Seal of the Department of Defense U.S. Department of Defense
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
Speech
On the Web:
http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1086
Media contact: +1 (703) 697-5131/697-5132
Public contact:
http://www.defense.gov/landing/comment.aspx
or +1 (703) 571-3343

The Reserve Components and the Real World
Prepared remarks by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry , Adjutants General Association of the United States, Washington, Wednesday, February 07, 1996

Thank you very much. ... Last June when I spoke to you, the National Guard had just made history when it deployed the 4th [Battalion] of the 505th Infantry [Regiment], a unit made up mostly of guardsmen, to perform multinational peacekeeping duties on the Sinai Peninsula. Well, the 4th of the 505th made history a second time when they returned to the United States because they had proven the reserve component's capabilities for dealing with post-Cold war missions and playing an even greater role in our national defense. We are confident that the Guard can play this greater role in the total force because over the years in national disasters and national security threats, the Guard has proven itself ready and capable time and time again.

One of the Guard's roles today has been unfolding during the mission to bring peace to war-torn Bosnia, where the Guard is serving from the flight lines in Aviano to the supply lines in Germany and Hungary to the front lines in Bosnia itself.

Today, I want to talk to you about Bosnia, because it's very much on my mind and it's probably very much on your minds as well. Last month, I went to the Bosnia theater to see how our deployment was going. I spent the first day at our air bases in Aviano and at Vicenza in Italy. For 2½ years, NATO has conducted an operation called Deny Flight, which has prevented the warring parties in Bosnia from conducting aerial bombardments of cities. It didn't get much publicity. Most people don't understand what it did, but it saved thousands and thousands of lives because it prevented that war from degenerating into indiscriminate bombing of cities.

Deny Flight was in operation 2½ years and was challenged by the Bosnian Serbs only once. They sent four fighter bombers out and began bombing a city. Two F-16s intercepted those four, shot down all four of them, and it was never challenged after that. So that was a very successful operation.

The second major activity in Aviano was the NATO air strike force that was put in place to coerce the Serbs to move their heavy weapons out of Sarajevo and stop the ground bombardment of that city. That threat worked initially, and the weapons were silent. Prior to the institution of that threat, there were as many as a thousand shells a day being launched from the hills and mountains around Sarajevo into the city. That was stopped. But then later in '94, the Serbs began testing the limits and began challenging that exclusion. And the U.N. command, fearing Bosnian Serb reprisals against their troops on the ground, would not give the authorization for the NATO air strikes to be used effectively.

Unchecked, the Serbs continued to escalate their violations until finally they overplayed their hand when they violated the so-called safe area of Srebrenica. That violation was so egregious that even the nations with troops on the ground with the U.N. agreed at a meeting in London that it was time to use NATO air power and to use it effectively.

In fact, at that meeting in London, I made the proposal if there's any further violations, that there would be a massive air campaign -- not just a bombing or two, but an air campaign. There was another violation. The nations had agreed to that air campaign, and we had such a campaign. From Aviano and from the decks of carriers in the Adriatic, we launched one of the most effective air campaigns that we've ever had. It was over 1,000 sorties. Every target that had been designated was destroyed, and there was zero collateral damage. This was a rare instance where by combination of exclusive use of precision guided ammunitions and very strict rules of engagement we conducted this massive campaign with no damage, no damage to civilians, no collateral damage of any kind.

Quite aside from the military effectiveness of the campaign, we know now, having talked with the Bosnian Serbs and the Serbian Serbs, that they were stunned by the power and effectiveness of this campaign. And more than anything else, that's what led them to conclude that the continuing fighting was a losing proposition, and they decided to go to the peace table at Dayton. This was one of the rare examples in history of successful use of coercive diplomacy. That is, the use of military power to achieve diplomatic objectives.

On this trip, I also went to Vicenza. Vicenza is the air base near Aviano where we have the CAOC, which is the Combined Air Operations Center. This is one of the most effective air intelligence operations that has ever been put together. At the CAOC, we bring in national intelligence, tactical intelligence, synthesize it and get it to the user -- to the pilots in the air -- in a matter of seconds.

This whole operation was rejuvenated after the shoot-down of [U.S. Air Force] Capt. [Scott] O'Grady. We looked very carefully in the after-action analysis there and discovered that we had the information which could have warned off Capt. O'Grady three minutes before the missile was fired. We got it to him five minutes later, which is two minutes after the missile was fired. Five minutes is pretty good, but not good enough -- not good enough to prevent the shoot-down of that airplane.

