Senior Defense Officials

Senior Defense Official #1: Just in terms of mechanics here, I'll talk for a couple of minutes about the policy. I'm the director for Humanitarian Demining and Antipersonnel Land Mine Policy and, in that job, I have basically two responsibilities

One, of course, is the antipersonnel land mine policy kind of issues, and then the other hat that I wear is to run the Department of Defense's Humanitarian Demining Program, which is a unique program in our military that works at actually attacking the other part of the land mine problem around the world, which is getting those minds out of the ground and building indigenous demining capability around the world.

After I make a few of those comments, I will turn the mike over to [Senior Defense Official #2], who will talk a little bit about some of the other aspects that are critical.

He asked the question there a second ago about why we're here, and a couple of reporters in the hallway asked, you know, what the news was today.

The issue land mines and the land mine problem around the world is really starting to come into focus right now. You've seen everything from the Princess Di articles to the Elizabeth Dole, the Senator Leahy legislation, et cetera. But this is a problem that's been around for a number of years that is moving into the spotlight.

It's a terrible problem. The estimate of land mines range from 180-to-110 million land mines around the world, potentially 70 countries affected, and a tremendous amount of injuries. One estimate ranges as high as 26,000 people a year.

It's a terrible human tragedy that affects those who can least bear it, mostly children, women, and subsistence farmers in countries that have no infrastructure. So it's a terrible problem.

One of the things that we look at to solve this problem, of course, is the issue of a land mine ban. The other job I have is taking them out of the ground. But we feel that a ban is a critical part to that.

The analogy we use is a bucket with a hole in it. Until we plug the hole, we don't stop this. And so the ban is the plug that's going to stop these mines from going in the ground. So we think the ban is essential.

But here recently, there has been some real confusion, and a number of questions about where does DoD stand on this issue. In fact, we have even had the question posed to us, why is DoD opposing a land mine ban? And that's the reason for today's session, is so that you understand this very complex issue.

The basic DoD policy was established by the President's policy statement of last year, May the 16th. If you take nothing else away from here today except that, you need to understand what that policy does.

That policy clearly commits this country to a course to do without land mines. The United States is absolutely committed to a total ban on antipersonnel land mines. That policy was written with the advice and the full support of the Department of Defense.

It's a policy we believe in. I can tell you very sincerely that no one understands the horrors of what land mines do better than soldiers. We understand it from the standpoint of war, and it's our people out there in the field in these countries developing around the world that see the children, that see the victims. So we understand the damage that is done.

We see that a land mine lies in the ground for many years, and kills victims long after the conflict is over. We had an incident in Egypt some months ago now where a ten-year old girl was killed and her brother was blinded by a land mine that was put in 1942 by Rommel. And that's the tragedy of what we're dealing with around the world there.

So, we want to be sure that you understand that DoD is committed to banning this weapon. But you need to look closely and read closely the President's policy because that policy is far more significant than the attention it got in the press. Because not only does that policy commit us to doing away with land mines, it does more than that. It commits us to banning, first of all, the mine that causes the problem, this long-lived land mine that people are now concerned about.

The United States unilaterally banned that land mine a year ago, but we went further. We also said that we are willing -- unilaterally -- to ban the high-tech self-destructing type land mine that we have and few other nations have even though this land mine does not contribute to the humanitarian problem, because it is a land mine and we recognize the problem. We're willing to give up that land mine just as soon as we get alternatives.

And the President's policy put us on a very clear course to not only find these alternatives, which we were directed to do, but to begin the process now of modifying the way we do business in the military, the way we fight wars, the way we think about fighting wars, and the way we fight our people. And the quote was, "To end reliance on antipersonnel land mines."

And, again, these are unilateral commitments and we've done these things a year ago. So, sometimes when the discussion goes on and it's about what's happening in Geneva or what's happening in Ottawa, the important thing to remember is that most of the items that are issue we've done already. The President went further in January.

In January he announced that we were going to the Conference on Disarmament. And in the Conference on Disarmament we were going to seek to get a world-wide negotiated ban. To energize that process, if you will, the President made two other very significant announcements. The first announcement was he banned the export of land mines, made the export of land mines permanent. We had a temporary one-year moratorium that is now permanent.

And then, significantly, he capped US existing stocks of the self-destructing smart mines, if you will, even though they do not contribute to the problem. He kept our current stocks on those. And he took these two significant steps to do one thing, to demonstrate to the world our commitment to getting the land mine ban.

