Background Briefing

Mr. Bacon: Good morning. Sorry we're late.

As you know, this is a background briefing on the Secretary's trip which begins on Sunday to Asia, and then to two newly independent states in Central Asia, Ukraine, and Georgia -- Europe, I guess I should say, Ukraine and Georgia.

The first part of the trip which covers Japan and Korea, the Republic of Korea, the background briefer will be the following, so you know who he is, if you don't know already. The second part of the trip which will cover Ukraine and Georgia, the background briefer is I think someone also well known to you all.

With that, I'll turn it over to the first Senior Pentagon Official who will walk you through.

Q: Can you say how long the trip will be?

Mr. Bacon: The trip will be approximately a week. I think we leave on Sunday and come back on Sunday.

Briefer: Good morning. Sorry to keep you all waiting.

Let me just give you a sense of Secretary Cohen's trip next week to Asia. First of all, I think as you all know, on Thursday Secretary Albright leaves for Asia, for Singapore, for bilateral meetings with key players around the Asian-Pacific, including Foreign Minister Tong. She'll also have meetings with her Russian counterpart, I think it's Foreign Minister Ivanov. But most importantly, she will be in Singapore for the ASEAN Regional Forum. It's an important opportunity for the United States to restate our long term and strong interest in Asia and in the preservation of peace and stability.

A few days later Secretary Cohen will leave from Washington for a two-part visit to our two closest allies and friends in Asia -- Japan and South Korea. We view these as normal but extremely important consultations about critical security and political developments that are underway in the region.

In Japan, Secretary Cohen will meet people now he's worked closely with over the last several years. He will have a meeting with his counterpart, the Defense Minister, JDA, senior officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He will have a meeting with a special Diet group who has been critically involved in the passage of the Defense Guidelines legislation several months ago in Japan. And of course he will have an opportunity to review security developments and also important bilateral issues in the U.S./Japan relationship with Prime Minister Obuchi and Chief Cabinet Secretary Nonaka.

We view that stop as important, and I think as there are some tensions currently in the Asian-Pacific region it's never more important to reaffirm the strong sense of our security commitment to Japan and the fact that we consider our security as indivisible from Japan.

From Japan, Secretary Cohen will travel to Korea for meetings with the CINC, General Tilelli; the Ambassador, obviously, and also senior officials from the Korean government, both at the Blue House, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and at the Ministry of National Defense. We will be reviewing the status of diplomatic efforts toward North Korea, we'll review the security situation on the Korean Peninsula, and also talk obviously about our ongoing attempts to reengage diplomatically with China. Obviously those issues also apply in Japan as well.

I think from there then he goes on around the world to meetings in Europe and in Central Europe.

That's the general outline of our visit. I'm prepared to take a couple of questions and then obviously turn it over to...

Q: What are the latest indications of preparations by North Korea for any possible missile launch?

Briefer: I'm not going to get into obviously talking about intelligence issues. I just want to say that we are monitoring developments very closely, and I think we've stated very clearly that we would view such a launch as having very serious consequences.

Q: You said a couple of weeks ago on the record that there was... Anyway...

Briefer: Someone said it.

Q: That there were preparations that were detectable. Is that still the case, or...

Briefer: I'll just stand with what I've said so far. You got that two weeks ago and you have what I've stated here.

Q: There was a story in the paper today that the Administration is considering cutting off supplies of parts for F-16s, split holding, announcement of the sale of a (inaudible) to Taiwan, and also has canceled a visit by defense officials to discuss air defense questions.

Is the story accurate in whole or in part?

Briefer: First of all, you all have worked with me. I generally don't in these situations speak in hyperbole, but that story is totally, completely inaccurate and untrue.

The United States, as Secretary Cohen stated very clearly yesterday, stands by its strong commitments in the Taiwan Relations Act, also the three communiques, and we believe the maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits and indeed in the entire Pacific is in the strong national interest of the United States.

You know we don't get into specifics of our unofficial defense relationship with Taiwan. I will say, however, those reports [reducing our commitment] are completely inaccurate.

