Friday, August 24, 2001 - 11:00 a.m. EDT
(Media roundtable at the Pentagon.)
Quigley: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. As the next of our series of an opportunity for you to meet the new members of the administration and vice versa, we have Mr. John Stenbit with us this morning. He's the new assistant secretary for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence. He was sworn into office on the 7th of August and has been hard at it ever since.
Stenbit: Not quite. I went on vacation.
Quigley: Because of the president's news conference at 11:40, our time, we will end this at 11:30 this morning. So, without further ado, Mr. Stenbit.
Stenbit: Hi. Good to meet you. I don't see any face I recognize, so we're 100 percent equal.
I'm John Stenbit. I'm excited to be here. I was here 25 years ago, also worked for Mr. Rumsfeld, not as closely, also for Dr. Schlesinger. It's interesting to examine how many of the issues are the same, how many of them have changed.
But it's an exciting job. For those of you who don't quite understand the arcane nature of C3I, that's sort of the "all other" place. And so I think it could have a broad set of issues of interest to you. So let's go.
Q: Could you tell us how you're dealing with the Code Red problem, where that --
Stenbit: There's actually an official organizational setup that's been set up. I'm not familiar with the details of exactly how it was set up, but the general who's in charge of Space Command is -- in fact has a second duty of information manager. There's an operations center here in town. When I went to visit, that was already on the screen, and how that's going. So the comparison with how the Pentagon deals with that kind of problem today, compared with three or four years ago, is enormously more positive. That's a good thing, because it's enormously dangerous these days.
But there is an institution working at it. We discovered all the normal things that happen when you start to do defensive issues and you shut down certain gateways in order to protect yourself. Some people weren't ready for that. And so we need to keep flushing that out. But --
Q: You've still got -- just to follow on that one, can you explain where things stand? I mean, you've still got some -- a lot of web sites are down. What's the prospect for getting things back to normal?
Stenbit: Let's see. It's not my understanding that there are a lot of DoD web sites down, but I'm not up to date on that. My general impression was that it was pretty well under control, but it was unfortunately done under -- put under control by blockage.
And so it could be that it's blocked until they put the patch in and they open it back up again. But I think the idea of it sort of having its way in a denial of -- we call that a denial-of-service attack -- I think that was mitigated. But it had its effects, no question about that.
Q: I assume when you came in you were briefed on the threat of information warfare on military networks. Can you tell us how this year, or what you've heard, has stacked up against previous years? Is it continuing to be a more threatening environment?
Stenbit: I don't think I have any credentials to do that, since I'm sort of snowed under and I'm getting what's going on right now. And historical (perspective) comes with a little bit more time.
Q: Well, can you tell us what's going on right now?
Stenbit: Well, it's very active. I mean, you've read about Code Red 1 and 1.1 and 2 and 2.1 and so forth. Those are very different from the kinds of attacks that occurred several years ago. I sat on a Defense Science Board panel that looked at information warfare, gosh, about eight or nine years ago, and we could see things like this coming. But even in those days, the kinds of attacks that these represent were not the kinds we were talking about. We were talking about a brute force denial of service. We were talking about penetration and getting at things, the kind of things that hackers think about. These are much more sophisticated and have unknown future ramifications. We hope we know what they are. We have guesses. But this is a game that's very, very sophisticated. And so if you want me to say it's worse today than it was in the past, I believe that's fair, but I don't have any ability to do a balanced judgment.
I think you had your hand up.
Q: Yes. Are you familiar with the EP-3 accident? Because I read a report that said it is not a regular information gathering, it has a whole new information warfare code that prolongs or something. Can you explain that? I'm sorry, I --
Stenbit: You're talking about the Chinese incident?
Stenbit: Well, gee, I don't want to go too much into the details, but to say that's not normal I think is incorrect. The U.S. flies aircraft and sails ships and puts satellites in places, which is legal, and we listen to other people, and we do that all the time. And that was one of them.
Q: I heard that there is a more upscale --
Stenbit: Some of what we do is more upscale than other. But I think I would still claim that it was in the normal course of events.
Q: Are you suggesting their capabilities of it -- maybe having information warfare capabilities; is that what you meant?
Q: Right. There's a new code --
Stenbit: If I were able to answer that question -- and I must hide behind "I don't know the answer" -- I couldn't tell you anyway. (Laughter.)
