An Overview of the 1995 Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense
The security relationship the United States enjoys with its major allies
continues to change at a rapid pace. Momentous initiatives undertaken at the
1994 NATO Summit--particularly Partnership for Peace (PfP) and
counterproliferation efforts--and the increasing scope of our bilateral
relations with Japan and the Republic of Korea, are transforming the way we
manage post-Cold War security challenges in Europe and North East Asia.
In the wake of this important transformation, the United States has adopted a
more comprehensive approach to burdensharing issues. This approach, suggested
in earlier editions of this Report and set forth explicitly last year, moves
beyond the traditional focus on the burdens of common defense to address
more broadly the responsibilities of cooperative security.
This is the basis upon which this Overview to the 1995 Report on Allied
Contributions to the Common Defense has been prepared. As with last year's
submission, this Overview presents a timely executive-level summary to assist
Congress in its deliberations. The complete Report, containing methodology and
detailed support of our findings, will be provided separately.
The Administration remains committed to increased sharing of the roles, risks,
responsibilities, and benefits of meeting common security goals and objectives.
This means continuing to seek greater cooperation with our allies and partners,
including all facets of expanded security responsibilities appropriate for this
Military and defense efforts remain paramount among factors contributing to
peace, security, and stability in the post-Cold War environment. Resources and
armed forces dedicated to the common defense continue to be the foundation of
our cooperative security arrangements with allies.
Beyond these contributions, however, are many diverse activities important to
U.S. and allied security interests. Allies' "responsibility sharing" efforts
encompass not only their customary defense contributions, but also the expanded
array of roles and risks they are undertaking in the face of new security
challenges. Such efforts include crisis management, peace operations,
denuclearization and limiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), promoting democratization and stabilization, and providing economic and
Another important part of responsibility sharing is host nation support
provided to U.S. forces based on allied soil, or deployed to foreign shores in
a contingency. Although extremely valuable, this support--including sharing of
U.S. stationing costs--is only one of many factors used to determine the extent
of nations' responsibility sharing efforts.
EVALUATION OF FAIR SHARES
There is no single, universally accepted formula for calculating each nation's
"fair share" of the responsibility for cooperative security. In theory, any
contribution that enhances peace and stability is part of a nation's
responsibility sharing effort. National contributions assume many forms,
requiring different measures and analyses. Some forms of responsibility
sharing, such as defense spending and force levels, can be calculated with
precision. Evaluating other types of contributions, such as host nation
support, involves a mix of quantitative analysis and subjective judgment.
Given wide disparities in levels of national economies, populations, and
economic well-being, any objective assessment of U.S.-allied responsibility
sharing must account for nations' efforts relative to their ability to
contribute. It is on this basis that most key indicators in this Report
are presented. Information on measures of nations' ability to
contribute--including GDP per capita, a key indicator of economic well
being--is included at Annex 1 [Selected Indicators].
The broad array of countries' responsibility sharing efforts and contributions
addressed in this Report are subdivided into five major categories. These are:
(1) aggregate resources for defense; (2) military forces for defense; (3)
crisis management and peace operations; (4) economic and financial assistance;
and (5) host nation support. Chart 1 provides a summary assessment of nations' efforts in each of these categories; additional detail is provided in the following sections and annexes to this Report.
To put U.S. and allied responsibility sharing in perspective, it is important
to note the substantial U.S. defense drawdowns that have taken place in recent
years. Annual U.S. defense outlays, for example, have declined in real terms
from the mid-1980s to 1994 by $77 billion (over 20 percent). In concert with
these budget cutbacks, since the end of the Cold War various elements of U.S.
active duty force structure have been drawn down 20 to 40 percent, with end
strengths dropping over 20 percent. A sizable proportion of these reductions
has occurred from units stationed overseas, predominantly from those in Europe.
Since 1990, the number of U.S. troops based on foreign shores has declined
190,000 (45 percent); in Europe alone, the U.S. drawdown exceeds 175,000 (60
percent). As a consequence of these reductions, the Department estimates that
annual costs of our forces based overseas have decreased by nearly $10 billion
(33 percent) since 1990.