Q: What about this delegation that was supposed to go to Taiwan? I think White House officials have confirmed that that visit has been called off.

Briefer: I have not seen what White House officials have said. First of all, I'll tell you that we have very regular and appropriate discussions, unofficial discussions with defense authorities in Taiwan. I don't want to get into semantic issues with you, but I will tell you that that report as appeared today is completely inaccurate, (sic) [as it pertains to curtailing arms sales].

Q: No signals were being sent to the Taiwanese government to cool it on these...

Briefer: We don't use security to signal.

Q: Could you explain the (inaudible) discussion with the Japanese government with regard to the technology transfer for the Japan plan to develop (inaudible) satellite and what is going to be talked about when the Secretary is in Japan?

Briefer: Let me say obviously the issue of potential satellite cooperation between the United States and Japan to support Japan's indigenous effort to develop a remote sensing satellite is a very important issue that Secretary Cohen is going to discuss with his counterparts in Japan. I don't need to tell you that there have been very extensive dialogue and discussion between Japan and the United States and I think we will have much more to say about that next week when Secretary Cohen is in Japan.

I just want to restate again, as Secretary Cohen did in the fall of last year, that we place a premium on cooperating with Japan in areas that we feel are mutually beneficial. We believe that as Secretary Cohen has stated, that we can support Japan's effort to develop an indigenous satellite capability.

Q: Have you commenced the review process of PDD-23, how you apply PDD-23?

Briefer: Let me just say that I think we'll have much to talk about next week, and we consider this relationship with Japan to be among the most important in the world, and we have given it a very high level of work and effort in the U.S. government.

Q: Will this meeting with Prime Minister Obuchi and Mr. Nonaka with the Secretary discuss issues related to U.S. bases in Okinawa?

Briefer: Yes, we will.

Q: (inaudible)

Briefer: I think the message will be clear that even though there are other issues that require U.S. attention, there are other issues that require strong U.S./Japan commitments to cooperation in terms of regional developments, that we do not forget our commitment which we think is extremely important, to continue steps to ease the burden of the forward-basing of U.S. forces on Japanese local communities.

Most pressing, of course, are our outstanding commitments that we've made in the so-called SACO process. I think you all know, Secretary Perry was in the building today for the unveiling of his portrait. It was a wonderful ceremony, and I was... When I was walking by shaking hands with he and Mrs. Perry, one of the issues he mentioned to me was, he said, "Let's keep up the progress on SACO. That's extremely important." I think Secretary Cohen also shares that view.

Now of course the delicacy here is that we acknowledge that any progress on Futenma relocation or outstanding issues in SACO or indeed on any community-building efforts require the strong support and cooperation of the government of Japan and the government of Okinawa and the people of Okinawa. So we can't impose solutions. We understand that.

We're seeking a process where we work together toward outcomes that benefit all the people of Japan in such a way as to strengthen our vital partnership for the 21st Century.

Q: Would you talk about the [G8 Summit] in Okinawa for (inaudible)?

Briefer: Can I characterize it?

Q: Yeah.

Briefer: I think it's extremely important. I think it's a very positive step. I actually think it's much more important in Japan even than it is in the United States. Because I've spent some time working in Japan, and it is a reminder to the people of Japan that Okinawa is indeed part of Japan. I think it's a reminder to Okinawa how important their contribution has been to the maintenance of peace and stability for these many years.

I think the Summit is an absolutely fantastic opportunity to demonstrate progress on the island, to show what steps we've taken to improve the working relationship between U.S. forces and the people of Okinawa. But let's keep in mind the real focus and the function of the G8 that takes place next year is to focus on the world economy and political developments in the world, and that's going to be a key time as Asia starts to reemerge from this period of economic uncertainty. And indeed...

Q: Are you going to Okinawa this time?

Briefer: I will not on this trip, but I will be going in the next several weeks, yes.

Q: In the next several weeks?

Briefer: How about I will be going in the near future. That's a better way to say it. We will be continuing discussions with Japanese counterparts.

Thank you all very much. See you on the trip, whoever's going.

Briefer 2: Good morning.

