Responsibility Sharing Report	June 2002

The Responsibility Sharing Report presents the Department of Defense’s annual assessment of the relative contributions toward the common defense and mutual security by our NATO allies, our Pacific allies (Japan and the Republic of Korea), and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations. The cornerstone of effective alliance relationships is the fair and equitable sharing of the full range of mutual security responsibilities, and the appropriate balancing of costs and benefits.

• NATO responded swiftly to the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, invoking Article V - the collective defense provision - of the 1949 Washington Treaty the next day.
• On October 4, NATO approved eight measures that "operationalized" the invocation of Article V, including deployment of NATO AWACS aircraft to support operations against terrorism. These aircraft began deploying to the United States on October 9.
• The UK and France contributed support aircraft to the air campaign over Afghanistan, deployed ground troops inside the country before the Taliban regime was overthrown, and dispatched naval forces to the Indian Ocean for maritime surveillance/interdiction operations.
• Other NATO nations, most notably Canada, Italy and the Netherlands, also sent naval forces to the Indian Ocean; Canada, Denmark, Germany, and Norway deployed special forces inside Afghanistan; and the Czech Republic has deployed a chemical defense unit to the region.
• The NATO allies provided the bulk of the sixteen-nation International Security Assistance Force in Kabul.

• Japan deployed a naval task force to the Indian Ocean to provide logistical and intelligence support the first time that Japanese Self Defense Forces units have been sent abroad to support an ongoing combat operation.
• The Republic of Korea provided a medical formation, C-130 transport aircraft, and an amphibious landing ship.
• Japan and the Republic of Korea provided significant emergency financial assistance and humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other adjoining countries. Both also provided enhanced security at U.S. bases within their territory.

• The GCC states provided critical support for operations in Afghanistan by granting overflight rights, and allowing the United States to base large contingents of aircraft, personnel, and equipment in their territory.
• Most GCC states increased security at bases hosting U.S. forces, provided key air traffic control and fuel storage services, and covered increased U.S. billeting costs.
• The GCC nations contributed generously to humanitarian operations in and around Afghanistan, and some provided significant economic assistance to Pakistan. They have also played a key role in efforts to block terrorist financing, including the seizure of al-Qaida financial assets.

NATO

• Defense Spending as a Percentage of GDP (Chart I-1): Overall, the non-U.S. NATO members spent an average of 1.9 percent of GDP on defense in 2001 as compared to 2.0 percent in 2000. Turkey, Greece, France, the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, Portugal, Poland, and Italy ranked at or above this average. All other Alliance members fell below average, highlighting that there is clearly scope for greater effort in this area.

• NATO Modernization Spending: Non-U.S. NATO members spent an average of 19 percent of their defense budgets on modernization programs in 2001. Turkey, the United Kingdom, Norway, the Czech Republic, and France ranked above average, while all other members fell below average. Nonetheless, nine allies increased their percentages in 2001.

• Military Forces: Most NATO allies contributed more than their fair share in at least one of the following categories: active-duty military personnel, ground combat capability, naval tonnage, and combat aircraft capability. Greece and Turkey contributed far more than their fair share in all four categories, while Canada contributed less than its fair share in all four. Greece contributed its fair share of military transport aircraft capacity and Turkey contributed substantially more than its fair share of military transport aircraft capacity and tanker aircraft. The remaining NATO allies contributed substantially less than their fair share in both categories.

• NATO Reaction Forces: Fourteen allies contributed more than their fair share of least one category of NATO Reaction Forces (ground, air, and naval) - and several allies in all three. In contrast, Germany contributed less than its fair share in all three categories.
• Multinational Peace Operations: Our NATO allies made strong contributions to multinational peace operations in terms of personnel and funding. The Czech Republic was the only ally that contributed less than its fair share in both categories.
• Foreign Assistance: Eleven allies provided their fair share or more of foreign assistance. Italy contributed less than its fair share, as did less wealthy countries: the Czech Republic, Greece, Poland, and Turkey. Hungary is a net foreign aid recipient.
• Cost Sharing: Italy and Germany, the only NATO allies with substantial numbers of U.S. troops stationed on their soil, offset 37 percent and 21 percent (respectively) of U.S. stationing costs.

• Japan spent one percent of GDP on defense in 2001, however its defense budget was second only to the U.S. in absolute terms. Japan provided substantially less than its fair share of active-duty military personnel, military forces, and peace operations personnel. However, this must be viewed in the light of constitutional and historical factors that have limited the size of Japan’s defense forces, and discouraged their deployment abroad. Japan provided more funding for foreign assistance than any other nation in this Report. It ranked second in cost sharing, offsetting 79 percent of U.S. stationing costs in 2000.

• The Republic of Korea (ROK) spent 2.8 percent of GDP on defense in 2001, which is above the average of 2.4 % for all nations covered in this report. The ROK contributed substantially more than its fair share of military forces. The ROK contributed substantially less than its fair share of multinational peace operations funding and personnel, military transport aircraft capacity, tanker aircraft and foreign assistance reflecting the focus on the North Korean threat. The ROK offset approximately 42 percent of U.S. non-personnel stationing costs in 2000. Under the terms of the new 2002-2004 Special Measures Agreement, ROK offsets will increase to 50 percent by 2004.

• Defense Spending as a Percentage of GDP (Chart I-1): The GCC nations spent larger percentages of GDP on defense (5.8 to 16.1 percent) than any other country addressed in this Report in 2001.
• Military Forces: All GCC nations contributed their fair share or more of ground combat capability, combat aircraft capability, and active-duty military personnel. Saudi Arabia, Oman, UAE, and Kuwait contributed their fair share or more of military transport aircraft capacity. Saudi Arabia contributed substantially more than its fair share of tanker aircraft.
• Multinational Peace Operations: The GCC nations contributed substantially less than their fair share of peace operations personnel and funding. Only the UAE contributed peace operations personnel.
• Foreign Assistance: Kuwait contributed substantially more than its fair share of foreign assistance, ranking fourth among all nations assessed, while Saudi Arabia and the UAE contributed substantially less. Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar are net foreign assistance recipients.
• Cost Sharing: Saudi Arabia offset 80 percent of U.S. stationing costs in 2000 ranking first of all nations in this Report. Kuwait ranked third, Qatar fourth, and Oman sixth.

• Relative to its ability to contribute, the United States contributed its fair share or better of defense spending, active-duty military personnel, UN peace operations funding, military forces, NATO Reaction Forces, and NATO modernization spending. The United States contributed less than its fair share of multinational peace operations personnel, and foreign assistance.
• The United States greatly outstrips all of its allies in a broad range of military capabilities that are not reflected in the static indicators assessed in this Report. The most important of these are the United States’ unique capabilities to deploy and sustain military forces over long distances for extended periods; others include suppression of enemy air defenses, precision strike, and theater ballistic missile defense capabilities.

The Department of Defense (DoD) considers that the nations addressed in this Report have recognized the importance of continuing to increase their efforts to share the roles, risks, and responsibilities of defending shared security interests. DoD will continue to urge allied and partner nations to maintain and increase their responsibility sharing contributions, particularly where there is scope for greater effort. Such areas include defense spending and host nation contributions for U.S. forces stationed overseas. Where it is appropriate to do so, DoD will seek cost sharing arrangements in which host nations contribute 50 percent of total non-personnel stationing costs, at least as an interim goal.