Because these sizable U.S. reductions have outpaced allied reductions in the
aggregate, our relative share of the common defense burden has diminished. At
the same time, our allies are showing strong support for important shared
security goals--including PfP, assistance to the New Independent States (NIS)
of the former Soviet Union, and denuclearization.
As discussed below, however, and depicted in Chart 1, wide differences remain
among the force improvement efforts and security contributions of individual
- When all factors are taken into account--but giving greatest weight
to the key yardstick of defense spending as a share of gross domestic product
(GDP) and other contributions as a function of ability to contribute--the
efforts of Turkey, the United Kingdom, the Republic of Korea, Greece, and
France look particularly strong. Norway likewise makes significant efforts.
- Portugal, the Netherlands, and Germany also make important
contributions, although their overall efforts can best be characterized as
mixed. The contributions of Belgium and Italy are also mixed, but the
performance of these nations is on a lower tier overall.
1 - Country Performance in Selected Responsibility Sharing Areas
(view full-size chart)
NOTE: No set of selected indicators can fully convey the entire range of a
nation's contributions. Readers are therefore urged to review this chart in
conjunction with the discussions and data elsewhere in this Report.
- The allies doing relatively less in most essential areas of defense
are Denmark, Canada, Spain, Luxembourg, and Japan. These nations do, however,
make noteworthy contributions in the broader security context, such as host
nation support (Japan), peace operations (Canada, Denmark, Spain, and
Luxembourg), and grant aid to developing countries and the emerging democracies
of Central Europe and the NIS (Denmark, Canada, and Luxembourg).
Aggregate Resources for Defense
The financial and personnel resources nations commit to defense remain their
most important contributions to collective security. This section addresses
financial commitments to defense, while personnel contributions are summarized
in Annex 1 [Selected Indicators].
- Financial contributions are measured by comparing the most
comprehensive indicator of defense effort (defense spending) against the most
comprehensive indicator of ability to contribute (GDP). Because this statistic
(defense expenditures as a percentage of GDP) best reflects the national
resources committed to defense and security compared to ability to contribute,
it receives the greatest weight in country assessments. This should not be
interpreted, however, as lessening the importance of nations' contributions in
the broader security context.
- As shown in Annex 1, Chart A-4, the nations with the highest share of
GDP dedicated to defense are the Greece, United States, Turkey, the United
Kingdom, and the Republic of Korea, with percentages ranging from 5.6 to 3.5,
respectively. At the other end of the spectrum are Germany, Canada, Belgium,
and Spain (figures just below 2 percent), followed by Luxembourg and Japan
(percentages hovering at 1 percent).
Military Forces for Defense
The standing military forces that nations raise and maintain represent their
most basic defense capabilities, and thus comprise an integral component of
- Military force contributions are measured according to each nation's
inventory of major weapons systems as a share of the aggregate for all nations
represented in this Report. Assessments of relative performance are based on
comparing these contributions with each nation's ability to contribute (its
share of aggregate GDP).
- As reflected in Chart 1, the highest rankings in this category belong
to Greece, Turkey, Republic of Korea, and Portugal, followed by Norway, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. Lowest rankings are shown for Japan and
Luxembourg. (Country rankings by military component are shown in Annex 1,
Charts A-6 through A-8.) In addition, the United States and, to a lesser
degree, the United Kingdom and France, make notable nuclear contributions.
Also, Japan has made progress toward achieving the military capability to
fulfill its agreed defense mission, i.e., the defense of its territory,
including adjacent air and sea-lanes within 1,000 nautical miles.
- Based on latest available country plans, by the end of the
1990's, most NATO nations, including the United States, will have made
sizable reductions to their force structure and/or weapons inventories from
Cold War levels. Allies' planned reductions continue to concentrate most
heavily on their armies as nations move toward smaller forces with enhanced
mobility and flexibility.
