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Dr. Cambone Briefing On The Office Of Programs Analysis And Evaluation

Presenters: Dr. Stephen Cambone, director, Program Analysis and Evaluation
September 18, 2002

Wednesday, Sept. 18, 2002

(Briefing on the role and missions of the office of Programs Analysis and Evaluation. Slides shown during this presentation are available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2002/g020918-D-6570C.html )

Staff: Good afternoon. This will be a briefing on the defense program overview by Dr. Stephen Cambone, the director of program analysis and evaluation.

Dr. Cambone?

Cambone: (Chuckles.) How are you all today? Can't believe you're here and not out listening to the secretary and his testimony.

(To staff.) Do we have the slides? We do. There's a slide.

The -- this has been a process that's been in training now for some period of time. We kick it off in the early August time frame as we in OSD begin to prepare for this review. It -- let me say a word about schedule, because I did not put a schedule chart in this brief. The services began to submit their program objective memoranda -- their budget and their out-year program between '04 and then '04-'09 beginning on the 22nd of August. It will take us in PA&E on behalf of OSD some period of time to sort through those POMs to just figure out what they did. I mean, how did they lay down their budget and program? How did they comply with the guidance they received for '04? How did that differ from what they might have had guidance to do last year? -- and so forth.

Then there is a process which will run in parallel with the one in PA&E which is designed to give the comptroller -- that is, the budget guys -- a good idea of how each of the services and defense agencies has costed its programs and whether they are internally consistent for budget purposes. So there's a program review that is ongoing, which is being done out of PA&E and a budget review that gets done out of the comptroller's shop.

Last year we brought those two things together very late in the process. This year we are starting from the beginning, with the two of them running in parallel. Now why would you want to do that? In the past, what you had was a program review and then a budget review. And inevitably some of the things that you did in the program review, which would begin in, say, the June timeframe, could be undone in the budget review when for budgetary reasons, you wanted to make changes and adjustments. And so there were sort of two bites at the apple for everybody, and there was, as a consequence then, a lack of -- sometimes a lack of consistency across decisions that were taken. So we thought we'd bring them both together.

So August 22nd, they submit their programs from the agencies and from the departments. During the course of the month of September, both the comptroller and PA&E will go through the process of combing those programs.

Toward the end of this month into the early part of next month, a number of suggestions will come up from PA&E in particular but probably from the comptroller's office as well in response to what a service or an agency has done. And I'll show you some of the subjects of interest. And so what we'll try to do in the early-October timeframe is to begin to frame issues for the senior management of the department. And that management would include the secretary and the deputy, the chairman and the vice, as well as the service secretaries and chiefs. And in some combinations, and I don't know, by issue it will probably be different, but in some combination, those people will be involved in each step in this process in sort of thinking about how the issue is framed, did we -- in the period in September and into October -- did we frame it well? Did we get all of the issues on the table? Did we represent well the concerns that a service may have? Did we overestimate something we may think is more appropriate, that is, PA&E might think. So there's a give and take that'll take place there in -- at a certainly level of senior discussion.

After we've gone through most of the issues of concern, there'll be toward the end of October into the earliest part of November kind of another sorting process in which you're going to have to rerack all of those. And if you get through one discussion, and it's thought, well, perhaps we want to lean a little bit to the right on this program and a little to the left on the other program. Well, you got to come back and reaggregate all that and say, "What do I have?" I mean, "Do I have a hole here, or do I just have a set of parts that don't fit very well together?"

Toward the end of November then, Thanksgiving timeframe, is when I hope we will be able then to draw those together in a way that, again, the senior leadership in its -- either as a group or in its parts, can come to a set of recommendations then that the secretary can take to the president as -- for inclusion in the budget for '04.

So sometime in the early-December timeframe, you could expect that those recommendations would come over from the department to the president for OMB then to go through its process of building the budget.

So that's sort of the broad outlines, things to be done here through September for analyzing what was done; issues sort of set up beginning in the early part of October with some definition then of choices in the November timeframe; hope to get recommendations firmed up around Thanksgiving, and then the process goes forward from there. Meanwhile, the budget process will be going in parallel.

Next slide.

The department has spent a lot of time over the last 18 months putting together guidance, which is meant to frame the manner in which the budget is to be put together. Here is a representation of some of the major elements of that effort over the past 18 months.

The upper left-hand corner, of course, is the Quadrennial Defense Review. That was done in September of last year.

The contingency planning guidance is guidance that is given by the president to his combatant commanders for use in the development of their plans. So the plans that the combatant commanders put together are done based on that guidance. The contingency planning guidance itself reflects the strategic principles that were laid down in the Quadrennial Defense Review.

