SEN. LEVIN: (Strikes gavel.) Good morning, everybody. The committee meets this morning to receive testimony on ballistic missile defense policies and programs in the proposed fiscal year 2002 amended budget from Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and the director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, Lieutenant General Ron Kadish. And I welcome you both to the committee this morning.
We're two days away from the first attempted intercept test in over a year of a missile defense system intended to address the possibility of a limited long-range missile attack from a nation such as North Korea, Iran, or Iraq. All of us hope that Saturday's test will be successful. However, the future of a research program will not hinge on the success or failure of any one test. Learning whether or not a system can be developed and understanding the true cost will take many tests over many years.
But there's a more fundamental uncertainty than the outcome of Saturday's test or future tests. Would a national missile defense system that is unilaterally deployed and conflict with a treaty produce a destabilizing response from other countries and increase the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction? And would that response increase the possibility that unimaginable horrors of a nuclear attack would be rained upon us as a result of breaching the treaty?
Would such a system make the United States, in other words, more secure or less secure? And is it worth taking -- is it worth risking those reactions to a unilateral deployment, particularly given the fact that a ballistic missile, we're told by the intelligence community, is the least likely means of delivering a weapon of mass destruction and that a truck, a ship, or a suitcase would be more reliable, less costly, and have no return address?
These fundamental policy questions will be the focus of later hearings. Today we will try to understand the budget request for missile defense programs that the administration has presented for fiscal year 2002.
The administration is proposing a large increase for missile defense of $3 billion, or a 57 percent increase over the current fiscal year, while proposing to decrease investments in other critical areas of the defense budget, such as procurement, science and technology, and even some readiness areas.
Secretary Rumsfeld told the committee two weeks ago that the, quote, "Taxpayers have a right to demand that we spend their money wisely," close quote. Well, a 57 percent increase is a huge amount for any program to absorb and spend wisely and efficiently in a single year.
The administration proposes to spend $8 billion on missile defense in fiscal year 2002, but the Pentagon has not provided Congress the details of how it intends to spend that $8 billion. General Kadish briefed the committee three weeks ago on his recommendations to the secretary of Defense. Two weeks ago, Secretary Rumsfeld told us that the actual details of the R&D budget for missile defense are still in a state of some flux.
The administration's plans for missile defense for fiscal year 2002 have been harder to zero in on than a target in a missile defense test. The purpose of today's hearing is to attempt to get specific details on activities proposed in this budget request, and clear answers to critical questions. Among the questions is whether any proposed activities in the administration's fiscal year 2002 budget request for missile defense would be in conflict with the ABM Treaty.
General Kadish addressed this very question in a briefing to the committee three weeks ago. He said that if all of his recommendations for missile defense were implemented, there would be no conflict with the ABM Treaty in fiscal year 2002. We have put the question of possible violations of the treaty in fiscal year 2002 to Secretary Rumsfeld twice in recent hearings. Secretary Rumsfeld first told the committee three weeks ago that, quote, "I don't think the '02 budget is a problem in that regard," close quote. He then told the committee two weeks ago that, quote, "We don't know for sure," close quote.
On July 2nd I sent a letter to Secretary Rumsfeld asking the following question, quote, "Are there any activities proposed to be carried out with the funding you are requesting for missile defense in fiscal year 2002 that would not be in compliance with the ABM Treaty and, if carried out, either would cause a violation of the treaty or would cause the United States to give notice under the provisions of the treaty that we would withdraw from the treaty?" Close quote. I have yet to receive an answer to my July 2nd letter.
This morning, the press reports that the administration has informed our allies that our missile defense research and development activities will conflict with the ABM Treaty in a matter of months, not years. That is exactly the question that I have been asking the administration for weeks without getting an answer.
If press reports are true, Congress will need to decide within months whether to fund research and development activities that conflict with the ABM Treaty. The consequences of such funding and the responsibility that goes with it are serious. Secretary Wolfowitz will, I'm sure, tell us if the reports in the papers are true and that we have informed our allies in Russia that, quote, "these tests will come into conflict with the ABM Treaty in months, not years," close quote.
The president alone has the right to withdraw from a treaty, but Congress has the heavy responsibility of determining whether or not to appropriate the funds for activities that conflict with a treaty. Knowing the consequences of the budget actions requested of us is essential, not just for those who are concerned about whether a treaty violation would leave America less secure; it is also essential for those who are concerned about the huge one-year increase in funding for missile defense given other pressing defense needs.
SEN. JOHN WARNER (R-VA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I examined the article this morning. I think the only one (with ?) detail that I could determine was in the Washington Post. And the best that I can determine -- and the secretary, I think, has verified it -- that emanated from briefings on Capitol Hill yesterday. And it's sort of a gathering of fragmentary reports; that there is in place no single press release. So I hope we give our witnesses this morning, whom I welcome with you, the benefit of the doubt. And we should, hopefully, receive today in the testimony -- and I reviewed Dr. Wolfowitz's statement -- the complete and accurate statement by the administration that was made yesterday.
You and I have been engaged here some 23 years in this committee in all types of reviews of this whole issue of missile defense, and it's been a long and arduous uphill climb. In that period of time, we have now reached, I think, clarity that all agree on, here in the United States as well as abroad, there is a threat. It is absolutely the duty of any president of the United States to step up and prepare our nation to defend itself against this threat.
And that's precisely what President Bush is doing, in my judgment. And I think that we should, as a Congress, give him the opportunity to, in a statesmen-like manner, prepare to lead this nation -- and hopefully our allies joining -- in a course of action to defend this country against what we clearly see now are actual threats.
Secretary Wolfowitz, in his opening statement, refers to the attack in the Gulf War where we, the United States, sustained the largest number of casualties as a consequence of a Scud attack during that conflict. I myself, together with Senators Inouye, Stevens and Nunn -- we were in Tel Aviv one night during the war when a Scud hit Tel Aviv. The following day we went out and saw the devastating damage inflicted. The nation of Israel -- or where we had our PAC-3 systems in there at that -- PAC system, not 3 -- in there at that time, and I think that system was effective to a degree -- it was defenseless. And we as a nation are just as defenseless 10 years after those attacks. Now, the PAC-3 has been upgraded but there's still a growing threat, so we accept that. And so now I think the president has properly outlined what he intends to do. He did that initially on May 1st, 2001, and I quote him:
"Today the sun comes up on a vastly different world. The wall is gone and so is the Soviet Union. Today's Russia is not our enemy, yet this is still a dangerous world; a less certain, a less predictable one. More nations have nuclear weapons and still more have nuclear aspirations. Many have chemical and biological weapons. Some already have developed the ballistic missile technology that would allow them to deliver weapons of mass destruction at long distances. We need new concepts of deterrence that rely on both offensive and defensive forces. We need a new framework that allows us to build missile defenses to counter the different threats of today's world."
That is simply a responsible statement by the commander in chief of our armed forces, as he is so designated under our constitution, and he is the chief architect -- not the Congress -- of the foreign policy. It's quite true we have the power of the purse, but I plead with my colleagues, let us form a partnership with the president to move forward. Let us recognize that he has the constitutional responsibility to lead, and see where and how we can best support him.
I think it's far too early to get tangled up in the small details of the lawyers trying to determine, does this or does that not comply with the ABM Treaty. So far as I know, the president has made good faith efforts in consultation with our allies, he has had preliminary discussions with Russia. This system which defends us against only perhaps as many as a dozen missiles is not a threat to the awesome -- and I repeat, awesome -- inventory of missiles that Russia has today in an operational status.
I'm confident that if we, the Congress, show our support to our president, he will eventually be able to work through the consultative process and eventually the negotiating process with Russia such that a hopeful new framework can be reached to replace the aging 1972 ABM Treaty and that we can go forward in such a way as to look at a far broader spectrum of options technically to defend this country; in all probability share to some extent that technology with our allies, possibly with Russia, because Russia should recognize that it is also threatened, and threatened by systems in existence today with shorter ranges, whereas our principle threat here at home are from the longer- range missiles.
So I believe our president will success, and I just hope that the Congress will act as a full partner and be supportive, let him take the initiatives as the Constitution clearly empowers him. And we hopefully will give him that support so that he can be successful.
I'll just put the balance of my statement in the record, Mr. Chairman.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator Warner. Secretary Wolfowitz.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, members of the committee, before I get into my testimony, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to thank you particularly, but also the ranking member and the entire committee and your hard-working staffs for moving so quickly with our nominees. I know you held hearings when you weren't yet even officially organized to do so, and I know you moved I think 15 of our nominees to the floor. We desperately need them. I hope the full Senate will act with the expedition that you did. But I sincerely thank you and everyone who participated in that.
There are more coming. (Laughs.) We need help.
Also appreciate this opportunity to testify before you on this very important subject. And General Kadish and I are here to try to answer in as much detail as we possibly can your questions and your concerns and to describe the program and to address those issues that you've raised and very important issues about where we are heading with respect to the treaty.
But let me begin with a sort of broader sketch. Imagine if you will the following scenario: A rogue state with a vastly inferior military but armed with ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction commits an act of aggression against a neighboring country. As President Bush sends forces into the theater to respond, the country's genocidal dictator threatens our allies and deployed forces with ballistic missile attack. Almost without warning, missiles rain down on our troops and pound into densely populated residential neighborhoods of allied capitals. Panic breaks out. Sirens wail as rescue crews in protective gear search the rubble for bodies and rush the injured to hospitals. Reporters mumbling through their gas masks attempt to describe the destruction as pictures of the carnage are instantaneously broadcast around the world.
Mr. Chairman, that scene is not science fiction. It is not a future conflict scenario dreamed up by creative Pentagon planners. It is a description of events that took place 10 years ago during the Persian Gulf War, events that Senator Warner personally witnessed in Tel Aviv.
I, too, have a vivid recollection of those events. When Saddam Hussein was launching Scud missiles against Israel, I was sent there with Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger to help persuade Israel not to get drawn further into that war. We saw children walking to school carrying gas masks in gaily decorated boxes; no doubt, to try to distract them from the possibility of facing mass destruction. They were awfully young to be thinking about the unthinkable. With those missiles, Saddam Hussein terrorized a generation of Israeli children and almost succeeded in changing the entire strategic course of the Gulf War.
This year is the 10th anniversary of the first U.S. combat casualties from a ballistic missile attack. In the waning days of Desert Storm, a single Scud missile hit a U.S. military barracks in Dhahran, killing 28 of our soldiers and wounding 99; 13 of them from a single small town in Pennsylvania called Greensburg. For American forces, it was the worst single engagement of the Gulf War. For 13 families in Greensburg, it was the worst day of their lives.
Today, 10 years later, it is appropriate to ask how much better able are we to meet a threat that was already real and serious 10 years ago and has become even more so today. The answer, sadly, is, not much better. Today our capacity to shoot down a Scud missile is not much improved from 1991 when we deployed, as Senator Warner correctly recalled, on an emergency basis, the PAC-II missiles to Israel and to Saudi Arabia and other countries.
We are still a year or two away from initial deployment of the PAC-III, our answer to the Scud -- and, let me add, a very effective answer, and General Kadish will be talking some about that technology in a few minutes -- but we are still many years from full deployment. Today our forces in the Persian Gulf and Korea and the civilian populations they defend have almost no means of protection against North Korean ballistic missiles armed with both chemical and conventional warheads. With no defenses, an attack by North Korea could result in tens or even hundreds of thousands of casualties.
Mr. Chairman, we underestimated the ballistic missile threat 10 years ago and today, a decade later, we are in danger of underestimating it still. The time has come to lift our heads from the sand and deal with unpleasant but indisputable facts. The short- range missile threat to our friends, our allies and our deployed forces arrived a decade ago. The intermediate-range missile threat is here now, and the long-range threat to American cities is just over the horizon -- a matter of years, not decades, away -- and our people and our territory are defenseless.
Why? The answer to that last question has four letters: A-B-M- T. ABM Treaty. For the past decade, our government has not taken seriously the challenge of developing defenses against missiles. We have not adequately funded it, we have not believed in it, and we have given the ABM Treaty priority over it. That is not how this country behaves when we're serious about a problem. It's not how we put a man on the Moon in 10 years. It's not how we developed the Polaris program for intercontinental ballistic missiles in even less time.
The time to get serious is long past. The number of countries pursuing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons is growing. The number of countries pursuing advanced conventional weapons and ballistic missiles is growing. Consider these facts: In 1972, we knew of only five countries that had nuclear weapons. Today we know of 12 with nuclear weapons programs. In 1972, we knew of a total of nine countries that had ballistic missiles.
Today we know of 28. And in just the last five years more than 1,000 of those missiles of all ranges have been produced. And those are just the cases that we know of. There are dangerous capabilities being developed at this very moment that we know we do not know about and which we may not know about for years, perhaps only after they are deployed.
For example, in 1998 North Korea surprised the world with its launch of a Taepo Dong I missile over Japan with a previously unknown and unanticipated third stage. The intelligence community tells us that this launch demonstrated a North Korean capability to deliver a small payload to the United States. North Korea is now developing the Taepo Dong II missile, which will be able to strike even deeper into U.S. territory and carry an even larger weapons payload. If we do not build defenses against these weapons now hostile powers will soon have or may already have the ability to strike U.S. and allied cities with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. And they might not even have to use the weapons in their possession to affect our behavior and achieve their ends.
While we have been debating the existence of the threat for nearly a decade, other countries have been busily acquiring, developing and proliferating missile technology. We can afford to debate the threat no longer. We are in a race against time, and we are starting behind. Thanks in no small part to the constraints of the ABM Treaty we have wasted the better part of a decade; we cannot afford to waste another one.
President Bush has declared his intention to develop and deploy defenses capable of protecting the American people, our friends, our allies and forces around the world from limited ballistic missile attack. The 2002 amended budget requests $8.3 billion for missile defense. We have designed a program to develop and deploy as soon as is appropriate. And General Kadish will be describing it in more detail. Developing a proper layered defense will take time. It requires aggressive exploration of key technologies, particularly those that have been constrained in the past by the ABM Treaty. So we plan to build it incrementally, deploying capabilities as the technology is proven ready and then adding new ones over time as they become mature. We have not yet chosen the system's architecture to deploy. We are not in a position to do so because so many promising technologies were not pursued in the past.
In order to accelerate the program we must first broaden the search for effective technologies before we can move toward deployment. We must dust off technologies that were shelved, consider new ones, and bring them all into the development and testing process. To do this we have designed a flexible and strengthened research, development, testing and evaluation program to examine the widest possible range of promising technologies. We will expand our program to add tests of technologies and basing modes, including land-, air-, sea- and space-based capabilities that had previously been disregarded or inadequately explored.
Notwithstanding the delays of the past decade, the capability to defend America is within our grasp. A great deal of work was done.
The technology of 2001 is not the technology of 1981, or, for that matter, 1991. Today ballistic missile defense is no longer a problem of invention, it is a challenge of engineering. It is a challenge we are up to. And General Kadish will describe in a few minutes how to go about it. Before he does, Mr. Chairman, let me address the very important questions about the ABM Treaty and try as best I can to answer your very pertinent questions.
Our program is designed to develop, as I said, the most capable possible defense for our country, our allies and our deployed forces at the earliest feasible time. That means that it must at some point, and increasingly over time, encounter the constraints imposed by the ABM Treaty. We will not conduct tests solely for the purpose of exceeding the constraints of the treaty, but neither have we designed our program to avoid doing so.
However, this administration does not intend to violate the ABM Treaty; we intend to move beyond it. We are working to do so on two parallel tracks. First, we are pursuing the accelerated research, development and testing program that I have described. And second, we are engaged in discussions with Russia on a new security framework, one that would reflect the fact that the Cold War is long over and the United States and Russia are not enemies. We are moving forward on both of these tracks simultaneously, and we feel the prospects for success in both cases are promising.
Mr. Chairman, we've begun a dialogue with Russia on how to build a new security relationship, one whose foundation does not rest on the prospect of the mutual annihilation of our respective populations that was the basis of the old U.S.-Soviet relationship. That is not a healthy basis for U.S.-Russian relations in the 21st century.
On his recent visit to Europe, President Bush had good discussions with President Putin, and Secretary Rumsfeld had an unexpectedly productive dialogue at NATO last month with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov. Indeed, after their meeting, Minister Ivanov declared his agreement with Secretary Rumsfeld. And I'm quoting from the Russian defense minister. Quote: "There are not only more threats facing us now in the 21st century, but they are multifaceted, much more so than in the past."
Our discussions with Russia are ongoing and we have no reason to believe they will fail. The question of whether we will violate the ABM Treaty in 2002 presumes they will fail, but there is no reason to assume that. And if we succeed, the ABM Treaty will no longer be an obstacle to protecting the American people, our allies or our deployed forces from ballistic missile attack.
We hope and expect to have reached an understanding with Russia by the time our development program bumps up against the constraints of the treaty. We would prefer a cooperative outcome, and we are optimistic that such an outcome is possible, but we must achieve release from the constraints of the treaty. If we all agree that a cooperative outcome is the preferable one, then I would submit, Mr. Chairman, that it is important also for Congress to demonstrate the same resolve as President Bush that we are going to proceed with development of defenses to protect our people, our friends and our allies and our forces around the world, defenses that cannot, by the wildest stretch of the imagination, be considered a threat to Russia or to Russia's broader security interests.
