DOD Base Closure and Realignment Report to the Commission

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

ANALYSES

AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

(Volume IV)

May 2005
# DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
ANALYSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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BRAC 2005 CERTIFICATION

I certify that the data supporting these recommended closures and realignments are complete and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Gordon England
Secretary of the Navy
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Title XXIX, Part A of the FY 1991 Defense Authorization Act, Public Law 101-510, as amended) (the Base Closure Act) is to provide a fair process that will result in the timely closure and realignment of military installations inside the United States. The statutorily mandated process is designed to ensure that the recommendations are based objectively on selection criteria and a 20-year Force Structure Plan developed by the Department of Defense (DoD). The recommendations are to be reviewed by an independent Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC Commission), the President, and the Congress. The Base Closure Act, at Section 2909(a), provides, with limited exceptions, that until April 15, 2006 it "shall be the exclusive authority for selecting for closure or realignment, or for carrying out any closure or realignment of, a military installation inside the United States."

This report constitutes the response of the Department of the Navy to the requirements of the Base Closure Act for the 2005 round of base realignment and closure ("BRAC 2005"). In addition to the Base Closure Act, the Department of the Navy base closure and realignment process is governed by implementing policy and guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy. The chapters that follow will describe the Department of the Navy process, the analyses from which its recommendations were derived, and the considerations that led to particular decisions.

Like all previous BRAC rounds, elimination of excess physical capacity was one of the objectives for BRAC 2005. This round of BRAC also serves to rationalize infrastructure with defense strategy. In this regard, BRAC 2005 was the means for reconfiguring the current infrastructure into one in which operational capacity maximizes war-fighting capability and efficiency. An additional focus of BRAC 2005 was to examine and implement opportunities for greater joint activity. Accordingly, the BRAC 2005 analysis was divided into two pieces. Joint Cross-Service Groups analyzed common business-oriented functions, while the Military Departments analyzed all Service unique functions.

The Department of the Navy employed a multi-pronged strategy for BRAC 2005 that sought to rationalize and consolidate infrastructure capabilities to eliminate unnecessary excess; balance the effectiveness of Fleet concentrations with anti-terrorism/force protection desires for dispersion of assets and redundancy of facilities; leverage opportunities for total force laydown and joint basing; accommodate changing operational concepts; and facilitate the evolution of force structure and infrastructure organizational alignment. In developing its BRAC 2005 recommendations, the Department of the Navy adhered to the basic principles that the recommendations must eliminate excess capacity, save money, improve operational readiness and jointness, and maintain quality of service. Developing recommendations in BRAC 2005 was particularly challenging given that the recommendations must be based on a 20-year Force Structure Plan, a much longer range view than has been done before. This requirement to fully consider the future and its inherent uncertainties resulted in the Department retaining more
infrastructure than the analysis supported, in order to ensure we do not eliminate anything we thought we might need in the future.

Accordingly, our objective was that set of recommendations that, building upon the substantial reductions in infrastructure resulting from prior rounds of BRAC and the organizational changes made in the years since BRAC 1995, will allow us to better afford the capital investments and modernization required in the future. This set of recommendations would both reduce excess capacity and balance force and base structure in a way that will foster operational flexibility, synergistic readiness support, and joint opportunities wherever possible. We have attempted to balance our base structure to support our future force structure in the following ways:

For operational bases, our recommendations maintain sufficient flexibility to meet future military commitments while effectively utilizing existing capacity. While our recommendations result in retention of capacity to house more ships and aircraft squadrons than will exist in our future force structure, this is necessary in order to retain the capability to adjust to operational tempo changes and to achieve the desired strategic laydown and presence. Our analysis also led to the determination that there is no significant excess capacity in Department of the Navy ground force bases, particularly given the planned increase in Marine Corps force structure. The recommendations enable us to maintain Fleet dispersal and viable anti-terrorism/force protection capability while simultaneously supporting optimal power projection, rapid force deployment and expeditionary force reach-back.

For training activities, our recommendations retain capacity and flexibility to meet current and future force structure and surge requirements. Prior rounds of BRAC concentrated on the consolidation of Navy recruit training. BRAC 2005 sought to extend that consolidation effort to Navy officer accession training. Department of the Navy unique professional military education activities were determined to be properly sized and sited to support their target populations. Retention of two Marine recruit training depots is considered necessary to maintain flexibility sufficient to accommodate surge and increased operational tempo.

For reserve activities, the overriding objective was to maintain a demographically sound Reserve establishment while providing balanced recruiting opportunities. Working closely with representatives from the Navy and Marine Corps Reserve components, we sought to consolidate units to active-duty installations or joint reserve centers where they could more effectively support the Fleet without impacting recruiting demographics. Our recommendations facilitate the downsizing of the Department of the Navy Reserve infrastructure by consolidating Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Centers while maintaining a geographically appropriate structure.

Our recommendations eliminate a significant portion of the excess capacity within the Recruiting Management function. Because of on-going organizational
transformation involving Navy Recruiting Districts, the focus in BRAC 2005 was on the elimination of excess management capacity and reduction of lease costs while maintaining sufficient recruiting management oversight to support Department of the Navy accession requirements.

Our recommendations continue the move toward a regionalized support structure in the Navy by reducing the number of Installation Management regions and aligning the other service commands to those regions, thereby saving costs relating to facilities and fostering beneficial consolidations and efficiencies planned for the future.

**Joint Cross-Service Group Contributions**

A primary objective of BRAC 2005 was to examine and implement opportunities for greater joint activity. Joint Cross-Service Groups analyzed common business-oriented functions and evaluated them for ways to consolidate and eliminate excess infrastructure. Recommendations developed by the Joint Cross-Service Groups benefit the Department of the Navy in the following ways:

For headquarters and support activities, the recommendations of the Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group develop joint enterprise-wide solutions for civilian personnel, correctional facilities, mobilization, investigative/adjudication and media activities, and establish joint basing arrangements affecting ten naval installations. The recommendations virtually eliminate all Department of the Navy requirements for leased space near the Pentagon, thereby enhancing anti-terrorism/force protection posture and reducing leased space costs. Additionally, the recommendations relocate Navy and Marine Corps Reserve, personnel, recruiting, and training commands to optimize organizational alignment and location.

For industrial activities, the recommendations of the Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group yield a smaller industrial base that is appropriately sized and positioned, flexible and multi-functional. The recommendations complete ship maintenance consolidation in Fleet concentration areas and initiate aviation intermediate and depot maintenance consolidation into aviation Fleet Readiness Centers.

In the education and training functional area, the recommendations of the Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group create several joint schools and establish a joint initial training site for the Joint Strike Fighter. The overall result of the education and training recommendations will be a better alignment of Service training functions, increased joint training and shared resources, and reduced infrastructure costs.

In the medical activities area, the recommendations of the Medical Joint Cross-Service Group leverage civilian opportunities by privatizing inpatient service facilities. The recommendations also optimize regional healthcare and joint healthcare options,
consolidate enlisted medical education, and create integrated full-spectrum centers of
excellence in the medical research functional area.

For technical activities, the recommendations of the Technical Joint Cross-Service
Group build upon the efforts of the Department of the Navy in prior BRAC rounds to
create integrated full-spectrum centers of excellence in functional areas. The
technical recommendations collapse major platform domains into integrated research,
development, acquisition, test and evaluation centers for air, ground, sea, and space
domains, and eliminate redundancy.

The recommendations of the Supply and Storage Joint Cross-Service Group transition
traditional military logistics linear processes to a networked, force-focused construct,
which minimizes the number of sites and reduces excess capacity while providing for
increased jointness, enhanced supply chain efficiency and leveraged DoD buying
power.

The inclusion of the Joint Cross-Service process in the BRAC 2005 evaluations allowed the
Department of the Navy to explore numerous innovative and transformational alternatives to
current configurations of business lines and locations. Additionally, the analysis and ultimate
integration of recommendations demonstrated the cross-functional linkages among operating
assets and the activities that exist to support them.

The Joint Cross-Service recommendations impacted numerous Department of the Navy
activities and installations. In some instances, a Joint Cross-Service Group recommendation
resulted in a realignment of the Department of the Navy installation. In other cases, the
recommendation or series of recommendations allowed for closure of the installation fenceline,
thereby generating additional savings and reductions in excess capacity.

In sum, these recommendations support total force operational flexibility and readiness
sustainability. Taken in conjunction with the substantial closures and realignments in prior
rounds of BRAC, these recommendations align the infrastructure of the Department of the Navy
with the forces it must support and identify savings that can be used for recapitalization and
force structure investments. Where excess capacity remains, it is either a reflection of the
peculiarities of the configurations of particular types of installations or a considered decision to
protect future strategic and operational flexibility.
CHAPTER 2

FORCE STRUCTURE PLAN

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended, (Base Closure Act) requires that the Department of Defense (DoD) recommendations for closure or realignment of military installations be based upon the Force Structure Plan included as part of the DoD budget justification documents submitted to Congress. This Force Structure Plan covers the 20-year period beginning with fiscal year (FY) 2005 and is based upon an assessment of probable threats to national security during the 20-year period, the probable end-strength levels and major military force units (including land force divisions, carrier and other major combatant vessels, air wings, and other comparable units) needed to meet these threats, and the anticipated levels of funding that will be available for national defense purposes during such period. For the 2005 round of base closure and realignment, the force structure plan covers the period from FY 2005 to FY 2024.

The classified force structure plan is contained in Volume II of the DoD Report. For the Navy and the Marine Corps, the unclassified portion of that plan is as follows:

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The 20-year Force Structure Plan outlined above is the revised plan submitted to Congress as provided in section 2912(a)(4) of the Base Closure Act.
CHAPTER 3

ORGANIZATION AND CONTROLS

The Secretary of the Navy has the authority and responsibility for making sound and timely base closure and realignment recommendations to the Secretary of Defense that are in compliance with the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended, (Base Closure Act) and Department of Defense (DoD) guidance. To satisfy this responsibility within the Department of the Navy, policies and procedures were promulgated, organizations and responsibilities were delineated, internal controls were developed, specific interactions within the Department of the Navy and with DoD were required, and evaluation was conducted, all leading to the Department of the Navy BRAC 2005 recommendations. The mechanics of this process are discussed below.

Policy Promulgation

The basic policies and procedures for the Department of the Navy BRAC 2005 process were promulgated by the Secretary of the Navy in memoranda dated November 25, 2002 (Subject: Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) 2005) and June 27, 2003 (Subject: Internal Control Plan for Management of the Department of the Navy Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Process Policy Advisory Two) and SECNAV Notice 11000, first issued on March 4, 2004 (Subject: Base Closure and Realignment). These policy documents empowered the initiation of the Department of the Navy BRAC 2005 process and allowed development of the process in satisfaction of the Base Closure Act and anticipated DoD guidance. SECNAV Notice 11000 reflected and built upon the experience gained within the Department of the Navy during earlier rounds of BRAC, in view of the validation of that process after extensive review by both the Government Accountability Office and the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC Commission). In general, SECNAV Notice 11000 described the organizations to be utilized by the Department of the Navy to arrive at its recommendations, the responsibilities of those organizations, and the general requirements for the conduct of the process.

Organizational Structure

As initially prescribed by SECNAV Notice 11000, the overall Department of the Navy BRAC 2005 process was placed under the oversight and guidance of the Secretary of the Navy, who relied upon an Infrastructure Evaluation Group for analyses and deliberations required to satisfy the mandates of the Base Closure Act. The Secretary of the Navy also established the Infrastructure Analysis Team to respond to the guidance and direction of the Infrastructure Evaluation Group in collecting data and performing analyses as necessary, and the Functional Advisory Board to support the Joint Cross-Service Group and Department of the Navy BRAC 2005 processes.

The Infrastructure Evaluation Group. The Infrastructure Evaluation Group had eight members. Membership was prescribed in SECNAV Notice 11000 with a view toward ensuring that the members had broad, relevant experience to apply to the base structure evaluation. The
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Environment) was designated as the Chair and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Infrastructure Strategy and Analysis) was designated as the Vice Chair. Two Navy Flag officers were appointed based on recommendations from the Chief of Naval Operations and two Marine Corps General officers were appointed based on recommendations from the Commandant of the Marine Corps. These officers had experience in logistics, planning, requirements, and/or operations, respectively. Two individuals of Senior Executive Service rank were also appointed, one of whom was nominated by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) and one of whom was nominated by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs). The inclusion of these two members ensured analyses fully considered acquisition program and personnel impacts.

The Infrastructure Evaluation Group was responsible for:

- Conducting analyses and developing recommendations in deliberative session regarding Service unique closure and realignment of Department of the Navy military installations or activities for approval by the Secretary of the Navy;

- Ensuring that an equitable and complete evaluation of all Navy and Marine Corps installations was conducted in accordance with the Base Closure Act;

- Ensuring that the process utilized, the conduct of the deliberations, and the preparation of the report containing recommendations were timely, thorough, and in compliance with the Base Closure Act, Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Navy policy, and SECNAV Notice 11000; and that the procedures used could be appropriately reviewed and analyzed by the Comptroller General as provided by the Base Closure Act;

- Ensuring that factors of concern to the Navy and Marine Corps operational commanders were considered in any recommendations that affected Department of the Navy installations;

- Providing base closure and realignment recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy for review;

- Supporting the presentation of the base closure and realignment recommendations by the Secretary of the Navy; and

- Providing direction, guidance, and oversight to the Infrastructure Analysis Team.

In carrying out these responsibilities, the Infrastructure Evaluation Group was charged with protecting the integrity of the process by ensuring that all certified data, considerations, and evaluations were treated as sensitive and internal to the process.

**The Infrastructure Analysis Team.** The Infrastructure Analysis Team was organized principally to provide staff support to the Infrastructure Evaluation Group. Under the direction,
guidance, and oversight of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Infrastructure Strategy and Analysis) and the Infrastructure Evaluation Group, the Infrastructure Analysis Team was composed of military and civilian analysts and supporting staff from throughout the Department of the Navy and from the Center for Naval Analysis. The individuals assigned to the Infrastructure Analysis Team represented a broad spectrum of expertise and capability, with emphasis on senior officers with operational experience.

The Infrastructure Analysis Team was responsible for:

- Responding to the guidance and direction of the Infrastructure Evaluation Group in collecting data and performing analyses as necessary;

- Developing analytical methodologies and techniques for consideration by the Infrastructure Evaluation Group;

- Working with external organizations, to include the DoD BRAC staff, the BRAC Commission staff, the Government Accountability Office, and Congressional staff, on day-to-day issues;

- Providing working-level analytical support to the Joint Cross-Service Groups and coordinating data development with the Functional Advisory Board and Joint Cross-Service Groups;

- Controlling the development of the Department of the Navy BRAC Information Transfer System (DONBITS) and associated documentation; and

- Protecting the integrity of the process by ensuring that all certified data, considerations, and evaluations were treated as sensitive and internal to the process

**The Functional Advisory Board.** The Functional Advisory Board membership consisted of the Navy and Marine Corps principal members of the seven Joint Cross-Service Groups.

The Functional Advisory Board was responsible for:

- Ensuring the Department of the Navy leadership was thoroughly briefed and prepared on Joint Cross-Service Group matters that would ultimately be addressed to the Infrastructure Executive Council and Infrastructure Steering Group;

- Reporting directly to the Infrastructure Evaluation Group and coordinating with the Infrastructure Analysis Team;

- Coordinating with the Infrastructure Evaluation Group to ensure that the Department of the Navy position on common business-oriented support functions was clearly articulated and understood;
Coordinating Joint Cross-Service Group BRAC data calls with the Infrastructure Analysis Team to avoid duplication of effort throughout the process; and

Providing a mechanism to ensure that the Navy and Marine Corps vision of the future, based on the 20-year Force Structure Plan, was clearly articulated, understood, and supported throughout the BRAC 2005 Joint Cross-Service Group process.

Because of the impending departure of the Infrastructure Evaluation Group chair (July 2004) and a desire to facilitate a better alignment of the Department of the Navy and Joint Cross-Service Group BRAC 2005 efforts, the Secretary of the Navy revised the Department of the Navy BRAC 2005 organizational structure on July 14, 2004 by: appointing the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Infrastructure Strategy and Analysis) as the Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy for all matters associated with BRAC 2005 (Special Assistant for BRAC); designating the Special Assistant for BRAC as the replacement for the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Environment) as a member of the Infrastructure Steering Group, with the same authorities and responsibilities; establishing the Department of the Navy (DON) Analysis Group as a decision-making body subordinate to the Infrastructure Evaluation Group responsible for analyzing Department of the Navy unique functions; and altering the membership and responsibilities of the Infrastructure Evaluation Group. These organizational changes were subsequently incorporated in a revised SECNAV Notice 11000, issued on January 4, 2005.

The revised Department of the Navy BRAC 2005 organizations and their respective responsibilities were as follows:

**The Infrastructure Evaluation Group.** The Infrastructure Evaluation Group had nine members. Membership was prescribed in SECNAV Notice 11000 with a view toward ensuring that the members had broad, relevant experience to apply to the base structure evaluation. The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, and the Special Assistant for BRAC were designated as Co-Chairs. Two Navy Flag officers were appointed based on recommendations from the Chief of Naval Operations and two Marine Corps General officers were appointed based on recommendations from the Commandant of the Marine Corps. These officers had experience in logistics, planning, requirements, and/or operations, respectively. Two individuals of Senior Executive Service rank were also appointed, one of whom was nominated by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) and one of whom was nominated by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs). As these members retired or were reassigned, they were replaced with individuals of similar seniority and broad experience.

The Infrastructure Evaluation Group was co-chaired by: Gen. William L. Nyland (Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps); ADM Robert F. Willard (Vice Chief of Naval Operations), who replaced ADM John B. Nathman on March 18, 2005; and Ms. Anne Rathmell Davis (Special Assistant for BRAC). In addition to the Co-Chairs, the final composition of the IEG was: VADM Justin D. McCarthy, USN, Director, Material Readiness and Logistics; VADM Kevin J. Cosgriff, USN, Deputy and Chief of Staff, U.S. Fleet Forces Command; LtGen Richard L. Kelly, USMC, Deputy Commandant for Installations & Logistics; LtGen Michael
A. Hough, USMC, Deputy Commandant for Aviation; Mr. Robert T. Cali, Assistant General Counsel, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs); and Dr. Michael F. McGrath, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research Development Test & Evaluation. Among them, the members of the Infrastructure Evaluation Group have more than 269 years of Federal service.

The Infrastructure Evaluation Group was responsible for:

- Developing recommendations in deliberative session regarding closure and realignment of Department of the Navy military installations or activities for approval by the Secretary of the Navy;

- Serving as the decision-making body for recommendations and issues developed by the DON Analysis Group and Functional Advisory Board;

- Ensuring that an equitable and complete evaluation of all Navy and Marine Corps installations was conducted in accordance with the Base Closure Act;

- Ensuring that the process utilized, the conduct of the deliberations, and the preparation of the report containing recommendations were timely, thorough, and in compliance with the Base Closure Act, Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Navy policy, and SECNAV Notice 11000;

- Ensuring that the procedures used could be appropriately reviewed and analyzed by the Comptroller General as provided by the Base Closure Act;

- Ensuring that factors of concern to the Navy and Marine Corps operational commanders were considered in any recommendations that affected Department of the Navy installations;

- Providing base closure and realignment recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy for review;

- Supporting the presentation of the base closure and realignment recommendations by the Secretary of the Navy; and

- Providing direction, guidance, and oversight to the Infrastructure Analysis Team, Functional Advisory Board, and Infrastructure Analysis Team.

In carrying out these responsibilities, the Infrastructure Evaluation Group was charged with protecting the integrity of the process by ensuring that all certified data, considerations, and evaluations were treated as sensitive and internal to the process.

The DON Analysis Group. The DON Analysis Group had eleven members. Membership was prescribed in SECNAV Notice 11000 with a view toward ensuring that the members had broad, relevant experience to apply to the base structure evaluation. The Special
Assistant for BRAC was designated as Chair. Members of the Infrastructure Evaluation Group (other than the Special Assistant for BRAC) each appointed an individual of Flag/General officer or Senior Executive Service rank to serve as their representative on the DON Analysis Group. These members also were designated as alternates for the Infrastructure Evaluation Group members. Two individuals of Flag/General officer or Senior Executive Service rank were appointed as representatives of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans, Policy, and Operations) and the Deputy Commandant (Plans, Policies and Operations Department). As these members retired or were reassigned, they were replaced with individuals of similar seniority and broad experience.

In addition to the Chair, the final members of the DON Analysis Group were: RADM Christopher E. Weaver, USN, Commander, Navy Installations Command/Director, Ashore Readiness Division; MajGen Emerson N. Gardner, Jr., USMC, Assistant Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources and Assistant Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies and Operations; BGen Martin Post, USMC, Assistant Deputy Commandant for Aviation; RDML Charles Martoglio, USN, Director, Strategy and Policy Division; Ms. Ariane Whittemore, Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Fleet Readiness and Logistics; Ms. Carla Liberatore, Assistant Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps; Mr. Thomas Crabtree, Director Fleet Training, U.S. Fleet Forces Command; Mr. Paul Hubbell, Deputy Assistant Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics (Facilities), Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps; Ms. Debra Edmond, Director, Office of Civilian Human Resources, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs); and Mr. Michael F. Jaggard, Chief of Staff, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition). Among them, the members of the DON Analysis Group have more than 292 years of Federal service.

The DON Analysis Group was responsible for:

- Conducting analyses and developing Department of the Navy specific recommendations in deliberative session regarding closure and realignment of Department of the Navy military installations or activities for consideration by the Infrastructure Evaluation Group;

- Ensuring that the process utilized and the conduct of the deliberations were in compliance with the Base Closure Act, Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Navy policy, and SECNAV Notice 11000;

- Ensuring that the procedures used could be appropriately reviewed and analyzed by the Comptroller General as provided by the Base Closure Act; and

- Ensuring that factors of concern to the Navy and Marine Corps operational commanders were considered in deliberations that affected Department of the Navy installations.
In carrying out these responsibilities, the DON Analysis Group was charged with protecting the integrity of the process by ensuring that all certified data, considerations, and evaluations were treated as sensitive and internal to the process.

The roles and responsibilities of the Functional Advisory Board and the Infrastructure Analysis Team were the same as those originally defined in SECNAV Notice 11000 of March 4, 2004, except that the Functional Advisory Board coordinated with the DON Analysis Group as well as the Infrastructure Evaluation Group and the Infrastructure Analysis Team provided analytic support to the DON Analysis Group as well as the Infrastructure Evaluation Group.

**Naval Audit Service/Office of General Counsel.** In addition to the designation of the Infrastructure Evaluation Group, DON Analysis Group, Functional Advisory Board, and Infrastructure Analysis Team as base closure-unique organizations, the Naval Audit Service and the Office of General Counsel were assigned particular roles within the BRAC 2005 process by SECNAV Notice 11000. The Naval Audit Service was assigned two independent responsibilities. First, a Senior Executive Service auditor was assigned full-time to and was in residence with the Infrastructure Analysis Team, to review the activities of the Infrastructure Evaluation Group, DON Analysis Group, Functional Advisory Board, and Infrastructure Analysis Team, to determine whether those organizations complied with the approved Department of the Navy Internal Control Plan, and to serve as principal point of contact with the Naval Audit Service, the DoD Inspector General, and the Government Accountability Office. Second, the Naval Audit Service was tasked to audit the Department of the Navy BRAC 2005 process to validate the accuracy and reliability of data in DONBITS provided by Department of the Navy activities in response to Infrastructure Analysis Team requests for data, with particular emphasis on compliance with the certification policy and procedures. During the course of the BRAC 2005 process, over 160 auditors reviewed the participation of Department of the Navy activities in generating required data, the data itself to ensure its accuracy, and the integrity of the process. Additionally, SECNAV Notice 11000 required the General Counsel or his designee to ensure that senior-level legal advice and counsel on all aspects of the closure and realignment process was present and available to the Infrastructure Evaluation Group, DON Analysis Group, and Infrastructure Analysis Team. This was accomplished, in part, by assigning senior counsel to work full-time with the Infrastructure Evaluation Group, DON Analysis Group, and Infrastructure Analysis Team.

**Internal Control Development**

Under the Base Closure Act, the Secretary of Defense must include with his recommendations a summary of the selection process that resulted in the recommendation for each installation and a justification for each recommendation, as well as certification of the accuracy and completeness of the information upon which the recommendation was based. DoD guidance for BRAC 2005, containing the policies and procedures required to allow the Secretary of Defense to meet his statutory responsibilities, was issued in a memorandum to the Secretaries of the Military Departments from the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), dated April 16, 2003. Pursuant to this guidance, DoD Components were required to develop detailed record keeping procedures to satisfy the information and justification requirements levied upon the Secretary of Defense by the Base Closure Act.
Additionally, DoD Components were to develop and implement an Internal Control Plan to ensure the accuracy of data collection and analyses.

The Infrastructure Evaluation Group developed an Internal Control Plan for management of the Department of the Navy BRAC 2005 process and issued it on June 27, 2003. The plan described the management controls to guide and regulate Department of the Navy actions to comply with the requirements of the Base Closure Act. The objective of the internal control mechanisms employed by Department of the Navy was to ensure the accuracy, completeness, and integrity of the information upon which the Secretary of the Navy’s recommendations for closure and realignment would be based. The two principal mechanisms outlined in the Internal Control Plan and employed in the Department of the Navy BRAC 2005 process are organization and documentation.

The organizational controls were derived from the interlocking responsibilities assigned to the Infrastructure Evaluation Group, DON Analysis Group, Functional Advisory Board, Infrastructure Analysis Team, and the Naval Audit Service by SECNAV Notice 11000, as outlined above. The Infrastructure Evaluation Group, DON Analysis Group, Functional Advisory Board, and Infrastructure Analysis Team each were charged with performing specific tasks to support the process, and the activities of each group were reviewed by the Naval Audit Service to ensure that the integrity of the process was protected.

The documentation controls were designed to ensure that all significant elements of the Department of the Navy BRAC 2005 process were properly recorded and clearly documented. The controls included requirements for data incorporation into the base structure database, certification requirements, and record keeping requirements.

Department of the Navy BRAC Information Transfer System (DONBITS). DONBITS, a secure web-based data collection and management tool, was the sole and authoritative Department of the Navy base structure database upon which all BRAC 2005 recommendations were made. The Document Repository portion of DONBITS housed the database, containing certified information, and the library, containing records of BRAC 2005 policy documents, official correspondence and the minutes and deliberative reports of the DON Analysis Group and the Infrastructure Evaluation Group. DONBITS contains a description of the Department of the Navy’s existing domestic shore infrastructure by activity and all of the data and information required to enable the Infrastructure Evaluation Group and the DON Analysis Group to conduct analyses, to evaluate activities/installations within each function, and to develop recommendations for base closure and realignment on the basis of the final selection criteria and the Force Structure Plan. SECNAV Notice 11000 and the Internal Control Plan provide that only information and data certified in accordance with SECNAV Notice 11000 can be maintained in DONBITS. The Internal Control Plan further provides that DONBITS is subject to Naval Audit Service source validity checks and data accuracy assessment.

Certification. Under the Base Closure Act, the Secretary of the Navy is required to certify that information provided to the Secretary of Defense and the BRAC Commission concerning the realignment or closure of a military installation "is accurate and complete to the best of his knowledge and belief." For BRAC 2005, the Secretary of the Navy determined that
the Department of the Navy would follow the procedures used in previous BRAC rounds by the Department of the Navy, which required "bottom to top" certification. This policy, promulgated in SECNAV Notice 11000, required the Department of the Navy officer or employee who initially generated data in response to a request for information to execute the statutory certification. Thereafter, certification at each succeeding level in the defined certification chain was required before such data was provided to the Infrastructure Analysis Team for inclusion in DONBITS. Use of the defined certification chain ensured that both the installation and mission chain of command had the opportunity to review the data and to provide input where appropriate. Absent certification from the point of origin through the chain, no information provided for use in the BRAC 2005 process could be entered in DONBITS or be relied upon by Department of the Navy deliberative bodies or the senior leadership for analysis or evaluation. As noted earlier, the Naval Audit Service played a key role in ensuring the integrity of this data certification process.

Record Keeping. Another significant documentation control was the requirement to prepare and maintain minutes of all formal meetings that were part of the Department of the Navy BRAC 2005 decision-making process (i.e., all meetings and deliberative sessions of the Infrastructure Evaluation Group and DON Analysis Group) in arriving at recommendations for base closure and realignment to be forwarded to the Secretary of the Navy for his consideration. To accomplish this tasking, three Judge Advocates (military lawyers) were assigned to the Infrastructure Analysis Team to serve as permanent Recorders for the sessions of the Infrastructure Evaluation Group and DON Analysis Group. Their records of meetings and deliberative reports provide an extensive description of the information presented to the DON Analysis Group and Infrastructure Evaluation Group and the rationale for the decisions based upon that information, encompassing approximately 384 hours of meetings over the course of two and a half years.

Development of Principles and Considerations

The Secretary of the Navy’s policy guidance regarding the conduct of the BRAC 2005 process incorporated the development of policy imperatives within the proposed timeline and plan of action. To that end, the Secretary of the Navy requested that the Navy and Marine Corps submit Service imperatives that would be synthesized and consolidated into overarching Departmental imperatives and used to inform key Department of the Navy personnel participating in BRAC 2005. This effort was subsumed within the Infrastructure Steering Group initiative to develop overarching BRAC principles and imperatives for DoD. The Infrastructure Steering Group effort culminated in a decision that the following set of BRAC Principles, limited in number and broadly written, would sufficiently enumerate the essential elements of military judgment to be applied in the BRAC process:

- **Recruit and Train:** The Department must attract, develop, and retain active, reserve, civilian, and contractor personnel who are highly skilled and educated and have access to effective, diverse, and sustainable training space in order to ensure current and future readiness, to support advances in technology, and to respond to anticipated developments in joint Service doctrine and tactics.
- **Quality of Life:** The Department must provide a quality of life, including quality of work place that supports recruitment, learning, and training, and enhances retention.

- **Organize:** The Department needs force structure sized, composed, and located to match the demands of the National Military Strategy, effectively and efficiently supported by properly aligned headquarters and other DoD organizations, and that takes advantages of opportunities for joint basing.

- ** Equip:** The Department needs research, development, acquisition, test, and evaluation capabilities that efficiently and effectively place superior technology in the hands of the warfighter to meet current and future threats and facilitate knowledge-enabled and net-centric warfare.

- **Supply, Service, and Maintain:** The Department needs access to logistical and industrial infrastructure capabilities optimally integrated into a skilled and cost efficient national industrial base that provides agile and responsive global support to operational forces.

- **Deploy and Employ (Operational):** The Department needs secure installations that are optimally located for mission accomplishment (including homeland defense), that support power projection, rapid deployable capabilities, and expeditionary force needs for reach-back capability, that sustain the capability to mobilize and surge, and that ensure strategic redundancy.

- **Intelligence:** The Department needs intelligence capabilities to support the National Military Strategy by delivering predictive analysis, warning of impending crises, providing persistent surveillance of our most critical targets, and achieving horizontal integration of networks and databases.

As noted, Secretary of the Navy policy guidance still required the Navy and Marine Corps to articulate policy issues and basic principles that impact formulation of Department of the Navy basing and infrastructure requirements. The process used to respond to the Infrastructure Steering Group principles and imperatives tasker enabled the Navy and Marine Corps leadership to focus on important issues regarding infrastructure required to support current and future Department of the Navy needs. Drawing upon that effort, and guided by the Department of the Navy’s overall strategy for BRAC 2005 (i.e., rationalize and consolidate infrastructure capabilities to eliminate unnecessary excess; balance the effectiveness of Fleet concentrations with anti-terrorism/force protection desires for dispersion of assets and redundancy of facilities; leverage opportunities for total force laydown and joint basing; accommodate changing operational concepts; and facilitate the evolution of force structure and infrastructure organizational alignment), the Infrastructure Evaluation Group developed and issued Department of the Navy Basing and Infrastructure Considerations for the BRAC 2005 Process, a set of 22 key considerations to guide and inform Department of the Navy personnel in their internal and external BRAC deliberations. The themes evidenced in these considerations include preserving operationally efficient access and proximity to support training and operational requirements; supporting the total
force concept in the disposition of forces, training, and related Fleet support functions; maintaining the ability to explore and sustain essential technological effort; ensuring responsive maintenance support in proximity to concentrations of operational forces; and structuring dispersed and strategically placed Fleet basing capabilities.

**Department of the Navy Interaction**

Another significant effort during BRAC 2005 was the interaction between the Department of the Navy BRAC deliberative bodies and the leadership of the Department of the Navy, the Navy, and the Marine Corps. SECNAV Notice 11000 specifically required Department of the Navy deliberative bodies to ensure that factors of concern to Navy and Marine Corps operational commanders were considered in any recommendations that affect Department of the Navy installations. Having the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and other senior military personnel as members of the deliberative bodies greatly facilitated satisfaction of this mandate. Similarly, SECNAV Notice 11000 tasked major claimants and Department of the Navy property owners and operators to identify and provide to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Infrastructure Strategy and Analysis) those policy issues and basic principles that dictate Navy and Marine Corps basing and infrastructure requirements. The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps facilitated this input, which resulted in promulgation of the Department of the Navy Basing and Infrastructure Considerations.

Throughout the BRAC 2005 process, members of the Functional Advisory Board regularly attended Infrastructure Evaluation Group deliberative sessions. Functional Advisory Board members were also invited to DON Analysis Group sessions when a matter of interest concerning the Joint Cross-Service Groups was to be discussed. Attendance at these deliberative sessions provided the Functional Advisory Board with a mechanism for directly reporting to the Infrastructure Evaluation Group, thereby fulfilling their obligation to ensure that the Infrastructure Evaluation Group was thoroughly informed on Joint Cross-Service Groups matters that would be addressed to the Infrastructure Steering Group and the Infrastructure Executive Council and that the Navy and Marine Corps vision of the future was clearly articulated, understood and supported throughout the BRAC 2005 process.

At significant stages during the BRAC 2005 process, senior leaders from Department of the Navy major commands were invited to DON Analysis Group and Infrastructure Evaluation Group meetings where they were provided information on all aspects of the Department of the Navy BRAC 2005 process, including data gathering from Department of the Navy activities, analytical approaches being utilized, results of capacity and military value analyses, and development of options for closure and/or realignment of Department of the Navy installations. These meetings provided, among other things, a forum for the senior Department of the Navy civilian and military leadership to address the potential impacts that Department of the Navy recommendations could have on Fleet operations, support, and readiness, so that the Infrastructure Evaluation Group could take such concerns into consideration during its decision-making. The issues raised were central to determining the needs for operational and basing flexibility and strategic access that are reflected in the Department of the Navy BRAC 2005 recommendations.
As needed, the DON Analysis Group and Infrastructure Evaluation Group received briefings from Navy and Marine Corps commands to better understand their respective missions, organizational initiatives, and concerns. For example, briefings were received from the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, the Naval Education and Training Command, Marine Forces Reserve Command, Navy Reserve Forces Command, and Commander, Navy Installations.

Finally, through periodic briefings from the Special Assistant for BRAC, the Secretary of the Navy, the Under Secretary of the Navy, the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps were apprised of significant developments during the Department of the Navy BRAC 2005 process.

DoD Interaction

The relationship between the Military Departments and the Office of the Secretary of Defense for BRAC 2005 was far more formalized and robust than in prior BRAC rounds. As noted earlier, a primary objective of BRAC 2005 was to examine and implement opportunities for greater joint activity. Previous BRAC analyses had largely considered all functions on a Service-by-Service basis, rather than a joint examination of functions common to all Services. The Secretary of Defense directed that the BRAC 2005 analysis be divided into two categories of functions, and established two senior groups to oversee the BRAC 2005 process, the Infrastructure Executive Council and the Infrastructure Steering Group. Joint Cross-Service Groups would analyze common business-oriented support functions and report their results through the Infrastructure Steering Group to the Infrastructure Executive Council. The Military Departments would analyze Service unique functions and report their results directly to the Infrastructure Executive Council. The Department of the Navy was represented on each of these groups.

**Infrastructure Executive Council.** The Infrastructure Executive Council, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and composed of the Secretaries of the Military Departments and Service Chiefs, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), was the policy making and oversight body for the entire BRAC process. The Infrastructure Executive Council was primarily responsible for reviewing and de-conflicting candidate recommendations received from the Military Departments and the Joint Cross-Service Groups (via the Infrastructure Steering Group) and preparing a consolidated set of candidate recommendations for the Secretary of Defense’s approval.

**Infrastructure Steering Group.** The subordinate Infrastructure Steering Group oversaw the Joint Cross-Service analyses of common-business oriented functions and ensured integration of that process with the Military Department specific analyses of all other functions. The Infrastructure Steering Group was chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), and composed of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Department Assistant Secretaries for Installations and Environment, the Service Vice Chiefs, and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations & Environment). As earlier
noted, the Special Assistant for BRAC was designated as the replacement for the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Environment) as a member of the Infrastructure Steering Group, with the same authorities and responsibilities. The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) was responsible for issuing operating policies and detailed direction for the conduct of the BRAC 2005 process.

**Joint Cross-Service Groups.** Subordinate to the Infrastructure Steering Group are the Joint Cross-Service Groups, responsible for analyzing common business-oriented support functions and examining ways to realize consolidation and elimination of excess infrastructure. The Infrastructure Steering Group established seven Joint Cross-Service Groups: Education and Training; Headquarters and Support Activities; Industrial; Medical; Supply and Storage; Technical; and Intelligence. Senior level Navy and Marine Corps officials were appointed as members of each Joint Cross-Service Group. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Infrastructure Strategy and Analysis), as the Director of the Infrastructure Analysis Team, served as an advisor to each Navy and Marine Corps Joint Cross-Service Group member to help ensure Joint Cross-Service Group activities were consistent with established BRAC processes and direction.

**Army and Air Force Interaction**

In furtherance of the BRAC 2005 objective to examine and implement opportunities for greater joint activity, the Military Departments established the Joint Action Scenario Team. Its primary mission was to assist the Military Departments in identifying and screening possible joint operational basing scenarios. The Joint Action Scenario Team consisted of senior individuals who represented the respective Military Department base closure offices. Approved Joint Action Scenario Team scenarios were evaluated by the Military Departments using their established BRAC 2005 analytic methodologies and, where appropriate, forwarded as recommendations to the Infrastructure Executive Council. The Joint Action Scenario Team received, reviewed and processed more than 100 joint operational basing scenario ideas.

