Thursday, February 22, 2001 - 1:30 p.m. EST
Quigley: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I have a few announcements this afternoon.
The Army will honor more than 100 surviving members of World War II's heroic 551st Parachute Infantry by presenting the unit with the Presidential Unit Citation Award on Friday. The Army will host the ceremony in the Pentagon's auditorium, Room 5A1070, at 2:00.
The 551st spearheaded the Allies' counterattack at the Battle of the Bulge during World War II. Veterans of the 551st will be available for brief interviews following the official ceremony. And for more details on that, please contact Army Public Affairs.
Second, we have a bluetopper today that announces an updated version of our Al-Jubail, Saudi Arabia, case narrative. This report was first published by the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses in August 1997, and it presents the results of subsequent investigations into the three suspected chemical warfare incidents at the port city of Al-Jubail, Saudi Arabia, during the Gulf War. [See http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2001/b02222001_bt075-01.html ]
Third, we also have a bluetop that announces the results of a recently completed study by the Center for Naval Analysis and the Institute for Defense Analysis, which points to increased satisfaction with military health care, especially since the implementation of TriCare, the Department of Defense's health care program. And we have a couple of paper copies, but only a couple, and otherwise that is posted on the Web. [See http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2001/b02222001_bt076-01.html ]
And finally, we are pleased to welcome to our briefing today Ms. Rebecca Abecassis from Portugal, who is visiting the United States, starting today, to March 9th, under the auspices of the Department of State International Visitor Program. She is the executive news editor for a cable news channel in Lisbon and is in the U.S. to learn about the role of our media and about our domestic and foreign policy. Welcome. Good to have you with us.
And with that, I'll take your questions. Charlie?
Q: Craig, two questions. Why weren't British jets involved in the raids in the northern no-fly zone today? And number two, what's being done to find out why so many of those expensive JSOWs [joint standoff weapons] missed targets in Iraq near Baghdad last week?
Quigley: I don't know the answer to the first part of your question. Let me see if I can find that out -- as to whether or not British jets were involved.
Q: Well, they said they weren't. London said British jets were not involved.
Quigley: Oh --
Q: I was just wondering if that was a coincidence or --
Quigley: Well, no. I mean -- no, it's my understanding they don't fly -- the Brits do not fly every mission that coalition aircraft fly in either the northern or southern no-fly zone -- frequent contributors, but not 100 percent of the time. I mean, I can double-check on that, Charlie, if you want, but I -- and my initial reaction would be to take them at their word.
Q: Well, I was not denying that; I was just wondering why that -- it's because they weren't along today or --
Quigley: Yeah, let me see if I can get some more information that.
Q: And -- (to colleague) -- did you want to --
Q: I just wanted some clarity on what did happen in the northern no-fly zone, by your account.
Quigley: The coalition aircraft that did fly -- and I'll see if I can get some more clarity on that -- were fired at by elements of the Iraqi air defense system in the northern no-fly zone, and coalition aircraft returned fire and engaged those antiaircraft systems there and have --
Q: In other words, they retaliated against what was fired at them? Is that what you're saying, or --
Quigley: Correct. Correct. And it was -- both AAA and surface-to-air missiles [SAMs] were used today. Coalition aircraft were not hit, but they did return fire and safely returned to their bases.
Q: Are you sure about the SAMs?
Q: And on the JSOWs, what's being done to determine why more than half of them --
Quigley: Well, Charlie, we've not acknowledged what sorts of precision-guided ordnance were used in last Friday's strike on the targets just north of the southern no-fly zone, but I will say that a variety of types of ordnance were used to take on the types of targets that we chose to engage in the strike. You typically do that. You'll tailor your choice of weapons for the type of target that you're shooting at. Some targets are more appropriately engaged with a unitary warhead -- in other words, a single warhead. Some are more appropriately engaged with an area munition, if they're spread out over a large area or just the weaponeering is such that it says you should choose that instead of a unitary point weapon.