Conversely, if we give Russia the mistaken impression that by insisting on adherence to the ABM Treaty, they can exercise a veto over our development of missile defenses, the unintended consequence could be to rule out, or certainly to make more difficult, a cooperative solution, and perhaps leave the president no choice but to withdraw from the treaty unilaterally.
As I stated earlier, as the program develops and the various testing activities mature, one or more of those will inevitably bump up against treaty restrictions and limitations.
Such an event is likely to occur in months, rather than in years.
However -- and perhaps, Mr. Chairman, this is the reason it has been difficult and remains still somewhat difficult to answer your questions with precision, but we're trying today to get as much precision as we possibly can -- it is not possible to know with certainty whether that will occur in the coming year.
This uncertainty is in part the result of the inevitable uncertainty of all research and development programs. You learn from your tests. You proceed from your tests. Your program gets altered, depending on the results of your tests.
But the uncertainty also reflects legal uncertainties. Many of the early issues that we will encounter inevitably involve legal complexities, legal ambiguities. These we will fully resolve through the treaty compliance review group and the established procedure for addressing those issues.
In the interest, Mr. Chairman, of trying to give you more precision about where we see those issues coming in the next fiscal year, let me give you what I believe are the most important examples.
For example, the test bed currently scheduled to begin construction in April 2002 is designed to permit the testing of ground-based, mid-course capability under realistic operational conditions. There will also be opportunities, while we are testing the Aegis mid-course system, to test the ability of Aegis ship-based radars to track long-range ballistic missiles, and there will be opportunities in the coming fiscal year, if the program proceeds as planned, to combine the data from radars used in mid-course tests with the radars used to track short-range missiles.
Will these tests exceed the limits of the treaty? In each case, you will be able to find lawyers who can argue all three sides of the coin. But we have an established system for resolving these issues, and what I can tell you is this: By the time a planned development activity encounters ABM Treaty constraints, we fully hope and intend to have reached an understanding with Russia. We would expect to identify any such issue six months in advance of its occurrence. At that point, we will either have reached an understanding with Russia -- in which case, the question would be moot -- or we would be left with two far from optimal choices: either to allow an obsolete treaty to prevent us from doing everything we can to defend America or to withdraw from that treaty unilaterally, which we have every legal right to do.
However, even in the latter circumstance, we wouldn't -- we'd certainly continue our efforts to reach understanding with Russia. But our goal is to reach an understanding with Russia well before that time. Such an understanding is in both countries' interests. The end of the Cold War has fundamentally transformed our relationship. We ask for your support as we continue to work toward that cooperative solution, and I can assure you that the president will adhere to the requirements of the treaty to conduct the proper notifications as we go forward.
Let me conclude with a few words about the new deterrence framework.
We're optimistic about the prospects of reaching an understanding with Russia because the Cold War is over, the Soviet Union is gone, Russia is not our enemy, we are not longer locked in a posture of Cold War ideological antagonism. Yet the ABM Treaty codifies a Cold War relationship that is no longer relevant in the 21st century.
The missile defenses we deploy will be precisely that -- defenses. They will threaten no one. They will, however, deter those who would threaten us or our friends with ballistic missile attack. Russia is not such a country. Americans do not lie awake at night worrying about a massive Russian first-strike the way they worried about a Soviet first-strike during the Cold War.
Our missile defenses will be no threat to Russia. Their purpose will be to protect against limited missile attacks that are now possible from an increasing number of sources but not conceivably against the thousands of missiles in Russia's arsenal. Further, they will be just one part of a larger 21st century deterrence framework. Just as we intend to build layered defenses to deal with missile threats at different stages, we also need a strategy of layered deterrence which can deter and dissuade a variety of emerging threats at different stages. Just as America's overwhelming naval power discourages adversaries from investing in competing navys, we should develop capabilities that, by their very existence, discourage adversaries from investing in other hostile capabilities. Missile defense is one example where we hope to achieve exactly that.
Having said what the program aims to do, let me say briefly what the program is not. It is not an effort to build an impenetrable shield around the United States. This is not "Star Wars." We have a much more limited objective to deploy effective defenses against limited missile attack. It is not a threat to anyone and will be a problem only for those states that wish to threaten our people, our allies, or our deployed forces with ballistic missiles.
Very importantly, Mr. Chairman, it will not undermine arms control or spark an arms race. If anything, I believe building effective defenses will reduce the value of ballistic missiles and remove incentives for their development and proliferation. Since they will have virtually no effect on Russia's capabilities, there is no incentive for Russia to spend scarce resources to try to overcome them. And China is already engaged in a rapid modernization of its missile capabilities and will continue this modernization whether or not we build defenses.
But in fact, both the Russians and the Chinese -- and I think this is very important -- will be able to see that we are reducing our offensive nuclear forces substantially and there is no need for them to build up theirs. In this budget proposal alone, with Peacekeeper, Trident, and B-1 reductions, we will be reducing START countable warheads by well over 1,000. We plan to reduce our nuclear forces no matter what Russia decides to do, but we believe it is in their best interest, and we think sooner rather than later they will recognize that it is in their best interest, to follow the same path.
This is not a scarecrow defense. We intend to build and deploy defenses that will grow more and more effective over time; the more capable the better, but defenses don't have to be perfect to save lives and reduce casualties. No defense is 100 percent effective. Notwithstanding the billions we spend on counterterrorism, and should be spending on counterterrorism, we did not stop terrorist attacks on the Khobar Towers or on our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania or on the World Trade Center. Yet no one would suggest that we stop spending money on counterterrorism because we have no perfect defense.
Moreover, defenses don't need to be a hundred percent effective to make a significant contribution to deterrence.
I've heard some astronomical figures attached to this program, Mr. Chairman, but we are not planning to spend hundreds of billions of dollars of taxpayer money. The money we propose to spend is comparable to other major defense development programs and comparable to other elements of our security strategy. We are proposing $8.3 billion for missile defense in 2002. That is still a large amount, but the consequences of failure could be larger still.
And finally, I do not believe it diverts attention and resources from other more pressing threats. Some have argued that we should not spend any money on missile defense because the real threat comes from terrorists using suitcase bombs. No question that that terrorist threat is a real one and we should be addressing it. But we should not argue that -- we shouldn't lock our front door because a burglar might break through the window; we should address both problems.
As we move forward with accelerated testing and development, there are going to be test failures. There isn't a single major technological development in human history that didn't proceed with a process of trial and error, including many of our most successful weapons systems. Let me just mention six. The Corona satellite program, which produced the first overhead reconnaissance satellites, suffered 11 -- 11 straight test failures at the beginning of the program. The Thor Able (sp) and Thor Agena (sp) launch programs failed four out of five times. The Atlas Agena (sp) failed five out of eight times. The Scout launches failed four out of six times. The Vanguard program failed 11 of its first 14 tries. The Polaris failed in 66 out of 123 test flights. Yet from these failures and from the successes came some of the most effective capabilities we have ever fielded. Failure is how we learn. If a program never suffers test failures, it probably means we're not pushing the envelope hard enough.
Mr. Chairman, let me conclude where I began: this threat is not fictional, it is not limited, it is not remote, and it won't disappear if one or another troublesome regime disappears. And this is not a partisan issue. We do not know whether the president who first faces a crisis with a rogue state capable of striking Los Angeles or Detroit or New York with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons will be a Republican or a Democrat, but we do know that individual will be an American. And that is how we must proceed: not as Republicans or
Democrats, but as Americans. Let future generations who look back at this period see statesmen who rose above party to make sure that America and its allies and its deployed forces were protected against this real emerging threat.
Thank you very much for your attention.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Secretary Wolfowitz.
GEN. KADISH: Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. It's a pleasure to appear here before you today to present the Department of Defense's fiscal year 2002 Ballistic Missile Defense program and budget. To allow more time for your questions I request the prepared statement that I forwarded to the committee be entered into the record.
SEN. LEVIN: It will be made part of the record.
GEN. KADISH: The fundamental objective of the BMD program is to develop the capability to defend the forces and territories of the United States, its allies and friends from all classes of ballistic missiles. The department will develop and deploy promising technologies and concepts in order to build and sustain an effective, reliable and affordable missile defense system.
The research, development, test and evaluation program is designed to enhance system effectiveness over time by developing layered defenses that employ complementary sensors and weapons to engage threats in the boost, mid-course and terminal phases of flight and to deploy that capability incrementally.
At the direction of the secretary of Defense, we have developed a research, development and test program that focuses missile defense as a single, integrated ballistic missile defense system, no longer differentiating between theater and national missile defense.
This revised structure involves three basic thrusts: First, the new ballistic missile defense program will build on the technical progress we have made to date by providing the funding required to develop and test elements of the previous program.
Second, the new program will pursue a broad range of activities in order to aggressively evaluate and develop technologies for the integration of land-, sea-, air- or space-based platforms to counter ballistic missiles in all phases of their flight. The new program will not cut corners. Rather, it is designed to pursue a parallel development path to improve the likelihood of achieving an effective, layered missile defense.
Third, the new testing program will incorporate a larger number of tests than in the past. They will employ more realistic scenarios and countermeasures. This will allow us to achieve greater confidence in our planning and development. Through this robust testing, we may discover opportunities to accelerate elements of the program based on their performance and increase the overall capability and credibility of the ballistic missile defense system. This approach is designed to enable contingency use of the demonstrated ballistic missile defense capabilities, if directed.
The goal of the BMD system is a layered defense that provides multiple engagement opportunities along the entire flight path of a ballistic missile. Over the next three to five years, we will pursue parallel technical paths to reduce schedule and cost risk in the individual RDT&E efforts. We will explore and demonstrate kinetic and directed energy kill mechanisms for potential sea-, ground- and air- and potentially space-based operations to engage threat missiles in the boost, mid-course and terminal phases of flight. In parallel, sensor sweeps and battle management and command and control will be developed to form the backbone of this system.
Before I proceed to describe the new program in detail, I would like to make clear what this program does not do. It does not define the specific architecture yet. It does not commit to a procurement program for a full, layered defense. There is no commitment to specific dates for production and deployment other than for lower-tier terminal defense elements. It is not a rush to deploy untested systems. It is not a step back to unfocused research programs. An it is not a minor change to our previous program. Rather, this is a bold move to develop an effective, integrated, layered defense against ballistic missiles of all ranges.
The new program is a major change in our approach to developing ballistic missile defense. The previous national missile defense program, for example, was a high-risk production and development deployment program, dependent for its success on an RDT&E effort that was somewhat underfunded, but charged with developing a system that would operate at the outset with near perfection.
And it was based on rigid military requirements.
The new program is built around a fully funded, rigorous RDT&E effort designed to demonstrate increasing capability over time through a robust, realistic testing program. The objective of the new program is a layered defense to project the United States, its allies, friends, and deployed forces against ballistic missiles of all ranges, and we will pursue this objective in the following way:
First, we are recommending a broad, flexible approach to RDT&E that allows us to explore multiple development paths and to reinforce success based on the best technological approaches and the most advantageous basing modes. This will provide a hedge against the inherent uncertainty of ballistic missile defense talents.
Second, we are recommending an acquisition approach that is evolutionary, one that will allow us to field systems incrementally once they are proven through robust testing.
Because of uncertainties in the development program, the evolutionary approach is implemented in two-year planning blocks. This allows us to adjust rapidly to change in the development performance of our subsystems and allows us to build on our successes over time without the inherent difficulties of date-certain expectations.
And third, rather than committing to a single architecture, as we have done in the past, we will deploy over time different combinations of sensors and weapons consistent with our national strategic objectives.
We have designed the program so that in an emergency and if directed, we might quickly deploy test assets to defend against a rapidly growing threat. This has been done before with other military capabilities, both in the Gulf War and in Kosovo. But barring such a emergency, we do not intend to deploy assets until they are ready, because such emergency deployments are disruptive and can set back normal development programs by years.
The technical and operational challenges of intercepting ballistic missiles are unprecedented. While these challenges are significant, our testing accomplishments to date tell us they are not insurmountable. Given the threats we expect to face, there is a premium on fielding highly reliable and effective systems.
Reliability will be realized in part through redundancy in our system. Effectiveness is partly a function of the number of opportunities the system provides to intercept an in-flight missile and how early and often those opportunities occur in the missile's flight. Because we need redundancy and determined that whatever the BMD systems we deploy, they should allow multiple encagement opportunities in the boost, in the midcourse, and terminal phases of ballistic missiles' flight.
The boost phase is that part of the flight when the ballistic missile's rocket motors are ignited and propel the entire missile system towards space. It lasts roughly three to five minutes for long-range missiles and as little as one to two minutes for short- range missiles.
When ballistic -- when the missile boosters are spent, the missile continues its ascent into what we call the midcourse part of flight, which lasts nominally 20 minutes for long-range missiles.
In this stage of flight, a ballistic missile releases its payload, warhead, submunitions and/or penetration aids in space. The missile enters what we call the terminal phase when the missile or elements of its payload reenter the atmosphere. This is a very short phase lasting from a few minutes to less than a minute.
We are presented with unique opportunities and challenges when engaging a threat missile in each of these phases. The layered defense, or defense-in-depth approach, will increase the chances that the missile and its payload will be destroyed. Intercepting a missile in boost phase, for example, results in the defense of any target that the missile might be aimed at, and can destroy a missile regardless of its design range. A midcourse intercept capability provides wide coverage of regions, while terminal missile defense protects a localized area. Intercepting a missile near its launch point is always preferable to intercepting the same missile closer to its target. When we add shot opportunities in the midcourse and terminal phases of flight to boost phase opportunities, we increase significantly the probability we will be successful.
Another advantage of the layered approach is that it complicates an adversary's plans. Countermeasures, for example, will always be a challenge for the defense, but because countermeasures have to be tailored to a specific phase of the missile's flight, layered defenses pose major challenges to any aggressor.
The fiscal year '02 program speeds development of established technologies, enables robust testing and evaluation of systems that are more mature, and explores new missile defense concepts and technologies. We plan to pursue multiple parallel development paths to reduce the risk inherent in the ballistic missile defense engineering with RDT&E initiatives in each of the boost, midcousre and terminal defense segments of the overall system. We do not want to be in a situation, in other words, where we discover a fundamental design in our kill vehicles or in our only sea-based booster that might be under development. That would amount to a single-point failure that could cost us years in developing effective missile defenses.
We must be agile in our engineering approaches to keep the program on track and affordable. This robust RDT&E program aims to demonstrate what does and does not work. These activities showing the greatest promise will receive greater resource emphasis. Our progress will inform an annual high-level decision-making processes that will steer the BMD program in the most promising direction, taking into account optimal approaches and the most reliable information on costs that we can get. This process will allow us to make informed decisions regarding research, production and any deployment.
This RDT&E approach will also minimize possible disruptive effects that the introduction of new technologies, development challenges or changes in the threat otherwise could have on any ballistic missile development program and allow us to keep pressing forward along the most promising paths. We will pursue enough paths so that the scaling back of any one effort will not undermine progress in other areas and that technological advances we make even in failed efforts will be put to good use. This represents the best approach for pursuing promising capabilities that will allow us to get out in front and pace a dynamic ballistic missile threat.
Now I'd like to discuss the fiscal year '02 budget and how it helps implement this aggressive program. As I've said, we propose to invest in previous efforts as well as newer activities in order to set up multiple paths for solving this difficult technical challenge.
The amended budget adds $2.54 billion to our program, for a total of $8.3 billion DOD-wide, and just over 7 billion within BMDO's RDT&E program. In the terminal defense segment, we have $988 million, an increase of 212 million over fiscal '01 enacted funding. In the mid- course for both ground and sea-based approaches, we have $3.9 billion, an increase of 1.4 billion, and in boost we have 685 million, an increase of 313 million over the fiscal year '01 enacted funding.
In fiscal year '02 we are requesting $496 million for our sensors activities, which represents an increase of $221 million over the fiscal '01 enacted funding. For integration of these segments in the overall ballistic missile defense system, we have $780 million, which is an increase of 253 million for test infrastructure and countermeasures. These funds will enable us to improve the more mature BMD activities, begin development of much-needed BMD test bed, and undertake new concept development activities and experiments.
In the terminal defense segment, we will continue investment in two of our most mature programs: THAAD and Arrow. We have added resources to accelerate the acquisition of a THAAD radar and buy more test missiles. This will allow us to capitalize on any early flight test successes, should our discipline development program prove effective in the test program.
The U.S.-Israeli Arrow program initiated deployments of its first battery this year. Next year, there will be additional flight testing of the Arrow system -- (inaudible) -- additional production capacity for the Arrow missile.
Patriot and Navy area are approaching procurement and deployment decisions. For this reason, and compliance with our program philosophy to have BMDO do research, development, test and evaluation and the services do procurement, and to support the services' air defense mission, the department is transferring the respective services the responsibility for the execution and management of these three programs. Patriot 3, Navy area, and the medium-extended air defense system, MEADS. The transfer of these systems will maintain internal focus, consistency and the interdependence of both BMDO and the services. In the mid-course segment, we will continue to make improvements to counter the long-range ICBM threat and to expand the ballistic missile defense test bed.
