a perfect institution with no problems. It has enormous problems. I would submit those problems have gotten a lot worse over the last ten years, and I'm not sure I'm saying cause and effect, but over the last ten years we have had a policy of isolating the Indonesian military. I wouldn't say it's been a stunning success in terms of promoting a better behavior by the military, more disciplined behavior by the military.

I think it's clear that the democratically elected government of Indonesia believes that in order for democracy to succeed in Indonesia, the government has to be able to have a successful relationship with its own security forces. It seems to me that those of us in the international community that have close relations with Indonesia ought to be helping that democratic government to achieve that goal.

Q: How do you put that together with, say, the U.S. intelligence report that says members of the Indonesian military may have been involved in the plot to kill Americans, the two Americans in Westport? First, how credible do you take those intelligence reports?

Wolfowitz: Well, you know, when people start to leak intelligence reports, they put people like me in an impossible position because we don't discuss intelligence. That doesn't mean, therefore, that I'm either confirming or denying it. I'd love to say more, but I can't.

But I think the real point is that, there is an important issue of what took place in Freeport and who was behind those killings, and I don't think we've yet gotten to the bottom of it. I guess by which I mean I don't think the Indonesian authorities have yet gotten to the bottom of it. I think they've got to get to the bottom of it and they've got to punish whoever is responsible no matter what, whether they're official or unofficial. And the more successfully they can do that, I think the more confidence the rest of the world, particularly the United States, will have in dealing with them. But I wouldn't jump to conclusions based on -- I have to say, there are intelligence reports and there are intelligence reports. You've been to Jakarta. You know there are rumors every day about almost everything, and I'm sure some of that finds its way into secret reports labeled intelligence. It's up to law enforcement to get to the bottom of this one.

Q: Let me ask you, over the last year or so the U.S. has been working quietly behind the scenes with Indonesia, especially since the Bali blast. Do you think this is an effective strategy, given that since the attacks on Bali we've seen really the arrest of Bashir and then nothing more concrete behind trying to dismantle --

[Pause to fix technical difficulties]

Q: Do you think that the strategy that you followed in dealing with Indonesia has been effective?

Wolfowitz: I'm not sure there's really an alternative. It sort of... let's begin by understanding that we're not the ones who can deal with terrorism in Indonesia; the Indonesians have got to do it themselves. We can encourage them, we can try to give them information. I think you used the word denial earlier as to whether the Indonesians have accepted the reality. I think it's probably fair to say that until September 11th of last year, Americans were in denial. We knew these people were out to get us. We read their fatwas. We knew they'd killed people in embassies. The idea that they could kill thousands of Americans in the United States, though, was if someone had said it, I think... you'd just have to say we were in denial also.

I believe there's no question that what happened in Bali has been something of a wakeup call for Indonesians. Whether it's had enough of an effect or whether the effect will wear off rather quickly, is something time will tell.

I do believe that Indonesians need to understand that this is not something they do as a favor to the United States, or to the outside world. If they want to have a successful democracy, they've got to get this problem under control. If they want to have a thriving tourism industry, they clearly have to get this problem under control. If they want to attract foreign investment, they have to get this problem under control. Does it mean perfect control and no terrorist events? None of us can do that sort of thing. But I think what outsiders can judge and will judge over time is what is the level of effort, as opposed to what is the record of terrorism. And if there's a succession of terrorist events and seeming lack of energy from the government is going to have bad consequences for Indonesia, no matter what any of the rest of us say.

Q: How would you judge the level of effort now?

Wolfowitz: It's improving. It's going up. I remember years ago, when I was with the Secretary of State, we were dealing with the dictatorship in the Philippines. An Asian friend of mine said you need a little patience, we're Southeast Asians, he said. Things go on a different schedule, but they go.

My experience with Indonesians over many years has been that their pace is different from Americans, but they are very serious people and I believe that they will get serious about this problem if they haven't already. Many of them are already.

