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European Theater Remains One of Conflict and Transition
Prepared statement of Gen. George A. Joulwan, USA, commander in chief, U.S. European Command, The House National Security Committee, Thursday, March 02, 1995

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, it is a privilege to appear before you today to discuss the United States European Command. I welcome this opportunity to provide my perspective on this busy theater -- a theater that spans Europe, parts of the Near and Middle East, the Northern African littoral, and sub-Saharan Africa: 83 countries and 13 million square miles.

I would like to articulate the vital importance of this theater to U.S. interests, describe the strategic environment and emerging opportunities and threats to U.S. interests, define my strategy to meet these challenges and, finally, prioritize the programs and resources necessary to ensure success.

As I survey the vast USEUCOM area of responsibility, I am impressed by the extent of the positive accomplishments over the past year. While peace still eludes us in Bosnia, we need to recognize that since I last came before you there has been fundamental and positive change in the security environment in EUCOM's area of responsibility. We have gone from a reactive to a proactive strategy. We have taken theory and put it into practice. Indeed, we are consolidating the gains for democracy brought about by the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the demise of communism. Let me be more specific.

EUCOM has maintained a high state of readiness in the force. Even as we drew down the size of the forward-deployed force from 314,000 to approximately 100,000, EUCOM demonstrated it can still react to crisis across the conflict spectrum. This past year EUCOM was engaged in numerous lesser regional operations, and the troops performed superbly. However, as the force declines there is concern about personnel turbulence as well as resources matching requirements. Both indicators impact on readiness.

Today EUCOM forces are part of NATO operations enforcing U.N. Security Council resolutions in the Adriatic and in the skies over Bosnia; multinational operations conducting air-land and air-drop flights to feed the hungry in Bosnia-Herzegovina; and multinational operations protecting the people of northern Iraq from the brutality of Saddam Hussein.

When tragedy struck last summer in Rwanda, EUCOM within hours began moving forward-deployed forces 6,000 kilometers to Central Africa. Once there, a joint force of water purification teams, engineers, medics, logisticians, airborne troops and airlift specialists stopped the dying of thousands of Rwandans. In one week the death toll dropped from 6,000 per day to 500, and within 30 days it had fallen to less than 200. Equally important, the EUCOM force worked with U.N. relief organizations and nongovernmental organizations in a constructive way and within 60 days turned the operation over to the UNHCR [U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees] and all U.S. forces were withdrawn. Not one soldier, airman, sailor or Marine was lost during Operation Support Hope.

EUCOM's Military Cooperation Program achieved great results last year, and the potential for the future is high. The Joint Contact Team Program brought Americans and American ideals and values to the countries of the former Warsaw Pact and the former Soviet Union. The teams plan bilateral programs in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and are cost-effective and productive. A particularly noteworthy aspect of this program is the role played by reserve forces. Reservists, the epitome of the citizen soldier's role in a democracy, comprise one-third of the JCTP's program personnel. Furthermore, 12 states have actually adopted the participating nations under the State Partnership Program. In addition, the George C. Marshall Center located in Germany graduated its first class last December and was a clear success. Seventy-three mid-level military and civilian officers from 23 former Warsaw Pact countries including Russia and Ukraine attended.

NATO's Partnership for Peace became a reality in 1994. Twenty-four nations -- mostly former Warsaw Pact countries -- have signed the framework document. There is a Partnership Coordination Cell operational, and representatives are there from 11 partnership nations. EUCOM fully supports this program, and in addition, U.S. forces participated in all three PfP exercises last year. EUCOM also conducted a bilateral exercise with Russian troops in Russia. This engagement strategy promotes mutual trust and confidence among former adversaries and an opportunity to develop common procedures, doctrine and standards among all nations of Europe and the former Soviet Union.

The list of achievements could go on. But the point is that EUCOM and NATO have changed and are adapting to the challenges of the post-Cold War period. NATO and its member nations achieved a great success five years ago with the collapse of a wall and the Iron Curtain. But that event was not the end of our nation's nor NATO's mission. It was only the end of one phase and the beginning of another.

How we as a nation and as an alliance respond in the remainder of this decade will determine the true security of the United States in the 21st century. Indeed the United States can be justifiably proud of its role in bringing about this revolution for democracy. It truly was brought about by the constancy and character of the American commitment. But it is not good enough to just bring about the revolution -- it is what you do afterward that is equally important in consolidating the gains for democracy. We as a nation and as a command must stay engaged in Europe -- albeit at reduced levels -- if we do not want to repeat the mistakes made twice in this century.

And we could not have realized the great events of five years ago without the continuing support of Congress, and on behalf of all those who have served and are serving in the European Command I thank you for that support. It is in that same spirit of cooperation and understanding that I ask for your support in today's new EUCOM as part of a new NATO. The struggle is not yet over, the need for vigilance still exists, the mission continues.

Indeed the EUCOM theater is still a theater in conflict as well as a theater in transition. Ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia are painful reminders that man's inhumanity to man continues. Recent events in Chechnya exposed the fragile democracy in Russia as well as a deep concern by Russia's neighbors. There are still more than 20,000 nuclear warheads in the former Soviet republics.

Instability and uncertainty are the norm, not the exception. Stability is not assured. Institutions that make democracy work -- economic, political, judicial, social and military -- take time to evolve. Terrorism and fanaticism still are prevalent in the Middle East and the northern littoral of Africa and threaten the fragile peace between Israel and its neighbors. Disease and starvation are rampant in sub-Saharan Africa and pose a long-term danger to the stability of that troubled continent.