Q: But is the Chinese information warfare capability a concern of the Pentagon?
Stenbit: You know, I don't know the details of what the people were listening to, but normally what they're trying to do is find out anything they can. We refer to those things as vacuum cleaners; they suck up anything they can find. You can take a picture, you can listen, you do whatever you can do.
Q: Mr. Secretary, in regards to aircraft like that, later this month I believe there's going to be a decision on the joint signals architecture family. Among other things, the Air Force is waiting for clearance from OSD to go ahead with their own programs for their legacy aircraft. Have you given that authority yet?
Stenbit: I haven't. There is clearly a discussion going on in the QDR about all kinds of issues, one of which is what's called low-density, high-demand assets, and I guess that's what you're talking about. And that's an issue that's under consideration, as all other kinds of issues are under consideration. But no, I know of no specific go-ahead on anything that would be above my threshold since I've been here, but as Admiral Quigley said, I've only been here a couple of days.
Q: Arthur Money, your predecessor, had a vision to make information superiority happen, and he had several initiatives underway. What over the next six months would you say are your priorities? Is there going to be a shift in priorities at all?
And also, if you could address the issue of information operations. It's been criticized by people outside of DoD saying that the defense world needs to better define it to understand how they want to use it. And we've heard a lot of talk about wanting to use space in information operations in future conflicts, rather than demand so much on the traditional warfare methods. Can you comment on that?
Stenbit: Well, those are two really different questions. Let me start with Art and I have known each other for a long time. He worked for me at TRW for a long time. And so we've been colleagues -- we come from the same general area, where we've worked and what we're used to. Our priorities aren't that different.
My priorities are really very clear. We need to get forward on this -- I'll use the current phrase -- network-centric architectures in warfare. Might be useful to tell you what I think that means, if you're interested, but somebody has to ask that. How's that for leading a question?
But the second is, if we achieve a network-centric operation -- and to me that means anybody can get any information at any time, and that means it's no longer a push system, it's a pull system. So anybody in the world who's got a gun at any moment can be solving the problem of what are his 10 best targets, and it's not somebody waiting for somebody else to tell him. I think that -- that doesn't mean he's supposed to shoot. I mean, there has to be procedural controls and all that. But I do believe that it's very important that we decentralize the decision-making.
That's already happening. Not to get too sophisticated about all of this, but the traditional systems rely on the fact that the bureaucracy that finds the target is the same bureaucracy that shoots it. And that causes the information exchange to be relatively easy. You can practice it. I mean, some of them are very sophisticated -- long-range radar, over-the-horizon, all the rest of that stuff. But it's still basically all tied together. We're moving to a world which is joint, which means it's different services. We're moving to a world where we're going to use longer-range kinds of weapons because we don't want our people hurt. All of that is very good. The corollary to that is, somebody finds a target which is not the same bureaucracy that shoots it. And when that happens, you need information to exchange and be coordinated a lot.
The only way the traditional military has talked about that, when I was around 25 years ago, was the SIOP. It was a big thing. It took 18 months to figure out, out in Omaha. If you wanted to change it, you had to wait 18 months. We've got to just picture using that model of how the world works. When they're flying in real time over short distances, you're not allowed to wait 18 months to make up your mind exactly how you're going to do that.
So we need a different architecture. We need a different form of information exchange. Network-centric is the right word. Those are the right concepts. The bottom line is, if you want to use my vernacular, we're separating the shooter from the sensor and we have to solve that problem. That's first.
Second, we then have to change the information that's available, because we've gotten very used to certain classes of information, and I think there are some that are going to be more useful in the future than perhaps have run up in the past.
And that runs right into all of the debates in the QDR about how fast you modernize, how fast you change direction, how fast you transform without fouling up what you'd be doing.
And then there's a third issue, which is we got to -- once we start depending upon them, we'd better make sure they're there. We tend to not overbuild the C3I system. We tend to have one or two, as opposed to -- you know, if somebody shoots one, what are we going to do? Well, we can wait for eight years before the next one gets built. That's not -- that's an exaggeration. That's just a figure of speech. But I think that's not an appropriate maneuver if in fact you're in this kind of transformation.
So those are my priorities. One of the issues that we're right in the middle of right now is spectrum. Perhaps some of you have heard that -- there's a big run on the spectrum from the 3G cellular guys.
