Wednesday, June 28, 1995 - 3:30 p.m.
(Also participating in this briefing were Captain Mike Doubleday, DATSD(PA); LtCol Don Blackwelder, Lead Coordinator for UAV and Decoy ACTDs; Dr. Louis Marquet, ADUSD for Advanced Development; Mr. Bruce Deal, ADUSD for Concept Development; Mr. Troy Crites, Lead Coordinator for the Air Base/Port Biological ACTD; and Mr. Larry Lynn, Director of the Advanced Research Project Agency)
Captain Doubleday: Good afternoon. Thank you all for coming.
I want to introduce Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Paul G. Kaminski. Dr. Kaminski is here today to make a personnel announcement and also to discuss some aspects of the Department's Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations Program.
With that, Dr. Kaminski, I'll turn it over to you.
Dr. Kaminski: Thank you very much, Mike.
Good afternoon. I want to take some time today to describe our Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration Program. This complex set of words is responsible I think, perhaps, for us not getting our full message across on this program, and that was one of my objectives today.
Let me start off, though, by introducing the team of people who have made the key contribution to this program over the past couple of years. Let me start off by introducing Dr. Anita Jones, Director of Defense Research and Engineering; Larry Lynn, who is the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Advanced Technology, and also now is acting Director of ARPA, and that's one I want to come back to a little bit later. Major General Ken Israel who is the Director of our Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office. Next, I want to introduce five Assistant Deputy Under Secretaries of Defense. These are Assistants to Larry Lynn. First, Tom Purdue with responsibility for Ballistic Missile Defense; next, Lou Marquet, with responsibility for Advanced Development; next, Bruce Deal, responsibility for Concept Development; Graham Law for Technology System Integration; and Pete Hoag, for Cruise Missile Defense. Finally, let me introduce Captain Benjamin Riley. Ben is the Military Deputy to Larry Lynn. He's hiding in the back. Mr. Troy Kreitz, our Lead Coordinator for our Air Base and Port Biological Defense ACTD, and Lieutenant Colonel Don Blackwelder, our Lead Coordinator for UAV and Decoy-related Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations.
My first main announcement here is that effective immediately, Larry Lynn is appointed director of the Advanced Research Project Agency. I congratulate Larry with the removal of the "Acting" piece of that title.
Larry has served for the past two years in this Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Advanced Technology position. Prior to that time, Larry spent eight years as a co-founder, vice president, and chief operating officer of Atlantic Aerospace Corporation.
In the early '80s, Larry was the deputy director of ARPA for four years, having come in to service there after two years of service in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In the preceding 26 years, he was at the MIT Lincoln Laboratory in Massachusetts.
In addition to Larry's broad experience in defense R&D, he served as a member of the Defense Science Board and the Army Science Board. Larry played, I think, really the critical pivotal role in establishing this whole approach of advanced concept technology demonstrations. I can really credit this fundamental idea to Larry and to the team of people with Larry in terms of implementation.
In addition to his new role as the Director of ARPA, I've asked Larry to retain his current position and his responsibility for the ACTD program through the planning cycle for our FY96 ACTD starts.
Since Larry has some additional responsibilities, I've asked Tom Purdue to become the principal assistant to Larry Lynn as he conducts this role helping to lead the outstanding team in our Advanced Technology Office.
I intend to continue to increase the Department's emphasis on ACTD's. I believe it is a critical initiative to improve our response time, our cycle time, to support our operational warfighter needs, and to decrease the time and cost to get new capabilities fielded.
ARPA has made many key contributions to the ACTD initiatives, and I expect with Larry as the director it will continue to do so in the future. However, the management of our ACTD program will continue to be an OSD function. After we get through this critical ACTD planning phase, I do expect to appoint a replacement in the Deputy Under Secretary for Advanced Technology position, who will then begin to work with our operational users in determining the next cycle of ACTDs and who will continue to expand this initiative in the future.
Let me turn now to describe our program of ACTDs, with some help.