And you've got to start at the overriding purpose of why we did the strike on Friday. This was to disrupt and degrade the capability of the integrated air defense system in the southern no-fly zone from engaging coalition aircraft while they are patrolling that no-fly zone. We feel the strikes had a good effectiveness in carrying out that overall objective. Did each weapon perform perfectly during the strike? No. It did not. But we feel that, on balance, the strike had good effectiveness.
And let me just throw up one measure of effectiveness. Of the various radars that were struck on Friday as part of that overall strike, we have seen only two of them be turned back on subsequent to the strike on Friday. Now, is that because we damaged them as part of the strike, or because they're reluctant to bring them up, to know that we would engage them again? We don't know that for sure, but I'm not so sure that it matters, at the end of the day. If my goal is to protect the coalition air crews from being shot at as they patrol the no-fly zone, then whether or not we have destroyed a system or they simply don't use it, my objective has been accomplished.
Q: I'll go back to my original question. What is being done, if anything, to find out why these $300,000-plus bombs, the preponderance of them, missed their targets on Friday?
Quigley: Well, then I'll go back to my original answer. We have not acknowledged what types of ordnance were used in the strike, other than to say that they were long-range, precision-guided ordnance.
Q: Is anything being done to determine --
Quigley: We always do that. If we fire one weapon, if we fire 50 weapons, you try your hardest to ascertain their performance each and every time. If there's something that didn't perform according to Hoyle, we try to find out what it was and fix it for next time.
If you choose -- let me just throw out one example -- if you choose to use an area munition, by definition you're covering a wide area and you have some latitude whether or not you hit your precise aim point by the very nature of the beast, and you are capable of oftentimes doing significant damage to your target and still being off on some of your aim points. We fired these weapons at a range of dozens of miles from the targets. And on balance, we feel that we had good effectiveness from the raid. It wasn't perfect, but we are on balance overall satisfied with it.
Q: Just following up on your point, though, the fact that you're using area munitions and that you could have had an impact, do you have any evidence that in these other radar sites, aside from the two that have come back up and are operating again, that these strikes did any significant damage in these cases where some of the weapons did not hit their aim point?
Quigley: Our assessment of battle damage is not yet complete. It may take days or even weeks for that to be complete. It comes in via a variety of means, Jamie. And we never quite close the door on some tidbit of information that would become available to us somewhere downstream that would add to our knowledge of how the weapons performed. When we get that, we factor that into the overall equation. And we're not sure that -- exactly why we have only seen two of those radars come back up. But if they're not being used, whether by damage or concern for them becoming damaged, I've accomplished my objective of disrupting and degrading his capability to engage coalition aircraft in the southern no-fly zone.
Q: Craig, surely you're not arguing that if the United States missed more than half of the radar that it went after, the mere fact that they aren't turning them back on is an adequate accuracy rate or an adequate result from this kind of a raid. You want to put bombs on target --
Quigley: You bet.
Q: -- and destroy the target --
Q: -- not just keep their head down.
Q: Is that not so?
Quigley: Absolutely. True. And that's why we'll take every bit of available data we have from the -- the feedback from our own air crews, as well as other means of determining damage assessment, try to ascertain to the best we can exactly where the weapons did hit, and try to figure out for those that did not hit their intended aim point, how did this happen? Mechanical failure? Software failure? Weather? What was it that caused this particular weapon or weapons to not perform as we expect them to? So that's the process that goes into place, John, each and every time.
Q: When you say two of the -- two radars, of how many? And was it customary in the past for those radars to be -- as long-range surveillance radars, were they on all the time in the past, and now they're not?
Quigley: Well, again, we've seen -- keep in mind from our descriptions on Friday that these very large, very long-range air defense and surveillance radars. Not particularly new radars, but still, effective and very long range.
What we saw was an improvement in the quality and quantity of the anti-aircraft systems in place in the southern no-fly zone to engage coalition aircraft -- quite an increase in that since the first of the year. And we looked about and we said why is that so? And we attributed the capability of these systems that were struck, both the radars and the command and control and communication facilities that all helped to knit them together as a coherent whole, that that contributed to the overall effectiveness of the planes south of 33 [degrees latitude]. And so that's why those particular targets were engaged.
