STAFF: Good morning, everybody. Thank you and welcome to what I know is going to be a great Defense Writers Group Discussion with Dr. Ely S. Ratner, assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs. The ground rules, as always, this is on the record, but there's no rebroadcast of audio or video. Feel free to record for accuracy and quotes.
Of course, I'll ask the first question. Then we'll go around the table. I have a huge list of people who asked in advance. We'll get to as many as possible before giving the final five minutes to Dr. Ratner. So, thank you for joining us today, sir.
My opening question, exactly one year ago, December of '22, you spoke to AEI. Great discussion there, and you said, and I quote, "In my view, 2023 is likely to stand as the most transformative year in U.S. Force posture in the region in a generation." Pretty dramatic quote. So here we are a year later. What's your AAR?
I know it's still a work in progress, but what progress has DOD made? What are the greatest challenges, and what's on your to-do list and help me understand the risks higher, lower, mitigated in Indo-Pacific?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ELY RATNER: Okay. Well, Thom, thanks so much for the opportunity to be here. You've just asked about eight really important questions that I could spend the entire time on. So let me take a swing at a couple of them and then really look forward to the discussion here with so many good friends.
So that's right. Last December, I was at AEI, looked forward to 2023 as arguing that it would be the most transformative year in a generation for U.S. force posture across the Indo-Pacific. And the answer to whether we have answered that call is an unequivocal yes. So 2023 has been the most transformative year in a generation for U.S. force posture in the Indo-Pacific.
I'm going to build on that in just a minute. But before doing that, I do want to say, just a minute about the challenges before we get into the achievements, because it is — as I articulate what a big year 2023 has been, it has not just been in the force posture space. It's been across a number of dimensions that I'm happy to talk through.
But it is still the case that the 2022 National Defense Strategy identified the People's Republic of China as the department's pacing challenge. That is because in the assessment of the department, but also in the National Security Strategy, the PRC has been identified as the only country in the world with both the will and increasingly the capability to reshape the international order.
That was the assessment at the time of the release of the National Defense Strategy, and that remains the assessment today. And for those of you who have had the chance to see the department's China Military Power Report, which is our annual assessment to Congress, there is an articulation there of both how we understand the PRC's ambitions and will, and how we understand their growing capability.
And this remains, in my view, the national security challenge of our time. And that has not changed. So that is the context within which I'm happy to articulate some of the achievements that we've had over the last 12 months, because I think we are rising to that challenge.
And if we wanted to trace a year ago from now, I would look at the Secretary's travels around the region, which have really documented a number of major achievements, starting in December of 2022, the AUSMIN talks, the Australia-U.S. Ministerial annual 2+2 talks here in Washington, where we agreed upon major new Force posture initiatives in Northern Australia in January 2023.
As part of the U.S.-Japan 2+2, again, Secretary Austin with Secretary Blinken and counterparts announcing major revisions to U.S. force posture in Japan, bringing forward in 2025 a Marine Littoral Regiment into Okinawa, the Marines’ most advanced fighting formation, as well as a number of other revisions to make U.S. posture in Japan more resilient, more mobile, more distributed and more lethal.
Agreeing at the time to increase cooperation and exercises in the Southwest islands of Japan, so major achievements at that time, having discussions about Japan's counter-strike capabilities in the context of Japan making major increases to its defense budget.
The next month, in February of this year, the Secretary traveled to Manila and agreed with Philippine counterparts to four new EDCA sites. These are — this was an agreement from 2012 for the United States military to have access at the time, in 2012, to five Philippine military locations. And what we agreed to in February was to add four additional strategic locations to that list, expanding the geography and the strategic opportunity for the United States to be working with Philippine counterparts.
In March, of course, the budget came out. You've heard department leaders describe this as the most strategy-driven budget ever in the department's history. A strategy focused on the PRC as the department's top pacing challenge.
Then in May, the Secretary returned to Tokyo, again, to take steps in the context of Japan doubling its defense budget, went to the Shangri-La Dialogue and spoke about a shared vision for the region that we hold with our allies and partners throughout.
