Chapter 5
Sizing and Selectively Modernizing Forces for an Era of Uncertainty
A key challenge for the United States as a global power is that it cannot easily predict future contingencies; it must be prepared to meet a very wide range of them. Consequently, the United States must maintain a broad array of military forces and capabilities. During the QDR, the Department considered options for reducing U.S. forces, but decided that doing so in the near-term could imperil America’s ability to meet its commitments and would place unacceptable demands on those in uniform.
The Department measures the degree to which U.S. forces are able to meet military objectives in the near term based on operational risk. To determine operational risk, the Department assesses its ability to defend the United States, deter forward in critical areas, swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts, and conduct a limited number of small-scale contingencies. To reduce operational risk, the FY 2003 defense budget and associated Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) provide a broad portfolio of conventional military capabilities that are essential to conducting air, land, and sea operations.
The conventional force structure includes land, naval, aviation, mobility and Special Operations Forces (SOF), less nuclear-capable elements. These forces conduct a full range of missions in support of the defense strategy. Employed in various mixes, conventional forces exert U.S. military power in operations ranging in size from major combat operations to smaller-scale contingencies. Conventional forces also contribute capabilities vital to the conduct of peacetime operations. Given the wide spectrum of missions they perform, conventional forces are key to meeting the objectives established in the QDR for homeland defense, forward deterrence, warfighting and other conventional operations.
The sections that follow discuss the composition of U.S. conventional forces and the major purposes for which they are employed. The discussion begins with an overview of the standards identified in the QDR for sizing and structuring conventional forces. A subsequent section examines the contributions made by reserve forces in carrying out the defense strategy. A final section describes the major elements of the conventional force structure and the capabilities they provide.
Force Planning Construct and Missions
Paradigm Shift in Force Planning
During the 2001 QDR, the DoD civilian and military leadership approached the force planning task acutely aware of the need to provide, over time, a richer set of military options across the operational spectrum than is available today and to ensure that U.S. forces have the means to adapt quickly and effectively to surprise. The new force-sizing construct specifically shapes forces to:
In doing so, DoD will maintain sufficient force generation capability and a strategic reserve to mitigate risks.
Evaluating the force size needed to satisfy these objectives will require an aggressive reassessment of existing contingency planning guidance and, ultimately, war plans. This process will unfold during CY 2002.
This new construct which supports the defense strategy has four underlying elements.
First, the construct places new emphasis on the unique operational demands associated with the defense of the United States and restores the defense of the United States as the Department's primary mission.
Second, the approach shifts the focus of U.S. force planning from optimizing for conflicts in two particular regions Northeast and Southwest Asia to building a portfolio of capabilities that is robust across the spectrum of possible force requirements, both functional and geographical. This approach to planning responds to the capabilities-based strategy previously outlined. The approach to force planning focuses more on how an adversary might fight than on who the adversary might be and where a war might occur. The shift will refocus planners on the growing range of capabilities that adversaries might possess or could develop. The new construct requires planners to define the military objectives associated with defeating aggression or coercion in a variety of potential scenarios in addition to conventional cross-border invasions. It calls for identifying, developing and fielding capabilities that, for a given level of forces, would accomplish each mission at an acceptable level of risk as established by the President and Secretary of Defense.
Third, the new construct serves as a bridge from today’s force, developed around the threat-based, Two Major Theater War construct, to a future, transformed force. The U.S. will continue to meet its commitments around the world, including in Southwest and Northeast Asia, by maintaining the ability to defeat aggression in two critical areas in overlapping timeframes. The U.S. is not abandoning planning for two conflicts. On the contrary, DoD is changing the concept altogether by planning for victory across the spectrum of possible conflict.
Fourth, the new construct for the first time takes into account the number and nature of the tasks actually assigned to the Armed Forces. Unlike previous approaches, this construct explicitly calls for sizing the force for defending the homeland, forward deterrence, warfighting missions, and the conduct of smaller-scale contingency operations. Consequently, the construct should better account for issues related to force requirements driven by forward presence and rotational issues. It should also better address requirements for low-density/high-demand (LD/HD) assets, enabling forces (such as transport aircraft), and the appropriate mix of Active, Guard and Reserve forces.