On the upper right-hand side, the Unified Command Plan, as you know, underwent major revision and then was amended again. So we will have two new commands being set up, Strategic Command and Northern Command, and we have sort of focused more the work that is to be done on Joint Forces Command.

The Nuclear Posture Review was consistent with what was done in the Quadrennial Defense Review as well. It's there to guide the development of plans for the offensive forces on the nuclear side. But as you know, in this guidance, we enlarge the area of interest and included conventional forces as an element of long-range strike capabilities, along with intelligence and defensive capabilities.

Theater security cooperation is peacetime activities, if you will, day-to-day activity by the combatant commanders in their regions of interest -- what countries do we need to make arrangements with and under what circumstances and so forth. So that's a peacetime planning process for them.

Then a defense planning guidance, of course -- this is the second issue; the first one was done last year, the second one this year -- and it is the direction to the services based on all of the others, designed then to say: Please program your forces. You are responsible, under Title X, for man, train and equip. Please be certain that you have now taken into account all of that prior -- all of the guidance you see up there in terms of what we want you to with your budget. All right?

All that comes together in the FY '04 budget and in the program plan, which goes out to '04 and '09. And that '04-'09 period, if you'll give me the next slide, is -- I mean, let's be honest. The farther out you get in time for any budget, the less detailed and hard that it is. On the other hand, investments that we are going to make -- and that's the point here in the middle bullet here -- the investments that we make now are going to begin to play out over that period of time. And so what we want to be sure is that as we make those investments in '04 and you play them out with their tails, as they are called, the subsequent year costs associated with an investment, that there is enough money in that out year budget, the budget we could expect to get in those out years, to pay for those programs.

Now if you want to make -- and that's where you begin now to get into the crunch between things that you have planned in the past and which you are paying for at the moment and for which you may pay another five or 10 years over -- against things you want to start now that you also have to pay for over the next five or 10 years. All right? And balancing out how much you want to continue with what you began in the past over against the priority that you want to place on things that you wish to begin in the present is where the tug and pull is, then, on the budget for '04 and planning for the out years.

The first bullet is meant to reflect the fact that in -- last year we went through -- and I forget. I've lost count -- with Dov -- five or six budgets of one kind or another. We did the amended '02, we did the supplemental, then another supplemental, then the '03, and so forth. So, I mean, there was a great deal of budget activity going on last year in the midst of the war, and that didn't give us the opportunity to be as deliberate as we are being this year in translating policy and plans into the budget.

Now, that said, I don't want to leave the impression that the '03 budget is unreflective. That's not the point that I'm making. We have said all along that the '02 budget would sort of make a down payment, and it did. It took care of housing, quality of life kinds of things for the troops, it looked after missile defense and S&T, and a few other things that the president had high on his agenda. The '03 budget has made an enormous investment in command, control and communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and is putting training and a handful of other programs that I'll mention to you in a moment. So the '03 budget sort of then sets the broad direction that we intended to go. This budget now says, or will say, all right, given those two increments, here's now a fuller appreciation for how we think we want to shape the force over time.

Next slide.

What we're trying to do is three things, but let me point first to the two items at the top on the left and the right. The political military environment, as you all know, is evolving at every stage and at every turn, and it will continue to evolve, in our estimation, over the next five or 10 years. And so we're planning in a fairly fluid, strategic environment and the military technical environment is equally fluid as we watch the proliferation of fairly advanced military capabilities around the world, not only in the weapons of mass destruction side of the house, but also conventional military. Whether it's surface to air missile systems or it's diesel submarines or other kinds of anti-access capabilities, it is clear that potential adversaries are becoming more sophisticated in their military equipment.

What we're trying to do here is a program that'll balance between the three bubbles you see here. The war on terror continues and will continue and has -- must be resourced to be successful. The people that we have and the forces we have have got to be maintained ready to do the tasks for which they've been assigned. And then we've clearly got to do the transformation.

So what we -- on the next slide -- can identify here, and I was alluding to it a moment ago in terms of what was accomplished in the '02 budget and what has been proposed in the '03 budget, which again, as you know, is still sitting up on the Hill, both in the appropriations and the authorization committees, we clearly have made these investments in people. We have gotten a pay raise that is quite substantial. There's a billion dollars' worth of money in '03 that is targeted against mid-grade officers and NCOs both. And we think that's terribly important, because they are the cadres around which an information age force needs to be developed. And they are the people for whom we compete most strongly with the private sector.