Since that time we have continued to press those negotiations both in Geneva. We have been actively engaged with the Canadians in the so-called Ottawa Process. And we've done one other thing that's significant, and that is that we have sent a team of DoD and State Department officials to do a series of bilateral discussions with a number of friends, allies and folks who are neither, with the goal of convincing them of where the United States stands on this key issue.

And the message we take to them is very simple, we are absolutely committed to a land mine ban. The new international norm has been established. The world is going to do without land mines. The United States Military is in full support of that. And regardless of what happens in Geneva or regardless of what happens in Ottawa, we are unilaterally taking those steps right now to do without land mines. And we're asking each of those countries to join us in this endeavor because we feel it's important that we stop these land mines from going in the ground. So far the response has been very positive.

If you've been watching the press very closely here for a number of these countries you've seen some former allies, you've seen some former enemies and some real surprises of countries who have seen this issue the same way we do and they've responded very favorably.

And, again, before I turn this over to [Senior Defense Official #2], I just wanted to repeat that one theme about DoD's involvement in this problem. And that is that we're absolutely committed to a land mine ban. We've been there for over a year. We're doing a lot about it. Our commitment is more than just talk.

At this point, I'll pass the mike to [Senior Defense Official #2] who can give you some of the details of that and then we'll take questions.

Senior Defense Official #2: Yes, thank you. Well, thank you very much. I just wanted to sort of pick up where Defense Spokesman # 1 left off here, and that is to give you some very specifics as to where and what we've been doing in this particular area.

As he's indicated already, we've unilaterally banned non-self destruct over a year and a half ago. The Chiefs, the war fighting CINCs, the Operational Commanders, our civilian leadership, both in this building, and the Commander in Chief, are totally on board with this policy. Our war fighting CINCs totally committed, totally engaged, to making this all happen. And we have been actively engaged for over -- a little bit over a year.

As I mentioned, and Spokesman # 1 mentioned, we have already unilaterally foresworn operational use of the type of antipersonnel land mines that are the cause of the humanitarian problem, and that is the non-self destruct APL.

In practical terms, what we have done and we've already directed our U.S. Military forces and their Commanders to cease all use of these devices, to modify all of their war plans to reflect this direction from the Commander in Chief, and to change their doctrine, to change their manuals, to modify their tactics, and also their training. And, again, this is a reality, not just rhetoric. Again, in sum, we no longer use these non-self destruct devices.

We are currently in the process of recovering our non-self destruct antipersonnel land mines and destroying them. To date, we've destroyed 1.1 million of these non-self destruct APL and we will compete destruction of our remaining stocks by 1999. Again, this is reality, not just rhetoric. We've done it.

The United States and DoD contributes more than any other country to worldwide humanitarian demining efforts. We have -- and Defense Spokesman # 1 can give you a lot of the details on it, but I've also been involved in it. And, again, since 1993 we've spent nearly or over $153 million in this effort. We've been at the forefront of this effort and the effort will be expanded and increased. Again, this is reality.

DoD has also undertaken a substantial program to develop improved mine clearing, mine detection and clearing technology, and is also committed to share this technology with the international community. We're actively doing that and, again, we have more details if you'd like them in questions on the specifics in that particular area.

DoD has also undertaken a research and procurement program designed to eliminate any reliance on -- eliminate reliance on all APL as soon as possible and we're actively engaged in that particular program.

I think in sum just to brief and to open up for questions, we've had an APL policy for over a year. It's a good one. It balances the humanitarian need, which I think all of us understand and accept and fully support with the realities of force protection. The policy works and we're well on our way to, as Spokesman # 1 said, a global ban.

We have come more than half way in this effort and we're looking at moving forward. And I can assure you that DoD and the Joint Staff as well are out in front. They're not at all reluctant to participate because we've expended a lot of energy, a lot of capital, a lot of initiative, into making this policy which we all support work.

Let me stop there and we can, perhaps, address some specifics for you.

Q: Starting with a question of semantics, you keep referring to the self-destruct mines and isn't it proper [to use] the term self-deactivate? The mine stays in the ground, it simply is disarmed after a certain period of time. It's electrically disarmed. It doesn't destroy.

A: We have two types of devices --

Q: Could you walk away from the --

A: Oh, okay, I'm sorry. Thank you very much. No, we have two devices. We have a self-destruct that is self-deactivating and then we have one that is -- that, essentially, destructs itself, and then we have one that, basically, is battery-driven that disarms. It does not necessarily -- depending on how it's in place, where it's particular location is, but going back into the semantics, the devices cannot work.