**Conduct of the Process**

The requirements for the conduct of the Department of the Navy BRAC 2005 process were derived from the Base Closure Act and were set forth in SECNAV Notice 11000. The DON Analysis Group and the Infrastructure Evaluation Group applied the selection criteria provided by law, considered all Department of the Navy military installations subject to the Base Closure Act on an equal footing, and made recommendations based on the 20-year Force Structure Plan provided by the Secretary of Defense. The DON Analysis Group and the Infrastructure Evaluation Group used DONBITS as the baseline for evaluation of Department of the Navy military installations and for the development of closure and realignment recommendations. Specifically, the DON Analysis Group and the Infrastructure Evaluation Group were tasked in SECNAV Notice 11000 to:

- Endorse DONBITS as the sole and authoritative Department of the Navy database for making base closure and realignment recommendations;
• Identify projected future excess capacity that could be eliminated and produce savings, and determine which activities, if any, were to be eliminated from further study for closure or realignment at any step of the procedures as a result of capacity, costs, or impact on critical mission, reconstitution, Fleet operations, support, or readiness;

• Within each functional category which the DON Analysis Group or the Infrastructure Evaluation Group determines has sufficient excess capacity to merit further review, evaluate all installations and activities subject to the Base Closure Act under the military value criteria;

• Develop feasible options for closures and realignments, a cost/benefit analysis for each option, and an impact analysis for each option; and

• Develop recommendations for closure and realignment of specific installations and activities to be presented to the Secretary of the Navy for his review and approval.

A description of the methodology followed in accomplishing these taskings, and the resultant analyses, is contained in Chapter 4 and in the Attachments.
CHAPTER 4

DESCRIPTION OF ANALYSES

In making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended, (Base Closure Act) requires the Secretary of Defense to use the military value and other criteria specified in subsections 2913(b) and (c). The Secretary of Defense must also provide to the Congress "a force structure plan for the Armed Forces based on an assessment of the probable threats to the national security..." (Section 2912). Based on this plan and these criteria, the Base Closing Act permits the Secretary of Defense to submit, by May 16, 2005, a list of installations recommended for closure or realignment. While the Base Closure Act does not set forth specific methodologies to be used by the Department of Defense (DoD) in evaluating installations for closure and realignment, it clearly requires a process that fully accounts for both the force structure plan requirements and the mandated selection criteria.

**Force Structure Plan**

The DoD, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, developed a long-range Force Structure Plan based on the probable threats to national security from 2005 to 2024. The 20-year Force Structure Plan was submitted to Congress as part of the budget justification documents supporting the budget for the DoD for FY 2005. This Force Structure Plan provided the basis for development of the Department of the Navy's initial closure and realignment recommendations. In accordance with section 2914 (a)(4) of the Base Closure Act, the 20-year Force Structure Plan was revised and submitted to Congress on March 15, 2005. The revised plan reduced the number of aircraft carriers from 12 to 11 and the number of battle force ships from 378 to a range of between 341 and 370 ships. It also amended the ship composition, reducing submarines by 21 percent and doubling the number of prepositioning ships. It also decreased the number of Navy personnel (active and reserve) from 434,000 to 415,000 while increasing the number of Marine Corps personnel (active and reserve) from 215,000 to 218,000. The Department of the Navy recommendations were reviewed in light of these changes and were determined to be consistent with the force structure projected for FY 2024. The unclassified portion of the Force Structure Plan that relates to the Department of the Navy is depicted in Chapter 2 above.

**Selection Criteria**

The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), in a memorandum dated April 7, 2004, prescribed the selection criteria to be employed by DoD components in base structure analyses to nominate BRAC 2005 closure or realignment candidates. Congress subsequently amended and codified the selection criteria in subsections 2913 (b) and (c) of the Base Closure Act. The criteria, which are very similar to those used in previous BRAC rounds, are:
Military Value

1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.

2. The availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.

3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.

4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications.

Other Criteria

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.

6. The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of military installations.

7. The ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and potential receiving communities to support forces, missions, and personnel.

8. The environmental impact, including the impact of costs related to potential environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities.

In accordance with the Base Closure Act, priority consideration was to be given to the military value criteria. The selection criterion relating to costs and savings or return on investment from the proposed closure or realignment of a military installation must also take into account the effect of the proposed closure or realignment on the costs of any other DoD activity or any other federal agency that may be required to assume responsibility for activities at the military installations.

Categorization of Functions

The Base Closure Act requires that all military installations inside the United States (and its territories and possessions) not previously selected for total closure and exceeding prescribed civilian personnel thresholds must be considered equally, without regard to whether the installations have been previously considered or proposed for closure or realignment by the
Secretary of Defense. In prior rounds of BRAC, analysis of installations/functions was primarily done on a Service-by-Service basis. Although Joint Cross-Service Groups were utilized in BRAC 1995, they had a different and more limited role. The BRAC 1995 Joint Cross-Service Groups were responsible for assisting the Military Departments in identifying asset sharing opportunities in the following functional areas: Depot Maintenance, Test and Evaluation, Laboratories, Military Treatment Facilities including Graduate Medical Education, and Undergraduate Pilot Training. The Joint Cross-Service Groups generated alternatives for consideration by the Military Departments in developing their BRAC 1995 recommendations. In some instances, the Services adopted the alternatives and recommended them, as made or modified, to the Secretary of Defense. In other instances, the Services declined to endorse them. This approach, however, did not result in the desired level of examination of functions that cross Services. Accordingly, the Secretary of Defense mandated that in BRAC 2005 the Joint Cross-Service Groups would analyze common business-oriented functions, examine them for ways to realize consolidation and eliminate excess infrastructure, and report their results through the Infrastructure Steering Group to the Infrastructure Executive Council. The functions approved for Joint Cross-Service Group analysis were as follows:

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<tr>
<th>Education and Training</th>
<th>Medical</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Flight Training</td>
<td>• Education and Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Specialized Skills Training</td>
<td>• Health Care Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Professional Development Education</td>
<td>• Research, Acquisition and Development</td>
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<td>• Ranges</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Supply and Storage</th>
<th>Headquarters and Support Activities</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>• Supply</td>
<td>• Civilian Personnel Offices</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Storage</td>
<td>• Major Administrative/HQs Activities</td>
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<td>• Distribution</td>
<td>• Joint Mobilization</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Military Personnel Centers</td>
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<td>• Corrections</td>
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<td>• Defense Finance and Accounting Service</td>
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<td>• Installation Management</td>
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<tr>
<th>Technical</th>
<th>Industrial</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Air, Land, Sea, Space</td>
<td>• Maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Weapons and Armaments</td>
<td>• Ship Overhaul and Repair</td>
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<tr>
<td>• C4ISR</td>
<td>• Munitions and Armaments</td>
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<td>• Innovative Systems</td>
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<td>• Enabling Technologies</td>
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The Joint Cross-Service Groups developed candidate recommendations within their functional areas for review and approval by the Infrastructure Steering Group and Infrastructure Executive Council. While these recommendations resulted in the movement of workload, equipment and personnel in or out of Department of the Navy installations they did not, by themselves, result in the closure of any Department of the Navy installation. The Department of the Navy closely monitored the recommendations of the Joint Cross-Service Groups as they were developed to identify opportunities for additional capacity reduction and savings through
the complete closure of Department of the Navy installation fencelines. A discussion of the fenceline closure process is provided later in this Chapter.

As noted above, the Secretary of Defense tasked the Military Departments with analyzing all Service unique functions and reporting those results directly to the Infrastructure Executive Council. Based upon the guidance contained in SECNAV Notice 11000 and in order to comply with the requirements of the Base Closure Act relating to evaluation in light of the Force Structure Plan and the selection criteria, the first step in the Department of the Navy BRAC 2005 process was to categorize the Department of the Navy unique functions performed on Department of the Navy installations and to aggregate them for study for closure or realignment. The Infrastructure Evaluation Group approved Operations, Education and Training, Headquarters and Support Activities, and Other Activities as the major areas for analyses. These major areas were then further divided into functions to ensure that installations performing like functions were compared to one another and to allow identification of total capacity and military value for an entire category of installations, as follows:

**Operations**
- Surface/Subsurface
- Aviation
- Ground
- Munitions Storage and Distribution

**Headquarters and Support Activities**
- Reserve Centers
- Recruiting Districts/Stations
- Regional Support Activities

**Education and Training**
- Recruit Training
- Officer Accessions Training
- DON Unique Professional Military Education

**Other Activities**
- Organizational Followers
- Dependent Activities
- Stand Alone Activities
- Specialized Functions Activities

In so dividing the major areas into functions, the Infrastructure Evaluation Group attempted to strike a balance in precisely dividing the Department of the Navy unique universe of activities to allow evaluation of activities that were performing the same function without making the divisions so small as to be meaningless (i.e., a single activity). There are 590 Department of the Navy activities at which these 14 functions are performed and each was reviewed during the BRAC 2005 process. Although only 112 of these activities are above the statutory threshold of 300 authorized civilian personnel, the remainder of the activities were included in the evaluation because the Department of the Navy infrastructure which will result from this round of base closure must be complementary and mutually supportive, regardless of the size of the activities.

Of the 889 activities in the total Navy and Marine Corps universe, 469 of these performed functions that were analyzed by one or more of the Joint Cross-Service Groups. Thus, a significant portion of the Department of the Navy universe was analyzed by the Joint Cross-Service Groups in BRAC 2005. Of the 889 activities in the Navy and Marine Corps universe, 590 of these performed Department of the Navy unique functions that were analyzed.
within the Department of the Navy process. In some instances, a Department of the Navy activity was analyzed by Department of the Navy and one or more Joint Cross-Service Groups. The Department of the Navy universe of activities was carefully reviewed to ensure that every activity fell under the analytic purview of either the Department of the Navy or a Joint Cross-Service Group. Finally, because the BRAC 2005 analysis was conducted on a functional rather than an installation basis, a review was conducted to ensure that the totality of activities covered the universe of Department of the Navy bases.

**Data Call Development and Responses**

The next step in the BRAC 2005 process was the development of requests for information, or data calls, for the purpose of collecting all types of information required for development of the base structure database and use in subsequent analyses. The Joint Cross-Service Groups and Military Departments, using technical experts from the various disciplines, jointly developed an initial capacity data call that sought relevant information in the areas of operations, base management, environment and encroachment, education and training, headquarters and support, industrial, medical, supply and storage, and technical. The capacity data call was issued to all Department of the Navy activities. Supplemental capacity data calls were developed and issued in the same manner except that they were issued to a smaller or targeted group of Department of the Navy activities (vice all Department of the Navy activities) to which the supplemental capacity data calls had relevance. A second series of data calls was then issued to obtain information necessary for the Military Departments and Joint Cross-Service Groups to conduct military value and other selection criteria analyses. Like the supplemental capacity data calls, these data calls were issued to targeted Department of the Navy activities. Because most Department of the Navy activities perform more than one function, each activity normally received multiple data calls. Additional data calls were issued during the scenario analysis phase.

The Department of the Navy BRAC Information Transfer System (DONBITS), a secure web-based file management system, was used for the distribution of data calls and collection of activity responses and supporting documentation. A key element in the Department of the Navy BRAC 2005 process was that data used for analysis was generated by the impacted base or activity and certified as being accurate and complete. Certified activity responses were forwarded up the designated certification chain to the Infrastructure Analysis Team using DONBITS. Responses were reviewed and, where necessary, revised as they proceeded up the certification chain. The Infrastructure Analysis Team also reviewed the certified responses for errors or omissions. Where an error or omission was suspected, the Infrastructure Analysis Team issued a discrepancy data call to the activity in question. Where this resulted in a correction to the certified response, the activity’s revised response was certified back through the established certification chain to the Infrastructure Analysis Team. Changes to certified data were tracked and noted in DONBITS. At all points in the data collection process a chain of custody was established for audit and tracking purposes. All certified data was tied to a unique Plain Language Address established for each installation/activity and stored in DONBITS’ secure central repository, allowing for quick and complete retrieval.
Surge

Section 2822 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2004 (P.L. 108-136) requires that the Secretary of Defense assess the probable threats to national security and, as part of that assessment, determine the potential, prudent surge requirements to meet those threats. It further requires that the Secretary of Defense use that surge determination in the base realignment and closure process. Surge is also a required consideration in military value Selection Criterion 3 as reflected in Section 2913(b)(3) of the Base Closure Act. DoD policy guidance provides that the Military Departments will determine any surge requirements necessary to meet probable threats and projected changes in the force structure, assess what capacity is available to satisfy that surge requirement, ensure that surge is appropriately reflected in its military value analysis, and ensure that their analysis recognizes the military value of difficult-to-reconstitute assets.

In its analytic process, the Department of the Navy did not include additional infrastructure requirements to accommodate a specific percentage of surge capability. As a general rule, the force structure for which we retain infrastructure is finite in number and cannot be quickly produced in the event of a contingency. For example, in the Surface/Subsurface Operations function, the Department of the Navy did not include a surge factor in calculating the amount of berthing space required at its operational bases because it would require additional ship construction to utilize that surge capability. The Department of the Navy analysis did, however, ensure that sufficient flexibility was retained to handle surge represented by operational tempo changes or emergent force positioning changes. Again using the Surface/Subsurface Operations function as an example, the Department of the Navy analysis concluded that there was sufficient berthing space available in non-operational bases (e.g., shipyards and weapon stations) to meet surge or other emergent operational requirements.

Surge was also a critical component in the military value analysis for each function. In developing the military value scoring plans, the deliberative body assigned weights to each of the military value selection criteria, including Selection Criterion 3 that was labeled “Surge Capabilities” in the Department of the Navy military value analyses. The deliberative body also assigned weights to the various attributes under each military value selection criterion and then assigned scoring statements to the applicable attribute and military value selection criteria. Through this process, the deliberative body made reasoned judgments concerning the relative importance surge played in assessing the military value of activities performing a particular function. Where applicable, details concerning the application of surge in each functional area are contained in the Description of Analysis portion of each Attachment to this Report.

Homeland Defense

Selection Criterion 2 requires consideration of the availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations. DoD Policy guidance required that the Military Departments use the draft “DoD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support” and other guidance documents issued by the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense) to assist in ensuring that capabilities necessary to support the homeland defense mission were retained. The Military Departments and Joint Cross-Service Groups were directed to consult with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense) and the Commanders of Northern Command and Pacific Command, as necessary, to clarify the information contained in those documents.

The Department of the Navy incorporated homeland defense considerations in the BRAC 2005 process. The Combatant Commands were tasked by the Secretary of Defense with evaluating closure and realignment scenarios for their potential mission impacts, including homeland defense, and communicating those concerns to the Military Departments for their consideration during scenario development and analysis. The Infrastructure Analysis Team met with representatives from Northern Command, Strategic Command, and the Joint Staff to discuss homeland defense mission requirements and consider whether a particular Department of the Navy scenario or combination of scenarios would negatively impact the Department of the Navy’s ability to meet the Maritime Homeland Defense mission, as set forth in the Maritime Homeland Defense Execution Order. The Department of the Navy (DON) Analysis Group had similar discussions with the United States Coast Guard. For example, the Coast Guard’s desire to consolidate its West Coast aviation assets at Naval Air Station Point Mugu, California, was a consideration in the Department of the Navy’s decision to retain Naval Air Station Point Mugu. Where identified, Combatant Command concerns were fully considered by Department of the Navy deliberative bodies as part of an executability and warfighter/readiness risk analysis performed for each Department of the Navy recommendation. Based upon the foregoing, the Department of the Navy concluded that its closure and realignment recommendations would not limit the accomplishment of the homeland defense mission.

**Capacity Analysis**

Capacity analysis was the process used to compare the current Department of the Navy base structure to the future force structure requirements to determine whether excess base structure capacity exists within the Department of the Navy. Capacity analysis was conducted on a functional basis (e.g., ship berthing) rather than by installation category (e.g., naval stations). For each function, measures of capacity were selected which reflected the appropriate "metric" for that function. For example, the metric used in the Aviation Operations function was the Hangar Module, i.e., that amount of hangar, maintenance, and administrative space necessary to support a squadron of aircraft. In choosing appropriate metrics, the Infrastructure Analysis Team reviewed the measures used in previous rounds of BRAC and consulted with technical experts to ensure that the measures used in BRAC 2005 were both valid and complete.

These metrics were used to determine the capacity at each installation performing a given function based upon data contained in the certified responses to the capacity data calls. The capacities of all installations performing a given function were summed and then compared with the capacity required to support the future force structure. If total current capacity in a function was greater than the capacity required to support the future force structure, excess capacity was deemed to exist within a particular Department of the Navy function. The fact that excess capacity was calculated at the functional (rather than the installation) level is an important distinction. Just as the categorization of functions was maintained at a high enough
level to allow comparison of activities performing like functions, the initial determination of excess capacity was at a macro-level to allow the Department of the Navy to obtain a clear picture of the amount of current capacity, without regard to where excess capacity was actually located. The other steps in the Department of the Navy BRAC 2005 process were designed to allow the narrowing of focus to develop options for reducing that excess.

Of the 14 functions evaluated, the Infrastructure Evaluation Group determined during capacity analysis that two of the functions (Ground Operations and Specialized Function Activities) demonstrated either little or no excess capacity. Of the functions with excess capacity, the excess ranged from 12 percent to 44 percent. The details of the capacity analysis for each of the functions, including those demonstrating no excess capacity, are contained in the Description of Analysis section of the Attachments to this Report.

Capacity analysis for the Regional Support Activities function used a slightly different approach. For these activities, capacity metrics such as span of control and workload balance were developed for each type of Regional Support Activity in an effort to find opportunities for better alignment leading to future efficiencies. Such measures included the number of supported customers and distance to customers. Although there are no stated requirements in the Force Structure Plan for Regional Support Activities, these capacity measures enabled the Department of the Navy to assess whether Regional Support Activities were properly located and aligned to support the Force Structure Plan. It was assumed that changes to the Force Structure Plan would be distributed on a regionally balanced manner. In this regard, capacity analysis was used to develop scenarios for Regional Support Activities that rationalized the span of control between regional headquarters and customers (personnel and properties).

**Military Value Analysis**

Except for a limited number of activities in the “Other Activities” area, each activity performing a given function was subjected to a military value analysis. The foundation of the analysis was the military value criteria, which are found in subsection 2913(b) of the Base Closure Act. For purposes of the military value analyses, the Infrastructure Evaluation Group’s shorthand description of these criteria is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion #1</th>
<th>Readiness (R)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Criterion #2
The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.

Facilities (F)

Criterion #3
The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.

Surge Capability (SC)

Criterion #4
The cost and manpower implications.

Cost and Manpower (C)

The purpose of the military value analysis was to assess the relative military value of activities performing a given function, using a quantitative methodology that was as objective as possible. It is relevant only in comparison to other activities performing that same function with distinctions revealed by a point-to-point comparison.

The process followed for the military value analysis for each function generally entailed six stages with alternating Infrastructure Analysis Team and Infrastructure Evaluation Group tasks. First, the Infrastructure Analysis Team developed proposed attributes and components that reflected important features and capabilities for activities performing that function. The Infrastructure Analysis Team then generated a list of proposed scoring statements and questions that captured the information necessary to assess each component. The questions were constructed to provide either a "yes/no" or scalable response. Each question was annotated with the particular data call and data element from which it would be derived, to allow audit of the answers to the questions. The questions were then grouped by subject area relevant to the function being evaluated. For example, in the Surface/Subsurface Operations function, the questions were grouped in the following subject areas: Operational Infrastructure, Operational Training, Port Characteristics, Environment and Encroachment, and Personnel Support/Quality of Life. The number of questions ranged from as few as 30 (for Recruiting District/Stations) to as many as 118 (for Ground Operations). The Infrastructure Analysis Team then proposed rankings for each scoring statement based on its relative importance by placing it in one of three bands (Band 1, 2, or 3) in descending order of importance. Finally, the Infrastructure Analysis Team suggested the military value selection criteria and attributes to which each scoring statement applied.

1 For the purpose of this description of the military value analysis process, the Infrastructure Evaluation Group is used throughout. In fact, the non-Infrastructure Analysis Team tasks in the described six-stage process were performed by the DON Analysis Group after July 14, 2005.
Next, the Infrastructure Evaluation Group assigned a value to each of the military value selection criteria so that the sum of the values equaled 100. For example, in the Surface/Subsurface Operations function, "Readiness" was valued at 50, "Facilities" at 20, "Surge Capability" at 15, and "Cost and Manpower" at 15. In each case, the values assigned reflected the relative importance that the Infrastructure Evaluation Group gave to each criterion in assessing the military value of activities performing that particular function. The Infrastructure Evaluation Group then reviewed, modified, and approved the proposed attributes and components. Next, the Infrastructure Evaluation Group reviewed, modified, and approved the proposed scoring statements and questions. Once the scoring statements and questions were finalized, the Infrastructure Evaluation Group reviewed, modified, and approved the proposed scoring bands. The Infrastructure Evaluation Group then assigned a numerical score to each scoring statement depending upon the priority band in which it was placed (i.e., Band 1: 10-6; Band 2: 7-3; and Band 3: 4-1). Next, the Infrastructure Evaluation Group assigned weights to each attribute to reflect its importance in supporting each military value selection criterion. Finally, the Infrastructure Evaluation Group assigned the scoring statements to the applicable attributes and military value selection criteria.

Based upon the Infrastructure Evaluation Group's assignments of relative importance, the Infrastructure Analysis Team calculated the military value weight of each question and the overall weight of each group of questions. The military value weight for each question was computed by multiplying the numerical score assigned to the question by the value assigned to the first of the criteria to which the question was assigned, and then dividing by the sum of the numerical scores of all questions relevant to that criteria. This calculation was done for each relevant criterion for a particular question, and the sum of the results is the total weight associated with that question. As the result of this formulation, the weight of any particular question depends heavily on the number of military value selection criteria to which it is assigned (and the values assigned to the criteria by the Infrastructure Evaluation Group) and the number of other questions assigned to those criteria. The Infrastructure Analysis Team also calculated the overall weight of each group of questions to show the relative importance of the functional groupings of the questions.

The Infrastructure Evaluation Group then reviewed the question weights to ensure that they properly reflected the judgment of the Infrastructure Evaluation Group as to what was important about activities performing a particular function. The review sought to identify anomalies in the relative importance of questions and to determine whether the groups of questions were proportionate to their importance for the function. It is critical to note that this review was conducted before answers to the questions for specific activities were made available to the Infrastructure Evaluation Group. There were a number of instances where the Infrastructure Evaluation Group refined its approach for valuing elements of functions, with a view to ensuring that it had adequately focused on what was truly of value. It was during this review, for instance, that the Infrastructure Evaluation Group developed its concept for dealing with Personnel Support/Quality of Life issues for activities. The Infrastructure Evaluation Group directed the Infrastructure Analysis Team to use a defined set of Personnel Support/Quality of Life questions, scores, and criteria assignments in the military value matrix for each function. This standard set served as a starting point to foster discussion by the Infrastructure Evaluation Group regarding suitability for a particular function and to allow the
Infrastructure Evaluation Group to adjust the Personnel Support/Quality of Life section for each function to reflect differences in Personnel Support/Quality of Life considerations between types of activities. As a result of this mechanism, the Infrastructure Evaluation Group tailored Personnel Support/Quality of Life values for BRAC 2005 to the activities based on the size and demographics of the military personnel stationed there. A similar approach was taken in validating all other elements.

Once the weight, or points, for each question in the matrix for a particular function was approved, the Infrastructure Analysis Team answered the questions for each activity within that function using certified data from the data call responses provided by the activity through the certification chain. If the question provided for a “yes/no” response, the activity received full or no credit for that question depending on their response. If the question was scalable, scaling was used to assign credit ranging from full credit to zero credit. After each question for each activity was answered, the total point score was determined for each activity in that function through simple addition of the points. Upon completion of these calculations, the questions and answers were displayed on a completed matrix sheet for review and analysis by the Infrastructure Evaluation Group.

The Infrastructure Evaluation Group then reviewed the completed military value matrices for consistency and counter-intuitive results. In some instances, scoring statements and questions were deleted by the Infrastructure Evaluation Group because they resulted in significant anomalies due to the fact that similar type activities provided inconsistent responses. Based upon this guidance, adjustments were made to the military value matrix as necessary, and each activity was rescored. The Infrastructure Evaluation Group then approved the final military value point total, or score, for each activity performing a function. As a result of the methodology described above, by the time a final military value score was calculated for each activity, the Infrastructure Evaluation Group had reviewed each of the questions in a military value matrix a minimum of three times and each time from a different perspective and for a different reason.

It is important to understand what a military value score is, and what it is not. The score for a particular activity is a relative measure of military value within the context only of the function in which that activity is being analyzed. While the differences in scores in a function are consistent because they were all derived from the same set of questions, what makes the scores different can be discerned only by looking at answers to those specific questions. Furthermore, the score obtained by an activity in one function has no relevance for comparison to the score obtained by an activity in another function, since the questions and quantitative scores were different for each matrix. For evaluative purposes, the process of arriving at the military value scores was as important as, if not more important than, the scores themselves. The process enabled the Infrastructure Evaluation Group to focus on each function individually, to consider that function and its relevance within the Department of the Navy infrastructure, to articulate what was important about the group of activities, and to identify critical differences between activities within a function. The military value analysis, then, is a process that translated mature, military judgment into a military value score that was a useful "quantifier."
Configuration Analysis

The results of the capacity analyses and military value analyses were then combined in that stage of the Department of the Navy BRAC 2005 process called configuration analysis. The purpose of configuration analysis was to identify for each function that set of activities that best met the needs of the Navy and Marine Corps in light of future requirements, while eliminating the most excess capacity. Configuration analysis used a mixed-integer linear programming solver, AMPL/CPLEX, to generate multiple solutions for an optimization model that allowed the DON Analysis Group to explore tradeoffs between eliminating excess capacity and retaining sites having high military value.

The solutions to the optimization model were required to meet operational requirements and policy considerations and did so by incorporating "rules" or "constraints" for functions so that the model would not select an operationally infeasible solution. Without such guidance, the model might well identify a set of activities that eliminated excess capacity but which bore little resemblance to operational realities. For example, if the East Coast naval bases had just enough berthing capacity to handle all of the ships in the Force Structure Plan, the model could place all the ships at those bases and suggest closure of all of the West Coast and Pacific bases, which would be militarily unacceptable. The Surface/Subsurface Operations function model, therefore, included a constraint that at least 40 percent of the Surface/Subsurface requirements be located on each coast. The DON Analysis Group reviewed the constraints to ensure that they were the minimum needed for the model to operate, so as not to artificially affect the model results.

Once the optimization model was approved for a particular function, it was used to generate optimal solutions by varying the maximum number of bases the model was allowed to retain. For example, if 20 bases are currently capable of performing a function and the optimization model tells us that a minimum of 14 are needed to meet capacity requirements, then the DON Analysis Group would review the 14-base solution with the highest average military value and compare it with the 15-base solution with the highest average military value and so on up to the 20-base solution. The DON Analysis Group would then consider the tradeoffs between retained military value and excess capacity reduction. Sensitivity analyses were also conducted on most functions to determine the effect on the solutions if the force structure requirements were increased or decreased by 10-20 percent, which allowed the DON Analysis Group to consider potential surge impacts. Additionally, in several of the functional models, a more detailed feasibility check was conducted to ensure that the retained bases could, in fact, accommodate the units assigned to activities as part of the computations. The DON Analysis Group review of these solutions became the basis for the discussion on what closure/realignment scenarios should be generated.

Configuration analysis was a critical tool within the Department of the Navy BRAC 2005 process because of the nature of Department of the Navy installations and of the types of excess capacity that exist. Department of the Navy military installations generally are not single function bases, although they are integrally tied to the Fleet and the forward-deployed mission of the Department. In many cases the precise relationship between an activity's capacity and future force structure is not easily discernible, and excess capacity in the aggregate
can be made up of small amounts of excess in many different places. As a result of these factors, it is difficult to identify segments of bases that equate to the precise amount of excess capacity that exists in any given function. Given these realities, possible combinations for basing Navy and Marine Corps assets could be unlimited. The computer model allowed the DON Analysis Group to focus its attention on multiple solutions for each function that were viable in light of identified limitations.

Scenario Development and Analysis

The configuration analysis solutions were used by the DON Analysis Group as the starting point for the development of potential closure and realignment scenarios that would undergo analysis to determine return on investment. This part of the process was critical for several reasons. First, the DON Analysis Group was seeking to look at multiple options for eliminating functional excess. Secondly, the DON Analysis Group recognized the desirability of having scenario development be an iterative process in which it could use the results from the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) analysis and inputs from the senior Department of the Navy leadership to generate additional options. Finally, the configuration analysis process had been deliberately constructed to arrive at extreme solutions within the established constraints that would eliminate the most excess. This enabled the DON Analysis Group to apply its military judgment to consider the potential operational impacts of such a course of action and to consider whether the Department could afford to, or afford not to, keep excess capacity in any particular function.

The DON Analysis Group and the Infrastructure Evaluation Group utilized two assessment tools at two different points during the scenario development and analysis process to frame their deliberative discussions. The first was a scenario Alignment Assessment, which graphically portrayed how well a scenario aligned with the Department’s BRAC strategy and compared it against the military value for the activity being evaluated for closure or realignment, allowing the deliberative bodies to discuss whether a scenario was consistent with the capacity and military value analyses prior to issuance of a scenario data call. The second assessment was used after scenario analysis was complete, and displayed the executability of a potential candidate recommendation arrayed against the risk such a recommendation might pose to warfighting or readiness capabilities. This Candidate Recommendation Risk Assessment provided a mechanism for both the DON Analysis Group and the Infrastructure Evaluation Group to logically discuss Selection Criteria 5 through 8 analyses, to compare alternative recommendations, and to assess whether the recommendations should be forwarded to the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps for their consideration.

DON Analysis Group Discussion. In reviewing the configuration model solutions, the DON Analysis Group tended to focus on activities that repeatedly were presented as closure alternatives by the model, since this suggested that, because of military value and/or capacity, those activities were appropriate candidates for eliminating excess capacity. The DON Analysis Group agreed that the viability of these alternatives would depend upon the costs and savings associated with their closure. Many of the alternatives for which scenario development data calls were issued were of this nature, and COBRA analysis was used to allow the DON Analysis
Group to further refine its understanding of how most appropriately to eliminate excess capacity for particular functions. For instance, in the case of Navy Officer Accession Training, the configuration model initial solution suggested consolidation of Officer Training Commands at Naval Air Station Pensacola, FL or Naval Station Newport, RI as a way of eliminating excess capacity in this functional area and the DON Analysis Group issued scenarios accordingly. As the DON Analysis Group continued to examine this functional area, additional scenarios were developed to explore consolidating Officer Training Commands at Naval Training Center Great Lakes, IL and relocating the Naval Academy Preparatory School, currently located at Naval Station Newport, to either Naval Air Station Pensacola, Naval Training Center Great Lakes or Naval Station Annapolis, MD, with and independent of the Officer Training Command relocations/consolidations. COBRA analysis was used to determine the costs and saving associated with the various scenarios, culminating in the recommendation to consolidate Officer Training Command Pensacola with Officer Training Command Newport at Naval Station Newport.

In other cases, the deliberative bodies reviewed the configuration results and the resultant remaining capacity should all of the activities suggested by the solution be closed and determined that the configuration remaining would diminish required strategic and operational flexibility or required capability. For instance, although Marine Corps recruit training activities showed some potential capacity (i.e., buildable acres), it was determined that consolidation to a single training site, as was previously accomplished with Department of the Navy recruit training, would have a detrimental effect on the recruit training mission. Retention of two recruit training depots was considered necessary to maintain flexibility sufficient to accommodate surge and increased operational tempo in light of the projected increase in Marine Corps end strength and the field based nature of the Marine Corps recruit training syllabus. Similarly, in the Surface/Subsurface Operations function, the configuration solution suggested closing Naval Station Everett, WA and relocating its assets to West Coast bases with available capacity. Notwithstanding the fact that the closure of Naval Station Everett would have reduced excess capacity and produced significant 20-year net present value savings, the Infrastructure Evaluation Group did not recommend the closure because it would have resulted in reduced operational flexibility and unacceptable levels of strategic dispersal in the case of carrier berthing on the West Coast. The Infrastructure Evaluation Group was not willing to accept this warfighting/readiness risk.

**Department of the Navy Leadership Input.** An integral part of scenario development was the input received from the Fleet, the major claimants (including the System Commands), and the Department of the Navy civilian leadership. The Fleet Commanders and major claimants provided input both directly, during meetings, and indirectly, through scenario data call responses. When the scenarios were issued, major claimants were advised that, while they needed to provide information that was responsive to the data call, they could also suggest receiving sites for the closing or realigning activity other than those contained in the scenario description and provide any other information that may affect the viability of the scenario. For example, the initial scenario for the closure of Naval Station Ingleside, TX and realignment of Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, TX identified Naval Air Station North Island, CA as the receiver site for the Mine Warfare Command and Mobile Mine Assembly Group. However, based on input received from the Commander, Fleet Forces Command, the scenario was revised
to collocate Mine Warfare Command and Mobile Mine Assembly Group with the Fleet Anti-
Submarine Warfare Center, Point Loma, CA to create an undersea center of excellence.

Perhaps more important from the standpoint of the viability of the Department of the
Navy BRAC 2005 process was the input received from the Fleet and major claimants during
deliberative meetings with the Infrastructure Evaluation Group. During those sessions, the
attendees were advised of the progress of the process and the results of the analyses, to include
alternatives under consideration, and asked to comment on the potential impacts on operations
and support. The discussions that occurred during these meetings were the basis for a clearer
understanding of, among other things, the strategic importance of Submarine Base San Diego,
CA as a submarine homeport and the importance of aligning industrial facilities/capabilities
with carrier and submarine force strategic laydown.

Input from the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps resulted in similar expressions of operational and policy
concerns that shaped the ultimate recommendations. The decision not to close Marine Corps
Air Station Beaufort, SC is a case in point. During its deliberations, the Infrastructure
Evaluation Group noted how encroachment has affected tactical aviation basing on the East
Coast, in particular Naval Air Station Oceana, VA. It also discussed the generally favorable
environmental and encroachment conditions at Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort and noted
that its closure would significantly reduce Department of the Navy tactical air basing flexibility
on the East Coast. However, because the closure of Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort would
generate significant savings and appeared to be operationally feasible, the Infrastructure
Evaluation Group recommended its closure. After fully considering the recommendation, the
Department of the Navy senior leadership concluded that Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort
should be retained for future tactical aviation basing flexibility, especially in light of concerns
about the continued viability of tactical basing at Naval Air Station Oceana. Accordingly, the
recommendation to close Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort was removed from further
consideration.

Joint Cross-Service Group Impacts. The Secretary of Defense mandated that in
BRAC 2005 the Joint Cross-Service Groups would analyze common business-oriented
functions, examine them for ways to realize consolidation and eliminate excess infrastructure,
and report their results through the Infrastructure Steering Group to the Infrastructure Executive
Council. Accordingly, the Joint Cross-Service Groups developed recommendations within
their functional areas for review and approval by the Infrastructure Steering Group and
Infrastructure Executive Council. These recommendations resulted in the movement of
workload, equipment and personnel into or out of numerous Department of the Navy activities
and installations. A complete listing of the Joint Cross-Service Group recommendations
impacting the Department of the Navy is found in Attachment K to this Report.

In some instances, a Joint Cross-Service Group recommendation or series of
recommendations relocated a majority of the functions, workload, equipment or personnel
from a Department of the Navy installation, thereby enabling closure of the entire installation
fenceline. The DON Analysis Group determined that a methodology for evaluating the need
for, and development of, Department of the Navy fenceline closure scenarios enabled by JCSG
recommendations was needed. The Department of the Navy identified 419 installation fencelines (i.e., a separate parcel of property on which one or more Department of the Navy reporting activities are located).

The developed methodology involved monitoring and evaluating Joint Cross-Service Group scenarios to determine their aggregate effect on a Department of the Navy installation fenceline. Where the DON Analysis Group determined that the aggregate of Joint Cross-Service Group actions were of such magnitude that it affected the “critical mass” of a Department of the Navy fenceline, e.g., impact on the major mission, a substantial number of personnel, and/or a substantial amount of acreage or square footage, a Department of the Navy fenceline closure scenario was developed. The fenceline closure scenario underwent Selection Criteria 5-8 analyses, and following that analyses, a determination was made by the Infrastructure Evaluation Group whether to recommend a closure or realignment of a Department of the Navy fenceline. The closure of Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Kittery, ME, is an example of a fenceline closure. The Infrastructure Steering Group and the Infrastructure Executive Council approved an Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group recommendation to relocate the ship overhaul and repair function at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard to Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, and Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, and to relocate the Submarine Maintenance Engineering, Planning and Procurement Activity at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard to the Norfolk Naval Shipyard. This recommendation eliminated Portsmouth Naval Shipyard’s primary mission and moved or eliminated approximately 90 percent of its workforce. After conducting Selection Criteria 5-8 analyses, the Department of the Navy recommended that Portsmouth Naval Shipyard be closed in its entirety. The Department of the Navy fenceline closure recommendations are contained in Attachment J to this Report.

Where the Joint Cross-Service Group recommendation impacted an installation that the Department of the Navy identified for closure in its analysis, the Joint Cross-Service Group recommendation was, per direction from DoD, integrated into the Department of the Navy closure recommendation for the affected installation and can be found in Attachments A-I to this Report. Where the Department of the Navy did not have a closure recommendation for the affected installation, the Joint Cross-Service Group recommendation is found in the respective Joint Cross-Service Group Volume of the DoD Report.