And happy to talk a little bit more about that because it's quite significant that the articulation of U.S. strategy in the region is shared by ASEAN, by India, by Australia, by Japan and South Korea, and the Philippines and the Europeans as well. This is not an American vision for the region. This is a vision shared by our allies and partners. Secretary made that point at Shangri-La, and then he went on to New Delhi.
We went to India. The Secretary signed a new defense industrial-based cooperation roadmap with his counterpart, a historic agreement that is setting our countries toward a deeper level of cooperation in an area to which there has been aspiration for decades, and often fits and starts. And in terms of integrating our defense industrial bases, working more in that area, we announced this summer a major agreement around jet engines. And we launched something called INDUS-X, which is a new effort to try to advance our private sector cooperation, particularly related to defense startups. That is really exciting, and we've put a lot of energy behind.
Now the next month, in July 2023, Secretary Austin was the first U.S. Secretary of Defense ever to travel to Papua New Guinea, and there took steps forward on the new Defense Cooperation Agreement that we have with Papua New Guinea, as we are looking to increase access in PNG through some upgrading of their port and airport facilities, another critical step in terms of working toward that more distributed posture in the region.
And then down in Brisbane, another really productive 2+2 AUSMIN talks with the Australians, again furthering force posture cooperation across all domains, including space.
Then just this November, we've just got back from another 10-day trip to the region. We went to New Delhi and, again, announced another major step forward in our defense industrial cooperation initiatives, onward to the ROK, where we put forward a bold vision for the alliance there and held a trilateral talk between Japan, ROK and the United States.
And at the end — and then down to Jakarta for the ASEAN Defense Minister Meeting-Plus, which is the annual defense minister meeting gathering in Southeast Asia with counterparts from throughout the region plus the ASEAN-Plus countries.
At the end of that trip, having had some face to face meetings with some of his counterparts that he hadn't met in person. Within a 50-day period, the secretary had met face-to-face with all five of our Treaty allies in the Indo-Pacific region, that's Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, Japan and South Korea. So just remarkable engagement with our allies during a time at which I don't have to tell anyone in this room, there are other things going on in the world. So intensive engagement in the Indo-Pacific with lots else that's going on. And, of course, the Secretary just recently, last weekend was out in California for the Reagan Forum. Maybe some of you were out there, and held an AUKUS trilateral meeting underscoring the last two years of progress.
So, again, sorry to go on a little bit, but I think it's important to lay down that record because this question of sort of what's happening in the region, that's what's happening, and a lot more and happy to talk about that, but we are — I think through the investments we are making, we are more capable in the region. We're more forward in the region due to the force posture changes that we made. And we're more together in terms of really remarkable progress in deepening our cooperation with our allies and partners. So let me stop there as kind of an opening chapeau, and look forward to the discussion.
STAFF: Great. Thank you, sir. First question from the floor. Demetri Sevastopulo, Financial Times. Demetri?
Q: Thanks, Thom. Ely, in the wake of the summit in San Francisco, President Biden and President Xi, two things. Have you seen any change in Chinese risky and coercive behavior over the South China Sea, either at sea or in the air? And now that you've been briefed on the Summit, did you hear anything that reassures you and makes you less concerned about what China's thinking about Taiwan?
DR. RATNER: Okay, so I guess, I'll — from the perspective — from my perspective, I will say, I have not seen anything over the course of the last couple of years that has indicated a change in China's strategic ambitions. Having said that, it is incredibly important that we and the PRC have open lines of communication. That is what, in terms of the defense relationship, our leaders agreed to reopen, renew military and military talks.
That's something that Pentagon has been calling for, for years now. You've heard Secretary Austin reiterate this a number of times, and we think that's really important. But I would say, as it relates to the — let me just say a word about the — for those who maybe are not following this issue quite as closely, the issue that Demetri raised, which is that we have seen a pattern of risky and coercive air intercepts by the PLA over the last couple of years.
Admiral Aquilino and I, a couple months ago, joined a Pentagon press conference to describe what was happening and why this is so important, and cited a phenomenon whereby there had been since 2021 — fall of 2021 through fall of 2023, about 200 what we characterized as risky and coercive air intercepts throughout the region, from the East China Sea to the South China Sea. And if you add in our allies and partners there, you would have about 300 total.