Indeed the world is still a dangerous place. Clearly the United States military and in particular the U.S. European Command are not and should not be the world's policeman. But U.S. leadership is required in creating the conditions which will reinforce our ideals and values and assure our security and that of our allies into the 21st century. How we engage is important.

The EUCOM strategy has been developed to take advantage of the opportunity brought about by the successes of the past 50 years. And 50 years after the end of World War II we celebrate not just victory in World War II, but also victory in the Cold War. The challenges and opportunities we face today are similar to those we faced following World War II. EUCOM's strategy seizes upon this unique period in history. It is designed to promote stability, thwart aggression, [and] develop multinationalism with our allies and trust and confidence with former adversaries while maintaining ready forces to protect our vital interests in the region.

The USEUCOM AOR remains critically important to U.S. security interests for both geostrategic and economic reasons, and because we share common values and a common culture with much of this region.

Access to this region is strategically critical. Many of the world's vital lines of communication traverse this region. A majority of the world's shipping, both in numbers and tonnage, transits the Mediterranean Sea and the Suez Canal. Western Europe and the emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union contain a large portion of, or provide essential access to, the world's resources.

The economic interests of the nations in this AOR complement the economy of the U.S. The European Union has the largest gross domestic product of any region in the world. Open markets and free trade, unimpeded access to trade routes and the free flow of resources contribute to our prosperity, and therefore to our security. Stability is a precondition for economic prosperity.

Consider the following:


  • Europe accounts for 34 percent of the worldwide total of gross domestic product -- more than any other region.
  • Europe accounts for 26 percent of U.S. merchandise trade exports and 31 percent of total U.S. exports.
  • One and a half million American workers are supported by U.S. exports to Europe.
  • U.S. generally has a trade surplus with Europe.
  • Fifty percent of U.S. direct foreign investment is in Europe.
  • Europe accounts for more than 60 percent of direct foreign investment in the U.S.
  • Of all foreign-owned manufacturing establishments in the U.S., 60-67 percent are European-owned (measured in terms of establishments, economic value and value of shipments). These establishments employ nearly 3 million Americans.

Beyond our economic relationship we share a common cultural foundation rooted in our political systems, heritage and religions. Our common values and ideas form the very foundation of our relationship. The 1990 census showed that 92 percent of all Americans claim European or African heritage. That heritage includes our arts, literature, music, religions and even our science and technology. Cultural bonds make our relationship with the people of this region unique and truly lasting.

We are in a new era. Let me describe the significant challenges and to some extent the dangers we face in the coming year. Last September the remaining U.S., French, British and Russian occupation troops departed Berlin -- now a free and reunited city. After 45 years of Cold War, U.S. and Russian soldiers train side by side in cooperative military exercises.

I could list many similarly astonishing facts. But the one big fact is that in this new environment the U.S. is without peer. Our pre-eminence gives us great privileges, but it brings great responsibilities as well. Nowhere is that clearer than in USEUCOM. Our leadership is sought on every security issue of significance. That means that our vision and our commitment mobilize the contributions of a whole community of powerful nations.

Unfortunately it also means that in the absence of our leadership, coherent international response to dangerous conditions develops slowly at best. Those conditions, left to themselves, ultimately can impinge upon the vital interests of our nation.

USEUCOM's area of responsibility is full of dangerous conditions. Another year has passed with no end to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Iraq remains hostile toward its Kurdish minorities in northern Iraq. Religious hatreds are renewing violence in the Middle East, the largest nation in North Africa is on the verge of chaos, and civil war in Africa is commonplace. Immediately adjacent to our area of responsibility, Russia remains involved in conflicts on its southwestern border and faces the prospect of a prolonged conflict in Chechnya.

USEUCOM, along with our friends and allies, actively engages in operations designed to control and ultimately to eliminate these dangers. The actions required drive our operations and personnel tempo higher than ever before. USEUCOM and NATO participated in more missions in the last five years than in the previous 45 years. On any given day USEUCOM is participating in no fewer than four "lesser regional conflicts," sometimes simultaneously supporting other nearby combatant commands.

Since August 1993 USEUCOM planned 32 operations and actually executed 13 of those, everything from noncombatant evacuation operations in Rwanda to our operations in the Balkans. The number and scope of these operations are indicative of the diverse national security challenges we face in this theater: regional conflict, weapons of mass destruction, transnational dangers, and failure of democratic reform.

You need only pick up a newspaper to see the effects of regional tensions throughout this theater. Ethnic and religious strife, resurging nationalism and territorial disputes prevail throughout the former Warsaw Pact countries. The regional "fault lines" penetrating throughout this AOR involve historic disputes that transcend traditional nation-state boundaries -- disputes whose terrible outcomes could potentially exceed the most pessimistic intelligence estimates.

These problems are not limited to Europe and the former Soviet Union. Those living in sub-Saharan Africa are not only threatened by conflicts among states, but by the disintegration of the states themselves. The struggle for democratic reform throughout the region has had mixed results and faces an even more uncertain future. As of late 1994, 14 of USEUCOM's 35 sub-Saharan countries were in various stages of transition and turmoil. Those problems are compounded by environmental disaster, disease and economic decline -- problems that have no short-term solution.

A similar situation exists in the Middle East and the North Africa littoral. Here vast quantities of advanced weaponry make the combination of ancient animosities and radical political forces approach critical mass. While recent peace agreements offer new hope, extremist factions counter their implementation with terror. Additionally, the possibility that radicals may obtain weapons of mass destruction adds -- a new dimension of danger to this volatile region.