**Consideration of Local Government Views.** Section 2914(b)(2) of the Base Closure Act requires that in making recommendations to the BRAC Commission in BRAC 2005, the Secretary of Defense must consider any notice received from a local government in the vicinity of a military installation that the government would approve of the closure or realignment of the installation. The Department of the Navy received only one such notice in BRAC 2005. The Mayor of the City of Concord, California, in a letter dated January 13, 2005, notified the Department of the Navy that the City urged and strongly supported the closure of the Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, Concord Detachment, including both the Inland and Tidal areas of that installation. The Tidal area, consisting of piers and ammunition handling facilities, is actively utilized by the Army for loading and unloading ships. The Inland area, consisting of magazines used for long term storage of munitions, has been in a reduced operating status since 1999.
Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, Concord Detachment was considered in analysis of the Department of the Navy Munitions Storage and Distribution function. See Attachment D of this Report. Capacity analysis was conducted for both the throughput and short-term storage functions. Analysis revealed that there was no excess throughput capacity at Department of the Navy weapons stations and therefore no weapons station could be closed in its entirety. Capacity analysis showed, however, that there was excess storage capacity at Department of the Navy weapons stations. Review of the magazine fields at Department of the Navy weapons stations to determine if any were severable and could be closed revealed the magazine field at Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, Concord Detachment, was the only viable severable parcel. After consultation with the Army, the U.S. Transportation Command’s Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, and the Pacific Fleet, it was determined that the Inland area was excess to Department of the Navy and DoD needs. Accordingly, the Department of the Navy recommended closure of the Inland area of Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, Concord Detachment, retaining such property and facilities as are necessary to support operations in the Tidal area.

**Summary.** As a result of the scenario development portion of the Department of the Navy BRAC 2005 process, the DON Analysis Group/Infrastructure Evaluation Group developed 187 scenarios involving 344 activities. This included a number of alternative scenarios suggested by major Department of the Navy owners/operators. Throughout scenario development, the DON Analysis Group and the Infrastructure Evaluation Group adhered to the principle that the net result of their closure and realignment recommendations should be an increase in the average military value of the Department of the Navy infrastructure that would remain. While they recognized that excess capacity would be substantially reduced if all alternatives were implemented, the iterative discussions with the Department of the Navy leadership support the conclusions that some calculated excess capacity is merely the result of facility configuration and that retention of some capacity that could be construed as excess is necessary to allow basing, surge and future force structure flexibility.

**Return on Investment Analysis**

In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Base Closure Act requires that the Department consider the extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for savings to exceed costs (Criterion 5). The Military Department and Joint Cross-Service Groups used a DoD-wide approach to the application of Criterion 5.

Costs, savings, and return on investment for each Department of the Navy installation considered for closure or realignment were calculated using the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) algorithms. The COBRA algorithms are used to estimate one-time and recurring costs and savings, the number of years required to obtain a return on investment, and a 20-year net present value of costs and savings associated with the closure/realignment action.

COBRA analyses were conducted on all closure/realignment scenarios developed by the DON Analysis Group as described above. Source data for the COBRA analyses consisted of certified responses to scenario data calls from affected installations/activities via the established
certification chain. The scenario data calls were drafted by the Infrastructure Analysis Team, using a standardized format that had been previously provided to the major claimants. Draft guidance on the elements that would be sought in the data calls had been prepared and distributed early in the BRAC 2005 process to assist field activities in being ready to respond to the scenario data calls. This was done through posting of Scenario Data Call Guidance and Frequently Asked Questions in the DONBITS library. The scenario data calls were issued via DONBITS to affected activities, both losing and receiving. In an installation closure scenario, the installation Commanding Officer or equivalent received the scenario data call. Scenario data calls not involving an installation closure action were targeted directly to the impacted activity rather than the installation Commanding Officer. Each scenario data call was assigned an Echelon 2 (claimant) “Quarterback” who was responsible for coordinating scenario data call reviews and monitoring timely development/input of data by the installations/activities involved. As a general rule, targeted activities were provided 48 hours from the time of release of the scenario data call to certify their responses in DONBITS. Additional time was provided for more complex scenarios. To the extent possible, the Quarterback ensured that responses were reviewed and agreed to by the chain of command prior to activity certification. Chain of command certifications took place as expeditiously as possible thereafter in DONBITS.

The methodology/assumptions used in the COBRA return on investment calculations were derived from DoD policy guidance, standard DoD and Department of the Navy costing practices/policies, and DON Analysis Group/Infrastructure Evaluation Group approved conventions. These conventions included assumptions on such data elements as proceeds from land sales, construction cost avoidances, base operating support costs, environmental restoration costs, and standards for facility construction. For example, the DON Analysis Group approved BRAC Facilities Planning Guidelines to ensure that the Department of the Navy applied a consistent methodology for costing support (e.g., bachelor housing, child development centers, and parking) and operational (e.g., piers and hangars) facility requirements when conducting COBRA analysis for each scenario.

In analyzing the scenario data call responses, the Infrastructure Analysis Team and DON Analysis Group aggressively challenged cost estimates to ensure both their consistency with standing policies and procedures and their reasonableness. Unless otherwise noted, scenario data call taskings assumed total closure, with only critical functions and facilities being moved. It was not expected that there would be a replication of all existing facilities at another site or that all personnel would move. The DON Analysis Group looked to see whether alternate ways of accomplishing critical functions were considered in the scenario data call responses. Illustrative issues that were discussed by the DON Analysis Group/Infrastructure Evaluation Group during review and evaluation of the scenario data call responses include the following:

Costs for gate improvements to address impacts of increased vehicular/pedestrian traffic flow at receiving installations were sometimes included in cost estimates. In addition to reviewing the reasonableness of the costs, the justification for the gate improvement was carefully reviewed. Before such costs were allowed in COBRA, the activity had to demonstrate that the BRAC action would not be executable without the improvements and that the improvements were not solely designed to address an existing deficiency.
Costs for replication of training simulators at receiving installations were sometimes included in cost estimates. In addition to reviewing the reasonableness of these costs, the need for such costs was closely scrutinized. Before such costs were allowed in COBRA, the activity had to demonstrate that the existing training simulator could not be relocated or that other existing simulators could not be used to satisfy the training mission.

Costs for construction of new facilities at receiving installations were often included in cost estimates. In addition to reviewing the reasonableness of these costs, the justification for new construction was carefully reviewed. Before such costs were allowed in COBRA, the activity had to demonstrate that the project was sized in accordance with applicable facility planning guidelines and that rehabilitation of an existing structure was not feasible and more cost effective.

In reviewing responses to scenarios that contemplated consolidation of activities, the Infrastructure Analysis Team and DON Analysis Group looked for significant eliminations of support personnel and considerable excessing of equipment and facilities. Similarly, with reductions in budgets and force structure, the Infrastructure Analysis Team and DON Analysis Group reviewed the data call responses to ensure that the out-year requirement was appropriately reduced in terms of personnel, facilities, and capacities of remaining facilities.

The DON Analysis Group and Infrastructure Evaluation Group used the COBRA algorithms as a tool to ensure that BRAC 2005 realignment and closure recommendations were cost effective. However, the COBRA analysis was not used by the DON Analysis Group and Infrastructure Evaluation Group in an attempt to make base closure recommendations simply on the basis of identifying a "lowest cost" alternative. The DON Analysis Group and Infrastructure Evaluation Group were particularly sensitive to up-front costs and the length of time required to obtain a return on investment. While savings or cost avoidances will significantly exceed the one-time costs, the Department of the Navy will be required to ensure sufficient funding and resources are programmed to execute base closure before such savings will be realized. As a result, 83 percent of the Department of the Navy recommendations will obtain a return on investment within four years, with savings offsetting costs of closure within the closure implementation period.

Section 2913(e) of the Base Closure Act requires that the Department’s costs and savings criteria take into account the effect of a proposed closure or realignment action on the costs of any other DoD activity or any other Federal agency that may be required to assume responsibility for activities at the military installation. By estimating the costs and savings to DoD associated with the proposed closure or realignment action, the COBRA model takes into account the effect of the proposed closure or realignment action on the costs of all DoD activities, thereby satisfying the requirements of section 2913(e) with respect to DoD activities. The Department cannot rely on the COBRA model, or undertake independent estimates of the costs and savings to other Federal agencies, in order to satisfy the requirements of section 2913(e) with respect to non-DoD Federal agencies. Accordingly, DoD guidance provides that where a scenario directly impacts a non-DoD Federal agency, the proponent of the scenario will
first assume that the non-DoD Federal agency will be required to assume responsibility for base operating activities on the military installation. The scenario proponent will further assume that since this is a new responsibility of the non-DoD Federal agency, the effect of the action will be to increase that agency’s costs. Where applicable, the cost impact on non-DoD Federal agencies is noted in the Department of the Navy closure or realignment recommendation.

**Fenceline Integration Review**

With the division of analytic responsibilities between the Joint Cross-Service Groups and Military Departments in BRAC 2005, the possibility of inconsistent analysis or conflicting recommendations at a given installation was a concern. In an effort to minimize these potential conflicts and to help ensure consistency of cost inputs to COBRA, the Department of the Navy established a Fenceline Integration Review process. The Department of the Navy constructed a Fenceline Activity Database that showed, for each Department of the Navy installation, all Joint Cross-Service Group and Military Department scenarios affecting that installation. Where the Fenceline Activity Database showed that there was more than one scenario affecting a given installation, the cumulative effect of all scenarios affecting that installation was analyzed. Specifically targeted were impacts on community support personnel (base operations support personnel, medical personnel, and tenant support), military construction requirements (use of current assets and community support structures), and additional environmental concerns. Where the review noted a possible concern, the Department of the Navy advised the appropriate Joint Cross-Service Group and/or Military Department to enable reconciliation of the scenarios, e.g., where two Joint Cross-Service Group scenarios relied on the use of the same building, the cost input for the COBRA analysis for one of the Joint Cross-Service Group scenarios would need to be modified to reflect new construction. This review process materially contributed to the quality of the COBRA analysis for scenarios impacting Department of the Navy installations.

**Economic Impact Analysis**

In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Base Closure Act requires that the Department consider the economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of military installations (Criterion 6). The Military Department and Joint Cross-Service Groups used a DoD-wide approach to the application of Criterion 6.

The impact on the local economic area for each Department of the Navy closure or realignment scenario was assessed during the scenario analysis process using an Economic Impact Tool. The Economic Impact Tool provided a uniform methodology for estimating the total direct and indirect job changes associated with a closure or realignment scenario. It measured the total potential job change in the economic area and the total potential job changes as a percentage of total employment in the economic area for each scenario. The direct job changes for each scenario, used in combination with information preloaded in the Economic Impact Tool, provided an estimate of indirect job changes. The sum of the direct and indirect job changes provided a scenario’s total potential job changes. Each military installation/activity was assigned to an economic Region of Influence in the Economic Impact Tool. The Region of Influence for each installation was defined as the Metropolitan Statistical Area or Micropolitan
Statistical Area in which the installation’s primary county lies. For installations in Metropolitan Statistical Areas that are divided into Metropolitan Districts, the Region of Influence was defined as the Metropolitan District in which the installation’s primary county lies. For installations that are not in one of these statistical areas, the Region of Influence was defined as the county itself.

In the process of evaluating economic impact, the Department of the Navy ensured that certified data was used throughout the process. Certified data from each scenario data call was entered into the COBRA model, resulting in data for direct changes in military, civilian, and student jobs for each scenario. Direct changes in contractor jobs for each scenario were also provided in the scenario data calls. The four certified data sets (direct military, civilian, student, and contractor) were then entered into the Economic Impact Tool, which calculated the indirect changes and estimated total potential job changes for each scenario.

To further assist in the consideration of the relative economic impact of a scenario, the Economic Impact Tool produced an Economic Impact Report that displayed the Region of Influence population and employment, the installation’s authorized manpower, the authorized manpower as a percentage of the Region of Influence’s employment, the total job change (sum of direct and indirect job changes), and the total job change as a percentage of Region of Influence employment. Additionally, the Economic Impact Report provided graphs displaying the total employment from 1988-2002, the annual unemployment rates from 1990-2003, and the per capita income from 1988-2002 for each Region of Influence. These graphs provided a reference for determining the relative impact a scenario might have on a local community’s employment. Cumulative economic impact of prior rounds of BRAC was not separately considered in BRAC 2005 deliberations, since prior rounds of BRAC have been fully implemented and the impacts from those actions are already reflected in the historical data in the Economic Impact Tool.

The Economic Impact Reports for those scenarios for which the DON Analysis Group decided to conduct full criteria review were provided and briefed to the DON Analysis Group. Any impacts of note were then summarized for the Infrastructure Evaluation Group. As a part of its deliberative process, the DON Analysis Group and the Infrastructure Evaluation Group reviewed the estimated change in employment resulting from each closure or realignment action, as well as the historical data for each affected economic area to discern a general description of both the prevailing economic conditions and recent changes in the local economy. The charts on the following page show a summary of the economic impact of recommended base closures or realignments on a regional and national level. The Department of the Navy is very concerned about economic impact and has made every effort to fully understand all of the economic impacts its recommendations might have on local communities.
Department of the Navy BRAC 2005 Economic Impact
Total Job Change (2006-2011)

National Summary

Direct Job Change:
   Military:       -8,454
   Civilians:      -6,024
   Contractors:    41
Total Direct Job Change:       -14,437
Indirect Job Change:           -14,266
Total Job Change:              -28,703
Total Job Change as a % of National Employment:  -0.0203 %
Current National Job Growth Rate:  204,500 jobs per month
Community Infrastructure Analysis

In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Base Closure Act requires that the Department consider the ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities’ infrastructure to support forces, missions, and personnel (Criterion 7). The Military Department and Joint Cross-Service Groups used a DoD-wide approach to the application of Criterion 7.

In order to assess and consider community infrastructure impacts of different scenarios, ten community attributes that best capture Criterion 7 were identified for consideration: demographics, child care, cost of living, education, employment, housing, medical providers, safety/crime, transportation, and utilities. Using a standard format provided by DoD, the Infrastructure Analysis Team created an Installation Criteria 7 Profile for each installation. Compiled from certified data obtained in the Criterion 7 data call, the Installation Criteria 7 Profile summarized the ten attributes of the community in which a military installation is located. The Department of the Navy collected additional certified data regarding community infrastructure impacts in scenario data calls. Activities were specifically requested to identify any community infrastructure impacts that could arise from a particular scenario, if it were to be adopted.

All Department of the Navy Installation Criteria 7 Profiles were provided to the DON Analysis Group. The Installation Criteria 7 Profiles for those scenarios for which the DON Analysis Group decided to conduct full criteria review were briefed to the DON Analysis Group. Any impacts of note were then summarized for the Infrastructure Evaluation Group. With this information, the ability of exiting and potential receiving communities’ infrastructure to support forces, missions, and personnel was evaluated. No significant, quantifiable community infrastructure impacts were identified for any of the Department of the Navy closure or realignment recommendations.

Environmental Impact Analysis

In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Base Closure Act requires that the Department consider the environmental impact, including the impact of costs related to potential environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities (Criterion 8). The Military Department and Joint Cross-Service Groups used a DoD-wide approach to the application of Criterion 8.

In order to assess and consider the environmental resource impacts of different scenarios, ten environmental resource areas were identified for consideration: air quality; cultural, archeological, or tribal resources; dredging; land use constraints or sensitive resource areas; marine mammals, resources, or sanctuaries; noise; threatened and endangered species or critical habitat; waste management; water resources; and wetlands.

Using certified data obtained from the capacity data call, the Infrastructure Analysis Team compiled a summary of the environmental data by environmental resource area in an Installation Environmental Profile. Prepared using a standard format prescribed by DoD, the
The Installation Environmental Profile presented the current picture of an installation’s environmental condition. The Installation Environmental Profile served as a guide to the raw environmental data regarding a particular installation and enabled the DON Analysis Group/Infrastructure Evaluation Group to consider how a particular scenario may impact the environmental condition at that installation. The Installation Environmental Profile was also used by the Infrastructure Analysis Team to assist in the formulation of tailored environmental questions for inclusion in supplemental scenario data calls. Unlike in prior rounds of BRAC, the environmental condition of Department of the Navy installations today is generally well characterized. This fact contributed materially to the accuracy and completeness of the Installation Environmental Profiles. For those scenarios for which COBRA analysis was completed and for which it was determined that a complete criteria review would be conducted, the Infrastructure Analysis Team prepared a Summary of Scenario Environmental Impacts. Following a standard format prescribed by DoD, the Summary of Scenario Environmental Impacts summarized the environmental impacts associated with a particular scenario. The Summary of Scenario Environmental Impacts consisted of an overview of the certified data, including the costs related to potential environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities. Lastly, to assist in the assessment of the cumulative environmental impacts from all scenarios at a particular installation, the Infrastructure Analysis Team prepared a Summary of Cumulative Environmental Impacts for each gaining installation. Following a standard format prescribed by DoD, the Summary of Cumulative Environmental Impact was compiled from the individual Summary of Scenario Environmental Impacts affecting that gaining installation. The Infrastructure Analysis Team environmental team worked closely with designated environmental subject matter experts from the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Environment), the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Marine Corps, and the Naval Facilities Engineering Command in developing these environmental documents and analyzing environmental issues.

The requirement of the Base Closure Act to consider impact of costs related to potential environmental restoration was satisfied by a review of certified data for pre-existing, known environmental restoration projects at installations identified during scenario development as candidates for closure or realignment. The certified data considered by the DON Analysis Group and the Infrastructure Evaluation Group consisted of the FY 2003 current estimate of costs to complete for Installation Restoration sites managed and reported under the Defense Environmental Restoration Account. The presence of Installation Restoration sites was also considered a land use constraint for installations receiving missions as a result of a realignment decision. Since the Department of the Navy has a legal obligation to perform environmental restoration regardless of whether a base was being closed, realigned or kept open, environmental restoration costs at closing bases were not included in COBRA cost analyses. However, the costs of environmental restoration were noted in the Installation Environmental Profile, Summary of Scenario Environmental Impacts, and Summary of Cumulative Environmental Impacts.
Recurring and non-recurring waste management and environmental compliance costs were included in the COBRA estimates of Base Operating Support costs generated for each scenario being evaluated as part of the scenario analysis process. Any one-time waste management and compliance costs associated with closing a facility (e.g., costs generated as a result of operating permit closure regulations) or similar one-time costs associated with realignment actions (e.g., expanding treatment or compliance operation permits) were also reflected in COBRA. These one-time costs were also included in the Summary of Scenario Environmental Impacts and Summary of Cumulative Environmental Impacts so that the DON Analysis Group and the Infrastructure Evaluation Group could assess the impact of these costs in their deliberations regarding closure and realignment scenarios. This was not a strict cost comparison but rather an identification and overview of the increased environmental management efforts associated with particular scenarios and their fiscal impacts.

Throughout the deliberative process, the DON Analysis Group and the Infrastructure Evaluation Group discussed the Department of the Navy commitment to integration of base closure and realignment actions with environmental laws and regulations at both the federal and state levels. All Department of the Navy Installation Environmental Profiles were provided to the DON Analysis Group for review. The Summary of Scenario Environmental Impacts were briefed to the DON Analysis Group for those scenarios for which the DON Analysis Group decided to conduct full criteria review. Any impacts of note were then summarized for the Infrastructure Evaluation Group.

The above-described environmental impact analysis permitted the DON Analysis Group and the Infrastructure Evaluation Group to obtain a comprehensive picture of the potential environmental impacts arising from the recommendations for closure and realignment and to determine whether environmental issues supported reconsideration of any recommendation. It provided a more in depth review of potential environmental impacts than any previous round of base closure. No environmental impacts that would preclude implementation were identified for any scenario. It is of note that no alternative receiver site was deemed inappropriate because of environmental issues and that many of the changes resulted in a positive environmental impact.

Conclusion

A detailed description of the analyses conducted for each function is contained in the Description of Analysis section of each Attachment to this Report, followed by any recommendations that may have resulted. An index of the Attachments may be found at page 51.
CHAPTER 5
RECOMMENDATIONS

In accordance with the instructions from the Department of Defense contained in the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) memorandum to the Infrastructure Steering Group Members and Chairmen, Joint Cross-Service Groups, dated April 11, 2005 (Subject: Organization and Structure of the Secretary’s Final BRAC Report), attached hereto as Attachments A - J are the justifications and impacts of the Department of the Navy's recommendations for closure and/or realignment of Navy and Marine Corps military installations. These recommendations were derived from the process outlined in Chapter 4. In summary, the recommendations are as follows:

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<td>Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, Kittery, Maine</td>
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<tr>
<td>Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi, Texas</td>
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<td>Naval Station, Ingleside, Texas</td>
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<td>Navy Reserve Readiness Commands</td>
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Page numbers refer to the page in the appropriate Attachment where the actual recommendation and justification may be found.
CHAPTER 6

BUDGET IMPACTS

As described earlier, the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) algorithms were used to estimate costs and savings associated with closure and realignment recommendations. COBRA costs and savings are estimated in two ways. First, some costs and savings are automatically calculated based on standardized algorithms (for example, personnel and moving costs). Remaining costs and savings reflect specific costs/savings identified during the COBRA scenario development effort, such as construction costs and construction cost avoidances. As described in the Return on Investment Analysis section in Chapter 4, these estimates received close scrutiny by the Infrastructure Analysis Team and the Department of the Navy Analysis Group since they were often very significant.

The total one-time cost to implement the recommendations developed by the Department of the Navy, as reflected in this Volume of the DoD Report, is approximately $2.1 billion. These one-time costs are more than offset by approximately $3.6 billion in savings during the implementation period, most of which reflect currently programmed funds. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of approximately $0.43 billion. Annual recurring savings after implementation are approximately $0.82 billion with a return on investment expected within four years in most cases. The net present value of the costs and savings for all recommendations over 20 years is a savings of approximately $8.4 billion.

The recommendations developed by the Joint Cross-Service Groups also contain costs and savings associated with each of the Military Departments. When the Department of the Navy share of these costs are added to the totals shown in the preceding paragraph, the total one-time cost to implement all Department of the Navy recommendations is approximately $3.8 billion, which is offset by approximately $8.0 billion in savings over the implementation period. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of approximately $2.6 billion. Annual recurring savings after implementation are approximately $1.6 billion. The net present value of the costs and savings for all recommendations over 20 years is a savings of approximately $18.1 billion.

The table on the following page displays the estimated total yearly costs and savings for all recommendations affecting the Department of the Navy.
### Estimated Department of the Navy BRAC 2005 Costs and Savings

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<td><strong>Costs:</strong></td>
<td>569</td>
<td>1,063</td>
<td>1,341</td>
<td>991</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>416</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Savings:</strong></td>
<td>152</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>1,144</td>
<td>2,055</td>
<td>2,195</td>
<td>1,947</td>
<td>2,030</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Net:</strong></td>
<td>417</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>-1,064</td>
<td>-1,347</td>
<td>-1,379</td>
<td>-1,614</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All figures are shown in millions of dollars and are constant FY 2006 dollars. Net Savings are shown as negative numbers.

The predicted savings shown above do not include any revenue that might result from the sale of land and facilities that will be available for other uses as a result of the recommended actions. While use of the COBRA algorithms provides a uniform methodology for estimating relative costs and savings associated with closure or realignment actions, it should be noted that COBRA output is not intended for use in preparing detailed budgets.
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ATTACHMENT A

DESCRIPTION OF ANALYSIS OF SURFACE/SUBSURFACE OPERATIONS

The Surface/Subsurface Operations function includes the activities that support, maintain, and train operational ships and assigned crews. The following activities were evaluated in this category. Asterisks indicate those activities that have some capability to berth operational ships but did not do so at the time of the analysis.

Naval Air Station North Island, San Diego, California
Naval Air Station Key West, Florida*
Naval Air Station Pensacola, Florida*
Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek, Norfolk, Virginia
Naval Base Ventura County, Point Mugu, California*
Naval Base Guam
Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, Kittery, Maine*
Naval Shipyard Norfolk, Virginia*
Naval Station San Diego, California
Naval Station Mayport, Florida
Naval Station Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, including Naval Shipyard Pearl Harbor
Naval Station Pascagoula, Mississippi
Naval Station Newport, Rhode Island*
Naval Station Ingleside, Texas
Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia
Naval Station Bremerton, Washington, including Naval Shipyard Puget Sound
Naval Station Everett, Washington
Naval Weapons Station, Seal Beach Detachment, Concord, California*
Naval Weapons Station Earle, Colts Neck, New Jersey
Naval Weapons Station Charleston, South Carolina*
Naval Weapons Station Yorktown, Virginia*
Submarine Base San Diego, California
Submarine Base New London, Connecticut
Submarine Base Kings Bay, Georgia
Submarine Base Bangor, Washington
Naval Ordnance Test Unit, Cape Canaveral, Florida*
Blount Island Command, Jacksonville, Florida*
Naval Support Activity, Panama City, Florida*
Naval Magazine, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii*

Naval Station Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico is excluded from the above list because it was closed outside the BRAC process by special legislation.
Data Call Development

The BRAC 2005 Surface/Subsurface Operations capacity data call was developed after a review and validation of the BRAC 1995 principal measure of capacity: ship-berthing capability. The BRAC 1995 “Cruiser Equivalent” metric, which normalized berthing capacity to the CG-47 class of ships, was retained as the standard measure for evaluating an activity’s capability to berth ships in a cold iron status. The capacity data call captured specific ship berthing information concerning linear feet of berthing, pier and slip width, dredge depth, shore power, and channel depth, and requested each activity to determine the maximum number of Cruiser Equivalents that could be berthed in a cold iron status. Conversion factors were defined for the various types of Naval ships. Based on the responses to the capacity data call questions, in general, any activity with reported Cruiser Equivalents was included in the Surface/Subsurface Operations functional analysis.

The military value data call was developed after review of the BRAC 1995 data calls, discussions with Fleet experts through Commander, Fleet Forces Command and development of a military value scoring plan by the Infrastructure Evaluation Group. The military value scoring plan included the following five attributes, which were used to evaluate an activity’s ability to support ships, ship personnel, and their families: Operational Infrastructure, Operational Training, Port Characteristics, Environment and Encroachment, and Personnel Support/Quality of Life.

Capacity Analysis

As noted above, the BRAC 1995 concept of the “Cruiser Equivalent” was retained for the BRAC 2005 Surface/Subsurface Operations capacity analysis. This concept evaluated pier space requirements, available ship support services and depth restrictions, both pier side and while transiting from sea to pier. Each activity provided a certified response indicating its maximum capacity to berth ships irrespective of deployment patterns or pier maintenance requirements. These reported capacities were reviewed and validated, and where necessary, data call clarifications and corrections were requested and obtained in accordance with the data certification process. Analysis of the certified data resulted in the determination of current capacity, which included all possible activities that possessed the capability to homeport ships. In order to determine potential excess capacity, the maximum capacity was reduced by the non-operational capacity (those activities indicated with an asterisk on the above list). Based on input from Commander, Fleet Forces Command on the impact of the Fleet Response Plan, an allowance of 50 Cruiser Equivalent was applied to permit ship maintenance and weapon handling pier-side, obviating excess pier shifts for nested ships. This allowance accounts for the fact that the maximum capacity reported at an activity included the maximum permissible ship-nesting limits and reflects the necessary flexibility to support ship maintenance and ordnance handling evolutions. Additionally, a five percent Cruiser Equivalent allowance was included to account for the need to periodically shut down piers to conduct maintenance. After review of the capacity data, the berthing capacity devoted to the contiguous naval shipyards at Naval Stations Bremerton and Pearl Harbor was determined not to be available for home-porting ships since it would conflict with the current mission, and therefore, was considered non-operational capacity.
The 20-year Force Structure Plan was used to determine the berthing requirements in the capacity analysis. This force structure plan included a significant number of future ships, including Multi-mission Destroyer (DD(X)) and Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). These ships have larger footprint requirements than current Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG) and Guided Missile Frigate (FFG) ships. The combination of ships used to determine the berthing requirements was based on the President’s Budget Ship and Aircraft Supplemental Data Tables. The total berthing requirements in Cruiser Equivalent were based on the total number of each ship class multiplied by the ship class Cruiser Equivalent factor and in-port percentage, and subsequently reduced by the ships in the shipyard and ships permanently deployed. The in-port percentage was used to reduce the overall berthing requirement accounting for historical deployment and operating patterns of the various classes of ships. The percentages used in the BRAC 1995 round were reviewed and adjusted by the Infrastructure Evaluation Group based on input from Commander, Fleet Forces Command. A surge factor in calculating the amount of berthing space required at its operational bases was not needed because it would require additional ship construction to utilize that surge capability. The Department of the Navy (DON) Analysis Group and Infrastructure Evaluation Group ensured that sufficient flexibility was retained to handle surge represented by operational tempo changes or emergent force positioning changes, and also concluded that there was sufficient berthing space available in non-operational bases (e.g., shipyards and weapons stations) to meet surge or other emergent operational requirements.

During the course of the 2005 BRAC analysis, a significant revision of the 20-year Force Structure Plan was promulgated. This revised plan reduced the number of ships in the overall capacity requirement. Changes to the plan reduced the nuclear attack submarine Fleet by 21 percent, and eliminated all Minehunter-Coastal ships from the Fleet early in the BRAC execution period. The number of Prepositioning ships and new High-speed Connector ships increased. However, since these ships are operated in forward areas only, are civilian manned, and do not require homeports, they were not included in the requirement. Accounting for the revised Force Structure Plan, the net result was an aggregate excess capacity of 25 percent, across Navy Surface/Subsurface activities.

Military Value Analysis

The matrix developed for military value analysis was modeled on the BRAC 1995 Naval Station matrix with modifications based on lessons learned, Fleet input, and improved modeling. Scaling functions were used to allow partial or relative value for a particular data point. The matrixes for the different Operational Functions (Surface/Subsurface, Aviation, and Ground) were similar in many respects, each having five attributes. However, the specific data and weighting of the attributes reflected the differences between each function.

Operational Infrastructure questions principally measured the size and versatility of ship berthing, maintenance, and support capabilities and proximity to naval shipyards. Additional value was given for strategic nuclear submarine homeport capability and Nimitz Class nuclear-powered carrier cold-iron berthing capability and ability to expand to accommodate surge and expansion of mission. Operational Training questions measured the proximity to training facilities, training ranges and operation areas. Port Characteristics
questions principally measured operational and strategic locations, port restrictions, and anti-terrorism/force protection capabilities. Environment and Encroachment questions measured an array of constraints, costs, and capabilities associated with balancing an activity’s mission and compliance with Federal and State environmental regulations. Personnel Support/Quality of Life questions measured an activity’s ability to support ship’s personnel and their families.

Question weights developed by the Infrastructure Evaluation Group placed high value on operational infrastructure and training. The military value scores for the activities in the Surface/Subsurface Operations function were fairly evenly distributed between 30.8 and 74.5 for all 29 activities. The range for the current operational homeports was 37.1 to 74.5 with an average military value for this category of 55.6. Large versatile bases and those in proximity to training areas and facilities scored higher, while smaller bases which were remote from training areas and facilities scored significantly lower.

Configuration Analysis

Configuration analysis was used to develop solutions that progressively reduced excess capacity while maximizing military value. The model’s parameters included: (1) the Cruiser Equivalent capacity; (2) the military value score for all 29 Surface/Subsurface activities; (3) the number of nuclear-powered carriers that could be berthed cold iron at an activity; (4) the ability to homeport strategic nuclear submarines; and, (5) East and West Coast location requirements. The initial model run included the following rules approved by the DON Analysis Group: (1) to ensure that the model did not result in unbalanced force levels on each coast, at least 40 percent of the requirements had to be located on each coast; (2) one strategic nuclear submarine homeport per coast was required to ensure that this key infrastructure capability was maintained; and, (3) two ports on each coast capable of cold iron berthing a nuclear-powered carrier must be retained in order to allow for dispersal.

The initial model run yielded sub-optimum results by closing some non-operational activities and relocating ships to other non-operational activities. Non-operational activities (indicated above with an asterisk) were removed from the model in order to prevent results that would either close activities that have a non-operational primary mission or relocate ships to these activities, which do not have the full infrastructure to support ships and assigned personnel. The model was required to ensure that Naval Weapons Station Earle remained open in any solution set, as it is required for Fast Combat Support Ship (AOE) stationing and was determined to possess unique explosive safety arcs necessary to homeport the Fast Combat Support Ships.

Activities suggested for closure by the model included Naval Station Pascagoula, Naval Station Ingleside, Naval Base Guam, Submarine Base New London, Naval Station Everett, Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek, and Submarine Base San Diego. These results were used as the initial input for the DON Analysis Group initial scenario development deliberations.
Scenario Development and Analysis

The DON Analysis Group reviewed the capacity data and military value scores contained in the model results and developed proposed scenarios designed to maximize the use of capacity in Fleet concentration areas by realigning assets, locating ship maintenance close to the Fleet, and optimizing mission accomplishment and rapid deployment capabilities. The DON Analysis Group noted that Naval Base Guam currently bases forward deployed submarines and Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek is the likely homeport for a significant number of Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) due to its facility configuration. The DON Analysis Group also recognized that the development of new types of warships necessitated retention of sufficient capacity to support them. The DON Analysis Group recommended, and the Infrastructure Evaluation Group approved, five base closure scenarios: Naval Station Pascagoula, Naval Station Ingleside, Submarine Base New London, Naval Station Everett and Submarine Base San Diego. Alternative scenarios were developed to analyze various receiver sites for the major missions and associated activities, such as the Submarine School, New London, Mine Warfare Training Center, Ingleside, and Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 15 (HM-15) from Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, TX. The Naval Station Everett closure scenario included alternatives for relocation of an entire Carrier Strike Group, including a Carrier Air Wing and appropriate escort ships, in accordance with the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy tasking document. The Infrastructure Evaluation Group also approved an alternative to the Submarine Base New London closure scenario, which sought to consolidate the Naval Station Norfolk submarine force at Submarine Base New London.

The DON Analysis Group and Infrastructure Evaluation Group reviewed the scenario analysis results in deliberative session and recommended three closure actions: Naval Station Pascagoula, Naval Station Ingleside, and Submarine Base New London. In each case, scenario alternatives were extensively analyzed to determine the most appropriate action for all affected activities. The DON Analysis Group and Infrastructure Evaluation Group considered alternate receiver sites recommended by the field and identified additional, or eliminated the need for, alternate receiving sites upon review of scenario analysis results and the revised Force Structure Plan. For example, the revised Force Structure Plan will decommission all Minehunter-Coastal ships by FY 2008. Therefore, the scenario to close Naval Station Ingleside provided an opportunity to single site the Mine Counter Measure ships at Naval Station San Diego without incurring military construction costs for a new pier.

The COBRA analysis for closing Naval Station Everett and relocating a nuclear carrier to Naval Station Bremerton indicated early return on investment with high one-time costs associated with constructing additional nuclear carrier support facilities. The DON Analysis Group, Infrastructure Evaluation Group, and senior Department of the Navy leadership weighed the risks associated with closing an existing deep-water nuclear-powered carrier homeport, as well as the remote likelihood of ever re-acquiring this capability and eliminated this closure scenario. Department of the Navy leadership further decided that issue resolution associated with Carrier Strike Group relocation to the Pacific theater required additional strategic analysis and discussions following the Quadrennial Defense Review and postponed any decision until post-Quadrennial Defense Review.
COBRA analyses for the closure of Submarine Base San Diego and relocation of the submarine assets to Naval Station Pearl Harbor indicated an early return on investment. However, the DON Analysis Group and Infrastructure Evaluation Group recognized that the loss of a West Coast Fast Attack Submarine (SSN) homeport would adversely affect strategic and operational capabilities, make the valuable training areas off the coast of San Diego of limited utility, and eliminate submarine logistic support in San Diego. The Infrastructure Evaluation Group decided to remove this closure scenario from further consideration.

The COBRA analysis to realign Naval Station Norfolk by relocating all submarine assets to Submarine Base New London indicated no return on investment primarily due to extensive one-time costs and no steady-state savings. The Infrastructure Evaluation Group decided to remove this scenario from further consideration.

To ensure the scenario development and analysis adequately addressed homeland defense, the Infrastructure Analysis Team met with representatives from U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Strategic Command, and the Joint Staff (Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate) to discuss homeland defense mission requirements and consider whether a particular Department of the Navy scenario or combination of scenarios would negatively impact Department of the Navy’s ability to meet the Maritime Homeland Defense mission, as set forth in the Maritime Homeland Defense Execution Order. Additionally, the DON Analysis Group had similar discussions with the U.S. Coast Guard. Where identified, Combatant Commander’s concerns were fully considered by the Department of the Navy deliberative bodies as part of an executability and warfighter/readiness risk analysis performed for each Department of the Navy recommendation. Based upon the foregoing, Department of the Navy concluded that its closure and realignment recommendations would not compromise homeland defense mission requirements.

Conclusion

The Force Structure Plan and the Fleet Response Plan’s changes to Surface/Subsurface deployment patterns affect the ability to significantly reduce Department of the Navy waterfront infrastructure, particularly in light of anticipated future force structure requirements for new classes of ships. The Surface/Subsurface Operations BRAC recommendations seek to close single function naval activities and utilize existing capacity in Fleet concentration areas. The risk of loss of key infrastructure capabilities, such as explosive piers and nuclear-powered ship capable ports, outweighed the benefit of additional closures. The three closure recommendations reduce the excess capacity for the Surface/Subsurface Operations function from 25 percent to 17 percent and increase the average military value of operational homeports from 55.64 to 58.47. The net savings to the Department over 20 years for all three closure recommendations is approximately $3.06 billion.
ATTACHMENT A-1

RECOMMENDATION FOR CLOSURE

SUBMARINE BASE, NEW LONDON, CONNECTICUT

Recommendation: Close Naval Submarine Base New London, CT. Relocate its assigned submarines, Auxiliary Repair Dock 4 (ARDM-4), and Nuclear Research Submarine 1 (NR-1) along with their dedicated personnel, equipment and support to Submarine Base Kings Bay, GA and Naval Station Norfolk, VA. Relocate the intermediate submarine repair function to Shore Intermediate Repair Activity Norfolk, at Naval Shipyards Norfolk, VA, and Trident Refit Facility Kings Bay, GA. Relocate the Naval Submarine School and Center for Submarine Learning to Submarine Base Kings Bay, GA. Consolidate the Naval Security Group Activity Groton, CT with Naval Security Group Activity Norfolk, VA at Naval Station Norfolk, VA. Consolidate Naval Submarine Medical Research Laboratory Groton, CT, with Naval Medical Research Center at Walter Reed Army Medical Center Forest Glenn Annex, MD. Relocate Naval Undersea Medical Institute Groton, CT to Naval Air Station Pensacola, FL and Fort Sam Houston, TX. Consolidate Navy Region Northeast, New London, CT with Navy Region, Mid-Atlantic, Norfolk, VA.