There's a lot around what I just said that is very important -- the information assurance, the information operations. I mean, if I set up a network, I've got to be sure it works. I've got to be sure the other people aren't in it. I've got to be sure he's not doing the same thing.
So there's a lot of other related issues, but I guess I'd like to leave it at those three priorities, if that's okay.
Q: What do you think of initiatives such as NMCI? And do you feel that --
Stenbit: Spent more time on that one than a couple. That's a great idea. I mean, the transformational idea is to get everybody so that they can get themselves moving towards access to all the information, wherever it comes. I commend the Navy for really jumping into that boat. When you jump into a big boat, sometimes, if you're as big as I am, it rocks. That one's rocking.
I think that OSD and the Navy are trying to focus on how to take some of the risk out of that program and make sure it's a success. But it's not all the way there yet.
Q: Can you talk a little bit about the testing issue and sort of where you stand? Your predecessor was calling for a higher level of testing. The Navy's been pushing for sort of more commercial grade. Where do you come down on that issue?
Stenbit: I don't care who does the test. I care what's tested and is it indicative of the scalability and other issues like that. And so if there were battles in the past about who twiddled a knob, I tend not to worry about -- I understand I'm breaking bureaucratic crockery if I say that, but I'd much rather understand that the knob were turned, and it is real data, and there were problems on that scale, too. And that's the ones -- those are the ones I've been working on.
Q: You mentioned the scalability. At one point they were requiring 25,000 seats be deployed before testing. Is that still going to happen?
Stenbit: I think the -- I don't know that anybody has ever said it that way. I think they've said it the other way: You can't put out any more than X and then run the test. I have not heard anybody establish a standard of how many there has to be before it's scalable. I thought it was a constraint on not going -- it was a fly- before-buy kind of a constraint.
Q: No, Mr. Wells said that 25,000 seats had to be tested before they could move forward. They were only planning on testing as they rolled out before.
Stenbit: All I can say is that's news to me.
Q: How close are you to resolving the testing debate, though? The Navy wanted a shorter testing time frame, and your office is arguing for more of a weapons testing program. Is that --
Stenbit: I don't want to characterize your statement about what my office was doing as correct. But I believe we're relying -- the Navy and OSD -- about what are the practical -- what's our practical ability to test. I also believe we're still in the mode that there are tests that could fail that could put that program in jeopardy, but that's -- I mean, that's like in all programs; we have such tests, we have a relatively good agreement about what they are and how they're going to get done and when they're going to get done. If they get done on time and they're very successful and the analysis says that they didn't pick the easy ones first, I have no way to pick that. I've got to go get somebody to take a look at that, or else I don't know whether they're scalable.
Q: So is there a resolution to the testing issue? And how soon will the testing be done before NMCI can begin rolling out more seats?
Stenbit: There's a policy -- as far as I'm concerned, there's an agreement on what we're going to do in the program, when it's going to get done, what the event-driven milestones are; that if it's done on time, who is responsible for doing what before the next event. And I'll leave it at that for right now, because I think the actual real details have to get worked out. But I'm comfortable we have a way forward -- "a way forward" seems to be a word that people use around here.
Q: Mr. Secretary, how about IT and QDR, I mean, what role do you think IT can play in reducing the force structure of the U.S. military without sacrificing, you know, operational readiness?
Q: And can I tag on to that, because it's also QDR-related? Secretary Rumsfeld talked yesterday about wanting to create a standing joint task force to fight wars, and then he also said there was something moving similarly in the information realm. Could you talk about that?
Stenbit: Those are two different questions in my mind. One of the best ways that IT and business management can help in the QDR is to free up money from the non-fighting part of the military in order to bridge the gap between force structure and modernization desires. I think that's where the real leverage is in IT.
I know that Jacques Gansler and that my predecessors have worked hard to try to take money out of some of the support functions by doing them more efficiently.
So I personally believe IT has a lot to say about the results of the QDR, but it's really in the -- making the back office more efficient to -- we used to call that, when I was around, the "tooth- to-tail ratio."
Now, the comment about joint expeditionary forces, or whatever the words that were used, they need a joint command and control system to go with them. That's exactly what we have to go worry about. That has to be a network-centric device because you don't know who's going to go, you don't know where you're going to go, you don't know what you're going to have happen.