Defense of the United States
The highest priority of the United States military is to defend the nation from any and all enemies. The United States will maintain sufficient military forces to protect its people, territory, and critical defense-related infrastructure against attacks from outside its borders, as U.S. law permits. U.S. forces will provide strategic deterrence, air and missile defense, and uphold U.S. commitments under NORAD. In addition and as directed, DoD components are responsible, under U.S. law, to support U.S. civil authorities in managing the consequences of natural and man-made disasters and NBC-related events on U.S. territory. Finally, the U.S. military will be prepared to respond in a decisive manner to acts of international terrorism committed on U.S. territory or the territory of an ally.
The safety of America’s citizens at home can only be ensured through effective cooperation among the many federal departments and agencies and state and local governments that have homeland security responsibilities. The roles, missions, and responsibilities of the many organizations and agencies involved in national preparedness must be clearly delineated through an integrated inter-agency process. The Office of Homeland Security, which is responsible for overseeing and coordinating a comprehensive national strategy to safeguard the United States against terrorism and responding to any attacks that may come, is leading this important process.
It is clear from the diverse set of agencies involved in responding to the events of September 11 that the Department of Defense does not and cannot have the sole responsibility for homeland security. DoD is working to address command relationships and responsibilities for homeland security and homeland defense. The decision to propose a Unified Commander responsible for homeland defense and to organize the Office of the Secretary of Defense accordingly are important steps. The Department is committed to working through an integrated inter-agency process that will identify the homeland security needs of the Nation. DoD will identify the resources and forces to support the Nation’s homeland defense requirements.
DoD is examining the roles and responsibilities of its Active, Guard and Reserve forces to ensure they are properly organized, trained, equipped and postured to provide for the effective defense of the United States.
Deter Forward
As a global power, the United States has important geopolitical interests around the world. The Department’s new planning construct calls for maintaining regionally tailored forces forward stationed and deployed in Europe, Northeast Asia, the Asian littoral and the Middle East/Southwest Asia to assure allies and friends, counter coercion and deter aggression against the United States, its forces, allies and friends. As this strategy and force planning approach are implemented, the United States will strengthen its forward deterrent posture. In this realm, security cooperation is a vital element of forward deterrence that links DoD's strategic direction with that of allies and friends, enhances U.S. military access and interoperability, and expands the range of pre-conflict options. Over time, U.S. forces will be tailored increasingly to maintain favorable regional balances, in concert with U.S. allies and friends, with the aim of swiftly defeating attacks with only modest reinforcement and, where necessary, assuring access for follow-on forces. A key objective of U.S. transformation efforts over time is to increase the capability of its forward forces, thereby improving their deterrent effect and possibly allowing for reallocation of forces now dedicated to reinforcement of other missions.
Major Combat Operations
U.S. forces will remain capable of undertaking major combat operations on a global basis and will train to be effective across a wide range of combat conditions and geographic settings. For planning purposes, U.S. forces will remain capable of rapidly transitioning from its steady-state condition to conducting of an effects-based campaign that aims at swiftly defeating attacks against U.S. allies and friends in any two theaters of operation in overlapping timeframes. Combat operations will be structured to disrupt and destroy enemy offensive capabilities throughout the depth of its territory, restore favorable military conditions in the region, and create acceptable political conditions for the cessation of hostilities. In addition, U.S. forces will degrade an aggressor’s ability to coerce others through conventional or asymmetric means, including NBC weapons.
U.S. forces will fight from a forward deterrent posture with immediately employable forces, including long-range precision strike capabilities from within and beyond the theater, and rapidly deployable maneuver capabilities, as was demonstrated effectively in Afghanistan. U.S. forces will retain the capability to decisively defeat an adversary in one of the two theaters in which U.S. forces are conducting major combat operations, including the ability to occupy territory or set the conditions for a regime change if so directed by the President.
This capability will be sufficient to impose America’s will and remove any future threat by an adversary.
Smaller-Scale Contingencies
The new planning approach requires the United States to maintain and prepare its forces for smaller-scale contingency operations in peacetime, preferably in concert with allies and friends. This approach recognizes that such contingencies could vary in duration, frequency, intensity, and the number of personnel required. The Department will explicitly plan to provide a rotational base a larger base of forces from which to provide forward-deployed forces to support long-standing contingency commitments in the critical areas of interest. These long-standing commitments will, in effect, become part of the U.S. forward deterrent posture. Moreover, the Department will ensure it has sufficient numbers of specialized forces and capabilities to ensure it does not overstress its force elements when they are involved in smaller-scale contingency operations.