Weapons of mass destruction pose the greatest potential for disaster. There are still more than 20,000 nuclear weapons in the hands of our former adversaries. Considering the political and economic instability in the former Soviet Union, many in Congress have expressed concern over the numbers, location and control of these weapons.

Of great concern is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the ability to deliver them. The dramatic rise in the smuggling of nuclear material and technology is alarming. Since 1990 there were more than 580 known incidents of nuclear smuggling in the USEUCOM AOR. More than 200 of these incidents occurred in the last year alone.

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction presents the potential for a nightmare scenario. Nuclear, biological or chemical weapons can cause mass casualties with little or no warning. Today's technology makes these weapons easier to produce, conceal and deliver -- making this threat more unpredictable and harder to counter. Even a credible threat to use such weapons is an effective tool of political terror, as demonstrated by Iraqi Scud missile attacks during the gulf war.

In the past decade, dangers such as international crime, drugs and terrorism have intensified to the point that they threaten the stability of the international community. Turmoil has exponentially increased the flow of refugees throughout the USEUCOM AOR. For example, more than 1.5 million people were displaced due to the Balkan conflict and more than 2 million were displaced due to the conflict in Rwanda. Stagnant economies and a widening disparity between the haves and have-nots aggravate unemployment and stimulate extreme political views, increasing transnational dangers. This drains resources and undermines respect for law and civil authority. Although their effect escapes simple formulation, they nevertheless increase regional instability.

Failure of political and economic reform in the former Soviet Union would cause grave problems for the international community and threaten U.S. interests in the USEUCOM AOR. We encourage and strengthen reform through our active engagement programs, creating apolitical militaries that are less likely to use force toward their sovereign neighbors to resolve problems. But it will take active economic and political programs to assist in the reform process. It is clearly to our benefit to foster a smooth transition to democracy, thereby reducing the risk of future conflicts.

We have just completed work on a theater strategy entitled Active Engagement and Preparedness, which provides a comprehensive plan for meeting the challenges facing us in the AOR . This strategy, which is derived from the president's National Security Strategy of the United States and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs' National Military Strategy, achieves the dual national military objectives of promoting stability and thwarting aggression by engaging in peacetime, responding to crisis and fighting to win.

Briefly, engage in peacetime is a forward-looking strategy that shapes the security environment by creating conditions for success and reducing the likelihood of armed conflict. This approach utilizes nonlethal mechanisms to foster a transition to democracy and civilian control of the military.

Respond to crisis serves both overarching strategic objectives: it promotes stability, and it thwarts aggression. It takes on many different forms in the AOR; it drives our optempo and perstempo, and it daily puts Americans in harm's way. These operations -- the gray zone between peace and war -- make up a vast majority of this theater's ongoing activities.

Fight to win is the traditional military role and our most important purpose. Our ability to do this is a necessary foundation for all other activities. USEUCOM forces devote most of their training and resources to being able to fight to win with the decisiveness the American people expect of their armed forces.

Before discussing these strategies further, there are two key factors that have long played a major role in our strategy -- our forward presence and NATO. Today these factors are as relevant as ever. They achieve a unique economy of force that cannot be effectively or efficiently achieved from the continental United States.

Forward presence in this AOR enables us to take part in a wide range of operations on a daily basis. U.S. presence helps bring peace and stability to Western Europe and provides the foundation for extending that stability to Central and Eastern Europe. As stated in the chairman's National Military Strategy, forward presence is key to our influence and engagement.

The force structure in our AOR, which is near the end of its 68 percent reduction from Cold War levels, provides the minimum elements necessary to support our strategies in this theater in conflict. In this large and highly volatile AOR it is critical to maintain the capability to respond and resolve crises before they gain momentum and mature into major conflicts.

Our forward-deployed forces provide us the opportunity to train at the international level, the ability to reinforce quickly and a degree of unilateral combat capability. This force structure also provides significant in-theater capabilities not readily available in the U.S., such as intelligence and surveillance, communications, theater missile defense and other vital capabilities.

Forward presence gives us access to basing and infrastructure necessary for force projection both here and in Central Command's area of responsibility. This proved critical during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, where 95 percent of the strategic airlift, 90 percent of the combat aircraft and 85 percent of the naval vessels were staged from or through USEUCOM's AOR. This would have been practically impossible without USEUCOM basing and infrastructure, to include equipment pre-positioned in theater to supply reinforcing forces.

Our presence also underwrites U.S. leadership of NATO and allows us to maintain, support and contribute to the integrity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is U.S. leadership of this premier alliance that provides the critical stabilizing mechanism of European security. U.S. leadership and forward presence reinforces our strong commitment to the trans-Atlantic link and makes us a European power, even though we do not have, nor desire, any European territory.

Our unique role as the "honest broker" gives credibility to the NATO alliance unseen in any other security alliance. Our leadership is especially important now as NATO grows from a defensive alliance to a mutual security organization. Its importance in this role, as Central and Eastern Europe transition toward democracies which act together to solve mutual problems and help resolve conflicts in adjacent regions, cannot be overstated.

U.S. influence in NATO leverages allied force contributions and infrastructure investment. NATO provides a force multiplier with a robust integrated command and control structure built on more than 40 years of planning, training and exercising with a standard doctrine. NATO gives us this economy of force in the daily operations throughout the AOR.