Is it permanent? No. You can replace or repair systems such as these that have been damaged. But if it disrupts and degrades and always keeps that air defense system either ducking or looking or somehow operating at less than peak effectiveness, and it goes to safeguard our coalition air crews while they're flying in those no-fly zones, we consider that a mark of success.
Q: I don't think you ever said two of how many.
Quigley: Because we never have quantified the number.
Q: Was one of the purposes of the strike also to disrupt air defenses in the north or are those radars not --
Quigley: No, they are not --
Q: -- not used?
Quigley: Correct; they are not situated as such that they would contribute to the Iraqi air defenses in the north.
Q: Are there corresponding ones in the north that do the same thing?
Quigley: I don't know.
Q: Craig, was this the first time that the United States and its allies struck a connecting network, as opposed to retaliating for when a fire-control radar was turned on, which, as I remember, provoked a bombing, but not a search-control radar.
Quigley: No, I don't think so, George. I can't give you a date, but over the months, I seem to recall that it isn't always fire-control radars that have been engaged. If any element -- and that could include any of the command-and-control communication nodes that are the brains of it and that help knit it all together, as well as some of the search radars that contribute to -- particularly the long-range air picture -- if we feel those have had an effect both north and south, those are fair game.
Q: Well, then, looking through Iraq's end of the telescope, if they turn on the search radar, which could be benign, could be for just seeing who's up there and traffic control, does that mean that's a no-no they'll likely get bombed, or is it strictly if you turn on -- if you paint me with a fire-control radar, then you take the consequences?
Quigley: We have a variety of means of ascertaining the role that a radar would play, and when you have a radar such as the Tall King or the Volex, which were the ones that General Newbold showed up here on Friday which were two of the types that were struck, their capabilities are of long-range surveillance and contributing to the early warning of coalition aircraft being in the southern no-fly zone. You take their pure mechanical and electronic capabilities as only one factor as to whether or not they contribute to that picture. There are other means that we then piece together to ascertain their greater role in contributing to that air defense picture. And we looked at the totality in choosing the particular sites that we chose for Friday.
Q: What U.K. aircraft were used in this raid?
Quigley: I'm sorry?
Q: U.K. aircraft?
Quigley: U.K. aircraft were used in Friday's strike, yes.
Q: Which were they?
Quigley: I don't know. You'd need to check with the Brits on that.
Q: Were they doing air to -- were they doing fighter CAP [combat air patrol] or were they doing air-to-ground as well?
Quigley: Again, I'd prefer to have you check with the British and let them talk about their planes.
Q: One final question. Why not identify the types of weapons we used at this time? Why are you not?
Quigley: Because you choose a weapon quite specifically to go after a particular type of target. Now, you could choose different types of weapons to go after a particular target, but there is a very exact process that goes into the weaponeering and the choice of weapon that you choose to go after a particular target. There are other factors of just the weapon and the target -- what is the weather, what is the terrain, what are my launch platforms? And you put all those parts together, and if you put all those parts together, you could be helpful in predicting what sort of a system would be used against a similar target set in the future. And I'm not going to help the Iraqis and put together the parts of that puzzle.
Q: Can you --
Quigley: Linda? I'm sorry. John, I'll be right back.
Q: Go ahead, John.
Q: Oh. Can you explain what the JSOW is? Is it one of your newest -- this is just hypothetical, just curious -- (laughter) -- is it one of your newer weapons? What makes it special?
Quigley: JSOW is an area munition. I think it entered service in early 1999. It was used in Kosovo some, although it was pretty new to the inventory at that point, John, and I don't think it was used in large numbers. But there was some use of it in Kosovo.
It is a standoff weapon, uses a combination of GPS [global positioning system] and inertial navigation to pilot itself to the target. It is a fire-and-forget weapon, with the coordinates that you program into the guidance system before launch. You can carry a variety of types of weapons with this, and it is designed to take on a large area sort of a target.
Q: It sounds like it's one of the more promising weapons in your inventory. Is that right?
Quigley: We definitely think so.