Current Forces
Today's force structure both Active and Reserve Components is the baseline from which the Department will develop a transformed force for the future. The force structure during the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, shown in Table 5.1, was assessed across several combinations of scenarios on the basis of the new defense strategy and force-sizing construct. The capabilities of this force were judged as presenting moderate operational risk, although certain combinations of warfighting and smaller-scale contingency scenarios present high risk.
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Table 5.1 Conventional Force Structure |
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|
Army |
|
|
Divisions (Active/National Guard) |
10/8 |
|
Heavy Armored Cavalry/Light Cavalry Regiments |
1/1 |
|
Enhanced Separate Brigades (National Guard) |
15 |
|
Navy |
|
|
Aircraft Carriers |
12 |
|
Carrier Air Wings (Active/Reserve) |
10/1 |
|
Amphibious Ready Groups |
12 |
|
Attack Submarines |
55 |
|
Surface Combatants (Active/Reserve) |
108/8 |
|
Combat Logistic Force Ships |
33 |
|
Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Air Wings (Active/Reserve) |
4/1 |
|
Helicopter Antisubmarine Light Wings |
2 |
|
Air Force |
|
|
Active Fighter Squadrons |
46 |
|
Reserve Fighter Squadrons |
38 |
|
Reserve Air Defense Squadrons |
4 |
|
Bombers (Combat-Coded) |
112 |
|
Marine Corps (3 Marine Expeditionary Forces) |
|
|
Divisions (Active/Reserve) |
3/1 |
|
Air Wings (Active/Reserve) |
3/1 |
|
Force Service Support Groups (Active/Reserve) |
3/1 |
Force Elements
This section describes the major elements of the conventional force structure land, aviation, naval, mobility and Special Operations Forces. The discussion highlights the roles and functions of these forces and the contributions they make under the Department’s new capabilities-based approach to defense strategy and planning.
Land Forces
The diverse and complementary mix of capabilities provided by the Army and Marine Corps gives military commanders a wide range of options for conducting missions in support of homeland defense and operations overseas. The Army provides forces for sustained combat on the ground, as well as for power projection and forcible-entry missions in support of joint operations. The Marine Corps, as an integral part of the nation’s naval services, provides expeditionary forces capable of projecting combat power ashore and conducting forcible-entry operations in support of naval campaigns or as part of joint task forces.
Army. The Army provides the nation with ground forces distributed across the Regular Army, the Army National Guard, and the U.S. Army Reserve. Light forces airborne, air assault, and light infantry divisions are tailored for forcible-entry operations and for operations on restricted terrain, such as jungles, mountains, and urban areas. Heavy forces are trained and equipped for operations against armies employing modern tanks and armored fighting vehicles. Light and heavy forces can operate independently or in combination. Through the application and sustainment of integrated combined-arms power, these forces provide the tailored mix of combat capabilities needed for specific contingencies. Combat, combat support, and combat service support forces from the active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve provide capabilities critical to the mobilization, deployment, and sustainment of Army and joint forces in land operations.
Consistent with the goals of the QDR, the Army is moving forward with developing Interim Brigade Combat Teams and the Interim Force. The Interim Force will invest in today’s advanced technologies to meet near-term capability shortfalls. Coupled with innovative doctrine, new organizational designs, and leader development, the Interim Force will increase rapid response deployability and ensure maximum lethality and survivability. The Interim Force and some elements of the Legacy Force the current Army structure constitute the bridge to the future Objective Force.
Marine Corps. Marine forces deploy as Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs). MAGTFs can be employed in a variety of configurations, from smaller, amphibious Marine Expeditionary Units to large Marine Expeditionary Forces. Deployable by sea or air, MAGTFs are rapidly responsive, scalable in size and structure, and sustainable. Forward deployed on amphibious ships, they provide a forcible-entry capability and can remain on station for extended periods of time if necessary. The close integration of active and reserve Marine units enhances the overall capability and responsiveness of the force. In addition to the general-purpose elements discussed above, the Marine Corps maintains a unique capability in its Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF), designed to provide a rapid initial response to chemical/biological incidents. Subsequent to September 11, CBIRF was subsumed by the newly established 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade/Anti-Terrorism (4th MEB/AT). The 4th MEB/AT was formed to consolidate selected Marine Corps capabilities that are critical to combating terrorism at home and abroad.