The test bed is an essential part of this program. It will provide an operationally realistic environment to test system elements and integration and to prove out construction, transportation and logistics concepts. Over time, the test bed will expand to include weapons and sensor capabilities, to improve overall missile defense capabilities as they are made available. We will also proceed towards the development of a sea-based mid-course capability against long- range missile threats. Under the new BMDO program we will continue the Navy theater-wide Aegis-LEAP intercept, or ALI program, to counter short-range threats.
In the boost defense segment we will explore directed energy and kinetic energy options leading to experiments and demonstrations in the 2003 to 2005 time frame. We are considering a sea-based boost activity to develop a high-speed, high-acceleration booster, coupled with a boost-phase kill vehicle. This activity will simultaneously support a proof-of-concept, space-based experiment somewhere after 2004 using a space-based kinetic energy kill vehicle. We will continue the airborne laser development and plan a lethal demonstration in 2003 to 2004 time frame. We will also continue space-based laser risk reduction as we work towards an integrated flight experiment early in the decade. The Department will consolidate program and management responsibility for the airborne laser and the space-based laser within BMDO. The sensors program element funds two key efforts: the SBIRS-Low program, which was transferred from the Air Force to BMDO, and the Russian-American Observation Satellite Cooperative research project with Russia.
Mr. Chairman, we have an aggressive RDT&E program designed to enhance system effectiveness over time by developing layered defenses that employ complimentary sensors and weapons to engage threat targets in the boost, mid-course and terminal phases of flight, and to deploy that capability incrementally. Along the way, there will be successes and there will be failures. We will learn from both and make significant progress in developing a layered ballistic missile defense system.
Mr. Chairman, I have a short film, if the equipment works, to demonstrate the fact that we have achieved the ability, at least in the demonstration phase in some of our programs, to hit an incoming warhead very accurately. And if I might, I'd like to walk you through the low altitude, the medium altitude, and then the space realm that we were testing on Saturday; the successes that we've had. Now, to be sure, we have had failures. But I want to show you the continuity of hitting more heads directly with hit-to-kill technology and how that has developed over the past few years.
SEN. LEVIN: About how long will the tape take?
GEN. KADISH: Three and a half minutes.
SEN. LEVIN: That's fine, thank you.
GEN. KADISH: We'll start out with -- (film in background) -- can you turn it up?
This is a target launch for our Patriot 3. You can see the Patriot 3 -- this is in the atmosphere, hit-to-kill. There are no explosives on Patriot for TBM intercepts. You can see the Patriot maneuvering to get in the position to very accurately intercept a TBM warhead that's coming in -- a short-range missile. Towards the turn you will see white smoke and you'll see that hit. That is a direct hit, hit-to-kill, in the atmosphere from Patriot. Patriot has missed only once in our test program, and we have 8-9 flights.
Now we move to THAAD which is higher-up in the atmosphere and into space. That was a target launch THAAD missile taking off. To stay on the range it has to do a maneuver, but it's a very high acceleration. This program is now in development to fix some of the problems we had with it. You can see it climbing into altitude to intercept the warhead in outer space. Here's a depiction of the target, and the THAAD you can see maneuvering to hit it very accurately. And there was no explosives on it. It has pure kinetic energy, hit-to-kill, body-to-body impact on the program. That was high enough so that you could see this particular intercept from Albuquerque from over White Sands.
This is another view, and more real time.
Now in a(n) example of what we're going to try to do on Saturday, the first time we did a National Missile Defense or long-range missile defense intercept -- it's coming up -- this is the last frame that THAAD saw before it intercepted it. And you can see the image of that warhead getting bigger in the sights of that intercept vehicle.
This is a target launch out of Vandenberg into the South Pacific, 5,000 miles away. It occurred in October of 1999, the first time we tried this. You can see the ranges are getting longer. This is the rise of the target into outer space. This is the interceptor at Kwajalein. (Pause.)
Now, the intercept takes place over 140 miles into space, and you can see -- in a minute -- the two bodies coming together, an infrared sensor. (Pause.) And this is a more real time look at it from a better perspective. That's the warhead in there, coming together.
Now, to be sure, we have major difficulties in making this type of technology work and work reliably and effective (sic). And that's what this test program is designed to do, especially in the mid- course. And we have had very many failures in this process. However, it's an engineering challenge at this time.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my opening remarks.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you both. The issue that this nation is going to have to face is whether -- not whether or not North Korea is trying to develop a missile capability, but whether or not our response to that will make us less secure or more secure. That's the issue. The moral obligation that the president has and that the Congress has is to make us more secure. And if the breach of a treaty, if that's what it comes down to, pulling out of a treaty, leads to a Russian and Chinese response which is to increase the number of weapons they otherwise would have, increase the amount of nuclear material, on Russian soil particularly, speed up the development of a nuclear program in China, lead to the greater possibility that terrorists could get their hands on nuclear weapons, thereby increasing the terrorist threat because of the greater access to nuclear material, the greater number of nuclear weapons in this world, if that is the response, and that very well could be the response, we then have a new arms race on our hands, a new cold war on our hands, and as greater proliferation threat on our hands.
Countries -- and this is the reason for the original ABM Treaty -- are going to respond. And as one of the experts put it back then, one side's quest for safety can heighten the other side's insecurity. That's the issue. Is our quest for safety in this particular way going to increase Russian and Chinese insecurity?
You hope it doesn't, we would all hope it doesn't. You say it shouldn't, we would all feel it shouldn't. The question is, will it? Does that mean we give anybody a veto? Of course not. Nobody has a veto. But does that mean that the response of other countries -- nuclear powers with the capability of increasing their capability, of MIRVing their weapons, of transferring countermeasures and decoys to other countries and developing them themselves -- is that response relevant to what we do? It seems to me it surely is relevant. And if it comes down to a unilateral deployment in violation of a treaty, we need to weigh that response and decide whether or not we will be left more or less secure by our unilateral deployment.
And that's a particularly difficult question, it seems to me, in light of the fact that we've been informed over and over again by our intelligence folks that the more likely means of delivery of a weapon of mass destruction is not a missile, it's not a ballistic missile, it's a truck or a suitcase or a ship. Do we then take action to defend unilaterally in violation of a treaty against the least likely means of delivery, with the likelihood of increasing a proliferation threat when there is another means of delivery more likely, cheaper, more accurate, stealthier? Those are the questions which this administration I believe has not given adequate attention to. We will be spending a lot of time on those questions at a later hearing, and obviously today people will comment on that, and you already have. But what we -- at least what I want to focus on today with my time has to do with the testing which is now being requested, the budgeting that you are requesting.
For the first time we are told in your statement that the tests that you are seeking funding for, or the activities that you are seeking funding for, are likely to bump up against the ABM Treaty in months rather than years. Now, as my good friend Senator Warner said in his opening statement, when the press reported that this morning, we were wondering whether that was just sort of snippets from various comments put together by the press. Well, no it isn't. What we have here this morning for the first time is the administration telling us that the likelihood is that this treaty, if we fund this budget request, the likelihood is that this treaty will be violated in months, not years. And we've been told that our allies and the Russians have been informed of that recently. That is what the press was told yesterday, that's what we've been told, that the Russians and the allies have been informed that the activities that would be budgeted for 2002 are likely to bump against, be in conflict with, the ABM Treaty in months, not years.
Now, we were told by General Kadish just three weeks ago that there would be no treaty violation in 2002 based on the recommendations that he had made.
We were briefed of that, and that's what you told us, General. Three weeks ago. Something's changed in the last three weeks. You obviously hope that these tests proceed well, you will want them to proceed well, the tests that we budget, and therefore, it's likely that they will bump up against the treaty in months, not years. That means that you are telling us that if we adopt this budget that you have requested, that this treaty, if not amended -- everybody hopes there will be an amendment, but if it's not amended with the Russians, that this treaty would be violated, unless we withdrew from it, during the fiscal year 2002. Is that correct?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: There's an important, very important measure of difference. I used in my testimony the phrase "bump up." I think in the talking points we use with our allies, we use the phrase "encounter." I notice the newspaper uses the phrase "conflict." And that is a very different -- that presumes you've already made the legal judgment. And as I tried to lay out very clearly in my testimony, at this early stage of where we're at, the legal issues are just loaded with ambiguities. The central ones in the examples I mentioned have to do with the question of whether the development of a testbed, which would clearly be legal under the treaty, becomes illegal if you harbor the intention or the plan or the possibility of turning that testbed into an operational capability. And it's going to take a great deal of legal argument to decide what the answer is to that.
The other issues that I described involve issues essentially of testing non-ABM radars (in/and ?) so-called ABM modes, or essentially issues that were argued throughout the period of the treaty because we had one interpretation and the Russians had another, and the lawyers are going to have to come up with some definitive judgments as to which of those interpretations apply. We are in a gray area, Mr. Chairman, and that is why I use a fuzzy phrase like "bump up" rather than a very clear-cut phrase like "conflict."
And as I said in my testimony, if we come to a judgment that it conflicts, then we have one of two -- and we haven't yet revised the ABM Treaty -- then we either can withdraw from the ABM Treaty, not violate it -- we're not going to violate it, we're legally allowed under the treaty to give six months notice of withdrawal -- or we can scale back our program and take out some tests that would otherwise be useful or stop doing something that would give us both a test and operational capability. But --
SEN. LEVIN: Mr. Secretary, I must tell you, the administration handed out a document to the press yesterday. The press asked us to comment on it.
(To staff) Could we give them a copy of this? (Pause.)
(Returning) And I'm just going to read this. This is what the press quoted. You can say there's a big difference between "conflict" and "bump up against." Okay? The administration said "conflict" in this document.
The document's entitled, "The Administration's Principal Themes on Missile Defense; Questions and Answers."
"Moreover, and again as we have told both allies and the Russians, while we do not know precisely when our programs will come into conflict with the ABM Treaty in the future, the timing is likely to be measured in months, not years."
Those are your words. That's the administration's words. Now you're telling us, well, you didn't mean conflict, you mean bump up? And you can't tell us whether there's anything in this budget which, if everything works well, would lead to activities which conflict with the ABM Treaty?
You don't know?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I can tell you, and I have identified them, that there are activities in this budget that will raise issues of treaty interpretation, and we have not yet come to a resolution of those issues.
SEN. LEVIN: Well, but you have a compliance review group, don't you?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Which is working on these issues as we speak.
SEN. LEVIN: And have they decided whether they would conflict or not?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I don't believe they have.
SEN. LEVIN: Well, you mean your -- well, when will we know that?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: At least six months before we proceed with these.
SEN. LEVIN: But we're not going to know that before you're asking us to vote on this budget, whether your own compliance review group thinks that the activities that you're asking us to fund are in conflict with an ABM Treaty which could lead to all kinds of ramifications for the world? We're not going to have that assessment from your compliance review group before you're asking us to approve a budget? Is that what you're telling us this morning?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I'm telling you, Mr. Chairman, that we don't have that assessment now. We will get it as soon as we can and we will certainly get it well in advance of six months of the event.
SEN. LEVIN: The whole purpose of that group, by the way, as you well know, is to tell us whether or not an activity violates the treaty. Pretty significant judgment. You're proceeding without it and you're asking us to proceed without it, and I hope we don't.
SEN. WARNER: I open the comments that I have provided to this hearing with the statement that it is my, really, belief that the Congress will work constructively as a partner in a calm manner to achieve the necessary defenses that this nation must have.
Now, I also point, we're going to talk about different interpretations of different statements, but clearly, on page seven, your last sentence, "And I can assure you that the president will adhere to the requirements of the treaty to conduct the proper notification as we go forward." In other words, time and time again our president has indicated that he is going to follow a path of consultation, then negotiation; and that, I think, should be sufficient reassurance to Congress that we can work as full partners.
Now, much is said, and rather loosely, about unilateral withdrawal. I think the president had no alternative but to lay down very clearly the threat against this country, his determination as the constitutional leader to deal with that threat technologically to the extent that we can but, at the same time, leave no doubt that if consultations and subsequent negotiations do not result in a framework, we have no alternative but to exercise the right under the treaty to withdraw. Otherwise, it is my judgment, and I ask the question to you, Mr. Wolfowitz, we put squarely in the hands of the Russians a veto. Am I not correct in that assumption?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I believe that's what we would be doing, Mr. Chairman, and then we would in effect be making the judgment that the kinds of dangers Chairman Levin has talked about, and which I believe are very manageable, are much more serious than what I believe the rather unmanageable proliferation of missile threats in the hands of rogue nations.
SEN. WARNER: Now, this phrase that within months we will, whatever you want to use, "bump up" or challenge the ABM Treaty, all during that period our president will be conducting consultations and negotiations, will he not, Mr. Wolfowitz?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: We expect those negotiations and discussions to be intensifying significantly in the coming months.
SEN. WARNER: Correct. So in good faith, he is manifesting not only to our country, but to the world that he's trying to work within the treaty framework to seek a resolution of the differences.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: That's absolutely right. And we are also demonstrating in a number of ways, including, most importantly, with the way we are bringing down our offensive forces, that we are not enemies any longer with Russia and that we need to move beyond the old thinking that put the focus on being able to annihilate one another within 30 minutes of warning. That's old. I mean, I understand we lived with that kind of thinking for so long there are vestiges of it certainly even in this country, but it -- it's rife in Russia, but I think we can move beyond it.
SEN. WARNER: I think that case is made very clearly.
Another observation, in my judgment. And I say this with great deference to this institution which I've been privileged to serve these almost 23 years. I really believe the Congress will reach down into its own wisdom and find a common basis to support our president. But should somehow we fail to do so, or should we turn up the rhetoric and heat it up, does that not hinder our president in those negotiations?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I think, senator, you're absolutely right. The entire record of negotiating with almost every country, and certainly with Russians and the old Soviet Union, suggests that the most effective way to reach agreement is to demonstrate some determination to move forward on our own.
SEN. WARNER: And if we can move as partners, it's more likely that he will succeed.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Absolutely. I think partnership and solidarity between the executive and legislative branches on this issue is crucial.
SEN. WARNER: Now, the law of the land, it was stated by the Congress in the Cochran legislation, there were 97 yea votes to three negative votes on that piece of legislation. And it is very clear that it gives the president, this president -- it was enacted and signed by the previous president -- the clear authority to move within the technological framework of milestones. In any way can anyone point to where the president has breached that law?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I believe he's in fully compliance with both the letter and the spirit of it.
SEN. WARNER: And I agree with that.
Now, General Kadish, let's assume for the moment that we are able to work through a satisfactory revision of the framework of the ABM Treaty. Your program under '02 is consistent with the Cochran bill, namely that we will pace ourselves in accordance with technology?
GEN. KADISH: That's correct, senator.
SEN. WARNER: I think it's important, General Kadish, that we also address the question of the limited defense which we use in terms of the intercontinental ballistic missiles. That's what we're endeavoring to do to defend ourselves against the hopefully less than a dozen that attack us. Assuming this system becomes effective, I do not see how it poses a threat to Russia. Their arsenal could crush that system like an ant. Am I not correct?
GEN. KADISH: The system against long-range missiles certainly would have inherent limitations.
SEN. WARNER: Would you speak up a bit? I'm not sure they're hearing in the back.
GEN. KADISH: Sorry. The system --
SEN. WARNER: The question simply is this: if we are able to bring into being technologically this limited defense, the Russian inventory today could overwhelm it in a matter of hours. Am I not correct?
GEN. KADISH: That's correct.
SEN. WARNER: And it doesn't pose a threat. I just -- do you see that it'd pose any threat to Russia, to induce them to go into a race, an arms race again?
GEN. KADISH: It is not designed against thousands of nuclear warheads, absolutely. So --
SEN. WARNER: So it'd be overwhelmed.
GEN. KADISH: -- it'd be overwhelmed. As could any defenses in the history of mankind could eventually be overwhelmed.
SEN. WARNER: Now, again, the word "limited" is applied to the intercontinental.
But when we get down to the smaller systems, particularly those systems we hope to have in the architecture to defend against our forward-deployed troops, those systems could interdict more than the few missiles. Am I not correct?
GEN. KADISH: That's correct, and our intention would be to have enough inventory to have a robust protection for our deployed forces.
SEN. WARNER: Against our forces. I think some clarity has to be made as we move along, because the fundamental concept is limited, and that's the main target that we're dealing with under the ABM Treaty. But we have -- there will be more missiles involved in that system.
My time is up.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator Warner.
SEN. JOSEPH LIEBERMAN (D-CT): Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Wolfowitz and General Kadish, I thank you for your testimony today. I think this is a very important day and discussion on a most significant and difficult issue. And I do think that you've moved us forward today by speaking directly about this new approach to ballistic missile defense, and I for one find it helpful.
I hope that the aim that you describe, Secretary Wolfowitz, of having ultimately there -- having bipartisan support here in Congress is realized, because this is a very important question of national security we're discussing. And traditionally, we have found ways not to divide on partisan lines on exactly this kind of question.
That goal will be greatly assisted if the administration speaks with more clarity and consistency on this question than it has up until this time. And I would like to feel that the statements that you have made today, which I have found, at least personally, to be helpful and clear; whether one agrees with them or disagrees with them, whether one is reassured by them or alarmed by them, will set a standard for what will follow.
Words are very important here, as Senator Levin's questions illuminated. And I think it's very, very important that everyone in the administration use the same language, be on the same program, and that will help us to find the common ground that we ought to be able to find on this critical issue.