- As reflected in Chart 2 , planned cutbacks in total U.S. forces
will exceed (in percentage terms) drawdowns projected for our NATO allies in
the aggregate for all key force categories--while cuts in U.S. forces
committed to NATO and forces based in Europe will exceed by even
greater margins planned reductions for our allies as a whole. Thus, the United
States will contribute a shrinking share of NATO forces projected for the late
1990s, both in total and Europe-based. The U.S. share of total NATO-committed
ground forces is projected to drop from 30 percent in 1990 to less than 20
percent by 1999; likewise regarding air forces, the U.S. share will decline
from 40 percent to 20 percent over this period.
- NATO authorities assess planned allied force levels to be generally
adequate for emerging post-Cold War security requirements. However, U.S. and
NATO officials have expressed concern over some planned reductions--such as
elimination of certain modern equipment, and cutbacks in reservist training and
conscript tour lengths--which could seriously degrade allied readiness and
force build-up capabilities.
- Among our Pacific allies, Japan has improved its
homeland defense and sea-lane protection capabilities, in spite of plans to
slow some defense procurement due to economic constraints. In addition, the
Republic of Korea is taking significant steps to increase its defense
responsibilities, including modernizing its forces. Following Korean
assumption of control over combined U.S. and South Korean ground forces in
1992, another major step toward South Korean military autonomy was taken in
December 1994, with the transfer of peacetime operational control of Korea's
armed forces from the Commander-in-Chief (CINC), Combined Forces Command, to
the Korean government.
Crisis Management and Peace Operations
The post-Cold War era poses many new security risks and challenges to the
United States and our allies, including a wide range of political, economic,
and ethnic instabilities that may affect areas of strategic interest. The
prevention and management of these risks will be increasingly important to
protecting fundamental Western values and enhancing our security.
- NATO's premier initiative for enhancing stability in Europe is the
PfP program, first proposed by the United States in 1993, and agreed at the
1994 NATO Summit. PfP provides a strong foundation for achieving our political
and security objectives to extend stability to NATO's east. The partnership is
expanding and intensifying political and military cooperation throughout
Europe, while increasing stability, diminishing threats to peace, and promoting
practical commitment to democratic principles.
- In the year since the Summit, PfP has made major strides. There are
now 25 countries participating in the program, of which 11 have met all
requirements and are now in the implementation phase of their partnership.
During 1994, NATO and its partners conducted two land-based peacekeeping
exercises and one maritime exercise. Planned for 1995 are 10 more PfP
exercises, along with scores of related activities and planning
conferences--including more than 30 additional exercises sponsored by
individual nations in support of PfP objectives.
- Recognizing the inability of many partners to fund exercises,
interoperability, language training, and other high priority PfP activities,
President Clinton announced the Warsaw Initiative in July 1994. Under this
initiative, the Administration is requesting $100 million in FY 1996 to promote
partner participation. In addition, the United States is continuing to press
vigorously for greater bilateral support for PfP from our allies.
- NATO also agreed at the Summit to reinforce ongoing efforts against
the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. Particularly in light of
the breakup of the Soviet Union and its nuclear arsenal, proliferation of WMD
has become a major challenge to the international security environment. NATO
is now actively engaged in assessing the proliferation threat and coordinating
members' collective diplomatic efforts as well as defense capabilities in
response to this critical issue.
- Increased instability around the globe is posing greater demands on
U.S. and allied military resources. During 1994, the United States and our
allies committed forces to crises in areas such as Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti,
Iraq, and the Balkans. Our allies have shown their willingness to take
increased security responsibilities: at the end of 1994, the NATO and Pacific
allies addressed in this Report had a total of over 21,000 personnel assigned
to some 17 U.N. peace operations worldwide, and had contributed collectively a
total of over $1.6 billion toward U.N. peacekeeping assessments during the
- Charts 3a and 3b depict countries' personnel and funding
contributions to U.N. peace operations, shown relative to their ability to
contribute. The largest personnel commitments (as a percentage of labor
force) to U.N. peace operations are made by Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands,
Belgium, France, and Canada, while the leading funding contributions toward
U.N. peacekeeping assessments (as a percentage of GDP) are recorded by the
United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Belgium, Norway, and Canada.
