Thursday, July 5, 2001 - 2:00 p.m. EDT
Quigley: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I have no announcements today, but I'm prepared to take your questions. Charlie?
Q: Craig, regarding the suspect in the alleged rape in Japan, we've been told that no decision yet has been made on whether or not to turn over the suspect or whether you're talking to the Japanese authorities. He has not been -- he has not been -- indicted by the Japanese. Is the Pentagon seeking assurances from the Japanese that his legal rights will be protected, in order to turn him over without an indictment, and have you received such assurances?
Quigley: Well, since the government of Japan made their request for a transfer of custody on the 2nd of July, we've been working very closely with the Japanese officials to figure out the details under which we would transfer custody. The process is continuing. I think we're getting closer all the time. But it is still not yet done, Charlie.
I would say, however, that as part of that ongoing cooperation with the Japanese government officials and law enforcement officials, since Saturday we've made the suspect in the case available to Japanese law enforcement authorities for some 30 hours of questioning. He has also received legal advice from the staff judge advocate there on Okinawa -- the U.S. staff judge advocate. And I understand, as of today, he has retained a Japanese attorney as legal counsel, as well. So we're getting closer all the time, but I don't have any specifics to announce at this point.
Q: Well, short of an indictment -- which, I understand, under Japanese law would guarantee him certain legal rights -- short of that, are you demanding some kind of written assurances from the Japanese that he will get legal rights commensurate with U.S. legal rights?
Quigley: I don't know as if we would insist on them in writing. Japan is a very close friend and ally. I don't know as if we would insist on them in writing.
Q: Have you received any such assurances, verbal or otherwise?
Quigley: Other than -- the talks have been continuously going on since the request was made on the 2nd of July. I don't know exactly what's been put in writing and what's happened in face-to-face meetings and phone calls. I don't know.
Q: What assurances does the U.S. want?
Quigley: John, I think it would be best to probably let that process work itself out in private consultations with the Japanese government, and make it a statement of what we've agreed upon after the fact.
Q: What has -- when the staff sergeant has been questioned by Japanese authorities, has he had U.S. counsel in the Room?
Quigley: I don't know.
Q: Is that a question that you could take?
Quigley: I'll try, yeah. [Update: No. The service member has the right to request counsel, however per Japanese law the counsel is not allowed in the room at the time of questioning.]
Q: And specifically, what are the issues that are preventing the U.S. from turning over this sergeant to the Japanese?
Quigley: Because the transfer of custody prior to an indictment against a U.S. service member is not covered in the existing status of forces agreement with Japan, it is a special circumstance each and every time. So each and every circumstance that arises like this, we're making sure that we not only have coordinated our position within the U.S. government, but also have a continuous dialogue going with the government of Japan in order to make sure that all parties' concerns are met to the best we can do it.
Q: Could you -- I think in the '95 case with the 12-year-old, the rape of the 12-year-old girl, the service members in that sense, I thought they were handed over before an indictment was given. Is that true?
Quigley: I think there was a case in 1995 that involved a slashing case, I believe, with a knife or some sharp object.
Q: Slashing of a person?
Quigley: Of a person, yes. And that's the only other pre-indictment -- and again, that was worked out with the particulars. I do not have the particulars under which the custody was transferred pre-indictment from 1995.
Q: So you can't --
Quigley: But that's the only one that we've been able to find, pre-indictment.
Q: So you can't give us any sort of "here's why we did it in that case" and what's preventing us at this moment --
Quigley: I don't have those details. I'm sorry.
Q: Do you know why the Japanese have not indicted him yet? Have they said?
Quigley: No, I don't. I would ask -- recommend that you ask the Japanese authorities that.
Q: Craig --
Quigley: Any law enforcement organization around the world has particular criteria that it applies before an indictment is issued, but I don't know what theirs are.
Q: Craig, you said you're getting closer all the time. Do you mean closer to a decision, or closer to turning him over?
Quigley: Closer to a decision. We have been in continuous dialogue with the Japanese authorities both here in Washington and through Ambassador Baker in Japan. It's just been nearly continuous during that period of time in the last couple of days.
Q: These discussions regard the particular assurances that you're seeking, or is there some other issue, some other legal issue where some definition --
Quigley: I'll just leave it that -- a discussion of the conditions.