Justification: The existing berthing capacity at surface/subsurface installations exceeds the capacity required to support the Force Structure Plan. The closure of Submarine Base New London materially contributes to the maximum reduction of excess capacity while increasing the average military value of the remaining bases in this functional area. Sufficient capacity and Fleet dispersal is maintained with the East Coast submarine Fleet homeports of Naval Station Norfolk and Submarine Base Kings Bay, without affecting operational capability. The intermediate submarine repair function is relocated to Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity Norfolk at Norfolk Naval Shipyard, and the Trident Refit Facility Kings Bay, GA in support of the relocating submarines. Consolidating the Naval Submarine Medical Research Laboratory with assets at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center Forest Glenn Annex will create a DoD Center of Hyperbaric and Undersea Medicine that will increase synergy by consolidating previously separate animal and human research capabilities at a single location. The consolidation of Navy Region, Northeast with Navy Region, Mid-Atlantic is one element of the Department of the Navy efforts to reduce the number of Installation Management Regions from twelve to eight. Consolidation of the Regions rationalizes regional management structure and allows for opportunities to collocate regional entities to align management concepts and efficiencies.

Payback: The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is $679.64 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a cost of $345.42 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $192.78 million with a payback expected in three years. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $1.58 billion.
Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 15,808 jobs (8,457 direct jobs and 7,351 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Norwich-New London, CT Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 9.37 percent of economic area employment. The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on this economic region of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.

Community Infrastructure: A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces, and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.

Environmental Impact: Naval Station Norfolk, VA is in Maintenance for Ozone (1-Hour) and Marginal Non-attainment for Ozone (8-Hour). An Air Conformity Determination may be required. There are potential impacts for dredging; marine mammals, resources, or sanctuaries; threatened and endangered species; and water resources. Naval Shipyard Norfolk, VA has the same air status as Naval Station Norfolk. There may be similar water resource impacts. Submarine Base Kings Bay, GA is in Attainment. There are potential impacts for dredging; marine mammals, resources, or sanctuaries; threatened and endangered species; and water resources. Naval Air Station Pensacola, FL is in Attainment. There are potential impacts to cultural, archeological, tribal resources; waste management; and wetlands. Walter Reed Medical Center-Forrest Glen Annex, MD is in Severe Non-attainment for Ozone (1-Hour and 8-Hour) and an Air Conformity Determination will be required. There are potential impacts to land use constraints or sensitive resources, and wetlands. Fort Sam Houston, TX is in Attainment. There are potential impacts to cultural, archeological, tribal resources; threatened and endangered species; and water resources. No impacts are anticipated for the remaining resource areas of noise; or waste management. This recommendation indicates impacts of costs at the installations involved, which reported $11.3 million in costs for waste management and environmental compliance. These costs were included in the payback calculation. Naval Submarine Base New London, CT, the closing installation, reports $23.9 million in costs for environmental restoration. Because the Department has a legal obligation to perform environmental restoration regardless of whether an installation is closed, realigned, or remains open, this cost is not included in the payback calculation. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the installations in this recommendation has been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to implementation of this recommendation.
ATTACHMENT A-2

RECOMMENDATION FOR CLOSURE

NAVAL STATION, PASCAGOULA, MISSISSIPPI

Recommendation: Close Naval Station Pascagoula, MS. Relocate its ships along with dedicated personnel, equipment, and support to Naval Station Mayport, FL. Relocate the ship intermediate repair function to Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity Mayport, FL.

Justification: This recommendation will reduce excess berthing capacity while allowing for consolidation of surface ships in a Fleet concentration area. Sufficient capacity and Fleet dispersal is maintained with East Coast surface Fleet homeports of Naval Station Norfolk and Naval Station Mayport, FL. Gulf Coast presence can be achieved as needed with available Navy ports at Naval Air Station Key West, FL and Naval Air Station Pensacola, FL. The Guided Missile Cruisers (CG-47 Class) at Naval Station Pascagoula are scheduled for decommissioning prior to FY 2006 and will not relocate. This recommendation also supports mission elimination at Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity Pascagoula and reduces excess repair capacity. The Defense Common Ground Station-Navy 2 facility can be relocated to another Naval activity or remain in its present location as a tenant of the U.S. Coast Guard, if the Coast Guard elects to assume property ownership of some or all of the Pascagoula facility.

Payback: The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is $17.94 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $220.02 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $47.43 million with an immediate payback expected. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $665.69 million.

This recommendation affects the U.S. Coast Guard, a non-DoD Federal Agency. In the absence of access to credible cost and savings information for that agency or knowledge regarding whether the agency will remain on the installation, the Department assumed that the non-DoD Federal agency will be required to assume new base operating responsibilities on the affected installation. The Department further assumed that because of these new base-operating responsibilities, the effect of the recommendation on the non-DoD agency would be an increase in its costs. As required by Section 2913(d) of the BRAC statute, the Department has taken the effect on the costs of this agency into account when making this recommendation.

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1,762 jobs (963 direct jobs and 799 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Pascagoula, Mississippi Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 2.57 percent of economic area employment. The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on this economic region of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.
Community Infrastructure: A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces, and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.

Environmental Impact: Naval Station Mayport, FL is in Maintenance for Ozone (1-Hour), but an Air Conformity Determination is not required. No impacts are anticipated for cultural, archeological, or tribal resources; dredging; land use constraints or sensitive resource areas; marine mammals, resources or sanctuaries; noise; threatened and endangered species or critical habitat; waste management; water resources; or wetlands. This recommendation indicates impacts of costs at the installations involved, which reported $20 thousand in costs for waste management and environmental compliance. These costs were included in the payback calculation. This recommendation does not otherwise impact the costs of environmental restoration, waste management or environmental compliance activities. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the installations in this recommendation has been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to implementation of this recommendation.
ATTACHMENT A-3

RECOMMENDATION FOR CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT

NAVAL STATION, INGLESIDE, TEXAS

AND

NAVAL AIR STATION, CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS

Recommendation: Close Naval Station Ingleside, TX. Relocate its ships along with dedicated personnel, equipment and support to Naval Station San Diego, CA. Relocate the ship intermediate repair function to Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity San Diego, CA. Consolidate Mine Warfare Training Center with Fleet Anti-submarine Warfare Training Center San Diego, CA. Realign Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, TX. Relocate Commander Mine Warfare Command and Commander Mobile Mine Assembly Group to Fleet Anti-Submarine Warfare Center, Point Loma, CA. Relocate Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 15 (HM-15) and dedicated personnel, equipment and support to Naval Station Norfolk, VA. Disestablish Commander Helicopter Tactical Wing U.S. Atlantic Fleet Aviation Intermediate Maintenance Detachment Truax Field at Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, TX and relocate its intermediate maintenance function for Aircraft Components, Fabrication & Manufacturing, and Support Equipment to Fleet Readiness Center Mid-Atlantic Site Norfolk, VA.

Justification: This recommendation moves mine warfare surface and aviation assets to major Fleet concentration areas and reduces excess capacity. Gulf Coast presence can be achieved as needed with available Navy ports at Naval Air Station Key West, FL and Naval Air Station Pensacola, FL. The Minehunter Coastal ships at Naval Station Ingleside are scheduled for decommissioning between FY 2006 and FY 2008 and will not relocate. Additionally, U.S. Coast Guard presence is expected to remain in the Gulf Coast region. Relocation of Commander Mine Warfare Command and the Mine Warfare Training Center to San Diego, CA creates a center of excellence for Undersea Warfare, combining both mine warfare and anti-submarine warfare disciplines. This reorganization removes the Mine Warfare community from a location remote from the Fleet thereby better supporting the shift to organic mine warfare. This recommendation also supports mission elimination at Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity Naval Reserve Maintenance Facility Ingleside, TX and Aviation Intermediate Maintenance Detachment Truax Field at Naval Air Station Corpus Christi and reduces excess repair capacity, along. The relocation of Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 15 (HM-15) to Naval Station Norfolk single sites all Mine Warfare Aircraft in a Fleet concentration area. This location better supports the HM-15 mission by locating them closer to the C-5 transport Air Port of Embarkation for overseas employment and mine countermeasures ship and helicopter coordinated exercises.

Payback: The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is $178.39 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $99.98 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $75.63 million with a payback expected in two
Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 6,864 jobs (3,184 direct jobs and 3,680 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Corpus Christi, TX Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 3.10 percent of economic area employment. The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on this economic region of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.

Community Infrastructure: A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces, and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.

Environmental Impact: Naval Station San Diego, CA is in Maintenance for Ozone (1-Hour), but an Air Conformity Determination is not required. There are potential impacts for dredging and wetlands. Anti-Submarine Warfare Center Point Loma is in Maintenance for Ozone (1-Hour), but an Air Conformity Determination will not be required. There are potential impacts to the resource areas of land use constraints or sensitive resources. Naval Station Norfolk, VA is in Maintenance for Ozone (1-Hour) and Marginal Non-attainment for Ozone (8-Hour) and no Air Conformity Determination is required. No impacts are anticipated regarding the other resource areas of cultural, archeological, or tribal resources; marine mammals, resources, or sanctuaries; noise; threatened and endangered species; waste management; or water resources. This recommendation indicates impacts of costs at the installations involved, which reported $983 thousand in costs for waste management and environmental compliance. These costs were included in the payback calculation. This recommendation does not otherwise impact the costs of environmental restoration, waste management or environmental compliance activities. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the installations in this recommendation has been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to implementation of this recommendation.
ATTACHMENT B

DESCRIPTION OF ANALYSIS OF GROUND OPERATIONS

The Ground Operations function included activities that currently host Naval ground forces. The universe of activities analyzed for this function was comprised of activities that currently support the Naval ground units including U.S. Marine Corps, Naval Construction Battalions, Naval Special Warfare Units, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal Teams. Naval Air Station Fallon, NV was added to the universe because the Army expressed interest in possibly stationing ground forces there. The following Department of the Navy activities were included in the Ground Operations universe:

- Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, Oceanside, California
- Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center-Twentynine Palms, California
- Naval Base Coronado, San Diego, California
- Naval Base Ventura County, Point Mugu, California
- Marine Corps Base Camp Hawaii, Kaneohe, Hawaii
- Naval Station Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
- Construction Battalion Center, Gulfport, Mississippi
- Naval Air Station Fallon, Nevada
- Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, Jacksonville, North Carolina
- Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek, Norfolk, Virginia
- Naval Base, Guam

Because of their strategic location and potential for operational training of ground forces, the following Army and Air Force activities were included in the Ground Operations analysis:

**Army**
- National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California
- Fort Benning, Georgia
- Fort Stewart, Georgia
- Fort Polk, Louisiana
- Fort Bragg, North Carolina
- Fort Eustis, Virginia
- Fort Monroe, Virginia
- Fort Lewis, Washington

**Air Force**
- Vandenberg Air Force Base, California
- Eglin Air Force Base, Florida
Data Call Development

The capacity data call was developed after a review and assessment of the BRAC 1995 data call. Questions were refined in order to collect specific current data concerning the following principal ground operations measures: administrative space, covered storage space and organic/intermediate maintenance space. The capacity data call measured unique facilities designed for specific types of ground operations (e.g., urban, littoral) and/or ground commodity groups (e.g., electronic, ordnance) as well as general all-purpose buildings and spaces that have the capability to support multi-function missions. Similarly, throughput data for receiving, staging, onward movement, and integration was captured in order to assist in analyzing an activity’s ability to support rapid deployments of ground forces. Housing, billeting, and messing facilities were considered ancillary functions common to all activities. Technical experts from the Fleet and Headquarters, Marine Corps reviewed and validated the capacity data call questions prior to their issuance.

The military value data call was developed after review of the BRAC 1995 data calls, discussions with Navy and the Marine Corps, especially in the areas of operational training and personnel support, and development of a military value scoring plan by the Infrastructure Evaluation Group. The military value scoring plan included the following five attributes, which were used to evaluate an activity’s ability to support naval ground forces, including training, deployment support, ground personnel, and their families: Operational Infrastructure, Operational Training, Base Characteristics, Environment and Encroachment, and Personnel Support/Quality of Life.

Capacity Analysis

As noted above, the capacity analysis measures were administrative space, covered storage space, and maintenance space. A “Battalion Equivalent” metric was developed as the standard measure for comparing the administrative, covered storage, and maintenance spaces at each activity. The Battalion Equivalent metric normalized space requirements based on a Marine infantry battalion as the standard unit of measure for both Navy and Marine Corps ground forces.

Each activity provided certified responses concerning total square footage, type of space, vacant space, and tenants (occupied space). These reported capacities were reviewed and validated, and where necessary, data call clarifications and corrections were requested and obtained in accordance with the data certification process. Analysis of the certified data resulted in a maximum capacity in Battalion Equivalents of administrative space, covered storage space and maintenance space for each activity and the totals for Navy activities, Marine Corps activities, and the Department of the Navy.

The 20-year Force Structure Plan was used to determine the capacity requirements in the capacity analysis. The force structure plan showed no change in the Department of the Navy ground forces from current levels. Based on input from experts from the Headquarters, Marine Corps and the Chief of Naval Operations, the amount of administrative, covered storage, and maintenance space required for the many types of Department of the Navy
ground units was determined. These requirements, converted to Battalion Equivalents, were multiplied by the number of units of each type to determine a total capacity requirement in the three areas of measurement.

The capacity results were compared to the requirement based on the 20-year Force Structure Plan to characterize excess capacity. The capacity analysis results indicated no excess capacity in administrative space, 12 percent excess capacity in covered storage space, and 11 percent excess capacity in maintenance space. Although some activities had excess capacity, the capacity analysis results indicated that no Department of the Navy activity had sufficient excess capacity to host an additional Marine Expeditionary Brigade. A Marine Expeditionary Brigade was determined to be the smallest Marine Air Ground Task Force unit that could be separately moved. However, relocating smaller Navy ground forces was considered where buildable acres vice facilities existed on larger Marine Corps bases.

The Army and Air Force activities noted above also provided capacity data call responses. Department of the Navy examined the results in order to identify potential receiver sites for Naval ground forces and the possible establishment of a joint ground forces training facility. In no case did a non-Department of the Navy activity possess sufficient excess capacity to warrant development of a scenario.

**Military Value Analysis**

The matrix developed for military value analysis was modeled after the Surface/Subsurface Operations and Aviation Operations functions with modifications for items unique to ground activities after consultation with Marine Corps and Navy ground operations technical experts and leadership. Scaling functions were used to allow partial or relative value for a particular data point. The matrices for the different operational functions (Surface/Subsurface, Aviation, and Ground) were similar in many respects, each having five attributes. However, the specific data and weighting of the attributes reflected the differences between each function. Military value analysis was conducted on Navy, Marine Corps, and the Army and Air Force activities noted above.

Operational Infrastructure questions principally measured the facilities and services, including operational staff buildings, ordnance storage depots, and organic maintenance shops, necessary for home basing naval ground forces. Additional value was given for an activity’s receiving, staging, onward movement and integration capabilities. Operational Training questions were designed to capture the proximity of an activity to the necessary ranges, maneuver areas, and training facilities utilized by ground forces. Base Characteristics questions principally measured geographic and physical components of an activity, proximity to aerial and seaports of debarkation, rail and highway throughput capacities, and the ability of the facilities and land to accommodate ground force operations. Environment and Encroachment questions measured an array of constraints, costs, and capabilities associated with balancing an activity’s mission and compliance with Federal and State environmental regulations. Personnel Support/Quality of Life questions measured an activity’s ability to support ground forces personnel and their families.
Question weights developed by the Infrastructure Executive Group placed high value on operational infrastructure and training. The military value scores for the activities in the Ground Operations function were evenly distributed between 34.0 and 66.0 and for all 11 activities with an average military value for this category of 46.9. Large versatile activities and those in proximity to training areas and facilities scored higher, while smaller activities which were remote from training areas and facilities scored significantly lower.

Configuration Analysis

Configuration analysis was used to develop solutions that progressively reduced excess capacity while maximizing military value. The model’s parameters included: (1) Battalion Equivalent capacity for each activity; (2) the military value score for all 11 Department of the Navy Ground Operations activities; (3) Navy and Marine Corps ground forces requirements; (4) identifiers for type of service (Navy or Marine Corps), specific type of ground force, and waterfront access; and; (5) East and West Coast location requirements. The initial model run included the following rules approved by the Department of the Navy (DON) Analysis Group: (1) to ensure that the model did not result in unbalanced force levels on each coast, at least 40 percent of the requirements had to be located on each coast; (2) to preserve Marine Air Ground Task Force integrity, forces must be relocated as a Marine Expeditionary Brigade, at a minimum; (3) Naval Mobile Construction Battalion forces must relocate only as four or more battalions and a regiment; (4) Naval Special Warfare forces relocate as a Naval Special Warfare group; and, (5) Explosive Ordnance Disposal forces relocate as an Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group.

No activities were identified for closure due to the shortage of administrative space. However, the model did identify the possibility of realigning forces if expansion (buildable acres) was allowed and the requirements were reduced.

Scenario Development and Analysis

The DON Analysis Group and Infrastructure Executive Group reviewed the capacity data and military value scores contained in the model results in order to assess the possibility of developing ground forces joint basing scenarios. The DON Analysis Group and Infrastructure Executive Group sought to develop scenarios to maximize the use of capacity in Fleet concentration areas by realigning assets, to support maritime unique operational concepts, and to optimize mission accomplishment and rapid deployment capabilities. The DON Analysis Group recommended, and Infrastructure Executive Group approved, one scenario to close Construction Battalion Center Gulfport, Mississippi and relocate forces to Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.

The COBRA analysis for closing Construction Battalion Center Gulfport indicated that a return on investment would take over 100 years to be realized due to high one-time costs to reconstruct facilities at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, and low steady state savings. This scenario provided little facility reutilization or mission consolidation opportunities at the receiving site. The Infrastructure Executive Group decided to remove this closure scenario from further consideration.
Conclusion

Similar to BRAC 1995, the capacity and requirements for Ground Operations were analyzed for three areas, administrative space, covered storage space and maintenance space, and standardized to a Battalion Equivalent metric. The Ground Operations universe was then analyzed in terms of its capabilities to host ground forces by providing necessary space, adequate training opportunities and rapid deployment support. No base had sufficient capacity for each type of ground force to absorb the additional requirements under any potential closure/realignment scenario. This evaluation confirmed that Department of the Navy ground bases are geographically located to support the mission of the ground forces and that planned force structure changes will further increase requirements. Consequently, Department of the Navy leadership determined that there was insufficient capacity to warrant further analysis of any closures or realignments in the Ground Operations function.
ATTACHMENT C

DESCRIPTION OF ANALYSIS OF AVIATION OPERATIONS

The Aviation Operations function analyzed those Department of the Navy, Department of the Army, Department of the Air Force, and civilian activities that have a principal mission to conduct aviation operations, homeport aviation units, provide training facilities, or operate a base from which operational and Fleet training missions can be flown by Navy and Marine Corps aircraft squadrons and detachments. The following activities were included in this function (asterisks indicate those activities considered “non-operational,” in that their primary function is Undergraduate Training, Fleet Training, or Research, Development, Test and Evaluation):

- Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona
- Marine Corps Air Station Camp Pendleton, Oceanside, California
- Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, California
- Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, Havelock, North Carolina
- Marine Corps Air Station New River, Jacksonville, North Carolina
- Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, South Carolina
- Marine Corps Air Facility, Quantico, Virginia
- Marine Corps Base Camp Hawaii, Kaneohe, Hawaii
- Naval Air Facility, El Centro, California*
- Naval Air Facility, Washington, DC
- Naval Air Station, Lemoore, California
- Naval Air Station North Island, San Diego, California
- Naval Air Station, Point Mugu, California
- Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, Florida
- Naval Air Station, Key West, Florida*
- Naval Air Station Whiting Field, Milton, Florida*
- Naval Air Station, Pensacola, Florida*
- Naval Air Station, Atlanta, Georgia
- Naval Air Station, Brunswick, Maine
- Naval Air Station, Patuxent River, Maryland*
- Naval Air Station, Meridian, Mississippi*
- Naval Air Station, Fallon, Nevada*
- Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi, Texas*
- Naval Air Station, Kingsville, Texas*
- Naval Air Station Oceana, Virginia Beach, Virginia
- Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, Oak Harbor, Washington
- Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base, Willow Grove, Pennsylvania
- Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base, New Orleans, Louisiana
- Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base, Fort Worth, Texas
- Naval Station, Mayport, Florida
- Naval Station, Norfolk, Virginia
Cambria Regional Airport, Johnstown, Pennsylvania
Stewart Air National Guard Base, Stewart, New York
Naval Air Weapons Station, China Lake, California*
Naval Air Engineering Station, Lakehurst, New Jersey*

Because of their strategic location and potential for basing and operation of naval air forces, the following Army and Air Force activities were included in the Aviation Operations analysis:

**Army**
- Fort Stewart, Georgia (Wright Army Air Facility)
- Schofield Barracks, Hawaii (Wheeler Army Air Facility)
- Fort Polk, Louisiana (Polk Army Air Facility)
- Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland
- Fort Drum, New York (Wheeler Sack Army Air Facility)

**Air Force**
- Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
- Beale Air Force Base, California
- Travis Air Force Base, California
- Vandenberg Air Force Base, California
- Dover Air Force Base, Delaware
- Hurlbert Field, Florida
- Patrick Air Force Base, Florida
- Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida
- Dobbins Air Reserve Base, Georgia
- Moody Air Force Base, Georgia
- Robins Air Force Base, Georgia
- Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana
- Otis Air National Guard Base, Massachusetts
- Columbus Air Force Base, Mississippi
- Keasler Air Force Base, Mississippi
- Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina
- McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey
- McEntire Air National Guard Station South Carolina
- Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina
- Andersen Air Base, Guam

**Data Call Development**

The capacity data call was developed after a review of the BRAC 1995 data calls and expansion of the questions to allow for more thorough analysis with respect to required and available infrastructure. The capacity data call measured the ability to house aviation squadrons and units while properly maintaining the aircraft, providing ample airfield operating resources and training infrastructure, and ensuring sufficient support facilities. The principal capacity metric was the “Hangar Module,” defined as the hangar space, line space,
administrative space, operational space, and maintenance shop space required to house one aircraft squadron. Because hangar space is dependent upon the kinds of aircraft to be housed in a particular hangar, the capacity data call also distinguished between hangar types. A Type I hangar, which is built to house the carrier-based aircraft, generally has smaller dimensions and, more importantly, lower door height clearance. A Type II hangar has the physical dimensions, including door height clearance, required to house larger aircraft. Other capacity measures (such as utilities, number of aircraft operations per hour, training and maintenance space, fueling facilities, runway configurations, etc.) were used to validate airfield resources supporting the primary measure of capacity.

The military value data call was developed after a thorough review of the 1995 data calls, comprehensive discussions with Fleet experts through Commander, Fleet Forces Command and Headquarters, Marine Corps, and development of a robust military value scoring plan by the Infrastructure Evaluation Group. The military value scoring plan included the following five attributes, which were used to evaluate an activity’s ability to support squadrons, squadron personnel, and their families: Operational Infrastructure, Operational Training, Airfield Characteristics, Environment and Encroachment, and Personnel Support/Quality of Life.

Capacity Analysis

As noted above, the number of Hangar Modules on board an airfield defines capacity. Each activity provided a certified response of the data described above in order to determine the number of Type I and Type II Hanger Modules. These reported capacities were reviewed and validated, and where necessary, data call clarifications and corrections were requested and obtained in accordance with the data certification process. Analysis of the certified data resulted in the determination of a total capacity, which included all Department of the Navy activities that possessed the capability to house and operate naval aircraft. In order to determine potential excess capacity, this total capacity was reduced by the non-operational capacity (those activities indicated with an asterisk on the above list). These activities were not included since their primarily function is Undergraduate Training, Fleet Training or Research, Development, Test and Evaluation. Additionally, the Marine Corps Air Facility Quantico was not included in the operational capacity since its exclusive mission is Presidential support.

The 20-year Force Structure Plan provided incremental requirements for Department of the Navy aviation assets through 2024. The Force Structure Plan shows requirements increasing for the next six years, and then slowly declining through 2024 to a level 12 percent below 2005 requirements. The Fleet Response Plan requires a permanent facility within the continental United States and Hawaii for each squadron, including those based overseas. Additionally, the requirement was not reduced to account for underway periods or deployments. Coordination with Commander, Fleet Forces Command indicated a need to accommodate follow-on maintenance not yet accounted for in the Facility Planning Criteria for Navy and Marine Corps Shore Installations (NAVFAC P-80) or the Fleet Response Plan. Therefore, the Department of the Navy (DON) Analysis Group approved a factor of 1.22 modules per squadron in order to accurately determine required capacity. Finally, in
determining the operational requirements, the squadrons in the Force Structure Plan that were designated for Undergraduate Training, Fleet Training, and Research, Development, Test and Evaluation were subtracted from the total to determine the aviation operational requirement. A surge factor in calculating the amount of Hanger Modules required at its operational bases was not needed because it would require additional aircraft procurement to utilize that surge capability. The DON Analysis Group and Infrastructure Evaluation Group ensured that sufficient flexibility was retained to handle surge represented by operational tempo changes or emergent force positioning changes, and also concluded that there were sufficient Hanger Modules available in non-operational bases (e.g., Training and Research, Development, Test and Evaluation bases) to meet surge or other emergent operational requirements.

Comparing the number of Hangar Modules of current operational Navy and Marine Corps aviation activities against the number of projected operational squadrons (times 1.22) based on the March 2005 revision of the 2024 Force Structure Plan resulted in an excess capacity in 2024 of 19 percent.

Military Value Analysis

The matrix developed for military value analysis was modeled on the BRAC 1995 Naval Station matrix with modifications based on lessons learned, Fleet input, and improved modeling. Scaling functions were used to allow partial or relative value for a particular data point. The matrixes for the different operational functions (Surface/Subsurface, Aviation, and Ground) were similar in many respects, each having five attributes. However, the specific data and weighting of the attributes reflected the differences between each function. The military value data call was composed to assess an aviation activity’s “value” regarding its ability or potential ability to base operational squadrons.

Operational Infrastructure questions principally measured the size and versatility of the airfield, hangar, maintenance, and support capabilities. Operational Training questions measured the proximity to training facilities, training ranges and airspace. Airfield Characteristics questions principally measured operational and strategic locations, restrictions, and anti-terrorism/force protection capabilities. Environment and Encroachment questions measured an array of constraints, costs, and capabilities associated with balancing an activity’s mission and compliance with federal and state environmental regulations. Air quality, noise and encroachment issues were major factors in this attribute. Personnel Support/Quality of Life questions measured an activity’s ability to support squadron personnel and their families.

Question weights developed by the Infrastructure Evaluation Group placed high value on operational infrastructure and training. The military value scores for the activities in the Aviation Operations function were distributed between 28.0 and 71.6 for all 35 Department of the Navy activities, with an average military value for this category of 56.5. The scores of all the operational air stations were evenly distributed throughout this range, except Cambria Regional Airport and Stewart Air National Guard Base, which scored very low due largely to the fact that the units responding to the data calls do not own or control the airfield on which they operate.
Further, an abbreviated Aviation Operations military value analysis was conducted for the non-Department of the Navy activities listed above. Of those activities, McGuire Air Force Base, Robins Air Force Base, Moody Air Force Base and Dobbins Air Reserve Base demonstrated potential opportunities as receiving sites for Navy or Marine Corps operational aviation squadrons.

**Configuration Analysis**

Configuration analysis was used to develop solutions that progressively reduced excess capacity while maximizing military value and maintain groupings of like-aircraft reflective of operational units. The model’s parameters originally consisted of: (1) East and West Coast location; and (2) aircraft requirement and air station characteristics including Hangar Modules and types. The model minimized excess capacity by placing squadrons of aircraft into available Hangar Modules of higher military value bases that currently host that type of aircraft. The initial model run included the following rules approved by the DON Analysis Group: (1) to ensure that the model did not result in unbalanced force levels on each coast, at least 40 percent of the requirements had to be located on each coast; and (2) to limit relocation of type specific support facilities, the introduction of aircraft types not currently on board an activity was not allowed.

Activities suggested for closure by the initial model were Stewart Air National Guard Base, Cambria Regional Airport, Naval Air Station Atlanta, Marine Corps Air Facility Quantico, Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, Naval Air Engineering Station Lakehurst, Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Willow Grove, Naval Air Station Brunswick, Naval Air Facility Washington, Marine Corps Base Hawaii, Naval Air Facility El Centro, Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans, Marine Corps Air Station Camp Pendleton, Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, and Naval Air Station Kingsville. Because many of these bases were either (1) serving as an airfield to support Fleet Training or Presidential Support, or (2) under evaluation by either the Education and Training or Technical Joint Cross-Service Group, the DON Analysis Group decided to exclude the 13 bases (those with asterisks on pages C-1/2), Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, and Marine Corps Air Facility Quantico due to their alternate mission requirements.

The next model was run excluding those bases used for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Undergraduate Training, Fleet Training and Presidential support, and it suggested the following closure actions: Stewart Air National Guard Base, Cambria Regional Airport, Naval Air Station Atlanta, Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Willow Grove, and Naval Air Facility Washington. Because these results targeted only reserve bases and did not suggest any suitable solutions for possible maintenance efficiencies in operational aircraft, the DON Analysis Group tasked the Infrastructure Analysis Team with devising improved parameters that offered a solution that not only decreased excess capacity and increased overall military value, but also logically placed operational sized groups—or packages—of aircraft at bases best suited to support those aircraft and their respective missions.
A new model run included the above parameters, and the requirements for the packages of Navy and Marine Corps aircraft (including Reserves). The model minimized excess capacity by fitting packages (operational sized groups of aircraft) of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleet squadrons, and Reserve squadrons efficiently into Hangar Modules available at aviation activities. Also considered were inputs by Marine Forces Reserve and Naval Reserve Forces concerning the realities of reserve demographics as well as analysis showing the changes in total force structure throughout the next 20 years. To account for this, Infrastructure Analysis Team ran models for requirements in 2009, 2014, and 2024, to demonstrate that actions taken during BRAC 2005 to meet the requirements of 2024 do not negatively impact the Department’s mission capability in the intermediate years.

Activities suggested for closure by the model were: Stewart Air National Guard Base, Cambria Regional Airport, Naval Air Station Atlanta, Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Willow Grove, Naval Air Facility Washington, Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans, and Naval Station Mayport. Marine Corps Air Station Yuma was in the list of those bases excluded because of its training mission, but the DON Analysis Group returned it to the list of operational stations after consideration was given to its future operational use. An additional model was run including Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, and the solution included those stations listed above as well as Marine Corps Air Station Yuma. These results were used as the initial input for the DON Analysis Group initial scenario development deliberations.

**Scenario Development and Analysis**

The DON Analysis Group reviewed the capacity data, military value scores and the results of the configuration analysis to develop proposed scenarios designed to reduce excess capacity, increase overall military value, place squadrons of like-aircraft at single sites where possible, increase maintenance efficiencies, and leverage joint opportunities. Stewart Air National Guard Base was not considered due to a lack of available viable receiving capacity for its mission and essential ongoing operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism. A Naval Station Mayport closure scenario would have resulted only in a partial closure of the higher military value activity (in Surface/Subsurface Operations function) and as a result was deemed not cost effective to pursue. A Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans closure scenario would have resulted in almost total elimination of the reserve air stations, as well as severely impact the demographics of all other non-aviation reserve units that utilize the base. Marine Corps Air Station Yuma is the Marine Corps’ primary air training facility, and its use as the West Coast master jet base following the introduction of Joint Strike Fighter is under consideration. Naval Air Facility Washington was removed because of a competing Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group installation management scenario (the Naval Air Facility Washington scenario would have only transferred control of the base to the Air Force and was more appropriately addressed by the Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group).

The DON Analysis Group recommended, and the Infrastructure Evaluation Group approved, four base closure/realignment scenarios: Cambria Regional Airport, Naval Air Station Atlanta, Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, and Naval Air Station
Joint Reserve Base Willow Grove. Due to the Marine Corps’ plan to single site the Joint Strike Fighter on each coast, a scenario was released to close Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort (the Marine Corps’ lowest military value jet base on the East Coast) and relocate its squadrons to Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point. Due to increasing environment and encroachment issues surrounding Naval Air Station Oceana, Navy leadership also directed a base closure scenario to close Naval Air Station Oceana. In light of the capacity at Naval Air Station Jacksonville that will be available following the retirement of the S-3 community, and the smaller operational “footprint” of the Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) as compared to the P-3, the DON Analysis Group developed a closure scenario for Naval Air Station Brunswick since it had been contained in one of the configuration model outputs. These scenarios included several receiver site alternatives for the relocation or consolidation of associated activities, such as Navy Tactical Aviation from Naval Air Station Oceana, and the Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape School at Naval Air Station Brunswick.

COBRA analysis for closure of Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth indicated an immediate return on investment. However this scenario was dropped from consideration due to a significant number of competing scenarios from the Army and Air Force Departments, and the Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group. The Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth scenario competed directly with the Naval Air Station Atlanta scenario because units from each base were relocated to the other. Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth was capable of receiving the units from Atlanta with only minor military construction, while Naval Air Station Atlanta needed both major military construction and land acquisition outside of its boundary to accept units from Fort Worth.

COBRA analysis of the Naval Air Station Oceana scenarios indicated a long return on investment, with high one-time costs for possible receiving site alternatives, including one Air Force base. Evaluation of the receiving sites all identified operational issues that could impact their viability as an East Coast master jet base. Therefore, without another viable location for a Navy master jet base on the East Coast, the closure of Naval Air Station Oceana was not possible and dropped from consideration.

The DON Analysis Group and Infrastructure Evaluation Group reviewed the scenario analysis results in deliberative session and forwarded four closure recommendations: Naval Air Station Atlanta, Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Willow Grove, Naval Air Station Brunswick, and Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort. The realignment of Cambria Regional Airport was included with the Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Willow Grove closure recommendation since all assets are placed at the same receiving site, McGuire Air Force Base. In each case, scenario alternatives were extensively analyzed to determine the most appropriate action for all affected activities. The DON Analysis Group and Infrastructure Evaluation Group considered alternate receiver sites recommended by the field and identified additional, or eliminated the need for, alternate receiving sites upon review of scenario analysis results and the revised Force Structure Plan. For example Commander, Fleet Forces Command recommended relocating Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape School to Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, vice Naval Station Norfolk. Also, senior leadership concluded that Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort should be retained for future tactical
aviation basing flexibility, especially in light of concerns about the continued viability of tactical aviation basing at Naval Air Station Oceana. Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort was dropped as a candidate recommendation.

To ensure the scenario development and analysis adequately addressed homeland defense, the Infrastructure Analysis Team met with representatives from U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Strategic Command, and the Joint Staff to discuss homeland defense mission requirements and consider whether a particular Department of the Navy scenario or combination of scenarios would negatively impact Department of the Navy’s ability to meet the Maritime Homeland Defense mission, as set forth in the Maritime Homeland Defense Execution Order. Additionally, the DON Analysis Group had similar discussions with the U.S. Coast Guard. The Coast Guard’s desire to consolidate its West Coast aviation assets at Naval Air Station Point Mugu, California, was a consideration in the Department of the Navy decision to retain Naval Air Station Point Mugu. Where identified, Combatant Commander’s concerns were fully considered by the Department of the Navy deliberative bodies as part of an executability and warfighter/readiness risk analysis performed for each Department of the Navy recommendation. Based upon the foregoing, Department of the Navy concluded that its closure and realignment recommendations would not compromise homeland defense mission requirements.

A review of the Naval Air Station Brunswick recommendation by deliberative bodies noted a concern regarding U.S. Northern Command’s ability to perform its Homeland Defense mission if there are no suitable air stations for P-3 detachments to operate from in the northeast. While this concern was somewhat mitigated by the availability of reserve air facilities in New England, e.g., Westover Air Reserve Base, the Infrastructure Executive Council concluded that a realignment of Naval Air Station Brunswick was preferable to a complete closure because, while it attains training and maintenance efficiencies by single siting the East Coast Maritime Patrol community at Naval Air Station Jacksonville, it also retains an operational airfield in the northeast that can be used to support the homeland defense mission, as needed, and maintains strategic flexibility.

**Conclusion**

The increase in squadrons in the next six years, the Fleet Response Plan, the increased presence of intermediate and depot level maintenance within squadron spaces, and the increased tempo of operations in both active and reserve forces in response to Global War on Terrorism mitigate much of the apparent excess capacity resulting from capacity analysis. The principal methodology for savings in the Aviation Operations function was to increase maintenance and operational efficiencies through the integration of active and reserve forces, preserve reserve demographics, single site like aircraft wherever possible, and leverage joint opportunities. The two closure recommendations reduce the excess capacity for the Aviation Operations function from 19 percent to 16 percent and increase the average military value of operational air stations from 55.73 to 58.18. The net savings to the Department over 20 years for all three closure and realignment recommendations is approximately $1.86 billion.
Recommendation: Close Naval Air Station Atlanta, GA. Relocate its aircraft and necessary personnel, equipment and support to Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans, LA; Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, TX; and Robins Air Force Base, Robins, GA. Relocate Reserve Intelligence Area 14 to Fort Gillem, Forest Park, GA. Relocate depot maintenance Aircraft Components, Aircraft Engines, Fabrication and Manufacturing, and Support Equipment in support of F/A-18, C-9 and C-12 aircraft to Fleet Readiness Center West Site Fort Worth at Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, TX. Relocate intermediate maintenance in support of E-2C aircraft to Fleet Readiness Center Mid-Atlantic Site New Orleans at Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans, LA. Consolidate the Naval Air Reserve Atlanta with Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Atlanta located at Dobbins Air Reserve Base, Marietta, GA. Retain the Windy Hill Annex.

Justification: This recommendation reduces excess capacity while maintaining reserve forces in regions with favorable demographics. The aviation assets will be located closer to their theater of operations and/or will result in increased maintenance efficiencies and operational synergies. Relocating Reserve Intelligence Area 14 to Fort Gillem creates synergies with joint intelligence assets while maintaining the demographic base offered by the Atlanta area for this function. The Fleet Readiness Center portion of this recommendation realigns and merges depot and intermediate maintenance activities. It supports both DoD and Navy transformation goals by reducing the number of maintenance levels and streamlining the way maintenance is accomplished with associated significant cost reductions.