Building on the earlier Operational Maneuver From the Sea concept, the Marine Corps has developed the Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW) concept as a framework for the future. Capitalizing on the Corps’ strength in maneuver warfare, EMW emphasizes the expeditionary and power projection capabilities that Marine forces provide for joint and coalition operations. The FY 2003 budget and FYDP support the EMW concept through investments in Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicles and further testing of the MV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft.
Aviation Forces
Aviation forces of the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps constitute an indispensable component of the national defense strategy. From homeland defense to offensive operations in a major war, these forces furnish the United States with a worldwide power projection capability. In large combat operations, aviation forces must gain and maintain air superiority to permit subsequent operations by joint and coalition forces. In addition, aviation forces conduct a wide range of strike operations in major combat engagements, often in conjunction with land and sea forces. For certain smaller-scale contingencies, aviation forces conduct more narrowly focused strikes, either independently or in conjunction with land and sea forces. When not engaged in combat operations, aviation forces stationed in forward locations offer tangible evidence of the U.S. commitment to protecting its global security interests.
Aviation forces of the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps are composed of fighter/attack, conventional bomber, and specialized support aircraft. These forces can quickly gain and sustain air superiority over regional aggressors, thus permitting rapid air attacks to be launched on enemy targets while providing security to exploit the air, land, and sea for logistics, command and control, intelligence, and other functions. Fighter/attack aircraft operating from land bases, aircraft carriers and amphibious ships can be employed against air, ground or naval targets. Conventional bombers supplement tactical air forces by providing an intercontinental capability to strike surface targets with heavy ordnance loads. The specialized aircraft supporting air, land, and sea operations perform functions such as surveillance, airborne warning and control, air battle management, suppression of enemy air defenses, reconnaissance, antisubmarine operations, aerial refueling, special operations, and combat search and rescue.
The precision-guided ordnance delivered by U.S. combat aircraft allows precise attacks to be mounted against fixed targets on the ground. The operational benefits afforded by precision munitions include:
The FY 2003 budget and FYDP provide resources to expand current capabilities and build those necessary for the future. As an example, aircraft will rely increasingly on low observable technology to gain access to threat areas, and they will acquire targeting data for their own weapons and the entire force using new sensors and communication suites. Additionally, tactical aircraft and bombers will employ smaller, internally-carried precision weapons, thus increasing the number of targets that can be attacked in a single mission.
Naval Forces
Naval forces are well suited to the demands of U.S. defense strategy, given their routine presence overseas and the diverse combat capabilities they provide. To bolster U.S. deterrent strength while providing a ready means of responding to crises worldwide, the Navy employs carrier battle groups (CVBGs), amphibious ready groups (ARGs), submarines, surface combatants, and maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft. The FY 2003 budget and FYDP will enhance forward presence by homeporting three attack submarines in Guam (the first of which will arrive in 2002) and by increasing carrier presence in the western Pacific. Additionally, the budget and FYDP implement key programs to improve capabilities and address future challenges for naval forces.
To enhance high-volume precision strike capabilities against fixed and mobile targets, the Navy will, beginning in FY 2004, field the Tactical Tomahawk missile. Later in the decade, the Extended-Range Guided Munition will more than triple the range over which ships can provide fire support to ground units. Finally, the new Naval Fires Network information system will enable ships to provide time-critical, high-volume fire support to forces ashore.
To counter asymmetric threats and reduce operational risks, the Navy is developing improved surveillance, tracking, and area defense capabilities. The Advanced Deployable System will allow for continuous surveillance both on and below the surface of littoral waters. To defend naval and expeditionary forces against the naval mine threat, new organic mine countermeasure capabilities will be integrated into a CVBG for the first time in 2005. Finally, Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles, Rolling Airframe Missiles, and upgrades to the Close-In Weapons System will provide carriers, amphibious ships, and surface combatants with improved defenses against advanced anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and ASCM-armed small boats.
