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Director PA&E Cambone Briefing on Phase II of the Budget Rollout Plan

Presenters: Stephen A. Cambone, USD (Policy)
November 21, 2002 9:00 AM EDT

(Phase II of the Budget Rollout Plan)

Cambone: Let me set the stage for you. And for some of you, I will end up repeating some things, and I'll try not to take more time on the front end than is necessary.

The services submitted their program objective memoranda, their POMs, on 22 August. We came down shortly after that to talk with you about the process that was going to unfold, and we said sometime toward the end of September we would have gotten through the process of reviewing their submissions and gone back to them, via discussions with the secretary and the other senior management of the department, on recommendations for adjustments or changes. Then, by the end of October, we would have sort of run those through and had a better sense of what kinds of choices and options were available to the secretary; that he, the secretary, then would take those options sometime in the early part of November, which is in fact where we are now, review those and then on the basis of his review be able, after proper consultations with the chairman and others in the department, make his proposals to the president then for inclusion in the budget.

And that's about where we are. That is to say we're at the point where we've compiled a range of recommendations and options. Those are now under review, and I would expect that sometime the early part of next month, he will make his proposals to the president. At that point, I lose -- we lose, the department does, sort of -- the control over the process, and it goes into the OMB process, and we end up with a budget message coming out sometime in the February time frame.

The way this has been done, that is the review, is we have had any number of teams that have looked at a large number of issues as a way of bringing the proposing organization, the Army, Navy, Air Force or Defense agency, into review, a program of interest, and to ask why they would have done it one way as opposed to another way; are there savings to be had, gains to be lost, you know, how do we balance what they had done within their program? And then, at a larger level, then look at how one set of program choices over/against another might be preferred.

As I say, that took place over the course of the entire period of time from August -- and it's still ongoing in a number of cases, by the way. And that has yielded the kinds of recommendations we have here. So the bottom line is that we have had a fairly -- a fairly -- a very open process in which the services and the agencies and OSD staff have interacted quite freely, and I think quite successfully in developing the proposals that were put forward.

So let me give you another slide here; go ahead.

We talked about this last time. We've got three things we need to be able to do, which is to be certain that we are able to look after our people and forces, particularly, as I have stressed before, in the joint context. And to insist that as we go forward, we assess choices that we make in the context of the contribution to the joint operation. And the quality of life is an important element to this: Facilities, and housing, and barracks and things of that sort; if they are expensive to maintain and to sustain and to improve. But the secretary in particular, and the president as well, has made it a point to get money put against those kinds of concerns; they affect servicemen and women in very particular ways.

The war on terror has its own costs associated with them. To this point, a lot of that has been dealt with in supplemental appropriations. But after a while, you begin to see that this does creep into the day-to-day conduct of activity. And so in the case, for example, of replacing helicopters, and combat losses, and material and so forth, you begin to see the necessity for doing that; the wear and tear on aircraft and so forth needs to be sustained beyond the cost of the immediate operation. And then, of course, transformation and balancing the need to put resources against those transforming efforts while maintaining the other two.

Next slide there.

We talked about this before; the joint operational concept is something that we are in the process of developing. I cannot stand before you today and say that we have successfully put one together; that is, a joint operational concept. What I can tell you is two things. One, in each case, the service has come in with a broad concept of operations that underpins the proposals that they have made with respect to their program. Those service concepts are becoming, as one looks at them, increasingly overlapping. Army and Air Force, Air Force and Navy, more and more you see the points not just of tangent, but of overlap in the concepts that they're putting forward.

And I think some of you may have heard or read General Jumper's comments this morning about focusing on the effects that we are looking to achieve by the application of these forces. And that notion of looking at effects is increasingly permeating the way in which the services are thinking about their concepts.

So the second I can say to you is that General Myers and Admiral Giambastiani have been given the task of developing a joint concept, and so that by this time next year, we should be able to stand here and say we're a long way toward having one and we are able to use that concept as a way to inform what we're trying to do.

Over-arching C4ISR. We've talked again and again and again about this, the need to be able to see, to hear, to move information in large quantities and to move it in a form which is usable by the recipient; that is to say, he doesn't have to take a message, reconstruct it for his purposes and then pass it on to someone else, but that it comes to him in a form that is readily usable by him and can be sent on to others. It's absolutely essential, and we'll talk a little bit more about that on one of the program areas.