Q: And one that -- one would think the United States would rely on this type of weapon increasingly in the future.
Quigley: Probably so. Given the trends of warfare, as you look down the road into the future, yes.
Q: So if one of these really promising weapons didn't work very well, that would be a source of concern to you.
Quigley: Oh, you can find any number of instances throughout history where weapons that have performed remarkably well over a long period of time have had instances of failure, for a variety of reasons. That's why I say that each and every time we try our darnedest to ascertain the weapons that did not work according to their specifications -- why? Was it an anomaly, or was -- is there something in the process, in the software, in the hardware, or something that is just not right and needs to be corrected throughout the inventory of these weapons? Or was it an anomaly? You try real hard to figure that out as best you can and then take the corrective actions from there.
Quigley: Linda, go ahead.
Q: Two questions. Along those lines, the first one -- I know you don't have the BDA [battle damage assessment] complete yet, but you have said twice now that you know it wasn't perfect. Can you elaborate on that? What wasn't perfect? Those were fired, they missed their target -- what part of that equation was not perfect?
Quigley: We know that every weapon used in the raid did not perform 100 percent. Rarely is that the case.
Q: Okay. The second part is, does the Pentagon have an estimate of how many threat radars have been degraded because of coalition airstrikes over the whole --
Quigley: No, not that I know of. And the number would be very transient, too. I mean, if I have attacked a radar in a strike and I have damaged it, so for that day and maybe for three weeks or some number of weeks afterwards it's out of commission, but ultimately it is repaired and returned to service, I have only taken it out of circulation for that period of time. During that period of time, it no longer contributes to the effectiveness of the Iraqi air defense system, but it may not be permanent. If I blow it to smithereens, that's a different issue and you can pretty much write it off. But I don't know of any overall tally that's been done over time.
Q: Any estimate on how many have been blown to smithereens?
Quigley: No, I'm sorry. Not that I've ever seen, no.
Q: Do you have any -- you said that you had seen only two radars come back online. Any indication whether the strikes have in fact degraded the command-and-control network, which you were really going after, or not at this point?
Quigley: No, not yet. Not this quickly after the fact. But we know, again, we had good effectiveness overall on the strike, and we know that several of those command-and-control sites were indeed damaged -- at least several. Again, our BDA is still imperfect here. And whatever is not functioning according to its design specifications is going to be a degradation and a disruption in the capability of the overall system.
Q: Just to return for a moment John's line of questioning. Without saying how you feel about the performance of the JSOW weapon on this past mission, can you say as of today, as of this moment, are you satisfied with the performance of this weapon?
Quigley: You would not bring a weapon into inventory that did not perform well during its testing phase. That's the period of time that you try to really test it under a variety of conditions and work out any bumps. Sometimes individual anomalies or systemic anomalies do develop after a weapon has been entered into inventory, and if that's the case, then we take the corrective action.
Q: Right, but can you say -- can you characterize how you feel about the performance of this weapon, as of right now?
Quigley: I don't have enough of a comprehensive track record over its two years of being in inventory to give you an intelligent answer on that, Tom. I'm sorry.
Q: Craig, Iraq has claimed today that it has defused one of the bombs -- or weapons used in Friday's attack that did not explode, and claims that there are other unexploded ordnance that will have to be defused as well. Are you aware or can you confirm if any of the weapons expended in Friday's attack failed to detonate?
Quigley: No. I don't have any way of ascertaining that to be the fact.
Q: Do you have any reason to believe that the Iraqi report might be correct that maybe a weapon or two did not explode?
Quigley: Occasionally there appears to be a germ of truth amongst the reports that the Iraqis variously put out. I don't know if that's the case in this particular instance. I just have no way of ascertaining that, Jamie, for sure.
Q: Do the bombs that the JSOW disperses, do they have a dud rate that might explain unexploded ordnance?
Quigley: I don't know if they do or not.
Q: Craig, you said these bombs were launched from dozens of miles away. Well, isn't it true that JSOWs, that's the whole purpose of JSOWs? I mean, wasn't that at the heart of the whole strike? Isn't the whole purpose of JSOWs so that you don't have to have a plane hovering nearby to guide a bomb in, as it was in the Gulf War, by radar, but you use satellites?