Readiness is up. Facilities are having a good deal of money put against them. You see $2 billion being added to recapitalization accounts. What that means is we're taking old facilities and trying to bring them up to contemporary private-sector standards, which means that the barracks get replaced and the depots aren't so bad and the runways get fixed. And it's an enormous amount of money that goes into that because those facilities have not been well cared for. You see that they were at a rate of some 200-plus at the recapitalization rate, and we're trying to take that down by nearly two-thirds.

In terms of investment, the top-line bullet there is important, I think. We put in $8 billion in terms of budgeting -- or out-year planning, rather, to take account of what we really think programs are going to cost. As you know, there is an approach to programs here which, you get them started, you know you've underfunded them, and you hope in each successive year, if the program proves to be successful, you can find the money to put into them, and if you can't, you stretch them, and they cost more and so forth.

So at least from the point of view of planning, we want to make sure that we have costed them appropriately both in any given year and then over the course of the period of planning. What that means is that there's $8 billion less to lay against other new programs or existing programs.

Next slide.

There were in the '03 budget, then, a handful of decisions that we have made and proposed to the Congress. Crusader you're all familiar with. The B-1 modernization effort has, I think, just kicked off. There was a desire to see an acceleration both in UAVs -- that's the Global Hawks -- and things of that sort, as well as the unmanned combat aerial vehicles. SBIRS-low. That is a satellite system that is intended to support the missile defense effort which was restructured back in December. The DD-21, of course, was cancelled, then we went to the DD(X); the SSBN to the SSGN; the Navy Area Wide was cancelled; and we're working, as I said, on both lasercoms and a C4ISR, and I'll spend a moment on those in a moment.

In terms of stewardship of the department and the defense enterprises, if you will, we're working very hard to see if we can't get, for example, an appropriate financial management system in place. Senator Byrd has rightly called our attention to the fact that those management systems are not what they should be. And Dov Zakheim, the comptroller, has put not only money but people and effort against putting that management system in place.

Next slide.

So that brings you the guidance for '04 and what are the kinds of things that we've asked people to do. We clearly are looking to highlight joint war-fighting capabilities, and you see them here. They shouldn't be of any surprise to you. As I said a moment ago, we went after funding people and housing and missile defense and S&T in '02 budget. We looked after C4ISR in last year's budgets. And now there's more still on C4ISR, but then there are other elements of the program where we think, again, as part of this transformational effort, we have got to put more emphasis and importance.

You've all been reading an awful lot about Special Operations. I mean, we're not inattentive to the need to see that the -- those special operators have what they need to do their job.

On space, there's an awful lot of attention that is paid to satellites in orbit. But those of you who appreciate it understand that, you know, a satellite at a half a billion or a billion dollars floating in space is useful if and only if it has secure up and down links that the place where the information that it moves is processed or retransmitted, and then the lines on which it is sent out to the users all have to be protected. And so that's a matter of making sure that they can't be jammed, that they can't be in one way or another tampered with, quite apart from what could be done to them in space.

The idea is to see if we can't stress capability over platforms. We tend to be platform-centric. In a moment, we'll talk about that. But what we're trying to do is stress that we want to see the capability and the output for the areas that we have highlighted on the top, rather than focus primarily on what system we are going to buy.

And then what we are trying to do is balance risk. And I apologize for the slide; it is written in Pentagon language. What it means is that the things on the left-hand side, as you see -- at homeland defense, experimentation, and so forth -- we would like to see the services and the agencies put those in priority, as opposed to the things that are on the right. So if you have a choice between a dollar going into homeland defense or going into what you see DOD-wide in direct overhead costs, that's the headquarters reduction. That's an awful lot of overhead we carry. Let's see if we can't get rid of some of that and put the money over into homeland defense.

There is, under the second bullet, the forces for winning decisively in a second conflict. What we mean by that is, we've changed the strategy. And as a result, what we ought to do is change the emphasis on where we are placing the modernization dollars and things of that sort, which is not to say -- and the reason I'm calling it out for you here on this slide is to underscore once, twice and a third time -- this is not an issue about force structure, this is an issue about how do we want to see the forces we have applied to the problems we're trying to address. Okay? So when it says, "Don't put your money into the forces that you would have used for the second MTW," which was the strategy of the 1990s, it doesn't mean get rid of the forces. It means how do we take the resources that would have been devoted to those kinds of missions and the upgrade of those forces and apply them to other things. In the Army, as has been reported, it's clearly evident what they've done; they have taken resources that would have gone to those forces which would've been in that second MTW, and they have, indeed, applied them to their future transformational-system concepts. So --

Q: (Off mike) -- something that --

Cambone: Upgrading tanks or fighting vehicles or something like that beyond a certain number. I mean, there will be a certain number required, but where you would've done it to the next new set of -- I don't know -- hundred or thousand or whatever it is -- we don't do that second set. The first set is probably the kind of thing you want to do.