- In terms of the absolute size of nations' U.N. support, the
largest contributors of personnel include France (with over 5,000), the United
Kingdom, and Canada (with approximately 4,000 and 3,000, respectively).
Country personnel contributions to U.N. peace operations ranged from 2,000 to
1,000 for the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, Denmark, Spain, Belgium, and the
United States. Regarding payments of U.N. peacekeeping assessments, largest
contributors include the United States (over $1.1 billion), Japan, Germany, the
United Kingdom, and France (ranging from $400 million to $200 million).
- The foregoing figures do not reflect the full measure
of countries' involvement in support of Security Council initiatives, however.
Not included are nations' considerable voluntary efforts made over and above
their U.N. peacekeeping assessments. For example, during 1994 the United
States incurred costs of approximately $1.9 billion beyond our U.N. assessments
for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. Included in this figure is
approximately $475 million for our operations in Haiti, where at the end of
1994 the United States had some 6,000 personnel. Estimates of other nations' voluntary contributions in support of Security Council initiatives are incomplete, although available data indicate that in 1994 Canada, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and France each provided sums in the neighborhood of $500 million to $1 billion in addition to their U.N. peacekeeping assessments.
Economic and Financial Assistance
Each of the nations addressed in this Report provides economic assistance to
developing countries, or has pledged aid to Central European nations and the
NIS. These contributions and pledges are an important boost to post-Cold War
stability, and represent notable economic commitments by donor nations.
- Nations showing the greatest cumulative contributions
of grant aid during 1990-1993 are the United States (roughly $60 billion),
Japan and Germany (each at around $50 billion), and France (over $30 billion).
During this same period, substantial assistance has also been provided or
pledged by Italy, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Canada--each
totalling between $15 billion and $10 billion. Smallest sums have been offered
by Turkey ($700 million), the Republic of Korea, Greece, and Luxembourg (in the
$300 million to $200 million range). These results are shown in Chart 4a.
- Chart 4b reflects grant aid as a percentage of GDP. When measured
relative to ability to contribute, strongest efforts are recorded by Denmark,
Norway, and the Netherlands--the only countries in which aid amounts to nearly
one percent or more of GDP. Above-average efforts overall are also registered
by France, Germany, Canada, Belgium, and Luxembourg. Among non-aid-receiving
nations, smallest efforts relative to ability to contribute are reflected for
Italy, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Japan, Spain, and the United States.
- A particularly important subset (roughly 15 percent) of
this aid is the assistance pledged to Central Europe and the NIS. Between
1990-1993, the nations addressed in this Report combined to pledge nearly $45
billion in such aid. Assistance to Central Europe and the NIS has made an
immediate impact on security by addressing problems of political and economic
instability, and promoting reform in these emerging democracies.
- Germany has pledged nearly as much aid to Central Europe and the NIS
as all other countries covered in this Report combined (nearly $20 billion).
Included in this amount, and of special significance, is over $8 billion
provided by Germany for restationing ex-Soviet troops. Other nations with
sizable grant aid pledges to the emerging democracies include the United States
($13 billion), France, Italy, Japan, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the
Netherlands (with pledges ranging from $2 billion to $1 billion). When
accounting for ability to contribute, Germany's pledges to Central Europe and
the NIS still remain well above the rest. Other above-average nations include
Denmark, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Canada.
Host Nation Support
Our European and Pacific allies provide a broad range of host nation support
to U.S. forces. As shown in Chart 5, the Department estimates that in 1993 we
received assistance valued at between $7.5 and $8.5 billion in direct allied
cost sharing support and foregone allied revenues. This equates to roughly 45
to 50 percent of the costs the Department incurs in these countries (excluding
U.S. military personnel costs). Our wartime host nation support (WHNS)
agreements with many of these countries provide us with additional extensive
cost avoidances. (Figures discussed here and depicted in Chart 5 are estimates
for 1993. Data for 1994 are currently being developed and will be
- Japan currently funds virtually all DoD in-country
construction costs and provides, at no charge, land and facilities used by U.S.
forces. These contributions represent between $2.9 and $3.2 billion in direct
support and almost $700 million in foregone revenues. Japan's assistance
exceeds that of our other allies in total and in the direct support category.