I implore you to spend as much time as necessary in speaking directly to the members of this committee in closed and open session, members of the relevant House committees, so we can find that common ground that it's ultimately going to be in the interest of our country.
The prevailing law here -- and we're after all a nation of laws -- is the National Missile Defense Act of 1999. I was an original co- sponsor of this proposal with Secretary -- Senator Cochran and others. And I think it's important for us to go back to it, because it says -- you know, it's important for our allies and others around the world to understand this -- that in this law, the United States committed to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective national missile defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited -- limited -- ballistic missile attack.
So the question, then, according to this law, is not whether we will build a ballistic missile defense, but how and when we will do it.
And these are serious questions that involve matters of international treaty and international security. I think you've spoken directly to this today, and I appreciate it. And I do think -- I, for one, will not shy away from supporting authorization or an appropriation that might necessitate a withdrawal from the ABM Treaty if I am convinced that it is necessary to do so for the protection of our national security, and that the administration has made every possible effort to negotiate the appropriate modifications of the ABM Treaty with the Russians, and that effort has failed.
So I think your directness has helped us to move forward here into difficult territory, but it's important territory. And I urge you to hold the line on the position you've taken as we begin to negotiate and discuss more specifically how we can achieve a bipartisan agreement on this critical question.
The National Missile Defense Act of 1999 had in it what I would consider to be two qualifications or conditions. The first is that the deployment of the national missile defense would be subject to the annual authorization of appropriations and the annual appropriation of funds for national missile defense. I have taken that to mean that we in Congress and members of whatever administration was in office at the time would have to make a judgment about priorities, how much are we prepared to invest in NMD now or BMD now as compared to other national security needs.
And I want to ask you to go into a little more detail in answering a question that you touched on in your opening statement. The Bush administration's proposed defense budget for fiscal year 2002 goes up overall 7 percent after inflation. The budget proposal for the ballistic missile defense Office goes up 57 percent after inflation. We've seen in hearings that this committee has held that, notwithstanding the 7 percent overall increase, there are serious cuts in weapons procurement; procurement for the Navy, for instance, is down as we rapidly head toward less than a 300-ship Navy; basic research and development for the Air Force, for instance, is down, and certain elements of readiness and training are not -- are less than they have been in the past.
So my question is, can you -- can you respond to that qualifier or condition in the National Missile Defense Act of 1999 that the administration's got it's priorities right here, and that the reductions in funding that are part of the overall budget, as compared to the dramatic increase in the national missile defense budget, are justified?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: A couple points, if I might. First, on your original comment, if there's been any lack of clarity in what people say -- and I also address this to the chairman -- it's not because of a lack of desire to achieve clarity, it's because these issues are murky. There are -- as I said, there are technological uncertainties and there are legal uncertainties. And we are trying, and my statement represents another part of that effort, to be as clear and direct as we possibly can be. And we have never for a minute hided (sic) the fact that we have directed General Kadish to develop a program that is not in any way constrained by the treaty; not to go out of his way to look for opportunities to violate the treaty at the earliest possible time, but also not to forswear something that makes developmental or deployment sense because it would conflict with the treaty.
And that's been a whole new revision in the way BMDO has done its work.
It has flushed new ideas and new issues on the table, and we're trying to be as clear as we possibly can with the Congress. I agree these are important issues, and we will continue to do that.
And I appreciate the effort of bipartisanship, but we have never made a secret of the fact that the president fully intends to deploy a defense of the United States and it is no secret -- by the way, of course, that is what the National Missile Defense Act calls for, as well -- and it should be no secret to anyone that Article I of the treaty explicitly prohibits such defense of American territory.
So we are on a collision course, and trying to determine the exact point of collision or the closest point of approach is what we're trying to do here, but no one is pretending anything about the idea that what we're doing is consistent with that treaty. We have either got to withdraw from it or replace it.
On the question about priorities, which is a crucial one, we've been wrestling hard with it, I would correct the notion that we have increased missile defense at the expense of everything else. We have -- and I'm sorry the numbers are not as fresh in my mind as I would like, but we have, I think, approximately a 22, 23 billion-dollar real increase in defense spending this year over the '01 budget, and I believe of that, roughly 10 percent of that increase is in missile defense. And we've weighed that against many other priorities. We've invested even more heavily in improved flying hours, improved base maintenance, a number of really -- not to mention increased health care costs, which is a $5 billion real increase. The largest single portion of that $23 billion increase is going to, essentially, welfare and training of our troops, which is the first priority. There is some $7 billion increase in research and development over and beyond the 2.4 billion that we're adding to missile defense.
And yes, Senator, I really do believe that is an appropriate allocation. As I said in my opening, our current schedule for deploying PAC-3 is woefully inadequate. It has got to be accelerated. On the current schedule, it won't be till the year '07 that we complete the planned deployment, and that is not nearly as thick as it ought to be in places like Korea. So we're accelerating theater missile defense as well as longer-range missile defense, and we will continue to weigh those priorities very carefully.
As we look in the '03 budget is where we really have to a address the fundamental issues of force structure -- how large the Navy should be, for example, that you mentioned in your comments just now. And what Secretary Rumsfeld is trying his mightiest to do with a very, very intensive approach to the Quadrennial Defense Review is to flush up as much as possible the trade-off so that he and the president and, ultimately, the Congress, can make sensible decisions about what we're funding and what we're not funding and where those trade-offs lie. But I really do believe this is a very important priority for our country.
SEN. LIEBERMAN: Thanks, Mr. Secretary. My time is up and I'd just say, finally, that it seems to me that you and General Kadish have laid out the administration's plans regarding missile defense with clarity and directness today, and that's an important step in this very, very significant debate. And I just urge you again to not only work as hard as you can with the Russians to see whether we can achieve a modification in the treaty to allow the testing program that the administration wants to carry out, or something like it, but that you work as hard as you possibly can with members of both parties in Congress to see if we can find a way to go forward on this critical national security matter without have party identification divide us. I think that's the -- that weakens the overall effort, and it's worth really reaching as far as possible to avoid that result.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator Lieberman. Senator Lieberman has made reference to the Missile Defense Act.
And we'll make part of record at this point the entire act, including Section 3, which is not referred to, which is the policy of the United States to seek continued negotiated reductions in nuclear forces of Russia, and the statement by the president signing this statement -- the Defense Act of July 23, 1999 when President Clinton signed the act -- that will be made part of the record, including his words that, "Our missile defense policy must take into account our arms control and nuclear non-proliferation objectives."
I don't know if that was the second condition that Senator Lieberman was going to refer to, but his time ran out so we will make both those documents part of the record.
SEN. INHOFE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Well first of all, General Kadish, I appreciate the visual that you brought with you today and the way you explained it. I think I wish all of the American people could be here and watching this.
And I said to Senator Smith, because he was a little late in getting here, Dr. Wolfowitz, that your opening statement I believe was the most passionate and accurate and superb opening statement I've heard in the 15 years that I've served in the House and in the Senate. And I thank you very much for that.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Thank you, Senator.
SEN. INHOFE: I know it came from your heart.
I want to ask four quick questions that it should just take a minute to answer. And the reason I want to ask these questions is that, you know, we sit around the table here and we're with Senators and we're with top military leaders and with negotiators and experts, but there are a lot of people who aren't here today, and those are the people -- a lot of whom are in Oklahoma, and there -- you know, there are some very basic questions that I think need to be brought to their attention, questions that we know the answer to that they don't. But they are performing one important thing; that is that they're paying for all this fun that we're having. And so I'd like just to have -- pose four quick questions and then I want to get into something here.
The first is, does the United States currently have the ability to defend the 50 states against an incoming missile -- very simply asked.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: None at all, Senator.
SEN. INHOFE: Right.
Doesn't Article 1 of the ABM Treaty explicitly prohibit the United States from defending our territory -- the 50 states -- against a missile attack?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Yes, it does.
SEN. INHOFE: Doesn't Article 5 prohibit the development, testing and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land- based missiles?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Yes it does, Senator.
SEN. INHOFE: Now, the other question -- the three of us have something in common, we're not attorneys. So let me ask you the question that is asked me quite often because I haven't heard a good answer yet. Why is it we're sitting around spending so much time talking about the violation or the amending of a treaty that was between two countries, one of which does no longer exist today?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I'm not a lawyer so I won't get into legal issues. I know the president has made a judgment that rather than to get into those legal issues -- and I know there are lawyers who would argue that the treaty lapsed with the demise of the Soviet Union -- that it is a very important fact in the relationship between the United States and Russia. And in fact -- I'll try to keep this answer short, but my impression from discussions that I had in Moscow when the President sent Steve Hadley and me there in May on consultations and from the discussions that Secretary Rumsfeld has had with his Russian counterpart, that the ABM Treaty is important, more because it is a tie to the United States that they badly want to preserve than because of its exact content.
And I think that is the spirit in which we're trying to replace it.
SEN. INHOFE: Thank you very much.
Let me just share with you there are two areas of this whole debate that have always -- I've found most offensive. One is the argument about the suitcase and the terrorist threat. It's a very real threat. It's there. And I -- there's no one in this hall today who is more sensitive to that than I am, being from Oklahoma, being from an area where I was there moments after the largest terrorist attack in the history -- domestic history of this country, and seeing what happened to the Murrah Federal Office Building and seeing the parts of bodies stuck to the walls, and people I knew intimately with loved ones that never were found, and to think that the explosive power of that was about one ton of TNT.
Yet of those nuclear warheads that we talk about, in most cases, the smallest one's about a kiloton -- 1,000 times the explosive power that devastated the Murrah Federal Office Building and killed a 168 Oklahomans.
And when you put that in that perspective, it changes the whole thought, I think, around this subject, in terms of defending ourselves.
The other thing that I have found offensive is that -- is this discussion today on -- that is, of the treaty. It's a treaty that it could be argued is not there, but let's assume that that treaty is in some degree of effect. It was put together at a time in our history that we're all three old enough to remember, even though we may not -- I didn't agree with it at the time -- but it was -- there's a pretty smart guy named Henry Kissinger who did. And he felt that we did have two superpowers and that perhaps this is -- this mutual assured destruction -- it made some sense at that time.
But Henry Kissinger himself has said -- and I've used his words on the floor of the Senate many times -- this is not 1972, there are not two superpowers. And in fact our threat that is facing America today, because of its proliferation and its lack of identity, is greater, in my opinion, than it was at that time. And he said, quote, "It's nuts to make a virtue out of our vulnerability." Here's the guy who is the architect of the ABM Treaty of 1972, and as you have both so accurately and along with some others pointed out, that isn't true -- that's not true today.
So with -- that treaty is a major discussion. In the last few seconds here, I want to just throw out a few things to at least get into this meeting the real sense of threat that faces this country. And I agree with George Tenet, director of Central Intelligence, who before this committee said that we are very likely in the most threatened position today that we've been in, in the history of our nation. Remember the movie that we saw recently, that's out right now, "Thirteen Days," talking about the Cuban missile crisis of the 1960s. And we have the same defenses today that we had back then, and people really aren't aware of this.
We have a -- we had something happen in 1996 off the -- in the straits off Taiwan. It was during -- trying to intimidate their elections, the Chinese were firing missiles. And their second-highest military authority said that "we're not concerned about America getting involved, because they'd rather defend Los Angeles than Taipei."
We recall that just two years after that, the secretary of Defense or minister of Defense of China said war is -- it was Chi Haotian -- said war with America is inevitable.
And you look at all these, and as you pointed out in your opening statement, Dr. Wolfowitz, the three-stage rocket that was -- that was August 31st of 1998 -- that that's a rocket from North Korea that has the capability of hitting the United States of America.
And only seven days before that we had a letter that said, dated the 24th of August, 1998, that it would be between five and 10 years before that threat would be there. And we know that when they talked during the last administration about how far out this threat was, and later on they said, Well, that's an indigenous developed missile. We're not talking about that anymore.
We're talking about countries that we know have the ability to fire a rocket and to hit us and we have no defense for that, and we know that they're trading technology and assistance with countries like Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, Pakistan, and we know specifically that Iraq is trading technology in systems with North Korea. And we know that Saddam Hussein said at the end of the war, he said "If we had waited 10 years to go into Kuwait, we wouldn't have had to worry about America because we would have had a missile that could have reached them." And here it is now, 10 years later.
So my question is, what is your current comfort level?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: My comfort level is very low; or my discomfort level is very high. And I should have said, in partial answer to Senator Lieberman before on the relative priorities, if you go back to the Gulf War, we overestimated virtually every Iraqi capability except this one. Ballistic missiles were the only area in which Saddam Hussein was much more capable than we thought he would be.
We know today that if there were -- not today; we know if there were a war in Korea this year that the ballistic missile threat from North Korea would be one of the most serious threats we would face. And this program -- I mean, the attempt -- one of the decisions Secretary Rumsfeld made was to stop talking about this difference between national and theater, because many of these capabilities apply across the board, and just as North Korea is seeking to extend the range of its -- (inaudible word) -- it's also true that our ability to defend across-the-board in a Korean conflict would be crucial.
The airborne laser, for example, which would be a clear violation of the ABM Treaty, can shoot down -- if it's successful, shoot down short-range missiles as well as long-range missiles in boost phase, and when you do an analysis of what would make the greatest difference for theater missile defense on the Korean peninsula, I believe the analyses conclude the most important effective advance would be airborne lasers.
So I think we are sitting here already very vulnerable to short- range missiles, increasingly vulnerable to intermediate-range missiles, and as you said, Senator, it's only a matter of time -- and not 15 years, but five or less -- before those countries acquire the capability the reach the United States, and not just a limited piece of the United States.
SEN. INHOFE: Thank you.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Thank you.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator. And now Senator Cleland.
SEN. CLELAND: Thank you very much. Thank you all for appearing today.
General Kadish, you mentioned an interesting point, that in the history of warfare there has been no defense system that was 100 percent perfect. Is it your opinion that this national missile defense system that is seeking to be deployed will not be 100 percent perfect in defense?
GEN. KADISH: We'll make it as good as we can make it, Senator.
SEN. CLELAND: No, no. The question is, is it not true that this system that we're going to spend billions to perfect and test, is it not true it will not be 100 percent effective?
GEN. KADISH: I don't think I can answer that question the way it's stated, because -- a hundred percent against what amount of threat? Because although it could be overwhelmed at some point, these systems can be very, very effective against a certain number of threats.
SEN. CLELAND: Well, all it takes is one nuclear warhead to ruin our day. Now -- I mean, isn't it true, you just said it yourself, in the history of warfare there was no defense system that couldn't be overwhelmed. So is it not true the deployment of this national missile defense system won't be a hundred percent effective? I mean, there's no such thing out there as some 100 percent security that we're going to get from that in terms of incoming missiles. Isn't true?
GEN. KADISH: That's true, but it's true for all the weapons systems we have in all our services.
SEN. CLELAND: All right. Now, is it not also true that over the last 29 years, since 1972, the inauguration of the ABM Treaty, that the combination of our deterrence and our treaty obligations, particularly in terms of the ABM Treaty, that that has been a hundred percent effective? We haven't had an incoming missile in terms of the United States territory. Isn't that true?
GEN. KADISH: That's true.
SEN. CLELAND: All right. Now, it does seem to me that this is part of the crux of this argument here. I mean, are we going to shift from a system that has been reliable for 30 years, a combination of deterrence and treaty obligations, particularly with Russia, to something here that actually is not going to be a hundred percent effective and may, indeed, destabilize, as the chairman has indicated, our relationships not only with Russia, but with China and cause the Russians to MIRV their warheads, cause the Chinese to build more missiles, and actually destabilize our relationship with our allies?
And Secretary Wolfowitz, in all honesty, you comment about bumping up the ABM Treaty -- you know, bumping up against it but not inhaling, I mean -- (laughter) -- that's strange credibility.
So that's where I get off the boat. I happen to be a big supporter of theater missile defense. And there is a distinction between theater missile defense. Theater missile defense is allowed under the law. All this testing we saw, General Kadish, that you pointed out on the media here, wasn't that allowable under the ABM Treaty?
GEN. KADISH: Yes, it was.
SEN. CLELAND: Yes. Well, we can continue to test and do those kind of things that we need to do. Matter of fact, I'm a strong supporter of the Arrow missile defense program with the Israelis, the THAAD missile high altitude intercept, the Patriot-3. Those are theater missile defense programs that can protect our troops and can be moved from time to time against whatever rogue nation we choose to target it against. This deployment of a national missile defense system is actually illegal under the ABM Treaty. And I think if we throw out the ABM Treaty here, we're throwing out the baby with the bath water. That's where I get off the boat.
Let me just say I also think that it compromises other aspects of our defense. I just finished reading "Waging Modern War". It's a book about the whole Balkan war. We used precision weapons to a degree unheard of in modern warfare. And yet the chief of staff of the Air Force sat right at that table two days ago, and when I asked him had we replenished our stockpile of precision munitions, he said no. I mean -- and yet we're going to spend $2.2 billion extra here on some national missile defense system in an effort to deploy it when it's not quite ready for prime time and we can't even replenish the stockpile of precision munitions that do work. I am greatly concerned that we're putting the cart before the horse here.