Next slide sort of lays that out. I mean, we did in the QDR -- you've seen this slide before -- ask that we have forces that are able to do all of the missions associated with the strategy, rather than, as we had in the past, said we wanted forces for two MTWs. All the rest we did was included in that. So once you had your five divisions for each contingency; once you had your five aircraft carriers; once you had your -- I forget what the numbers were on airplane squadrons -- we were done. And then if you had to go to Haiti, you just took forces out of one MTW pod or the other, and you sent them.

We said, "No, that's not the right way to do this." What we want to make sure is that the force structure and the force's capability will do what we say here, and that is to deal with some number of contingencies. Here there happen to be two listed; it could be more than two. But we surely wanted to be capable of deterring any kind of conflict in the major theaters around the world -- Europe, Southwest Asia, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia. And in the event of a conflict, we wanted to be able to conduct two effects-based campaigns against adversaries. Those conflicts could come in overlapping timeframes. And we wanted to bring about a swift defeat of those adversaries. We didn't want to see protracted warfare. And the secretary, I think, has talked an awful lot with you about the need to move quickly and to bring these conflicts to a quick conclusion. And so what we want to do is have a force which is manned, trained, equipped and deployed and employed in a way that will allow us to do that.

Now it could be that an adversary is simply not going to understand that he has been defeated or is likely to be defeated. And he -- and the president, therefore, will have to exercise an option to bring about what's being identified here on the green chart as a decisive win, which is to borrow the phrasing from the past, which is, indeed, the invasion, occupation and overthrow of a regime if that becomes necessary.

Now under this arrangement, of course, if you have two overlapping conflicts, neither adversary's going to know which of them might be subject to such a decision by the president. And therefore, we think that the deterrent value is quite high. And all that needs to be done while we continue to do the same here at home, particularly in the environment in which we live now.

Next slide.

So all of that, then, brings us back to -- okay, so how do you get from all of that to a budget -- or a program, rather? And what we're trying to do is, again, as I said before, to stress the joint operational concepts -- (repeating for emphasis) -- joint operational concepts, joint operational concepts. In every meeting the secretary has with the service chiefs and secretaries, with the undersecretaries and the like, he continues to stress that we got to move to a joint way of thinking about how we're going to fight. And each of the services this year, in its own way, has begun that process of moving toward presenting their own budgets and programs in that context. Now, since it's being done by each of the services -- I mean, we're not quite there yet -- all right? -- and part of the function of my office and the review process that we're going through is to try to begin to knit together those connections. And that work is being done in very close cooperation with the chairman's staff down on what's called the J-8, which is the counterpart to my office. And so there's a good deal of effort to start stitching those -- and as we get into the habit of doing this year on year, and as the chairman and Joint Forces Command develop those joint operational concepts, we'll step by step get to the point where over the next two or three years we will have the ability to talk to you about what a joint operational concept might be.

All of that, however, has got to be done with an overarching backbone of the C4ISR. We are, I think, firmly of the view that C4ISR is a key to getting the transformation done. The list here is exemplary, it is not meant to be definitive.

So, we'd like to be able to go to some form of laser communication over time. How fast we do that is a function of technology and dollars and how fast we can redo the command and control nets and things of that sort. But the payoff is enormous. Think of it as fiber optics to and from space, as opposed to your telephone line going into your computer at home -- all right? I mean, so if you can imagine the difference between -- I mean, you begin to get some idea of the difference when you think of ISDN lines and DSLs over against your standard telephone line. I know this because my 12- year-old wants a DSL line. You can make up for some of that, as I did, when you buy a faster computer, and that's fine, but the information doesn't get in the computer any faster -- all right? What we're trying to do is to get to the point where we can move information by light, and if we can do that, we can move enormous quantities of information over very long distances and enable the kind of networked operations that we think will be the hallmark of the future.

Intelligence collection systems are enabled and enhanced by that kind of communication system, but they themselves, that is the collection systems, need to be redone. And we are looking at them both from the point of view of airborne, seaborne, terrestrial kinds of systems, as well as those that might be located in space.