The stuff in the middle here, on the deter forward, that's just a representation of the kind of strategy and force structure that was laid down in the QDR. And it's a reminder that we are trying to put theses concepts together and the command and control together to enable us to maintain our deterrent posture forward, to be able to conduct two overlapping campaigns to bring about the swift defeat of an adversary, and to reserve at the same time for the president the option, if necessary, to conduct a much different campaign which might result in, for example, the occupation of a country and the replacement of a government. We need to do all that even as we are trying to assure that we can defend ourselves here at home. And all of that lay-down in terms of both strategy and force structure has its effect on the way in which the program lays itself out. You can't -- going back to the earlier slide -- have the wherewithal to take care of your people and to look after the war on terror and transform unless you're able to put it into that kind of context.

We have been looking, as I said a moment ago, at effects-based, and we have talked about having a capabilities-based approach to our strategies and to our choices, but the fact is that we program by platforms and programs. And so when we put a budget together, we don't say that we want a capability to overcome anti-access efforts on the part of our adversaries. Although we can talk about it that way, in the end we budget against airplanes and ships and amphibious capabilities. And so the trick in this process has been to translate capability into program and to do that in an ongoing basis.

So the next slide, then, reminds that this is all -- it is tied together. We've been through the Quadrennial Defense Review, which was the broad strategy in force structuring. The Contingency Planning Guidance is signed out by the president, which is a directive to his combatant commanders to develop their contingency plans in light of the strategy that was laid down in the Quadrennial Defense Review. The Posture Review was an effort to do much the same with respect to the strategic forces but added the notion that it was time to begin thinking about other conventional long-range capabilities that might be applicable in a strategic context.

The Unified Command Plan was designed, then, to assure that we had the proper combatant command structure to execute the strategy and to bring those effects to bear. And the two major -- three major changes there were to create Northern Command, which stood up on 1 October; to create Strategic Command, which was a merger of the old Strategic Command with Space Command; and then, thirdly, to relieve Joint Forces Command down in Norfolk of its territorial -- its area of responsibility. It was dual-hatted as CINCLANT, in the NATO context. So Joint Forces Command is now devoted to its force provider role and its experimentation efforts.

The others you know about -- the Defense Planning Guidance, then, is the guidance that is designed to bring the kinds of requirements that emerge from all that into one place, and to tell the services how to program -- the agencies and services how they might want to program their budgets in order meet the requirements.

Next slide.

What are we looking for in terms of capabilities? The goal there is the portfolio of capability: see today's threat, meet tomorrow's challenges.

What do we want in the way to characteristic capabilities? A rapid transition into combat operations. So that is from your -- a daily posture. Being able to get the forces organized, moved and into the fight rapidly is important. We saw it -- again, I harken back to the Afghanistan business, but the ability to move quickly into a fight is terribly important in a world in which things happen very quickly, and if we're not prepared, bad things can happen quickly.

We want to get the effects you see there applied to targets, full depth of the adversary's battle space. We can't just be concentrated on fixed targets; we've got to worry about mobile targets as well. We're pretty good against the fixed ones. We've got to get better against the moving targets.

Persistent surveillance. This is the need to be able to constantly update and refresh our information about what's taking place in the area of regard, the battle space that we are interested in, because indeed people do move, circumstances do change, and if you're going to be precise in the application of your forces and bring about the desired effects, you have to be able to persistently surveil the environment in which you're operating. And that, in turn, then supports the ability to dominate the air, sea and ground portions of the fight. And maneuverability on the ground is especially important in being able to avoid obstacles and close with an adversary and defeat them in detail, if that's necessary. Holding at risk, commanding control and the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear explosive devices remains terribly important. And in the end, what you want to have is the capacity, as I said earlier, to bring the fight to a close rather quickly again, because the longer a conflict continues, the more chances there are for untoward events to occur.

Next slide.

I called out a handful of things here that we might just talk our way around for a few minutes to give you some idea of the nature of the conversation that has taken place. I am not going to reveal to you what the numbers are, and all of that; it's just not going to happen. (Laughter.) But I can talk my way around why we did those things, and how we talked about them and what the implications can be, if indeed we go forward on these. So --

Q: (Off mike) -- haven't even been made though, have they?

Cambone: No.

Q: But you're talking about something that hasn't been --

Cambone: Roger.

So, next slide.

Q: He's Secretary Rumsfeld --

Cambone: That's right, he's -- what are we trying to do with communications? Today we operate on a -- primarily on a circuit-based system, when -- for those of you who used to work with Wang systems, as opposed to the Internet, well, just imagine the difference between the two. We want to go from sort of a Wang-based communication where if you were on the Net, that was great, but you couldn't take any of that -- there was no way that you put a disk into a Wang system and moved it to anything else. If you weren't on that system, you couldn't talk to anybody else. We wanted to get to the point where we could be on an Internet-based approach. We are about halfway there. We have sort of the local area network approach, and so on, but that's not good enough. We really do need to get to a network-based approach.