So this is coercive behavior in certain instances. This is quite dangerous behavior that could lead to crisis or inadvertent conflict. We released a huge number of photos and videos associated with that behavior. Actually one from each month over the last year, and this is something that, again, has been occurring not just to the United States, but to U.S. allies and partners.
We saw an incident against — and again, not just in the air domain, though that was the focus of that release, but also in the maritime domain as well and in some instances on land as well. And we just saw a recent incident against the Australians. We've seen others against the Canadians, the Philippines. This remains the issue of PRC assertive behavior, particularly against countries operating consistent with international law, remains a major concern, Demetri.
Q: What about since the Summit? Has there been an uptick downtick change that you've seen? Any patterns?
DR. RATNER: I don't have a comment on that today.
STAFF: Great. Thanks, Demetri. Tony Bertuca, Inside Defense.
Q: Thank you. I wanted to ask about the national security supplemental. Obviously, most of it's for Ukraine, some for Israel. It does mention the Asia Pacific in there. How necessary is it that money come and start flowing and what in there would aid Taiwan?
DR. RATNER: Okay. So a couple of thoughts here. I mean, let me just make a quick comment about as it relates to security assistance towards Taiwan, which is that one of the things we have done over the last year is ensure that we are using all of the tools available to the administration to fulfill our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act.
So, traditionally, the focus of that for the U.S. government has been on foreign military sales. But over the last year, for the first time, the United States has used both Foreign Military Financing and Presidential Drawdown Authority. And in last year's National Defense Authorization Act, Congress put forward authorities against PDA, Presidential Drawdown Authority, and Foreign Military Financing.
And Secretary Austin has been on the record repeatedly saying that for the department to effectively leverage those authorities, it's going to be required to get appropriations against them. So, to the extent that the supplemental provides appropriations against the authorities that Congress has provided that enables us to fulfill our commitments against the Taiwan Relations Act, then that would be welcome.
And consistent with what the Secretary has asked for in the particular — well, go ahead. What's your thought?
Q: PDA gets to my follow-up question, and we hear a lot about the PDAs from Ukraine, as small as 100 million. We heard about the one to Taiwan and we didn't find out what was in it from DOD. Will there be more coming out about PDA for Taiwan, or is the policy to just say, we're not going to talk about PDA to Taiwan when we do it?
DR. RATNER: So the — again, Congress provided an authority against a billion dollars of PDA in this year. There was no appropriation against that. So, significant distinction between Presidential Drawdown Authority for Ukraine and Presidential Drawdown Authority for Taiwan is that the Presidential Drawdown Authority toward Ukraine has been appropriated against for backfill, which is quite significant because it allows the services to be able to provide those capabilities with lower levels of risk associated with readiness.
The appropriation against PDA for Taiwan was not provided in 2023. And we went ahead with a major delivery or package of PDA earlier this year. And we are going to continue to assess the ability to provide that in the future. Some of that will be based upon needs, some will be based upon the funding and resources available, but I would consider PDA part of, as I said, the spectrum of tools that the administration has looked forward to using to fulfill our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act.
STAFF: Chris Gordon, Air & Space Force Magazine.
Q: I think — good morning. Thanks, Thom. Thank you, sir, for doing this. There's been a lot of discussion about whether America is diverting resources from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East recently. But to flip the question, not ask about U.S. force posture. What is China's goal in the Middle East? They've had numerous naval vessels there operating for years and trying to increase their partnerships. What's their endgame? What is their goal there, do you see?
DR. RATNER: So I think you'd have to ask them exactly about what their goals are there. But I will tell you, we have said when we articulate China as having the — both the will and increasingly the capability to reshape the international order, that is to create an international order that better suits their authoritarian preferences and the interests of the Chinese Communist Party. So that is the primary lens through which they're going to view their foreign policy decisions throughout the world. And as it relates to the defense issues, we have expressed concern about PLA's ambitions to be expanding its overseas presence around the world. We've expressed concerns about PRC support for Iran and support for Russia, obviously, as well. So those are some of the trends that we continue to watch. I don't know if you have a follow-up there about particularly which element of it you're —
Q: I'll be honest and say it's really a second question. How concerned are you about China's ability to disrupt, in the case of a possible conflict, America's military logistics through their involvement in commercial ports, both through ownership and the technological control? This is something TRANSCOM has brought up as a possible issue —
DR. RATNER: In the Middle East in particular?