After Secretary Cohen completes his work in Tokyo and Seoul he will travel to the western part of Eurasia for meetings in Ukraine and Georgia.

In Ukraine he will meet with the President of Ukraine and the Secretary of the National Security Council, President Kuchma and Secretary Horbulin, and he will also meet, of course, with Minister of Defense Kuzmuk.

Secretary Cohen has a very close relationship with Minister of Defense Kuzmuk and last saw him, I believe, in November when Kuzmuk was here in Washington on a counterpart visit.

The main objective of our work in Ukraine is to continue and to further the progress in our military and defense relationship that we've established with Ukraine over the past several years. We will be talking about a number of general themes including U.S./Ukrainian cooperation and NATO/Ukrainian cooperation in the aftermath of Kosovo, and the possibility of Ukrainian contributions to KFOR, the peace implementation force in Kosovo.

A major thrust of our work with Ukraine focuses on military reform. It's important to keep in mind for all of the states of the newly independent of the former Soviet Union, of newly independent states -- perhaps with the exception of Russia -- that none of these states have had their own militaries in modern times. In fact none of these states have been states independent in modern times. Russia is the exception because in the Soviet days, of course, all defense decision making was focused in Moscow.

With all of the non-Russian states, our policy in terms of defense reform, our working with the militaries of these countries, is to help them develop modern militaries which are consistent with our broader goals of democratization and economic reform in this part of the world. We are assisting governments in many fundamental ways in building modern militaries -- everything from helping them develop capabilities and cadres of officers skilled in defense planning, to officers skilled in defense resource management so they can actually develop force structures and go to their parliaments with budgets and force structure ideas that are sized for their defense strategy needs and for their budgetary constraints. So a lot of the work that we have ongoing in this area is relevant to Ukraine as well.

We are engaged in work with the Ukrainians on these issues of defense planning and strategy and resource management. We are conducting military exercises with Ukraine. We are engaged in helping Ukraine revamp its military education system for educating both non-commissioned officers and officers to serve future Ukrainian security needs.

All of these topics will be discussed between the Secretary and his various interlocutors during the course of his stay in Ukraine.

After Ukraine, the Secretary will be traveling to Georgia. This will be the first visit of, I believe, any secretary of defense to Georgia, but certainly the first visit of Secretary Cohen. I think it's correct, any secretary of defense to Georgia.

This comes at a very important time for Georgia. The United States, of course, is very closely associated with and highly supportive of the Shevardnadze government in Georgia, and the timing and importance of Secretary Cohen's visit to Georgia cannot be understated as an expression of American support for and commitment to Georgian sovereignty, the success of Georgia as a state, Georgian independence, as well as support for the Shevardnadze government itself. The Secretary will meet with key parliamentary figures as well as President Shevardnadze and of course with his own counterpart, Minister of Defense Tevzadze.

We have much the same kind of program in general structure as we have with other NIS countries in Georgia, which is characterized by our, again, very fundamental work with the Georgian Ministry of Defense on developing modern defense strategy and methodology for reforming its armed forces. These countries, as you well know, inherited at their independence in the early 1990s Soviet-style force structures which were designed to wage combat in the European Theater. So they were heavy mechanized units. It is the decision of most of these countries, including Georgia, that they wish to reorient their armed forces towards more mobile militaries, much smaller militaries, both consistent with their own threat perceptions and consistent with their own resource constraints. We are helping them to do that.

It is our hope in our work with the militaries of the newly independent states including Ukraine and Georgia, that we are able to help them develop these modern militaries and fundamentally influence the choices that they themselves must make in the future.

So the talks between Secretary Cohen and President Shevardnadze, Minister Tozadze and the parliamentarians is one that will be extremely well and warmly received by the Georgians, and considered extremely important to the Georgians, and will help propel and serve to give much greater momentum to the cooperation that we have already achieved in U.S./Georgian defense relations.

With that, I'm prepared to take questions.

Q: On Ukraine, what kind of contributions might they make or is the U.S. interested in having them make to the KFOR?