Mobility Forces
Mobility forces consisting of airlift and sealift forces, along with prepositioned equipment move military personnel and materiel to and from operating locations worldwide. Mobility forces are a key component of the defense strategy, enabling the United States to maintain a forward deterrent posture and to conduct expeditionary operations in distant theaters. To provide needed transport, the Department relies on military as well as commercial aircraft, cargo ships, and ground transportation systems. Through this combination of organic and commercial assets, the Department maximizes efficiency in deploying and supporting forces abroad, while avoiding the prohibitive cost of maintaining military systems that duplicate readily available civil-sector capabilities.
Airlift. Airlift is essential to the rapid movement of military personnel and equipment to operating locations. Sometimes employed in conjunction with prepositioning, airlift delivers the forces needed in the critical early days of a crisis or conflict. Because of the special features they possess, military transport aircraft contribute unique capabilities to airlift operations, such as the ability to land at austere or unimproved airfields, air drop cargo and personnel, unload cargo rapidly, and carry outsize loads like Patriot missile systems, tanks, or helicopters.
Airlift investments in coming years will focus on procuring additional state-of-the-art C-17s, modernizing the avionics and engines of C-5 aircraft, and improving C-5 reliability, availability, and performance. The FYDP includes funds to procure 60 additional C-17s through FY 2008 and to upgrade nine C-5s by FY 2007. In addition, a number of airlift and tanker aircraft will be equipped with enhanced self-defense systems, improving their survivability against surface-to-air missiles.
Integral to airlift capability are aerial-refueling (or tanker) forces comprising KC-135 and KC-10 aircraft. Beyond their tanker roles, both the KC-135 and KC-10 can be employed as passenger or cargo transports, and the KC-10 can perform both airlift and refueling missions simultaneously. Approximately 20 KC-135s have been reconfigured to accommodate multipoint refueling pods, enhancing their ability to refuel Navy, Marine Corps, and allied aircraft. Due to the advanced age of the tanker fleet and the stress of current operations, the Air Force is exploring options to accelerate the replacement of selected portions of the fleet. In addition to providing aerial-refueling capability, potential replacement tankers may be equipped for other key missions, such as command and control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
Sealift. Sealift forces carry the full range of equipment and supplies needed for operations abroad. Sealift capacity comes from three sources government-owned ships, commercial ships under long-term charter to DoD, and ships operating in commercial trade. The majority of government-owned ships are roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) vessels, breakbulk ships, and tankers for carrying fuel. The newest sealift ships, Large Medium-Speed RO/ROs (LMSRs), will be used for two purposes: prepositioning Army and Marine Corps equipment abroad and providing surge-sealift capability to operating locations. Seventeen LMSRs have already joined the fleet, and another three are scheduled for delivery during 2002–2003. The Department charters dry cargo ships and tankers from commercial operators to transport military cargo to locations not normally served by commercial routes. The U.S.-flag commercial fleet includes more than 100 dry cargo ships and approximately 80 tankers. A number of these vessels can be made available for military contingencies under the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) maintained by the Departments of Defense and Transportation. Beyond securing additional shipping capacity, VISA provides access to the intermodal capabilities of commercial carriers, such as rail, truck, and pier facilities.
Prepositioned Materiel and Equipment Stocks. The force planning construct set forth in the defense strategy calls for maintaining regionally-tailored forces in Europe, Northeast Asia, the Middle East/Southwest Asia, and the Asian littoral. As part of this forward deterrent posture, the Department maintains stocks of prepositioned materiel and equipment around the world. Shore-based stocks include equipment for Army brigades, Air Force units, and Marine Expeditionary Forces in Europe, as well as for Air Force and Army forces in Korea and Southwest Asia.
In addition, the Department prepositions equipment on vessels at sea. Sea-based prepositioning stocks include Army combat and support materiel, Marine Corps equipment and supplies, and Air Force munitions.
The FY 2003 budget makes continued investments in Air Force bare-base sets, increasing funding for the reconstitution of sets used in past contingency operations, while accelerating procurement of additional sets to enhance responsiveness in future crises. Similarly, the budget provides funds to expand Army stocks of prepositioned logistics support and war reserve secondary items. By providing an immediate source of materiel until sea lines of resupply can be established, these investments will enhance the ability of U.S. forces to sustain contingency operations.