- The Republic of Korea provides land and facilities for U.S. use;
logistics support, including ammunition storage and equipment maintenance; and
manpower augmentees to U.S. Army units (KATUSAs). During 1993, these
contributions amounted to nearly $200 million in direct support and roughly
$1.7 billion in foregone revenues.
- Virtually all NATO allies furnish land for U.S. bases and/or material
storage facilities. Germany, which hosts the largest concentration of U.S.
forces in Europe, provides by far the greatest offsets to U.S. stationing costs
in Europe, including land and facilities provided free-of-charge, and offsets
for police, fire, and public health services provided to U.S. military
communities. Germany's direct support for 1993 is estimated at around $250
million, with foregone revenues estimated at between $1.4 billion to $1.9
MAJOR ISSUES AND RECENT PROGRESS IN RESPONSIBILITY SHARING
This section addresses key topics of special concern to Congress and
highlights recent developments in our ongoing efforts to ensure equitable
NATO Security Investment Program
Virtually since its inception, NATO has provided infrastructure for Alliance
needs on a commonly funded basis. NATO's Infrastructure Program--recently
renamed the NATO Security Investment Program to reflect more accurately its
reorientation to the new strategy and force structure--is thus among the oldest
and surest tools for equitably sharing defense costs among the allies.
- Although initially created to build fixed facilities during the Cold
War, the Security Investment Program has in recent years undergone dramatic
downsizing and restructuring to meet NATO's rapidly changing needs. The
program now focuses on crisis management and political consultation
requirements, C3, force mobility, reinforcement and mobilization, and logistics
resupply. NATO common funding can also support PfP requirements such as
provision of administrative facilities, sponsorship of workshops and seminars,
and planning, training, and communications for joint activities.
- The NATO Security Investment Program provides important direct
benefits to the United States. As we continue to consolidate and reorient our
NATO-deployed forces, the Program remains the primary source of funding for our
facility restoration, upgrade, and construction requirements in Europe.
Likewise, most of the funds needed for embarkation facilities in the United
States to support the mobilization and movement of our NATO-reinforcing forces
and equipment, and for European storage facilities for U.S. Army prepositioned
war reserve materiel, come from the NATO Security Investment Program. NATO
funding is planned for the majority of new construction at Aviano Air Base,
Italy, to support the stationing of two U.S. F-16 squadrons. In addition, the
Security Investment Program is expected to cover some of our operating
expenditures at European-based storage sites and at air bases from which U.S.
reinforcements plan to operate in times of crisis or war.
- In addition to U.S.-specific requirements, the Security Investment
Program funds the procurement, maintenance, and upgrade of theater-wide and
common-use systems and facilities essential for allied military operations.
Examples of such systems, upon which NATO's command structure and U.S. and
allied forces depend, include secure and reliable communications; NATO command
headquarters with modern management information systems; interconnecting
systems of early warning and air defense radars; cross-border fuel pipelines;
air/sea embarkation and reception facilities; and joint training ranges.
- The Security Investment Program has been fundamentally reoriented to
respond to the risks and instabilities of the emerging security environment.
The Program provides critical support to U.S. and allied forces, and is
essential to NATO's post-Cold War strategy, roles, and missions. Total Program
funding from all nations, averaging $1.7 billion in the late 1980s, is now less
than half that sum (around $800 million), and the U.S. budget request of $179
million for FY 1996 stands at roughly one-third of the FY 1990 request. The
Program continues to provide significant economic benefits to U.S.
NATO-assigned forces and remains a model of allied cost sharing.