The ACTD program and process is one of the fundamental core elements in improving our acquisition system. There are three characteristics here which are the hallmark of the program. The first is that there is usually joint service involvement in an ACTD. Second, ACTDs allow our warfighters to perform a very early operational assessment of a system concept before we've invested a lot of money in the concept. And third, there is usually some residual operational capability left in the field at the completion of an ACTD, even if we haven't decided to put the program into a full development phase. Prototyping and early user involvement in product assessment and tactics development are key to reducing our development time and providing quick initial operational capabilities.
As opposed to the more traditional approach under which our material developer first produces an item and then hands it off serially to the user after development, ACTDs are taking full advantage of the integrated product and process development approach that I described a few weeks ago -- currently used in the Department -- and also used by commercial industry to ensure shorter cycle times, lower cost, and more rapid delivery to the customer.
The intent is for ACTDs to marry technology and the related employment doctrine. This marriage, I think, is one thing that we have not given adequate attention to in the Department in the past. We have traditionally underestimated the importance of developing the appropriate doctrine and the tactics for the employment of technology along with the related training of the people who will use the system.
As I look back to my own personal experience in the F-117 program, I note that as advanced and as significant as that technology was, I think that one of the major contributions made in that program was to very carefully understand the limitations as well as the strength of the technology, to develop the mission planning tools and the training to support its use, so that we could employ the system in a way that the limitations that were there were not apparent in its application. That is, we knew these limitations, we had the planning tools to work around them, and one couldn't see the limitations as the system was employed because we understood them.
Our leverage here was obtained by people, by warfighters, doing things that certainly were not standard from a historical, tactical, and doctrinal standpoint. That's the same issue we're facing with our ACTDs. The real issue here, I think, as we look ahead, is how can we do more with less, where the measure is not simply in developing the best technology or even building the best equipment, but getting this combination of equipment and people in the field to use it wisely. ACTDs are a key part of the Department's plan to get this job done.
If I may have the first slide.
The Department currently has ten ongoing ACTDs and 12 FY96 new starts shown on this chart. Just to give you some feel for the base here, in FY96, if we add up the ongoing programs plus the new starts, including both OSD and service funds, this is roughly a $1 billion program in '96. The total '96 investment will be slightly more than what we've invested in the program all the way through FY95 thus far. So you can see that this program is building and growing on a base.
Today we will have four of our lead coordinators present you with an overview of the two ongoing and the four new start ACTDs. Those are shown in blue lettering on this chart.
Let me start that process right now by turning over the podium to our first lead coordinator, Lieutenant Colonel Don Blackwelder. Don?
Lieutenant Colonel Blackwelder: Good afternoon.
The first ACTD I'll introduce is a High Altitude Endurance UAV. The objective of this ACTD is to demonstrate and produce and evaluate the military utility of a design-to-cost system with long endurance, all-weather, wide-area coverage capability.
The objective is to have it tasked by the warfighter and provide that information directly back to him with the only fixed requirement being a $10 million unit fly-away price. Some of the lessons we learned in DESERT STORM were that the commanders needed better, wide-area, all-weather coverage that was very responsive to his needs. The current systems today are limited in numbers, payload capability, endurance, and aren't as responsive as the commanders would desire.
Another thing we've learned from passive elements in UAVs, we've had difficulty converging on an affordable design. We're finding out in today's environment with the spreading of very sophisticated air defense systems, we put our pilots at a lot of risk and end up chancing losing those pilots, or having a POW situation.
In this concept scene, the tasking would come directly from the theater commander to the ground control element. They would do the mission planning and control the aircraft while it's airborne, via line-of-sight or SatCom datalinks. He would also have the capability to do real time in-flight retasking so as the priority changes, they can retask the aircraft and the sensors on board to look at different targets. The imagery would flow back through the datalink, back to the ground control station, and then back out to the users and the analysis centers as determined by the theater commander.
The United States Atlantic Command is the lead user. It's representing the warfighting community. The Advanced Research Projects Agency is leading the development of the effort. The Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office rounds out the team in making sure this all fits into a joint architecture. ARPA leads the Joint Program Office, and there are deputy program managers and project officers from each of the services. The team together is taking full advantage of the acquisition streamlining initiative and ARPA's other agreement authority to get this done quickly, cheaply, and basically at the most bang for the buck.