We very clearly understand the desire of the Japanese government to transfer custody. We just need to have a very clear understanding of the conditions under which we would agree to something like that.
Q: Well, Craig, who will ultimately decide whether the assurances from the Japanese government are sufficient to protect the rights of the servicemember? Will that be the commander in chief -- chief of Pacific Command? Will it be made here in this building? The White House?
Quigley: It would be an inter-agency process involving the Defense Department and the State Department.
Q: Did Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz have a discussion with the Japanese minister of defense?
Quigley: I know that several of the senior leadership in the Department of Defense have had discussions with Japanese officials over the last few days, as well as at the State Department. I don't know if Secretary Wolfowitz has or not specifically.
Q: Has President Bush --
Quigley: Yes, sir.
Q: So, do you think the final decision will be made later today?
Quigley: I can't predict that for you. I'm not sure. Don't have a very good track record of making accurate predictions on when issues like this will be settled. Both we in the United -- we and the government of the Japan want to resolve it as quickly as possible.
Q: Is President Bush directly involved in this?
Quigley: Not that I know of, no.
Q: Okay, how about anybody at the White House?
Quigley: Ask them. Not that I know of.
Q: As I understand it, in the Japanese legal system, the rights of the suspect change pre-indictment versus post-indictment. Are there things beyond the normal things that they would give the suspect post-indictment that the United States is seeking? Or would the normal conditions post-indictment be enough?
Quigley: I don't have a detailed knowledge of the Japanese legal system to answer that, I'm sorry.
Q: This spring, the United States and Japan were working on a revision of the Status of Forces Agreement. Do you know if it -- what changes are being contemplated and where that process stands?
Quigley: I don't know that there is an ongoing process to revise the Status of Forces Agreement.
Q: There was something I recently read about in March that was stalled, it was a SOFA discussion. It was stalled, but -- (inaudible.)
Quigley: We were working with the Korean government over the past many months to develop a revised SOFA. I don't know of an overall effort to revise the SOFA with Japan.
Q: And what is the United State concerned about here? Why (inaudible)?
Quigley: A variety of things. We want to do the right thing as best we can by all parties, Charlie -- both the individual servicemember as well as the legitimate concerns of the citizens of Japan and the government of Japan. Those concerns are not always focused on the same things. So you continually discuss this to try to arrive at a solution that is acceptable to all parties and trying as best you can to accommodate the disparate concerns that are involved.
Q: New subject?
Q: There's been an often-repeated statistic over the last week or so about the Japanese criminal justice system that said that in 90 percent of the cases, that there are convictions.
Are you concerned that the Japanese legal process is more geared toward convicting people?
Quigley: No, I don't think that's so much the issue as it is you do have differences in cultures, you have differences in governments, you have differences in legal systems, and you're trying, as I just indicated, to satisfy, as best you can, sometimes very disparate concerns amongst different parties that have different priorities. That's the issue here, is we're working as quickly as we can and as thoroughly as we can to try to make all those parts come together.
Q: How much access have the Japanese authorities had to question Sergeant Woodland at this point?
Quigley: In excess of 30 hours.
Q: Over how many days? Do you know how many sessions or --
Quigley: Since -- I don't have that number of times, but I know it's more than 30 hours, and on several occasions.
Q: Has the United States provided other witnesses or access to --
Quigley: Yes, that as well.
Q: If the turnover process delays, the security relations between the two countries could be affected. What do you think about that?
Quigley: I don't think it will come to that.
Q: In that 30 hours questioning, which side -- (inaudible) -- interpreter?
Quigley: I don't know that either.
Q: New subject?
Q: No, same one.
Q: During this 30 hours of questioning, has a representative of the United States government or the United States military been present during that questioning? Has it been conducted in private?
Quigley: I don't know. I don't know. That was asked before, and I don't know.
Q: Well, on the same lines, a service member in this country facing these kinds of charges in this country would have a right to counsel. Will the United States be providing counsel? You mentioned that he'd retained a Japanese lawyer. Is that at U.S. expense?
Quigley: No, that's at his expense, but we have also provided a staff judge advocate's legal advice to him as well, and will continue to do so.