Q: The majority of the mines that we use now, you know, the ones that have a timer on them and at the end of that time period turn themselves off, they don't actually blow up.

A: That's not necessarily the case. (Off mike)What's the next spike on that?

Senior Defense Official #3: All of our self-destructing land mines --

Senior Defense Official #2: Yeah, we'll get Spokesman #3 to give you the exact statistics on what we've got. The next -- I think you're a little bit off on the next --

Senior Defense Official #3: All of our self-destructing land mines have both types of devices. The first device that will activate is a self-destructing device. And it is set to go off after a pre-set period of time, four hours, 48 hours or 15 days. And that is pretty much dependent on the way that they're going to be utilized.

But, regardless of that, at the end of that period those land mines will no longer sit out there as a land mine. They will be gone. They will destroy themselves. In other words, they explode out there.

If that does not work and there has been -- the land mines have been tested over a period of time, a total of 32,000 have. Only one has failed to self-destruct in the period of time and that one self-destructed an hour late. So, very reliable system.

If that doesn't work then it has the self-deactivation function which without fail will turn itself -- the land mine will cease to function because the battery runs out within 90 days.

Q: There's a report in the Early Bird that the Administration in unhappy with the pace of talks in Geneva. Are you aware of the report? Can you comment on that?

A: Are you referring to the one that was in the Early Bird today and Ms. Wareham -- Mary Wareham -- from the campaign to ban land mines said that the Administration was unhappy with the pace. I'm not sure who she talked to. I haven't talked to them and found that out.

I had one of my people assigned to the Conference on Disarmament for the last two months working on that. It's international negotiations. They are detailed. They are difficult. We have recently virtually doubled the size of the Conference on Disarmament.

There are a number of nations who are there for the first time. There are a number of international agendas being played out. But in the midst of all of that discussion, we have seen progress, significant progress. And, in fact, two of the states that had absolutely refused before to even discuss the land mine issue, who we've also addressed unilaterally or bilaterally, the Russians and the Chinese, have both now agreed to work with us in the Conference on Disarmament to try to move this thing forward.

And just before the second session closed, they were successful in appointing a special coordinator for the land mine issue which is a significant step forward.

Q: Why does the United States maintain the mines in Korea? When do you foresee that being lifted?

Senior Defense Official #2: I think -- let me get -- I think talk about a little bit about the terrain of Korea. I've been a Commander in that particular area, so I'm relatively familiar with it.

One, there's a significant risk of aggression in Korea, as you well know. And the way that the opponent, the opposition forces, are postured it gives a very small response time for us to react. The APL that are there in Korea -- we have a requirement, again, to protect US/UN and allied soldiers -- the APL that are there are integral to the defense of the Republic of Korea. And, again, they're used for valid tactical reasons.

When you take a look at the numbers of avenues of approach, it's a very narrow peninsular area and we're -- opposition forces are postured and how quickly they can react and the main avenues or quarters that they could use to come in. Again, that's -- we have integrated APL onto the defense and that is mainly to delay, block and disrupt them primarily moving into or moving from North Korea into South Korea. The threat is both mech[anized] and infantry.

Again, without the APL we feel that the UN and US and our allies, other allies, could expect to take a significant higher casualty rate. The conflict would last a lot longer. And, again, until we have some alternatives available we feel that the use of the non-self destruct in Korea is essential in order to defend the peninsula.

Q: Can't any country use those same arguments to say it's a good case for mines? I mean how can you say on the one hand we're for a ban of land mines and then go through a fairly detailed explanation about why land mines are so good for our defensive purpose? It doesn't seem to make sense to most people.

Senior Defense Official #1: I've had this discussion with a number of the militaries and the military people recognize that the situation in Korea is different.

It's not, for example, this thing that you find along many other long, thin, poorly defended international borders, which is what many militaries argue that they need land mines to protect. The situation in Korea is different.

In Korea you've got hundreds of thousands of armed -- vehicles are gassed, tanks are uploaded, sitting literally within a mile or two of the forces that are in opposition to us. That's unique. That's the only place around the world that we face that that is, in Korea now, after many years with the Cold War. And there's no place else that that kind of threat exists these days.

Q: Well, the Israeli government -- you could certainly make an argument along those lines couldn't you?

A: The Israeli government argument comes along defending their borders against infiltrators. Their primary use of mines is to stop infiltration. And we've had some discussions with the Israelis and we believe that they can solve the problem they have through other means and fairly quickly.