For example, while the U.S. contributes approximately 500 troops in neighboring Macedonia, NATO countries provide more than 23,000 UNPROFOR [U.N. Protection Forces] troops within the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Forward-deployed U.S. forces in other regions of the world would welcome a similar relationship that encourages sharing risks and burdens of protecting common interests. NATO proved that it can adapt to the new security environment and remain cost-effective by sharing responsibilities across a broad spectrum of operations.

The new NATO, born out of the 1991 Rome Declaration's new Alliance Strategic Concept, not only provides an organization capable of defending the territory of its member states, but also fosters the emergence of a safer and more stable Europe.

Our strategy to engage in peacetime is proactive and far-reaching. It uses military resources in unconventional ways to mold the security environment in our AOR by creating conditions for a successful transition to democracy, thus preventing armed conflict and promoting stability. We aim to promote stability, democratization and military professionalism in Central and Eastern Europe, and to assist host nations in Africa in democratization and, when possible, relief of human suffering.

USEUCOM employs several avenues to promote stability, democratization and military professionalism, such as military cooperation programs, the Security Assistance Program, the George C. Marshall Center, and conventional and nuclear arms control. These unilateral programs also provide a foundation for multilateral programs, such as Partnership for Peace.

USEUCOM engages in two types of military cooperation programs: The first program takes the form of combined bilateral and multilateral military exercises, while our second program provides the model of an apolitical military under civilian control. Combined exercises are building trust and confidence with our former adversaries in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

USEUCOM participated in every Partnership for Peace exercise last year and completed a peacekeeping exercise with Russian forces in Russia. Exercises also allow us to train with countries in Africa where our resources are limited and the security environment is different from Europe. These valuable exercises lay the groundwork for more complex multilateral exercises and encourage regional cooperation. Combined exercises focus on opportunities to train at a relatively low cost.

The Joint Contact Team Program invests in the long- term relationship between a country's military and its governing body. It extends a hand of friendship to countries of Central and Eastern Europe and has been successful beyond all expectations. The in-country military liaison teams help facilitate the assistance that host nations need to implement democratic reforms such as human rights guarantees, a military legal code based on the rights of a citizen soldier, chaplain and noncommissioned officer corps and a governmental structure that makes the militaries subordinate to civilian control in democratic societies.

A small investment in the JCTP significantly increases trust between East and West, and accelerates the East's transition to apolitical militaries, thus enhancing stability for the entire region. JCTP also provides the building blocks needed for Central and Eastern Europe to participate in the Partnership for Peace program.

The JCTP is a uniquely American program. I don't believe any other nation could do it the way we have done it or as well. To begin with, we are welcome in Eastern Europe because we bear no historical baggage. Furthermore, as a nation with very significant military forces but not territory on the continent we can help solve what has historically been a nearly unsolvable security problem without endangering the sovereignty of smaller nations. These facts make us welcome.

When our service members arrive on the ground, the fact that they are citizens of the United States gives them special capabilities. Because they come from a nation of federated states, they understand instinctively the advantages and the challenges of many governments working together. Coming from a nation which is full of ethnic diversity, but which on the whole has made this diversity a strength rather than a weakness, they understand the complexity of the situation in Central and Eastern Europe without being resigned to the problems which currently go along with it.

A third of them are reservists -- American reservists are a unique group, and as citizen soldiers they represent in their persons the concept of a military subordinate to civilian authority. Many of them are members of the National Guard; they thus know firsthand how militaries less vast than the armed forces of the United States can serve a government whose interests are less global than our own.

Taking a good idea one step further, 12 state national guards have "adopted" these JCTP countries under the State Partnership Program, further encouraging the development of long-term institutional and personal relationships between military and civic leaders and allowing more Americans to become involved directly in helping countries transition to democracy.

Security Assistance is made up of a number of components to include Foreign Military Financing, Foreign Military Sales, Direct Commercial Sales and International Military Education and Training.

Foreign Military Financing enables selected friends and allies to improve their defense capabilities by financing acquisition of U.S. military articles, services and training. As FMF helps countries provide for their legitimate defense needs, it promotes U.S. national security interests by strengthening coalitions and cementing strong military-to-military relationships. FMF also supports our regional security cooperation with key allies such as Greece, Israel and Turkey by rectifying shortcomings in their defense capabilities. Except for funds earmarked for Israel, almost all FMF is spent in the United States -- this translates to U.S. jobs.

Direct Commercial Sales and Foreign Military Sales also promote interoperability with U.S. forces, while contributing to a strong U.S. defense industrial base. This industrial base constitutes part of DoD's mobilization base in the event the U.S. must respond quickly to a military conflict. For FY [fiscal year] 93, the most current year for which we have available figures, Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales in the USEUCOM AOR alone accounted for more than $8 billion. This translates to 320,000 U.S. jobs.

A premier component within the Security Assistance Program is the IMET program. IMET promotes military-to-military relations and exposes international military and civilian officials to U.S. values and democratic processes. In FY 94 we sent 876 international students to the U.S. from the European Command and paid for seven English language laboratories in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, all at a cost of only $11.6 million.

Twenty percent of all flag officers in Turkey are IMET trained. Eighty percent of the senior leadership in Portugal are IMET graduates. More than 500 senior civilian and military leaders throughout the USEUCOM AOR are IMET trained. Over the years this familiarity with U.S. doctrine and equipment leads to repeat equipment orders and favorable base rights negotiations. Several instances of immediate support during Desert Shield/Storm were directly attributed to relations fostered though IMET. Simply put, IMET is the centerpiece of Security Assistance.