Quigley: Until the case is resolved. I mean, it's a permanent commitment.
Pam, next subject.
Q: They've reached a cease-fire agreement, and other countries are indeed stepping up saying, you know, they'll offer a hundred or 300 troops towards the ultimate force of up to 3,000 that NATO talked about. What has the United States pledged or is contemplating pledging towards this force?
Quigley: Let me make a comment on the cease-fire at first. I mean, we're very, very pleased to see that. It's a very important step. It just goes to what both the United States and many other nations have been saying, that indeed you need to have a political solution to this, not a military one. The process, though, that NATO follows in putting together a force that would come under the overall NATO control is that it goes out to the 19 member nations; it says we have a requirement to do X; and which of you can provide what aspects of the pieces of that to make it a coherent, all-parts-accounted-for sort of a force?
The 19 then take a look internally at which parts of that request they could satisfy, what time frame, what -- would it have an impact on their own militaries and what have you, and then come back to NATO headquarters with at least a tentative response to the request for forces.
It can change over time. If one nation initially thinks that it can provide, let's say, three elements of that, but after further contemplation they think that one part of that might have too much of an impact on their own military, they would withdraw one part, let's say, or they could add another part. So it is very fluid up until the very end of the process.
Some nations say, "We're not in a position to provide anything right now."
So other than the process being ongoing, I do not know of a final U.S. position yet as to what we are willing to contribute.
Q: At the request --
Quigley: We have said we will be a part of that force, and we anticipate using forces that are there in Skopje to help carry that out. But I don't think we have settled on numbers or specific types of equipment or other sorts of enabling capabilities yet within our government and within that process.
Q: So --
Quigley: That's a long answer to your question, but you have a lot of parties providing answers at slightly different time periods. Sometimes you have an overlap, and you have, say, three countries providing basically the same thing, and that's not what's necessary to provide the force. So NATO then goes back and say(s), "I appreciate your offer, but we have too much of what you've offered. Could you possibly provide this?" And you do that put and take over a period of time, till you've got a coherent force.
Q: When General Robertson (sic) [Ralston] was here, he spoke downtown, and I was under the impression, from what he said, that he wouldn't want KFOR Rear troops to be used, because they're busy, they have other jobs to do. He had a press conference at the Mayflower, and I believe that's what he said.
Quigley: Well, if you have forces that are assigned to KFOR and that are presently serving in Kosovo, those very much have a NATO -- specifically tailored and earmarked for NATO missions to accomplish. But many nations have put forces in place within Macedonia to specifically support the forces that they have contributed to NATO. But those forces, those logistical support mechanisms, for the most part, are not under direct NATO control.
So you're really talking two different chains of command and spans of control. One is to carry out the NATO mission within Kosovo itself, and the second is designed, on a national level, to support those forces in Kosovo.
Q: But he seemed to have a concern that those folks have a job already and that if they're pulled off to do another job, the support room that they needed for the people in Kosovo won't get done.
So he wanted to see a fresh and different --
Quigley: I won't speak for other nations, but I know the United States will not contribute forces from there within Macedonia that would have an adverse impact on us carrying out our NATO mission.
Q: Craig, is this cease-fire sufficient to trigger the beginning of NATO involvement in the disarmament process, or does some political settlement have to be signed and sealed and delivered?
Quigley: That's a good question. I'd say it's certainly a step in the right direction. And it's changing very quickly.
Ultimately, though, whatever force that NATO would assemble would have to be approved by the NAC, by the North Atlantic Council. It's going to continue to be a work in progress and be debated there, within that deliberative body, and NATO would then take a position as to whether or not the conditions that exist on the ground in Macedonia would be sufficient at that point or at least as predictive as you can realistically hope to be -- would they be sufficient for NATO to insert those forces.
Q: (Off mike) -- the U.S. position on how -- what type of political settlement or what degree of settlement has to be accomplished first?
Quigley: I don't know as if we've come to that in house. It's still being worked through the NATO channels at this point. I suspect it would be very actively debated within the NAC and --
Q: But didn't the secretary himself say that -- he said Albanian rebels would have to agree to give up their arms in order for any force --
Quigley: Well, I think NATO has been very clear about the conditions that it certainly wants to see in place on the ground, and this would be a cease-fire, this would be a cessation of hostilities, a voluntary turning-in of weapons by the NLA and other parties, and a limited time frame.