I don't want to tell you war stories about 25 years ago, which -- before some of you were apparently born. (Laughter.) But I learned this lesson the hard way when I was here before. General Haig, who was the commander in Europe, for a whole set of reasons, which we don't have to get into, moved a brigade of the Army from southern Germany up to northern Germany in the middle of where the Dutch and the Belgians and some other people were. They couldn't communicate, they had no intelligence; there was nothing there for them. The whole system had been set up knowing in advance where you were going to be. And they actually had, you know, hard-wired telephones, but there weren't any telephones up there -- I mean, that's where they issued to all the soldiers 10-pfennig pieces, which is what it cost to go into the local pay phones. I mean, that's ludicrous. But that was a real event, and it caused everybody's eyes to open that we need to learn how to do these things differently. And if we're going to really get serious about long-range power projection, we have to accelerate that particular issue.
Q: Could the Navy CEC program be possibly a basis for that? Are you interested in getting the other services involved in that?
Stenbit: Well, the CEC happens to be very effective at gluing together in a lot of detail pretty alike kinds of platforms. And they have reached out, and there are attempts to have CEC have other services. But it's a pretty small tight club, and it's difficult to join and it's difficult to get your ticket punched to join. And so it is a great view of what could happen, but it needs to be more opened up in a general case. It's not a good model for the general case.
Things like -- well, I guess you don't know very much about Intel Link -- neither do I -- but it's a pretty good example. In the command and control area there's a logistics system which is called G --
Q: -- CCS.
Stenbit: -- not GCCS. GCSS, which I am told has the attributes I am talking about, which is anybody on the net can get any element of information from any other place, as long as they're able to do Sequel, SQL queries, or browse.
Now, that's a good model for what I'm talking about.
Q: What kind of leadership are you going to provide -
Stenbit: Is it okay if I can have other people, since you'd had a chance? Is that a --
Stenbit: Lady in the back.
Q: On the spectrum issue concerning --
Stenbit: Thank you. (Laughter.)
Q: -- 3G, one of the options that's on the table, obviously, is relocating DoD.
Q: And DoD being compensated. If there's enough money that is -- (inaudible) -- to compensate DoD for moving, is that a viable option? Are there other issues that would make that --
Stenbit: I don't believe it's a money issue, I believe it's a risk management issue. I think there's an enormous asymmetry in the risk. And I'll give you a hypothetical, just so that you can understand. If somebody came to me and said, "I have already provided for you the antennas in the place where they don't jam my stuff, and I've gotten the lawyers to do the environmental impacts with the NIMBYs in that area and it's all done, and the FCC's given the frequencies, and actually I can go and do the job I need to do with your stuff with one caveat -- if the GPS has trouble because you weren't right and the plane crashes," you put that in your prospectus when you go to the venture capitalists for the money. Or if the precision-guided bomb out on the test range lands in Reno instead of on the range, that you put that in your prospectus, that you've assumed that risk as well. Then I would be very happy to move in an instant, because the stuff will be newer, it will be jazzier, and I have no problem.
But we're not talking about those kind of risks when, on the other hand, the guys are trying to get venture money from whoever to go do an auction to see, and it's a portfolio problem for them. If they lose the money, they'll go do it again. I come from that business. I understand that business. It's fine, but it's not the same risks that we have.
And I'm not trying to be, you know, "We're more patriotic than you" or something like. It's just it's a very hard problem to build up the certainty that we need to do what we're doing. And that's in general not just money.
Q: In -- (inaudible) -- vein, there's been a push to make better use of commercial space, satellites, communications and that sort of thing.
Stenbit: No question. We do that.
Q: Do you have the same reliability concerns? Will it be there when the rocket goes off?
Stenbit: I think that having more is always better than having less because you have more options to work. And that's one of the things we do. There's a program that we just talked about yesterday, that we're very frustrated somehow got caught in the bureaucracy in Congress, called Teleport, which is in fact a program to deploy pretty sophisticated ground stations by DISA that in effect allow mixing and matching between commercial -- doesn't make any difference what the frequency is -- be able to go around the world and use all kinds of systems and not care whether they're commercial, leased, or whatever, that we can in fact get it done.
Q: Given the reluctance among some potential defense contractors to do business with DoD, given -- because of intellectual property concerns. How has that impacted your office?
Stenbit: That's a big deal for us, because we're totally dependent -- nah, "totally" is probably the wrong word, but I haven't found any yet where the technologies that we're dependent on aren't basically derived in the commercial sector -- I mean, in terms of software and in terms of processing, in terms of computers, communications. So those misunderstandings about intellectual property I fully expect to see. I've had them myself in my past life, and I -- that's a big deal.