Special Operations Forces
Special Operations Forces (SOF) make unique contributions to U.S. military operations. The diverse capabilities provided by these forces include specialized tactics, equipment, and training; foreign language skills; and flexible unit deployment options tailored to a wide range of missions. SOF forces which include land, air, and maritime elements play a key role in executing the military strategy and in supporting allies, either as part of joint or single-service packages.
Special Operations Forces also play a major role in combating terrorism. While the primary focus centers on counterterrorism measures directed at deterring, preventing, or responding to terrorist acts against U.S. interests, SOF provide a robust capability to aggressively combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
While the QDR validated the importance of these forces, the war in Afghanistan has underscored the critical contributions that Special Operations Forces make in achieving national objectives. For example, SOF units deployed in Afghanistan are coordinating humanitarian assistance operations, conducting psychological operations (such as leaflet drops and radio broadcasts), performing combat search and rescue missions, and helping find targets for coalition aircraft. Given their linguistic, cultural, and political training, SOF are well suited for coordinating command, control, and intelligence information with allied headquarters and coalition forces.
As SOF units become lighter and more capable of self-deployment, their reliance on strategic airlift will be reduced, thereby enhancing their rapid responsiveness. The FY 2003 budget and FYDP invest in programs critical to this objective, including procurement of CV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft, aircraft survivability equipment, SSGN conversions, and the advanced SEAL delivery system for undersea mobility. In addition, the budget supports increased SOF involvement in joint experimentation and the reorganization of the Navy SEALS (known as Naval Special Warfare Force 21).
Reserve Components in the Total Force
The defense of this nation has been based in large part on the concept of the civilian who prepares for active service during peacetime and becomes a soldier-at-arms in times of national emergencies.
Today’s Reserve Components, comprised of the National Guard and Reserve forces, are an integral part of the defense strategy and day-to-day operations of the U.S. military. They have been assigned missions that are among the first needed during a national emergency or war. Since 1990, there have been six occasions on which the President has initiated an involuntary call-up of Reserve Component members to active duty, including the call-up after the events of September 11.
Within minutes of the September 11 attacks, National Guard and Reservists responded to the call to duty. They flew combat air patrols, patrolled the streets, and provided medical assistance, communications, and security at numerous critical sites across the country. Perhaps the National Guard’s most visible support to civil authorities was to provide security at America’s airports until additional security measures could be established. When the bombing in Afghanistan started on October 7, more than 30,000 reservists supported operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom the most Guard and Reserve personnel on active duty since Operation Desert Storm. By March 11, six months after the attacks, there were about 73,000 Reserve Component members on duty. Guard and Reservists immediately integrated into operations across the full operational spectrum of the armed services. While Air National Guard personnel flew flights over Afghanistan, Guard and Reserve personnel from all services contributed by flying combat air patrols and providing force protection at home, enabling logistics support in neighboring countries, serving on ships in the Indian Ocean and preparing humanitarian supplies. Working with the active military components, Guard and Reservists continue working worldwide in ongoing operations in the Balkans, Operations Southern Watch and Northern Watch in Iraq, and port security in the Middle East.
The use of Guard and Reserve troops to support operational requirements has steadily grown from around 900,000 duty-days annually in the early 1990s to a sustained annual level of over 12 million duty-days since 1995, which equates to about 35,000 full-time personnel.
The QDR directed a comprehensive review of the Active and Reserve mix, organization, priority missions, and associated resources. This review, which is ongoing, will help determine the future utilization priorities of the Guard and Reserve Components in support of the new defense strategy.
Conclusion
As a result of the new defense strategy, the Department has fundamentally changed its approach to managing operational risk. It has moved away from the two MTW construct and adopted an approach based on planning for the defense of the U.S. homeland, deterring aggression and coercion in four critical regions, swiftly prevailing in two major combat operations in overlapping timeframes, and conducting a limited number of smaller-scale contingencies. The requirements of the new construct permitted little operational slack in the current force structure. Furthermore, in light of the operational burdens of the war against terrorism, the Department concluded that it could not contemplate any near-term reductions in force structure. The capabilities of this force were judged as presenting moderate operational risk, though certain combinations of war fighting and smaller-scale contingencies presented high risk. At the same time, the Department has requested resources to invest in current forces in order to mitigate these near-term operational risks.