But you keep working that within the NATO process, and we'll -- I'm sure that will actively debated within the NAC.
Q: What --
Q: Change subject?
Q: I was going to say, what -- is 700 still the correct number of Americans now in Macedonia? And what are their specialities? What are they doing -- can you describe in any more detail what it is they're doing now?
Quigley: I think it's -- it goes up and down a little. I think it's closer to 600. Let me take that figure to confirm. But they are largely logistical support. If you -- you have the U.S. forces that are a portion of KFOR, that are in Kosovo, and the supplies -- fuel, food, you name it -- equipment parts -- will flow through the U.S. support facility at Skopje on their way up into Kosovo. So you have -- there's a robust force protection package in place there, but you also have mostly logistics support forces to support the U.S. forces in Kosovo that are carrying out the NATO mission.
And I'll double-check that number for you.
Q: And who would make the -- on the U.S. end, how high up does the decision go as to, A, whether the U.S. will participate, and B, in what form? Is it a SACEUR decision? Is it a SECDEF or the president? Or who's going to make the decision?
Quigley: I think you would develop alternatives and propose courses of action through the interagency process, and I expect ultimately it would be the president that would make the call.
Q: Is the United States definitely going to participate? And also, has the NATO request for forces gone out yet that lists what specific jobs we'll be doing? And if so, could you share that with us?
Quigley: The president has said unequivocally that we will participate in the force. The details of that, as I indicated earlier, are still being worked out, but there's no question that we will participate if the conditions, you know, that all of the NATO nations are hoping to achieve can be brought to play.
What was the second part? I'm sorry.
Q: The request for forces that lists "Here's what we think we need, and what kind of tasks we want them to do," that initial message, has that gone out?
Quigley: Yes, it has.
Q: And can you tell us what kinds of jobs, what kinds of forces and --
Quigley: I have not seen that. Perhaps NATO can provide that for you.
Q: Is the fact that you're suggesting or indicating that the U.S. contribution will likely come from what's in Macedonia, does that imply that 600 would be the upper end of what the U.S. would contribute?
Quigley: I don't know, again except to say that no final decisions have been made. If the total strength on the ground is 6(00) to 700, we're not going to empty that force completely to support that. You could find also some particular needs of the NATO force that could not be met with existing forces that are in the Balkans right now. That is entirely possible. And if that be the case, and it's only the United States or perhaps the United States is best suited to provide that particular capability, then that is something we would consider as well.
Q: Change the subject?
Q: Has the Chinese government presented the United States with a bill for the landing of the EP-3 and for provisions and other supplies provided the crew and people while they were there? Have the Chinese billed the United States?
Quigley: Not that I'm aware of. I don't think it would come straight to defense channels, I think it would go through diplomatic channels. We're certainly prepared to pay for the reasonable costs of the support that we contracted for and support that was provided by the Chinese government and local businesses and what have you while the Lockheed Martin recovery crew was on the ground there. I have not seen a bill still to this time, nor do I know that one's been submitted.
Total number of forces in Macedonia is 500, John, getting back to the answer to your question. That does rise and fall slightly over time as units come and go, but on average, it's around 500.
And, let's see. I'm advised that both the local Japanese counsel, the attorney and the JAG advisor, of course, are both being provided to the accused on Okinawa at U.S. government expense, at no cost to the member.
Q: The Japanese attorney, you said?
Quigley: Yes. And of course the staff judge advocate there is a uniformed legal advisor.
Q: But that answer does not answer the question whether or not any of those people are present when this guy has been interrogated for 30 hours.
Quigley: Right. And I still don't have that.
Q: Thank you.
Q: Two more Woodland questions. Under the law, okay, you have to turn him over if there is an indictment, but short of an indictment, or prior to an indictment, is it now a given, in fact, that you will do that and you are simply discussing the conditions? In other words, is it now a question only of when, not if?
Quigley: No, I'm not prepared to say that yet, Barbara. Our discussions with the Japanese government continue. And we very clearly understand their desire. We have been trying since the 2nd, since the request was made, to try to find a way to accommodate their desire and still take care of other issues and other conditions that we think are important as well.