Payback: The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is $43.03 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $289.85 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $66.05 million with an immediate payback expected. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $910.87 million.

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 2,186 jobs (1,420 direct jobs and 766 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on this economic region of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.

Community Infrastructure: A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces, and
personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.

**Environmental Impact:** Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, TX is in Serious Non-attainment for Ozone (1-Hour) and an Air Conformity Determination may be required. There are potential impacts to waste management. Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans, LA is in Attainment. Robins Air Force Base, GA is in Attainment. There are potential impacts to cultural, archeological, tribal resources; land use constraints or sensitive resource areas; noise; waste management; water resources; and wetlands. No impacts are anticipated for the resource areas of dredging, marine mammals, resources, or sanctuaries; or threatened and endangered species. For Fort Gillem, GA and Dobbins Air Reserve Base, GA, there are no anticipated impacts regarding the resource areas of air quality; cultural, archeological, tribal resources; dredging; land use constraints or sensitive resource areas; marine mammals, resources, or sanctuaries; noise; threatened and endangered species; waste management; water resources; or wetlands. This recommendation indicates impacts of costs at the installations involved, which reported $230 thousand in costs for waste management and environmental compliance. These costs were included in the payback calculation. This recommendation does not otherwise impact the costs of environmental restoration, waste management or environmental compliance activities. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the installations in this recommendation has been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to implementation of this recommendation.
RECOMMENDATION FOR REALIGNMENT
NAVAL AIR STATION, BRUNSWICK, MAINE

Recommendation: Realign Naval Air Station Brunswick, ME to a Naval Air Facility and relocate its aircraft along with dedicated personnel, equipment and support to Naval Air Station Jacksonville, FL. Consolidate Aviation Intermediate Maintenance with Fleet Readiness Center Southeast Jacksonville, FL.

Justification: The realignment of Naval Air Station Brunswick will reduce operating costs while single siting the East Coast Maritime Patrol community at Naval Air Station Jacksonville. This recommendation retains an operational airfield in the northeast that can be used to support the homeland defense mission, as needed, and maintains strategic flexibility. The Fleet Readiness Center portion of this recommendation realigns and merges depot and intermediate maintenance activities. It supports both DoD and Naval transformation goals by reducing the number of maintenance levels and streamlining the way maintenance is accomplished with associated significant cost reductions.

Payback: The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is $147.16 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a cost of $112.62 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $34.87 million with a payback expected in 4 years. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $238.77 million.

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 4,266 jobs (2,420 direct jobs and 1,846 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Portland-South Portland-Biddeford ME Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 1.29 percent of economic area employment. The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on this economic region of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.

Community Infrastructure: A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces, and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.

Environmental Impact: Naval Air Station Jacksonville, FL is in Maintenance for Ozone (1-Hour) and no Air Conformity Determination is required. This recommendation has no impact on air quality; cultural, archeological, or tribal resources; dredging; land use constraints or sensitive resource areas; marine mammals, resources or sanctuaries; noise; threatened and endangered species or critical habitat; or water resources; or wetlands. This recommendation indicates impacts of costs at the installations involved, which reported $200 thousand in costs for waste management and environmental compliance. These costs were
included in the payback calculation. This recommendation does not otherwise impact the cost of environmental restoration, waste management, or environmental compliance activities. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the installations in this recommendation has been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to implementation of this recommendation.
ATTACHMENT C-3

RECOMMENDATION FOR CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT

NAVAL AIR STATION, JOINT RESERVE BASE, WILLOW GROVE, PENNSYLVANIA
AND
CAMBRIA REGIONAL AIRPORT, JOHNSTOWN, PENNSYLVANIA

Recommendation: Close Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Willow Grove, PA. Relocate all Navy and Marine Corps squadrons, their aircraft and necessary personnel, equipment and support to McGuire Air Force Base, Cookstown, NJ. Relocate the minimum amount of manpower and equipment to support intermediate maintenance workload and capacity for Tire and Wheel, non-destruction inspections, and Aviation Life Support System equipment to McGuire Air Force Base. Relocate intermediate maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Components, Aircraft Engines, Fabrication & Manufacturing, and Support Equipment to Fleet Readiness Center East, Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, NC. Deactivate the 111th Fighter Wing (Air National Guard) and relocate assigned A-10 aircraft to the 124th Wing (Air National Guard), Boise Air Terminal Air Guard Station, Boise, ID (three primary aircraft authorized); 175th Wing (Air National Guard), Martin State Airport Air Guard Station, Baltimore, MD (three primary aircraft authorized); 127th Wing (Air National Guard), Selfridge Air National Guard Base, Mount Clemens, MI (three primary aircraft authorized) and retired (six primary aircraft authorized). Relocate Armed Forces Reserve Center Expeditionary Combat Support manpower to Eglin Air Force Base, FL. Relocate Co A/228th Aviation to Fort Dix, Trenton, NJ. Relocate Reserve Intelligence Area 16 to Fort Dix. Establish an enclave for the Army Reserve units remaining on or relocating to Willow Grove and the Air National Guard 270th Engineering Installation Squadron. Realign Cambria Regional Airport, Johnstown, PA, by relocating Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 775 Detachment A, to include all required personnel, equipment, and support, to McGuire Air Force Base.

Justification: This recommendation will reduce excess capacity while creating new joint opportunities in the McGuire Air Force Base/Fort Dix/Naval Aviation Engineering Station Lakehurst military concentration area. This recommendation leverages maintenance and operational efficiencies within Marine Corps Reserve Aviation and maintains reserve forces in areas with favorable demographics. Inclusion of the realignment of Cambria Regional Airport in this recommendation allows the assets currently housed there to be collocated with their headquarters at McGuire Air Force Base. The major intermediate maintenance functions are consolidated into a Fleet Readiness Center, which reduces the number of maintenance levels and streamlines the way maintenance is accomplished with associated significant cost reductions.

This recommendation enables Air Force Future Total Force transformation by consolidating the A-10 Fleet at installations of higher military value, and contributes to Army’s establishment of the Northeast Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command.

C-13
The USAF KC-135E model aircraft (16 primary aircraft authorized) at McGuire Air Force Base, NJ, retire. The capacity created by the Air Force force structure retirement of KC-135Es (16 primary aircraft authorized) from McGuire Air Force Base enables the execution of this recommendation.

**Payback:** The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is $126.26 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $134.73 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $60.65 million with a payback expected in two years. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $710.50 million.

**Economic Impact on Communities:** Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1,805 jobs (1,142 direct jobs and 663 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Philadelphia, PA Metropolitan Division, which is 0.08 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 138 jobs (86 direct jobs and 52 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Johnstown, PA Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 0.19 percent of economic area employment.

The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on these economic regions of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.

**Community Infrastructure:** A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces, and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.

**Environmental Impact:** McGuire Air Force Base, NJ is in Severe Non-attainment for Ozone (1-Hour). The Air Force indicates that no Air Conformity Determination is required, but an air permit revision may be required. There are potential impacts for cultural, archeological, tribal resources; noise; waste management; water resources; and wetlands. Fort Dix, NJ is in Severe Non-attainment for Ozone (1-Hour and 8-Hour) and Air Conformity analysis will be required. There are potential impacts to cultural, archeological, tribal resources. Boise Air Terminal Air Guard Station, ID is in Attainment. There are potential impacts to cultural, archeological, tribal resources; and land use constraints or sensitive resource areas. Martin Airport Air Guard Station, MD is in Moderate Non-attainment for Ozone (8-Hour) and an Air Conformity Determination may be required. There are potential impacts to wetlands. For Eglin Air Force Base, FL the Air Force indicates a significant air permit revision may be required. There are potential impacts for cultural, archeological, tribal resources; land use constraints or sensitive resource areas; noise; threatened and endangered species or critical habitat; waste management; water resources; and wetlands. No impacts are anticipated for the resource areas of dredging; marine mammals, resources or sanctuaries. Selfridge Army National Guard Base, MI is in
Marginal Non-attainment for Ozone and an Air Conformity Determination will be required as well as permit revisions. There are potential impacts to cultural, archeological, tribal resources; land use constraints or sensitive resource areas; noise; waste management; and wetlands. No impacts are anticipated for the resource areas of marine mammals, resources, or sanctuaries; and dredging. Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, NC is in Attainment. There are no anticipated impacts for the resource areas of air quality; cultural, archeological, or tribal resources; dredging; land use constraints or sensitive resource areas; marine mammals, resources or sanctuaries; noise; threatened and endangered species or critical habitat; waste management; water resources; or wetlands. This recommendation indicates impacts of costs at the installations involved, which reported $2.5 million in costs for waste management and environmental compliance. These costs were included in the payback calculation. Willow Grove, the closing installation, reports $10.3 million in environmental restoration costs. Because the Department has a legal obligation to perform environmental restoration regardless of whether an installation is closed, realigned, or remains open, this cost is not included in the payback calculation. This recommendation does not otherwise impact the costs of environmental restoration, waste management, or environmental compliance activities. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the installations in this recommendation has been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to implementation of this recommendation.
ATTACHMENT D

DESCRIPTION OF ANALYSIS OF

WEAPONS STATIONS

Weapons Stations have a primary mission of loading and unloading munitions on combatants and Combat Logistics Force ships. In support of this mission, short-term (less than six months) storage for munitions is needed. The Single Manager Conventional Ammunition, an Army command, performs long-term storage of munitions.

The explosive nature of munitions means that facilities involved in their storage and handling must have certified Explosive Safety Quantity Distance arcs. These arcs represent the explosive hazards associated with the amounts of explosive on hand and impose strict limitations on operations within those arcs. Because of the explosive hazards entailed, weapons stations are separated geographically from operational homeports. In the recent past, large combat logistics force ships were homeported at appropriate weapons stations. Manning of these vessels is being switched to civilian crews, so, while the ships still need to be berthed at the weapons stations, there are no longer significant numbers of military crew members requiring the support offered in a homeport. The weapons stations’ mission is primarily performed by a relatively small civilian workforce.

The Munitions and Armaments Subgroup of the Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group performed analyses on munitions maintenance and long-term (“wholesale”) storage, so those functions were not included in this analysis. The Department of the Navy analysis focused on the munitions storage and distribution function as performed at Naval Weapons Stations. This subcategory is composed of four Naval Weapons Stations along with their detachments, two Naval Magazines, the Naval Support Activity at Guam and the Blount Island Command, as follows:

Naval Weapons Station, Seal Beach Detachment, Concord, California
Naval Weapons Station, Seal Beach Detachment, Fallbrook, California
Naval Weapons Station, Seal Beach Detachment, San Diego, California
Naval Weapons Station, Seal Beach, California
Blount Island, Jacksonville, Florida
Naval Magazine, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
Weapons Station, Earle, New Jersey
Weapons Station, Charleston, South Carolina
Weapons Station, Yorktown, Virginia
Naval Magazine, Indian Island, Washington (Port Hadlock)
Naval Support Activity, Guam

The Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group received direction to not include strategic weapons in their analysis. For the sake of consistency, this analysis does not include any strategic weapons facilities. Naval Weapons Station, Seal Beach Detachment, San Diego, CA was excluded at the direction of the Department of the Navy (DON) Analysis Group based on its
small size, entirely military workforce, limited customer base (submarines based at Point Loma), and its having been considered an activity that would follow operational forces if they were relocated.

**Data Call Development**

The Munitions and Armaments Subgroup of the Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group developed the munitions-specific capacity and military value data calls. Munitions-specific capacity questions were written from a wholesale perspective. The Department of the Navy capacity data call included some questions designed to capture the type and volume of weapons stored. Additionally, the capacity data call sought information on specific features and capabilities pertinent to weapons storage and distribution such as the size, capacity and condition of piers, cranes and magazines. The Industrial military value data call placed primary emphasis on storage capability and outload capabilities as well as the numbers of personnel and the cost of running the activity. The Department of the Navy military value data call included standard modules to capture information about base services relevant to quality of life. The combination of Joint Cross-Service Group and Department of the Navy questions provided a full set of data to evaluate Weapons Stations.

**Capacity Analysis**

With the Department of the Navy process, capacity analysis was conducted for both the throughput (loading and unloading) and short-term storage functions. A data call was sent to each Service to solicit their input for requirements for both throughput and storage capacity at the Weapons Stations. Requirements were provided as certified responses from Chief of Naval Operations, Ordnance Programs and Policy Branch, Marine Corps Installations & Logistics, and the Army and Air Force BRAC offices. Requirements for storage were requested in square feet of magazine space and requirements for throughput were couched in terms of the numbers and types of ships that would need to be loaded with munitions during both peacetime and surge. Further questions directed to Chief of Naval Operations, Ordnance Programs and Policy Branch, asked for characteristics of the ships to be loaded that would allow determination of the ability of a given Weapons Station to accommodate that type of ship.

The throughput capacity analysis compared Weapons Stations’ ability to support loading and unloading of munitions onto various types of ships with the surge requirements developed from analyses conducted to support the Fleet Response Plan. The analysis arrayed the ships needing loading with munitions during surge in a given geographic area (East Coast, West Coast, Mid-Pacific and West Pacific) against the piers capable of loading those particular ships. It was noted that two activities in the subcategory, Blount Island Command and Naval Weapons Station, Seal Beach Detachment Concord, support the munitions outload requirements of the Marine Corps and Army respectively. Operation of the Tidal area of Concord is the responsibility of the Army’s Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, a part of the joint U.S. Transportation Command.

The throughput analysis revealed that, during surge, weapons station pier space would be barely adequate to load all the ships needed to support the Fleet Response Plan, i.e., there is no
excess throughput capacity. This is largely driven by the limited number of berths appropriate to load Combat Logistics Force ships. The presence at these piers by combat logistics force ships whose huge munitions load exhausts the net explosive weight allowed by the Explosive Safety Quantity Distance arcs precludes loading smaller ships at those weapons stations, even where more pier space exists.

Because the Army reported their throughput requirements for Concord (and Indian Island) in tons of munitions loaded per week, and no other Service indicated requirements for Concord, Concord’s throughput was analyzed separately from the rest of the subcategory. The figures provided by the Army reveal a surge need to load munitions at a rate that exceeds the combined rates at Concord and Indian Island. The lower range of the Army’s surge throughput requirement appeared to be so much larger than the combined output rate that the calculations suggest railcars of munitions would need to be stored in Concord’s Inland area. The uncertainty in this calculation, coupled with the community’s request for closure of the base, led the DON Analysis Group to request Army participation in the deliberations on the need to retain the Inland magazine field at Concord.

Storage capacity analysis was performed by comparing the maximum storage capability of the Weapons Stations, measured in usable square feet, to the peacetime and surge storage requirements. The total Weapons Station peacetime storage requirement was based on average historical inventory expressed in net explosive weight and multiplied by factors derived from descriptions of typical munitions packaging to determine the volume and square footage based on stacking to six feet high. The surge requirement was identified as the entire non-nuclear ordnance requirement and greatly exceeded the capacity available. Given the uncertainty in ever owning the entire non-nuclear ordnance requirement, a more realistic surge storage requirement was calculated by adding the magazine space needed to store the munitions that would be loaded on the numbers and types of surging ships provided as input to the throughput requirement. For example, throughput requirements showed that two Combat Logistics Force ships would need to be loaded on the East Coast simultaneously. Requirements data provided by the services showed that the largest of this class of ships holds enough ammunition to require 30,000 square feet of magazine space, therefore 60,000 square feet of usable magazine space was construed to be the East Coast surge storage requirement.

In order for the Army to use Concord’s Inland area for temporary storage of munitions-loaded railcars, the magazines must be empty so that the Explosive Safety Quantity Distance arcs are not overloaded. If the Army were to determine that it does not need the Inland area, Department of the Navy would be in a position to consider closure. In either case, the magazines would not be available to store munitions. For this reason, the DON Analysis Group reviewed the storage capacity with and without the magazine space at Concord. Without Concord’s magazine space, the excess storage capacity overall is 16 percent or 486,000 square feet. The DON Analysis Group concluded that sufficient excess storage capacity existed to warrant analysis of Weapons Stations’ military value.
Military Value Analysis

The military value matrix was developed after review of the BRAC 1995 matrix, with modifications based on lessons learned, technical expert perspectives, and matrices already approved by the DON Analysis Group. The military value scoring statements were grouped into five subject areas, covering Storage Capability, Throughput Capability, Strategic Factors, Environment and Encroachment, and Personnel Support.

The Storage Capability statements drew from data call questions concerning the amount of magazine space, its condition and the existence of modern, efficient missile magazines. Throughput Capability was rated in terms of onload rates, characteristics of piers and cranes, and types of ships that can be served. Strategic Factors included rail access, distance to Fleet customers and channel restrictions. Environment and Encroachment focused on expansion potential for munitions functions, dredging and explosives safety issues. The Personnel Support module used by the Surface/Subsurface function was the baseline for Personnel Support statements, though those questions most relevant to a large military population were omitted due to the civilian nature of the workforce.

The military value scores ranged from 24.45 to 62.60 with an average military value for this category of 41.40. Fallbrook scored the lowest because of its lack of waterfront property, while Earle was highest because of its high throughput, unconstrained access waterfront and historical legacy of personnel support facilities.

Configuration Analysis

Since the DON Analysis Group decided that there was no excess throughput capacity, a focused review was conducted to examine the possibility of eliminating excess storage capacity. Satellite imagery of the bases was examined to see if there were clear, severable sections of magazine fields that could be closed. Except for Concord, whose capacity was already excluded from this analysis, no other base had such non-contiguous magazine fields. It was noted that maintenance of magazine fields is relatively inexpensive, so retaining excess does not entail significant costs and provides some insurance against unforeseen requirements.

Because of its low military value, closure of Fallbrook was reviewed as a way to eliminate some excess storage capacity. The DON Analysis Group examined the feasibility of performing Fallbrook’s mission of loading large-deck amphibious ships at another West Coast location. Since the ships to be loaded are homeported in San Diego, transit to Indian Island was considered to impact the ability for timely out loading of these ships. Additionally, the throughput analysis indicated other ships would otherwise occupy those piers during surge operations.

Seal Beach was also reviewed as an option to load these ships. Large-deck amphibious ships are too large to get to Seal Beach’s pier, so they would need to be vertically replenished, i.e., loaded by helicopter, which is the manner of their loading by Fallbrook. The DON Analysis Group examined the operational feasibility of Seal Beach vertically replenishing the large-deck amphibious ships, by reviewing whether the characteristics of the landing zone used by
Fallbrook could be sited at Seal Beach. Seal Beach is a small (less than two miles square) activity nearly completely covered by its own Explosive Safety Quantity Distance arcs. Fitting the landing zone’s Explosive Safety Quantity Distance arc into Seal Beach appears to be impossible, especially in light of the close, urban neighbors. Additionally, vertical replenishment operations would entail flying munitions suspended below helicopters over a busy commercial harbor. The DON Analysis Group weighed the information presented and determined that they would not recommend closure of any entire weapons station.

There remained a desire to reduce excess storage capacity. Concord’s magazine field in the Inland area had been identified as the only severable storage capacity. Department of the Navy analysis of the potential need to utilize the Inland area to temporarily hold munitions-laden railcars during surge operations did not provide a clear cut reason to retain this property, so input from U.S. Transportation Command was sought. Their statement that there was no DoD requirement for the Inland area allowed the DON Analysis Group to conclude that a closure of this area should be considered.

**Scenario Development and Analysis**

A scenario closing the Inland area of Concord and realigning the rest of the activity to provide support to Tidal area operations was released. Responses indicated that presence of Explosive Safety Quantity Distance arcs and wetlands in the Tidal area did not allow enough room to replicate the maintenance and administrative buildings needed to support Tidal area operations. Consequently, the activity was permitted to propose using the small portion of the Inland area closest to the Tidal area (just across from the entrance, adjacent to the pass office) for building the facilities required.

The data provided showed recurring savings based on shutdown of facilities and one-time costs associated with building facilities that were previously located in the Inland area. There were no recurring costs in the implementation period nor one-time savings. It was noted that development of the land after closure will need to be compatible with the nature of operations in the Tidal area as well as the presence of a number of environmental issues. Operations in the Tidal area are the responsibility of the Army; so closure of the Inland area would leave no Department of the Navy mission at Concord. With no anticipated job loss and the request by the City of Concord to close the activity, the DON Analysis Group recommended taking forward the recommendation to close the bulk of the Inland area Concord and transfer the remaining property to the Army.

**Conclusion**

Weapons Stations were analyzed for munitions throughput and munitions storage. The analysis showed no excess capacity for munitions throughput, and showed excess capacity for storage. With the closure of Concord's Inland area, excess storage capacity was 16 percent. Closure of any Weapons Station to eliminate further storage capacity would result in a shortfall in the munitions throughput capacity, since no other Weapons Stations have capacity to absorb the munitions throughput requirement. The analysis confirmed that Department of the Navy Weapons Stations are geographically located to support their
mission of loading munitions ships and there is no excess in capacity to perform the loading portion of their mission. Consequently, Department of the Navy leadership determined that there was insufficient capacity to warrant further analysis of any closures or realignments in the Weapons Stations.
ATTACHMENT D-1

RECOMMENDATION FOR CLOSURE

NAVAL WEAPONS STATION SEAL BEACH DETACHMENT, CONCORD, CALIFORNIA

Recommendation: Close the Inland area of Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach Detachment, Concord CA, except retain such property and facilities as are necessary to support operations in the Tidal area of Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach Detachment Concord. The Tidal area of Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach Detachment Concord, along with the retained portion of the Inland area, shall be transferred to the Army.

Justification: While Department of the Navy weapons stations have no excess capacity for loading and distribution of munitions, there is an excess of munitions storage capacity. Because of the departure of Fleet units from the San Francisco area in the 1990s, Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach Detachment Concord’s Inland magazine field has been in a reduced operating status since 1999. At that time, the Inland area was retained in an effort to minimize risk should a future need develop to expand storage capacity. The Explosive Safety Quantity Distance arcs in the Inland area were available to allow safe, temporary holding of railcars with munitions destined for loading by the Army-managed Marine Ocean Terminal Concord (at the Tidal area) during high tempo operations. After consultation with Combatant Commanders, the Army Material Command and the Army component of the U.S. Transportation Command, the Department of the Navy has concluded this capability is no longer necessary. The Inland area is excess to Department of the Navy/DoD needs and is severable. The closure of the Inland area, therefore, will save money and have no impact on mission capability.

The City of Concord requested closure of both the Inland and Tidal portions of Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach Detachment Concord. Munitions loading requirements preclude closing the Tidal area but the Inland area is excess and may be closed. Because Tidal area operations are in support of the Army component of the U.S. Transportation Command, transfer of the property to the Army aligns the property holder with the property user.

Payback: The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is $13.95 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $43.24 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $16.39 million with a payback expected in one year. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $199.72 million.

Economic Impact on Communities: This recommendation will not result in any job reductions (direct or indirect) over the 2006-2011 period in the Oakland-Fremont-Hayward, CA Metropolitan Division economic area. The aggregate economic impact of all
recommended actions on this economic region of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.

**Community Infrastructure:** A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces, and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.

**Environmental Impact:** Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach Detachment Concord, CA is in Extreme Non-attainment for Ozone (1-Hour) but no Air Conformity Determination will be required. There are potential impacts for cultural, archeological, or tribal resources; threatened and endangered species or critical habitat; and wetlands that may impact new construction. No impacts are anticipated for dredging, land use constraints or sensitive resource areas; marine mammals, resources, or sanctuaries; noise; waste management or water resources. This recommendation indicates impacts of costs at the installation involved, which indicated $250 thousand in costs for waste management and environmental compliance. These costs were included in the payback calculation. This recommendation does not otherwise impact the costs of environmental restoration, waste management, or environmental compliance activities. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the installations in this recommendation has been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to implementation of this recommendation.
ATTACHMENT E

DESCRIPTION OF ANALYSIS OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY SERVICE SPECIFIC EDUCATION AND TRAINING FUNCTIONS

The Department of the Navy was responsible for the analysis of institutional education and training functions deemed to be Service specific and not within the Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group scope of analysis. The Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group was responsible for the analysis of active component/reserve component education and training institutions, Defense Agency schools, and civilian institutions, with the exceptions of healthcare and intelligence professionals’ education and training, which were covered by the Medical and Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Groups, respectively. The Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group was organized into four subgroups: Flight Training, Professional Development Education, Specialized Skill Training, and Ranges and Collective Training Capability. The Department of the Navy identified the Service specific Education and Training functions not under the Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group purview and categorized them into four sub-functions characterized by the types of training supported: Graduate Level Flight Training, Recruit Training, Officer Accession Training, and Professional Military Education. Analysis of Recruit Training, Officer Accession Training, and Professional Military Education are included in this section. Graduate Level Flight Training requirements were included in the Aviation Operations function and thus subsumed in the Aviation Operations analysis covered in Attachment C of this report.

Recruit Training

The scope of analysis for Department of the Navy Recruit Training included all Department of the Navy activities and processes that support the Recruit Training Function, including Navy Recruit Training, Marine Corps Recruit Training and Marine Combat Training. Department of the Navy Recruit Training is conducted at the following five Department of the Navy activities or schools:

- Naval Recruit Training Command, Great Lakes, Illinois
  (excluding Recruit Division Commander School)
- Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, South Carolina
  (Recruit Training course only)
- Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, California
  (Recruit Training course only)
- Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, Jacksonville, North Carolina
  (Marine Combat Training course only)
- Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, Oceanside, California
  (Marine Combat Training course only)
The three Recruit Training activities provide the basic indoctrination into their respective military service for enlisted inductees. The eight-week Navy Recruit Training course is conducted at a single site. The 12-week Marine Recruit Training course is conducted at two sites, one on each coast. Due to firing range and field space limitations at Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego, West Coast recruits spend four of the 12 weeks at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton.

Marine “boot camp” graduates from Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island continue their follow-on training at the School of Infantry, Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune and graduates from Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego continue their follow-on training at the School of Infantry, Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton. Approximately 60 percent of Marine boot camp graduates attend Marine Combat Training, a three-week course conducted by the School of Infantry at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune and Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton. Marine Combat Training trains non-infantry Marines (i.e., Marines not assigned to a combat arms military occupational skill), in the infantry skills essential to operate in a combat environment.

**Officer Accession Training**

The scope of analysis for Department of the Navy Officer Accession Training included all Department of the Navy activities and processes that support the Officer Accession Training function, including U.S. Naval Academy, Naval Academy Preparatory School, Officer Candidate School, Officer Indoctrination School, Seaman-To-Admiral/Broadened Opportunity for Officer Selection and Training, Naval Science Institute, Basic Officer Leadership for Limited Duty Officer/Chief Warrant Officer Indoctrination, Direct Commission Officer Indoctrination, and The Basic School. Department of the Navy Officer Accession Training is conducted at the following five Department of the Navy activities or schools:

- U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland
- Naval Academy Preparatory School, Newport, Rhode Island
- Officer Training Command, Newport, Rhode Island
  (excluding Chaplain School and other Initial Skills, Skills Progression, and Functional Training courses)
- Officer Training Command, Pensacola, Florida
- Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia
  (The Basic School and Officer Candidate School course only)

The five activities that conduct Officer Accession Training are not collocated at Fleet concentration areas and do not rely on other military activities to complete their mission. Their course offerings are frequently of longer duration requiring temporary additional duty orders. The U.S. Naval Academy grants bachelor degrees along with officer commissions to its graduates and is the only Department of the Navy unique degree granting institution included in this function.
Professional Military Education

The scope of analysis for Department of the Navy specific Professional Military Education included all Department of the Navy activities and processes that support the Department of the Navy specific Professional Military Education function, including the Marine Corps Senior Non-Commissioned Officer Academy, Navy Command Leadership School, and Navy Senior Enlisted Academy. Department of the Navy specific Professional Military Education is conducted at the following seven Department of the Navy activities or schools:

- Marine Air Ground Task Force Training Command, Twentynine Palms, California
  (Sergeant’s Course only)
- Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina
  (Sergeant’s Course, Career Course, and Advanced Course only)
- Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California
  (Sergeant’s Course, Career Course, and Advanced Course only)
- Marine Corps Base, Hawaii (Kaneohe Bay)
  (Sergeant’s Course only)
- Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia
  (Senior Non-Commissioned Officer Academy, Expeditionary Warfare School, and Commander Program courses only)
- Command Leadership School, Newport, Rhode Island
- Senior Enlisted Academy, Newport, Rhode Island

The seven activities conducting Professional Military Education primarily provide short duration courses to enlisted personnel. The Marine Corps Senior Non-Commissioned Officer Academy courses include the seven-week Sergeant’s, Career, and Advanced Courses. The Navy Command Leadership School includes the two-week Command Leadership Course, one-week Command Spouse Leadership Course, and two-week Executive Officer Course. The Senior Enlisted Academy includes the six-week Senior Enlisted Academy Course and two-week Command Master Chief/Chief of the Boat Course.

Data Call Development

The data calls used in the BRAC 1995 process, supplemented by lessons learned, formed the starting point for BRAC 2005 capacity and military value data call development. The capacity data call was designed to capture specific features and capabilities of each training activity, including manpower factors, physical space available for expansion and support, facility and equipment characteristics, and contingency and mobilization features. Data generally was requested for the current period through FY 2009. Maximum capacity was determined by student throughput, tied to objective facility capabilities. The annual course throughput and average-on-board student populations for FY 2003 were used to define requirements. In contrast to the BRAC 1995 analysis, which utilized “facilities usage” to measure training capacity, the BRAC 2005 capacity data utilized classroom square footage, billeting (number of beds), and messing (number of students fed) required to
accomplish the Department of the Navy specific training missions to measure training capacity.

The military value data call emphasized the types of training actually performed at the activities, student throughput, impacts of specific location on mission accomplishment, unique capabilities, facilities and/or equipment that added value to each mission area, and alternatives that existed to obtain training or support elsewhere. Questions concerning historic and planned capital improvements were included to capture base infrastructure and investment information. Other military value questions addressed availability and condition of land, environmental issues, contingency and mobilization features, and weather impact on operations. A standard set of quality of life questions was developed and used for the three functions.

**Capacity Analysis**

The capacity analysis methodology was developed after review of both the BRAC 1995 Department of the Navy methodology and the BRAC 2005 Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group methodology, and included modifications based on Department of the Navy specific training requirements. Future requirements for Department of the Navy specific training were extrapolated based on Department of the Navy active component end-strength projections for FY 2024, that indicated a 7.6 percent Navy end-strength reduction and a 3.4 percent Marine end-strength increase.

The capacity measures for Department of the Navy specific Education and Training functions were academic classroom space, billeting, and messing. These capacity measures were tailored to best capture the type of training conducted by the 17 Department of the Navy specific training activities, e.g., the classroom square footage requirement was computed using the Facility Planning Criteria for Navy and Marine Corps Shore Installations (NAVFAC P-80) Average-On-Board method design standard. In general, capacity was determined by the amount of academic classroom space (number of classrooms and associated square footage), billeting (number of beds), and messing (number of students fed) available at each activity. Academic classroom capacity is defined in terms of building design capacity (in square feet), computed using the methodology described in Facility Planning Criteria for Navy and Marine Corps Shore Installations (NAVFAC P-80), “Training Facilities.” This approach accounts for the number and configuration of classroom instruction spaces. The size of required dedicated classroom training space was determined by using a detailed description of the certified reported syllabi for Department of the Navy specific Education and Training courses, as a function of student throughput. This approach summed the training space (square feet) required for all events to meet the planned throughput requirement and compared it with the available training space. For each course of instruction, the capacity analysis compared the maximum available classroom space against the FY 2003 peak monthly average-on-board student population for current usage requirement and against the FY 2024 projected Force Structure Plan for future usage requirement.
Recruit Training

The capacity measures for Department of the Navy specific Recruit Training are academic classroom space, billeting, and messing. In general, capacity was determined by the amount of academic classroom space (number of classrooms and associated square footage), billeting capacity (number of beds), and messing capacity (number of students fed) available at each Recruit Training activity.

Recruit Training at all five activities experiences a marked annual peak. Since Recruit Training exhibits seasonal variation, capacity requirements were determined using historical monthly peaks, resulting in a built-in surge capacity across the non-peak months. This built-in surge capacity, along with the ability to add instructors or training days, accelerate, truncate or cancel courses to accommodate student production surge, eliminated the need to factor in a separate surge capacity. The capacity analysis compared maximum capacity against the peak loading FY 2003 monthly requirement. Comparison of the number of recruits to be trained on an annual basis with the capacity measures identified whether or not excess capacity existed for the Recruit Training function.

Using peak capacity as the requirement, the analysis of academic classroom space conducted at the five activities indicated insufficient academic classroom capacity at three activities and excess classroom capacity at two facilities ranging from 9 percent to 15 percent. Overall, there is no excess academic classroom capacity for the Recruit Training function. Analysis of billeting and messing capacities was limited to the three activities performing basic recruit military training, i.e., Naval Recruit Training Command and the two Marine Corps Recruit Depots. The results for billeting capacity indicated excess capacity ranging from 15 percent to 22 percent at two of the three activities, and a slight deficit at the third resulting in an overall excess of 13 percent for the function. Results for messing capacity indicated excess capacity at all three activities, ranging from 21 percent to 27 percent, with an overall excess of 25 percent for the function.

Officer Accession Training

The capacity measure for Department of the Navy specific Officer Accession Training is academic classroom space for Officer Training Command Newport, Officer Training Command Pensacola, and Marine Corps Base Quantico (The Basic School and Officer Candidate School). In general, capacity was determined by the amount of academic classroom space available at each activity conducting Officer Accession Training (number of classrooms and associated square footage). In addition to academic classroom space described above, billeting and messing were also used as capacity measures for U.S. Naval Academy and Naval Academy Preparatory School.

Officer Accession Training at four of the five activities experiences a marked annual peak. Since Officer Accession Training exhibits seasonal variation, capacity requirements were determined using historical monthly peaks, resulting in a built-in surge capacity across the non-peak months. This built-in surge capacity, along with the ability to add instructors or training days, accelerate, truncate or cancel courses to accommodate student production
surge, eliminated the need to factor in a separate surge capacity. The capacity analysis compared maximum capacity against the peak loading FY 2003 monthly requirement. Comparison of the number of officers/officer candidates to be trained on an annual basis with the capacity measures identified whether or not excess capacity existed for the Officer Accession Training function.

The analysis of academic classroom space conducted at the five activities indicated no excess capacity at one activity and excess capacity ranging from 24 percent to 82 percent at four activities. The overall academic classroom space excess capacity for the Officer Accession Training function was 34 percent. Analysis of billeting and messing capacities was limited to U.S. Naval Academy and Naval Academy Preparatory School. The results for billeting capacity indicated excess capacity at both activities, ranging from eight percent to 14 percent, with an overall excess of 14 percent. The analysis of messing capacity was limited to U.S. Naval Academy and indicated excess messing capacity of 12 percent.

Professional Military Education

The capacity measure for Department of the Navy specific Professional Military Education is academic classroom space. In general, capacity was determined by the amount of academic classroom space available at each activity conducting Professional Military Education (number of classrooms and associated square footage).

Professional Military Education at five of the seven activities experience a marked annual peak. Since Professional Military Education exhibits seasonal variation, capacity requirements were determined using historical monthly peaks, resulting in a built-in surge capacity across the non-peak months. This built-in surge capacity, along with the ability to add instructors or training days, accelerate, truncate or cancel courses to accommodate student production surge, eliminated the need to factor in a separate surge capacity. The capacity analysis compared maximum capacity against the peak loading FY 2003 monthly requirement. Comparison of the number of students to be trained on an annual basis with the capacity measures identified whether or not excess capacity existed for the Department of the Navy specific Professional Military Education function.

Analysis of academic classroom space indicated that all seven activities have excess capacity, ranging from 17 percent to 84 percent, with an overall excess of 44 percent for the function.

Review of the capacity analysis for Professional Military Education activities revealed that, while measures of academic classroom space are useful in determining course and facility requirements on an individual bases, it is difficult to draw meaningful conclusions about excess classroom capacity as a collective whole. Classroom space by its very nature is often used for a variety of instructional purposes. Classroom space is also a commodity that needs to be available at many locations to support training requirements, if it is to be cost effective, but the utilization of the space is not full-time. Therefore, methods of calculating classroom capacity will usually result in significant excess, particularly when comparing availability to utilization.
Military Value Analysis

The military value matrix was developed after review of the BRAC 2005 Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group matrices, with modifications based on technical expert input, tailoring for Department of the Navy specific activities, and matrices previously approved by the Infrastructure Evaluation Group. The military value questions were grouped into five attribute areas, covering Training Infrastructure, Location, Personnel Support, Ability to Support Other Missions, and Environmental and Encroachment. Primary emphasis was placed on student throughput, classrooms, and training facilities on larger facilities and training centralization. Training centralization refers to the degree to which the installation has the required training facilities to complete their training mission(s) and the percentage of students needing cost orders to attend. Personnel Support was valued similarly to other Department of the Navy functions.

Recruit Training

The highest value accrued to those activities with larger facilities and a higher degree of training centralization. The military value scores ranged from 34.53 to 77.14, with 53.27 the overall average military value.

Officer Accession Training

The highest value accrued to those activities with larger facilities and a higher degree of training centralization. The military value scores ranged from 51.13 to 66.95, with 55.91 the overall average military value.

Professional Military Education

The highest value accrued to those activities with larger facilities and a higher degree of training centralization. The military value scores ranged from 34.83 to 59.30, with 52.12 the overall average military value.

Configuration Analysis

The configuration analysis methodology was based upon the mathematical logic of the optimization model designed for BRAC 2005. The optimization model methodology was intended to generate alternative configurations for existing infrastructure, i.e., develop solutions that minimize excess capacity, while meeting the 20-year Force Structure Plan requirements. Notionally, the model finds the configuration (among all possible combinations satisfying imposed requirements) that best meets the decision maker’s goals. The model was designed for analysis of multiple installations or activities, and the resulting number of alternatives generated by the model can be large. Since Department of the Navy specific education and training did not have large numbers of installations and activities to analyze, it was possible to conduct the configuration analysis manually using the optimization model logic.
The capacity parameters utilized in the configuration analysis were consistent with those applied in the capacity analysis, (e.g., academic classroom space, billeting, and messing availability). An additional parameter utilized was the available “buildable acres” present at a given installation. This parameter was critical for determination of expandability at a given installation in light of explored alternatives. Use of these parameters in the configuration analysis defined the acceptable configurations for consolidation or realignment of the current infrastructure.