In this ACTD, we're going to be building two -- back to building, testing, and evaluating, two -- very different air vehicles. The first to fly will be the low observable DARK STAR that the Boeing/Lockheed team rolled out earlier this month. It's scheduled to fly this October.
The conventional UAV -- the contract -- was competitively awarded this month to Teledyne/Ryan. It will be more of a workhorse for the wide area coverage. It will be a moderately survivable system with threat warning and electronic countermeasures that will have much greater range, payload, and endurance capabilities, giving it the ability to cover 40,000 square nautical miles a day with one system. It will have the endurance to fly about 40 hours, so you can trade off that endurance for range and time over target. The objective was to produce a system that would have 3,000 nautical mile range, be able to stay there for 24 hours, and come back home again, and data link that imagery back to the warfighter so he can have it immediately.
The roll-out for the conventional is scheduled for October '96, with the first flights starting in early '97.
Together, the two vehicles form a very -- have the potential to be a very responsive and capable team that will address those urgent needs for the warfighters.
My other ACTD that I'm going to briefly introduce is a miniature air-launched decoy. Our objective here is to demonstrate the military utility of a light- weight, low-cost expendable decoy that will act and look like an attacking aircraft.
The decoys have a good reputation as a result of operations like Bakka Valley and DESERT STORM. In Bakka Valley, the decoys were used to simulate Syrian air defense systems. Anti-radiation missiles honed in on those radars, destroyed the radars, and then attacked aircraft to destroy the missiles and launchers at very reduced risk. In DESERT STORM, we also used decoys to confuse and saturate the Iraqi air defense system.
In this scene, the decoys are being used to stimulate the defense systems on the ground, increasing the effectiveness of the attacking aircraft so they can proceed on with their mission.
You can also use them as a deception tool. You can launch them into an area to fake an attack, to draw airborne air defenses away so your main attack can get in and be much more effective. One of the things we want to explore in this ACTD is their use in an air-to-air role, where you can take an aircraft. Because they're light weight you can load up to ten or so on an airplane and saturate the defenses, or giving up maybe just one weapon station, you can provide each airplane out there with a standby expendable wing man in case he gets into an air-to-air fight. That's one of the things we're going to explore as an option.
ARPA is the lead development agency on this ACTD also, and we're building upon their work in small turbine engines. We're going to use an engine that weighs about seven pounds, has a four inch diameter turbine, and produces 50 pounds of thrust. The avionics are going to come from the brilliant anti-tank submunition, and there's a host of packages, emitter packages out there, to simulate attacking aircraft that both the services and industry have developed.
The integrated user/developer team, in this case ACC is the user representative. We're going to be producing 25 to 30 missiles, about half of those used in the demonstration, and the other half will be set aside for residual capabilities in either real world contingencies or future demonstrations at the end of it. This ACTD is scheduled to actually start in late '96, after they finish up some of the small engine work that's ongoing now with the first flights and demonstrations to be in early '98.
This concludes the two ACTDs I was going to present. Now Dr. Marquet will present the Joint Countermine and Counterproliferation.
Dr. Kaminski: The ACC here is our Air Combat Command...
Dr. Marquet: The first ACTD I'd like to discuss is in fact one of '95 starts, so it is underway already. It's called Joint Countermine Operations ACTD. It is a combined ACTD in the true joint sense of the word with Navy, Marine Corps, and Army participants.
Now mines represent an extremely serious threat to the ability of our forces to carry out operations that we may be called upon to do. They are, in effect, the poor man's great equalizer. We've had some very unpleasant experiences with mines in the past. The threat is here and now. It is crucial for us to address this threat as rapidly as we possibly can. Hence, one of the major motivations in bring this program into the ACTD world.
Our experience, for example, in the Gulf War where we had an amphibious operation available to us. One of the major reasons why that operation was not carried out was, in fact, our uncertainty about the situation with respect to mines off the coast of Kuwait. Therefore, the uncertainty as to whether or not we were going to be successful with the kinds of casualties that we would encounter, and so on.