Blue force tracking. It is a package not bigger than the badges you all wear; it has a little transmitter on it, tells you where the -- our people are. Now, why is that important? In an immensely complex battlefield in which people are moving in every direction all at once, where airplanes are trying to drop bombs, where ships are trying to give naval gunfire support, where the indirect-fire systems from the Army are trying to operate, you'd like to know where your people are. And this is a little transmitter and it just says, "Here I am, here I am, here I am." But it is another -- imagine having some number of people, and numbering in the thousands, out there operating, and imagine that many little transmitters going and you can begin to think about how much bandwidth gets used up for that. So again you come back to the communications revolution that we have to go through in order to enable those kind of things.

And that's what the networks are about, moving information around. We know what networks are because we use them every day. The military isn't there yet as a practical matter, and over time we want to move in that direction.

And what does that yield? Some call them self-synchronizing operations and there are other ways to talk about it, but rather than having a top-down, serial approach to operations, what you can enable -- I'm not saying this is going to be the inevitable outcome, but you can enable a situation where the commander lays down his intent, he gives the broad outlines of his plan, and then each element of that plan, each element of the force in effect watches it unfold in front of them. And they know when they are to take part. They see it happening. They know that their time is now. They go ahead and do what's necessary, and we don't have the elaborate and time-consuming and sometimes self-defeating process of having to do everything from a command headquarters.

I talked about capabilities. They're here in the middle. I don't think I have to go on about them. The only reason for talking about them here is what I said a moment ago. We don't buy capabilities, we buy programs or systems. And so you've got to translate the capabilities you want into the programs that we have. We have done it in a way in which we are trying to put these discriminators you see on the left and asking ourselves is it joint? Does it reduce our footprint? What about speed and range? Speed is expensive, so do we have it in the right places and are we spending the money for the right kinds of things? Once you get to the theater, are you mobile there? And how survivable are you? And survivability, again, comes through any number of means and methods. And so you need to kind of weigh those things out.

On the next slide, I will show you want some of you have all seen before, has been printed here and there. We ask for a lot of work to be done. There are some 80-some-odd studies that we've asked for. Here is a list of some of them. You know, they're sort of in many cases self-explanatory. There is an awful lot in here on information operations, and there's a reason for that. Dating back to John Hamre, we've talked again and again about cybersecurity and being able to assure that our own systems are secure and so forth. And we need to put in place inside the department the wherewithal organizationally to be able to do what needs to be done.

On the next slide is a set of other activities which are under way in terms of studying what we can do and how we can go about accomplishing the many, many elements of a contemporary force that we think are essential to be funded and programmed if we're going to bring about the kind of transformational capabilities we're looking for.

You see, for example, midway down on the right-hand side, there's a thing on -- a line on intelligence experimentation on EBO. EBO is -- Effects-Based Operations, the theory being that you don't have to get your forces lined up hub-to-hub at the start line -- you know, those newsreels from the battle of El Alamein, where Montgomery lined up his tanks and his artillery and away everybody went. The idea is that you can substitute for some of that mass effects. If you can target the right things, you can be precise in targeting them and you know what the effect of having targeted them would be in your adversary, you can begin to condition him in the battlespace in ways that are to your advantage, thereby making it possible to have that swift defeat take place with less force than you otherwise would.

Well, if you're going to do all that, you really do have to know more than we have in the past in the way of supporting the combatant commanders. I mean, it's not enough merely to know where the adversary is. You have to know something about how he might react, what's in his mind, what's his intent. So there's a lot of work that will have to be done over time in getting the kind of support that's needed.

On the next slide are the issues that you all have been writing about, sort of with greater frequency over the last month or so. I called these out for that reason. They are issues just like the others that have been analyzed. Let me just call out two that are of some interest.

The first is the operational availability that you see at the top of the right-hand -- left-hand side. That's a study being done down in -- by the vice chairman. The effort here is to understand in a swift defeat against the strategy I just described for you how much force do we have to get into the battle and how quickly? What does it need to do? What are it's -- what's its composition? Which leads you to the next point, which is the active and reserve mix. How much of the force needs to be active? How much needs to be in the reserve? And then with respect to both components, what's the internal mix of those two forces? Do we need to change them as a consequence of the change in strategy?

What does that do in turn them for the next item on the list, which is rotation ratios? For every soldier that's forward, there are four or five, depending on how you count, in the pipeline somewhere to support that soldier. For every carrier that goes forward, there's another two of them that have to support it. For every fighter squadron that goes forward, there's some -- so depending on how much you think you need forward and how much you need to bring to the fight immediately tells you something about what your rotation ratios are, which in turn then affects the quality of life of your people.

So you've heard about OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO and all of those kind of things which have afflicted the force in the past. Even as we try to move to a force that we can, you know, get to the fight quickly and who can bring about a quick defeat, what we're trying to do is to reduce the stress that that strategy places on our people. And the way you get there, in the end, is to transform the force, so that with presumably either fewer units of force for any given fight, or a more capable set of forces for those units, you can bring about a swift defeat of your adversaries.