Another program designed to train foreign leaders in democratic processes and ideals is the Marshall Center. In December the Marshall Center graduated its first class of 73 mid- to senior-level officers and civilians from 23 Central/Eastern European and former Soviet Union countries. The Marshall Center's mission is to assist these countries in the development of military institutions compatible with democratic processes and civilian control. The center offers courses, holds conferences and sponsors research on defense procedures and organizations appropriate to democratic states with free market economies. Special emphasis is placed on human rights' and civilian control of the military. This is a very cost-effective means of influencing the future generation of regional defense leaders.

While these unilateral activities are of long-term benefit to the U.S., they also provide the foundation needed to build the new security architecture of a reunited Europe. The Partnership for Peace program has been one of the most dramatic developments this past year.

Since January of 1994, 24 nations have signed the basic PfP agreement; 15 have submitted their list of proposed activities, called presentation documents; and 11 have already sent liaison officers to the NATO headquarters in Mons, Belgium, to work on the program. In fact, at the Partnership Coordination Cell in Mons, partner liaison officers are planning, training, developing common operational procedures and becoming friends.

One need only visit the Partnership Conference Center to capture the spirit of PfP. The building's foyer now contains the flags of 39 partner and NATO nations arranged in alphabetical order -- Albania to Uzbekistan -- not NATO on one side and partners on the other, but flags side by side. This is PfP, the New Europe and the New NATO.

You would have sensed the same spirit of partnership at the opening ceremony of the first PfP exercise near Poznan, Poland. There, more than 600 soldiers from 13 countries -- six NATO and seven partner states -- trained together. Organized in five international companies with national platoons, these soldiers practiced observation, patrolling and escorting tasks common to peacekeeping operations. They are the vanguards of partnership, opening a whole new chapter in the history of NATO and Europe. The tempo of similar and even more ambitious exercises will continue over the coming year.

While cooperation with our former adversaries is important, the cooperative reduction of the overall military arms inventory is key to building mutual trust and reducing the potential for future conflict. USEUCOM is actively involved in the arms control effort. Nowhere in the world does the level or spectrum of activity in the arms control arena match what is taking place in the USEUCOM theater of operations. Our daily efforts to comply with the protocols and confidence building measures of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, Conventional Forces Europe Treaty and Vienna Document 1994 set the highest example for the international community on how to responsibly comply with and participate in the post-Cold War European security process.

The Conventional Forces Europe Treaty represents the most comprehensive conventional arms control treaty since World War II. As the secretary of defense's executive agent responsible for ensuring the U.S. government's compliance with that treaty, I am proud to report that our forces completed their required equipment reductions and destruction, a full two years ahead of schedule.

In addition, their direct participation in Vienna Document 1994's confidence and security building measures, such as unit inspections, exercise observations, base visits and military equipment demonstrations, continues to help reduce military tensions and suspicions, improves upon a record of confidence and stability, and shapes the European security environment.

As USEUCOM looks toward future arms control agreements, I consider reducing strategic nuclear weapons and controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to be endeavors that are vital to U.S. and European security. I support the full implementation of both START I and START II, and the indefinite extension of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. These agreements not only reduce the stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction and the potential for accidents or incidents, but allow newly emerging democracies the opportunity to demonstrate cooperative intentions to the world community. I intend to remain fully engaged and supportive of several arms control initiatives that are on the horizon, including the Open Skies Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention. I will monitor these developments closely and their effect on my combat capabilities.

Turning south toward Africa, our resources and interests are more limited. USEUCOM's strategy provides a means for assisting African host nations in democratization and, when possible, relief of human suffering. The focus is on humanitarian national assistance activities of a nonlethal nature. Some of our key initiatives include senior officer visits, medical training exercises, training cruises, civil affairs training and IMET.

Nowhere in the AOR is IMET so important. In African militaries IMET is the most well-known and sought-after U.S. program. And from the U.S. perspective, IMET is our most cost-effective program in this part of the AOR. Through professional interaction between U.S. and host nation forces forward presence operations contribute to the promotion of democracy and a professional military ethic. These actions, if continued, should help reduce the likelihood for U.S. military response. Should contingency operations to protect U.S. interests become necessary, the exposure of U.S. forces to Africa will increase their effectiveness.

In crisis situations early intervention can avoid conflict. Forward-deployed forces are capable of responding quickly and effectively across an extensive spectrum of crises. Because respond to crisis covers such a broad area, from humanitarian operations, noncombatant evacuation operations and sanctions enforcement to the whole spectrum of peace support operations, it is the prime cause of USEUCOM's high operational and personnel tempo. Though crisis response often supports the objectives of promoting stability, it sometimes is intended to thwart aggression by threatening or using U.S. military power to protect our vital interests. It may also be structured as a prelude to our third strategy, fight to win.

In the case of humanitarian operations the objective is to relieve human suffering. Often USEUCOM forces are committed when significant loss of life threatens to happen so quickly that no other agency can respond in time. We primarily use our logistics capability to conduct these missions and use it to stave off great loss of life until other government agencies and non-governmental organizations can be mobilized.

Operation Support Hope demonstrated the key role forward presence plays in responding to a humanitarian crisis. Our primary goal, to stop the dying, was accomplished quickly and effectively. Our unique lift capability, logistics support and overseas bases helped make this operation a success. As the name of this mission implies, we supported other agencies by providing these unique capabilities. We ensured our mission statement was clear and concise, which prevented "mission creep" and provided an orderly and expeditious exit strategy. In short, we responded quickly, accomplished our mission, turned over our responsibilities as soon as other agencies were prepared to assume them and exited. There is no residual U.S. military footprint in the Rwanda area of operations.