To do that, we have undertaken two things. One is already underway, which is the Global Information Grid, the expansion of its bandwidth, which is the laying of fiber optic cables to move the information and data at a much higher rate than we do today. And John Stenbit can give you the numbers on what that is; I forget. It's an enormous increase in the amount of information that we're going to be able to move around.

The second has been a proposal that C3I has been developing in concert with the Air Force, to look at using laser communications through space as a way to move even more data than we are able to move today. And they are looking at whether or not that is feasible, and the extent to which it is feasible and when; and that's the nature of the conversation that is presently ongoing.

If we can do it, what we will be able to do is have the kinds of effects that we're describing here, and for the war fighter, there are sort of two major consequences. One is his footprint overall is much smaller, in that you don't need a separate radio for each one of the circuits that you presently live on, and all the people who go with it.

But more importantly, I talked earlier about persistent surveillance, for example, and the ability to be constantly refreshing what you know. Well, you need a lot of bandwidth to move that kind of data around. Think about whether you would have been able to use your 286 computer to work the Internet as it exists today in the refresh rates that you require. You can't do it. So we need to bring our capability to do that up to and, we would think, beyond even the industry standards as a way of giving the advantage to the war fighter.

Next slide.

Then for something like a space-based radar, which has been proposed in the past, we're again sort of exploring whether this has application in the world in which we're moving, particularly as something that can provide the sort of persistence that you would like to have in a battle space. Again, this is a satellite system which would have to be networked with other sensors, particularly aircraft like JSTARS, to make sure that you're going to get the highest rate of return for the dollars invested. And so we're trying to see if we can work our way through this and have the confidence that the technology is available in a time frame of interest for the dollars available to get the kind of return here in identifying vehicles in motion, to being able to understand the contours of the Earth. Why is that important? You want to know where the defiles are, the hills are, where are people going to hide, where could they move, and so forth. And then man-made structures; how are things that are at rest changing, and what does that tell you about the circumstances of interest to you?

Q: Are those in geosynchronous orbit or are they in --

Cambone: No, it will probably be -- there's a debate that goes on between whether you put them in low Earth orbit, medium. These, I think, at this point people are talking bout low Earth orbit.

Q: You need a whole bunch of them.

Cambone: You need a handful of them, yep. And then the question is, how many. And that gets to how frequently do you want to be able to revisit any point on the face of the Earth and how long do you want to be able to view it. So the energy at the moment is in sort of working through that combination of factors and then asking yourself how does that in turn play with Global Hawks and JSTARS and ground-based sensors and things of that sort. But the aim is to find a mechanism for getting to that persistent coverage that we think we're going to need.

Next.

Shipbuilding and CVNX. A lot of discussion going on. The Navy -- I mentioned earlier that the services have emerging concepts of operations that are really quite interesting in their own right. And the Navy has been working very hard on this. You've probably heard the CNO and the secretary of the Navy talk about their concepts. In fact, I think there was an article in this morning's Early Bird from the secretary of the Navy on this.

It's fascinating work, and it has rolled down, from the Navy's point of view, then, into questions about the capabilities of their ships, about the need for new classes of ships, new types and designs. And that is reflected in the kind of proposals that they have brought forward.

We shouldn't forget, because it was only six months ago, that they put through the integration of Navy and Marine Corps air, a very big change for them, in terms not only of culture but also of bringing more combat capability to bear for, as it turns out, less cost.

And then there is, as a result of all of this, and what the Navy call sea-basing, the notion about, well, then what is forcible entry about in the future? What -- how does the Marine Corps think about the performance of the missions that it is historically assigned? How does the Army play in that role? What is the integration of air and sea assets if we're going to face circumstances where, operating from a sea base, we would want to be able to engage in forcible entry operations?

So we're going to go back in this next year and, as part of the follow-up on the Navy's concepts, begin to look at those kinds of questions. That is, I think, something that you will all want to talk with the Navy about. General Jones, for example, raised this question in -- about a week or so ago as well.

Next slide.

Combat air forces. A lot of going on here. This is the F-22, the F-18, the JSF. And there's a lot of discussion going on about both the programs individually and then how do they come together.

What I wanted to say here was that we clearly have to get, we think, into a stealth force with -- as quickly as we can. There are limitations to how fast you can go, based on the development of the airframes and so forth. And so there will continue to be some reliance on non-stealthy aircraft for some time.

But what we're really after here is the second bullet, and that is what we'd like to do is set this up so that by the time, hopefully, into the -- sort of the end of this decade, we will have -- the department will have a handful of choices about how it might want to go forward for the kinds of missions that we think are going to be associated with air power.

And that competition would -- we'd like to develop is between sort of three buckets of capabilities. One is with respect to the UAV and UCAV, and what kinds of UAVs and UCAVs do we want, what missions we want a to assign to them, what role and function do we think that they can play.