The obvious way to address mine warfare is to avoid the mines in the first place. So the emphasis, in fact, on this ACTD, is in the detection area. Of course you can't be positive you're going to detect all of the mines, and therefore, avoid them to a complete extent. It is also necessary to be prepared to clear them if you do impact and counter them.
There are a large number of programs that have been started by both the Navy on the one hand for the deep water; the Marine Corps for the shallow zone and the surf zone; and the Army for the land warfare. A large number of programs, both existing capabilities as well as future capabilities. But what has been lacking up until now is an integrated approach for putting all these programs together into a common command/control structure, and carrying out operations to evaluate, as I say, an integrated expeditionary force. So that's the basic purpose of this ACTD, to weld all of those various pieces together into an efficient and effective integrated operation.
It's being carried out, as I said, by the army, the folks at SEACOM down at Fort Belvoir; the Navy ONR; as well as the Marines at Quantico, the Marine Corps Combat Development System.
Our primary sponsor, our warfighting sponsor, is the United States Atlantic Command in Norfolk, Virginia. What we plan to do in several exercises in FY97 and FY98 is integrate this ACTD into actual training exercises off the coast of Camp LeJeune, North Carolina, and the forces that will be provided by USA Command will be responsible for evaluating the efficacy of the various approaches.
The residual capability here... Primarily, of course, there will be various bits and gizmos and various techniques that are developed peace power wise, but we believe the most effective and most enduring residual capability with us will be the integration into the CCC network that allows this operation to be carried out in a seamless fashion.
Let me go on now to the next ACTD which is a '96 start. This one is in the area of counterproliferation. I want to emphasize that counterproliferation, of course, deals with the issue of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of potential adversaries, and the Department is very concerned, obviously, about this problem. It has been a major initiative in this area.
Our ACTD really is a small microcosm within the very broad area of counterproliferation. It's important to understand that we're not going to solve the entire problem. We've carved out a small piece of this, and in particular, the piece of the problem which addresses attacking a facility, primarily a hardened facility, which may well harbor materials of weapons of mass destruction. That is to say nuclear materials, biological warheads or production facilities, or chemical facilities.
Again, we've had some experience from our Gulf War era which has emphasized the need to develop specialized tools and sensors and weapons to be able to put such facilities at risk, and at the same time -- and this is what's really unique about this particular initiative -- at the same time, being cognizant of the implications in terms of collateral damage. If we release these pathogens or agents into the atmosphere, for example, we need to understand how much of them are going to get released, be able to predict with some confidence what exactly is going to happen as a consequence of this attack.
So our approach, again, here is to integrated a variety of sensors, in fact sensors from both space, intelligence-type sensors, airborne sensors, sensors that could be implanted on the ground to monitor the facility prior to the attack, and also to monitor the affects after the attack. This is an area, again, of significant deficiency, is our ability to carry out what's called bomb damage assessment, BDA, after an attack -- exactly what have we done. Have we destroyed the facility? Have we released the pathogens? What have you. So we need to tailor sensors to be able to improve our ability to carry out such an assessment.
Finally, there will be also tailoring of the weapons themselves. This is where the folks at Eglin Air Force Base are developing specialized weapons that will allow us, we believe, to attack these facilities with, again, an eye to minimizing the collateral effects.
The primary user sponsor for this is the United States European Command, EUCOM, and the developers include, first they're led by DNA, the Defense Nuclear Agency which is drawing upon its experience in understanding hardening facilities from the standpoint of designing our own hardened facilities historically, as well as from the standpoint of weapons effects upon facilities. They are helped in this area by, as I mentioned before, the Air Force, especially at Eglin Air Force Base, and also at ARPA and parts of the DOE laboratories from a sensor standpoint.
So the residuals in this particular case will actually be a suite of sensors that could be taken out and used if necessary in a real kind of engagement. They'll be available for continued experimentation, along with some specialized weapons that again, were designed to put these hard targets at risk.