Quigley: We have a variety of munitions in our inventory whose purpose is --
Q: Not bombs, though. You have -- not bombs.
Quigley: Well, I wouldn't call JSOW a bomb.
Q: Well, it's a glide bomb.
Quigley: It carries submunitions. When I think of a bomb -- I'm sorry, maybe I'm all wet on this -- I think of a single object that hits its target, more of a unitary sort of a warhead. So I'm not sure that's an accurate comparison.
QI'm trying to figure out how to word this. It sounds as though the Defense Department does not want to acknowledge that you had a significant problem or anomaly with one of your weapon systems in this raid. Would that be giving away the store to the enemy, to acknowledge that the bombs that the U.S. dropped flat out didn't work the way they were supposed to? Would that be a big secret?
Quigley: Well, I'm not sure -- given the imperfection of our battle damage assessment as of today -- I'm not sure that we can say with certainty how much effect a given weapon that was used did or didn't have. I mentioned the example of only two radars being brought back up. But I'll be the first to acknowledge that we're not sure why that is. Did we damage them, even though the aimpoint may have been missed? Again, understanding that this is an area weapon and I have a very big spread by design, so I could have done damage to my target without having hit my aimpoint precisely. I want to hit my aimpoint, because I've done my weaponeering analysis to optimize the damage that I will do by choosing an aimpoint on purpose. So let me be very clear, that's the desired point of impact of the weapon.
But with an area munition, I have tolerance there for being off a little, and I can still do some damage. It probably is not as optimized as the weaponeering analysis would have told me it should be if I hit my intended aimpoint, but it may not be zero either. And given our imperfect knowledge today of the battle damage that was incurred, I'm not sure that we can give a good answer to the question. If we see that a system does not perform as we expect it to, for whatever reason, we try very hard to find out why and fix it.
Q: Can you characterize the footprint of a JSOW anomaly, and what area do the bomblets cover?
Quigley: I don't have that with me. I'm sure we do have that somewhere, but I don't have that with me. I'm sorry.
Q: New subject?
Q: Change of subject.
Quigley: Go ahead.
Q: What does Secretary Rumsfeld have in mind on asking the services to review their policy on civilian participation in --
Quigley: Yeah, that is still a work in progress, but his general thrust will be to provide guidance to the services that will put some sort of a governing mechanism in place, at least on a interim basis, to make sure that while the importance of the programs to have citizens come out and take a look at what their armed forces do on a daily basis -- that's very important, and that's not the issue really; the issue is for now to put in place a moratorium on putting individuals in control of the systems -- tactical vehicles; airplanes; ships; things of that sort -- until we can take -- each of the services take a concerted look here and pause and take a look at the controls that are in place and just take a look to see if the system, as each service has it in place, is appropriate.
Q: Do you know any other -- can you give any other examples of control -- quote, unquote "control" positions that civilians routinely are allowed to --
Quigley: Well, it'd vary by service depending on what sort of vehicles that service would have in its inventory. Ships, planes, tactical vehicles would certainly cover most of the instances. I can't think --
Quigley: Yeah, yeah, definitely, definitely.
Q: But you say that's a work in progress. Has the order gone out?
Quigley: No, not yet. Now, like I said Tuesday, I believe the Army and the Navy have so far taken this action on their own, at least as an interim step. But all the services know that this is coming. It should be signed in a day or two, I would think, and they would have that guidance from the secretary to perform that review.
Quigley: Yeah, George?
Q: On Monday a formal naval court of inquiry is supposed to start on the Greeneville accident, which presumably killed nine people. In the USS Cole, it was 18 people killed, and there was no U.S. Navy formal court of inquiry. Why the double standard?