I would say to you that increasing national missile defense funding by some 57 percent more than last year is a little bit out of line with what we're trying to do in other aspects of our military. And I think, quite frankly, the real threat, as the chairman has indicated, and as others have indicated, and intelligence analysts have indicated, is not so much from a missile with a return address but from a terrorist attack somewhere. Look at the most recent attack. It was on the U.S.S. Cole sitting dead in the water and vulnerable to a terrorist attack.
So I think -- I think we have to rethink our priorities here. The Defense Department's own reports call this national missile -- the deployment of this national missile defense program into great question.
Mr. Chairman, I have a copy of the report. It took eight months to get this out of the Pentagon. I would like to have it entered into the record along with an article: "Pentagon Report Reveals Flaws in Missile Defense." I ask that this report be included in the record --
SEN. LEVIN: Will be made part of the record, both of them.
SEN. CLELAND: -- in view of this report.
Why are we in such a hurry to spend an additional 3 billion on missile defense, national missile defense? And it is termed national missile defense in the law. I can find no good reason to justify the increase. I think it's unconscionable when our servicemen and -women are flying aircraft that are 18 to 22 years of age. It's unconscionable when American pilots that are flying foreign-built fighters defeat those flying our own equipment in 90 percent of training engagements. That's one reason why I'm so big on the F-22. It's unconscionable when we're preparing ships at a rate that will erode our Navy to a level of ships well below that which is reasonable to meet our requirements. And it's unconscionable when 70 percent our Army's major combat systems are more than half-way through their projected service life.
Well, I'd just state quite sincerely that I was as much for a theater missile defense as anyone and the technology involved in it. But in a fiscal environment that precludes us from meeting our legitimate bread-and-butter needs in a global security environment that presents us with a multitude of potential threats more imminent than missiles not yet off the drawing board, I can't look the taxpayers of this country and of my state in the eye and tell them that this is a worthy expenditure of their money. And I'm convinced that this NMD effort is something that we need to take a strong look at and that the Congress ought to use the power of the purse in rejecting this increase.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator Cleland. Senator Bunning.
SEN. JIM BUNNING (R-KY): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I'd like to thank both the secretary and the general for their clarity and straightforwardness in answering questions and discussing our national missile defense and all theater missile defenses and for the notification of Russia and our allies that we intend to go forward with this defense system. The first priority in the Constitution is the national defense, and things certainly have changed since 1972. And we're now in the year 2001, and spending money to defend the United States of America from intercontinental ballistic missiles ought to be the top priority that we have.
And I congratulate you on making that decision and doing what is necessary to defend the majority of our American people.
General Kadish, are you positive the technology is there to build this system?
GEN. KADISH: I guess the way I'd answer that is that we -- at this point for the technologies we're pursuing, there are no inventions required to do it, it's a matter of very difficult engineering activities. And then as we pursue some of the additional ideas that might come out of this new process, that we -- that because of treaty issues and other activities we didn't explore very much, there may be some new technologies that could be applied. So it's an engineering challenge rather than an invention challenge for the types of systems that we're looking at very early in this process.
SEN. BUNNING: Secretary Wolfowitz, I just came back from Seoul, Korea. There are about 45 million people in the greater Seoul area. The North Koreans have just moved up their conventional artillery 10 miles behind the 38th parallel. Not only do we face a nuclear threat out of North Korea, but a conventional (threat). Do we have anything possible in our systems right now if North Korea decided to pull the trigger on the conventional weapons? Could we defend ourself and our 35,000-38,000, depending on what time of the year it is, American troops that are there?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Against conventional ballistic missiles our capability is negligible. We have -- and I'd like to make this also an answer to some of Senator Cleland's comments before. The theater missile threat as you were describing it is very real and very urgent. There are hundreds of those North Korean conventionally armed missiles. Some may have conventional weapons -- chemical weapons on them. Frankly, I do believe, particularly when we're talking about conventional missiles, if you can take out 50 percent of them, that's a heck of a lot better than zero. And during the Gulf War with the PAC-2, which was a lot less than 50 percent, there wasn't a single ally or a single commander who didn't clamor for more.
The problem -- and we are adding a substantial amount of money, I believe it's on the order -- and General Kadish can correct me -- on the order of $1-1/2 billion, Senator Cleland, in this increase goes exclusively for theater missile defense. And another large part of what we're doing is dual-capable. And I bring up, as I said before, the airborne laser, which, when it starts to shoot down missiles, will be a clear violation of the ABM Treaty whether those missiles are heading for Los Angeles or heading for Seoul, because it shoots them down in the boost phase when it can't tell the difference, unless you're going to start putting hardware -- I mean, software in to tell it you can only shoot down missiles of a certain limited boost capability. That threat is very real. I agree strongly with Senator Cleland on the urgency of dealing with the theater missile threat. But what I would also urge all of your colleagues to consider is that the more serious we are across the board, the more our capability will be across the board.
By pursuing defenses against long-range missiles we develop technologies that are also useful against shorter-range missiles, and vice versa. And frankly, if it's taken us more than 10 years to field PAC-3, I have to conclude we haven't yet been serious as a country. It's time to be serious.
SEN. BUNNING: In other words, the money we are devoting to the upgrade of not only theater missile defense but national missile defense is a priority that should be at the top of the list, not down the list.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: And in fact, every theater commander will tell you that's his biggest vulnerability. Again, I believe strongly investing in ships and aircrafts, and I wish we had more money to spend on them, but in a war in Korea, many of our air bases could be rendered completely useless. Many of our ships would be sunk by ballistic missile attack. It's a critical deficiency in our military capability in both that theater and in the Persian Gulf.
SEN. BUNNING: I suggest that everybody on the Armed Services Committee that hasn't been to the 38th Parallel can look just 10 miles North and see the encampment and the batterys that have been moved in place that expose 45 million people to, my God, who knows what; whether there is nuclear or whether there is -- just if there's just conventional warheads on those we would have a slaughter that would shock not only our own people in the United States, but would put in jeopardy all of the 35,000 or 38,000 U.S. service people that are there to defend and help defend and enforce the 1953 cease-fire that was put in force. So I want to thank you for going forward with this, and make it as fast and quick as possible.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Thank you, Senator. By the way, the increasing range of North Korean missiles means that it's not just South Korean facilities that are at risk, everything in Japan --
SEN. BUNNING: No, no, I'm just talking about those --
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Everything in Japan --
SEN. BUNNING: -- those bases.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: (Off mike.)
SEN. BUNNING: They're the ones -- the other ones are capable of reaching the United States of America.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Sure.
SEN. BUNNING: Thank you.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator Bunning.
SEN. REED: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, General Kadish.
This morning's testimony, together with other positions of the administration with respect to CTBT and others, raises great concerns because I believe what's happening is there's conscious rejection of arms control as a central tenet of American foreign policy, and by that I mean an endeavor through bilateral and multilateral agreements to not just limit weapons but to create a stable structure -- stable strategic structure. And I know the secretary's indicated that you intend to talk to the Russians, but the definite insistence that, regardless of the results of those discussions you will proceed with these plans, suggests that that's less than an invitation to negotiations and more of a demand for acquiescence, which is very difficult to achieve in the international arena.
What I've heard this morning I'd sum up as the four no's: no specifics with respect to a deployable system; no cost estimates with respect to the life cycle of a deployable system; no agreement with our allies, both our old allies and our new-found allies; and, most emphatically, no ABM.
Now, let me turn to some specific issues.
Mr. Secretary, you've several times referred to the reduction of our missiles as part of this new framework, making specific reference to Peacekeeper. Yesterday we had the opportunity in the Strategic Subcommittee to discuss these issues with Admiral Mies and General Blaisdell and Admiral Dwyer. You have budgeted $5 million to acquire some equipment to begin the preparation for the reduction -- elimination of Peacekeeper. We're told that that's less than a third of what's necessary.
There is absolutely no provision in the -- going forth, that we were shown, to suggest that you've budgeted the approximately $500 million necessary to actually retire the Peacekeeper missile.
And so your words today do not seem to be supported by your proposals in this budget and looking forward to '03. Is that accurate?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I'd have to get the details, Senator, because you're asking me something I'm not completely certain about. But I believe the remaining funds would be coming in '03 and possibly future years, although I'd assumed we'd be finished in '03.
SEN. REED: Well, it would seem that --
MR. WOLFOWITZ: You don't have an '03 budget request yet. You have an old '03 budget that didn't plan for Peacekeeper in or Peacekeeper out.
SEN. REED: I understand that, Mr. Secretary. But I also --
MR. WOLFOWITZ: The clear intent is to retire Peacekeeper.
SEN. REED: Well, if that's your clear intent, then you're grossly underfunding the first preliminary step in terms of acquiring equipment to do that. And you apparently haven't made any provisions, at least not to the awareness of Strategic Command, to fund the approximately $500 million that will be necessary to do that.
And again, when not just the Senate but the world looks at our words and then looks at our budget, if there's a discontinuity, then I think they will tend to look more at the budget than our words.
General Kadish, the proposed budget dedicates funds to something called space-based kinetic. Is it right to assume that there's a Brilliant Pebbles type system? And as such, I have some specific questions. Are you planning to openly deploy a space-based interceptor system if the technology works?
GEN. KADISH: The line also includes sea-based kinetic as well, so this is an effort to define how we can do boost-phase kinetic energy intercepts as a hedge against the directed energy that we have in that area -- namely, the airborne laser in particular.
There has been very little work done on that in the last few years, and the situation we face with kinetic energy boost-phase interceptors, terrestrially based, is that you have to catch an accelerating missile with another accelerating missile that's launched many minutes after the first one. So overtaking and intercepting an accelerating missile is a very tough challenge. So we're going to explore that area with the monies involved.
SEN. REED: Let me just --
GEN. KADISH: We have an additional effort to look at and experiment doing the same from space, because there you're in a better position to do that. And that has some legacy back to Brilliant Pebbles, but it is not a major effort at the beginning to look at that as part of our architecture, other than to do the early experiments.
SEN. REED: But if these experiments prove to be effective, there is a possibility that you could propose to deploy a system of satellites in order to acquire these targets and essentially put in a system, a space-based system. Is that correct? I mean, the technology --
GEN. KADISH: That would just be one of the many hundreds of decisions that have to be made about how the architecture develops in an incremental way. That is certainly not imminent in our program right now.
SEN. REED: It's not imminent, but we've heard repeatedly, in our discussions, both your responses and my colleagues', that Russia or China -- no one has any fear with the proposals that we're talking about today in this budget. Yet you're beginning to do research which could create a space-based interceptor system, which, unlike the airborne laser, needs to be close -- closely proximate to the threat area, could effectively interdict Russian or Chinese missiles. Is that correct?
GEN. KADISH: Well, Senator, if my memory serves me, we got $5 million out of a $7 billion budget to look at that effort.
SEN. REED: General, you know, I won't quibble with you on the dollars, but essentially you're beginning to investigate possibilities that could in fact raise legitimate concerns from a technical point with both the Russians and the Chinese. Is that a fear?
GEN. KADISH: I'm not sure exactly what their concerns would be.
SEN. REED: Let me put it this way. If Russia had a system in space that was capable of intercepting our ICBMs when they left our launch pad, would you be concerned?
GEN. KADISH: I'm always paranoid about those types of things. That's what you pay me for. (Laughter.) But I guess it's a strategic framework issue, and maybe the secretary should answer that from a policy --
SEN. REED: My time has expired, but if Mr. Secretary -- Mr. Chairman?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I would say, Senator, that we're years away from anything of that kind, and whether it's in space in Russian altitudes or in space over Iranian altitudes or Iraqi altitudes, for example, would make all the difference in the world. But we're just years away from that. That's, as the general said, it's a very small piece of the program. But I think it is important to try to understand what the technological possibilities are.
But we're looking for a relationship with Russia where we're not threatening one another and we're -- I think we're moving significantly -- we've already moved significantly in that direction. We have a much longer way to go.
SEN. REED: Mr. Secretary, if I may, but if you withdraw from the ABM Treaty, this research could -- there's no constraint on deploying a system such as this if it proves out technically, is that correct?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Unless we came to some different agreement with the Russians that constrained it, or unless we decided politically to constrain it because it was a matter of concern, or unless we limited it in a way that made it clear to the Russians that it wasn't a matter of concern, or perhaps conceivably -- conceivably if we did it cooperatively because we are both vulnerable to those kinds of attacks.
We're talking about something, in the case of what you're talking about -- and I hate to put numbers on it, because we just had enough trouble with figuring out what's going to happen in fiscal year '02 -- but I would guess we're at least 10 years away from that even being something that you could talk about concretely. By that time, I would hope the U.S.-Russian relationship is genuinely transformed and then, in fact, we could talk about whether those capabilities could be mutually beneficial, if deployed in the right way or the right numbers.
Lord knows, neither of us want to be vulnerable to an accidental attack by either side. If you asked me would I feel threatened if the Russians had a limited capability to shoot down an accidentally launched American ICBM, I would feel much more comfortable if they had that capability than if they're primed, as they are today, to launch on warning. They nearly launched a few years ago when they saw a Norwegian weather rocket. I'd feel so much safer if they had some ability to defend against a limited attack than if they sit there thinking that launch-on-warning is the answer.
So -- I'm not trying to be contentious. We're miles down the road. We're trying to develop a relationship with the Russians where we're talking regularly and frequently about where we're heading in our defense programs, across the board, from a perspective of essentially common interests, which I think are growing.
SEN. REED: Mr. Secretary, my colleagues have been very kind, but let me say, it's not just a question of how far down the road we're going. It's what roads we're taking, I think, is a critical issue.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator Reed.
SEN. JEFF SESSIONS (R-AL): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I thank Mr. Wolfowitz and General Kadish for, I think, a ringing call to reality and to face the fact that the world has changed and we have different threats. Jim Inhofe referred to Henry Kissinger. I believe one his statements I heard him make was he never heard of a country whose policy it was to keep itself vulnerable to attack when we have the ability to defend ourselves from attack.
Mr. Wolfowitz, you served on a commission to examine this, a bipartisan commission, when President Clinton was president. And would you tell us how many people served on that commission and the makeup of it and what your conclusion was?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Well, in fact it was known as the Rumsfeld commission because Don Rumsfeld -- I guess he was already Secretary Rumsfeld by that time -- was the chairman of the commission. There were nine of us, five Republicans, four Democrats, very diverse points of view. I felt honored to be included among those people.
SEN. SESSIONS: And the commission rendered a unanimous report, did it not?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: It did, and, I think, to the surprise of pretty much all of us. We came in there with very diverse points of view. Our mandate was -- let me emphasize, it was not to assess how to deal with this problem, it was to assess what the problem was. And if we had been asked -- (laughs) -- to recommend how to deal with it, you would have probably had 11 different solutions from our nine members. But on assessing what the threat was, we came to a degree of unanimity that surprised me and, I think, surprised everyone. And it happened because the more we dug into the facts, the more astonished we were at how rapidly this ballistic missile technology had proliferated, how much the various bad actors were cooperating with one another, sharing technology with one another, and how aggressively this had all moved forward.
SEN. SESSIONS: Well, I think you found that in '72, nine nations had ballistic missiles, and now we have 29 nations with ballistic missiles. Those things, I think, are important. And as to what's unconscionable, I think it's unconscionable for us to have the president of the United States handcuffed in the ability to take strong action around the world because in doing so he might subject the American people to a missile attack. It's that fundamental, to me.
Now, with regard to the Soviet Union, which is now gone, and the now-existing Russia, it is my great hope and belief that we can reach a partnership, a peaceful partnership between those two countries and that we can move forward carefully to expand that friendship in a way that we can't even imagine today. Nothing would be better for the world. And I think we have every reason to believe that's possible.
But is it not true that we have a treaty with Russia, the ABM Treaty -- presumably it's still a treaty -- and that agreement does not impact any of the other nations around the world who have these ballistic missiles? It does not bind them; is that right, Mr. Wolfowitz?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: That's correct, although some of them feel it should bind us, but it doesn't bind them.
SEN. SESSIONS: So what we're saying is this agreement we have with Russia over how we're going to conduct our bilateral relations at the beginning of 1972 is now a major detriment to our ability to protect ourselves from a North Korea or some other nation that may decide to attack us with a ballistic missile.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Or from even a limited accidental attack.
SEN. SESSIONS: Or from a limited -- it might come from one of the Russian missiles.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: It could.
SEN. SESSIONS: So to me, we're in a new world here. We're holding on to this relic of the cold war, this agreement between the United States and a nation that no longer exists, the Soviet Union, and we're denying ourselves the ability to prepare a defense against attack by missiles from any other country in the world. Is that fair to say?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I think that's pretty accurate.
SEN. SESSIONS: General -- and are you familiar with the 1999 legislation, Mr. Wolfowitz, that the Senate passed 97-3 to move forward with a national missile defense, to deploy it as soon as we're technologically able to do so?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Yes, I am.
SEN. SESSIONS: I know the chairman mentioned that President Clinton when he signed it made a statement that did not say we would never make any -- did not make any reference to the abrogation of the ABM Treaty or not. But that language is not part of the law of the United States, is it?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I'm not a lawyer. I won't try to practice without a license -- (laughing) -- but I think not.
SEN. SESSIONS: I think not also. I'm a poor lawyer, and I don't think that a piece of legislation can be changed by a statement made at the time the president signs it that's not made a part of that legislation. So that's not a factor here.