The other set are the ones under the program issues. Again, there's been a great deal of discussion about these, and all I can tell you is that consistent with the schedule I gave you earlier, I wouldn't expect any hard decisions to have been taken on those programs until we get to the Thanksgiving time frame.

Q: Steve, what's the issue of the AC-130?

Cambone: The AC-130 is a highly capable gunship, and it was in last year's budget -- a proposal to procure, I think, four more. Well, what do you want in that? What does it look like? Is it still a 130? Would you arm it the same way if you did? Does it need to have a different set of comm units and computers and that kind of thing? Or is there some other concept for gunship support that we could use? And so that's the issue -- is to sort of talk about that.

Yeah?

Q: Sir, I don't know if this is -- (inaudible) -- but I don't see up there a study or a major program issue identified for the joint command and control ship that the Navy and the joint community are going after.

Cambone: The MC-2As and the MMAs and all that? They may be on one of the earlier ones having to do -- I know that they are included under the C4ISR heading -- okay? -- is a place where they are included. They are included as well under consideration of what the space-based radar might be. If you had a space-based radar, how does that play against a follow-on to JSTARS? Which is partly what the MC-2A aircraft is intended to do. So it's being looked at in that vein. So that's where they've been called out. All right? So there's that.

Let's skip over the next one, because that just sort of repeats everything in a different context. Hello? Bang, bang? Next [slide].

Q: Can you say something about the KC-135? Because of the questions that surround the possible Air Force leasing of the Boeing 767.

Cambone: Yeah. That I -- I am ignorant of sort of where that leasing argument is.

With respect to the 135s, they are older aircraft. They need some replacements. And the question is partly the issue of whether you lease them or not. But over time, then, the question is, what -- is it possible to get more use out of those aircraft? And one of the concepts that the secretary of the Air Force has advanced is that of smart tankers and the idea that you could use them as passer-receivers in the battle space, since they are close enough by in their orbits that they might be useful for some other things. And so they're looking to -- they're trying to think about what that future tanker fleet is going to look like and then try to put that in the context of both those things that they're going to have to do in theaters abroad and the extent to which they're going to need tanking here at home if they're going to continue to run combat air patrols. So the lease thing is a sort of short-term kind of question, as I understand it, and then there is still, though, the broader question of what does the tanker fleet look like as we begin to replace it over time.

Q: Does that mean -- do you mean to say, then, that you wouldn't expect the Air Force to make any decision on the lease thing until at least the Thanksgiving time frame that you --

Cambone: No, I think they've got that on a -- no, they've got that on another track. I mean, they're trying to line up what they're looking to do.

Q: But how do you square that with your statement that joint --

Cambone: Because they're taking that into '03.

Q: Sorry?

Cambone: They're taking that into '03. This is '04 and beyond. So that's sort of -- you know, the funny world we live in, right? I mean, we do things sort of on top of one another. But that is a separate track.

Q: What kinds of outstanding questions do you have about the V-22 and CVNX, which were listed up there?

Cambone: I think that the secretary, undersecretary for acquisition, has sort of talked about the V-22. It has gone into a test program now that will extend over the next period of time. There are sort of way points along the way where he's going to go back and check to see how they're doing.

And so it is, I think, a reasonable question to ask, if for some reason the program is not successful, what are the alternatives? That's one question. The other question is, if it is successful, what else do we need to do, because there's still the issue of heavy and light helicopters, if you will, that need to be looked after, so what kind of mix would you end up with. So you just look at a variety of scenarios to make sure that the options are available before you -- as you go forward.

On the carriers, they are, you know, a major unit of the fleet. There are a handful of proposals that the Navy has brought forward for follow-ons to the current builds. And so I think the question is let's just sort of make sure we understand how that fits in the context of all the other elements of the shipbuilding program, the aircraft programs. And let's make sure again, going back to the joint operational concepts, does this all make a whole? All right? I mean, that's kind of what we're trying to get to, and to make sure that we have all the investments lined up to take advantage of each other.

Yeah?

Q: Yeah, I have a little elaboration on the V-22, and what kind of feedback are you -- I mean, how likely is it going to be that that's going to be continued at least through another year? And also on the V-22, which was just renamed yesterday as -- I mean -- sorry, the F-22, the F/A-22, basically what's its future? Is it likely to be continued or substantially reduced?

Cambone: I can't answer either one of those. I mean, that's what we're in the midst of trying to do. I mean, that's -- you know, I told you -- that's why I started where I did. I mean, you know, when the number gets here, you know, we'll all know what the answer is.