Quigley: I wouldn't describe it that way at all. You had a JAG manual investigation that was performed, and that was able to provide the answers to the questions that needed to be answered. In this particular case, the convening authority, Admiral Fargo, thought the better vehicle to ascertain the facts here was a court of inquiry. That gives you certain capabilities that a lesser body does not have, specifically, subpoena power for non-military members, should they wish to be subpoenaed by the court. Every case is tailored to the circumstances at hand. The authorities thought that the JAG manual was appropriate for the Cole and a court of inquiry for the Greeneville.
Q: Well, who made the decision not to have a court of inquiry for the Cole?
Quigley: I have no idea.
Q: If the Greeneville had contact with the Ehime Maru 71 minutes before the accident, as the NTSB [National Transportation Safety Board] says, how could you explain possibilities for losing track of it in the intervening 71 minutes, in the final minutes before the collision?
Quigley: A great question that I'm sure the court of inquiry will get into.
Q: You don't have any explanations or possibilities of what could have happened?
Q: I'm still confused about Iraq, because you say, on the one hand, that, you know, two radars back up, 18 not, you don't know --
Quigley: I didn't say that. Those are your words.
Q: Fine. But basically, many of the radars have not come back up, and I believe you said you don't know why, whether they've been damaged or whether or not the Iraqis are simply stepping back and not turning them on, and that your BDA is ongoing, so it's very difficult to judge the effectiveness of one of the weapons that you said -- although you didn't name it -- had gone astray.
Having said all of that, how, on the other hand, can both you and General Newbold repeatedly say the strike had good effectiveness?
Quigley: Because we think that it was successful in at least to a certain degree disrupting and degrading the capability of that integrated air defense system. If I have fewer systems to use, I'm going to be less capable.
Q: But you don't -- I mean, where I guess I'm still confused is you don't really know whether it was disrupted or degraded; all you know is, at the moment, some certain number of Iraqi radars have not come back online.
Quigley: We don't have zero BDA. We don't have perfect BDA. Our knowledge is somewhere between the two. We know that we had some effectiveness in hitting the targets that we shot at. And we know that many of them were indeed damaged, some of them considerably. There's no way you could have a system be as completely operational and helpful to the contribution of the air defense picture in the South if it is no longer operational.
Q: What is your feeling about comparing the effectiveness of the strike against the radar targets versus the command-and-control nodes? Where do you think you did better?
Quigley: I don't know if we're looking at it that way, as a scorecard sort of a circumstance. We tried to look across at all of the targets and learn what we can about what went right, what could have been done better; and if it's over here, we're happy, if it's over here and it needs to be improved, we'll do what we can to try to improve the performance.
Q: My last question. What do you think could have been done better?
Quigley: We don't know that yet. We're still getting back information from the systems that were used. And the BDA will take a while. That's in large part a measure of your success. It isn't a hundred percent of the measurements that you use. But I could hit a target, but if the Iraqis are able to repair it fairly quickly, I've had a relatively temporary effect. If I've really knocked it out and I'm going to take weeks or months or maybe not ever to reconstitute that element, then I've had a more permanent effect. So I'm not sure how to give a good answer to your question.
Q: Of the two radars that have come back up, are they up continuously, intermittently? And do the Iraqis have other long-range radars or are they, in effect, with the exception of those two, blind from looking south?
Quigley: No, there are other long-range radars that the Iraqis have at their disposal, certainly. And in the first part of your question, we've only seen them on just a little bit. "Intermittently" might even be a little strong. But they have been turned on, so it hasn't been zero.
Q: Craig, in Mozambique there's been heavy flooding again and, just like a year ago, there are people in trees. The foreign minister is asking for new help and today he said one thing he needed was aircraft. Has the Defense Department been approached to provide assistance? Are you considering assistance?
Quigley: Bryan was trying to get me up on that one as I was literally walking down the hall. Not that I know of yet, Alex. I mean, if there would be a request to the United States government for some assistance and if there is something we can contribute to that, I mean, we'll certainly do what we can. But I don't think that's got to that point yet.
Q: Back to the Greeneville. According to the NTSB, their news briefing, one crewmember actually said a civilian was disruptive. Does that statement contradict your position that 100 percent sure civilians didn't distract the operation?
Quigley: I don't think anybody's ever said that we're 100 percent sure of anything. That's why the Navy is convening a court of inquiry.