And then if we can arrange ourselves with those programs so that we're satisfied, the question then would be, relative to UCAVs and UAVs, what about unmanned aircraft? How do we think about their application and their role, and how would you balance those two sets of capabilities?

And then thirdly, you see listed here other things: standoff weapons, cruise missiles, hypersonics and so forth. Is there a role for those kinds of capabilities in this mix? And do they -- do you launch a hypersonic missile from a ship? Do you launch it from a UAV? Do you launch it from an aircraft? How about from the ground? What effect, then, does speed have on the type of operations that you can conduct?

And just to show you how this all begins to come back around together again, speed is helpful if you know what you're looking at and can identify in near real time what your targets are. And so you go back to a space-based radar and you say, "Gee, if I can get that kind of real-time information, speed then is worth having." And the reason I raise the point is that speed's expensive. And so --

Q: (Off mike) -- is not terrific on --

Cambone: All right. So when I went back to the beginning and said a joint concept with a C4ISR over the top of it -- here is a perfect example of where all of those begin -- start to come together, and you start to make the trades back and forth. Is any of that going to be settled in the '04 budget? No. Is the circumstance to set up the competitions over time and aim of what we're trying to do? We'll see how that comes out, all right?

Next.

Army transformation. The Army is engaged in a substantial top to bottom change with respect to its capabilities. It's looking to move toward the objective force as rapidly as it can. It's looking to get its first units equipped in '08 and an IOC in 2010. They are, as part of that mix, of course, working on things like the Stryker and a new Non-Line-of-Sight cannon to replace the Crusader. And so they are proposing means and methods of making that transition; and I think we'll sort of close that out over the next few weeks, and see where that all rests.

Next slide.

Special Operations Forces -- there's been some discussion on this, and I just wanted to note it here; and I guess I saw another piece in this morning's newspapers. The issue here is this: As you stand here today and look out into the next decade, what role is it do we think that the Special Operations Forces will be playing? And it's an important question to be asking, because they are at a point where they, the command, need to make some decisions about re-capitalizing existing equipment, about the replacement of any combat losses and if we are going to change their role in some way, or if their role is going to be changed by circumstances; then they have to start a process of recruitment and training. And, as you know, finding senior enlisted men who speak four languages, perform appendectomies and teach school simultaneously is not easy. And so, how do we want to take that resource and apply it is the question that is being asked here.

So, that's what is happening there. The command's not at risk, the concept isn't -- this is sort of, "Let's sit down and think our way through this because we have an opportunity now to make some changes, and do we want to make them now, or not?" is the question that is really at issue here.

Q: Is this is a size issue or qualitative applications issue?

Cambone: Yes. I mean it's both. Do you think that there are more missions or different missions that they need to be performing? And if you do, then how do you -- do we have enough people inside the command to do all the things that you want them to do? Or, on the other hand, if you want to confine, or define, rather, a mission space different than the one we have today, and then ask yourself, how does that affect your manpower? So, I mean, I think we're sort of in two directions. For the moment, they are being pulled in a lot of directions; and it's very stressing for them.

Next slide.

So, where do we go from here? I have to say, this is just a repeat of where I started. The SecDef, that should be, has met, but he's been meeting and with the senior leadership of the department, with the combatant commanders to go over these kinds of things in some detail. He'll meet undoubtedly with the deputy and the vice chairman, as well as the chairman. He may revisit some of these issues with the service secretaries. But in the end, he'll take some proposals over to the president and line those up for him and ask for his guidance on this. And then in December, we have to put this to bed and start the process of the comptroller building a budget in order to be able to get us there.

That's what I had.

Q: How do you -- when you get a left turn like the $690 million cost overrun on the F-22, how do you calculate that into this very -- well, a process that goes like this, when all of a sudden you have a huge bump?

Cambone: Well, the good news is that we know it before we send the '04 budget up. So, depending on the decisions that might be taken -- I think Pete Aldridge said there was a DAB on the 5th. Depending on the decisions or recommendations that come out of that, you can adjust a little more easily now than it is once you've locked all the pieces into place. When these kinds of things happen in the course of a regular year, during the year of execution, it's a bit more difficult because, in essence, you have to reprogram money, and that's not a pleasant thing to have to do.

Q: Are you basing budget decisions also on the possibility that there might be another war next year, meaning the war with Iraq, on top of all the other things that you're involved in?

Cambone: Basing budget decisions on the -- I mean, everyone is attentive to where we are and the need to assure that we have proper capabilities in place, that we have taken care of the munition costs, that the training regimens are where they should be. So all of that is being taken account of. So I guess the answer is yes, but I'm not sure that's what you're looking for.