Yeah?

Q: Could you explain -- on the previous chart up there, under "other major resource issues" there was "MDA deployment guidance." Could you explain what that is?

Cambone: The Missile Defense Agency has a program in place. It is designed to provide to the secretary, who then in turn can recommend to the president, the deployment of capability from the program either in an emergency mode -- you know, a threat comes into being and it's decided that some of the equipment that is in development can be put into an operational mode for that emergency, or -- that's one possibility -- or another possibility is that at some point you may actually want to start an acquisition program for the purposes of sensors or interceptors or command and control.

And so the guidance that they received last year was to structure their program to permit those kinds of decisions to be taken. They've done that. The program's now structured that way. So now they've asked, not unreasonably, the next question, which is, all right, how do you want me to arrange myself against the possibility that you may at some point ask me to begin this process of deployment for emergency purposes, on the one hand; and when would you like me to bring to you proposals for a standard acquisition, on the other? I need to know something about that so I can start to structure the test programs and so on and so forth in that light. And so that's all part of -- that's being done in the policy office and in conjunction with the people over in missile defense.

Q: And that's across the entire spectrum missile defense, both the system that would be in place to protect the United States and also what --

Cambone: Yeah, well, because not all of the theater -- the shorter-ranged systems have been decided upon. I mean, we have -- Patriot is moving forward in its PAC-3 configuration. The THAAD program is sort of proceeding on a course to be available -- I think it's '07 or -- I think it's '07 still, or '08 -- '07, '08. So they're sort of proceeding along. But, you know, there are proposals, for example, for sea-based systems to do longer-ranged intercepts, or intercepts of longer-range missiles. So General Kadish, not unreasonably, wants to see, well, where do you think I ought to fit this into this process and how should I structure the program? So that's what that's for.

Q: Will he deliver to you, say, hardware buys and also the personnel needed to -- you know, those kind of figures --

Cambone: I think -- the way we are structured at the moment is that he's got the R&D side of the house, and at some point a program would have to transition into an acquisition program of one kind or another. And depending on which we're talking about, if we're going to take test assets or developmental assets and use them for operational purposes -- JSTARS in the Gulf War -- that would probably come out of his program, because that's the way you can do these thing quickly. But in the same way then that JSTARS transitioned into an acquisition program pursued by the Air Force, and so on and so forth, I mean, that -- that's sort of how it would be done.

Now, my guess is, what he would come forward with is, you know, here's how we think it would work. You know, it's got so many of these and so many of these and requires this kind of thing. But that's not his decision to take.

Q: I didn't quite get what you said on the CVNX. Are you really talking about alternatives to aircraft carriers, or what is the problem with CVNX?

Cambone: There isn't a problem with CVNX. CVNX is a big commitment. It's a large ship. Puts a lot of airplanes on it. And there has been a very constructive conversation that has gone on with the secretary of the Navy and the CNO about the characteristics of that ship and any of its potential follow-ons; how it differs from the current ship; how the deck-loadings can be changed based on the kinds of aircraft, JSFs, that'll be available over against F-14s, and how does that change perhaps potentially; the role it can play in a conflict; how does that fit against some of the other concepts that the Navy has for its strike groups and other concepts for shipping. I mean, we just -- the Navy's been working 18 months in thinking their way through this process, and they've now delivered it to the secretary, essentially. And so the question is, okay, let's understand it. Let's understand this at least as well as the Navy understands it.

Q: Does that mean fine-tuning the design of it or does it mean --

Cambone: No, it's not the design. The Navy knows how to design ships.

Q: Is it do we need it?

Cambone: Well, it's not need. It's where does it fit as a concept. I mean, there is -- I don't -- I do not believe there is any notion that carrier aviation is not something that the force needs. Okay, that said, here's a proposal for doing it. It fits in with a much broader proposal that the Navy's made about restructuring the fleet, going to a different kind of organization. And so, let's all get smart on this, at least as smart as the Navy, so when we make our commitments, we know what we're committing to.

Q: On that slide where you had the program issue studies, what sorts of issues will your naval shipbuilding study look at?

Cambone: They are the ones you'd expect. I mean, it goes along with this question of kind of where do all the parts fit. I mean, we got submarines; we got cruisers; we got destroyers; we've got -- we've got carriers -- who, where, what, when, why, and how, you know, to make sure that when we lay down a program, it's one that's sustainable and is going to give the Navy the opportunity to bring on the advance concepts that they're working on -- littoral combat ships, the new DDXs, the new concepts they have for cruisers and maritime prepositioning. So I mean, there's -- there's a tremendous amount of work that's gone on inside the Navy, and we all sort of need to get as smart -- as I say, as smart as they are in what they're trying to do.