Mr. Wolfowitz, is it your view that it is now time in this post- cold war period for us to reassess how we're going to defend America, what the threats are to America, and do you consider it your challenge to analyze this situation and to move us into a new period to deal with the changed threats to America? And is that what the president has directed you to do?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Yes, senator. But can I also make a kind of bipartisan appeal? Because I think it's much broader than just re- thinking those threats and developing the ability to defend against them. It's also a matter of re-thinking the whole relationship with Russia. I think General Kadish was a little nonplussed at the expression of how would we feel about a Russian ability to shoot down an American ICBM. But -- I don't mean to suggest that my good colleague here is mired in the cold war, but frankly, I think we need to think about an era in which if the Russians have a capability to shoot down an accidentally launched American missile we will understand that to be in our interest, just as it's in their interest if we're not vulnerable to their accidental attack.
I mean, if we could pass an agreement that abolished all ballistic missiles in the world, we'd probably be a lot better off. We can't do that. But let's move away from the mindset that said stability rests on the ability of Moscow and Washington to push a button and be absolutely sure within 30 minutes they had annihilated the other country. It is absolutely appalling. Senator Cleland said it worked a hundred percent. You know, it worked a hundred percent for a limited amount of time. I lived through the '62 Cuban missile crisis, old enough to be pretty darned scared. I don't think it's the greatest system in the world, and I think -- but a big change in thinking is necessary to get beyond it. And again, I'm going to pick on General Kadish because he's here and he's useful. I mean, the fact that somebody as forward-thinking as my colleague here has a little bit of trouble thinking that way, imagine the mental changes, the intellectual changes we're asking of the Russians, who in many ways are much more mired in the cold war than anyone you could find in this country.
But let's think beyond not just in terms of defenses, but in terms of our whole relationship with Russia. It is a different country. It is a brand new country. It will never be the -- never be the threat to the United States that the Soviet Union was. And frankly, I think it can be a real partner, because if you look around the world at real stability, which in my view is not the stability that comes from mutual annihilation, it's the stability that comes from a stable Europe, it's the stability that comes from a stable Northeast Asia, it's a stability that comes from a stable Persian Gulf. Those three critical parts of the world are right around the border of Russia. They're not interested in -- they shouldn't be. Sometimes they act contrary to their interest, I think. We need to try to talk them out of that. But Russia's interests are served by stability in those regions just as ours are served. And we ought to be aiming at a relationship that is based on that kind of interest in mutual stability, not the interest in mutual annihilation.
SEN. SESSIONS: Well, I thank you for that wonderful response. I think you're right. And I think your concern that we need to be able to defend ourselves from other threats around the world that are growing and becoming more sophisticated is legitimate. And I thank you for having the courage to articulate a new vision for America's defenses. Thank you very much.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Thank you, Senator.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator Sessions.
SEN. MARK DAYTON (D-MN): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I share with the president and with your administration being newly arrived in Washington and our responsibilities in January of this year. And so from the outset, I have thought that the administration's request for the broadest possible latitude in developing its plans and the budget were appropriate, and I think they have been supported by the Congress with, among other things, I think what I'm told was an unprecedented revision in the Budget Act -- the budget resolution that permitted the secretary of Defense to come subsequent to the adoption of that resolution and to -- the chairmen of the two budget committees to put in what hadn't been contemplated until that time. So I think the Congress has been responsive and supportive.
And I would say that that in my own view, before today's testimony, that there has been, I think, a reprehensible lack of detail and even, at times, candor about these enormously consequential decisions that you are making and we are being asked to concur with. I support entirely what Chairman Levin recounted in terms of the difficulty of obtaining accurate information. I noted that you, Mr. Secretary, respectfully, have a different perspective, which is understandable, from the chairman in response to Senator Lieberman.
I would just go back again and say if I, if you reviewed the prepared testimony of the secretary on June 21st and June 28th of this year and his response to questions posed here, to hear this now two weeks later, it's either been a great intellectual leap forward or it's been a matter of, I think, difficulty for this committee to obtain the information that I would believe I am entitled to and others are entitled to to carry forward our responsibilities. And I would just say again, from my own personal experience, I've learned more information about your intentions by watching and reading independent news reports than I have from any hearing in this room or even in closed session, in executive session. And I think that's antithetical to what you're talking about here in terms of a collaboration and a partnership.
And I think it would be one thing to ask for that kind of latitude and ambiguity if what you were discussing or proposing is a continuation of essentially the previous and generally accepted military and diplomatic strategy, rather than what is in this case a very dramatic and even radical departure from both prior military theory and strategy, as well as an -- what's contemplated to be an abrupt rupture of a long-standing international arms-control agreement.
I would say today's testimony is the first real specificity, and I certainly trust the veracity that's been forthcoming, and I commend you for that. I think that perhaps now, on the basis of this -- and I would certainly second what the chairman, Senator Lieberman, and others have said in urging you to make this the new hallmark and trademark of this relationship -- that perhaps this committee and the Congress can now begin to engage in the same process that the administration claims it's pursuing with its allies and its former adversaries, which is a discussion and a debate about the merits and the demerits of these momentous decisions.
I recall the very distinguished former chairman of this committee, the senator from Virginia, noted the word "partnership" between the Congress and the administration, and I think that's appropriate to ask for. In my business and professional experience of partnership, it requires that I know who or what my partner really is, and that I will be consulted and informed, rather than engaged in an intellectual game of hide and seek, where words are often more intended to evade and even to mislead than to inform, and then, finally, being told what the administration has already decided it's going to do and asked to concur with that under the guise of partnership and patriotism.
I'd also like you to say, in partial response to some observations that have been made by other members of this committee, that I don't think there's anybody on this committee or anybody in the Congress, nor in this administration nor, I believe, in former administrations who does not want to make this country safer and more secure, who doesn't want to reduce the chance of nuclear war and annihilation anywhere and everywhere in this world.
But I think we can admit that we're going to need to have an honest debate and even disagreement about how best to achieve those conditions, and I hope we can proceed on that basis.
And I guess as a preface to that, I guess I would ask, Mr. Secretary, in your testimony, you've said that this system will not undermine arms control or spark an arms race. If anything, it will build defenses, will reduce the value of ballistic missiles, and thus remove incentives for their development and proliferation. Are you willing to acknowledge that that constitutes a -- at least a significant departure from previous established U.S. military theory and strategy? I recall that the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General -- (struggles with pronunciation of the general's surname) -- Shalikashvili -- I never got that one out right -- said words to the effect that any new defensive system creates a new wave of offensive systems and technology.
You refer to the Soviet -- former Soviet Union, Russia, and our hoped-for new relationship there, but as you yourself had noted, sir, this world is in a constant state of flux, and is it reasonable to assume that setting up this kind of multi-layered defense system is not going to spawn worldwide an attempt to develop offensive systems of greater ability to evade and destroy?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Let me, before I answer that question, just address very briefly the concern you said at the outset.
I really do not believe in intellectual games of hide and seek; don't believe I've ever practiced them in many dealings with the Congress. We don't --
SEN. DAYTON: I'm not referring to you sir. I'm not -- just speaking in general terms.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: No, and I'm not taking -- I'm understanding what you're saying and I'm understanding the desire of this committee and the whole Congress to be as well-informed as possible on these crucial issues. And we will do our level best to give you that information.
One of the reasons that some of these independent news reports tell you things that we haven't told you is because sometimes they know things that we don't know and some of those things aren't true. I mean, you get a contractor who has a gleam in his eye about some way that General Kadish can help keep him going and before you know it there's a story in some newspaper that says we're actively considering or maybe even have decided. And we've got to be a lot more careful before we come up with something that is actually a program. And even when we have a program, as we've tried to explain, programs change, especially development programs, in the course of testing.
So as far as I am aware, there has been no effort to conceal. There has been a genuine difficulty in absorbing a lot of change; a lot of facts in a really relatively short period of time. And as you alluded to, Senator, this isn't the only issue on which we've been having to scramble hard. So I appreciate your indulgence and I hope that you'll take this testimony today as a significant measure of trying to respond to those concerns. And quite honestly, I would acknowledge that I think the mere scheduling of this hearing has flushed a lot more information up in our system to higher levels and that has been useful.
On the question you raised about defenses spawning a new arms race, at the risk of picking a fight with an even higher-ranking general or at least an intellectual argument, I think that thinking is a vestige of the Cold War. And there is no reason for the Russians to start taking their scarce resources and investing them in new nuclear systems because we build a limited -- very limited capability to shoot down an accidental launch or a North Korean or Iranian ballistic missile. And I don't honestly believe they will. I think they might come and ask us for some relief from some of the arms control restrictions. They're going to end up costing them money because money -- their security problems are, above all, economic security problems. But you have to take each of these things, I think, in very specific context.
I used in my testimony the example of what American naval supremacy -- in fact, you could go back further and say Anglo-American naval supremacy -- has done to piracy. People, except in fairly remote parts of the world, don't invest in big pirate fleets because they can't succeed. In fact, very few countries invest in big navys because they can't challenge us.
So you can -- the effect of our improving missile defense capability I think will be to discourage countries from following the path of North Korea and Iran and maybe even discourage North Korea and Iran from investing so heavily in those capabilities. You've got to take it case-by-case, you've got to look carefully. But I really do believe that it's a non-trivial fact that this is the one capability where Iraq did better than expected in the Gulf War. It is the one Achilles Heel of the American military. The reason these countries are putting so much money into ballistic missile capabilities, conventional and non-conventional, has got to be because they can't beat us any other way and they see this as a vulnerability. And I think it's a vulnerability we should close.
SEN. DAYTON: I thank you again for your specificity and candor and the diligence you're putting into this. You've got enormous responsibility, and we want to share that with you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is expired.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator Dayton. (Pause.) Thank you very much, Senator Dayton.
Senator Allard. Let me, before you start, indicate where we are. We have two votes that are now scheduled. The first vote has begun just a few minutes ago. After Senator Allard we have Senator Nelson for the first round.
There may be other senators, too, who come for their first round, and the question is, How do we proceed to our second and third rounds?
One possibility, because there's a huge amount of material here which we have not yet proceeded to discuss, and the thing, I guess the possibility I want to talk to Senator Warner about is that, given the fact that we have a subcommittee meeting this afternoon and that we have much material to cover, that after everybody concludes their first round here -- I'll call on Senator Allard in a moment, because he can get his questions in before the first vote is over; I'm not sure that Senator Nelson will able to do that -- that we then adjourn this hearing till next Tuesday, where we had an open slot, and we pick up at that point. It's either that or we go after lunch, which would create a conflict, I think, with the subcommittee, which we'd like to avoid.
So -- this is no way to consult, this publicly, but we don't have much choices, so this is --
SEN. WARNER: I'm just wondering, if I were to go vote right now and Senator Allard used the time for his questions, then you and I each have a follow-on round, I think we could almost continuously use the time between now and, say, 1:30, and conclude this hearing, and I'm prepared to do that.
SEN. LEVIN: Why don't we -- is that agreeable with you? You stay here till 1:30 if we're able to conclude by then? If I make an assessment that we can conclude, I'd like to talk to other members of the committee, but assuming that we reach that assessment, are you able to stay that late?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Yes. I'll be a little late to something else, but this is more important.
SEN. LEVIN: So you can do that? Okay.
SEN. DAYTON: Mr. Chairman, that --
SEN. LEVIN: Senator Dayton.
SEN. DAYTON: -- public discussion -- (inaudible). We've received an enormous amount of information today and, given the importance of this subject, I think I'd be better prepared -- others, perhaps, as well -- to come back next Tuesday and ask a follow-up round of questions.
SEN. LEVIN: I think I'm going to proceed that way, for this reason, and I hate to do it, given Senator Warner's suggestion which is somewhat different, but we did not have your testimony until this morning. We expect it 48 hours in advance under our rules, and you were asked about that at your confirmation. This is a hugely important subject. Given the fact that we have this problem now and that we need time to digest that testimony, I think what we will do is, after everyone's first round here now, we will adjourn this till next Tuesday, if that is an agreeable time with the ranking member. If that is not an agreeable time, we will pick this up at another date which is agreeable with the ranking member, if Tuesday is not agreeable. But there's just too much material here to squeeze this in this way.
SEN. WARNER: Mr. Chairman, we accept your perfect right to schedule for next Tuesday, but I would like that you and I at least have the opportunity -- I have purposely withheld one or two observations until I could have the benefit of hearing all colleagues comment on this. So I do have some conclusion remarks about, I think, what has been an extraordinarily successful hearing and an excellent presentation by both --
SEN. LEVIN: We will do that after -- after everybody's first round here today, you and I will then take a few minutes to wind up today. We will then adjourn till next Tuesday, at least tentatively, at the same time. and we'll now call upon Senator Allard, and --
SEN. BEN NELSON: Mr. Chairman?
SEN. WARNER (?): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SEN. BEN NELSON: Does that mean that I would go ahead and do mine next Tuesday, or whenever you set a date?
SEN. LEVIN: No, if you can squeeze it in today, definitely. Anybody who has not had a first round today will have an opportunity today to do their first round.
SEN. BEN NELSON: Come back after the two votes?
SEN. LEVIN: After the two votes, absolutely.
SEN. BEN NELSON: Okay. Thank you.
SEN. ALLARD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to commend the panel on their great presentation today. I have watched the presentation by General Kadish in the past where it showed the technology; that we do have the capability to use a missile to hit another missile during flight.
And I think that's phenomenal technology, and every time I see that I'm continually amazed. It demonstrates to me that we're clearly on the way technologically to being able to even apply that kind of technology on longer-range missiles. And I'm confident that we're moving in the right direction technologically and showing that that can technologically be done.
The other thing that particularly amazes me is that the argument is made somehow or the other we're perpetuating a nuclear arms race because we're just responding to what other nations are doing throughout the world. And I was struck by your statement that we now have some 28 countries that have ballistic missiles, we have some 12 countries that are developing the ability to have a nuclear program. And yet, when we come forward and this administration comes forward with a proposal that says that we're going to move from strictly an offensive posture established during the cold war and we're going to begin to look more closely and truly at a defensive way of protecting ourselves and that even when the administration has said, look, we're willing to even step ahead at any treaty that we have signed and reduce our nuclear warhead capability below what is being called for in any other treaties that we've signed, that somehow or the other we're accused of moving towards some kind of a race, an arms race. And from what I see out of this administration is a definite commitment to bring about world peace. And I commend the president for reaching out to our allies. Really, he's just started that process. I think he has a long ways to go, but I think it will work and I think it's the right thing to do. I think that we need to move ahead with our own technology, and I am impressed with which the panel has presented this committee here today.
Senator Levin, chairman of the committee here, had raised concerns that the ballistic missile budget before us had not been fully vetted -- in other words not been looked at as to whether it was complying with the treaties and the review process. But I understand that the BMDO budgets have never been fully vetted when they've been submitted to the Congress. In fact, they've never been fully vetted even after they've passed the Congress. And I'm told, for example, that the compliance review group certified your last long-range missile defense test on June 30th of 2000, and the test took place on June 8th of 2000.
So the question I have, does the process to determine the compliance of a program -- activities during the -- does the process to determine the compliance of program activities during the budget cycle differ significantly from the process used in past years? In other words, you're using the same budget process as far as the vetting process as we've ever done in the past? We haven't deviated from that, have we?
GEN. KADISH: No, senator. We're using the same compliance review process. But that'll be adjusted somewhat, I think, to ensure that we put more attention than we have in the past on that, given the secretary's interest in this subject.
SEN. ALLARD: Which shows again the commitment, I think, by the administration to try and comply, I think, with -- work with our allies. And I want to follow that up with another question. Isn't it true that compliance certification usually comes in only a matter of days to months prior to the test event?
GEN. KADISH: That's been true in the past because there is so much analysis that goes into those compliance reviews of testing activities. So many times we don't know exactly the final configuration of the test until days beforehand or weeks beforehand. We're trying to improve that, but that's just a fact of life, and therefore the final compliance certification tends to follow those decisions in the program. So we've had that situation I think in the past few tests that we've done.
SEN. ALLARD: Were you going to comment, Mr. Wolfowitz?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Well, my first comment, Senator, is you've just informed me of something rather significant that I didn't know about before that we certified a test after it had been conducted. So obviously there's more I have to understand about this arcane process than I knew before I came here. And obviously we've got to make it work in a way that gets information on these legal judgements to the president and to the Congress in a more timely way than that particular example suggests. But at this moment, I can't tell you how we're going to do that exactly.
SEN. ALLARD: Pardon me, my information is a week before.
My understanding is that I have a vote on the floor. I'm the only one here in the committee, so I'm going to put it in recess so I don't miss my vote. And then when I get right back, I'll finish my question period.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Okay. Thank you.
SEN. ALLARD: Put the committee in recess.
SEN. ALLARD: I'm going to go ahead and call the Armed Services Committee back to order. When you're at the first of the alphabet, you get a chance to vote first. Sometimes there's an advantage. I was the last to leave and first to arrive. So I'll continue to use my time to question the panelists.
And I'd like to move forward with my questioning by addressing this to General Kadish. In your testimony, you've spoken about a significant effort to improve your testing capabilities in the Pacific. And as I recall, the realism of your testing program has been criticized considerably, not only by individuals, like Mr. Coyle, who is the former director of operational testing and evaluation, but also groups like the Union of Concerned Scientists and even some members of Congress.