Q: What I'm asking is, you know, if there is a war with Iraq next year, the cost of that would probably be -- are you thinking that that would be handled by supplementals or are you planning to --

Cambone: Well, we can't -- it's very difficult for us to budget against something that doesn't exist or hasn't happened. Okay?

Q: (Off mike.)?

Cambone: So what we've done is -- yeah, so what we've done is we have, as I say, taken care of the munitions, made sure the readiness levels are up, that the whole process of getting the forces to their proper levels of capability is taken care of. So that was the point about having the war, the forces and transformation and making sure that in fact we've done that.

Q: What's the biggest cost of a somewhat anticipated contingency like a war with Iraq? You say you've anticipated a lot of potential costs.

Cambone: Well, as I say, the munitions stocks have been taken care of, so we've looked at those. We have put a lot of money in this budget into readiness levels so that the Army, the Navy and the Air Force's readiness levels are up at the levels. Now, what happens oftentimes when people try to balance off these budgets is, you take money out of those accounts. We did not do that. Okay? So, you know, I mean, I don't know how else to answer other than that. It is possible to say, "I want to do a new start on Project X, and what I will do is reduce my Army tank miles by 10 percent." I mean, that's the standard they use for that. We didn't do that. We made sure that we met those goals and those marks.

Q: What about chem-bio? Have you put more money into chem-bio preparation?

Cambone: Well, there are sort of two parts to that problem. One is the near-term preparations kinds of things, and then the other is what are we going to do over the longer term. I can tell you that on the former -- that is, the near-term preparation -- that's been handled out of the strategic readiness oversight -- Senior Readiness Oversight Council, the SROC, and Dr. Chu has been leading that effort, so I can't -- I don't know -- I'm not familiar with where they are on those details.

With respect to the broader question of chem-bio -- research, installation protection, response and so forth -- yeah, that along with anti-terrorism and other force protection activities have gotten some focus and will put it on a path that will sort of rationalize that process, we hope.

Q: You had mentioned that others have talked about this moving to effects-based or capabilities-based, but when it comes right down to it, in the end it's all about programs and how do you build a budget around programs and platforms. How do you reconcile those two things? In other words, how are we going to see that transformation and that line of thinking that people like Jumper have talked about -- you know, getting away from program ownership and program focus and getting to this capabilities-based thing -- when in the end you really do have to build these budgets around programs? How do you keep this stuff about capabilities and effects becoming just rhetoric?

Cambone: That's a fair question, and I'll give you just three reasons why I think it's actually already past rhetoric. One is the statement by General Jumper that you're citing. He, secretary of the Air Force, secretary of the Navy, the CNO and so forth have all talked about the need for looking at the effect we wish to create and asking ourselves what portfolio of capability does one need in order to be able to achieve the effect. That has led to a number of proposals having to do with the second example, the Navy-Marine Corps integration for their air forces. That is an effort to produce a greater effect for the resources available in order to be able -- and at the same time to conserve resources.

Now, the third is the discussion I talked about here with space- based radars, aircraft and so forth. There's a lot of close analysis going on about indeed how do you produce that kind of persistent surveillance that we want over the range of choices we have to create it, as opposed to just saying, "I want to build more of this airplane and I want to build that satellite, and someday the two of them will come together." That's not how they're being pursued. But in the end, you know, you got to buy it buy the program because that's how you budget for these things.

Now, we will over time create sort of different categories of things, group things differently? I don't know. I mean, that's a process we have to go through over the next few years. It's going to take time.

Q: Can you give some idea where you're looking to cut in all of this? I mean, you talked about the --

Cambone: No, that's fair. And there has been a fair amount of work done in that area. The Navy will -- has, in fact, reduced the number of aircraft it requires, as a result of the integration. And --

Q: (Off mike.)

Cambone: I'll have to give you -- you'll have to give me a call. I mean, I don't have at the top of my head how far they were able to reduce their requirements for aircraft as a result. But it's not insubstantial.

Now, you see them out when those -- particularly JSF comes on line, so the immediate return on that is not as great. The Army is moving a substantial amount of money out of its current force and modernization programs, or at least proposing to do so, as a way of funding their future combat system. The Air Force has taken off line -- last year, for example, they moved B-1s out of the fleet and they're taking older aircraft out. The Army's taking Hueys out of the fleet. So there's a lot of stuff that's coming out that is not always visible, if you will. So those adjustments are taking place even as they are adding to the other programs.

Q: Do you see cuts in major weapon systems?

Cambone: Cuts in major weapon systems. I don't know the answer to that. I mean, as I say, the proposals are sitting there.

Q: Does it require cuts in major weapon systems?