The configuration analysis identified the best, second best, and third best solution sets. Sensitivity analysis was then conducted to illustrate the effect when requirements are increased by ten and 20 percent and decreased by ten percent, which allowed the decision makers to see the potential impacts of surge. Configuration analysis was conducted separately for each of the three Department of the Navy specific education and training functions: Recruit Training, Officer Accession Training, and Professional Military Education. The analysis highlighted different features and produced different potential configurations of activities and functions as solutions for each function. In some cases, decision makers were provided with solutions that indicated only one feasible option based on the capacity and military value analysis. In other cases, more than one configuration was possible by examining the situation from different perspectives.

**Recruit Training Activities**

The initial solution output from the configuration model closed no Recruit Training activities, despite the presence of excess capacity for billeting and messing. There were no feasible second or third options. The sensitivity analysis demonstrated that increasing the requirement necessitated all sites to remain open. Only when requirements were decreased ten percent did the model suggest closure of one of the two Marine Corps Recruit Depots.

**Officer Accession Training**

The initial solution output from the configuration model provided four options, two of which were constrained due to the lack of excess capacity at Naval Air Station Pensacola, FL and the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD. The sensitivity analysis demonstrated that increasing the requirement did not significantly affect the possible options. In addition, the analysis was able to portray that capacity limitations could be offset by buildable acres if scenario configurations so dictated. Marine Corps Officer Accession Training was not affected by variations in requirements or sensitivity analyses since all Marine Corps Officer Accession Training is already performed at a single site (Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA).

**Professional Military Education**

The initial solution output from the configuration model closed no Professional Military Education activities. Since Navy Professional Military Education is already single-sited, the only feasible options for Navy Professional Military Education were to consolidate it with either Navy Recruit Training or Navy Officer Accession Training at another location. Sensitivity analysis increasing or decreasing the requirement did not produce any effects for
these options. Similarly, configuration analysis of Marine Corps Professional Military Education, including sensitivity analysis decreasing the requirements, did not produce any viable solutions or options. This was due to the small student throughput at each Marine Corps Professional Military Education location, the close proximity of existing Professional Military Education to operational forces (pool of students), and the increased travel/housing costs that would result if Marine Corps Professional Military Education were consolidated at fewer sites.

**Scenario Development and Analysis**

The results of the configuration analyses provided the Department of the Navy (DON) Analysis Group with a starting point for deliberations leading to scenario development.

**Recruit Training**

Navy Recruit Training was consolidated at a single site by BRAC 1993 actions and thus no further consolidation is possible. However, configuration analysis results indicated that, while the two Marine Corps Recruit Depots lacked sufficient current excess capacity to consolidate Marine Corps Recruit Training at a single site, sufficient buildable acres exist to expand capacity through new construction. A scenario data call was issued to the Marine Corps Recruit Depots to determine whether efficiencies and cost savings could occur if all Marine Recruit Training was consolidated at a single activity. Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island was designated as the potential consolidation site because Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island has greater excess billeting capacity and buildable acres than Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego. Additionally, the Infrastructure Evaluation Group considered issuing scenarios consolidating Marine Recruit Training at an operational base, but applied military judgment in determining that recruit training and operational unit basing and training should not be collocated.

COBRA analysis was conducted on the scenario data call consolidating the Marine Corps Recruit Depots at a single site. The Infrastructure Evaluation Group’s review of the scenario data call responses and COBRA analysis indicated that consolidating the Marine Corps Recruit Depots at a single site would incur substantial one-time and recurring costs, including significant new construction and creation of additional support infrastructure, while producing only minimal training benefits. Retention of two Marine Corps Recruit Depots is considered necessary to accommodate surge and increased operational tempo in light of the field-based nature of the Marine Corps recruit training syllabus and the projected increase in Marine Corps end strength. Accordingly, the Infrastructure Evaluation Group determined it would not recommend the closure of either of the two Marine Corps Recruit Depots.

**Officer Accession Training**

The results of the configuration analysis provided the DON Analysis Group with a starting point for deliberations leading to scenario development. Since Marine Corps Officer Accession Training is currently performed at a single site, no further consolidation is
possible. However, the results of the configuration analysis indicated the possibility of consolidating the two Navy Officer Training Commands and relocating with Naval Academy Preparatory School at a single site. Scenario data calls were issued to the Officer Training Commands and Naval Academy Preparatory School to determine whether efficiencies and cost savings could occur if these Officer Accession Training functions were consolidated/relocated at a single site. Naval Station Newport RI, Naval Air Station Pensacola FL, and Naval Station Great Lakes IL were designated as potential consolidation sites based on configuration analysis. Additionally, a scenario data call was issued to the U.S. Naval Academy and Naval Academy Preparatory School to determine if collocation of U.S. Naval Academy and Naval Academy Preparatory School at Naval Station Annapolis MD would produce efficiencies and cost savings.

COBRA analysis was conducted on each of the scenario data calls. Additionally, COBRA analysis was conducted using data subsets from two of the scenarios reflecting consolidation of the Officer Training Commands at a single site while leaving Naval Academy Preparatory School at its current location and relocating Naval Academy Preparatory School independently of the Officer Training Commands. Review by the Infrastructure Evaluation Group of the scenario data call responses and COBRA analysis indicated that consolidating the Officer Training Commands and relocating Naval Academy Preparatory School at Naval Air Station Pensacola or Naval Station Great Lakes, consolidating the Officer Training Commands at Naval Air Station Pensacola or Naval Station Great Lakes, and relocation of Naval Academy Preparatory School to Naval Air Station Pensacola, Naval Station Great Lakes or Naval Station Annapolis would incur substantial one-time and recurring costs including significant new construction and/or rehabilitation and creation of additional support infrastructure. However, analysis of consolidating the Officer Training Commands at Naval Station Newport indicated that significant savings could be achieved with minimal one-time and recurring costs while gaining training efficiencies. Additionally, analysis indicated that the greatest degree of training efficiency would be achieved by consolidating the Officer Training Commands at Naval Station Great Lakes due to additional billet eliminations made possible by potential synergies between the Officer Training Commands and the Recruit Training Command at Naval Station Great Lakes. The Infrastructure Evaluation Group determined that further analysis should be conducted on consolidating the Officer Training Commands at Naval Station Newport and Naval Station Great Lakes.

Economic impact, community infrastructure, and environmental impact analyses were conducted on scenarios consolidating the Officer Training Commands at Naval Station Newport and Naval Station Great Lakes. Review by the Infrastructure Evaluation Group of these analyses determined that there were no substantial economic, community infrastructure, or environmental issues affecting these scenarios.

The Infrastructure Evaluation Group determined that while consolidation of the Officer Training Commands at Naval Station Great Lakes would yield the greatest training efficiencies in terms of billets eliminated, the substantial costs and lack of net savings over a 20-year payback period made this scenario cost prohibitive. Consolidation of the Officer Training Commands at Naval Station Newport would achieve nine fewer billet eliminations
than consolidation at Naval Station Great Lakes, but could be implemented at minimal cost and achieve net savings in two years. Accordingly, the Infrastructure Evaluation Group determined it would recommend consolidation of the Officer Training Commands at Naval Station Newport.

Professional Military Education

Since configuration analysis indicated that there were no options capable of producing cost savings or training efficiencies for the Department of the Navy specific Professional Military Education function, the Infrastructure Evaluation Group determined that neither consolidation nor relocation of Department of the Navy specific Professional Military Education functions could be supported. Therefore, no scenarios affecting Department of the Navy specific Professional Military Education were developed.

Conclusion

Analysis of the limited number of Department of the Navy specific Education and Training activities demonstrated that the current configuration allows for operational and educational flexibility. Since capacity requirements were determined using historical monthly peaks, resulting in built-in surge capacity across the non-peak months, there was no need to factor in a separate surge capacity. While excess capacity exists, it is either located in support facilities (billeting and messing) or consists of classroom space at multi functional bases that does not lend itself to closure.

Recruit Training

Although Department of the Navy Recruit Training activities generally showed excess capacity for billeting and messing facilities, either mission requirements or excessive infrastructure costs to replicate facilities did not permit further consolidations within the Department of the Navy Recruit Training community.

Officer Accession Training

Marine Corps Officer Accession Training is already single sited at Marine Corps Base Quantico and thus no further consolidation is possible. Based on the analysis of the various Navy Officer Accession Training scenarios involving Naval Academy Preparatory School and the Officer Training Commands, the Infrastructure Evaluation Group determined that consolidation of the Officer Training Commands at Naval Station Newport presented the most cost-effective solution to achieve efficiencies. The consolidation of the Officer Training Commands at Newport enables a reduction in excess capacity at Department of the Navy Officer Accession Training sites, and reduction in the number of sites from four to three: Naval Station Newport, Naval Station Annapolis, and Marine Corps Base Quantico.
Professional Military Education

Although Department of the Navy specific Professional Military Education activities generally showed excess classroom capacity, it was determined that the associated courses were sized and sited appropriately to their target populations. The Navy’s Command Leadership School and Senior Enlisted Academy are already collocated at Naval Station Newport. The Marine Corps Senior Non-Commissioned Officer Academy courses are conducted at one training and four operational sites; however, consolidating them to a lower number of sites would detract from the benefits of their current close proximity to the student populations. As a result, no scenarios were developed for Department of the Navy specific Professional Military Education.
ATTACHMENT E-1

RECOMMENDATION FOR REALIGNMENT

OFFICER TRAINING COMMAND, PENSACOLA, FLORIDA

Recommendation:  Realign Naval Air Station Pensacola, FL by relocating Officer Training Command Pensacola, FL to Naval Station Newport, RI and consolidating with Officer Training Command Newport, RI.

Justification:  Navy Officer Accession Training is currently conducted at three installations: (1) U.S. Naval Academy Annapolis, MD hosts Midshipman Training; (2) Naval Station Newport hosts Naval Academy Preparatory School and Officer Training Command Newport, which includes Officer Indoctrination School and Seaman to Admiral-21 Program courses; and (3) Naval Air Station Pensacola hosts Officer Training Command Pensacola which includes Navy Officer Candidate School, Limited Duty Officer Course, Chief Warrant Officer Course, and the Direct Commissioning Program. Consolidation of Officer Training Command Pensacola and Officer Training Command Newport will reduce inefficiencies inherent in maintaining two sites for similar training courses through reductions in facilities requirements, personnel requirements (including administrative and instructional staff), and excess capacity. This action also supports the Department of the Navy initiative to create a center for officer training at Naval Station Newport.

Payback:  The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is $3.57 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $1.38 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $0.91 million with a payback expected in 4 years. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $10.0 million.

Economic Impact on Communities:  Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 675 jobs (295 direct jobs and 380 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Pensacola-Ferry Pass-Brent, FL Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 0.32 percent of economic area employment. The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on this economic region of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.

Community Infrastructure:  A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces, and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.

Environmental Impact:  Naval Station Newport, RI is in Serious Non-attainment for Ozone (1-Hour) and in Moderate Non-attainment for Ozone (8-Hour) but no Air Conformity Determination will be required. No impacts are anticipated for air quality; cultural, archeological, or tribal resources; dredging; land use constraints or sensitive resource areas;
marine mammals, resources, or sanctuaries; noise; threatened and endangered species or critical habitat; waste management; water resources; or wetlands. This recommendation does not impact the costs of environmental restoration, waste management, or environmental compliance activities. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the installations in this recommendation has been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to implementation of this recommendation.
ATTACHMENT F

DESCRIPTION OF ANALYSIS OF

RESERVE ACTIVITIES

One hundred ninety-six Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Centers were evaluated. These centers were broken down into three categories, based on mission commonality, as follows:

**Navy Reserve Centers.** One hundred fifty-two installations were analyzed in the general category of Navy Reserve Centers. Included in this group were Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Centers, Navy Reserve Centers, Navy Reserve Facilities, and Navy Reserve Activities at Armed Forces Reserve Centers. The general mission of these installations is to provide trained units and qualified individuals for active duty in time of war or national emergency and at such times as the national security requires. The centers provide classrooms, audiovisual equipment, library resources, and qualified instructors to assist in training Reservists. Reserve Center active duty personnel provide maintenance and updates of Reservists’ service records, provide manpower and personnel computer updates, identification cards and benefit qualification resources for Reservists, as well as family member support during time of mobilization. In addition, the centers provide maintenance and updates of Reservists’ medical and dental records, physicals, human immunodeficiency virus testing, and physical readiness testing. The center support staff also provides the logistical needs of drilling Reservists such as berthing, meals, and uniforms.

**Marine Corps Reserve Centers.** Thirty-four installations were analyzed in the general category of Marine Corps Reserve Centers. The general mission of these operations is to provide trained units and qualified individuals for active duty in time of war or national emergency and at such times as the national security requires. The centers provide equipment storage, armories, limited classroom space, and large parking lots for heavy assault equipment including artillery and heavy-duty transport equipment. Unlike Navy Reserve Centers, the major portion of Marine Corps Reserve training is conducted in outdoor, combat-like field activities and on firing ranges. Similar to the Navy Reserve Center personnel, Marine Corps active duty personnel provide maintenance and updates of Reservists’ service records, provide manpower and personnel computer updates, identification cards, and benefit qualification resources for Reservists, as well as family member support during time of mobilization. The center support staff also provides the logistical needs of drilling Reservists such as berthing, meals, and uniforms.

**Naval Air Reserve Centers.** Ten Naval Air Reserve Centers were analyzed in this category of reserve centers. The general mission of the Naval Air Reserve operations is to provide aircrew and aviation technical training ground instructors, classrooms and maintenance operations required for training equipment and devices for both tenant and reserve aviation units and squadrons. The Air Reserve Centers train all assigned units for their mobilization assignments and provide administrative coordination and logistics support to Naval Air Reserve units in the local area. Many of these operations also provide support to the assigned Marine Air Groups and Marine Corps (Wing) Reserve Units assigned to the facilities.
Data Call Development

After review of the BRAC 1995 data calls, the capacity data call was developed to capture specific features and capabilities of each reserve center, including manpower, physical space, facility characteristics, and number of weekends the drill center was utilized per month. Data was generally requested for the current period through 2011. The military value data call placed emphasis on the size of the reserve center’s drilling population, demographics as applied to size of local population and reserve center density, proximity to required training facilities, set-off distances from fencelines, and facilities and operational costs. A standard set of quality of life questions also was developed and used for all reserve centers. In developing these data calls, the Department of the Navy conferred with both the Navy and Marine Corps reserve component headquarters. Both headquarters have conducted extensive reviews over the last two years to identify what reserve centers were optimal for reserve component mission and demographic support. Data call development used these reviews to ensure the Department of the Navy BRAC process focused on the appropriate factors.

Using these measures, the capacity and military value data calls were constructed to measure current facility utilization by reserve centers and the expected future requirements for those facilities in 20 years. The assumption of capacity requirements for each reserve center was based on the Facility Planning Criteria for Navy and Marine Corps Shore Installations (NAVFAC P-80).

Capacity Analysis

The capacity analysis methodology was developed after review of both the BRAC 1995 Department of the Navy methodology and the BRAC 2005 Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group methodology, and included modifications based on Department of the Navy unique training requirements. Future requirements for Department of the Navy unique training were extrapolated based on Department of the Navy Reserve Component end-strength projections for fiscal year 2024. The extrapolations were based on a 16.4 percent Navy Reserve end-strength reduction and an unchanged Marine Corps Reserve end-strength.

The total existing capacity was determined by summing up all the existing inventory of reserve training and administration facilities reported in the capacity data call. Next, the facility requirement was determined individually for each reserve center using the Facility Planning Criteria for Navy and Marine Corps Shore Installations (NAVFAC P-80). NAVFAC P-80 Tables 171-15 A and B for Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Centers sets the size criteria for reserve training and administrative buildings. The NAVFAC P-80 criteria for sizing reserve training and administrative buildings is based on the number of drilling Reservists at each site. Since the 20-year Force Structure Plan projected a 16.4 percent reduction in Navy Reserve end-strength, the number of drilling Reservists at each site was decremented by 16.4 percent before applying the NAVFAC P-80 criteria. The sum of these requirements calculated with the NAVFAC P-80 represented the total required capacity. The
difference between the total existing capacity and the total required capacity indicated the Navy Reserve had a 14.3 percent excess capacity for its reserve centers and no excess capacity for Marine Corps Reserve Centers.

**Military Value Analysis**

The military value questions were grouped into four subject areas covering Effectiveness of Operation, Efficiency of Operation, Quality of Facilities, and Personnel Support. Effectiveness of Operation questions emphasized the proximity to training facilities, reserve demographics, and location of the reserve center in the community. Efficiency of Operation questions emphasized costs of operations, type of installation, and usage rate of facilities. Quality of Facilities questions emphasized facility condition and security. Personnel Support focused on medical, housing, availability of base services, and metropolitan area characteristics.

Final military value scoring placed emphasis on the Effectiveness of Operation and Efficiency of Operation sections, with the highest weighted questions addressing proximity to training facilities and number of drilling Reservists. In scoring the matrix, the Infrastructure Evaluation Group recognized the importance of readiness and weighted this criterion the highest, with facilities, cost, and surge capabilities receiving less weight. The range of scores for these activities was from 31.3 to 79.2 for the Navy Reserve Centers, and from 32.0 to 68.0 for Marine Corps Reserve Centers. The average military value for Navy Reserve Centers was 59.96, while it was 50.60 for Marine Corps Reserve Centers. In general, the highest scores were received by the reserve centers with the larger number of drilling Reservists with a large nearby population center.

**Configuration Analysis**

Configuration analysis was conducted using a linear programming model to develop solutions that minimized excess capacity while maintaining regional distribution to support the ability of Reservists to maintain a reasonable commuting distance. The capacity parameters were determined by the Navy Facility Planning Criteria for Navy and Marine Corps Shore Installations (NAVFAC P-80) guidelines for reserve centers. Two rules were imposed on the configuration model. The first rule required that every state maintain the presence of at least one reserve center. The second rule limited the number of Reservists that have to commute over 100 miles to no more than 15 percent of the total number of Reservists. This rule sought to ensure reserve centers were within a two-hour commute for most Reservists. Sensitivity analysis was conducted to evaluate the effect of surge by increasing and decreasing excess capacity by 10 and 20 percent.

The configuration analysis identified various solution sets differing in the number of reserve centers closed according to the desired amount of excess capacity reduction. Up to 32 reserve center closures were found to be possible for the Navy in the configuration analysis. If the maximum number of 32 possible Navy Reserve Centers were closed, the average military value would have increased to 62.22. Marine Corps Reserve Centers had no identified excess capacity, so the configuration model was not used for Marine Corps Reserve Centers.
Scenario Development and Analysis

The results of the configuration analysis provided the Department of the Navy (DON) Analysis Group with the starting point for deliberations leading to scenario development. There were two comprehensive reviews of reserve centers to develop scenarios. During the first review, the DON Analysis Group decided to issue closure scenarios for those centers that were identified to close in the configuration analysis, had a below average military value score, and were identified by the service’s reserve headquarters as having less than optimal support characteristics. The second review resulted in the DON Analysis Group developing closure scenarios for those centers that met two of the three previous criteria. These reviews led to issuance of 35 reserve center scenario data calls.

In addition to the scenarios developed within the Department of the Navy, scenarios were developed in coordination with the Department of the Army through the Joint Action Scenario Team. The Joint Action Scenario Team was created to assist the military departments in assessing joint operational basing scenarios. The military departments submitted joint scenarios to the Joint Action Scenario Team for review and processing. The Joint Action Scenario Team received, reviewed, and processed more than 100 joint basing scenario ideas. Forty-four of the Joint Action Scenario Team reserve scenarios had Navy involvement and generated scenario data calls for Department of the Navy. Some of these scenarios included reserve centers being considered for closure under Department of the Navy scenarios. The Department of the Navy decision to participate in a given Joint Action Scenario Team scenario was based on an analysis of criteria that examined whether the Joint Action Scenario Team scenario resulted in capacity reduction, increased the average military value of remaining reserve centers, had a reasonable payback period (within 20 years), addressed claimant interests, and compared favorably to alternate Department of the Navy reserve center candidate recommendations, giving due consideration to the 50 State Review of reserve centers performed by Naval Reserve Forces Command and the Navy Reserve Readiness Commands.

In reviewing the COBRA analyses and determining their recommendations for reserve center closures, the DON Analysis Group considered a number of factors including the following: (1) ready opportunities for relocation of Reservists to other reserve centers in the region; (2) poor utilization of facilities (e.g., excess capacity, only one drill weekend per month, etc); (3) distance to training areas; (4) cost to relocate; and (5) the condition of the drilling space at the reserve center. Similarly, certain factors were present in virtually every reserve center scenario which the DON Analysis Group determined to reject for closure, such as (1) high one-time costs; (2) a lengthy period for return on investment or no return on investment; and (3) need to continue support of an active operational activity.

Based on such factors, the Infrastructure Evaluation Group recommended the closure of 23 Navy Reserve Centers (Tuscaloosa AL; St. Petersburg, FL; Pocatello, ID; Forest Park, IL; Evansville, IN; Cedar Rapids, IA, Dubuque, IA; Sioux City, IA; Lexington, KY; Bangor, ME; Adelphi, MD; Duluth, MN; Cape Girardeau, MO; Lincoln, NE; Glens Falls, NY; Horseheads, NY; Watertown, NY; Asheville, NC; Cleveland, OH; Central Point, OR; Lubbock, TX; Orange,
TX; La Crosse, WI); one Navy Reserve Facility (Marquette, MI); 11 Navy Marine Corps Reserve Centers (Mobile, AL; Encino, CA; Los Angeles, CA; Grissom Air Reserve Base, IN; Baton Rouge, LA; Akron, OH; Tulsa, OK; Reading, PA; Tacoma, WA; Moundsville, WV; Madison, WI); and two Inspector-Instructor activities (Rome, GA and West Trenton, NJ).

The Infrastructure Evaluation Group determined not to recommend closure of six Navy Reserve Centers (San Jose, CA; Columbus, GA; Louisville, KY; Avoca, PA; White River Junction, VT); 18 Navy Marine Corps Reserve Centers (Bessemer, AL; Phoenix, AZ; Wilmington, DE; Peoria, IL; Rock Island, IL; Des Moines, IA; Grand Rapids, MI; Battle Creek, MI; St Louis, MO; Raleigh, NC; Portland, OR; Lehigh Valley, PA; Chattanooga, TN; Greenville, SC; Amarillo, TX; Houston, TX; Spokane, WA; Milwaukee, WI); 12 Inspector-Instructor activities (Huntsville, AL; San Bruno, CA; Tampa, FL; Terre Haute, IN; Baltimore, MD; Dayton, OH; Folsom, PA; Charleston, SC; Texarkana, TX; Memphis, TN; Newport News, VA; Yakima, WA); and two Marine Wing Support Squadron Detachments (Marine Wing Support Squadron 473 Detachment A, Fresno, CA; Marine Wing Support Squadron 472 Detachment A, Wyoming, PA).

**Conclusion**

While there is excess capacity at Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Centers, the overriding concern to maintain a demographically sound reserve establishment and guarantee reserve recruiting opportunities resulted in closures only in areas with obvious duplication. Technical experts from the Navy and Marine Corps reserve forces provided critical knowledge of recruiting demographics and reserve population support during the analytical stages.

In general, Department of the Navy recommendations retain reserve centers in every state for the Navy, and in states where they now exist for the Marine Corps, and collocate units to active-duty or joint service centers where they may contribute more directly to the fleet, without impacting recruiting demographics. Each reserve center recommended for closure is located near a more complete Department of the Navy Reserve establishment, usually within a reasonable commuting distance.

For Navy Reserve Centers, these recommendations close 35 activities and retain 117 centers. Excess capacity is reduced from 14.0 percent to 3.1 percent and military value increased from 59.96 to 61.75. For Marine Corps Reserve Centers, the analysis sought to optimally locate activities. Two facilities were identified for closure and movement to existing Navy owned facilities, keeping 32 Marine Corps owned reserve facilities open. Excess capacity is reduced by 5.5 percent. The average military value for Marine Corps Reserve Centers does not change because the two actions move the Marine units onto nearby active duty installations with valued characteristics, thereby enhancing the military value. The net savings to the Department over 20 years for all 37 closure recommendations is approximately $126.20 million.
RECOMMENDATION FOR CLOSURE

NAVY RESERVE CENTERS

Recommendation: Close the following Navy Reserve Centers:
- Tuscaloosa, Alabama
- St. Petersburg, Florida
- Pocatello, Idaho
- Forest Park, Illinois
- Evansville, Indiana
- Cedar Rapids, Iowa
- Sioux City, Iowa
- Lexington, Kentucky
- Bangor, Maine
- Adelphi, Maryland
- Duluth, Minnesota
- Cape Girardeau, Missouri
- Lincoln, Nebraska
- Glens Falls, New York
- Horseheads, New York
- Watertown, New York
- Asheville, North Carolina
- Central Point, Oregon
- Lubbock, Texas
- Orange, Texas

Close the following Navy Reserve Facility:
- Marquette, Michigan

Close the following Navy Marine Corps Reserve Centers:
- Grissom Air Reserve Base, Peru, Indiana
- Tacoma, Washington

Justification: This recommendation will reduce excess capacity through the consolidation of 23 Navy Reserve Centers/Navy Reserve Facilities and Navy Marine Corps Reserve Centers with other reserve centers in the effected areas. These reserve centers will close and their drilling population supported by other existing centers; thereby reducing management overhead. Sufficient capacity for drilling reserves is maintained throughout the United States, and all states will continue to have at least one Navy Reserve Center/Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center. This recommendation reduces excess capacity in the Department of the Navy Reserve Center functional area, but existing capacity in support of the Department of the Navy Reserve component continues to be in excess of force structure requirements.
This recommendation is part of the closure of 37 Department of the Navy reserve centers, which includes 35 Navy centers (Navy Reserve Centers, Navy Reserve Facilities and Navy Marine Corps Reserve Centers) and two Marine Corps centers (Inspector-Instructor activities). The closure of 35 Navy centers will result in a capacity reduction of 12.7 percent of total current square footage. The closure of two Marine Corps centers will result in a capacity reduction of 5.5 percent of total current square footage.

Payback: The total estimated one time cost to the Department of Defense to implement the closure of Navy Reserve Center Tuscaloosa, AL is $0.05 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $4.24 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $0.77 million with an immediate payback. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $11.41 million.

The total estimated one time cost to the Department of Defense to implement the closure of Navy Reserve Center St. Petersburg, FL is $0.09 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $4.51 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $0.81 million with an immediate payback. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $12.12 million.

The total estimated one time cost to the Department of Defense to implement the closure of Navy Reserve Center Pocatello, ID is $0.04 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $3.31 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $0.60 million with an immediate payback. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $8.96 million.

The total estimated one time cost to the Department of Defense to implement the closure of Navy Reserve Center Forest Park, IL is $0.13 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $7.53 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $1.37 million with an immediate payback. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $20.41 million.

The total estimated one time cost to the Department of Defense to implement the closure of Navy Reserve Center Evansville, IN is $0.06 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $2.94 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $0.54 million with an immediate payback. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $7.97 million.

The total estimated one time cost to the Department of Defense to implement the closure of Navy Reserve Center Cedar Rapids, IA is $0.05 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $2.66 million.
Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $0.490 million with an immediate payback. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $7.24 million.

The total estimated one time cost to the Department of Defense to implement the closure of Navy Reserve Center Sioux City, IA is $0.05 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $3.13 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $0.57 million with an immediate payback. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $8.50 million.

The total estimated one time cost to the Department of Defense to implement the closure of Navy Reserve Center Lexington, KY is $0.05 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $2.57 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $0.47 million with an immediate payback. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $6.97 million.

The total estimated one time cost to the Department of Defense to implement the closure of Navy Reserve Center Bangor, ME is $0.04 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $3.88 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $0.71 million with an immediate payback. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $10.49 million.

The total estimated one time cost to the Department of Defense to implement the closure of Navy Reserve Center Adelphi, MD is $0.18 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $4.95 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $0.91 million with an immediate payback. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $13.51 million.

The total estimated one time cost to the Department of Defense to implement the closure of Navy Reserve Center Duluth, MN is $0.07 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $4.82 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $0.88 million with an immediate payback. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $13.10 million.

The total estimated one time cost to the Department of Defense to implement the closure of Navy Reserve Center Cape Girardeau, MO is $0.06 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $2.65 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $0.48 million with an immediate payback. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $7.20 million.
The total estimated one time cost to the Department of Defense to implement the closure of Navy Reserve Center Lincoln, NE is $0.18 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $3.51 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $0.65 million with an immediate payback. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $9.63 million.

The total estimated one time cost to the Department of Defense to implement the closure of Navy Reserve Center Glens Falls, NY is $0.04 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $4.53 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $0.83 million with an immediate payback. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $12.29 million.

The total estimated one time cost to the Department of Defense to implement the closure of Navy Reserve Center Horseheads, NY is $0.05 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $2.27 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $0.42 million with an immediate payback. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $6.16 million.

The total estimated one time cost to the Department of Defense to implement the closure of Navy Reserve Center Watertown, NY is $0.06 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $2.21 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $0.40 million with an immediate payback. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $6.00 million.

The total estimated one time cost to the Department of Defense to implement the closure of Navy Reserve Center Asheville, NC is $0.07 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $2.96 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $0.54 million with an immediate payback. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $8.01 million.

The total estimated one time cost to the Department of Defense to implement the closure of Navy Reserve Center Central Point, OR is $0.04 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $2.83 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $0.52 million with an immediate payback. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $7.67 million.

The total estimated one time cost to the Department of Defense to implement the closure of Navy Reserve Center Lubbock, TX is $0.08 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $3.68 million.
Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $0.70 million with an immediate payback. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $9.97 million.

The total estimated one time cost to the Department of Defense to implement the closure of Navy Reserve Center Orange, TX is $0.32 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $6.53 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $1.25 million with an immediate payback. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $18.26 million.

The total estimated one time cost to the Department of Defense to implement the closure of Navy Reserve Facility Marquette, MI is $0.05 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $2.57 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $0.47 million with an immediate payback. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $6.94 million.

The total estimated one time cost to the Department of Defense to implement the closure of Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Grissom Air Reserve Base, IN is $0.7 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $3.13 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $0.57 million with an immediate payback. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $8.46 million.

The total estimated one time cost to the Department of Defense to implement the closure of Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Tacoma, WA is $0.14 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $5.65 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $1.02 million with an immediate payback. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $15.24 million.

**Economic Impact on Communities:** Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of Navy Reserve Center Tuscaloosa, AL will result in a maximum potential reduction of 10 jobs (7 direct jobs and 3 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Tuscaloosa, AL Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of Navy Reserve Center St. Petersburg, FL will result in a maximum potential reduction of 22 jobs (12 direct jobs and 10 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of Navy Reserve Center Pocatello, ID will result in a maximum potential reduction of 10 jobs (7 direct jobs and 3 indirect jobs)
over the 2006-2011 period in the Pocatello, ID Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of Navy Reserve Center Forest Park, IL will result in a maximum potential reduction of 20 jobs (15 direct jobs and 5 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL Metropolitan Division, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of Navy Reserve Center Evansville, IN will result in a maximum potential reduction of 9 jobs (7 direct jobs and 2 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Evansville, IN-KY Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of Navy Reserve Center Cedar Rapids, IA will result in a maximum potential reduction of 9 jobs (7 direct jobs and 2 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Cedar Rapids, IA Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of Navy Reserve Center Lexington, KY will result in a maximum potential reduction of 12 jobs (9 direct jobs and 3 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Lexington-Fayette, KY Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of Navy Reserve Center Bangor, ME will result in a maximum potential reduction of 9 jobs (7 direct jobs and 2 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Bangor, ME Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of Navy Reserve Center Adelphi, MD will result in a maximum potential reduction of 28 jobs (17 direct jobs and 11 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV Metropolitan Division, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of Navy Reserve Center Duluth, MN will result in a maximum potential reduction of 11 jobs (8 direct jobs and 3 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Duluth, MN-WI Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of Navy Reserve Center Cape Girardeau, MO will result in a maximum potential reduction of 8 jobs (7 direct jobs and 1 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Cape Girardeau-Jackson, MO-IL Micropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of Navy Reserve Center Lincoln, NE will result in a maximum potential reduction of 11 jobs (7 direct jobs and 4 indirect jobs)
over the 2006-2011 period in the Lincoln, NE Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of Navy Reserve Center Glens Falls, NY will result in a maximum potential reduction of 9 jobs (7 direct jobs and 2 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Glen Falls, NY Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of Navy Reserve Center Horseheads, NY will result in a maximum potential reduction of 14 jobs (7 direct jobs and 7 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Elmira, NY Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of Navy Reserve Center Watertown, NY will result in a maximum potential reduction of 15 jobs (9 direct jobs and 6 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Watertown-Fort Drum, NY Micropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of Navy Reserve Center Asheville, NC will result in a maximum potential reduction of 9 jobs (7 direct jobs and 2 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Asheville, NC Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of Navy Reserve Center Central Point, OR will result in a maximum potential reduction of 9 jobs (7 direct jobs and 2 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Medford, OR Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of Navy Reserve Center Lubbock, TX will result in a maximum potential reduction of 10 jobs (7 direct jobs and 3 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Lubbock, TX Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of Navy Reserve Center Orange, TX will result in a maximum potential reduction of 17 jobs (11 direct jobs and 6 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of Navy Reserve Center Sioux City, IA will result in a maximum potential reduction of 10 jobs (7 direct jobs and 3 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Sioux City, IA-NE-SD Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of Navy Reserve Facility Marquette, MI will result in a maximum potential reduction of 9 jobs (7 direct jobs and 2 indirect jobs) over
the 2006-2011 period in the Marquette, MI Micropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Grissom Air Reserve Base, IN will result in a maximum potential reduction of 9 jobs (7 direct jobs and 2 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Peru, IN Micropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Tacoma, WA will result in a maximum potential reduction of 35 jobs (20 direct jobs and 15 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Tacoma, WA Metropolitan Division, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on these economic regions of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.

Community Infrastructure: A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces, and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.

Environmental Impact: This recommendation has no impact on air quality; cultural, archeological, or tribal resources; dredging; land use constraints or sensitive resource areas; marine mammals, resources, or sanctuaries; noise; threatened or endangered species or critical habitat; waste management; water resources; or wetlands. This recommendation does not impact the costs of environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the installations in this recommendation has been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to implementation of this recommendation.
ATTACHMENT F-2

RECOMMENDATION FOR CLOSURE

NAVY AND MARINE CORPS RESERVE CENTERS

Recommendation:

Close Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Encino, CA and relocate the Marine Corps units to
Marine Corps Reserve Center Pasadena, CA.

Close Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Moundsville, WV and relocate the Marine Corps
units to Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Pittsburgh, PA.

Close Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Reading, PA and relocate the Navy and Marine
Corps units to Navy Marine Corps Reserve Centers Lehigh Valley, PA.

Close Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Los Angeles, CA and relocate the Navy and
Marine Corps units to Armed Forces Reserve Center Bell, CA.

Close Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Akron, OH and Navy Reserve Center Cleveland,
OH and relocate the Navy and Marine Corps units to Armed Forces Reserve Center Akron,
OH.

Close Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Madison, WI, Navy Reserve Center Lacrosse, WI
and Navy Reserve Center Dubuque, IA and relocate the Navy and Marine Corps units to
Armed Forces Reserve Center Madison, WI.

Close Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Baton Rouge, LA and relocate the Marine Corps
units to Armed Forces Reserve Center Baton Rouge, LA.

Close Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Tulsa, Ok and relocate the Navy and Marine
Corps units to Armed Forces Reserve Center Broken Arrow, OK.

Close Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Mobile, AL and relocate the Marine Corps units to
Armed Forces Reserve Center Mobile, AL.

Close Inspector-Instructor West Trenton, NJ and relocate Marine Corps reserve units and
support staff to Navy Reserve Center Ft. Dix, NJ.

Close Inspector-Instructor Rome, GA, and relocate Marine Corps reserve units and support
staff to Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Atlanta, GA.

Justification: This recommendation will reduce excess capacity through the consolidation
of 12 Navy Reserve Centers and Navy Marine Corps Reserve Centers with other reserve
centers in the effected areas or into Armed Forces Reserve Centers. Nine of 12 of the reserve center closures are joint actions with the Department of the Army that support relocation into Armed Forces Reserve Centers. This recommendation will also relocate two Inspector-Instructor activities to existing reserve facilities aboard active duty bases. Sufficient capacity for drilling reserves is maintained throughout the United States, and all states will continue to have at least one Navy/Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center. This recommendation reduces excess capacity in the Department of the Navy reserve center functional area, but existing capacity in support of the Department of the Navy Reserve component continues to be in excess of force structure requirements. This recommendation is part of the closure of 37 Department of the Navy reserve centers, which includes 35 Navy centers (Navy Reserve Centers, Navy Reserve Facilities and Navy Marine Corps Reserve Centers) and two Marine Corps centers (Inspector-Instructor activities). The closure of 35 Navy centers will result in a capacity reduction of 12.7 percent of total current square footage. The closure of two Marine Corps centers will result in a capacity reduction of 5.5 percent of total current square footage.

**Payback:** The total estimated one time cost to the Department of Defense to implement the closure of Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Encino, CA is $0.1 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of $4.56 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $0.83 million with an immediate payback. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $12.31 million.

The total estimated one time cost to the Department of Defense to implement the closure of Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Moundsville, WV is $0.24 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $4.67 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $0.89 million with an immediate payback. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $13.01 million.

The total estimated one time cost to the Department of Defense to implement the closure of Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Reading, PA is $9.10 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a cost of $5.03 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $0.96 million with a payback expected in 12 years. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $4.14 million.

The total estimated one time cost to the Department of Defense to implement the closure of Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Los Angeles, CA is $12.20 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a cost of $8.02 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $0.85 million with a payback expected in 18 years. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $0.470 million.

The total estimated one time cost to the Department of Defense to implement the
The total estimated one time cost to the Department of Defense to implement the closure of Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Akron, OH and Navy Reserve Center Cleveland, OH is $11.77 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a cost of $4.21 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $1.66 million with a payback expected in 7 years. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $11.84 million.

The total estimated one time cost to the Department of Defense to implement the closure of Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Madison, WI and Navy Reserve Center Lacrosse, WI and Navy Reserve Center Dubuque, IA is $10.21 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of $3.69 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $1.78 million with a payback expected in 6 years. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $13.56 million.