Q: So it's -- I want to make sure I understand. Is it at all within the realm of possibility pre-indictment you will not turn him over?
Quigley: You're looking for a far more comprehensive answer than I'm prepared to give. I'm sorry. Other than to say that we are still discussing it, I can't give you a for-sure yes or a for-sure no. We're not there.
Q: And my other question is, just to wrap up a loose end on this: The other service members that were questioned in the initial couple of days as potential witnesses, do you have any assurances from the Japanese now that they have been cleared? Are they still being questioned? Are you still turning them over for questioning? What's their status?
Quigley: I do not have particulars on those others; I'm sorry, I don't.
Q: Is it a true fact that if there's a formal indictment, the United States must turn over the service member?
Quigley: We would comply with the terms of the Status of Forces Agreement, which stipulates a transfer of custody if indictment has occurred, yes.
Q: Under those conditions, does that also then provide for these other assurances that you're seeking in any pre-indictment custody?
Quigley: If we felt that it was -- it was an issue, an element that was important to the government, that we felt it was important to the rights of the individual, we would certainly discuss that, but ultimately, it comes down to what is in the Status of Forces Agreement.
Q: I guess that's really -- that's what I was trying to ask is. In the Status of Forces Agreement, does it provide for the protection of the rights that you are concerned about now? If it comes to the point where he is indicted, charged, and you have to turn him over because of the agreement, does that agreement also include assurances about representation and other issues?
Quigley: I do not believe that it does.
Q: Can you just double-check that and get back to us if there is any change?
Quigley: Mm-hm. (Confirmation.)
Q: Can I just follow up on that? I hope maybe I just misunderstood. Are you saying that this SOFA, if he's indicted and turned over, under SOFA he has no right -- additional rights than what would be on the table right now, that the SOFA guarantees him?
Quigley: That is my understanding, correct.
Q: Thank you.
Q: Well, what's --
Q: Oh, sorry.
Q: No, I'm sorry. I --
Quigley: It does not stipulate any additional rights. It stipulates that the government of the United States will transfer custody of a person who has been indicted, and there are no assurances or negotiable positions or what-have-you beyond that point.
Q: Is --
Q: Does he get -- excuse me -- does he get counsel, does he get an interpreter? What does he get under SOFA?
Quigley: I don't believe so.
Q: But isn't it true that under Japanese law an indictment would draw his rights closer to U.S. rights? Legal rights?
Quigley: Yes. Yes. But how to exactly parse that, I don't know.
Q: New subject? Can you bring us up to speed on the status of Secretary Rumsfeld's strategic review? I'm aware that all these panels have been feeding into the Quadrennial Defense Review, but seven -- six months into the administration now, what was the strategic review? I mean, what was the final product?
Quigley: It was a mislabeling. He wanted to put in place a variety of studies to stimulate his thinking as we prepared for the '01 supplemental, the '02 budget preparation, and now the QDR and the '03 budget. The strategic review, I guess you could describe that as the compilation of the various studies, but the purpose of the studies was to stimulate his thinking so that he could ask the right questions as we went into these very significant events that I just described.
Q: Well, was there no capstone document produced?
Quigley: There's not going to be -- no, there is no capstone document that says, "Here's the Rumsfeld strategic review." You've seen already the -- you've had some discussion on QDR.
Quigley: You've seen space. You've seen quality of life and morale.
These were all examples of individual studies. Cumulatively, is that a portion of the strategic review? Yes, I guess you could put it that way. But all of these were very tailored for a specific purpose -- to stimulate his thinking, to go into these events.
Q: Who mislabeled it as a strategic review book?
Quigley: I don't know. I think it became more of a catchphrase than anything else.
Q: Well, because we read about sweeping reviews that are going to cause the most drastic changes since World War II, and this and that and --
Quigley: I think you're still seeing it going on, Tony, if you want to look at it in one way. The most significant opportunity for that is the Quadrennial Defense Review. You're seeing a very, very hard -- a very focused level of effort right now going into putting the Quadrennial Defense Review together, which will feed into the '03 budget. You've got the nuclear posture review as an element of -- separate element that is due at the end of the year. If that's not a strategic way of looking at things, I don't know what is.