Q: Is that what the UGT...
Dr. Kaminski: UGT stands for Unmanned Ground Sensors, not underground tests.
Q: Right there, around the black area?
Dr. Kaminski: UGS. Unmanned Ground Sensors. Those that could be implanted either by hand, by Special Operations Forces, perhaps dropped in by aircraft, perhaps even shot in in some fashion or the other. The idea that these sensors would survive upon impact; they would be sufficiently covert so that they couldn't be collected within a few minutes after their implantation; and they would monitor various aspects -- perhaps, for example, seismic disturbances to allow us to characterize a facility prior to the attack, help us plan that attack, and then finally help us to do post-attack assessment. We're not talking about the underground tests.
At this point I'd like to introduce Mr. Bruce Deal who is going to be telling you about the combat identification ACTD.
Mr. Deal: As Lou mentioned, I'm going to be talking about the combat ID ACTD. The objective of this ACTD is to demonstrate enhanced air-to-ground and ground-to-ground operations that can be made possible through the deployment of reliable identification technologies. We're focusing in this ACTD in air-to-ground and ground-to-ground operations, predominantly because that's been shown in our DESERT STORM experience, as well as experiences at National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California, that this is the major source of friendly fire incidents.
By providing this capability -- both air-to-ground and ground-to-ground -- to the ground combat forces, the fixed and rotary wing assets, and also integrating in the forward air controllers and their close air support, we expect to accomplish two things. We're looking to not only reduce the incidences of friendly fire, but what we want to do is to increase the opportunities for our forces to engage hostile targets at the maximum effective range of their weapons.
The sets of equipment that we're going to be deploying are going to be evaluated by the Army, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force at National Training Center as part of the Army's Task Force 21 Exercise in February of '97. They're also going to be evaluated by the All-Service Combat Identification Evaluation Team which is headquartered in Eglin Air Force Base.
We're looking at multiple technologies inside this ACTD. The dominant ground-to-ground identification methodology is the Army's 38ghz Q&A system, the Battlefield Combat Identification System. For air-to-ground we're looking at creating pods with this technology, and also looking at GPS reporting schemes that utilize a variety of our radio links and also integrated with a digital battlefield for situation awareness combat ID.
For fixed wing-to-ground we're doing everything we're talking about for helicopter-to-ground, but also including some aspects of advanced electronic support measure techniques to identify targets.
Putting all those together will provide us not only ability to reduce friendly fire, but also allow us to more accurately sort out friend from foe and increase combat effectiveness.
With that, I'd like to introduce Troy Crites who is going to talk about a bio-defense ACTD.
Mr. Crites: I'm also going to review a '96 start for an ACTD. It's called the Air Base Port Biological Detection ACTD. The objectives of this ACTD are really three-fold.
First off, it goes to improve our detection capability and our protection capability against biological threats against theater strategic assets.
Besides that first critical issue, the other two that it's going to be working on is to develop the doctrine and procedures to know how to deal with biological threats if such an event occurs. That kind of an issue is critical in knowing when to put on masks, when not to put on masks, when to try to take a mask off, especially if one is working at an air base where there is significant possibilities for aerosolization.
The third is to take a look at getting an early user assessment of the developing products that we have in a much larger R&D line on biological defense. There is a significant effort in the Department. We're bringing along new capabilities and new C4I systems in that area. This ACTD is intended to integrate the user with the equipment as early as possible so that we can have a better set of equipment results with the far term equipment when they come on line.
Participants in the ACTD, which is led by the Bio Defense Joint Project Office under the leadership of Brigadier General Busby. The user for the ACTD is yet to be determined. There is a significant user interest, both PACOM and CENTCOM. We have yet to formalize the final documentation on the actual user participation for the ACTD. However, all the development laboratories who are participating and the test organizations are all lined up, and it does include participation from the Air Force, Navy, and Army.