Q: Let me switch you to the Philippines. The Philippine government overnight said they were notified by the U.S. government that it was planning on putting the MILF [Moro Islamic Liberation Front] on its list of terrorist organizations, the Morozan Corporation from the largest Muslim separatist group in the Philippines. Is that the case?

Wolfowitz: We try to stay in our lane here at the Defense Department. That's a State Department issue.

There are concerns about that organization, but obviously also there are important Philippine views about whether these people are terrorists and whether they're people you can in fact negotiate with politically. And I'm sure that that's the subject now of pretty intense discussions.

Q: Given the near-concrete links that have come out over the last few months about the MILF training camps being used by Gama'at al-Islamiyya and al Qaeda, is this something that the United States is concerned about?

Wolfowitz: Obviously that's the kind of thing we've got to be very concerned about.

Q: Is it true that President Arroyo has lobbied the U.S. government against putting the MILF on its list?

Wolfowitz: I couldn't answer that one way or the other.

Q: The MILF is one of the groups in the southern... the U.S. has placed the Abu Sayyef squarely on it, but the MILF has been pegged for many of the bombings that have been linked to al Qaeda and Gamma'at al-Islamiyya. How does the U.S. look at the MILF right now?

Wolfowitz: Well, as I say, it's got some ambiguous qualities and this is something we are discussing with the government if the Philippines. But I think we've got to be very careful about people who present a nice warm political face and then underneath that surface are conducting and supporting terrorism.

Q: It's been several months now since we first talked about this. What more have you learned about the way al Qaeda works globally and in particular in Southeast Asia?

Wolfowitz: I think we've learned quite a bit of detail, particularly, it's amazing to me how much some of these senior al Qaeda people have divulged once they've been captured. It's encouraging, actually. It doesn't in my view fundamentally alter the picture. I'm trying to think now, but there's nothing that I think we've learned that changes fundamentally the way we look at it. We've learned more about their tactics, somewhat more about hiding places, somewhat more about the connection between them and a variety of foreign governments. But I think first of all the murderous intent just keeps being confirmed in everything we learn. And secondly, there is unfortunately I think a striking resemblance between this organization and a cancer that has metastasized, if that's the right word. It's not something where you just cut off the head and the organization withers. It's cells all over the place, cells with connections with other cells, terrorist groups with connections to other groups. Many different governments, terrorist-supporting governments, that play a game of help of one kind and disowning them in other ways. So it's - I think what it confirms, unfortunately, is what President Bush has been saying from the beginning, which is this is not a problem that's going to be successfully dealt with by an isolated action in Afghanistan, or successful capturing of a handful of terrorists. We've really just got to change the whole world climate in which terrorism was once accepted as a sort of necessary evil and understand that in an era of weapons of mass destruction that connection is just no longer something we can live with.

Q: How would you gauge the way the U.S. has conducted the war on terror? How are we doing in the war on terror?

Wolfowitz: I think we've had some extraordinary successes. I believe when the President or Secretary Rumsfeld has said this may be like the Cold War, we may be at this for a very long time. To be honest, initially I thought it can't be that long. Well, I don't think we know. We do know that these evil networks have burrowed in very very deep, and we also know that the extremist education that has created much larger numbers -- particularly in places like Pakistan, of people who are unfortunately sympathetic to that kind of outlook -- has burrowed deep in a number of important countries. And it's going to take not only dismantling those networks and getting states to stop supporting terrorism, it's also going to take, I believe, remaking the educational system in a number of countries, and opening up opportunities, particularly for young Muslims, to see that there's a lot more to life than this kind of extremism. It's what President Bush spoke about in his State of the Union message as building a better world beyond the war on terrorism. You don't build a better world overnight. It takes time.

Q: Those are longer-term measures. But in the short term, in terms of strategy, what we saw in Yemen, for example with the CIA strike. Is that change in strategy now?

Wolfowitz: Not fundamentally. It's a very successful tactical operation, and one hopes each time you get a success like that, not only to have gotten rid of somebody dangerous, but to have imposed changes in their tactics and operations and procedures. And sometimes when people are changing, they expose themselves in new ways.