And so at that point, we decided to completely restructure and organize air intelligence support. We had to do two things. We had to change our procedures to get the information out to the field quickly, and we had to find a way of downgrading some of the highly classified strategic intelligence which was needed by the pilot -- by the warrior. Most of those things have been done, and they are now operating quite effectively at Vicenza.

The other thing that's operating out of Vicenza is the management of the airlift operation into Bosnia. We have a massive airlift to deploy our forces and deploy our equipment into Bosnia. Everything is being coordinated out of Vicenza. I've seen the most effective logistics management that I've ever seen at Vicenza. The National Guard airplanes, Reserve airplanes, the active duty airplanes, all coming from the United States and from Germany into Bosnia. All were being managed out of Vicenza.

From Italy, I got on a C-17 and flew into Taszar, Hungary. In Hungary we are managing the logistics for all of the equipment and personnel flowing into Bosnia. The concept that [U.S. Army] Gen. [George A.] Joulwan [supreme allied commander Europe] had was that we would take all of our forces that are in Germany and instead of moving them directly to Bosnia, we would move them to a staging area in Hungary. So we have 300 trains over a period of a month, each one with 20 or 30 freight cars, go from Germany to Taszar. We unload it, regroup, and then from Taszar we proceed by road in combat units into Bosnia. In combat units in full march with guns loaded ready for combat.

As it turned out, we did not meet any combat. We did not meet any armed resistance when we went into Bosnia. But we did not know we would not meet resistance, so we went in prepared for resistance. We will probably be criticized for having overreached on this or having had too large a force, too well-armed a force. But my judgment was the same then as my judgment is now -- that if I'm going to err, I want to err on the side of being too strong and too ready rather than the other way around.

Also, we will never know -- since we cannot rewrite history -- the extent to which the strength and the capability of that force deterred or dissuaded people from resisting. As it turns out, we have had absolutely no armed resistance in Bosnia. In fact, we're being met with full cooperation by all the parties there. And there was no question that the U.S. forces, when they entered Bosnia, were met with great respect. They came in, as I said, fully armed with flak jackets, with their helmets, with their guns at the ready position and loaded. And people paid attention to that.

Now, our reserve components have played a key role in all of these operations I've described to you. They provided significant airlift access including a large percentage of the truly tremendous C-17 capability, which is being used to airlift the supplies in there and which I used to hitchhike a ride when I went into Bosnia. They're being used in the aeromedical capability, and they provide about half of the tanker support. The reserve components continue to be crucial as we are slowly turning peace into a reality in Bosnia.

Now, we also saw reserve component forces at the logistics staging area in Taszar, Hungary. We now have 7,000 people running this logistics center. One incidental side feature of the operation in Hungary is it has built up a new relationship with the Hungarian government. We requested permission of Hungary to have a base in Hungary. Hungary's parliament met, and by a vote of 300 to 1 they agreed to let the United States use their base. And when I visited that base, I was met by the leaders of the Hungarian government, and I've never seen such a warm relationship between two countries as developed between Hungary and the United States -- all because of our use of the Taszar base.

From Taszar, I flew on to the Sarajevo Airport and then drove down to the president's residence where I met President [Alija] Izetbegovic and his cabinet. On the drive from the airport into the president's office in downtown Sarajevo, I drove through the destruction that had been wrought by years and years of shelling in this city, and I was just heartsick to see this once beautiful city in Europe reduced almost to rubble.

But as I drove through it, I also was heartened to see that this had now stopped. We drove right down sniper alley without any danger. The shelling has stopped. I had a very good meeting with the president, and when I left the meeting, I came out of the office building and there were 300 to 400 Bosnians on the other side of the street being held off by a police cordon. They wanted to see the American secretary of defense.

I had no idea what kind of reaction we would have in the crowd, but as I walked out the door, they started cheering and shouting "U-S-A, U-S-A!" And I drove my security people actually wild at that point. I left my group, crossed the street, went through the police cordon and started shaking hands and talking with the Bosnians who were there.