Q: Can I just follow up? What things do you think can be done to ease the -- (inaudible)?
Stenbit: Well, it starts by having somebody understand it -- that's how people make money -- and that it's a bigger deal for them than it is -- the government is very prone, sometimes, to decide that competition and -- is more important for the system than protection of information. And I mean, I've been faced with that lots of time.
By the way, let me say it's not only the government; TRW has had this problem with GM and Ford -- large bureaucracies. There was a guy at GM named Lopez. Some of you may have heard of him. I mean, he basically took everybody's proprietary data and put it out to other people and said, "Can you build this cheaper?" Well, of course they could, because we were amortizing the R&D that had gone into it, and lo and behold, it happened. That's the same thing. People get angry about that and they go work on it.
Q: Back to broadcast spectrum. It's been -- the cellular people are saying this is going to be decided in Congress, and it's a foregone conclusion you're going to lose that spectrum, and what you should be doing is planning on how you're going to move out of it. Do you feel that it's foregone? Are you still going to fight it, or --
Stenbit: Yeah, they got a lot more money than we do. An election year's coming. I mean, I -- who knows? They're going to try hard in Congress.
The bottom line is, we cannot vacate that spectrum and have -- let's just pick GPS as an example -- work for about 17 years. So --
Q: Seventeen years?
Stenbit: Something like that. It's a fly-out issue. It's not a money issue. It is -- there are practical issues. I basically have more faith in the Congress, in the long run, that -- I think they're doing a good job of doing their lobbying.
They're going to do a better job of doing the lobbying. But we do have some real problems.
My real approach here -- and I think they tried to make it into a money issue. They're doing a good job of making it into a money issue. I don't happen to think of it that way. I think if we're talking about 2017 or 2015, it's also incumbent on the DoD to start a long-range process to understand how we can rationalize spectrum over the long range. I mean, I would not like to get to 2017 having won the battle this year but having 17 others between now and then and, you know, just have it over and over and over again. There's got to be a different way to work this particular problem, and I intend to have that happen.
Q: Going back to Joint Command and Control, do you think the individual services are doing enough in their individual programs in C3 to help to help Joint Command and Control? And do you favor moving some authority to Joint Forces Command?
Stenbit: Let me not comment on the authority issue. The problem is that the services' job is to train and equip and -- there's some other words that I'm afraid I don't remember at the moment --
Q: (Off mike.)
Q: Recruit --
Stenbit: No, no, it's not to fight. It's --
Q: Recruit, train, and equip.
Stenbit: Recruit, train, and equip. And then they support the CINCs, who are the ones that do the fighting. That's -- in business, that's called matrix management. In a functional organization, it helps the other people.
In business, the money would have been given to the CINCs, and they would have bought what they needed from the services. That's not how it happens in the Pentagon. It's upside-down matrix management.
But there's no problem when they send people with airplanes and pilots; the airplanes fly, the pilots work, the guns work, and so forth and so on. When they send radios and electrons, if nobody's paid any attention to it, it doesn't necessarily work with the other guys. That's what the problem is. That's why there's an office like mine. We're supposed to pay attention to looking across what the services are doing and work on these funny words called "interoperability" and things like that. And that's why there have to be different kinds of attention paid to the C3 and the I, rather than some of the other elements that the services do.
Q: You don't have an opinion on Joint Forces Command having to do more or less what they should be doing?
Stenbit: Well, I think that you can't have the revolution about turning the matrix over just for Joint Forces Command. So I think we're in the business the way we are. Goldwater-Nichols was an attempt to say that's an important problem, and we're a lot better at that than we used to be.
But the bottom line is, there still needs to be some attention paid to the individual programs, to make sure they work together when they're deployed.
Q: Can I ask you about the Advanced EHF? Is that something you've been following in your --
Stenbit: Yeah. I have to be a little careful. I come from TRW. That's --
Q: I know that.
Q: But you know the situation. A year late, a billion dollars over the projection, and there's a billion dollars in the terminal synchronization issue. How bad of a problem do you have here with that program, and what is the way forward in terms of finding the money?