The total estimated one time cost to the Department of Defense to implement the closure of Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Baton Rouge, LA is $3.89 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $0.93 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $0.97 million with a payback expected in 3 years. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $10.23 million.

The total estimated one time cost to the Department of Defense to implement the closure of Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Tulsa, OK is $5.53 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a cost of $3.70 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $0.49 million with a payback expected in 14 years. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $1.13 million.

The total estimated one time cost to the Department of Defense to implement the closure of Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Mobile, AL is $7.97 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a cost of $4.60 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $0.71 million with a payback expected in 12 years. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $2.37 million.

The total estimated one time cost to the Department of Defense to implement the closure of Inspector-Instructor West Trenton, NJ is $1.33 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $1.36 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after the implementation period are $0.48 million with a payback expected in 3 years. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $5.89 million.

The total estimated one time cost to the Department of Defense to implement the closure of Inspector-Instructor Rome, GA is $0.05 million. The net of all costs and savings
to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $0.64 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $0.14 million with an immediate payback. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $1.92 million.

**Economic Impact on Communities:** Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Encino, CA will result in a maximum potential reduction of 12 jobs (8 direct jobs and 4 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Moundsville, WV will result in a maximum potential reduction of 21 jobs (16 direct jobs and 5 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Wheeling, WV-OH Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Reading, PA could result in a maximum potential reduction of 25 jobs (18 direct jobs and 7 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Reading, PA Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

The closure of Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Los Angeles, CA will not result in any job reductions (direct or indirect) over the 2006-2011 period in the Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale, CA, Metropolitan Division. Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Los Angeles and Armed Forces Reserve Center Bell are in the same Metropolitan Division.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Akron, OH and Navy Reserve Center Cleveland, OH will result in a maximum potential reduction of 34 jobs (25 direct jobs and 9 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH, Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Akron and Armed Forces Reserve Center Bell are in the same Metropolitan Area.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Madison, WI, and Navy Reserve Center Lacrosse, WI and Navy Reserve Center Dubuque, IA will result in a maximum potential reduction of 9 jobs (7 direct jobs and 2 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the LaCrosse, WI-MN, Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Madison, WI, and Navy Reserve Center Lacrosse, WI and Navy Reserve Center Dubuque, IA will result in a maximum potential reduction of 32 jobs (24 direct jobs and 8 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Dubuque, IA, Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Madison and Armed Forces Reserve Center Madison are in the same Metropolitan Statistical Area.
Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Baton Rouge, LA will result in a maximum potential reduction of 10 jobs (7 direct jobs and 3 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Baton Rouge, LA Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

The closure of Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Tulsa, OK will not result in any job reductions (direct or indirect) over the 2006-2011 period in the Tulsa, OK, Metropolitan Statistical Area. Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Tulsa and Armed Forces Reserve Center Broken Arrow are in the same Metropolitan Statistical Area.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Mobile, AL will result in a maximum potential reduction of 7 jobs (5 direct jobs and 2 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Mobile, AL Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center Mobile and Armed Forces Reserve Center Mobile are in the same Metropolitan Statistical Area.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of Inspector-Instructor West Trenton, NJ could result in a maximum potential reduction of 16 jobs (12 direct jobs and 4 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Trenton-Ewing, NJ Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, the closure of Inspector-Instructor Rome, GA could result in a maximum potential reduction of 12 jobs (9 direct jobs and 3 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Rome, GA Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on these economic regions of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.

Community Infrastructure: A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces, and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.

Environmental Impact: This recommendation has no impact on air quality; cultural, archeological, or tribal resources; dredging; land use constraints or sensitive resource areas; marine mammals, resources, or sanctuaries; noise; threatened or endangered species or critical habitat; waste management; water resources; or wetlands. This recommendation indicates impacts of costs at the installations involved, which reported $135 thousand in costs for environmental compliance activities. These costs were included in the payback calculation. This recommendation does not otherwise impact the costs of environmental restoration, waste management, or environmental compliance activities. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the installations in this
recommendation has been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to implementation of this recommendation.
ATTACHMENT G

DESCRIPTION OF ANALYSIS OF

NAVY AND MARINE CORPS RECRUITING MANAGEMENT

The Department of the Navy recruiting commands (Commander, Navy Recruiting Command and Marine Corps Recruiting Command) are responsible for the recruitment of qualified applicants for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. The scope of this analysis was focused on Navy Recruiting Districts and Marine Corps Recruiting Stations. These commands are responsible for the direct management and oversight of the “storefront” recruiting offices and recruiters. There are currently 31 Navy Recruiting Districts and 48 Marine Corps Recruiting Stations. For analysis purposes, the Navy Recruiting Districts and Marine Corps Recruiting Stations are referred to as recruiting centers throughout this report.

Navy Recruiting Districts

- Navy Recruiting District, Montgomery, Alabama
- Navy Recruiting District, Phoenix, Arizona
- Navy Recruiting District, San Diego, California
- Navy Recruiting District, Los Angeles, California
- Navy Recruiting District, San Francisco, California
- Navy Recruiting District, Denver, Colorado
- Navy Recruiting District, Jacksonville, Florida
- Navy Recruiting District, Miami, Florida
- Navy Recruiting District, Atlanta, Georgia
- Navy Recruiting District, Chicago, Illinois
- Navy Recruiting District, Indianapolis, Indiana
- Navy Recruiting District, New Orleans, Louisiana
- Navy Recruiting District, New England, Massachusetts
- Navy Recruiting District, Detroit, Michigan
- Navy Recruiting District, Minneapolis, Minnesota
- Navy Recruiting District, Kansas City, Missouri
- Navy Recruiting District, St. Louis, Missouri
- Navy Recruiting District, Omaha, Nebraska
- Navy Recruiting District, Buffalo, New York
- Navy Recruiting District, Raleigh, North Carolina
- Navy Recruiting District, Columbus, Ohio
- Navy Recruiting District, Portland, Oregon
- Navy Recruiting District, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
- Navy Recruiting District, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
- Navy Recruiting District, East Meadow, New York
- Navy Recruiting District, Nashville, Tennessee
- Navy Recruiting District, San Antonio, Texas
- Navy Recruiting District, Dallas, Texas
- Navy Recruiting District, Houston, Texas
Navy Recruiting District, Richmond, Virginia
Navy Recruiting District, Seattle, Washington

Marine Corps Recruiting Stations
Recruiting Station, Montgomery, Alabama
Recruiting Station, Phoenix, Arizona
Recruiting Station, Los Angeles, California
Recruiting Station, Orange, California
Recruiting Station, Sacramento, California
Recruiting Station, San Diego, California
Recruiting Station, San Francisco, California
Recruiting Station, Denver, Colorado
Recruiting Station, Jacksonville, Florida
Recruiting Station, Orlando, Florida
Recruiting Station, Atlanta, Georgia
Recruiting Station, Chicago, Illinois
Recruiting Station, Indianapolis, Indiana
Recruiting Station, Des Moines, Iowa
Recruiting Station, Louisville, Kentucky
Recruiting Station, New Orleans, Louisiana
Recruiting Station, Springfield, Massachusetts
Recruiting Station, St. Louis, Missouri
Recruiting Station, Baltimore, Maryland
Recruiting Station, Frederick, Maryland
Recruiting Station, Detroit, Michigan
Recruiting Station, Lansing, Michigan
Recruiting Station, Twin Cities, Minnesota
Recruiting Station, Kansas City, Missouri
Recruiting Station, Portsmouth, New Hampshire
Recruiting Station, Colts Neck, New Jersey
Recruiting Station, Albuquerque, New Mexico
Recruiting Station, Buffalo, New York
Recruiting Station, Albany, New York
Recruiting Station, New York City, New York
Recruiting Station, Raleigh, North Carolina
Recruiting Station, Cleveland, Ohio
Recruiting Station, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
Recruiting Station, Portland, Oregon
Recruiting Station, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania
Recruiting Station, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Recruiting Station, Charleston, South Carolina
Recruiting Station, Columbia, South Carolina
Recruiting Station, Nashville, Tennessee
Recruiting Station, Dallas, Texas
Recruiting Station, Fort Lauderdale, Texas
Recruiting Station, Fort Worth, Texas
Each recruiting center has a headquarters and staff to support the recruiting mission and recruiters in the field. The staff consists of the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, Senior Enlisted Advisor and various support staff members. The areas of responsibility for the recruiting centers are clearly defined but vary significantly in geographical size and population.

Data Call Development

There were no data calls from prior BRAC years that assessed this level of the recruiting function, so there were no models or lessons learned to use as a starting point for the development of the recruiting BRAC 2005 capacity and military value data calls. The Department of the Navy process sought information from the recruiting commands to identify any elements of importance for both capacity and military value. The capacity data call was designed to capture specific features and capabilities of each recruiting center, including manpower, physical space, facility and equipment characteristics, and contingency and mobilization features. Data generally was requested for the current period through 2011. The number of recruiting offices and recruiters currently managed by the recruiting centers was evaluated to determine maximum capacity.

The military value data call placed emphasis on recruiting performance (e.g. recruiting goals/accomplishment), recruitable population, geographical area of responsibility, number of recruiters/recruiting offices, number of high schools in the area of responsibility, location of the recruiting center headquarters office and proximity to recruiting offices. Other military value questions captured lease costs, facility condition, and relative security posture of the facility. A standard set of quality of life questions was developed and used for all recruiting centers.

Capacity Analysis

In general, the capacity analysis evaluated the number of recruiting offices and recruiters managed by the recruiting centers. The highest ratios of recruiters and recruiting offices managed by recruiting centers during FY 2004 were used as the benchmarks in determining potential excess capacity. Each recruiting center was evaluated against the benchmarks to determine its excess capacity or potential to manage more recruiters and/or recruiting offices. This capacity analysis identified an overall 26 percent excess for Navy Recruiting Districts and 20.80 percent excess for the Marine Corps Recruiting Stations, leading the Department of the Navy to conduct a military value analysis.
Military Value Analysis

The military value questions were grouped into four subject areas covering Effectiveness of Operations, Efficiency of Operations, Quality of Facilities, and Personnel Support. The Effectiveness of Operations questions emphasized the recruiting mission, recruiting demographics, and scope of responsibility. The Efficiency of Operations questions emphasized proximity and control of the recruiting center and the cost of operations. The Quality of Facilities questions emphasized facility condition and security. Personnel Support focused on medical, housing, employment, Morale Welfare and Recreation/Marine Corps Community Services/fleet and family services, and metropolitan area characteristics.

Final military value scoring placed emphasis on the Effectiveness of Operations and Efficiency of Operations sections with the highest weighted questions addressing proximity to recruiting offices and recruitable population in the area of responsibility. In scoring the matrix, the Department of the Navy (DON) Analysis Group recognized the importance of readiness implications and potential recruiting markets and weighted these criteria the highest, with Facilities, Surge, and Cost/Manpower receiving less weight. The range of scores for these activities was 57.6 to 86.5 for the Navy and 52.5 to 88.0 for the Marine Corps. The average military value score was 69 for the Navy (31 activities) and 69.2 for the Marine Corps (48 activities). In general, the majority of recruiting centers with the highest military values were located on military installations, had high scores in the Effectiveness of Operations attribute, and were within relatively close proximity to their recruiting offices.

Configuration Analysis

Configuration analysis was conducted using a linear programming model to develop solutions that minimized excess management capacity throughout recruiting centers while maintaining regional distribution to support required oversight of recruiters and storefront recruiting offices. The capacity parameters, though consistent with those applied in the capacity analysis, were more specific (e.g., number of recruiters/storefront recruiting offices managed). Two rules were imposed on the configuration model. The first rule required that no recruiting center exceed the number of recruiting offices of the existing recruiting center with the highest number of recruiting offices. The second rule required that no center exceed the number of recruiters managed by the existing center with the highest number of recruiters.

The configuration analysis identified three solution sets for the Navy Recruiting Districts and one final solution set for the Marine Corps. Sensitivity analysis was conducted to evaluate the effect of changes in the recruiter force (FY 2004 manning was used as the benchmark) when increased and decreased by 10 and 20 percent respectively.

The model's best solution for the Navy involved the closure of eight Navy Recruiting Districts, including Montgomery, Omaha, Buffalo, Indianapolis, Jacksonville, St. Louis, Portland, and San Antonio. This solution resulted in the total elimination of excess capacity. The second and third best solutions, based on the DON Analysis Group determination to run the model with the elimination of five Navy Recruiting Districts both resulted in the same reduction in excess capacity. The second solution included the closure of Navy Recruiting Districts
Montgomery, Omaha, Buffalo, Indianapolis, and Kansas City. The third solution also closed five activities, substituting San Antonio for Kansas City, in the above solution. The sensitivity analyses involving the increase/decrease of personnel by 10 percent resulted in no impact. The sensitivity analysis involving the 20 percent increase caused minimal impact proving that a significant personnel change would be required to affect the analysis. The 20 percent personnel reduction resulted in no impact, reaffirming this conclusion.

The model’s best solution for the Marine Corps involved the closure of ten recruiting stations. This solution resulted in the total elimination of excess capacity. The sensitivity analysis for the Marine Corps had similar findings to the Navy, enabling evaluation for potential scenario development.

Scenario Development and Analysis

The results of the configuration analysis provided the DON Analysis Group with the starting point for deliberations leading to scenario development. The DON Analysis Group decided to package the recruiting center closures as one scenario due to the potential impact of closures on the overall geographical distribution of recruiting centers for the Navy and Marine Corps. The combined scenarios allowed respondents to evaluate the net change in span of control of all impacted recruiting centers. Although some excess capacity remained under two of the three solutions for the Navy, the DON Analysis Group determined the results did provide a basis for conducting COBRA analyses on Navy Recruiting Districts. Accordingly, three scenario data calls were issued. The first scenario closed five Navy Recruiting Districts, including Montgomery, Omaha, Buffalo, Indianapolis, and San Antonio. The second scenario also closed five Navy Recruiting Districts but substituted Kansas City for San Antonio. The third scenario involved the closure of eight Navy Recruiting Districts, including Montgomery, Omaha, Buffalo, Indianapolis, Kansas City, San Antonio, Portland, and St Louis. This scenario resulted in the elimination of all excess capacity. After deliberation, the DON Analysis Group determined the Marine Corps Recruiting Station was not the appropriate organization level in the Marine Corps Recruiting Command for closure analysis. While both the Navy Recruiting Districts and the Marine Corps Recruiting Stations manage storefront recruiting offices, the Marine Corps Recruiting Station staffs have a more direct interface with the recruiting offices. Many of the resource management functions performed by Navy Recruiting District’s staff members are conducted at higher echelons (e.g. Marine Corps Districts) for the Marine Corps. In addition, the planned increase in Marine Corps end strength will result in increased workload for Marine Corps recruiting activities. These new requirements will directly impact the Recruiting Stations. Consequently, no scenario data calls were issued to the Marine Corps and no further analysis was conducted on the Marine Corps Recruiting Stations.

The DON Analysis Group reviewed the Navy Recruiting Districts scenario data call responses in the context of anticipated military manpower savings in the recruiting management staff. The COBRA analyses on the three scenarios consistently resulted in immediate payback and cost savings due to personnel eliminations, reduced lease costs, and reduced operational costs (e.g. government vehicles). The scenario involving the closure of eight Navy Recruiting Districts was determined to represent a high risk of increased stress to the Navy recruiting program, particularly in light of other reorganization initiatives underway to streamline
management and consolidate active and reserve recruiting efforts. This scenario therefore was dropped from further consideration. The scenario closing five Navy Recruiting Districts including Navy Recruiting District San Antonio had the lowest net savings and also had potential adverse impact on surrounding Navy Recruiting District geographical boundaries. Additionally, Navy Recruiting District San Antonio had one of the highest overall military value scores. The scenario involving the closure of five Navy Recruiting Districts that did not include Navy Recruiting District San Antonio (Montgomery, Omaha, Buffalo, Indianapolis, and Kansas City) had a higher savings and caused the least impact to the Navy recruiting mission.

Conclusion

The requirement to eliminate excess capacity within the Recruiting Management function was accomplished. Although the analysis determined there is excess capacity in this level of Department of the Navy recruiting management, mission requirements did not permit the total elimination of the excess capacity. The focus of effort became eliminating excess management capacity and reduction of lease costs while maintaining sufficient recruiting management oversight to support Department of the Navy accession requirements. The recommendation closing five Recruiting Districts reduces the excess capacity for the Recruiting Management function from 26 percent to 10 percent and increases the average military value of Navy Recruiting Districts from 68.9 to 69.79. The net savings to the Department over 20 years is approximately $214.5 million.
ATTACHMENT G-1

RECOMMENDATION FOR CLOSURE

NAVY RECRUITING DISTRICTS

Recommendation: Close the following Navy Recruiting Districts:

- Montgomery, Alabama
- Indianapolis, Indiana
- Kansas City, Missouri
- Omaha, Nebraska
- Buffalo, New York

Justification: This recommendation achieves economies of scale and scope by reducing excess capacity in management overhead and physical resources in the Navy Recruiting District functional area. Through the elimination of leased space, the recommendation results in an annual lease savings of over $682 thousand. The recommendation is consistent with the Commander, Navy Recruiting Command’s Transformation Plan, which envisions consolidation of active and reserve recruiting functions, and supports the reallocation of management oversight over all Navy recruiting functions. This recommendation involves the closure of the specified Navy Recruiting Districts only and does not impact the storefront recruiting offices currently assigned to the closing Navy Recruiting Districts. The recruiting offices and associated personnel and resources will be reassigned to the remaining 26 Navy Recruiting Districts.

Payback: The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is $2.44 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $78.3 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $14.5 million with an immediate payback. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $214.5 million.

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 68 jobs (41 direct and 27 indirect) over the 2006–2011 period in the Montgomery, AL Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 54 jobs (38 direct jobs and 16 indirect jobs) over the 2006–2011 period in the Indianapolis, IN Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 64 jobs (38 direct and 26 indirect) over the 2006–2011 period in the
Kansas City, MO-KS Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 60 jobs (32 direct jobs and 28 indirect jobs) over the 2006–2011 period in the Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 53 jobs (37 direct and 16 indirect) over the 2006–2011 period in the Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on these economic regions of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.

Community Infrastructure: A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces, and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.

Environmental Impact: This recommendation has no impact on air quality; cultural, archeological, or tribal resources; dredging; land use constraints or sensitive resource areas; marine mammals, resources, or sanctuaries; noise; threatened and endangered species or critical habitat; waste management; water resources; or wetlands. This recommendation does not impact the costs of environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental activities. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the installations in this recommendation has been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to implementation of this recommendation.
ATTACHMENT H

DESCRIPTION OF ANALYSIS OF

REGIONAL SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

Regional Support Activities are those activities that provide management oversight of activity and personnel support functions. Regional Support Activities were divided into four categories: Installation Management; Large Service Providers; Middle Management Providers and Administrative Service Providers. Within each category, each type of activity was analyzed separately. Their administrative management functions were reviewed for opportunities of alignment and integration. The categories and activities analyzed were:

**Installation Management**
- Navy Region Southwest, San Diego, California
- Navy Region Northeast, Groton, Connecticut
- Navy Region Southeast, Jacksonville, Florida
- Navy Region Gulf Coast, Pensacola, Florida
- Navy Region Hawaii, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
- Navy Region Midwest, Great Lakes, Illinois
- Navy Reserve Forces Command (Installation Management Function), New Orleans, Louisiana
- Navy Region South, Corpus Christi, Texas
- Navy Region Mid-Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia
- Navy Region Northwest, Seattle, Washington
- Naval District Washington, DC
- Navy Region Marianas, Guam

**Large Service Providers**
- Naval Facilities Engineering Field Division Southwest, San Diego, California
- Naval Facilities Engineering Field Activity West, San Bruno, California
- Naval Facilities Engineering Field Activity Southeast, Jacksonville, Florida
- Naval Facilities Engineering Field Division Pacific, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
- Naval Facilities Engineering Field Activity Midwest, Great Lakes, Illinois
- Naval Facilities Engineering Field Activity Northeast, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
- Naval Facilities Engineering Field Division South, Charleston, South Carolina
- Naval Facilities Engineering Field Division Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia
- Naval Facilities Engineering Field Activity Northwest, Poulbo, Washington
- Naval Facilities Engineering Field Activity Chesapeake, Washington DC
- Naval Facilities Officer in Charge of Construction Marianas, Guam
- Public Works Center, San Diego, California
- Public Works Center, Jacksonville, Florida
- Public Works Center, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
- Public Works Center, Great Lakes, Illinois
- Public Works Center, Norfolk, Virginia
- Public Works Center, Washington, DC
Public Works Center, Guam  
Fleet Industrial Supply Center, San Diego, California*  
Fleet Industrial Supply Center, Jacksonville, Florida*  
Fleet Industrial Supply Center, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii*  
Fleet Industrial Supply Center, Norfolk, Virginia*  
Fleet Industrial Supply Center, Puget Sound, Washington*

**Middle Management Providers**

Naval Reserve Readiness Command Southwest, San Diego, California  
Naval Reserve Readiness Command Southeast, Jacksonville, Florida  
Naval Reserve Readiness Command Midwest, Great Lakes, Illinois  
Naval Reserve Readiness Command Northeast, Newport, Rhode Island  
Naval Reserve Readiness Command South, Fort Worth, Texas  
Naval Reserve Readiness Command Northwest, Everett, Washington  
Naval Reserve Readiness Command Mid-Atlantic, Washington, DC  
Naval Legal Service Office Southwest, San Diego, California  
Naval Legal Service Office Southeast, Jacksonville, Florida  
Naval Legal Service Office Central, Pensacola, Florida  
Naval Legal Service Office Pacific Detachment, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii  
Naval Legal Service Office Mid-Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia  
Naval Legal Service Office Northwest, Bremerton, Washington  
Naval Legal Service Office North Central, Washington, DC  
Twelfth Marine Corps District, San Diego California  
Eighth Marine Corps District, New Orleans, Louisiana  
Ninth Marine Corps District, Kansas City, Missouri  
First Marine Corps District, Garden City, Long Island, New York  
Fourth Marine Corps District, Cumberland, Pennsylvania  
Sixth Marine Corps District, Parris Island, South Carolina  
Naval Reserve Recruiting Area Pacific, San Diego, California  
Naval Reserve Recruiting Area West, Aurora, Colorado  
Naval Reserve Recruiting Area Southeast, Orlando, Florida  
Naval Reserve Recruiting Area Central, Great Lakes, Illinois  
Naval Reserve Recruiting Area South, Dallas, Texas  
Naval Reserve Recruiting Area Northeast, Washington DC  
Trial Service Office West, San Diego, California  
Trial Service Office Southeast, Mayport, Florida  
Trial Service Office Pacific, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii  
Trial Service Office East, Norfolk, Virginia  
Trial Service Office Northeast, Washington, DC  
Naval Recruiting Region West, Oakland, California  
Naval Recruiting Region South, Macon, Georgia  
Naval Recruiting Region Central, Great Lakes, Illinois  
Naval Recruiting Region North, Scotia, New York  
Marine Corps National Capitol Region Command, Washington, DC
Administrative Service Providers
- Human Resources Service Center, San Diego, California*
- Human Resources Service Center, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii*
- Human Resources Service Center, Stennis, Mississippi*
- Human Resources Service Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania*
- Human Resources Service Center, Portsmouth, Virginia*
- Human Resources Service Center, Silverdale, Washington*
- Healthcare Support Office, San Diego, California
- Healthcare Support Office, Jacksonville, Florida
- Healthcare Support Office, Norfolk, Virginia
- Personnel Support Activity West, San Diego, California
- Personnel Support Activity Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia

*These activities were also analyzed by the Headquarters and Support Activities and Supply and Storage Joint Cross-Service Groups and thus were removed from review at the Department of the Navy level after initial evaluation.

Data Call Development

Regionalization of the Navy shore Installation Management commenced after BRAC 1995 in an effort to decrease overhead and infrastructure. BRAC 2005 sought to build upon this effort by analyzing commands, in addition to installation management regions, in an effort to seek common measures of management with an eye towards opportunities for better alignment. There are no commonly accepted benchmarks for the administrative management functions performed by this diverse group of activities. As a result, data call development focused on questions to identify commonalities among these activities. Commander, Navy Installations and the Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Installations and Logistics were both consulted for insight and input into the data call development process.

The capacity data call requested information on span of control and workload balance. Because Regional Support Activities are made up of a diverse collection of activities performing multiple missions, there was no common output measure. Instead, a variety of measures were derived from data collected on customers and subordinates served, facilities supported, and distance to customers.

Military value key factors for Regional Support Activities were: operational proximity, criticality of location, scope of responsibility, regional alignment, relative productivity, quality of facilities, and personnel support. These key factors were analyzed within standard attribute groupings: Effectiveness of Operations, Efficiency of Operations, Quality of Facilities, and Personnel Support.
Capacity Analysis

Span of control and workload balance measures were utilized in the assessment of capacity for the various Regional Support Activities in an effort to find opportunities for better alignment leading to future efficiencies. Such measures included the number of supported customers and distance to customers. Because there were no stated requirements or clear limits on the appropriate span of control for Regional Support Activities, there was no measurement of excess capacity. The capacity measures were used in conjunction with military value to test possible scenarios that stressed current spans of control while strengthening alignment.

Military Value Analysis

Final military value scoring placed heavy emphasis on operational proximity, criticality of location, current scope of responsibility, co-location, regional alignment and relative productivity. Each of the four Regional Support Activities categories shared the same attributes, yet were weighted slightly differently to account for different mission characteristics, including accessibility to customers. Military value was determined by individual activity type within the category.

Effectiveness of Operation and Efficiency of Operation were given the greatest weight across all four categories of Regional Support Activities. With the exception of Administrative Service Providers, Quality of Facilities outweighed Personnel Support. Activities scoring on the high end of the range included Commander, Navy Region Mid-Atlantic, Engineering Field Division Southwest, Public Works Center Norfolk, Naval Legal Service Office Mid-Atlantic, Trial Service Office San Diego, and Naval Reserve Readiness Command Mid-Atlantic. These activities generally are close to customers, have low overhead, and are located at or near the Installation Management regional headquarters. Activities that had low scores were generally in leased space, not located in proximity to operational units, and/or not aligned to the Installation Management regional headquarters. Installation Management had a range of scores from 40.4 to 86.7 with an average military value for this category of 60.9; Large Service Providers, 45.2 to 87.7, with an average of 72.6; Middle Management Providers, 34.4 to 85.4, with an average of 66.0; and Administrative Service Providers, 58.8 to 87.6, with an average of 77.0.

Configuration Analysis

Configuration analysis was used to develop solutions that progressively reduced the number of installation management regions, while maximizing military value and minimizing distance to installations served. The model’s parameters included: (1) military values of each current regional management activity; (2) distances to each Navy installation; (3) plant replacement value and workforce at each Navy installation; and (4) the state in which each Navy installation is located. The model runs include the following rules approved by the Department of the Navy (DON) Analysis Group: (1) maintain Navy District Washington in its current configuration; (2) achieve balance in workload between regions, to the extent practical; and (3) do not split states across multiple regions (except as necessary to maintain Navy District Washington. The configuration analysis produced various alternatives for structuring the regions. Although it was not possible to define a specific measure of excess
capacity in this group of activities, the DON Analysis Group did review alternatives in terms of workload, balance of workload, and geographical distribution relative to installations served.

Scenario Development and Analyses

The DON Analysis Group decided to use the optimization model results to begin scenario development for Installation Management, and then sought to successively align the other groups of activities to various Installation Management options to see if these options could increase efficiency between Regional Support Activities. In addition to alignment, it was felt that collocation could potentially lead to further efficiencies as commands identified other like functions. The DON Analysis Group decision for scenarios to be analyzed was based on balance and alignment of the various configurations; having non-contiguous regions was not viewed as a viable option. Three scenarios resulted, two of which included options for the continental United States region consolidation, and one that consolidated Pacific regions. The continental United States options differed in that Northeast was consolidated in one (leaving five continental United States regions exclusive of Navy District Washington) and left open in another (leaving six continental United States regions). Navy District Washington has a unique mission and therefore the DON Analysis Group determined that it would maintain its current status as a region and would not be considered for consolidation. Once the continental United States region configurations were identified, other Regional Support Activities that did not currently align with the regions or had significant capacity imbalances were reviewed and scenarios developed to assess the impact of alignment with the Installation Management Regions. Efforts were also made to stress the potential for relocation of commands from leased space onto government owned property.

The Pacific Installation Management scenario consolidated Installation Management regions in Hawaii and Guam. This was evaluated but rejected because the DON Analysis Group felt realignment might be counter-productive. The elimination of eight personnel did not outweigh the potential disruption and risk to fleet missions. In addition, both regions are working with other Services to maximize opportunities for consolidation.

The continental United States scenario selected as a recommendation minimized the number of regions while maximizing their span of control by eliminating Commander, Navy Regions South, Gulf Coast, and Northeast, and by eliminating Commander, Naval Reserve Forces Command as a region. While the closure scenario as initially analyzed included all of the region closures, in the course of integrating candidate recommendations per the Office of the Secretary of Defense guidance, the Northeast Region and Naval Reserve Installation Management closures were incorporated into the closures of Submarine Base New London and Naval Support Activity New Orleans, respectively.

Naval Facilities Engineering Command commenced consolidation of its subordinate commands prior to BRAC 2005. The Naval Facilities Engineering Command Transformational Plan addressed consolidation of Engineering Field Activities and Divisions with Public Works Centers and regionally managed public works departments. This plan keyed on alignment with the installation management Regions in an effort to further the Chief of Naval Operations’ priority of alignment.
Engineering Field Activity Northeast and Engineering Field Division South were the only naval facilities activities that were not directly addressed by the Naval Facilities Engineering Command Transformational Plan, and did not align to the current existing regions. Multiple scenarios were run simultaneously with the Installation Management regional scenarios to ensure the correct number of Engineering Field Divisions/Engineering Field Activities aligned to the optimized number of regions. Relocating Engineering Field Activity Northeast to Submarine Base New London was removed from consideration after determining that Commander, Navy Region Northeast would be eliminated under the optimized Installation Management regional structure. A scenario closing Engineering Field Activity Northeast and realigning its remaining mission to Engineering Field Division Atlantic showed increased payback. Naval Crane Center was part of the same facility lease as Engineering Field Activity Northeast, and relocation of the Navy Crane Center will allow for closure of this leased facility. The DON Analysis Group determined that savings and other synergies are realized by locating the Crane Center with other like industrial activities in a fleet concentration area. Realignment of Naval Facilities Officer in Charge of Construction Guam and Public Works Center Guam to Hawaii was removed from consideration since the DON Analysis Group decided to discontinue consideration of consolidating Commander, Navy Region Marianas, Guam to Commander, Navy Region Hawaii.

Aligning the reserve readiness commands with the Installation Management regions ensures a reserve voice at each region as well as enabling future savings through consolidation of like functions. Reserve readiness commands were fairly well aligned to future regions with three exceptions: Naval Reserve Readiness Commands South, Northeast and Mid-Atlantic. The scenario relocating Naval Reserve Readiness Command South aligned well with the accompanying regional scenario and was immediately approved. The relocation and realignment of Naval Reserve Readiness Command Northeast to the region did not show any savings and was therefore removed from consideration. The scenario in which alignment to the region is achieved by consolidation of Naval Reserve Readiness Command Northeast with Naval Reserve Readiness Command Mid-Atlantic and subsequent relocation to Norfolk was approved. The scenario resulted in six personnel remaining as a detachment to Navy District Washington, therefore ensuring each region a reserve management support structure.

Because Naval Legal Service Office Central was not aligned with a future region, a scenario for relocation was issued. Personnel savings were small, however, and the DON Analysis Group determined that because of the small size of this activity, its realignment to a region did not require a BRAC action.

The DON Analysis Group also attempted to align all the Marine Corps Recruiting Districts within their respective areas of responsibility. Scenarios were analyzed that relocated the Eighth and Fourth Marine Corps Districts. However, with the high costs of relocation, these scenarios could not be justified as stand-alone recommendations although appropriate placement of the Marine Corps Districts was favored. The Eighth Marine Corps
District was subsequently relocated as part of the closure of Naval Support Activity New Orleans.

Conclusion

The Regional Support Activities analysis was a forward-looking comprehensive review to ensure that Navy support infrastructure will be properly sized and aligned to best serve the Fleet and the Services’ various shore commands, now and in the future. Since 1996, the Navy has endeavored to reduce infrastructure support costs as a means of funding operational needs. This BRAC 2005 effort continues this effort and makes it more inclusive by broadening the regionalization analysis. By aligning all “regional support” commands, synergies will be found and further savings beyond BRAC may be possible through the consolidation of like functions. These recommendations create the right number of Installation Management and Regional Support Activities to ensure minimum management staffs and overhead while maintaining robust support to mission customers. The closure and realignment recommendations increase the average military value of Installation Management regions from 60.86 to 63.92; of Naval Facilities Engineering Field Division/Activities from 65.74 to 72.61; and of Naval Readiness Reserve Commands from 72.03 to 75.68. The net savings to the Department over 20 years for these recommendations is approximately $208.1 million.
ATTACHMENT H-1

RECOMMENDATION FOR CLOSURE

NAVY REGIONS

Recommendation: Realign Naval Air Station Pensacola, FL by consolidating Navy Region Gulf Coast, with Navy Region Southeast at Naval Air Station Jacksonville, FL. Realign Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, TX by consolidating Navy Region South with Navy Region Midwest at Naval Station Great Lakes, IL and Navy Region Southeast at Naval Station Jacksonville, FL.

Justification: In conjunction with other recommendations that consolidate Navy Region Commands, this recommendation will reduce the number of Installation Management regions from twelve to eight, streamlining the regional management structure and allowing for opportunities to collocate other regional entities to further align management concepts and efficiencies. Sufficient Installation Management capability resides within the remaining regions. As part of the closures of Naval Support Activity New Orleans, LA and Submarine Base New London, CT, the Navy Reserve Forces Command installation management function and Navy Region Northeast are also consolidated into the remaining regions, significantly increasing operational efficiency.

This recommendation supports the Department of the Navy establishment of Commander, Navy Installations in order to align shore assets in support of Navy requirements, to find efficiencies through common business practices, and to provide consistent shore installation services to allow the operational commander and major claimants to focus on their primary missions. Consolidating Navy Regions allows for more consistency in span of responsibility and better enables Commander, Navy Installations to provide operational forces support, community support, base support, and mission support to enhance the Navy’s combat power.

Payback: The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is $3.21 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $8.88 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $2.72 million with a payback expected in one year. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $34.55 million.

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 65 jobs (24 direct jobs and 41 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Pensacola-Ferry Pass-Brent, FL Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 144 jobs (59 direct jobs and 85 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011
period in the Corpus Christi, TX Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on these economic regions of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.

**Community Infrastructure:** A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces, and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.

**Environmental Impact:** This recommendation has no impact on air quality; cultural, archeological, or tribal resources; dredging; land use constraints or sensitive resource areas; marine mammals, resources or sanctuaries; noise; threatened and endangered species or critical habitat; waste management; water resources; or wetlands. This recommendation does not impact the costs of environmental restoration, waste management or environmental compliance activities. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the installations in this recommendation has been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to implementation of this recommendation.
ATTACHMENT H-2

RECOMMENDATION FOR CLOSURE

ENGINEERING FIELD DIVISION/ACTIVITY

Recommendation: Close Naval Facilities Engineering Field Division South leased space in Charleston, SC. Consolidate Naval Facilities Engineering Field Division South, Charleston, SC with Naval Facilities Engineering Field Activity Southeast, Jacksonville, FL at Naval Air Station Jacksonville, FL; Naval Facilities Midwest, Great Lakes, IL at Naval Station Great Lakes, IL; and Naval Facilities Atlantic, Norfolk, VA at Naval Station Norfolk, VA. Close Naval Facilities Engineering Field Activity Northeast leased space in Lester, PA. Consolidate Naval Facilities Engineering Field Activity Northeast, Philadelphia, PA, with Naval Facilities Atlantic, Norfolk, VA at Naval Station Norfolk, VA and relocate Navy Crane Center Lester, PA to Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Norfolk, VA.

Justification: This recommendation enhances the Navy’s long-standing initiative to accomplish common management and support on a regionalized basis by consolidating and collocating Naval Facilities commands with the installation management Regions in Jacksonville, FL, Great Lakes, IL and Norfolk, VA. This collocation aligns management concepts and efficiencies and may allow for further consolidation in the future.

Naval Facilities Engineering Field Division South, Naval Facilities Engineering Field Activity Northeast and Navy Crane Center are located in leased space, and this recommendation will achieve savings by moving from leased space to government-owned space. Naval Facilities Engineering Command is undergoing organizational transformation, and this recommendation facilitates the evolution of organizational alignment. This recommendation will result in an increase in the average military value for the remaining Naval Facilities Engineering Field Division/Engineering Field Activity activities, and it relocates the Navy Crane Center to a site with functional synergy.

Payback: The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is $37.85 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a cost of $9.06 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $9.33 million with a payback expected in four years. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $81.81 million.

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1,433 jobs (543 direct jobs and 890 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Charleston-North Charleston, SC Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 0.43 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 447 jobs (247 direct jobs and 200 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Philadelphia, PA Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 0.54 percent of economic area employment.
period in the Philadelphia, PA Metropolitan Division, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on these economic regions of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.

**Community Infrastructure:** A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces, and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.

**Environmental Impact:** Naval Air Station Jacksonville, FL is in Maintenance for Ozone (1-Hour) and Attainment for all other criteria pollutants. No Air Conformity determination will be required. There are potential impacts for cultural, archeological and tribal resources; and wetlands. Naval Station Great Lakes, IL is in Severe Non-Attainment for Ozone (1-Hour) and Moderate Non-Attainment for Ozone (8-Hour). An Air Conformity Determination is not required. Naval Shipyard Norfolk, VA is in Maintenance for Ozone (1-Hour) and Marginal Non-Attainment for Ozone (8-Hour). An Air Conformity Determination is not required. Water Resources will be impacted. There are no anticipated impacts for air quality; dredging; land use constraints or sensitive resource areas; marine mammals, resources or sanctuaries; noise; threatened and endangered species or critical habitat; waste management; or water resources. This recommendation indicates impacts of costs at the installations involved, which reported $8 thousand in costs for environmental compliance. These costs were included in the payback calculation. This recommendation does not otherwise impact the costs of environmental restoration, waste management or environmental compliance activities. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the installations in this recommendation has been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to implementation of this recommendation.
ATTACHMENT H-3

RECOMMENDATION FOR REALIGNMENT

NAVY RESERVE READINESS COMMANDS

Recommendation: Realign Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, TX by consolidating Navy Reserve Readiness Command South with Naval Reserve Readiness Command Midwest at Naval Station Great Lakes, IL. Realign Naval Station Newport, RI and the Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC by consolidating Naval Reserve Readiness Command Northeast with Naval Reserve Readiness Command Mid-Atlantic and relocating the consolidated commands to Naval Station, Norfolk, VA.