NEOs, similar to the Rwanda NEO prior to Operation Support Hope, are a special kind of humanitarian mission because they are conducted in an unfriendly environment, possibly requiring the use of military force. Speed, planning, organization and a high degree of flexibility are all required to accomplish NEOs successfully. Although they can be very demanding, they are of short duration and do not tie up critical resources for a long time.

Unlike NEOs, peace operations do tie up critical resources for a long time. Often the desired political end state requires time and is opposed by actors deeply committed against it. Furthermore, it is hard to define a military objective that supports the desired political goal.

The peace operations in the former Yugoslavia, by which we aim to help achieve a negotiated peace settlement, are examples of military involvement in a conflict that requires a long-term political solution. While this solution will not occur overnight, our forces are containing the conflict, supporting sanctions imposed by United Nations resolutions and meeting humanitarian assistance needs on a daily basis. U.S. forces, in concert with NATO forces, have not only saved lives and relieved the suffering of thousands of people, but have been directly responsible for preventing this conflict from escalating. For example, in February and April of 1994, in response to a U.N. request and to relieve the senseless bombardment of Sarajevo and other safe areas, the North Atlantic Council declared exclusion zones to protect the people of that region.

Operation Provide Promise involves daytime airlift missions to Sarajevo and nighttime airdrops to exclusion zones over Bosnia-Herzegovina. As of Jan. 12, 1995, the U.S. had flown 4,131 sorties into Sarajevo (36 percent of the 11,321 total sorties) and delivered 50,920 metric tons of cargo. By that same date the U.S. had airdropped 17,480 MTONS of food and 200 MTONS of medicine to needy people in Bosnia. Provide Promise is a prime example of sharing risks, roles and responsibilities among our allies. U.S. aircraft and crews participate in the Sarajevo airlift with those of four other countries (Germany, Canada, France and the United Kingdom) and in humanitarian airdrops with two other countries (Germany and France).

In the Adriatic two U.S. surface ships are enforcing economic sanctions with 18 other allied surface ships from 13 countries in the NATO Operation Sharp Guard. U.S. participation in this operation changed from enforcing the U.N. embargo to enforcing sanctions as of Nov. 15, 1994. As of Jan. 12, 1995, the allied ships had challenged a total of 45,114 ships, actually stopping or boarding 3,479 of those.

Operation Deny Flight is another example of the concept of shared contributions for common security interests. NATO is executing this operation in support of the U.N. Security Council resolutions calling for the protection of airspace over Bosnia as well as U.N. forces on the ground. Our aircrews have flown close air support for embattled U.N. troops, saved thousands of lives in Sarajevo by enforcing the exclusion zone and shot down four Serb aircraft caught in the act of bombing a Bosnian village.

The many missions NATO has accomplished recently illustrate how the past 40 years of harmonizing and streamlining NATO tactical procedures paid off. The U.S. currently contributes 76 of the more than 167 NATO tactical aircraft involved in the no-fly-zone enforcement operation over Bosnia-Herzegovina. A total of 21,500 sorties have been flown as of Jan. 12, 1995.

We also have people involved in many other aspects of the humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts in the former Yugoslavia, including medical teams to support UNPROFOR personnel and approximately 500 personnel in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as part of Task Force Able Sentry. Of the peacekeeping troops in the former Yugoslavia, however, U.S. personnel make up only about 3 percent of the total.

Another long-term humanitarian relief effort is Operation Provide Comfort, which is operating under a U.N. mandate to assist the Kurds in northern Iraq. Since Combined Task Force Provide Comfort's contributions to the relief effort began in April 1991, large quantities of relief supplies have been delivered -- food, medical supplies, fuel and shelter materials. Coalition fighters have flown 31,210 sorties in support of Provide Comfort since October 1991.

We also supported operations in the CENTCOM AOR. On January 26, 1994, we deployed the four-ship Inchon Amphibious Ready Group into the CENTCOM AOR to support operations in Somalia. We again dispatched forces to aid the withdrawal of UNOSOM [U.N. Operation - Somalia] forces as the U.S. disengaged from Somalia. USEUCOM also took quick action by sending troops, again to the CENTCOM AOR, to reinforce Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and send Saddam Hussein, a clear message of U.S. commitment and resolve.

USEUCOM's experiences in current operations throughout this theater have taught us some important lessons for the future. Specifically, they have demonstrated that to obtain maximum leverage from combined military forces, deployable, trained and flexible headquarters are needed for contingency operations.

Under this approach NATO will train and organize a headquarters adaptable to a wide variety of possible situations and be capable of leading both NATO and non-NATO units. Such a headquarters would use the military capabilities of nations both in and out of NATO and would take full advantage of the more than 40 years of NATO training in controlling multinational operations. This is the combined/joint task force headquarters concept.

The CJTF headquarters could draw under its control groups from NATO's streamlined military structure as well as non-NATO units provided by the PfP partner countries. This concept holds great promise in the area of future crisis response. With these forces CJTF could exercise command and control over peacekeeping, humanitarian relief or other missions. In doing so it could serve either NATO or another security institution; because it could draw from so many nations, it would reduce U.S. commitments. This is the kind of leverage the U.S. and the alliance need for future challenges.

Maintaining a high state of readiness, EUCOM forces are prepared to fight to win, ultimately guaranteeing our vital national interests. The fact that we demonstrate the capability and the resolve to implement it is the key to our influence in every region in the AOR. Our efforts to promote democracy and stability peacefully are and should be the cornerstone of our strategy, because deterring a war is infinitely preferable to fighting one. But if deterrence fails, we must be prepared to fight to win.