What does the ACTD consist of? First off, it's a set of netted sensors put at a CINC-defined air base or port facility. Ten to 12 facilities, completely automated sensors hooked into a C4I system which will rapidly detect any onset of a biological threat. That is to greatly decrease the amount of time required to do that. That system is automated. It would then provide a warning. People can put on all-nasal masks. These are also provided by the ACTD, and for key personnel to be able to get into hasty shelters potentially airtight shelters to allow them to remain operationally effective but protected.
There is a semi-automated identification activity associated with this. This is not completely automated at this time, but what we'll do is within 15 minutes from a warning, be able to identify what the bio-weapon is. That is critical for being able to treat the people and to know exactly what to do, and the medical countermeasures will be included in the ACTD. To know what to do about being able to de-mask or come out from a warning situation, assure that it truly is a biological threat of danger, and provide the ability to take care of the people.
The ACTD starts in '96. It completes within three years. We hope to significantly improve our capabilities to deal with biological threats.
I'll turn it back over to Dr. Kaminski.
Dr. Kaminski: The recurring theme here that you see in the ACTDs is development of a concept. In many cases the technologies may be developed. What we're doing is applying these in a warfighting concept. In almost all cases there's a useful residual capability. That is, if a prototype is developed, one system might be useful in some contingency operations.
There are really three outcomes that can happen at the end of an ACTD. Outcome one is that the user really likes it and we need to proceed with a full scale development program for large scale use, in which case we jump start our acquisition system and be able to pick up something closer to a milestone two with a milestone zero start. This will be able to field the system in numbers more quickly.
The second outcome that can happen is that there isn't any user interest; that the concept is flawed in some way or incomplete. Therefore, we won't go further with that particular approach. What we've done in that process is understood what the deficiencies are so we don't repeat that mistake. We've done that with a very small investment.
The third outcome, and it's one we'll probably see most often in the process, is that the concept isn't quite right yet for large scale development, but the user would like to keep what's been developed because it's the best thing that he or she has. Now what we might like to do is in a systematic way correct the deficiencies before we produce something in larger numbers.
Let me offer to take any questions. Larry, would you come up and join me?
I also want to afford you, Larry, to say anything you'd like to at this point.
Mr. Lynn: I'd like to make a couple of remarks, at least.
I've spent roughly 25 years or more dealing with ARPA in various ways over the years, and have a tremendous respect for the organization and what it's been able to do. It is, of course, a very small fleet of foot organization trying to deal with some of the most advanced technology that's applicable to the Defense Department. I've been privileged to be a part of ARPA in the past, and am truly honored to have this opportunity to lead the organization through the coming times when I think it has important things to do as the world shifts. So I am really pleased and honored to do that.
The second best job in town is the one that I'm leaving, although as Dr. Kaminski described, I'm leaving slowly. But in time, I will. I believe that the ACTD process is one that is also critically important to the future of the Defense Department.
There are two things that soften my departure, at least in my own head. One, ARPA has been a very active participant, probably the most active participant in the ACTD process. Secondly, I leave behind a very strong team of people, some of whom you've heard from today -- not all of them. But they're very strong and I think will continue to carry the ACTDs to their right conclusions.
Dr. Kaminski: This team of people is a very unique team of people. They have combined a set of skills of being comfortable with a technologist in terms of being able to make realistic assessments of what's out there, and they're also able to work with our warfighters, the users, to try to understand their needs, and to do the job of bringing together technology to meet the needs. That's really what we're looking for in this team of people, and they've been very effective, I believe, in doing that.
Our emphasis on this program in the future is going up, not down. It's taken a couple of years to get this foundation in place through Larry's leadership, and we're going to continue to build on that in a very significant way. Larry will be a very key contributor in his position at ARPA as well.
Any other questions?
Q: Are these mostly internal programs using computers to develop concepts? Are you working with a lot of contractors?
Dr. Kaminski: The latter. We're working heavily with contractors.
Q: Do you have a figure on how much all these projects will cost to demonstrate? Each of these you've described to us?
Dr. Kaminski: Individual project?
Q: Yeah. All of them together.
Dr. Kaminski: I don't have with me...