In fact, Mr. Coyle made the following recommendations in his NMD DRR report, and I quote: "Current test range limitations need to be removed to adequately test the NMD system. Target trajectories or radar surrogate locations need to be changed." And it goes on to say that "flight testing artificialities must be eliminated, multiple engagements must be accomplished. This type of engagement should (be flown ?) in integrated flight tests before OIT&E." And then there's closed quotes.
The Union of Concerned Scientists stated that testing should be conducted -- and I quote them -- "under realistic conditions." And the GAO had cited in their May 20th, 2000, report that -- and I quote that report -- "a number of test limitations affect the ability to test, analyze and evaluate system performance."
Now, it seems to me that the testbed you're proposing should go a long towards answering the criticism that I've just mentioned. In fact, it seems that it's a much better way to test the systems we're trying to develop. Could you comment on the advantages of the testbed that you're proposing?
GEN. KADISH: You're exactly right, Senator. In fact, many of those -- all of those recommendations have been in one way or another incorporated into this testbed idea because the best way to test against the long-range missile threat in a mid-course type system, whether it's ground based or, for that matter, sea based, is to do it the way you plan to operate. And this idea of the testbed being put and anchored in the Pacific with elements at Fort Greeley, Kodiak, Alaska; and our current planning, with the Kwajalein and Vanderberg and other elements, does exactly that, to the best of our ability to replicate an operationally realistic test arrangement.
That gives us many more geometries to test against. It gives us much more flexibility and realism to test the communications and command and control as well as reliability and maintainability of the systems, and it provides us with a lot more information than we had planned to get. But it is expensive.
SEN. ALLARD: Now, as I had mentioned in some of my remarks earlier, the president has proposed a new strategic framework that relies on a mix of offensive nuclear forces, missile defenses and nonproliferation efforts. And I wondered if the panel would elucidate again what you see as the fundamental differences between deterrence during the Cold War and the 20th -- 21st century challenge.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I guess deterrence, the heart of it comes down to who it is you're trying to deter and what you're trying to deter them from doing. And while there were many other concerns we had during the Cold War, I think our whole nuclear posture, the whole structure of arms control during the Cold War was driven by the fact that there were 23 Soviet divisions, heavy divisions, in Eastern Germany. There were some hundred, more or less, divisions backing them up all the way to the Urals. They had operational plans to, in the event of war, move within a matter of a few weeks to the English Channel. And we on the other side went from planning to deal with that with tactical nuclear weapons to planning to deal with it with increasing levels of long-range nuclear weapons, and the Soviets responded in kind.
So we had a hair-trigger situation built on a major military confrontation in the heart of Europe.
What we have today is something very different. The relationship with Russia is just completely transformed. It bears no similarity to the old Soviet Union. And I would submit not only are we not enemies, but as I said to one of your colleagues earlier, I believe we have a real interest in mutual stability, but it's not the mutual stability that comes from mutual annihilation. It's the mutual stability that comes from stability in Europe, stability in East Asia and stability in the Persian Gulf.
The people we're trying to deter are a number of countries whose hostility to the United States and hostility to its friends has been made abundantly clear. What they're really trying to do, as exemplified in some ways by the Gulf War, is find ways to keep us from applying our unquestioned conventional superiority to protect our friends and allies from threats from those countries. And if you imagine what the Gulf War crisis would have been if Saddam Hussein had had the capability to threaten Tokyo and Paris and London with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, or even worse, if he could have threatened Washington with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, maybe we would have gone ahead in just the same way that we proceeded. I question that. I question even more whether our allies would have proceeded in that way.
So what we're trying to do is add to the obvious enormous offensive nuclear capability that we have relative to any of those small countries and to the impressive capability that we have an ability to protect against limited attacks and to deny them that -- as much as we possibly can that option of blackmailing us or blackmailing our friends.
In this framework also, I think the larger efforts of nonproliferation and counterproliferation loom much larger as well because where the Soviet Union's capabilities were almost entirely indigenous, although we did make a big effort to make sure that they didn't get help from our friends and allies, in the case of these countries, they all depend on a great deal of help from other places. And we can't cut off all of it. We can't stop North Korea from cooperating with Iraq. But we can try to prevent France and Japan from cooperating with Iraq or North Korea. So that's got to be another major piece of preventing these threats from emerging.
SEN. ALLARD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator Allard. Senator Nelson.
SEN. BEN NELSON (D-NB): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I want to thank both of you, Mr. Secretary and General Kadish, for being here today. I appreciate the opportunity to learn more about missile defense and some of the other issues that are extremely important to national defense.
I have a lot of questions about missile defense, but personally, I think it's important to say that we should never say no to missile defense outright. There are some who say absolutely yes, and there are some who say absolutely no. And I want it clear that I'm saying maybe. Maybe, not because I don't think there's a legitimate defense or legitimate threat; I think there is a legitimate threat from the so-called rogue nations that they might launch toward us.
I think there is a concern, legitimate concern, about accidental launch. I think these are certainly things that we do need to take into account.
But I want to be assured that sufficient research has been done and is being done, so that we could determine if missile defense is even possible and how likely it is that it's going to work, because it's a cost-benefit analysis in many respects. It's certainly a personal safety and humankind safety issue as well. But what we're being asked to do is to consider it in terms of the overall budget for defense and how it might relate to taking money away from other threats that are very likely. Biological warfare is clearly very possible, or chemical warfare, or even another weapon of mass destruction being delivered in another -- through another mechanism. And so I want to make sure that we do is based on sound science and that our cost-benefit analysis is thorough.
I've asked the secretary if he could give me some idea of a percentage of success that we might be able to evaluate to determine whether or not missile defense is possible, whether it truly is the kind of security that we would want it to be if we're going to spend that kind of money.
I've heard the argument that at least it's a scarecrow. Well, I mean, I come from an agricultural state, and I know my Nebraska farmers would not put a scarecrow out that didn't scare crows, and they wouldn't call it a scarecrow if it didn't scare crows. And they'd want to know how much that scarecrow cost before they invested in it and what it was -- on a cost-benefit basis that it was going to be worthwhile.
So what I'm leading up to is that I want to make sure that we've done everything that we can in this arena, because I'm worried that we're inching our way toward deployment without ever having answered the questions or given -- whether I -- before I've received answers to my questions. I think -- whether it's a runaway train that's heading down the track or whether it's boiling a lobster slowly or whatever it is, I think there is a decision made that we're going to have it, and we're going to have it regardless. I hope that's not the case, but everything that I hear, everything that I see would almost lead me to that conclusion. And I hope that -- I don't want to be a cynic. I hope that we're being asked to pursue this honestly and sincerely, as I'm attempting to do, because I haven't concluded that we ought not to deploy it.
But I haven't concluded either that it -- that there is such a thing as truly a missile defense. I know we can call it that, but will it be a defense? Will it really work the way we want it to work, and how will it fit into our other defense needs and our defense requirements? Those are my questions. They're very simple.
I know that we've tried to arrange schedules to get together, where I could talk to you privately, and I hope we're able to do that, because I don't simply want to talk about it in the public forum; I want to talk about it in every way and every -- explore every avenue that I can.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Well, first of all, I'd be eager to get together with you privately and talk at whatever length is useful. Let me just, therefore, sort of summarize by saying we have no intention of deploying things that don't work. We are, as --
SEN. BEN NELSON: Excuse me. How -- maybe you can get to me what the definition of "work" is.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Well, let me --
SEN. BEN NELSON: What does it have to do to work?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Well, let me give you an example, which I think is germane. It's not with respect to defense against longer-range missiles, but we are getting ready to deploy the PAC-3 as a defense against shorter-range missiles.
Up to what range, General?
GEN. KADISH: In tens of kilometers -- 20, 30 kilometers.
SEN. BEN NELSON: It's more for the theater defense.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: The range of the incoming --
GEN. KADISH: Oh, the range of the incoming. They're short-range missiles, up 600 kilometers.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: So --
SEN. BEN NELSON: So the theater defense --
MR. WOLFOWITZ: We're getting ready to deploy finally.
SEN. BEN NELSON: And I really don't have a problem with that at all. I think, to protect our --
MR. WOLFOWITZ: And it does work, but it didn't work four years ago or five years ago.
And we are actually investing significant additional amounts in that program because it does work. If you look at the defenses against longer-range systems, what this program represents is a certain stepping back to explore what does and doesn't work and to research much more aggressively things that we set aside, I think largely because they -- maybe for other reasons, but I think largely because they raised ABM Treaty issues, and we will try and learn from research and development which of those potentially promising technologies work and which ones don't. And when we've decided which ones work we'll come up with notions, sustainable notions of what they can do and what they can't do. I mean, airborne laser, for example, which we're referred to many times in this hearing, if it works as we hope it may work still then leaves issues about how much do you invest in it because its geographical range is intrinsically limited.
So we definitely are going to take this step by step, and every one of those steps will be up here for thorough scrutiny and appropriation and authorization. So the intention is certainly not to throw a lot of -- we don't have money to throw away at things that don't provide us a real capability.
SEN. BEN NELSON: Well, I wouldn't suggest that we would or that you would advocate that, either. My time has expired, but let me -- maybe you can clarify for me what the installation -- maybe during the next round of questions you can help me understand a definition of "deployment". As we work on the definition of what works and what percentage of success it has to have for us to be able to say it works, maybe you can help me understand the steps of deployment, because I must admit that I would see the installation of Alaska as steps one, two, three or some incremental steps of deployment. But maybe I don't understand the word.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I don't know if we have time or not --
SEN. BEN NELSON: We can do it -- we can do it in the next round--
SEN. LEVIN: We are going to pick this up Tuesday --
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Sure.
SEN. LEVIN: -- and that's the type of question which we're going to be focusing on, that -- those kind of technical questions at the Tuesday hearing.
SEN. WARNER: Mr. Chairman, that's such a key question I think we really ought to take just a minute or two -- I'll yield a minute or two of my time to --
SEN. LEVIN: It's going to take many more minutes to answer it, but fire away.
SEN. WARNER: I think it's important. The senator raises a key question, and a lot of people want to know, because, you know, I look at the Missile Defense Act of '99, and it's clear that we're not going to do anything until it's technologically feasible -- 97 votes behind that.
SEN. BEN NELSON: And that's -- excuse me. And that's what I'm referring to, because I'm in favor of research and development to get the technology to the point where we can say it works. But I'm worried that we haven't defined what "works" is yet, and I certainly don't have any understanding of what "deployment" is, when it starts -- I think I'll know when it's over, but I won't know when it's started. And that's what worries me.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Let me try a quick answer. If it needs correction, I'll ask General Kadish to correct. If it just needs elaboration, then we'll keep the elaboration till next week.
SEN. BEN NELSON: Sure.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: But the Alaska system is a complicated issue because it is a -- what we're trying to develop there is a uniquely realistic testbed for exploring the land-based mid-course intercept system.
And it -- it would be hard to improve on it, I think, as a way of finding out as well as possible how that kind of system would work. In fact, it will do it so well that at some point we might say, "Gosh, this works as well as we expected," or maybe even better than we expected, and if at that same time country Orange -- let's not be too specific -- came out with a primitive ballistic missile threat to the Western United states, we would say, Well, we have a primitive capability to shoot down that primitive missile.
SEN. BEN NELSON: So is it part of development? Is it part of the technological development to comply with the vote, the '97 vote?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: But that is not the capability we're aiming at. The real capability -- that would be a sort of emergency departure. What we would really anticipate is if we say, "Gosh, it works," and we're not in an emergency state, we would take that information that it works, develop a real architecture that makes maximum use of that capability and then come her with a full-fledged, long-term program for deployment of that full-up capability. (Inaudible.)
SEN. BEN NELSON: So it might be in the range of development at this point in time, or research, or something; not deployment?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: That's the way I would consider it, Senator, but it has a little bit of dual potential. JSTARS, which is one of the most spectacular technological developments of the last decade, which is this ability to track vehicles moving on the ground with amazing precision, was still in the development phase when the Gulf War broke out, and someone said, "Gee, it's just developmental, but we could use anything that might possibly work." So we sent it to the Gulf, it turned out it worked amazingly well. We tracked the one major Iraqi attack on Khafji (ph). These aircraft in the air saw three large armor formations converging on one place and we were able to destroy them from the air, so it certainly proved its worth.
People will also tell you that it set back the long-term development of the JSTARS program by some significant amount of time because it's disruptive to do that. So you do it in an emergency; you don't do it according to a plan.
SEN. BEN NELSON: Thank you.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator Nelson. We'll now turn to Senator Warner for his remaining questions and wrap-up, and then I'll do the same.
SEN. WARNER: Fine. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, I think we have had an excellent hearing. The intensity of the debate, I think, is constructive. We've laid a solid foundation for the Senate and indeed, I think, the Congress, eventually, to make a decision. And it's my personal judgment that we move forward; that we had a positive sequence of exchanges today, on the whole, and that you move forward towards the goal of defending this country. We've got a long way to go, and I commend both of you.
I'm going to just ask some very basic questions here, because so many people are going to look at this hearing, in many parts of the United States, and some of it is a little complicated, I recognize that, and I'm just going to ask some basic questions.
First, General Kadish, I am confident that our president, if not hindered by the Congress, will be able to achieve a new framework with Russia. It's just my own personal conviction. Now, on that assumption that we resolve that, and that this new framework will enable us to go ahead with these various options which the treaty has precluded for these 30-plus years, or 30 years -- precluded our country from doing in its various formulations of trying to meet this threat, if we are able to go ahead, would not we then be able to get a system that is more effective and achieve it in less time?
GEN. KADISH: I believe that to be the case, Senator.
SEN. WARNER: So do I, and I've often said that, for decades around here, that that treaty has acted -- well, it was designed -- it was designed for the purpose of not letting the United States -- I mean, it was the intent of the treaty not to let us build any defenses. So once we resolve this new framework, then we can go ahead, and it'll be more effective.
Now, much has been said about the suitcase bomb, and this is a chart that the Joint Chiefs have provided the committee. And quite accurately, my colleague points out that the suitcase bomb sort of falls in the middle spectrum of threats. In other words, it's more likely that someone would bring a suitcase bomb than the intercontinental exchange of an accidental or a rogue firing of a missile.
But at the same time, the other axis of the chart clearly shows that the damage done by a suitcase bomb is but a small fraction of the damage that potentially could be done by an intercontinental ballistic missile. Am I not correct in that, General Kadish?
GEN. KADISH: Yes, sir.
SEN. WARNER: Could you give us some possible multiple of the damage? Would it be 10 or 100 times more damaging? Say that the North Koreans did send that missile onto a major city in California or Hawaii or the Chinese, who had some bellicose statements about firing a missile against California at one time. Suppose that did happen, and it had a nuclear warhead. What is the multiple of damage that that missile would create as opposed to the suitcase bomb? These are just rough estimates, and I realize it's speculation.
GEN. KADISH: To speculate a little bit, probably 15 times.
SEN. WARNER: Fifteen times as great.
GEN. KADISH: I would say 14 to 15 times.
SEN. WARNER: Now also, in the case of the suitcase bomb, it's in the category, quite properly, of a terrorist weapon. And Secretary Wolfowitz, as I've sat here these many years, we the United States have put in place as best we can technologically and other means, by the expenditure of literally billions of dollars, every resource we can to prevent that suitcase bomb. Take for example the intelligence. That's the first, and it has proven to be the most successful way to interdict that suitcase bomb.
But in sharp contrast to the accidental firing of a missile, where we have not yet been able to devise a defense, we have in place significant defenses and deterrents for the suitcase bomb, am I not correct? And we've expended enormous sums of funding dollars.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: That is correct. And we should do so. And we should continue to aggressively pursue, I think, every reasonable avenue in that direction. But as you are implying, Senator, in the case of an accidental missile launch, we've not only not pursued it aggressively, we have allowed our hands to be tied behind our back.
SEN. WARNER: Yeah, we covered that ground very clearly.
Now, you pointed out I think quite clearly that the accidental firing could be an accident here by the United States of America in our arsenal. I regret to have to point out that we've seen two very significant military accidents here in a little over 12 months. One, the Russian submarine, which I think the public should understand was the very top of their technology; a modern submarine.
We have every reason to know that their crews are the finest trained among their armed forces, yet they lost that submarine with all hands. The full accident report is yet to be known, but it happened. And in stark contrast, one of our own submarines, with one of the finest- trained crews that we have, was brought to the surface, negligently in my judgment, and created a loss of life. There is a clear example of how the military itself, both sides -- Russia and the United States -- is subject to accidents happening. I don't know what clearer proof we need that accidents can happen.
If we were to accidentally fire a missile -- your comment was we would want to have Russia be able to interdict that missile with a system which presumably we might be able to help them with in building, rather than have it cause severe damage. Am I not correct in that?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Correct.
SEN. WARNER: And we cannot, under the current framework of the ABM Treaty and the current provision, share that technology should our president and successive presidents so desire. Am I not correct?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I believe that is correct, Senator.
SEN. WARNER: I know it's to be correct. So I think there's another example of the reason why we should move forward and change this framework.