So we have just got to keep the pressure on everywhere we're able to, and we've got to deny the sanctuaries everywhere we're able to, and we've got to put pressure on every government that is giving these people support to get out of that business.

But then on the other side of it, it is very important -- it may be a long term project but you don't get to the long term unless you start in the short term -- to begin looking at things like the educational systems that are producing people who are inclined in this direction, and not just looking at the bad ones but looking at how to built an alternative that's attractive to young people.

Q: Were you working with the Yemen government on that? And is this something that we expect to see more of in the future?

Wolfowitz: We don't discuss future operations. We've had pretty good cooperation with the government of Yemen and it's certainly improved a lot. You asked about the kind of progress we've made; I think the progress we made in Afghanistan certainly contributed to much better cooperation from a number of governments, including the government of Yemen.

Q: I asked you earlier about countries in Southeast Asia being in different stages of denial. Can you tell me in your view what that is, what that means for each of the -- I'm looking specifically at Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia.

Wolfowitz: I know I've heard Singaporeans, including the Senior Minister himself, say that they were astonished when the JI [Jamaa Islamiya] people were arrested in Singapore, that there could be... it's not a large number, but that there could be any people with those sort of fanatical views who have successfully operated in Singapore who were on the verge of actually blowing up an American ship. Maybe on the verge of [inaudible], but not too far from being at the point of doing that. They thought this was something that happened in Yemen, it doesn't happen in Singapore. And they thought the Muslims of Singapore are different from the Muslims of the Middle East, and by... there are huge differences, but I think what they came to an awakening about is it doesn't take a large number of fanatics to do enormous damage, and if they can pile damage on damage on damage, they begin to radicalize people who aren't fanatics.

I think that is their goal. I think what they'd like to do is to radicalize the population of Indonesia and other Muslim populations in Southeast Asia.

I think for Indonesians it took something as horrific as the bombing in Bali to recognize that Indonesia has a real terrorist problem. And I hope they will understand that it's not an admission of guilt to say we have a problem. No Americans feel that we as Americans are guilty because some foreign Muslims came into this country and committed a bombing, but maybe it's because Indonesia is a 90 percent Muslim country, there's a little more resistance to the idea that that happened and we're not responsible. Indonesians are not responsible, but they are responsible for taking serious measures to try to get these kind of people under control.

Q: What about Malaysia and the Philippines?

Wolfowitz: I think the Philippines actually have probably been living with this far longer, certainly aware of it longer, and not only in the form of indigenous insurgent groups and terrorist groups whose target was the Philippines, but it's been a base for international terrorism with Ramzi [Ahmed] Yussef and bin Laden's uncle, who was in Manila in the mid-1990s. We've had, going back to at least that period, very close cooperation with Philippine law enforcement. Ramzi Yussef is now serving a life sentence in a jail in the United States. That wouldn't have happened without what the Philippine law enforcement people did, as his colleague in crime, Mr. [Abdul Hakim] Murad, is here now. So I think the Philippines probably was the first to discover this problem and to discover that it had an international dimension as well as a domestic one.

The Malaysians are clearly on top of it now also, and I think the fact that we know that one of the meetings that seems to have been a planning meeting for September 11th took place in Malaysia in early 2000 -- of course we discovered that thanks to cooperation from the Malaysians. I have to say that very clearly. But I think they've known for a couple of years that they are a potential platform for this kind of [inaudible].

Q: Something they never quite admit, though.

Wolfowitz: You know, the Secretary also has been very clear -- some countries are going to find it comfortable to cooperate with us privately but not publicly. Some will cooperate publicly but not privately. That's not so great, actually, although I can't think of an example, to tell you the truth.

What we're interested in is serious policy and serious action, and if sometimes it's the judgment of a government that they are going to keep private about what they do, I think we're going to judge things by results, not by what people say.

Q: Are we seeing... is that what's happening also with Indonesia? Could it be, are they doing more than what is actually being admitted?