Mr. Lynn: I can give you some sense of it. The first year of the ACTDs did some of the cream skimming. It's going to taper down in terms of the amount that you can do, but the first nine that Dr. Kaminski listed on the chart amounted in the aggregate to about $3 billion over the total FYDP.
Q: Up to the point where they're demonstrated...
Mr. Lynn: They're completely demonstrated. They've left the residual capability in the field. They've operated in the field for a two year period so that the users can adjust their con ops and can make a true evaluation of them.
Dr. Kaminski: Larry said it was important, being able to fund, leaving this capability and using it in the field for a couple of years. No matter how smart we think we are in developing things, users always find out some better ways to use things, and it's very important to allow that period of time to go by to see how it can be applied, how it can be stretched, or alternatively, what the deficiencies are.
Q: How do you see the growth of the program? Twelve in FY96. How many in '97?
Dr. Kaminski: I see growth here in an evolutionary way. This isn't the sort of thing you double. This is something that will be measured in a modest percentage growth.
Where the growth really happens here is where one of the program is picked up and adopted in a major way and we start now to produce in quantities. That's where you'll see the exponential growth.
Q: Some of these ACTDs are composed of several different programs. How do you protect against the internal budget shifts that may occur in a service, for instance. They may decide to cancel one particular element of an ACTD. Is there some kind of angel watching over those particular programs...
Dr. Kaminski: A lot of hard work. Larry, you do this day in and day out.
Mr. Lynn: The answer is there are no angels. There is, for each one of these, a management plan. There's a plan which is not a detailed execution plan, but which amounts to 25 pages or less, which outlines what's going to be done, what the resources are, who's obligated to provide them. It takes six months to get a plan signed because there are so many signatures, and it tries to get agreement from senior level of every organization which is contributing resources -- whether the resources be a platoon of soldiers or a million dollars. So it is signed off ultimately at the CINC or commander level of the forces, and up to the SAE level, the Acquisition Executive level in the services.
It's a commitment. Of course there is no such thing as an irrevocable commitment, but to the extent you can, it is an agreement by all the players.
Q: On a separate topic, what is your schedule for releasing the second part of the bomber industrial base study?
Dr. Kaminski: We're very close to releasing that. It was due July 1st. We'll come very close to making that date.
Q: Are you going to come back and brief, or are you just going to release that?
Dr. Kaminski: We'll probably just release it. If there's a lot of interest, we can schedule a session to talk about it.
Q: I'd like to ask a question on the high altitude endurance UAV. How does that affect ACC, this is a good example. The Senate Intelligence Committee has suggested zeroing tier-two plus. What does it do to an ACTD like that if you get the funding changed.
Mr. Lynn: That's an easy one to answer. If it is zeroed, it goes away. (Laughter)
Mr. Lynn: Well, the minus is there. You're also well aware that there's an entire spectrum across the committees that have spoken so far, ranging from minus 110 or 117 to plus 60, and a variation in between. But obviously, you would terminate that program if you zero the budget. We haven't found any philanthropic industries yet. (Laughter)
Q: Reports keep surfacing that a former Warsaw Pact country has developed a radar system that can detect stealth aircraft. Is that credible? Is that possible? Can they do it? Are you concerned about it?
Dr. Kaminski: I think the real issue there is, the key question is detect stealth aircraft under what conditions, under what ranges? Stealth aircraft can be detected with your eyeball. The issue is, is this militarily useful. So I have no doubt that there are projected detection characteristics. I do have some doubt that there is something that is significantly militarily useful in terms of detecting and being able to do something about the detection to cause some harm to come to bear.
Q: You mean in terms of a radar?
Dr. Kaminski: In terms of a radar that can usefully hand off to a fire control system that can do something about it. I'm doubtful... I have not seen data, however, on this particular system to give you a confidence-specific answer. I'm just operating from some general experience in the field.
Q: Let me ask you a philosophical question about this thing. Take the first year three outcomes. It pans out we go in, and basically we lead (inaudible) to milestone two. Those wickets that you short-circuited that take out time and money, and we all [thretch] about. In principal, they're all in there to protect the government against risk of various kinds. So you have made a deliberate decision that that's an acceptable risk in these cases.