Cambone: Does it require cuts in major weapon systems? The issue will not be whether a -- I think it would be fair to say that there isn't a desire to cut a major weapon system for the purposes of saving money. The question will be whether the weapon system at issue is going to support the kind of joint operational capability that we are attempting to construct here. And so if the judgment is that it does not, or it doesn't in a way that isn't -- it does not do so as well as something else might, that's, I think, where the focus is at the moment rather than on the issue of having to cut a big program to save dollars. But, you know, we're not done yet, so I hesitate to say never.

Q: And you can't give any, you know, specifics about which would be vulnerable, considering your --

Cambone: I'd rather not. (Chuckles.)

Q: How does that notion square with the whole point of the bow wave that you and Rumsfeld were talking about in '08, '09 and the need to -- one of the options being cutting --

Cambone: The question is, on the net --

Q: Yeah.

Cambone: -- have we managed that better than where we were a year ago. And when we get it all done, why don't we talk about that, and you tell me if you think we did it.

Q: Well, but sir, at the point early on, was the marker '08, '09, beyond? There is this -- all these programs --

Cambone: Which is why we talked about the competition to be started in the aircraft, why we talked about trying to balance off space-based things over against air capabilities, what we want to do with the amphibious forces. Okay. All of that is part and parcel of trying to manage exactly that.

Q: Well, the sense I'm getting here is, you're going to -- you want to try to manage that issue by initiative, as opposed to programmatic cuts of large programs.

Cambone: Let's -- when we get it all done, let's tote it up, and you tell me where you think we ended up.

Q: All right. Can I -- on CVNX, there's been a lot of speculation about, oh, they're going to cut -- they're going to terminate this program. Can you expound on this a little bit in terms of what are the issues about CVNX? And is termination even a viable reality right now?

Cambone: The Navy has a -- in its POM argued that they would like to begin construction of what they call CVNX-1 in FY '07, CVNX 2 in FY '11 and, in doing so, step through a process by which the technical content and the military capability of the second ship would be greater than that of the first, but that the first itself would be greater than that of the current design. And what we have been investigating with them is if that's the right strategy to pursue and how much of the technology that might be intended for the second of the two in the series might be brought forward. And so they are working to propose ways that they might be able to do that.

Q: (inaudible) terminating -- not even building this CVNX-1, is that -- that's not on the table?

Cambone: As I say, we have talked with them about taking the technologies that were in second and whether and how it can be incorporated earlier, and to see if indeed that can be done. And so that's what they are preparing to and have and -- are proposing to take a look at.

Q: It doesn't sound like you've killed CVNX-1 though?

Cambone: Why don't we see what we got when we're finished?

Q: Are you anticipating --

Cambone: Let me get this question back here. Sorry.

Q: If you went over this, I apologize.

Cambone: That's all right.

Q: Are there any plans to increase salaries for service members? Are you talking about -- what about personnel issues and quality --

Cambone: You really need to get David Chu down here to --

Q: (Off mike.)

Cambone: -- again, that's David's world of work, and so you might want to talk with him over there.

Q: Are you anticipating a sizable increase over the current fiscal year, asking for a sizable increase --

Cambone: That's why we go over and talk to the president. (Laughs.)

Q: (Off mike) -- I mean, you basically know the broad-brush outlines. I mean, what is your sense? The global war on terrorism, possible war with Iraq.

Cambone: I think it's fair to say that there's probably going to be a proposal that will be not less than what we have today -- okay -- and is likely to be higher, but by how much I don't know, because I don't know what the secretary's decided he wants to bring forward. I mean, that's why I go back to Tony's point and Bob's. I mean, you know, you're looking for an answer to a question I can't give you --

Q: Is there any way to sort of say what -- you know, broadly what portion of it is related to the global war on terror?

Q: Well, but sir, at the point early on, was the marker '08, '09, beyond? There is this -- all these programs --

Cambone: Which is why we talked about the competition to be started in the aircraft, why we talked about trying to balance off space-based things over against air capabilities, what we want to do with the amphibious forces. Okay. All of that is part and parcel of trying to manage exactly that.

Q: Well, the sense I'm getting here is, you're going to -- you want to try to manage that issue by initiative, as opposed to programmatic cuts of large programs.

Cambone: Let's -- when we get it all done, let's tote it up, and you tell me where you think we ended up.

Q: All right. Can I -- on CVNX, there's been a lot of speculation about, oh, they're going to cut -- they're going to terminate this program. Can you bound this a little bit in terms of what are the issues about CVNX? And is termination even a viable reality right now?