Q: Can't the United States solve this problem in Korea through the intelligence that is has and the satellite capability that it has and all those other --

A: If you're talking about in terms of warning time, no, we can't. Because they sit so close to the border the classical means of warning that tell you they're building up and moving forward and prepositioning, those are the things that give you 30, 60, 90 days of warning. In Korea, all they have got to do is start the engine and start driving south.

Q: But wouldn't that be the best example that you could have to say the United States is truly committed to not using land mines by taking them out of a place like that and move towards other means? I mean, you're laughing. But I think other people make that argument.

A: Well, it certainly is an argument, but --

Q: It's a nation that's also almost imploding and they have a lot of people starving, so, I mean --

A: And one of the things we have said repeatedly is we regard the situation in Korea as temporary. One, we are only going to have those there until we get alternatives. Or until the risk of aggression is removed by the political problems, which could very well be faster than we get alternatives.

We see it as a temporary situation. But in terms of would this be a gesture that would truly demonstrate our commitment, the answer is, yes, it would.

Q: Mines in Korea, basically in the de-militarized zone, which is a restricted area and civilians aren't supposed to be there in the first place. We also forget this somebody else country --

A: The other point I was going to make is that most of the mines in the Korean area were put in by the Koreans. And the second is that the mines that are in the ground are now -- are in along the de-militarized zone. And these are in areas that are fenced.

To step on one of those mines as a civilian, you have to cut your way through about six rows of fences to get to it. This is not an where people are wandering around. And that's why we say that the situation in Korea is truly unique. It's not the same elsewhere. And we have made that argument to a number of other militaries, they see it.

Senior Defense Official #2: No, as we indicated earlier, the situation is one that's deemed temporary. If the political situation were to change, then obviously this could be reconsidered.

Q: As a general arms control problem, mines create even more problems than chemicals. In the first place, they're so terribly easy to produce, and unlike chemicals, you know, without any precursors to track. I mean, what's the realistic expectation of you to ever get rid of land mines from the kind of people who are most prone to use one? Ethnic groups, you know, terrorist organizations that are beyond the control of the international regimes?

A: Well, it's a very good question and it's one we have gone over. You have to understand what the goal of the land mine ban is. Because mines are so cheap and so easy to build, you are probably correct that we will never have a regime that will get every single land mine in the world.

That's probably just not realistic. You can make an improvised mine fairly easily. But if we can stop the wholesale laying of mines by the millions, that is what's contributing to the humanitarian problem. And we do believe that if we get enough nations to sign a responsible land mine ban with some verification, that over time we, in fact, can reduce this problem down to a low level. Will we ever get all the mines? Probably not.

Q: Could you talk about what the problem with the Leahy legislation and apparently the dropping of one word, you know, DoD thinks triggers action against, you know, basically the many munitions from rockets and everything else?

A: Well, the reason I laughed is because I have answered this question about four times in the last two days. We had an unfortunate situation where a reporter -- a very good reporter, obviously -- got a hold of an internal document where we looked at Senator Leahy's latest proposed legislation.

And we had a problem with the definition that Senator Leahy was using. And to give you a little background on this, Senator Leahy proposed a moratorium on land mines a couple of years ago that was temporary for one year. And he used a set of definitions for a land mine. And at that time DoD posed no objection to that definition.

In the last year, year and a half, a fight in this issue in the Convention on Conventional Weapons, CCW, in Geneva, they took, basically Senator Leahy's definition. And what we saw over a year was that a number of people began to expand and change that definition and interpret it differently.

And in the process of fighting that for a year, we found that dropping that word "primarily," which is what -- our definition would say primarily designed to kill people -- Senator Leahy's drops the primarily. What we found is that there are a number of people -- a number of groups and institutions out there that want to make this ban, CCW or APL ban, as inclusive and as broad as possible.

So what we had the people in our acquisition and technology community do, was go through that definition with our lawyers, take the results of CCW and say to which systems could this definition be stretched of someone chose to do that, and then they prepared a paper.

And the answer was horrifying even to us. Not only do they capture our four or five land mines that we expected, it caught a total of 35 systems, some as far afield as ATTACKMs and various types of bombs and many munitions that have nothing to do with land mines.

And so that was our concern. So we had this paper circulating around that very clearly identifies what each of those technologies were and under what circumstances the definition would have to be stretched to fit them. And someone got a hold of that and used it.

We have talked to Senator Leahy's people about this. His staffers have assured me -- you'll have to get Senator Leahy's opinion from him -- but his staffers have told us that this was not their intention. And we really believe that after recess, working with those folks, we can get this definitional issue behind us.