Lastly, the reductions in the levels or our own inventory of nuclear weapons. That's been a subject that's been discussed by our president; it is his intention at an appropriate time. To the extent that you can inform the Senate in public hearing, is that to be an integral part of the negotiations with Russia in the ABM framework of negotiations? Is it independent? And what's the likely timing of a decision -- again, is it linked to the ABM or could our president independently make that decision?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I think, Senator, we're still in a discovery mode. We've already made some decisions; as I pointed out, three quite significant ones in this year's budget that were done without relation to any requirement to negotiate with the Russians or see whether -- how our forces compare with the Russians. But I imagine that, in his meetings in Genoa later this month with President Putin, that one of the -- I would hope one of the points President Bush makes is we are already doing this kind of thing. We're not trying to threaten you and we would encourage you to take as many economies as you can in your forces. It just doesn't make sense to have unnecessary nuclear capabilities.
But we are trying to proceed with more precision as rapidly as possible to come up with a structure for what is a truly required long-term nuclear posture in an era when Russia is no longer an enemy. And I think that's going to come in stages. I think it will be part of this framework of discussions with the Russians. It won't necessarily be -- some will be formal negotiations, some will be other kinds of things. In fact, I think a major goal of what we'd like to achieve with the Russians is the kind of dialogue and transparency that we take for granted with allies. I mean, we don't have treaties with Britain and France to regulate -- (chuckles) -- the nuclear balance between our two countries. Russia's not yet at the level of being a member of NATO but we have very important common interests. And we think that with openness and with showing them what we have in mind and where we're going that we can encourage them in a positive direction with us.
SEN. WARNER: Lastly, you're one of the most seasoned and experienced members of this administration with regard to Russia, and you were recently there. Do you share my view of optimism that our president can work out a framework agreement?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I do very strongly, because I think so strongly that it's in the interests of both Russia and the United States.
SEN. WARNER: I do too.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: And I really think we're in a new era. I understand for everyone, myself included, there are a lot of thoughts that come from the Cold War that you've got to extract from your brain.
But the faster we can do that, the further we can go with that. That's, I think, really building mutual security for the future.
SEN. WARNER: And that's a very sound note on which to conclude my participation. I thank the both of you.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Thank you, Senator Warner.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator Warner.
I think everybody wants to make this world safer. We all start with that, and there's -- that -- there's no argument that North Korea is seeking that capability, and the only real question here is whether or not our response to it, if it's unilateral and if it results in a Russian and Chinese response, which is to maintain a lot of additional nuclear weapons on Russian soil, nuclear material which then makes the proliferation of it, the theft of it more likely by terrorists, surely that is going to make us less safe, not more safe. If China speeds up their activities, works on countermeasures, decoys, sells them to others, we have then helped to unleash a(n) arms race which will make us less secure, not more secure. So the question isn't whether or not there's a threat that is emerging over here, the question is whether or not the response to that threat will make us more secure or less secure. That is a very significant issue. The issue isn't whether there is a threat which is emerging, which North Korea is working on, it is what is the best way to respond to that threat in a way which makes us more secure. That's our moral obligation. That's the moral obligation of the president and the moral obligation of the Congress, to make us more secure and not to respond to the least likely threat, which is that attack with a ballistic missile from North Korea, and increase the likelihood of terrorist threats from a different direction as a result.
That, it seems to me, is what requires a great deal of analysis. It's not good enough to simply say there's a threat without asking yourselves is there a way to respond to that threat which makes us more secure rather than less secure, and would a unilateral response, if we can't get a modification of the treaty with Russia, would a unilateral response precipitate something by Russia, some actions by Russia or China and -- including not just the proliferation increase likelihood, but also the countermeasures and the decoys which can be then created by them in order to overcome such a threat, then be transferred to others as a result.
I couldn't agree with you more about getting out of cold war thinking, by the way. I think everybody agrees with that. But I hope that you will firmly keep in your minds what was known back then, which is still true, it was known in the '70s, it is known now and will always by the case, that when one country seeks unilaterally to achieve its own safety, it can increase the insecurity in another country.
Now, that's not our intent. I couldn't agree with you more that's not your intent. But you have to consider the Russian and Chinese view. Don't give them a veto. No one's going to give them a veto. But at least consider why is it that they don't agree with you; why is it that they feel less secure if we deploy a limited defense. You've got to consider it, and I hope you will consider it.
The problem is, you've made a decision you're going to deploy without consideration of why it is that those other guys out there will feel less secure by that unilateral deployment. That is the challenge. I wish you had gone about this in a very different way, frankly. I wish you had started with the argument, "Hey, let's move together to a different structure, based on defenses; the world will be better off," and then try to persuade people, rather than the statement, the declaration, "We're going to do it, like it or not; we hope you like it." Because it's more likely you're going to precipitate a negative response by taking that approach than you would by the persuasive approach, which is, "Hey, doesn't it make more sense for us to have defenses rather than to continue the same form of deterrence?"
Deterrence has worked. I think you would agree with that. Deterrence is important. You're not aiming to end deterrence. It's worked with North Korea, by the way, has it not?
GEN. KADISH: A combination of different things, yes.
SEN. LEVIN: Yeah. But deterrence has worked with North Korea. All those missiles that North Korea now has have not been used. Probably a number of reasons, but I'll tell you one good reason: It would amount to their suicide if they used them. And we've been told by our intelligence people that the number one goal of the North Korean regime is survival. That's the number one goal, we've been told. That being the case, for them to launch a missile at us, which may or may not work, but launch a missile at us, which would lead to their immediate destruction, runs counter to their number one goal, which is the survival of the regime.
In addition, we've been told on this threat spectrum that there are other means of delivery of a weapon of mass destruction, not just a truck bomb but a nuclear weapon, biological, chemical weapon, not just with a truck -- not just with a suitcase, but with a truck and with a ship. And I take it, General, that a nuclear weapon that's delivered by truck of the same size as a nuclear weapon delivered by a ballistic missile would have the same damage. Is that a fair statement? The same size nuclear weapon?
GEN. KADISH: Same size nuclear weapon. It would be a little harder to deliver by truck, I think, though.
SEN. LEVIN: It may be a little harder, but if it were deliverable by truck would that be about the same damage?
GEN. KADISH: (Yes ?), sir.
SEN. LEVIN: And how about two trucks and three trucks? Would that --
GEN. KADISH: It scales.
SEN. LEVIN: Yeah. Okay.
And so in addition to being concerned about the response and why other countries respond to this unilateral approach of ours, there's another -- this other factor, which is that in pursuing that road, we are ignoring the fact that it is much easier, cheaper, more accurate for them to deliver a weapon of mass destruction with another means -- no return address -- which doesn't lead, necessarily, to their own destruction if we don't know where it came from.
Those are critical -- those are critical policy questions. Now, we have lots of technical questions, as well, and we're going to get into those next time, but I just want to ask a few questions and then wrap it up.
General Kadish, three weeks ago you told us there was nothing in your recommendations which, if implemented, would violate the ABM Treaty in 2002.
Is that still true, in your judgment?
GEN. KADISH: No, it isn't, Senator.
SEN. LEVIN: What's changed since you testified before?
GEN. KADISH: We -- at the time we talked about this, I believe I said at the time that the program was not fully approved and that the compliance review process was ongoing and could change things a lot.
SEN. LEVIN: What's changed?
GEN. KADISH: And what's changed is that the definition of the program in getting into the compliance review -- which is a lengthy process, to some degree -- pointed out events that were potentially more near-term that the secretary described. So this process is ongoing, and it will yield the types of decisions that you're talking about.
SEN. LEVIN: Okay. Now we need to know precisely, if everything goes well in this program in 2002, what are those events which would be in conflict with the ABM Treaty? If everything goes well that's in your request, your budget request, what specific activities are in conflict with the ABM Treaty?
GEN. KADISH: As we develop, that's a living list. And I think Secretary Wolfowitz has outlined a couple of them in his testimony already.
SEN. LEVIN: He didn't say they would in 2002. He said --
GEN. KADISH: That's right.
SEN. LEVIN: I'm asking you.
GEN. KADISH: Well --
SEN. LEVIN: If everything goes well in 2002, give me the specific activities in your budget which would be in conflict with the ABM Treaty. Just give me one, two, and three.
GEN. KADISH: That is not my responsibility -- to determine whether they are in compliance.
SEN. LEVIN: Okay. Secretary Wolfowitz, what activities in your budget will be in conflict with the ABM Treaty in 2002, if every -- if all those activities in the budget go well?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Again, that's also not my responsibility. There's a legal determination that goes through the treaty compliance --
SEN. LEVIN: And you haven't asked your lawyers yet.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: The lawyers are working on these issues. I -- what I've outlined in my testimony, Senator, are, as best we can identify them, the most significant issues that are coming in. I'm sorry; I don't have the same version of the testimony that you have. But as I said, as the program develops, we have some issues coming.
The first issue is the test bed currently scheduled to begin construction in April 2002, designed to permit the testing of a ground-based, midcourse capability under realistic operational conditions.
Second, there will be opportunities --
SEN. LEVIN: You're saying that that is in conflict with the ABM Treaty?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: No, I'm saying that raises an issue about ABM Treaty interpretation.
SEN. LEVIN: Well -- and you don't care what the answer to the issue is?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Of course I care. I don't know the answer.
SEN. LEVIN: But when will we find out? When will you find out?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I don't know.
SEN. LEVIN: And if you care, why is it in your budget before you know?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Because we're trying to do two things at once, and we have to. I mean, we need to proceed.
I listed the other two major examples in my testimony.
SEN. LEVIN: But you're not able to say now, without this board giving us a decision, whether or not those activities are inconsistent with the ABM Treaty or not. Is that correct? Is that your testimony today?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: That's correct.
SEN. LEVIN: I just want to end with this one comment. Clarity is important, and I think that at least there's a little greater clarity today than there has been. But I got to tell you, we're a long way from there. Just on policy issues we're a long way from there, because just yesterday -- just think about this -- we've got an issue here which is so significant to the world. I mean, everybody's involved in this issue.
Just about every country cares about this issue. We just get visits from the British. We get British (sic) from other allies. They come and visit us. This is the issue we talk about.
Yesterday, the administration hands out a document which says that while we don't know precisely when our programs will come into conflict with the ABM Treaty in the future, the timing is likely to be measured in months not years. That's just yesterday. Today, you tell us that one or more aspect will inevitably bump up against the treaty. Such an event is likely to occur -- that's the bump-up -- likely to occur in months rather than years.
Now, this isn't splitting hairs, because you also testified today that there's a difference between "bumping up" and "in conflict with." That's your testimony. So yesterday the administration hands out a document which uses the word "in conflict with ABM." Today, the administration testifies that it will "bump up" in months, or likely to bump up in months instead of years.
We got a long way to go before there's just clarity. And clarity, it seems to me, is the basis for a solution hopefully, bipartisan solution, because that's got to be the goal of everybody, but then ultimately a solution not just between Congress and the administration, but ultimately a solution that hopefully will allow us to move together with our allies who are very skeptical of this, and hopefully with the Russians, towards a new kind of structure, because that's everybody's goal, I think, to try to move together towards a new kind of structure where defenses have a role. That's the reason that we're doing the testing. We want to see if we can come up with something which is operationally effective, cost-effective, and which will make us more secure. That's everybody's goal.
And I think it has been a helpful hearing. I agree with Senator Warner. And I also feel though that it is important that we spend this time, and I hope you feel it's useful as well for us, for Congress -- we're being asked to fund these programs -- as well as for the country and for the world, that we really explore what roads we're walking down at what speed with what advantages, what disadvantages, with what risks and what gains.
We hope that your recovery is complete so that when we see you next Tuesday, you'll be out of your -- out of that temporary -- interim cast.
SEN. WARNER: Can I just say a word here?
SEN. LEVIN: Sure.
SEN. WARNER: I thank my colleague. First, I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, that our committee proceed to try and declassify that testimony that General Kadish provided this committee which has been the subject of discussion as to what you did say. Seems to me there is sufficient caveats in here that you properly placed about taking certain steps with lawyers and others before proceeding.
SEN. LEVIN: I would very much like that as a matter of fact.
SEN. WARNER: Yeah, I think we can -- we can do that.
SEN. LEVIN: What I have said here however, I want to assure my good colleague, was approved, so that I did not saying anything.
SEN. WARNER: (Inaudible.)
SEN. LEVIN: No, no. I think it is important though however that we try to declassify General Kadish's entire testimony.
SEN. WARNER: Lastly, Mr. Chairman, we've had a lot of discussion today about unilateral, and the term has been used by a number of senators. And I think I'd like to just clarify my own view on a very important point. First, the treaty explicitly provides for that, am I not correct?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Absolutely, Senator.
SEN. WARNER: So it's not a matter of breaking the law. The treaty gives a president that option.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: There is a withdrawal provision.
SEN. WARNER: And secondly --
SEN. LEVIN: That he can withdrawal? I'm sorry.
SEN. WARNER: Yes. I mean, it's explicit. It's not something that we would just do. It is in the treaty.
Those who wrote the treaty -- and I happened to have been around at the time it was written -- envisioned a problem could arise some day and it would be in the national interest and the commander in chief, our president, would have to make that decision. So it's in the treaty.
And secondly -- and this is my own view -- having come to know our president and having formed a great respect for him, I am confident that if, after a clear and credible program of first, consultation with allies and then negotiations with Russia, if he were of the mind that that was the only alternative, to go to that provision of the treaty, that he would come to the Congress of the United States, particularly when I predict that Congress will be a full partner in each step of the way, and consult with the Congress before he would take that action under the treaty. It wouldn't simply be raising the telephone and calling the leadership and say, "I'm going to do this tomorrow morning" -- that he would go through a period of consultation. Would you share that view with me?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I believe so, yes, Senator.
SEN. WARNER: And I think that should be known by the people following this.
SEN. LEVIN: Could I -- well it also should be known that we will give you a chance; that the president has said -- I mean, it's great to hear that he's going to consult, but the president's said he's going to withdraw if he can't get modification. I mean, he's already said that. So we always welcome consultation but the consultation needs to come before decisions, not after.
SEN. WARNER: Well, this is part of the consultation.
SEN. LEVIN: I think he had to say that in fairness to the Russians to know the full -- and the American people. He said that to the American people, not just to the Russians.
SEN. WARNER: Well, the Russians know it; it's in the treaty. And he simply says, "I've got to protect this nation and I want to do it through a new framework." What's in the treaty is the power to withdraw.
SEN. LEVIN: The president's told the American people he is going to deploy. And if he doesn't get an agreement to modify, he's withdrawing. So I welcome consultation, but again, the consultation, to be real, needs to be real. It's got to come before decisions, not after decisions.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Mr. Chairman, can I --
SEN. LEVIN: Yeah, absolutely.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: -- make one quick response?
There's a great deal in what you said that we could -- I guess we will discuss at length on Tuesday. And I agree with you, all these choices are a matter of balancing risks. And you and I may assess the risk differently. Maybe if we discuss some more we'll come to convergence on that. But I think we would absolutely agree that the way to minimize most of the risks that you're concerned about is to come to some kind of cooperative approach with the Russians. I don't think there's any argument on that question.
And on that question, I think I would implore you and everybody to think about -- in the Congress -- to think about the fact that I think the record shows consistently that our success in getting that kind of cooperative outcome depends on having some momentum. The ABM Treaty itself would never have come into being if the United States hadn't shown some determination through some extremely difficult votes up here, one of which in fact succeeded on a tie vote as I recall, to move ahead with the so-called Safeguard System. That's what brought the old Soviets to the negotiating table.
We went through a very difficult period a few years ago with a completely different country, that is Russia, over the subject of NATO enlargement. And it was difficult but I think if you look at it from 20-20 hindsight now a couple of years later, I think even the Russians are beginning to realize that bringing Poland into NATO is no threat to Russia and has actually improved relations between Poland and Russia.
But they --
SEN. LEVIN: We never had a treaty with Russia that we wouldn't enlarge NATO.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I -- each case is different, but what I'm saying is that if we brought the Russians around, I think in that process the Clinton administration did through a framework -- not an agreement, but a framework of understanding that actually did include a formal agreement between Russia and NATO that was part of the enlargement of NATO process. I think what you need to achieve a cooperative approach is both a willingness to cooperate and some determination to move forward. I think that's the combination that the president is looking for.
SEN. LEVIN: A lot of determination to move forward, plenty of momentum in the billions that we've put into test programs -- a lot of momentum that everyone's supported. We've supported the research and development program. So there's a lot of momentum in that. But I think we will pick this up next Tuesday 9:30. We will start -- let me just make this clear to everybody. We will -- there have been a number of people who have not had a chance to have their first round. We will start with questions instead of opening statements, except if the ranking member and I want to make a brief opening statement at the beginning. But other than that, we won't have opening statements from you. We'll go directly to questions. And then there's -- I want to hold open the possibility that if there's time that we consider additional witnesses on the technical side, which we want to get to at some point, anyway.
SEN. WARNER: Mr. Chairman, they may wish upon examination of today's lengthy record, desire to make some brief opening statement to --
SEN. LEVIN: They can -- we would have to keep it very limited, otherwise we're going to run into the same kind of problem. We would welcome corrections, clarifications --
SEN. WARNER: That gives them the chance.
SEN. LEVIN: (Laughs.) They may be very long in that case, those opening statements.
We will stand adjourned. (Sounds gavel.)
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