Briefer 2: We are interested in Ukrainian contributions to KFOR, and Ukraine has expressed its interest to us and to NATO, both at the executive branch level and subsequently last week the Rata, the Ukrainian parliament, the Rata, has blessed Ukraine making a contribution to KFOR.

We are discussing with Ukraine -- we, the United States is, but perhaps more importantly NATO, General Clark is discussing with Ukraine possible contributions that they could make. This is an excellent opportunity for Ukraine to demonstrate what has been a leadership and very responsive and supportive role that it has played in the Partnership for Peace over the last several years, so it's a natural extension of that. Other countries, by the way, have expressed similar interest. Again, derivative from their longstanding and successful participation in the Partnership for Peace.

This would be an excellent training opportunity for Ukraine, but it would also be an excellent way for Ukraine to express its commitments to the goals of interoperability between NATO and itself, which is one of the primary pillars of Partnership for Peace.

We are, to answer your question directly again, we are interested in their contributions. We are discussing what contributions they could make. There are, of course, constraints on resources which are also questions of discussion.

Q: Do they have troops in Bosnia?

Briefer 2: Yes, they do.

Q: Would the U.S. be willing to help subsidize the Ukrainian...

Briefer 2: These are issues under discussion. A decision has not yet been made on that. We are working with the Ukrainians to identify resources that they can bring to the table for this, but frankly, their resources will be limited for extending their participation to KFOR. So it is possible that the U.S. would be prepared to provide some kind of support for a Ukrainian force. Of course since they'll be joining not a U.S. effort but a NATO effort, we may as well extend this question to other states who are involved in KFOR, to find out what level of support there might be for Ukraine.

Q: Can you talk about the impact of the Kosovo war on relations between Ukraine and NATO and the United States? Whether it had any impact at all.

Briefer 2: I'll give you a broad picture and a narrow picture.

The narrow picture with respect to the defense relationship between Ukraine and the U.S. was that there was very little impact caused by the war. Certainly there was no adverse impact.

Minister of Defense Kuzmuk virtually displayed the Western leanings that he has by making clear during the air campaign that the air campaign would not adversely affect the U.S./Ukrainian military relationship. Of course in the case of Russia, as you know, that was quite different.

In a broader political context, however, there were costs, the magnitude of which we're going to have to assess over time in terms of the Ukrainian attitude towards NATO.

We're entering a presidential election season in Ukraine and a number of candidates worked to trigger some dormant stereotypes of NATO, maybe we can put it that way, from the Soviet period, during the air campaign in Kosovo which resulted in public opinion changing over time which resulted in more expressions of anti-NATO attitude in Ukraine, in the broader political sphere. But this is very much a function of a run-up to a presidential election, too.

So in terms of what the real impact, what the real political impact of the war on U.S./Ukrainian relations or on NATO/Ukrainian relations, I think we're going to have to tell over time. But in the narrower context of the military relationship, as I said, there was no adverse impact at all. In fact our summer exercise program with Ukraine is continuing. There's a major exercise, PFP exercise in Ukraine this August. And coming up in July there's a naval exercise, part one of a naval exercise in July and part two of that naval exercise will be later this fall. So our program continues unabated.

Q: Do you think the issue of arms control or transfer of nuclear technology?

Briefer 2: These are always issues on the agenda, and so non-proliferation will undoubtedly be an issue that's discussed with Ukraine. But we have good cooperation with both countries with respect to dealing with counterproliferation issues or preventing the flow of technology, of WMD-related technology to states that desire to gain weapons of mass destruction capabilities.

We have an extensive program in Georgia and a very solid program in Ukraine as well not only between DoD and our counterparts in these countries, but between other agencies of the U.S. government and their counterparts in these countries such as State Department on border control... We have a DoD/FBI program and a DoD/Customs program which are being exercised in both countries which provide training for officials to make them more expert in not only legal mechanisms and regulatory mechanisms, but also operational mechanisms, capabilities for detecting attempts to smuggle technologies across borders. And equipment can be brought in under these programs as well. So we have a very successful program in both countries designed to accomplish these ends.

Press: Thank you.

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