Talk about the kinds of risks that you have accepted generally... The kinds of risks you have deliberately decided to accept, why it's acceptable in these cases; and then turn it around. If it's acceptable to accept those risks and short circuit this thing, why does this type of approach have to grow only at... Why don't we have lots of ARPAs and lots of angels and so forth.
Dr. Kaminski: Let me answer part of that and let Larry answer another piece as well.
One of the things that we're working on with these ACTDs is to look at approaches which are not simply going down the path of recapitalizing existing systems. Our standard acquisition system is just fine if we're replacing Ship A with a followon ship class. We know how to do that. There isn't a lot of risk associated with that concept of a ship, and we have a proponency for that approach.
If, on the other hand, we're looking at a system that replaces something that we're accustomed to doing day in and day out, then there's a risk associated with going to a new concept and giving up a well established platform which has a constituency in place.
You don't want to make a big investment while you're taking that kind of a risk, because the risk there is the risk of the concept being accepted. So what I'm wanting to do is minimize the investment that I'm putting in that concept until I'm over that period of risk. What we're describing to you today, many of these are very high risk. Many of these aren't going to make it through that second piece. Many of them, I believe, will leave some small residual useful capability in place. But it's that kind of risk we're dealing with.
We in the department are not planning to recapitalize every single platform we've had for the inventory with a new platform. This is one path to begin to do that.
Mr. Lynn: If you think about it from a different perspective, you look at the question of how we go about buying things. We typically do on paper, we'll do a technology experiment. That technology experiment then is discussed and it leads to a decision on the part of the operational community that they'd like to proceed with that. There is then a meeting of the minds or appears to be a meeting of the minds.
The communities do not communicate all that well. There are different cultures, different people looking at it.
Q: Operators and technologists?
Mr. Lynn: Operators and technologists and acquisition. There are three different communities that get into play here. And they all work together, they all support one another. But they oftentimes generate the requirements for and the specs for a system which everybody believes are well matched. And as you begin to get into the development, you get into a DEMVAL phase, you watch the number of changes that get made there. That's because the operator now is beginning to understand.
It's the elephant story. One of them is holding the tail, one is holding the trunk, and the other one is holding the leg. They've got different elephants in mind. When you get out into the field with hardware, they find that it wasn't quite what they wanted and they begin to change it, and it's very expensive to change once you've put it into a formal system.
If you now do that while it's very informal, which is what the ACTD tries to do, then you've gotten a complete understanding, you've worked out the changes while it's still inexpensive to do, and then they can go ahead and buy it. So in effect, you're doing some of that.
The other comment I would make as far as the risk, the risk prevention rules -- which are many -- come about, accumulated over 50 years of errors. Every time there's an error, there's another rule. We've made a lot of errors, so we have lots of rules. What you really want to do is to drive things with good judgment and careful attention to the public interests and to the extent that you can do that, then you want to take more risks. That's what we're trying to do.
Dr. Kaminski: If every one of these ACTDs that we've described works and ends up being transitioned in a significant way, then you ought to be holding Larry Lynn and myself accountable for not being aggressive enough in what it is we're trying to do.
Q: I know you said at some point you would find a replacement in DUSD advanced technology, but given that some of the ACTDs, work can be done under ARPA, and maybe there's a proposal around to move DARO under CCI, is it possible you'll do away with that position?
Dr. Kaminski: I don't think so, but we have yet to work out a specific transition plan. What we wanted to be very sure of is that we didn't let the momentum in this program drop in any way while we were working this out. We're going to continue to give that very close attention.
Mr. Lynn: May I make one comment on that one? I've strongly recommended to Dr. Kaminski one of the notions, because it's an easy one to think about, is just moving it into ARPA. That is absolutely the wrong thing to do, I believe, for a variety of reasons.
Dr. Kaminski: We agree on that. I said earlier on in the march, we want to continue to operate this activity from an OSD position and we'll do that. It would be a mistake, I think, to put it into ARPA.
Thank you all.
Press: Thank you.