I can take about one or two more, and then I really do got to -- I got to go.

Q: You made the point early on about this being a dynamic process that takes into account all sorts of issues and changes in perceived threats. I'm wondering about what effect you think it would have on missile defense spending if Iraq -- if Saddam is knocked out of the box, and if North Korea, as seems possible, reaches some kind of agreement with the United States on doing away with its missile program, leaving only Iran, for the time being, as a member of the "axis of evil" that is among those that has been cited among the administration as the kind of rogue nations?

Cambone: Is that what's known as a leading question? Is that what that's known as? (Laughter.)

Q: I'm asking you, what do you think, what impact, you know, given the --

Cambone: If we were in court, it would be inadmissible leading the witness.

Q: -- would --

Cambone: I don't know. I'd need time to think my way through that for the moment. I -- not here now. I mean, we can talk about it another place and time. I mean, that's a big question. So -- yeah?

Q: S&T investment is a big priority for the administration.

Cambone: Yes.

Q: Yet there's a persistent tendency in the services, at least in the Navy, to seek to reduce S&T investment. Is that a concern for OSD? Would OSD object to that?

Cambone: It is a concern. But here's -- let me -- let me sort of give you some insight into how -- what we wrestle with on that. The budget -- the top line of the budget has gone up by some amount of money between '03 and '04. You say to yourself, how -- and we want to continue to make investments in science and technology, how much do you want to make?

You can set a percentage number, which has a disadvantage of it going up or down as the budget goes up or down. The argument against the budget going -- having a percentage number of the budget going up is that in part, the reason the budget goes up is because procurements presumably are taking place, and how much do you want to spend on S&T over against procurement, and if you can get a higher rate of return for the science and technology you've done by buying at a more efficient rate now, ought you not to shift those dollars into procurements, especially if you're short on airplanes or tanks or ships or something? That's one argument.

The other argument is, as the budget comes down, S&T investment goes down. If it's a fraction of the total, it goes down. And about the last time you want to see your S&T spending go down is when the budget goes down, because that's when you probably actually want to ramp it up, because you need to begin to plan for the next set of things that you need to take care of. So percentages are tough.

If you want to do it by program, I mean, programs eventually sort of run out, and they have to transition. I mean, if -- you know, if you leave them in S&T all the while, then, you know, it's a hobby shop; it's not S&T. So when you go from S&T to R&D and into procurement -- so it -- we are wrestling with that problem.

Q: And would you --

Staff: The last question, please.

Q: I'll let -- (off mike).

Q: Can I ask you a quick -- (off mike)? When the Air Force submitted its POM, they apparently neglected to identify the money that they need to put in there for the TriCare program, the health care, I think the retirement benefit program. Have they now done that? And has that slowed down or --

Cambone: I don't know that the facts of the question are right.

Q: Okay.

Cambone: It is true that they had to go back and shake some numbers and adjust, yeah. And they're about done.

Q: So you're okay looking at all their programs during -- did that slow you down at all or --

Cambone: Sure. Sure. But again -- and let me close with this -- people make mistakes. Stuff happens. We have been working -- my office, the Joint Staff, J-8, the -- my counterparts in each of the services. We meet every week for an hour or more to go over just those kinds of problems. All right? "This happened." "I can't get this piece of data in." "Here's the next problem we're going to have to deal with." "How do we want to think about V-22s over against -- whatever." So we sit and we've talked through all those kinds of things.

So the Air Force representative two weeks ago came in and said, "We got a problem." The question to him was, "Well, how far is it going to affect elements of the budget?" And he came back a couple days later and said, "Look, my guess is that this, this, this and this are pretty much going to stay the same. These are areas where we may have to start looking for some ..." -- so our guys went off on the places where they said that they would probably remain solid and were able to get some work advanced.

Does it slow the system down? Sure it does. But you know, there are ways around it.

So -- but the point I'm trying to make is that this has been as -- we have tried to make it as transparent and straightforward as we possibly can. We, for our part, have laid down concerns we've had, and each of the services has come back promptly and said, "This is what we did. This is why we did it. And this is why we think you'd make a mistake if you made us go back to do it the way you want it done." And all of -- no, but that's the kind of conversation you've got to have to grapple with a problem as big as this one.

So I think that, at least from our point of view, this has gone about as well as it can. And we'll see how we do in the next couple months.

Okay?

Staff: Thank you, sir.

Cambone: Thanks, guys.

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