USEUCOM's fight to win strategy includes maintaining ready forces, enhancing our interoperability with our friends and allies, maintaining adequate infrastructure and basing, and supporting modernization.

Maintaining ready forces is the foundation of the fight to win strategy. Given the diversity of this AOR and the high optempo it imposes, maintaining readiness requires intense involvement by CinCEUR [commander in chief, USEUCOM]. I must stay involved by designating the kinds of missions EUCOM forces must be ready to accomplish, making sure that units meet the necessary standards in order to be certified as ready and maintaining oversight of the training process to keep our training resources focused on the proficiencies we need. Only with this kind of clarity and precision have we succeeded in maintaining both our readiness and our optempo.

Part of doing this right is taking care of our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines. Providing an acceptable quality of life for our service members and their families is not only a long-term investment in readiness, but our obligation. Our troops expect nothing more -- we must demand nothing less: Maintaining an acceptable quality of life for our troops is my No. 1 priority.

Treating our service members as they deserve and maintaining a high standard of training is not enough. An adequate force structure must be in place for us to be effective.

USEUCOM's end strength of approximately 100,000 troops provides the force levels needed for crisis response in or near the USEUCOM AOR, meets our alliance commitments and maintains the infrastructure necessary to reinforce our forces or provide throughput to neighboring regions. U.S. Army, Europe, is structured around a two-division corps. Each division is rounded out by a brigade dual-based in the U.S. This corps is the smallest operational level at which we fight and deploy our Army. U.S. Air Forces Europe provides 2.33 wings of fighter aircraft and a limited number of support aircraft to accomplish a wide range of tasks throughout this theater. U.S. Navy, Europe, and Marine Forces, Europe, force structure includes only the shore forces that support the carrier battle group, the Mediterranean amphibious ready group/Marine expeditionary unit; and conducts maritime surveillance operations. In addition, the Special Operations Command, Europe, provides unique war-fighting and crisis-response capabilities necessary to fulfill our theater requirements.

Our infrastructure and basing give us access to this and nearby regions as well as vital supply lines to maintain and reinforce our forces. This infrastructure is critical to U.S. influence abroad.

Modernization is essential to maintaining our war-fighting capabilities. Our forces need the technological edge to ensure greater effectiveness and reduce casualties in the event of war. More importantly, our advantage in technology effectively deters would-be aggressors -- avoiding the need to fight to win.

Our strategy of active engagement and preparedness is designed to ensure our national interests well into the next century. Today's complex security environment demands that we synchronize our efforts with the many U.S. agencies outside DoD who are engaged in Europe, the former Soviet Union and Africa. We must be able to plan and work together toward a common set of objectives.

To achieve that end we have developed a comprehensive and integrated architecture that we call the Theater Security Planning System. The purpose of this system is to synchronize the planning and execution of the theater strategy by interfacing EUCOM and component efforts with embassy country teams in the production of executable campaign plans. These plans establish goals, determine priorities and effectively allocate resources. We believe that TSPS ensures we have One Team. One Voice. One Fight.

The most visionary strategies and wisest objectives are of no use without the means to implement them. Our success over the past year is directly attributable to congressional support for our many programs.

O&M [operations and maintenance] dollars maintain readiness, train and exercise our forces, and maintain our busy pace of operations. Unfunded contingency operations and theater transition costs drain those dollars and negatively affect training, readiness and perstempo. We appreciate the supplemental contingency funding that we received this past year. But timing is critical, and if funding arrives late, even if it is generous, we must cancel exercises, defer equipment and facility maintenance, delay or cancel contracts or even pay for a contract we cannot afford to terminate. All of these factors adversely impact our combat readiness.

Burden-sharing legislation, as we have seen it formulated in recent years, can also result in a reduction in readiness. Cuts made in the name of burden sharing are made with hopes of forcing our allies to pick up the difference. We should remember that "the difference" must be voted by European parliaments and that the people and their representatives sincerely believe that they are both shouldering a fair share of the burdens and risks in this theater's daily operations and contributing to overall security in important and expensive other ways as well.

For example, Germany, our largest host nation, spends 2 1/2 times Japan's percentage of GDP [gross domestic product] on national defense. In addition, Germany contributed four times more than the U.S. to aid economic reform in the former Soviet Union, which also benefits our interests. This is even more impressive considering the high cost of Germany's reunification. And in Bosnia it is our allies' soldiers, 17,000 of them, who are on the ground within the range of Serb guns. I urge the Congress to consider all the risks and burdens shared by our allies, along with the impact to our troops, before considering future burden-sharing legislation.

O&M funds promote stability through several activities, such as our Joint Contact Team Program, bilateral training exercises, Security Assistance, the Marshall Center and the Partnership for Peace program. These important programs need funding to work. Our Joint Contact Team program and Security Assistance programs, under legislative jurisdiction of the State Department, need special consideration since their funding mechanism is outside DoD's control.

The Partnership for Peace program is vitally important because it provides the vision and the mechanism for the future trans-Atlantic security environment. This program is the catalyst that links the individual security interests of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union countries to the highly successful process of collective security embodied in NATO. PfP is the first step toward a reunited Europe that includes Russia.