Cambone: The Navy has a -- in its POM argued that they would like to begin construction of what they call CVNX-1 in FY '07, CVNX-2 in FY '11, and in doing so step through a process by which the technical content and the military capability of the second ship would be greater than that of the first, but that the first itself would be greater than that of the current design. And what we have been investigating with them is if that's the right strategy to pursue and how much of the technology that might be intended for the second of the two in the series might be brought forward. And so they are working to propose ways that they might be able to do that.

Q: But the issue of terminating -- not even building the CVNX- 1, is that -- that's not on the table?

Cambone: As I say, we have talked with them about taking the technologies that were in second and whether and how it can be incorporated earlier, and to see if indeed that can be done. And so that's what they are preparing to and have and -- are proposing to take a look at.

Q: It doesn't sound like you've killed CVNX-1, then. No?

Cambone: Why don't we see what we got when we're finished?

Q: Are you anticipating --

Cambone: Let me get this question back here. Sorry.

Q: If you went over this, I apologize.

Cambone: That's all right.

Q: Are there any plans to increase salaries for service members? Are you talking about -- what about personnel issues and quality --

Cambone: You really need to get David Chu down here to --

Q: (Off mike.)

Cambone: -- again, that's David's world of work, and so you might want to talk with him over there.

Q: Are you anticipating a sizable increase over the current fiscal year, asking for a sizable increase --

Cambone: That's why we go over and talk to the president. (Laughs.)

Q: (Off mike) -- I mean, you basically know the broad-brush outlines. I mean, what is your sense? The global war on terrorism, possible war with Iraq.

Cambone: I think it's fair to say that there's probably going to be a proposal that will be not less than what we have today -- okay -- and is likely to be higher, but by how much I don't know, because I don't know what the secretary's decided he wants to bring forward. I mean, that's why I go back to Tony's point and Bob's. I mean, you know, you're looking for an answer to a question I can't give you --

Q: Is there any way to sort of say what -- you know, broadly what portion of it is related to the global war on terror? Or do you basically see it all related to the global war on terror?

Cambone: That is a very, very hard question to answer; it is a very hard question to answer. When the, you know, you fly the CAPs, you tank the aircraft, you steam the ships, I mean, is that all part of the war on terror? Yeah. Are they doing things that are immediately focused on the war on terror? Not in all cases; but -- that is to say, an active, specific operation. So, I don't know how to answer that question; I really don't.

Q: On Special Forces, can you explain a little bit the kinds of mission changes that are being considered?

Cambone: Well, let me give you an example. They have a -- one of their missions is training; they do a lot of training for foreign armies. That is a manpower-intensive undertaking, and it's something that is done over a long period of time. So, in the question of whether they ought to be the force that is engaged in training coalition forces, Afghan Army, so forth, I mean, is that something that we could ask the Army's Rangers to do, for example, and take that burden off of the Special Forces people? That's not so much taking away the mission, perhaps, as unburdening them from having to do it in all the places where they -- because of sort of the habit that has grown up, that when you want to get foreign troops in your region of interest as a combatant commander trained, you call General Holland. I mean, that's sort of the habit of doing that.

And so you say, well, gee, can we relieve them of the burdens of having to do that in order to focus them in other places, and what's the down-side risk of doing that -- because there's advantage to them, to the Special Forces people, for having that kind of intimate understanding and knowledge of other armies. And so, is that really the right thing to do?

Q: But what do you feel that Special Forces -- or not Special Forces, Special Operating Forces -- should be doing that they're not doing now?

Cambone: No, it's not -- I'm not sure, Bob, that it's a question that there's something that has emerged, you know, that they are not doing, and so therefore, we've got to -- it is they are doing so much. Do they need to continue doing all of the things that they are doing, and have them concentrate on fewer things; is that a plausible and reasonable thing to do, or not? Okay?

And then, the second question is, looking out into the future, might there be things we have not yet considered for which they would be appropriate, and do we need to pay attention to that? So that's more of a thoughtful piece. I mean, is there just -- are we missing something that we ought to be paying attention to? So, it's worth sort of spending a little time on it, and that's what he's asked us to do.

Q: The Marine Corps debate over forcible, or the questions the Marine Corps is asking about what is forcible entry in the future; can you talk in a little bit greater detail about what they're asking and how they're looking at that issue differently than they have in the past?

Cambone: Well, the, I mean, you can take three things that are, in terms of program of interest, and then we can talk a bit about circumstance.

Programs of interest: If the Navy is proposing, for example, to look at the creation of a new maritime positioning ship, which would be different in character from the kinds of ships we have today -- and the idea is they are more efficient, you can move people faster -- and connected with it would be high-speed vessels, for example.