But it's one that's critical to us. In any international negotiation, we want to be real sure that when we ban weapon systems that, one, we ban the weapon systems that are causing the problem. And, two, if we're going to ban land mines, we are, in fact, banning land mines. And we're not banning a number of high tech systems that our military is really depending upon with our reduced forces. So that definitional issue is critical for us.

Q: Well, the problem is that the -- many munitions have a fairly high failure rate and any they end up laying on the battlefield. There were probably more casualties in Kuwait and Saudi from people stumbling under those things than there were from mines.

A: For example, I have a program in Laos -- I say I have a program in Laos -- I manage a program for Laos where we do about $3 million a year with the Laotian Government, 95 percent of that problem is unexploded ordnance dropped there during the '60s and '70s. These were old cluster-bomb type units. And under some circumstances, if you took the existing land mine ban definition, without that primarily in there it could be, in fact, stretched to include this high unexploded ordnance rate.

That could knock out a number of systems that we really do need -- some of our runway and island munitions and that sort of thing, and that's what we're concerned about. We want to be sure that if we're talking a land mine ban we're talking land mines. That is what we're trying to do here.

Q: Can you tell us a little bit about the demining efforts, is that primarily technical assistance and money or are we putting demining teams in the field?

A: It's one of the areas I am most happy to talk about. This is a program that it's not unique in the world. Several other countries have done it, but we like to think we are doing it about as well or better than anyone. We've currently got 14 countries out there that the United States Government is assisting. DoD is active in 12 of those this year. This year, for example, we are going to train about 1,200 demining technicians; but the program is more than just training people to go out and get mines out of the ground.

What we are actually trying to do is build indigenous demining structure. The demining problem is so big, so vast that these countries are never going to solve it depending on outsiders. So, what we do is go in and work with these people so that they can solve their problem with some assistance from us. We help them, we equip them and then we train their deminers; but, more importantly, we train the infrastructure they need to build a national capability. They need supervisors. They need medical support. They need communications. They need to know how to prioritize things in country so their own country can support them; and, in fact, over time -- and we figure to be there three to five years -- they build a capability that is uniquely theirs.

We have had some tremendous successes. Cambodia, for example, is now getting assistance from about 20 nations. Their program has got a long way to go because it's probably the most heavily mined area in the world, but they have made a tremendous difference.

We have a country in Namibia, for example, we're going into this summer. We have been there three years, now. In three years, the death rate has dropped 94 percent and we have got a piece of test equipment we're going to send out there this summer that if it works, that country can be mine-free in a year. That's a success. We have got the same kind of statistics in other places.

But, again, the idea is that our soldiers are not out there taking mines up. We are prohibited by law from doing that. What our program is is a 'help yourself' program. If you are willing to help yourself rid your country of land mines, you can come to us and we'll help you. There are only two conditions. We need a formal request, and the war has got to be over. We will help friends, allies, and even former enemies.

Q: What's the piece of equipment?

A: We've got a 'berm sifter' going out there. In Namibia, one of the areas they mine so heavily was a series of electrical lines. They mined around the base of these electrical pylons to keep people from taking down the electrical lines. They made no maps, they didn't chart them. Went away. Now this is valuable farmland, but you can't get near them.

We had an effort in there a couple of years ago. They went in with bulldozers and pushed these mines all up in the berms. So, now you have got the mines in a very small area, but very densely mined. So, we've got a piece of gear that is essentially, I guess for want of a better term, I'll say it's a modified potato harvester that you drive into this berm and it tears the berm apart, sifts it, takes out the land mines harmlessly and kicks them to the rear and then we destroy them. We don't know if it is going to work or not. It works in tests. It works in the lab and now we are going to put it in a mine field.

We built it at a rapid prototyping facility down here at Fort Belvoir -- again, a unique program that we're very proud of. We have got the only military program in the world right now that is putting military money strictly against humanitarian demining. This year, for example, about $15 million.

Q: Is there an industry, though, involved in --

A: Oh, yes. We have got -- I'm not sure what the company that actually built this one was. I could find out for you. But it is a program we're very proud of. In the last three years we have developed our prototypes, 29 technologies of which 17 showed some real promise. We have tested in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Namibia this summer. We've got stuff in Cambodia an Laos right now. In fact, a couple of the NGOs have bought some of our prototype equipment and shipped it to Laos at their own expense because it is starting to work. And, again, it is a unique program.

Anybody wants more details on that, I could give you hours of that or set you up a demo if you would like it. It is something we are very proud of.

Q: Thank you very much.

Printer-friendly Version

Email A Copy