Q: — globally.
DR. RATNER: Okay. Sorry, could you restate the question again?
Q: If China's control through ownership or their — the technology behind the commercial ports possibly disrupting American military logistics in a conflict, the department is — for at least TRANSCOM has articulated as a possible issue and then what are your thoughts on that?
DR. RATNER: Yeah, I think we have to — I don't have a very specific answer to that question, except to say that — ensuring that we have sufficient logistics to be able to project power into the Indo-Pacific and sustain and maintain our military in peacetime but, of course, through crisis and conflict remains a major focus, including for TRANSCOM, but for INDOPACOM and the department as well. And we have to be looking at potential vulnerabilities across the board, and I think we are — it is no secret that the PRC's military strategy is predicated in part on trying to prevent the United States from doing just that, from projecting power into the region and being able to maintain it. Some of you who follow these issues have heard the term anti-access / area denial. And I think we have to be very clear-eyed about PRC's attempts to disrupt the United States military's ability to do that every step of the way.
STAFF: Okay. Thank you, sir. Courtney Kube, NBC. You have the floor.
Q: Thank you. So APEC was about three weeks ago. Have there — just to be clear, because I know we're asking every day, have there been any discussions between Chinese and the U.S. about the agreements in APEC, mil-mil, MMCA, or anything like that? Did I get that acronym wrong? Did I get that wrong?
DR. RATNER: MMCA, that's right. That's one of our operational talks that we have held historically with the PRC. The state — so, no, we have not held a round of the MMCA, nor would one have expected that to occur in the short period of time since the APEC meeting. Those meetings tend to take a considerable amount of preparation, both logistical and substantive. The — where we are today is that the leaders in San Francisco signaled willingness on both sides to renew military-to-military engagements, discussions, and we are currently in the process of discussing with the PRC, the Defense Department is, about what that's going to look like in the months and year ahead and the combination of what will be meetings, calls, dialogues and engagements over the next twelve months. So nothing to announce on where that has landed, but yes, we're in regular discussions at the working level right now to try to set forward path on that.
Q: I think there was an assumption and it was — a mistaken one that there would — maybe quickly be some sort of phone call or something that would happen. And I was never really clear if it would be at the highest level. Like Secretary Austin would have a call, which I don't really know who, because I don't really understand his counterpart necessarily, right now. But — has Secretary Austin or anyone in the Pentagon senior level reached out since APEC and the call not been answered or has there been an overture to try to have communication since then, and it's not been so good?
DR. RATNER: What I would say is we're in discussions right now with the PRC about what that schedule of engagements is going to look like and what the sequencing is going to be.
Q: Is it so that months away, weeks away, years away that are or so?
DR. RATNER: It would depend on which elements you're talking about. Again, some require more preparation than others.
Q: I guess the first touch point since APEC. How long do you think that would be before that is? Months?
DR. RATNER: At the very latest, months. And sooner than that, hopefully.
STAFF: Sir, month or months?
DR. RATNER: Look, I don't want to put a timetable on it.
(CROSSTALK)
DR. RATNER: I don't want to put a time. Again, we're in active discussions. I think we're following up — both sides are following up on what the leaders agreed to and, again, this is consistent with what Secretary Austin has been saying all year about the importance of open lines of communication. So our policy and approach from the Pentagon has not changed. We have remained open to these kinds of talks and dialogues and engagements over the last couple of years. And right now, we're in discussions with the PRC about what that sequencing is going to look like.
STAFF: Thanks. Eric Schmitt, New York Times.
Q: Two questions. One is, can you give us an update now on what the current state of transfer of technology or arms, anything else, assistance from China to Russia, that can be used in the Ukraine war? And the second would be also the same kind of question about North Korea, the ammunition, artillery rounds and reports of missiles also being directed to Russia. Where do things stand with all of this?