Stenbit: Let's see, I believe we were supposed to have a DAB on that last week --
Stenbit: -- or maybe it was earlier this week. There are some milestones in the program that are important. We're trying to work those kinds of issues out. Normal acquisition process requires that you have the money, and you have the problem solved, you have the risk mitigated. And it's exactly the issue of was all of that appropriately available in order to make the decisions, and it wasn't, but we thought we could do it very shortly. So I think that's where we are.
So it's under advisement. It's a short-term kind of an issue.
Q: Back to spectrum for a second --
Stenbit: Well, let me have --
Q: In the modernization --
Stenbit: No, no. No, I'm sorry. I was after you, and then I'll come back to you, and that will be the last one.
Is that all right?
Staff: Yes, sir. That's fine.
Q: I just wanted to return to NMCI just for a second. You said there were a number of risks associated. I'm wondering if you can characterize those. I'm also wondering if you would support an NMCI-type program for the remaining services.
Stenbit: Well, the risks are when you're doing things you haven't tested and you don't know whether it does what you thought it was. That's -- I don't want to go any further than that. I didn't mean to imply anything other than we don't know.
Q: But you know those computers, you know the Cisco routers work, and Dell computers work.
Stenbit: Those are not the problems in IT installations; it's how the applications and run and how the people work them and whether they get too slow. And those are the kinds of failures that occur. And we don't know that because -- they're working hard. They haven't had anything break. I don't know -- I don't have any opinion that the risks are higher than they should be. It's just the issue of when are you going to have enough comfort through the tests.
And your second question?
Q: NMCI --
Stenbit: Oh, should it be somewhere else?
Q: No, I'm talking about --
Stenbit: No, no. I mean should other people do the same model?
Stenbit: I think that NMCI is a good model, especially if we pull it off and it's successful, of the kind of thing that somebody could do. But I think it's not a perfect -- I know it's not a perfect program. And so it's like everything else, there are lessons learned. But if it's a success and it leads to a major transformation, then I think that's great. That's what we need are models like that.
Q: I'm sorry. Can you just expand on "it's not a perfect program" meaning -- ?
Stenbit: We're having the discussions we're having.
Q: On the 3C issue, if DoD spectrum is selected for that, there has to be somewhere for it to move to, and Mr. Wells has expressed some concern that there might not be suitable other spectrum out there for all these DoD systems.
What's your take on that? And do you think there is a viable alternative, even?
Stenbit: Well, the real issue is, as I say, we can't move for 15 years or something like that. So there's already a miscommunication about that. The sharing issue. I mean, we will jam their cell sites with our antennas. They will jam our uplinks with their cell sites. I mean, there has to be a lot of work done if we were going to share.
Now, if we moved, I assure you that to wherever we move will be the next place somebody wants to go. Well, there's no reason not to. I mean, all the spectrum in that general area that has the same attributes are valuable to people for the right reasons; they have certain attributes. So, yeah, I'd be very suspicious that there was a place to which we could move that would then stay there.
I think we better stop. The president certainly has priority.
Q: (Off mike) -- an opportunity to describe network-centric that you felt was -- no one really asked you about it, so --
Stenbit: Thank you very much.
For those of you who read World War II history, in Italy there was this place called Monte Cassino, and it was in the middle of Italy. And up on top of there, the Germans had all these guns. And they held up the entire deal for a long, long time. And the reason was because they had their guns together, and every time anybody down below would put guns together to start shooting back, other than randomly, they could shoot them. And so they were basically able to convert the world into -- they could do it by precision and have everything happen at the same time, and the returns could only get there one at a time sort of randomly, which is still destructive, but not anywhere near as much.
Network-centric allows us to go anywhere we want, in very small groups, talk to each other, and get everything to get up there at exactly the same instant and turn it all around, which is -- they never had anything to shoot at that was worth it, and we had all of the concentrations. It was called concentration of effects instead of concentration of weapons.
And, I mean, it's a big deal if you start to think about those kinds of issues. The way we used to do it is we'd line up all these guns. You've seen those war movies, where they're all lined up. And they all say, "Okay, one, two, three, now!" Right? Wham! And they shoot at the same time. Well, why did they do that? So all the shells would get at the other end at the same time. But when they were spread out, couldn't do that. Maybe a bad analogy, but --
Q: Because the information is a big priority in the whole transformation plan, the whole --
Q: How high?
Stenbit: On mine? That's why I got a job. (Laughter.)
Thank you very much.
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