Funding the services to improve mobility is a high priority. Mobility is vital to supporting our crisis response and war-fighting strategies. It is even more significant considering the drawdown in Europe. Strategic lift, combined with pre-positioned materiel, is critical to fighting or supporting any major regional conflict in or near the USEUCOM AOR. The C-17, our aging C-141s, C-5s and C-130s, and commercial aircraft provide airlift for initial reaction forces, and follow-on reinforcement and logistics. I strongly support the C-17, key to delivering critically important outsized equipment directly to the battle front. Likewise, we must improve our strategic sealift capability to provide heavy reinforcement and sustain theater logistics. We also require sufficient amphibious lift to support a forced entry capability and a medium-lift replacement helicopter for the Marines and special operations forces.

Funding for modernization of key weapon systems ensures we can achieve our strategic objectives. In USEUCOM we face a challenging theater missile threat, particularly in the southern region. At present our theater missile defense systems are limited in protection capability and force deployability. Just over the horizon are several new systems in final stages of development that address the theater missile defense threat. We need to pursue the development of these systems today, to make them operational in the near future.

We need to modernize critical war-fighting capabilities through continued acquisition of precision standoff munitions, strategic precision bombing capabilities and JSTARS [Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System]. These systems provide a credible deterrence with proven pinpoint accuracy and critical war-fighting capabilities.

Another aspect to maintaining our joint war-fighting capabilities is to support the Joint Professional Military Education Program for our senior leaders. USEUCOM requires joint-trained professionals to integrate and employ the unique capabilities of our service component commands effectively. Joint professional military education is one of the foundations of our joint operations capabilities. It underwrites both our ability to respond to crises in the near term and our development of long-term strategies in this AOR. Investing in this education will help build the future military leadership of this country as envisioned in the Goldwater-Nichols [DoD Reorganization] Act of 1986.

Specialized support capabilities must be funded in this theater to be effective. Of particular importance to USEUCOM are satellite and land communication systems that enhance command and control and funding for tactical reconnaissance programs that support our intelligence needs.

My highest intelligence priority is the Joint Analysis Center at RAF [Royal Air Force Base] Molesworth and its associated systems and communications. The JAC is the model for intelligence support to joint and combined operations, and its products meet national, theater, service component and tactical requirements. The JAC supports every level of our theater's strategy, from arms control verification to humanitarian operations to traditional war-fighting capabilities. Its success in meeting the intelligence needs of U.S. forces, NATO and our coalition intelligence at the United Nations proves that consolidated intelligence at the joint theater level is a concept compatible with today's intelligence challenges and resource constraints.

USEUCOM basing and infrastructure are essential to maintain our forward presence, give us access and support to this and nearby regions, and underwrite our commitments to our friends and allies. Our command structure and infrastructure have been streamlined and consolidated to better accomplish our strategy with fewer resources.

For example, our Air Force component restructured its headquarters and went from a staff of more than 2,000 to 837 (58 percent) and reduced the number of general officers by 64 percent. Our Army component also restructured and trimmed 42 percent of their staff. Finally, USEUCOM consolidated many of the theater functions that were redundant at the component level, such as theater intelligence, which reduced billets from 20,500 to less than 7,600 -- a 63 percent reduction.

Our drawdown of facilities is near completion and will leave USEUCOM at 59 percent of our Cold War infrastructure levels. The facilities we retain allow future consolidation and flexibility. Any facility not supporting our end state is being returned to the host nation. We must, however, maintain our remaining infrastructure and provide essential construction projects to meet readiness and quality of life requirements. Military construction is one of the key factors in maintaining an acceptable quality of life for our people. Above all else, we must maintain our commitment to our people by investing in the infrastructure necessary to meet their needs.

I place a high priority on fully funding one of the most successful arrangements in the alliance -- the NATO Infrastructure Program. About 28 cents of U.S. investment buys access to one dollar worth of infrastructure through this revitalized program. But even more impressive is the return we received on this investment. Over the last five years we have invested $1 billion in NATO infrastructure. U.S. industries have received more than $1.7 billion in high-tech contracts and more than $100 million in construction contracts within the continental United States through the NATO Infrastructure Program. Cuts to this program undermine our leadership in the alliance and adversely affect U.S. and alliance operational capabilities.

A permanent force structure of approximately 100,000 fulfills our commitments to the National Command Authority. The key to reducing our perstempo to sustainable levels is the rotational forces that serve in varying capacities, such as some of the Operation Deny Flight squadrons, the carrier battle group and the Mediterranean amphibious ready group/Marine expeditionary unit. Also critical to our success are the reserves, who perform highly specialized and critical functions throughout this theater, such as language experts to augment our Joint Contact Team Program and water purification specialists.

Achieving a high quality of life for the troops and their families is my No. 1 priority. People are our most valuable resource and constitute the backbone of our quality force. We must never break faith with our troops whose dedication and devotion are second to none. We have an obligation to maintain an acceptable quality of life for their families. Our troops have endured many hardships while performing diverse missions at an extremely high operations tempo. All of this was accomplished in the midst of the largest drawdown since World War II. In the end it will be the dedication and professionalism of those who serve our country that will underwrite our commitment to national security. Our loyalty to our people will lay the foundation of their commitment.

Our active involvement in the USEUCOM AOR offers the very real possibility of preventing the need to engage in more costly operations -- in terms of lives and resources. We must remain engaged as NATO's leader and continue to help shape events to fit our national purpose. With U.S. leadership and commitment we can help guide this region of the world towards peace and prosperity. ...


Published for internal information use by the American Forces Information Service, a field activity of the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Washington, D.C. Parenthetical entries are speaker/author notes; bracketed entries are editorial notes. This material is in the public domain and may be reprinted without permission. Defense Issues is available on the Internet via the World Wide Web at