Wolfowitz: I think they're doing a lot. Could they do more than they're doing now? Probably. But as we said earlier, I think that, in Indonesia it's a more complicated question than in Singapore, because of the nature of the post-Suharto government,

Q: How will the war on terror in Southeast Asia be affected if the U.S. strikes Iraq?

Wolfowitz: Let's start by making it very clear that the President's goal is to achieve the peaceful disarmament of Iraq, and we're not going to achieve that unless Saddam Hussein is finally convinced that it's his only way to survive, so there has got to be some threat of force behind it.

If we get to that point -- and I sincerely hope that we will -- I'm not sure I want to start placing bets on what Saddam Hussein is going to do, but if we get to that point, there's still going to be one of the worst tyrants in the world ruling one of the most talented populations in the Muslim world, and I don't see how that can last forever, and hopefully it won't last for very long. And at some point, you're going to get to a point I think where one way or another, with or without American help, there's going to be a liberation of the Iraqi people. And when that happens, instead of people talking about attacks on Iraq, I think they're going to start to say, 'Well why didn't all these wonderful humanitarians in Europe, why didn't all the liberals of the West, why didn't all the people who say they care about democracy and human rights do something for the Iraqi people sooner?' That's what the issue is.

This isn't... we're not talking about an attack on Iraq. We're talking about trying to end a threat from Iraq that threatens all of us, and we're trying to free, as I say, one of the most educated, most talented people in the Arab world from one of the worst tyrannies in the world. The only one I can think of which is in the same league is North Korea.

Q: But if you look to North Korea, in that sense the U.S. isn't taking the same kind of action, pressure on North Korea that it is with Iraq.

Wolfowitz: Well, the cases are different and the instruments are different. There are a lot of differences. We've got 16 UN Security Council Resolutions that Iraq has been in defiance of for 11 years. On the other side of the coin, we have very substantial economic leverage that can be brought to bear on North Korea, whereas Iraq seems to be using economic leverage on our friends to keep them from taking the problem seriously. So, each situation is different.

The President, in the State of the Union message where he talked about the axis of evil, identified a very clear problem, which is countries that have weapons of mass destruction that support terrorists and that are hostile to the United States, but he didn't say there's a one size fits all policy that deals with every one of these countries the same.

In fact, I think the difference between strategy and tactics is understanding the difference between the goal which the President defined and the means by which you get there and the timing by which you get there.

Q: Maybe that's more of my question, is in terms of timing, the kind of, the threat of force against Iraq or the possibility of that could actually have a very negative impact on the war on terrorism in Southeast Asia.

Wolfowitz: I don't believe it. I know people say that, but let me say two things. Number one, I don't see how you can set about trying to eliminate sanctuaries for terrorists in Pakistan, which we're doing with the cooperation of the government of Pakistan, to eliminate sanctuaries in Yemen which we're doing in cooperation with the government of Yemen, to eliminate them in Indonesia, which we're trying to do with the cooperation of the government of Indonesia, and continue to allow them in Iraq because the government of Iraq actively supports terrorists. I mean, if you're going to eliminate sanctuary, you've got to look at it in a global way.

The other thing is that people are properly fearful about military action. Wars are a terrible thing and they have all kinds of unpredictable consequences. But the demise of this tyranny in Iraq, and the liberation of some 20 million very talented people, the testimony they're going to give when they are finally free to talk about how horribly the government has treated them for the last several decades, I think is going to, if anything, inspire a certain amount of guilt on the part of those people who say we should have left this regime in power.

Just think about how attitudes changed when the Taliban fell in Afghanistan and the world finally had a clear view of how terrible that regime was and how badly it treated women, and how badly it treated its minorities, and how it was starving its people and keeping girls from going to school. I would say, as an American, I don't think we got quite the credit we deserved for liberating a Muslim people, but I think certainly the whole view of that war changed once people had a chance to get in there and see what the regime had been like.

Q: So you think the Muslim world will rally behind --

Wolfowitz: Not necessarily rally behind, but they will certainly have to take a different view of it when 20 million Muslims in Iraq are saying you should have come and helped us sooner.