For me, it was the most emotional moment of the trip -- to see their gratitude. These are people who for four years have been living in this city that was subjected to continues shelling for much of that period. They now saw a prospect of peace. And there's no doubt in their minds that peace was being delivered to them by the United States. I was a symbol of the U.S. and they wanted to show their gratitude.

From Sarajevo, I flew to Tuzla, which is the headquarters of the American forces there, and met [U.S. Army Maj.] Gen. [William] Nash. We got into Black Hawks and flew over to the Sava River, landing on the Croatian side of the Sava River. This was the day after they had finished the bridge, opened the bridge.

I got out of the helicopter and walked up to the bridge and walked into Bosnia across the bridge. It was a cold, windy, muddy walk. Halfway across the bridge there were 30 or 40 American combat engineers still working on some aspects of the bridge. They were dirty, cold and tired, but very proud of what they had done.

As it turned out, one of them had just completed his first enlisted term that week and had decided to re-enlist. And so we had the re-enlistment ceremony there on the bridge. Gen. Joulwan, [U.S. Army] Gen. [John] Shalikashvili [chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] and I swore in this soldier for four more years in the U.S. Army. And I can tell you I have never been more proud of the Army than standing there that day and swearing in this soldier in the mud and the ice and snow. He had just been through that, and he was ready for four more years of it. That tells you something about the spirit and the pride of the U.S. soldier.

I went back then to the base camp at Tuzla. I got a real taste of the flavor of this operation and the jointness of it. This base is the headquarters for Army Gen. Nash and his division, and many of the battalions are based there. But working alongside of these Army units was an Air Force unit called Red Horse. Red Horse is an engineer team that builds bases. And if you ever want to see jointness in operation, go out to Tuzla and watch these Army soldiers not only working but living in the mud and the snow and the ice, coming back after a patrol and finding that the Air Force had just completed building a tent for them with a wooden floor and a stove -- a warm, dry place to sleep that night. So this was jointness in operation, and the Air Force were the heroes of the day for the Army soldiers who were there.

Besides the jointness, this was a multinational operation. Gen. Nash ..., in addition to two American brigades, has a Nordic brigade -- 4,500 people in the Nordic brigade. That is a build-up of a battalion that had been there in the U.N. forces. They brought a knowledge of the territory and knowledge of the people -- a great asset to Gen. Nash to have that Nordic brigade there.

There is a Turkish brigade. They also had been there with the U.N., and they also brought a familiarity with the people and terrain which is a great value to us. And most amazingly, we have a Russian brigade. When I was there, the advanced guard of that brigade had just arrived. But as of a few days ago, the entire brigade is there, is out conducting patrols, and it's just one of Gen. Nash's brigades doing the job there.

I spent my whole career as a cold warrior and I never, never would have contemplated the possibility of having a Russian brigade working in an American division conducting a peacekeeping operation in the Balkans. But there it is. And it seems to be working very well.

I can only imagine what Gen. [Dwight D.] Eisenhower, the first SACEUR, would think if he saw a general from Russia sitting with Gen. Joulwan, today's SACEUR, at the SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe] compound reviewing NATO's operation plan for deployment in Bosnia. But indeed, Gen. Joulwan and [counterpart Russian commander Col.] Gen. Leontiy Shevtsov spent a week at SHAPE headquarters planning this whole operation which I saw getting started.

I spent a lot of time while I was in Bosnia talking with the intelligence people on their assessment of the mine situation. The good news is all three of the warring parties are trying to cooperate with us, providing charts where they think the mines are located and helping to clear the mines.

Before all of our units went down there, each battalion spent a couple of months specifically training for combat operations that involved mine awareness, mine location, mine removal and most importantly, mine avoidance.

I spent some time yesterday at our Advanced Research Projects Agency, reviewing some of their technology. One of the specific things I was looking at was the technologies that might be useful in this area. They're working on it, but I'm afraid the realistic assessment is that mine avoidance and detection is still a matter of training and

discipline and attention to detail. And so the training that we have done to prepare our soldiers was the best thing that we could have done in preparing our soldiers for the very real problems they're running into in Bosnia.

They've been there now for almost seven weeks and we've not had a fatality yet from a person stepping on or a vehicle going over a mine. We have had one fatality [Army Sgt. 1st Class Donald A. Dugan, Feb. 3], but it turned out it was not a mine accident. We have had four or five different mine incidents. Fortunately no one was killed in those incidents, but it's going to be a problem as long as we are in Bosnia. A way of dealing with that problem is going to be twofold: continuing to work with the warring parties for removal of mines on the one hand, and the second, very careful attention to detail, discipline, training to minimize our chance of the mine accidents.