Recent Cost Sharing Initiatives
Congress continues to be concerned with the level of U.S. outlays associated
with our forces based overseas--a concern shared by the Administration. Since
1990, the real annual costs of our overseas forces have dropped by nearly $10
billion (33 percent), and the share of U.S. non-salary costs defrayed by our
allies in the aggregate has increased. This Administration remains strongly
committed to seeking additional cost sharing progress, and is continuing to
pursue agreements with our major allies that will result in reduced U.S.
- As a result of the multi-year Special Measures Agreement signed in
1991, Japan is assuming all labor and utilities costs at U.S. bases on their
soil by March 1996. In addition, Japan provides direct funding for facilities,
construction, rent, and other programs under the Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA). These contributions exceed by a wide margin the cost sharing support
provided by our other allies. The United States is currently engaged in
discussions with the Government of Japan seeking a new multi-year host nation
support agreement. We hope to have this agreement concluded by the end of
- Since 1989, the Republic of Korea has annually increased its
contributions toward sharing the costs of U.S. stationed forces. The Republic
of Korea has pledged to pay $300 million in cash and in-kind support for U.S.
Forces Korea (USFK) in 1995. The United States will soon begin discussions
with the Republic of Korea to conclude a multi-year cost sharing agreement.
- U.S. cost sharing efforts in Europe include discussions with NATO
itself--where, in 1992, the United States succeeded in obtaining agreement to
expand common funding eligibility to cover O&M costs for reinforcement
facilities. In addition, we have raised cost sharing on a bilateral basis with
the principal European allies that host U.S. troops--namely, Germany, the
United Kingdom, and Italy. U.S. proposals were tabled in 1994 to pursue a
three-track approach aimed at lowering U.S. stationing costs, including: (1)
increased cash and in-kind payments; (2) expanded host government relief from
taxes, fees, and charges; and (3) cooperative/combining arrangements that,
through economies of scale, could result in reduced costs for all countries
concerned. Once confirmed, the newly appointed Ambassador for Burdensharing
has an immediate and high priority mission in resuming these negotiations with
our principal NATO allies.
- Recent cost sharing discussions with our Gulf allies have focused on
recoupment of the incremental U.S. costs of Operation Vigilant Warrior, our
response last fall to ominous Iraqi troop movements. To date, we have received
reimbursement for half these expenses, amounting to $226 million, from
The Japanese Cost Sharing Model
The political and military relationship the United States enjoys with our
major allies is uniquely tailored to the strategic and economic circumstances
of each ally. For this reason, it would be inappropriate to apply a single
standard or approach to countries as varied as those addressed in this Report.
Nevertheless, some observers have proposed that the United States negotiate
with our European allies a substantial host nation support package covering up
to 75 percent of our annual stationing costs--based on the agreement we have
- While the United States believes that more can and should be done to
increase the offsets we receive for our Europe-based forces, the Department of
Defense and the Ambassador for Burdensharing take strong exception to proposals
that we seek cost sharing arrangements in Europe on a scale similar to those we
have with Japan.
- Perhaps the most serious problem with applying the Japanese model to
Europe is that it subordinates the truly extensive network of transatlantic
responsibility sharing to much narrower cost sharing considerations. Such an
approach fails to recognize a wide variety of important security and defense
efforts made by our European allies. It overlooks extensive political and
military consultations within NATO, the highly developed process of assigning
national defense assets to multinational roles and missions, integrated plans
and procedures across virtually the entire spectrum of civil/military affairs,
and cost sharing arrangements such as the Security Investment Program and the
- Even if our European allies were able to provide substantial
cash increases comparable to Japan to offset U.S. stationing costs, overall
U.S. burdensharing objectives would be undermined since this would unavoidably
result in decreases in allies' ability to field and maintain ready and modern
forces. This is a fact of life in view of constrained defense budgets, and it
is also in keeping with the trade-off Japan makes in its defense priorities,
since substantial Japanese host nation support is offset by quite modest
defense efforts relative to its wealth.