Q: Actually, I'll throw in one for CNN Presents...one for [inaudible]. [Laughter]

Abu Bakar Bashir, for many many months, was allowed to go free in Indonesia. He had dinner with the Vice President in Indonesia. A man called an agent of Osama bin Laden. During the time that that was happening, what was the U.S... what did you think about that and what were you doing about that?

Wolfowitz: Let's take a different example. I don't remember the man's name, and it's probably just as well, but there is a very prominent preacher in England who spews hate every Friday in the Mosque, and who certainly, if you didn't care about civil liberties, you would say he ought to be in jail, but we don't go in and tell the British what their laws are and what they allow them to do.

I think there are similar problems in Indonesia. I'm not in a position to say in detail. Clearly there's a line when people actually conspire to kill people and conduct criminal acts. Unfortunately, the terrorists don't usually lay out their plans out in the open so you can draw those dots so clearly even after the fact.

How you deal with people who are inciting to violence, who are preaching violence, whose words are dangerous but whose deeds can't be tied to horrific events is a problem for every democracy. It's unfortunately the case that some of the countries that are most effective against terrorists are the ones that we have problems with on the civil liberties side of the coin.

So I think we need to be careful about preaching to Indonesians. At the same time, I think they should stop being in denial and stop pretending there's no terrorist problem and stop pretending that this is just something the Americans invented and get on with developing good, solid democratic methods for dealing with these people.

Q: [inaudible] for a one-hour special that we're working on. You know we're doing this for three different things.

Wolfowitz: This has got to be the last one.

Q: I think the public, normally when they think of al Qaeda they think of Afghanistan, maybe now Pakistan. Southeast Asia is a relatively new landscape for the public to understand about al Qaeda.

How important is Southeast Asia from what you know for al Qaeda's goals as a base? Just [inaudible].

Wolfowitz: I think actually this is a very good question and I think for Americans to understand it, it probably is helpful to think of Indonesia as something much closer to Germany than to Afghanistan. By that I mean in two respects. Number one, Afghanistan in the old days, or parts of perhaps Yemen or Iran or Iraq today, where they can set up training camps, they operate fairly openly either because they are in inaccessible parts of the country or because the government isn't interested in chasing them.

In Indonesia, if you actually knew where terrorists were operating the government would go and get them. It's like Germany; the problem is they go underground. And like Germany, it's a democratic country, so there are limits on what law enforcement is willing or able to do.

The difference between Indonesia and Germany is it's a 90 percent Muslim population in Indonesia. Given that actually, it's surprising that there aren't more terrorists there and that they haven't made deeper inroads. But it's very much a matter of working with a democratic country through law enforcement methods to root out cells that are hiding in apartment houses and appearing to be perfectly innocent people. Afghanistan was a completely different proposition when you had a government that was openly sheltering terrorists and setting up training camps. That's a military problem. We in the Pentagon know how to deal with that one. But going and rooting out people who are renting apartments in Hamburg or Jakarta is law enforcement work, and it's difficult.

Q: What would you say if some people call this, Southeast Asia, the second front. Are we going that route, or --

Wolfowitz: I think -- Second of how many? Seven, eight? [Laughter] The United States is probably the first front. I know what they actually mean is it's second after Afghanistan. That's very misleading, I think. I don't want to start nominating other countries; we've seen a problem in Yemen just now. But it is a huge mistake to think that this is a problem that is isolated to one or two principal fronts, or one or two principal countries. It's a global problem. And not only do you need to go after it everywhere, but when you have a success in one place it can lead you to success in other places.

The reason this guy was killed in Yemen was because they got chased out of Afghanistan. The reason we were able to round up the gang in Singapore was because we found a videotape in Afghanistan that led us there.

Each time we have a success in one place, it tends to disrupt their network, give us more information, and sometimes leads to success halfway around the globe.

Q: Thank you very much.

Wolfowitz: You're welcome. It's good to see you.

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