I'm going to come now to a few conclusions about Bosnia to share with you. The first conclusion is so far, so good. I say this even as our hearts go out to the family of the American soldier who lost his life over the weekend. My second conclusion, which is suggested by that, though, is that we still have 10 tough months ahead of us and we must not get complacent.

When Gen. Shali and I talked with our soldiers over there and our commanders, we had two messages for them really. The first, keep your focus. Pay close attention to detail. And the other was, take care of each other.

My third conclusion is that this whole operation in Bosnia is going to determine the character of European security certainly for the rest of this decade and probably on into the next decade. One of the single biggest security problems at the end of the Cold War was finding the right formula for maintaining the kind of security umbrella that NATO had provided for 45 years.

We found that formula in Bosnia, where all of Europe is pulling together for peace. Not only all of the NATO countries but one -- 15 in all (we had to exclude Iceland, which does not have military forces) -- but even more non-NATO countries. Nineteen non-NATO countries are participating as well as the 15 NATO countries. The United States is leading the way, even leading the Russians.

This U.S. military performance in Bosnia demonstrates once more the capability and the effectiveness of our forces. Our equipment, our training and our people are the best in the world. This goes both for the active and for the reserve components, and our challenge is to make wise and full use of all of these assets. That means we need to involve the Guard and Reserve more deeply in the ongoing missions of our military.

You all know that last year we announced what we called the Increased Use Initiative. The goal was to find creative ways to include our reserve forces in real missions of the active duty forces, to increase their proficiency and their readiness and to make more use of your talent and capability.

One of the important benefits of this is we helped reduce the very high operational tempo rate of the active duty force. After one year, preliminary reports say, yes, we can do these things. But it's not just the reports that are saying it. More importantly, the CinCs [commanders in chiefs] are saying it, too. They are saying it by spending time, effort and money to make use of Guard and Reserve talents.

In 1995, for example, the CinCs called on reserve component personnel for 97 missions. In 1996, it will be up to 167 missions. The CinCs have pledged about $10 million to make this integration possible. However, the CinCs are assigning Guard and Reserve personnel to real-world, not make-work, missions. The Army Guard, for example, is supporting the Combat Maneuver Training Center in Hohenfels, Germany. Navy reserve engineer units are deploying to Haiti to work with the United Nations forces there. The Colorado National Guard will assume command of the 4th Space Warning Squadron, taking over for an active unit which formerly performed that job.

The Defense Department has added $25 million over the next two years to help the CinCs make more use of Guard and Reserve. I'm optimistic that if we put the total effort of our total force behind the program, it will be successful. But to make the program work, we must ensure that it achieves its intended effect of increasing the CinCs' war-fighting capability as well as the readiness of our reserves by not having unintended bad side effects, such as hurting the recruiting and retention in the reserves.

One way to protect the Guard and Reserve recruitment and retention is by doing what we can to protect the quality of life of the reserve component. We can provide more support and outreach to Guard and Reserve families when their head of the household is on deployment. And we can also give employers better warning when we send their employees on deployment, and give employers a voice in our Guard and Reserve policies. Debbie Lee [assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs] told you more about these and other quality of life initiatives for the reserve components. They are critical to making our Increased Use Initiative a real success.

I'm going to wrap up now by telling you that in case you did not know it, I do believe in a strong Guard and Reserve, and I believe in taking care of our citizen-soldiers, their families as well, who serve our country.

Gen. Omar Bradley once said our military forces are a team, a team that's in the game to win. And each player on that team must be an All-American. Every member of today's Total Force -- the active forces, the reserves, the National Guard, their families and their employers -- is an All-American. The National Guard and its leadership are doing an All-American job at home, around the nation, and wherever our country sends them.

I am proud of your work, and I am proud to be your secretary of defense. Thank you very much.

 

Published for internal information use by the American Forces Information Service, a field activity of the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Washington, D.C. Parenthetical entries are speaker/author notes; bracketed entries are editorial notes. This material is in the public domain and may be reprinted without permission. Defense Issues is available on the Internet via the World Wide Web at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/index.html.