- If our European allies were to copy the Japanese model
completely--that is, in terms of defraying the bulk of U.S. stationing costs
and in making relatively modest national defense efforts compared to
ability to contribute--this would result in a significant reduction in their
overall contributions. To illustrate, if Europe were to match Japan's
performance both in cost sharing and in defense contributions it would
cause our NATO allies' current annual defense budgets to drop from $170 billion
collectively to around $70 billion (a decline of 60 percent). Aggregate
European defense spending would drop to one percent of GDP from 2.5 percent,
while the size of Europe's active duty military would decline from over 1.5
percent of the labor force to just a fraction of one percent.
- In sum, it is politically and economically infeasible to demand
enormous increases in cost sharing from our European allies. As the FY 1995
Defense Authorization Report points out, it is also ill-advised to determine
U.S. forward presence policy solely on the basis of allied cost sharing. For
more than 45 years, NATO's greatest benefits to U.S. national security have
come from its success in strengthening European military capabilities and
encouraging our allies to assume increased defense roles and responsibilities.
In a very real sense, these are still our paramount responsibility sharing
objectives in Europe. Reducing European defense capabilities to pay for U.S.
costs would yield neither an improved security environment, nor true long-term
burdensharing benefits to the United States.
Residual Value Compensation and Environmental Restoration
Since 1990, while the number of U.S. military personnel stationed in Europe
has dropped from over 300,000 to roughly 130,000, the number of DoD sites in
Europe has likewise been reduced--from around 1,400 to approximately 500, a
decline of more than 60 percent. Over half of these sites, the majority in
Germany, have now been returned to the host government.
- Through December 1994, host nations have paid over $70 million in
cash compensation to the United States for U.S.-built improvements at returned
sites--of which about one-third represents payment for sites returned prior to
1990. Additional outstanding claims worth hundreds of millions of dollars are
still under negotiation with our allies.
- Congressional provisions permitting the Department to seek residual
value compensation on an in-kind basis have substantially improved our
ability to conclude negotiations successfully with host nations. Since 1990,
Germany has agreed to provide over $265 million worth of military construction
projects on U.S.-operated bases against future residual value settlements. Due
to the domestic benefits associated with in-kind compensation, host nations may
find this alternative to be politically and economically more attractive than
outright transfers of sizable cash sums. In-kind payment thus offers a
valuable dimension to our residual value negotiations.
- Among the most complex issues involved with the return of overseas
bases is that of environmental restoration. Recognizing the difficulties
surrounding these matters, the NATO Status of Forces Agreement provides a
process for the cost sharing of claims resulting from environmental damage. In
other bilateral agreements, SOFAs, and technical arrangements, environmental
cleanup responsibilities are addressed in a variety of ways. Some agreements,
for example, call for a reduction in residual value equal to the estimated cost
of environmental cleanup. Other arrangements, particularly those with East
Asian countries, allow facilities to be returned in their current condition,
with no monetary exchange.
Responsibility sharing is an attempt to address the entire spectrum of
post-Cold War security challenges which now faces us. Through this approach,
we seek to recognize and encourage not only nations' contributions to the
common defense--which remain the cornerstone of our security--but also the
broad range of other efforts undertaken to promote peace and stability. This
perspective emphasizes the strategic view of our shared security interests, and
permits a more comprehensive assessment of national contributions.
Among our NATO allies, responsibility sharing focuses on their continued
commitment of resources and forces for defense, their significant contributions
in the areas of peacekeeping and financial assistance to fledgling democracies
in Central Europe and the NIS, and on their support for critical new missions
such as PfP and counterproliferation.
As for our Pacific allies, Japan is assuming increased responsibility for
self-defense, and continues to show steadfast support for the U.S. role in the
region, including providing extensive host nation support to stationed U.S.
forces. Meanwhile, the Republic of Korea continues to rank among the top
nations assessed in this Overview in the key categories of defense resources
and forces. In addition, the Republic of Korea has made important strides
toward military autonomy and in augmenting their host nation support
contributions to help defray U.S. stationing costs.
We are encouraged by Congressional support for this more comprehensive
approach to assessing nations' efforts. As we expand the security dialogue
with our allies and explore new arrangements to meet shared objectives, we look
forward to building on the theme of responsibility sharing through continued
discussions with the Congress.
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