Okay, well, what can you do with a high-speed vessel? Well, with a high-speed vessel you can move about a battalion's worth of troops with their vehicular equipment at about 40 knots over the distance, as they do now from Okinawa to Japan; there's a regular run that goes back and forth, and they have practice with that. We say: Self, gee, if I can do that, do I need to have the kind of arrangement that we do today, where they come, you know, out of well decks and all of that to go across the beach? If I can take this high-speed vessel, and against a -- in fairly shallow water against a relatively unimproved dock or cay or something, unload the force and move them very rapidly? Okay, well, there's a thought. So, what does that effect? Well, so how do I want to do this from the ship to the shore, and then, in light of what they might be able to do with an MPS future and a high-speed vessel?

The V-22, it gives them enormous capabilities. If that aircraft proves to be a viable air frame, how do you want to think about crossing the beach? I mean, you're going to do it at 10,000 feet as opposed to sea level? Can you do it? And if you can, then what's the implications for, again, maintaining a very large capacity for crossing the beach? On the other hand, if you think that there are going to be occasions where you have to actually go ashore against hostile fire, well, then maybe I need to balance some other elements into the equation.

So, there is potential out there that the Marine Corps sees, and what they're raising is the question of taking advantage of it. And if they do, then how would they structure themselves? It's a fascinating subject.

Q: Can you give us a little idea of what the directions were to the services? It sounds to me as though the directions were not: Cut your budgets from last year, but come in with approximately the same monetary amounts that's beyond that. What kind of directions were given to the services?

Cambone: Well, most of the programs that we talked about here were subject of some direction to one or another service or agency. And I think the first time I was down here, we talked about a number of these programs as having, you know, different kinds of questions being asked. In some cases, they were given direction to do something very specific; facilities, for example; bring them up to a certain level of capability. In other cases, they were asked to look at a series of options to include some particular one. And then in the third case, they were asked to address a problem we know we have, and give us alternative ways of approaching those problems. All right. Now you're to ask me for an example of the third one, and I'm trying to --

Q: Well, to the services in particular -- I mean, for example, was the Army told to accelerate transformation? Was the Navy told to increase --

Cambone: Take the Army. In that case, following the cancellation of Crusader, there was a discussion then about investing in indirect fires, all right, in order to be able to bring along things like Excalibur and HIMARS and things of that sort. So we asked them to do that, and they have come back with their proposal in their budget, which is what that is, on how they would execute that guidance. Okay?

Anything else? I got two more and I then I got --

Q: Can I -- I want to get back to the bow wave issue and the program cuts. Is it accurate to say that the one challenge is, all the services came back with budgets that seemed to mitigate in their own way their respective bow wave issues in '08 or in '09, and that in turn has mitigated from your standpoint the need to cut major programs for budget reasons.

  • Cambone: I think that you got more variables going in there in formation than --
  • Q: Focus it, then. (Off mike) --

Cambone: There are cases where they -- let me put it to you this way. Each of the services and agencies were attentive to the issue of an out-year bow wave and the need to manage it. Each of them, in their own way, has taken steps to address that bow wave from the perspective of the service.

The task, then, for PA&E is to sort of take all that, then, and rationalize it, and then assess -- and that's why we're not done yet -- all right, what's the net effect both in the FYDP or in that period between '04 and '09, and then what's the out-year bill constraint limits that we would leave to our successors. All right? And that's where we are at the moment.

The very thing that you're asking for I directed to have put together last week. Last week I directed to have it put together. I don't have it in my hand yet, which is why I can't give you a better answer on how I think we did, because I don't know yet.

Q: Will the big, major budget decisions be made by Wolfowitz in program decision memorandums or in program budget -- the PBDs?

Cambone: It'll be a mix.

Q: Be a mix. But the F-22, CVNX will both logically be decision memos from the undersecretary?

Cambone: Deputy secretary.

Q: Excuse me. The deputy --

Cambone: I don't know how they're handled. I mean, there will be one or the other document. But in any case, the secretary will take that decision with the deputy, the chairman and the vice chairman. I mean, they will -- all right, the process by which they're executed, I think, is less important than the fact that all of them will take that decision.

Q: Thank you.

Cambone: Yeah?

Q: I don't think there was any mention of missile defense in all of this. Has -- where does that fit in the priorities? Is it less of a priority now? And do you have a better sense of what -- how much of -- how much money that's going to involve in the future and what kind of a drag that's going to --

Cambone: I don't think that we anticipate that there's going -- we did not give them guidance to reduce the levels that they had been at last year, in terms of their out-year planning. General Kadish is proposing a number of programs within that budget, which -- you're right to put your finger on it -- which the secretary has reserved to himself to review and decide upon. I mean, so that is something, along with, I think, the Strykers I think I mentioned earlier, sort of still something to be completed. So that's where we are on that.

Okay?

Staff: Thanks, Dr. Cambone.

Cambone: Thanks one and all.

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