Q: The secretary of Defense said there was no evidence whatsoever that the civilians had distracted the crew.
Quigley: I think he said -- his exact words, I believe, was "We have no evidence whatsoever at this time that any civilians on board the submarine," and those were true words when they were spoken.
Q: So do you care to amend that for now?
Quigley: No, not until the court of inquiry completes its work and we find the answers to all these very good questions.
Q: So your position now is everything is in the investigation, so you don't say 100 percent with the civilians --
Quigley: Well, everything will be taken up by the court of inquiry. The quick-look investigation that Admiral Griffiths accomplished for Admiral Fargo has been turned over to Admiral Fargo. That's the starting point for the court of inquiry.
Q: On the V-22, just any idea when the IG will make a determination on the accident investigation portion, and then the final out-brief?
Quigley: No, not yet. Although the accident investigation is not an element of the IG's direct actions here. I mean, his --
Q: But the IG is looking at whether the accident investigation was tainted by the --
Quigley: Right. I was going to say, that is exactly where I was going. That's an element of it, although not the central thrust. I just asked the IG this morning how it was going. He said it's proceeding well, but he still can't put any sort of a time frame on when he'll be completed.
Q: One more on that. I saw General Amos is on the list of promotions to major general. Are we to infer from that the IG has at least concluded there was no undue command influence in the situation?
Quigley: I don't know as if the two items you just mentioned have any relationship to each other.
Q: Only that --
Quigley: A person in the Headquarters Marine Corps staff is not in the chain of command for the operational Marine Corps forces in the field. Under Goldwater-Nichols, that comes under the unified CINC. Administratively, they always stay within their service chain. But, I mean, the head of a service, or anybody on the staff of the head of that service is not in the operational chain of command for those units.
Q: Greeneville again. It's reported that you all are considering some special envoy to Japan from this building. Have you decided who is going?
Quigley: We have not yet. I've seen those reports, but no final decisions have been made.
Q: Do you have anything new on the photos from the ROVs [remotely operated vehicles] that are looking at the Ehime Maru and on the technical feasibility of raising the boat?
Quigley: Well, I know that the bottom surveys continue. What you hope to accomplish with the ROVs and the side-scan sonars is to basically come up with a bottom relief map showing the type of bottom, any topographical features in the vicinity of the vessel, any debris on the bottom. You're looking for a relief map, in the truest sense of the word, that would be helpful to a salvage company in ascertaining the way ahead as to how they might -- those are essential, fundamental questions you've got to have pretty good answers to before you come up with a comprehensive proposal for the next step.
Q: Do you have anything new, any new answers on that?
Quigley: Well, that bottom survey is still going to take several more days. I think the goal is to get about a six-square-mile area around the vessel mapped as accurately as we can make it, and that process is going to take several more days yet. The weather has been on our side, though, so we're hopeful that we can keep up the current pace.
Q: Back on General Amos, does the fact that he's on the promotion list mean that the Office of Secretary of Defense is satisfied that his now-notorious e-mail discussing the close-hold and secret nature of the actual reliability of the V-22, that that was totally appropriate and OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense) has no problem with that?
Quigley: A lot of things go into the selection of an officer for a promotion. All I can say was that process was followed. At each step along the way, those reviewing the list found that the names on that list were appropriate and forwarded them to the next step in the chain of command.
Q: Admiral, has anyone in this building had a chance to review the proposals put forward by Putin on missile defense?
Quigley: Starting. Starting. We now have received their proposals, and I believe as of this morning, as a matter of fact. And so we're starting to take a look at them.
Q: Thank you.
Quigley: Yes? Tony?
Q: Tony Blair is going to be visiting President Bush in the next day. The British are integral to national missile defense because we need one of their sites to operate early-warning radar. Can you check to see if in fact the British at this point have given the United States permission to use the radar site at Fylingdales? You may know this off the top of your head, but if you don't, could you check that for the record?
Quigley: I don't believe the British government has made any such announcement, Tony, and they would be the ones that would do that.
Q: Thank you.
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