Justification: This recommendation enhances the Navy’s long-standing initiative to accomplish common management and support on a regionalized basis, by consolidating and collocating reserve readiness commands with the Installation Management regions. This collocation aligns management concepts and efficiencies and ensures a reserve voice at each region as well as enabling future savings through consolidation of like functions. This recommendation will result in an increase in the average military value for the remaining Naval Reserve Readiness Commands and ensures that each of the Installation Management regions has an organization to manage reserve matters within the region.

Payback: The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is $2.56 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of $30.94 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $6.47 million with a payback expected immediately. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $91.69 million.

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 95 jobs (59 direct jobs and 36 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Fort Worth-Arlington, TX Metropolitan Division, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 114 jobs (49 direct jobs and 65 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA Metropolitan Division, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 62 jobs (37 direct jobs and 25 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV Metropolitan Division, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment.

The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on these economic regions of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.
**Community Infrastructure:** A review of community attributes indicates there are no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces, and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.

**Environmental Impact:** Naval Station Great Lakes, IL is in Severe Non-Attainment for Ozone (1-Hour) and Moderate Non-Attainment for Ozone (8-Hour). An Air Conformity Determination is not required. Naval Station Norfolk, VA is in Maintenance for Ozone (1-Hour) and Marginal Non-Attainment for Ozone (8-Hour). An Air Conformity Determination is not required. This recommendation has no impact on air quality; cultural, archeological, or tribal resources; dredging; land use constraints or sensitive resource areas; marine mammals, resources or sanctuaries; noise; threatened and endangered species or critical habitat; waste management; water resources; or wetlands. This recommendation does not impact the costs of environmental restoration, waste management or environmental compliance activities. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the installations in this recommendation has been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to implementation of this recommendation.
ATTACHMENT I

DESCRIPTION OF ANALYSIS OF
OTHER ACTIVITIES

In identifying the universe of activities subject to Department of the Navy BRAC 2005 analysis, a large number of activities that were not otherwise functionally aligned in the Department of the Navy or by a Joint Cross-Service Group were reviewed to determine the scope of analysis required. These include some groups of activities that were categorized and analyzed in prior BRAC rounds. Review of these activities by their principal mission allowed them to be placed in five logical groups or categories. The categories are: Organizational Follower activities, Dependent activities, Stand Alone activities, Specialized Function activities, and Regional Support activities. The analysis of Regional Support activities is described in Attachment H. The Infrastructure Evaluation Group approved the following definitions and the analysis of the four remaining groups of activities:

The location of Organizational Follower activities is directly tied to current Naval surface/subsurface, ground, and aviation operational forces. Therefore, these activities would relocate if associated operational forces are relocated. No separate analysis of these activities was conducted, although they were included within scenario analysis as appropriate. The following activities were designated as Organizational Followers:

Commander, Airborne Early Warning Wing Pacific, Point Mugu, California
Commander, Airborne Early Warning Wing Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia
Commander, Airborne Electronic Warfare Wing Pacific Whidbey Island, Oak Harbor, Washington
Commander, Amphibious Group Three, San Diego, California
Commander, Amphibious Group Two, Norfolk, Virginia
Commander, Combined Air Bases West, Miramar, California
Commander, Combined Air Bases East, Cherry Point, North Carolina
Commander, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group One, San Diego, California
Commander, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group Two, Norfolk, Virginia
Commander, Fighter Wing Atlantic, Virginia Beach, Virginia (subsequently disestablished)
Commander, Helicopter Tactical Wing Pacific, San Diego, California
Commander, Helicopter Tactical Wing Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia
Commander, Helicopter Anti-Submarine Wing Pacific, San Diego, California
Commander, Helicopter Anti-Submarine Wing Atlantic, Jacksonville, Florida
Commander, Light Helicopter Anti-Submarine Wing Pacific, San Diego, California
Commander, Light Helicopter Anti-Submarine Wing Atlantic, Mayport, Florida
Commander, Mine Warfare Command, Corpus Christi, Texas*
Commander, Naval Surface Group Mid-Pacific, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
Commander, Naval Surface Group Pacific Northwest, Everett, Washington
Commander, Patrol Reconnaissance Group, Norfolk, Virginia
Commander, Patrol Reconnaissance Wing Ten, Oak Harbor, Washington
The activities marked with an asterisk were included in closure or realignment recommendations relating to the installations on which they are based.

Dependent activities also would close, consolidate or relocate if the specific operation they support closes, consolidates or is relocated and no separate analysis of these activities was conducted. These activities included various support, shipyard supervision, and installation management activities. The following activities were designated as dependent:

Commander, Undersea Surveillance Dam Neck, Virginia Beach, Virginia
Commanding General, Western Region Recruiting, San Diego, California
Commanding General, Eastern Region Recruiting, Parris Island, South Carolina
Consolidated Dive Unit, San Diego California
Fleet Technical Support Center Pacific, San Diego, California
Fleet Technical Support Center Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia
Military Sealift Command Pacific, San Diego, California
Military Sealift Command Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia
Military Sealift Command Office, Marianas, Guam
Naval Air Engineering Station Lakehurst, New Jersey (Installation Manager)*
Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Maryland (Installation Manager)*
Naval Station Newport, Rhode Island (Installation Manager)*
Naval Submarine Support Center, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
Naval Support Activity Corona, California*
Naval Support Activity Crane, California
Naval Support Activity Orlando, Florida
Naval Support Activity Panama City, Florida
Naval Support Activity New Orleans, Louisiana*
Naval Support Activity Saratoga Springs, New York
Naval Support Activity Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania
Naval Support Activity Mid-South Millington, Tennessee
Naval Support Activity Norfolk, Virginia
Readiness Support Group, Mayport, Florida
Readiness Support Group, Ingleside, Texas*
Readiness Support Group, Norfolk, Virginia
Regional Support Office, San Diego, California
Southwest Regional Maintenance Center, San Diego, California
Supervisor of Shipbuilding, San Diego, California
Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Groton, Connecticut
Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Jacksonville, Florida
Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Bath, Maine
Supervisor of Shipbuilding Gulf Coast, Pascagoula, Mississippi
Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Newport News, Virginia
Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Portsmouth, Virginia
Supervisor of Shipbuilding Puget Sound, Bremerton, Washington

The activities marked with an asterisk are affected by recommendations relating to the host activity.

Stand Alone activities are not tied to a specific location by operational units and, therefore, could be relocated without impacting operational units. These activities did not lend themselves to capacity or military value comparative analyses because they tend to be “one of a kind”. The following activities were designated as Stand Alone:

Naval Forces Alaska, Juneau, Alaska
Joint InterAgency Task Force West, Alameda, California
Fleet Imaging Command Pacific, Lemoore, California
Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography Center, Monterey, California*
Naval Space Operations Center, Point Mugu, California
Center For Seabees and Facility Engineering, Port Hueneme, California
Naval Facilities Engineering Logistics Center, Port Hueneme, California
Center For Information Technology, San Diego, California
Naval Special Warfare Center, San Diego, California
Center For Submarine Learning, Groton, Connecticut*
Joint Communications Support Element, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida
Center For Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Diving, Panama City, Florida
Center For Naval Aviation Technical Training, Pensacola, Florida
Defense Activity for Non Traditional Educational Services, Pensacola, Florida
Naval Education and Training Professional Development and Technology Center, Pensacola, Florida*
Naval Education and Training Security Assistance Field Activity, Pensacola, Florida
Navy Flight Demonstration Squadron, Pensacola, Florida
Marine Corps Logistics Command, Albany, Georgia
Asian Pacific Center, Honolulu, Hawaii
Naval Service Training Command Great Lakes, Illinois
Commander, Naval Air Reserve Force, New Orleans, Louisiana*
Submarine Maintenance Planning and Procurement Activity, Portsmouth, Kittery, Maine*
Navy Medical Information Management Center, Bethesda, Maryland
Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences, Bethesda, Maryland*
Navy Medical Logistics Command, Fort Detrick, Maryland
Naval Information Warfare Activity, Fort Meade, Maryland
Naval Ice Center, Suitland, Maryland
Naval Oceanography Center, Stennis Space Center, Mississippi
Marine Corps Support Activity, Kansas City, Missouri*
Navy Crane Center, Lester, Pennsylvania*
Navy Sea Logistics Center, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania
Navy Support Information System Activity, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania
Navy Warfare Development Command, Newport, Rhode Island*
Navy Manpower Analysis Center, Millington, Tennessee
Commander, Mobile Mine Assembly Group, Corpus Christi, Texas*
Fleet Surveillance Support Command Northwest, Chesapeake, Virginia
Joint Warfare Analysis Center, Dahlgren, Virginia
Headquarters, Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia
Center For Naval Engineering, Norfolk, Virginia
Center For Naval Leadership, Norfolk, Virginia
Camp Allen, Norfolk, Virginia
Naval Network Warfare Command, Norfolk, Virginia
Naval Construction Forces Command, Little Creek, Norfolk, Virginia
Naval Safety Center, Norfolk, Virginia
Surface Warfare Development Group Little Creek, Norfolk, Virginia
Fleet Information Warfare Center, Norfolk, Virginia
Navy Operational Logistics Support Center, Norfolk, Virginia
Navy Personnel Development Command, Norfolk, Virginia
Navy Exchange Command, Norfolk, Virginia
President, Board of Inspection and Survey, Norfolk, Virginia
Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia
Human Performance Center, Dam Neck, Virginia Beach, Virginia
Navy Ophthalmology Support and Training Activity, Yorktown, Virginia
Board for Correction of Naval Records, Washington, DC
Navy Council of Personnel Boards, Washington, DC
Marine Barracks, Washington, DC
Naval Media Center, Washington, DC
Naval History Center, Washington, DC
Navy Civil Law Support Activity, Washington, DC

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The activities marked with an asterisk are affected by recommendations related to the host activity.

Specialized Function activities are groups of activities (therefore not stand alone) performing similar actions. The groups are identified as follows:

**Communications:**
- Naval Computer and Telecommunications Station, San Diego, California
- Naval Computer and Telecommunications Station, Jacksonville, Florida
- Naval Computer and Telecommunications Station, Guam
- Naval Computer and Telecommunications Area Master Station Pacific, Honolulu, Hawaii
- Naval Computer and Telecommunications Area Master Station Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia
- Naval Computer and Telecommunications Station Puget Sound, Silverdale, Washington

**Meteorology and Oceanography:**
- Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Facility Pacific, San Diego, California
- Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Facility Atlantic, Jacksonville, Florida
- Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Center Pacific, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
- Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Center Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia
- Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Facility Pacific, Whidbey Island, Oak Harbor, Washington

**Integrated Undersea Surveillance System:**
- Naval Ocean Processing Facility Dam Neck, Virginia Beach, Virginia
- Naval Ocean Processing Facility Whidbey Island, Oak Harbor, Washington

For this category of activities the Department of the Navy (DON) Analysis Group examined capacity to determine if there was excess.

**Data Call Development**

A special data call was issued for all of the above activities in order to analyze the mission, location impact, relationships with other commands, and any specially configured equipment that would impact the relocation of the activity, if required. This data call was also used to ensure the categorization of the activity was correct and to identify any issues relating to bases where these activities were located.
The original capacity data call did not define appropriate capacity measures for these types of activities, except for the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System Specialized Function, which used the same metric as BRAC 1995. Additional capacity data calls were issued for Meteorology and Oceanography and Communications activities after consultation with Navy technical experts concerning the mission and function of these activities.

**Capacity Analysis**

Certified data from the two Integrated Undersea Surveillance System activities indicated that the activities could not be consolidated into a single site. The DON Analysis Group determined since no excess capacity existed and there were no scenarios to close the two installations where the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System activities are located, no further action was required.

The Communications capacity was based on the percent of usage of the major frequency bands at the Communications activities and their detachments. Review of the data indicated that there are significant periods of time (20 to 100 percent) where the entire band is used at or near full capacity, with the exception of the High Frequency spectrum. However, the DON Analysis Group recognized that, since High Frequency operates as a satellite systems backup and is occasionally used at or near full capacity, no reduction in High Frequency capacity was warranted. The DON Analysis Group determined since no excess capacity existed and there were no scenarios to close the installations where Communications activities are located, no further action was required.

The Meteorology and Oceanography Facilities and Centers capacity results indicated significant excess facility capacity, irrespective of the number of assigned personnel. The DON Analysis Group recognized that the Department of the Navy is developing a reorganization initiative designed to centralize product line support, establish primary Meteorology and Oceanography Centers, and downsize the assigned personnel at detachments to appropriate support levels. Therefore, the DON Analysis Group determined that the planned reorganization obviated the need for any BRAC action.

**Scenario Development and Analysis**

As described in Attachment E, the DON Analysis Group and Infrastructure Evaluation Group analyzed Education and Training scenarios pertaining to Naval Station Newport to determine which activities should remain at or be relocated to Naval Station Newport to increase synergies. During this analysis, Commander, Fleet Forces Command suggested to the DON Analysis Group that Navy Warfare Development Command could be collocated with Commander, Fleet Forces Command to better place that activity with its customers. The DON Analysis Group proposed a scenario to relocate Navy Warfare Development Command to Naval Support Activity, Norfolk, VA. The initial COBRA analysis indicated that this scenario had high military construction costs for new facilities, so a second scenario data call was issued for relocation to Naval Station Norfolk, VA. The analysis indicated that Naval Station Norfolk has adequate available capacity to accommodate Navy Warfare Development Command by rehabilitating existing facilities at a
lower cost vice requiring new construction. Navy Warfare Development Command makes extensive use of contractors and that unique aspect was taken into account when determining facility requirements during analysis of both scenarios.

Conclusion

Review of these activities was undertaken to ensure that major mission functions at all Navy and Marine Corps installations were appropriately evaluated during the BRAC 2005 process. The review confirmed that these activities tend to be components of larger installations or followers of operational forces or other operations (i.e. shipbuilding, installation management, etc.). As such, they were subject to being relocated, combined, and disestablished as a result of separate BRAC actions that addressed the major missions of the installations upon which they reside. Examples include movement of the Navy Crane Center at Lester, PA and the Submarine Maintenance Planning and Procurement Activity at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Kittery, ME. In other cases, relocation of the mission activities allows closure of the installation management function, such as Naval Support Activities at Corona, CA and New Orleans, LA.
ATTACHMENT I-1

RECOMMENDATION FOR REALIGNMENT
NAVAL STATION, NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

Recommendation: Realign Naval Station Newport, RI by relocating the Navy Warfare Development Command to Naval Station Norfolk, VA.

Justification: Navy Warfare Development Command performs the functions of warfare innovation, concept development, fleet and joint experimentation, and the synchronization and dissemination of doctrine. Relocating the Navy Warfare Development Command to Norfolk better aligns the Navy’s warfare development organization with those of the other joint force components and Joint Forces Command, as well as places Navy Warfare Development Command in better proximity to Fleet Forces Command and the Second Fleet Battle Lab it supports, resulting in substantial travel cost savings to conduct experimentation events. Location of Navy Warfare Development Command in Hampton Roads area places it in proximity to Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, VA and Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA, as well as in closer proximity to the Air Force Doctrine Center at Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, which furthers joint interoperability concepts.

Payback: The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is $11.75 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a cost of $8.33 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $1.02 million with a payback expected in 13 years. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over the next 20 years is a savings of $2.06 million.

Economic Impact: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 490 jobs (200 direct, and 290 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on this economic region of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.

Community Infrastructure: A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces, and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.

Environmental Impact: Naval Station Norfolk, VA is in Maintenance for Ozone (1-Hour) and Marginal Non-attainment for Ozone (8-Hour) but an Air Conformity Determination is not required. There are potential impacts for the environmental resource areas of cultural, archeological, or tribal resources and wetlands. No impacts are anticipated for dredging; land use constraints or sensitive resources areas; marine mammals, resources or sanctuaries;
noise; threatened and endangered species or critical habitat; waste management; or water resources. This recommendation indicates impacts of costs at the installations involved, which reported $75 thousand in costs for environmental compliance activities. These costs were included in the payback calculation. This recommendation does not otherwise impact the costs of environmental restoration, waste management or environmental compliance activities. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the installations in this recommendation has been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to implementation of this recommendation.
ATTACHMENT J

FENCeline Closures

Joint Cross-Service Groups developed recommendations within their functional areas for review and approval by the Infrastructure Steering Group and Infrastructure Executive Committee. These recommendations resulted in the movement of workload, equipment and personnel in or out of individual military installations but did not, by themselves, result in the closure of any Department of the Navy installations. The Department of the Navy (DON) Analysis Group, therefore, determined that a methodology was needed to evaluate whether Department of the Navy fenceline closure scenarios should be issued. The Department of the Navy identified 419 installation “fencelines” (i.e., a separate parcel of property on which one or more Department of the Navy reporting activities are located) or installations for review under this methodology.

The methodology developed involved monitoring and evaluating Joint Cross-Service Group scenarios to determine their aggregate effect on a Department of the Navy fenceline. Where the DON Analysis Group determined that the aggregate of Joint Cross-Service Group actions was of such magnitude that it affected the “critical mass” of a fenceline, i.e., impact on the major mission, a substantial number of personnel, and/or a substantial amount of acreage or square feet, a Department of the Navy fenceline closure scenario was developed. The Infrastructure Evaluation Group made the determination whether to recommend a closure or realignment of a Department of the Navy fenceline.

Based upon this approach, six Department of the Navy installation fencelines were recommended for closure/realignment:

- Marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow, California (realignment)
- Naval Support Activity, Corona, California
- Navy Supply Corps Schools, Athens, Georgia
- Naval Support Activity, New Orleans, Louisiana
- Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, Kittery, Maine
- Marine Corps Support Activity, Kansas City Missouri

The Marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow, CA was evaluated for closure. Based on the strategic need to maintain ground depot maintenance operations at a location in the western United States to rapidly support the Pacific forces, the Marine Corps Logistics Base was retained. However, the analysis did lead to the realignment of base operations, logistics support, and depot maintenance functions to gain efficiencies.

Other fencelines were considered for closure due to the removal of their major mission components, but did not become final recommendations. Arlington Service Center, Arlington, VA was considered for closure but retained as an economical alternative to new construction to accommodate leased space being vacated in the National Capital Region under a Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group recommendation. Naval Air Station Point Mugu, CA was considered for closure, but retained due to its relatively
unencumbered air space to support operations; to support movement from Naval Support Activity Corona, CA; and for potential consolidation of Coast Guard activities on the West Coast. The Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA was considered for closure, but the Infrastructure Executive Council decision to not privatize Service post-graduate education negated the closure recommendation.
ATTACHMENT J-1

RECOMMENDATION FOR REALIGNMENT

MARINE CORPS LOGISTICS BASE, BARSTOW, CALIFORNIA


Justification: This recommendation follows the strategy of minimizing sites using maximum capacity of 1.5 shifts while maintaining a west coast depot maintenance presence at Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow to provide west coast operating forces with a close, responsive source for depot maintenance support. Required capacity to support workloads and core requirements for the DoD is relocated to other DoD Centers of Industrial and Technical Excellence, thereby increasing the military value of depot maintenance performed at these sites. This recommendation decreases the cost of depot maintenance operations across DoD through consolidation and elimination of 30 percent of duplicate overhead structures required to operate multiple depot maintenance activities. This recommendation supports transformation of DoD’s depot maintenance operations by increasing the utilization of existing capacity by up to 150 percent while maintaining capability to support future force structure. This recommendation also results in utilization of DoD capacity to facilitate performance of interservice workload. In addition, based on present and future wartime surge projections, Marine Corps Logistics Center Barstow will establish an additional 428 thousand hours of amphibious vehicle capacity.

This recommendation along with other recommendations affecting supply and storage functions, optimizes the depot maintenance operations at Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow.

Payback: The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is $26.02 million. The net of all costs and savings during the implementation period is a savings of $56.49 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $18.40 million with an immediate payback. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $230.61 million.
Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 796 jobs (409 direct jobs and 387 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on this economic region of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.

Community Infrastructure: A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces, and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.

Environmental Impact: Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany, GA is in Attainment although Title V permit modifications will be required. There are potential impacts to cultural, archeological, or tribal resources; threatened and endangered species or critical habitat; waste management; and wetlands. Anniston Army Depot, AL is in Attainment. There are impacts anticipated for threatened and endangered species or critical habitat. Letterkenny Army Depot, PA is in Marginal Non-attainment for Ozone (1-Hour and 8-Hour) and an Air Conformity determination is required. Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA is in Moderate Non-attainment for Ozone (1-Hour) and an Air Conformity determination is required. No impacts are anticipated for the remaining resource areas of dredging; land use constraints or sensitive resource areas; marine mammals, resources or sanctuaries; noise; or water resources.

This recommendation indicates impacts of costs at the installations, which report $884 thousand in costs for waste management and environmental compliance. These costs were included in payback calculation. This recommendation does not otherwise impact the costs of environmental restoration, waste management or environmental compliance activities. The aggregate environmental impacts of all the recommended BRAC actions affecting the installations in this recommendation have been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to implementation of this recommendation.
Recommendation: Close Naval Support Activity Corona, CA. Relocate Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Corona, CA to Naval Base Ventura County (Naval Air Station Point Mugu), CA.

Justification: The Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Corona performs three required missions for Department of the Navy (Independent Assessment Capability, Metrology and Calibration Laboratories, and Tactical Aircrew Combat Training System Ranges). It was analyzed under 11 Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation functions (Air Platforms Development & Acquisition; Air Platforms Test & Evaluation; Ground Vehicles Test and Evaluation; Information Systems Technology Development & Acquisition; Information Systems Technology Test & Evaluation; Sea Vehicles Development & Acquisition; Sea Vehicles Test & Evaluation; Sensors, Electronics, and Electronic Warfare Development & Acquisition; Sensors, Electronics, and Electronic Warfare Test & Evaluation; Weapons Technology Development & Acquisition; and Weapons Technology Test & Evaluation). In each functional area, Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Corona’s quantitative military value scores fell in the bottom half of facilities performing the same function, and thus were reviewed for relocation and/or consolidation with like functions. The Department of the Navy determined it would lose a critical capability if the 11 functions were relocated to a variety of locations, since this would fracture the full spectrum warfare center and independent assessment capability. Considering the overall military value and the fact that Naval Support Activity Corona was a single function facility, the Department reviewed the possibility of relocating the Naval Surface Warfare Center functions to a multi-functional location with the capability to host these functions. Relocation of Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Corona to Naval Air Station Point Mugu collocates it with other Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation activities and with fleet assets at Naval Air Station Point Mugu. This consolidation of space will provide a more efficient organization with greater synergies and increased effectiveness.

Relocation of Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Corona Research, Development & Acquisition, and Test & Evaluation functions to Naval Air Station Point Mugu removes the primary mission from Naval Support Activity Corona and eliminates or moves the entirety of the workforce at Naval Support Activity Corona except for those personnel associated with the base operations support function. As a result, retention of Naval Support Activity Corona is no longer necessary.

Payback: The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is $80.18 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a cost of $65.47 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $6.03 million with a payback expected in 15 years.
The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $0.36 million.

**Economic Impact on Communities:** Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1,796 jobs (892 direct jobs and 904 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 0.12 percent of economic area employment. The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on this economic region of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.

**Community Infrastructure:** A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces, and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.

**Environmental Impact:** Naval Air Station Point Mugu, CA is in Severe Non-attainment for Ozone (1-Hour) but no Air Conformity Determination will be required. There are potential impacts for cultural, archeological, or tribal resources; threatened and endangered species; waste management and wetlands. No impacts are anticipated for dredging; land use constraints or sensitive resource areas; marine mammals, resources, or sanctuaries; noise or water resources. This recommendation indicates impacts of costs at the installations involved, which reported $410 thousand in costs for waste management and environmental compliance. These costs were included in the payback calculation. This recommendation does not otherwise impact the costs of environmental restoration, waste management or environmental compliance activities. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the installations in this recommendation has been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to implementation of this recommendation.
ATTACHMENT J-3

RECOMMENDATION FOR CLOSURE

NAVY SUPPLY CORPS SCHOOL, ATHENS, GEORGIA

Recommendation: Close the naval installation at Athens, GA. Relocate the Navy Supply Corps School and the Center for Service Support to Naval Station Newport, RI. Disestablish the Supply Corps Museum.

Justification: This recommendation closes a single-function installation and relocates its activities to a multi-functional installation with higher military value. Naval Station Newport has a significantly higher military value than Navy Supply Corps School and the capacity to support the Navy Supply Corps School training mission with existing infrastructure, making relocation of Navy Supply Corps School to Naval Station Newport desirable and cost efficient. Relocation of this function supports the Department of the Navy initiative to create a center for officer training at Naval Station Newport.

Center for Service Support, which establishes curricula for other service support training, is relocated to Naval Station Newport with the Navy Supply Corps School to capitalize on existing resource and personnel efficiencies.

Relocation of the Navy Supply Corps School and Center for Service Support to Naval Station Newport removes the primary mission from the naval installation at Athens and removes or relocates the entirety of the Navy workforce at the naval installation at Athens, except for those personnel associated with base support functions. As a result, retention of the naval installation at Athens is no longer required.

Payback: The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is $23.79 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a cost of $13.56 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $3.54 million with a payback expected in 7 years. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $21.80 million.

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 831 jobs (513 direct jobs and 318 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Athens-Clark County, GA Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 0.86 percent of economic area employment. The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on this economic region of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.

Community Infrastructure: A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces, and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.
**Environmental Impact:** Naval Station Newport, RI is in Serious Non-attainment for Ozone (1-Hour), however, an Air Conformity Determination will not be required. There are potential impacts for cultural, archeological, or tribal resources; and water resources. No impacts are anticipated for dredging; land use constraints or sensitive resource areas; marine mammals, resources, or sanctuaries; noise; threatened and endangered species; waste management; or wetlands. This recommendation will impact environmental costs at the installations involved, which reported $30 thousand in costs for waste management and environmental compliance. These costs were included in the payback calculation. This recommendation does not otherwise impact the costs of environmental restoration, waste management or environmental compliance activities. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the installations in this recommendation has been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to implementation of this recommendation.
ATTACHMENT J-4

RECOMMENDATION FOR CLOSURE

NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY, NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA

Recommendation: Close Naval Support Activity New Orleans, LA. Relocate the Navy Reserve Personnel Command and the Enlisted Placement and Management Center to Naval Support Activity Mid-South, Millington, TN and consolidate with the Navy Personnel Command at Naval Support Activity Mid-South, Millington, TN. Relocate the Naval Reserve Recruiting Command to Naval Support Activity Mid-South, Millington, TN and consolidate with the Navy Recruiting Command at Naval Support Activity Mid-South, Millington, TN. Relocate the Navy Reserve Command to Naval Support Activity Norfolk, VA, except for the installation management function, which consolidates with Navy Region Southwest, Naval Station San Diego, CA, Navy Region Northwest, Submarine Base Bangor, WA, and Navy Region Midwest, Naval Station Great Lakes, IL. Relocate Headquarters, Marine Forces Reserve to Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans, LA, and consolidate with Marine Corps Reserve Support Command element of Mobilization Command, which is relocating from Marine Corps Support Activity, Kansas City, MO. Relocate Naval Air Systems Command Support Equipment Facility New Orleans, LA, Navy Recruiting District New Orleans, LA and the Navy Reserve Center New Orleans, LA to Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans, LA. Relocate 8th Marine Corps District to Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, TX. Consolidate Naval Support Activity New Orleans, LA installation management function with Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans, LA.

Justification: The collocation of the Navy Reserve Personnel Command, the Enlisted Placement Management Center, and Naval Reserve Recruiting Command at Naval Support Activity Mid-South, Millington creates a Navy Human Resources Center of Excellence, improves personnel life-cycle management, and furthers active and reserve component total force integration and effectiveness. This recommendation consolidates Reserve personnel and recruiting headquarters with like active component functions in a single location and eliminates stand-alone headquarters. In addition, activities of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Navy Manpower Analysis Center and Navy Personnel Research and Development Center are currently located at Naval Support Activity Mid-South.

The relocation of the Navy Reserve Command, comprised of Navy Reserve Forces Command, Navy Reserve Forces, and Naval Reserve Air Forces, to Naval Support Activity Norfolk, VA will enhance internal active and reserve component interoperability. By locating the reserve headquarters elements on the same base with Fleet Forces Command, its active component headquarters, this recommendation will significantly increase interaction between the two components, produce a reduction in force size by eliminating duplicative staff, and allow for further decrease in staffing size for common support functions. The consolidation of the Navy Reserve Command installation management functions with other Navy Regional organizations is part of the Department of the Navy efforts to streamline regional management structure and to institute consistent business practices.
The relocation of Headquarters, Marine Forces Reserve and the Marine Corps Reserve Support Command element of Mobilization Command to Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans maintains a central location for management of widely-dispersed Marine Corps Reserve elements and allows consolidation of Marine Reserve management functions. Marine Corps Reserve Support Command is currently the only geographically separated element of the Marine Forces Reserve. Consolidation with its Headquarters will significantly increase interaction and operational efficiency as well as eliminate duplicative staff. Location of this consolidated headquarters at a joint reserve base will enhance joint service interoperability concepts.

Relocation of 8th Marine Corps District to Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth moves this management organization within their geographic area of responsibility. It also places them at a major transportation node with reduced average distance to managed recruiting stations.

Relocating these functions removes the primary missions from Naval Support Activity New Orleans, and eliminates or moves the entirety of the workforce except for those personnel associated with the base operations support function and a number of smaller tenant activities. As a result, retention of Naval Support Activity New Orleans is no longer required. Accordingly, this recommendation closes the installation and eliminates or relocates the remaining base operations support personnel and tenant activities. Base operations support organizations and tenant activity services currently shared between Naval Support Activity New Orleans and Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans consolidate at Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans to support the remaining area population.

**Payback:** The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is $164.59 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a cost of $86.12 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $36.50 million with a payback expected in three years. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $276.42 million.

**Economic Impact on Communities:** Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 2,096 jobs (1,192 direct jobs and 904 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 0.27 percent of the economic area employment. The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on this economic region of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.

**Community Infrastructure:** A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces, and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.
Environmental Impact: Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans, LA is in Attainment. There are potential impacts to waste management and wetlands. Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, TX is in Serious Non-attainment for Ozone (1-Hour) and in Moderate Non-attainment for Ozone (8-Hour), however, no Air Conformity Determination will be required. No impacts are anticipated for air quality; cultural, archeological, or tribal resources; dredging; land use constraints or sensitive resource areas; marine mammals, resources, or sanctuaries; noise; threatened and endangered species; or water resources. Naval Support Activity Mid-South Millington, TN, Naval Station San Diego, CA, Submarine Base Bangor, WA, Naval Station Great Lakes, IL and Naval Support Activity Norfolk, VA report that there are no impacts anticipated for air quality; cultural, archeological, or tribal resources; dredging; land use constraints or sensitive resource areas; marine mammals, resources or sanctuaries; noise; threatened and endangered species; waste management; water resources; or wetlands. This recommendation indicates impacts of costs at the installations involved, which reported $262 thousand in costs for waste management and environmental compliance. These costs were included in the payback calculation. This recommendation does not otherwise impact the costs of environmental restoration, waste management or environmental restoration. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the installations in this recommendation has been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to implementation of this recommendation.
ATTACHMENT J-5

RECOMMENDATION FOR CLOSURE

NAVAL SHIPYARD, PORTSMOUTH, KITTERY, MAINE

Recommendation: Close the Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, Kittery, ME. Relocate the ship depot repair function to Naval Shipyard Norfolk, VA, Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility Pearl Harbor, HI and Naval Shipyard Puget Sound, WA. Relocate the Submarine Maintenance, Engineering, Planning and Procurement Command to Naval Shipyard Norfolk.

Justification: This recommendation retains one nuclear-capable shipyard on each coast, plus sufficient shipyard capacity to support forward deployed assets. There are four Naval Shipyards performing depot-level ship refueling, modernization, overhaul and repair work. There is sufficient excess capacity in the aggregate across the four shipyards to close either Naval Shipyard Pearl Harbor or Naval Shipyard Portsmouth. There is insufficient excess capacity to close any other shipyard or combination of shipyards. Naval Shipyard Portsmouth was selected for closure, rather than Naval Shipyard Pearl Harbor, because it is the only closure which could both eliminate excess capacity and satisfy retention of strategically-placed shipyard capability. Planned force structure and force positioning adjustments reflected in the 20-year Force Structure Plan led to the selection of Naval Shipyard Portsmouth as the preferred closure candidate between the two sites. Additional savings, not included in the payback analysis, are anticipated from reduced unit costs at the receiving shipyards because of the higher volume of work.

Relocating the ship depot repair function and Submarine Maintenance, Engineering, Planning and Procurement Command removes the primary missions from Naval Shipyard Portsmouth and eliminates or moves the entirety of the workforce at Naval Shipyard Portsmouth except for those personnel associated with the base operations support function. Naval Shipyard Portsmouth had a low military value compared to operational homeports, and, its berthing capacity is not required to support the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, closure of Naval Shipyard Portsmouth is justified.

Payback: The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is $448.43 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a savings of $21.42 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $128.57 million with a payback expected in four years. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $1.26 billion.

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 9,166 jobs (4,510 direct jobs and 4,656 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Portland-South Portland-Biddeford, ME Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 2.76 percent of the economic area
employment. The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on this economic region of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.

**Community Infrastructure:** A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces, and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.

**Environmental Impact:** Naval Shipyard Norfolk, VA is in Maintenance for Ozone (1-Hour) and Marginal Non-attainment for Ozone (8-Hour). An Air Conformity Determination is required. There are potential impacts for cultural, archeological or tribal resources; waste management; and water resources. Naval Station Bremerton, WA is in Attainment. There are potential impacts for cultural, archeological or tribal resources; waste management; and wetlands. Naval Station Pearl Harbor, HI is in Attainment. No impacts are anticipated for the environmental resource areas of dredging; land use constraints or sensitive resources; marine mammals, resources, or sanctuaries; noise; or threatened and endangered species. This recommendation indicates impacts of costs at the installations involved, which reported $4.9 million in costs for waste management and environmental compliance. These costs were included in the payback calculation. Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, the closing installation, reports $47.1 million in costs for environmental restoration. Because the Department has a legal obligation to perform environmental restoration regardless of whether an installation is closed, realigned, or remains open, this cost is not included in the payback calculation. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the installations in this recommendation has been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to implementation of this recommendation.
ATTACHMENT J-6

RECOMMENDATION FOR CLOSURE

MARINE CORPS SUPPORT ACTIVITY, KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI


Justification: The relocation of Marine Corps Reserve Support Command and its parent command, Headquarters, Marine Forces Reserve to Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans maintains a central location for management of widely dispersed Marine Corps Reserve elements and allows consolidation of Marine Reserve management functions. Marine Reserve Support Command is currently the only geographically separated element of the Marine Forces Reserve. Consolidation with its headquarters will significantly increase interaction and operational efficiency as well as eliminate duplicative staff. Location of this consolidated headquarters at a joint reserve base will enhance joint service interoperability concepts.

Relocating these functions removes the primary missions from Marine Corps Support Activity Kansas City and eliminates or moves the entirety of the workforce except for those personnel associated with the 9th Marine Corps District and 24th Marine Regiment. This recommendation closes the Marine Corps Support Activity but retains an enclave for these organizations.

Payback: The total estimated one-time cost to the Department of Defense to implement this recommendation is $23.28 million. The net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a cost of $8.03 million. Annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation are $5.83 million with a payback expected in three years. The net present value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $49.83 million.

Economic Impact on Communities: Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 583 jobs (333 direct jobs and 250 indirect jobs) over the 2006-2011 period in the Kansas City, MO-KS Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is less than 0.1 percent of economic area employment. The aggregate economic impact of all recommended actions on this economic region of influence was considered and is at Appendix B of Volume I.

Community Infrastructure: A review of community attributes indicates no issues regarding the ability of the infrastructure of the communities to support missions, forces, and personnel. There are no known community infrastructure impediments to implementation of all recommendations affecting the installations in this recommendation.
**Environmental Impact:** Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans, LA is in Attainment. There are potential impacts to water resources. No impacts are anticipated for air quality; cultural, archeological or tribal resources; dredging; land use constraints or sensitive resource areas; marine mammals, resources or sanctuaries; noise; threatened and endangered species; waste management; or wetlands. This recommendation indicates impacts of costs at the installations involved, which reported $228 thousand in costs for waste management and environmental compliance. These costs were included in the payback calculation. This recommendation does not otherwise impact the costs of environmental restoration, waste management or environmental compliance activities. The aggregate environmental impact of all recommended BRAC actions affecting the installations in this recommendation has been reviewed. There are no known environmental impediments to implementation of this recommendation.
ATTACHMENT K

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY ACTIVITIES AND INSTALLATIONS AFFECTED BY JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUP AND OTHER SERVICE RECOMMENDATIONS

The Joint Cross-Service Groups developed candidate recommendations within their functional areas for review and approval by the Infrastructure Support Group and the Infrastructure Executive Council. These Joint Cross-Service Group recommendations impacted numerous Department of the Navy activities and installations. In addition to the Joint Cross-Service Group recommendations, the Air Force and Army also developed recommendations that impacted Department of the Navy activities or installations.

For completeness, this section identifies those Department of the Navy activities and installations that are included in a Joint Cross-Service Group, Air Force, or Army recommendation. This section does not include closures or realignments already discussed in Attachments A-J. The table below lists those Department of the Navy activities and installations impacted by a with Joint Cross-Service Group, Air Force, or Army recommendation. The impact is shown as gain, lose, or move. To understand the specific actions refer to the appropriate Joint Cross-Service Group, Air Force or Army volume of the BRAC 2005 report.

Department of the Navy Activities and Installations Affected by Joint Cross-Service Group, Air Force, or Army Recommendations.

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