But if you're looking for a document that will carry the title "Rumsfeld's Strategic Review," I don't think there is one.
Q: But would you agree, though, that the perception over the last six months was that there would be a product -- that this was kind a synthesis of Mr. Rumsfeld's thinking on various issues. Maybe that's not going to happen --
Quigley: Not for any lack of trying on my part.
Q: But that's been the perception. Is that --
Quigley: Again, not for any lack of trying to dispel that on my part.
Q: Well, I mean, because the bottom line here -- doesn't seem like there was a one overarching strategic review but various pieces that have been parsed out to the services.
Quigley: All of those efforts have tried to look at things from a strategic perspective. They were not tactical in nature. They were very broad by the very nature of the studies being done.
But again, if you're looking for a strategic review of the -- some early version of a Quadrennial Defense Review, it isn't there, and it won't be there. The results of the individual studies fed into the major events that I've described -- the '02 budget, the Quadrennial Defense Review, which is just heating up right now -- you're going to see the results of those very significant efforts in the '03 budget and in the QDR.
Q: But we're not going to see anything between now and the December time frame when the '03 budget comes out? Somebody briefing us on what actually was found?
Quigley: I think our intentions -- I know our intentions are to continue to brief some of the additional studies. We anticipate scheduling here in the next couple of days for some time next week, I hope, the financial management study. But again, these are pieces of this, and not part of some very large document that you can label "the strategic review."
Q: The expectations were there, and I thought the Pentagon maybe should have done this a little earlier; kind of muted expectations.
Quigley: Well, I -- it would have been hard to predict exactly. I mean, as Secretary Rumsfeld got here, he knew he needed to ask these questions, and the forms of some of the answers were in some of the studies that helped to move the process along. But I know I have said on any number of occasions from here that these were individual studies, to stimulate his thinking, to feed into these processes.
Q: But President Bush --
Q: I think what Tony's getting at is, is what will be the answers to all of this? You've briefed us on the conventional forces study, what was recommended to him. When are we going to see something that indicates what the decision will be on conventional forces?
Quigley: It isn't a "one in this side, one out that side" sort of an equation. All of the studies go into his thought process. He gets the result of one of the studies; that has now become a factor in his thinking as we prepare the budget and as we prepare the QDR. But a study effort will not result in a one-for-one study output -- "if we started this effort, therefore we're going to do that."
The findings go in to him. I mean, as he has often said before in Andy Marshall's strategy part, there is the strategy study. It's not the strategy.
Q: So that we're clear here, we didn't make this up. President Bush said on February, I think it was 14th, at the NDU and the Armed Forces College, that he was directing Rumsfeld to undertake a sweeping review of Pentagon policy, which is very different from what we have all been now told, which is, you know, that these are meant to stimulate his thinking. When the president says that the Defense secretary is undertaking a sweeping review, we're under the expectation of that, and that review will have an end, and we will have some results. And so I feel like we've been switched mid-stream.
Quigley: I think you're going to see the most comprehensive result of the president's tasking in the QDR, and feeding into the president's budget for '03.
I think by any measure, the secretary is working as hard as he can to carry out the president's tasking. But if you're looking for one single document or something that says "Strategic Review Results," you're not going to find that labeled as such. But the efforts that have been expended to date to take a fresh look at how to design America's military for the 21st century, you have seen some of these in the '02 budget, you will see more manifested in the Quadrennial Defense Review's findings.
Q: Thank you.
Q: Oh. I think a lot of us have had the impression that the Andy Marshall report that you referred to a minute ago is the linchpin for a lot of this other work, that a lot of the decisions that will be made flow from whatever it is that comes out of the Marshall study. Are we ever going to get briefed and are we ever going to see that study? We've all heard a lot about it, but are we ever going to actually see it?
Quigley: I don't know. Let me see what I can do. It's almost exclusively classified.
Q: Am I wrong that it is the linchpin for a lot of the other studies?
Quigley: I would be hard pressed to rank it, but it would be up there near the top as a very -- you've got to get your mind focused in the right way to know where you're going. And the strategy review was a very important part of that.
Q: Thank you.
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