DR. RATNER: I'm not going to get into specifics about exactly what our latest information is on either of those accounts today.
Q: Did you see any change? Let's start with PRC. Do you see any change in what they provided to Russia and Ukraine?
DR. RATNER: I continue to remain concerned about the support that China is providing to Russia for its war in Ukraine, and that's in a variety of ways. And certainly, on the question of DPRK support to Russia, that is deeply concerning as well. And you've seen some specific information that the White House has put out on that. It's something we continue to watch very closely.
We were, again, just in Seoul and had the opportunity to talk — Secretary Austin had the opportunity to talk with Minister Shin and Minister Kihara about this specific issue. And it is an issue that not only is of concern to our allies in Northeast Asia, but is of concern to our European allies as well. So I think it's a really dangerous trend. It's also a violation of U.N. Security Council Resolutions. And I think we are — as it relates to some of the support Russia may be providing back to DPRK. And I think this will be an important issue for us to remain focused on the denuclearization agenda as it relates to North Korea. And I think it's a question for Beijing about which side of that debate does it want to be on, in terms of whether it is going to continue to enforce U.N. Security Council Resolutions that it has voted for.
Q: What is your personal assessment about the impact that the ammunition in particular, that DPRK is providing? What impact will that have as we enter this new kind of winter transition, winter war transition phase?
DR. RATNER: I defer to colleagues who are day-to-day working on the Ukraine conflict.
Q: But is the volume you're seeing now even more troubling than the last White House briefing?
DR. RATNER: Again, I don't want to characterize its operational effects on the war in Ukraine. That would be a better question for Celeste Wallander and others in the ISA account.
STAFF: Thanks. Next is Mallory Shelbourne of Naval Institute News. Mallory?
Q: Hi there. Mallory, USNI. There's a pretty significant effort in the Indo-Pacific to move out on some technologies. Pretty dynamic shift they're pushing for with using unmanned out there to sort of get out the problem that you have. How is that feeding into your work on the policy side and the conversation you're having with allies and partners in the region and how they move with the department?
DR. RATNER: On the technology cooperation broadly and —
Q: Yeah, like unmanned —
DR. RATNER: Unmanned systems therein. No, it's a good question because I think if you look back on this past year, one of the significant achievements that we've had, but also trends that you will see, is that the administration has been opening up a number of technology-focused dialogues with our allies and partners.
Of course, we — the first major one of these was the ICET with India at the national security level in January. We launched another one with Singapore just a few months ago. And within each of these, there has been a major defense component. And that's something that, again, we've been very eager to participate in.
And again, as part of that — DIU has taken a very active role in terms of thinking about what is the role of commercial technologies therein. Doug Beck, the new director there, has been very ambitious in terms of the international agenda and also in terms of building international partnerships. And part of that has been looking at some of these unmanned, low-cost solutions, particularly in the maritime domain, as it relates to the Indo-Pacific. And we have been in a number of our engagements, whether it's with partners in South China Sea, with India, with other high-end partners, we have been talking with them about opportunities we see for them to integrate some of these low-cost unmanned systems into their militaries, particularly for maritime domain awareness, and to help them police their littoral areas, which is an area — coming back to some of the concerns about China's coercive behavior, an area where the PRC has been very active. So it's of huge benefit for these allies and partners to have greater awareness around what's happening in their area. And these kind of unmanned systems are critical to that, including subsurface. So what you're articulating is very high on the agenda.
Deputy National Security Adviser Finer is in India, I guess yesterday, or on his way back just now, following up on some of these issues. And it's going to remain top of our agenda. And just having been in Southeast Asia with the Secretary and his meetings with Southeast Asian partners, talking a lot about these opportunities.
Q: So I can ask a quick follow-up from the intercepts that we talked about in the discussion. Navy pilots who fly these say that most of their interactions with the Chinese intercepts are pretty routine, (inaudible) about two months ago, you saw an uptick between 2021 and 2023, but what did that look like before 2021? What — I don't think we have a sense of the denominator here. Is there — is it that there's more intercepts happening and therefore some of them are, you know, more aggressive? Or is it that there's, you know, the same that happening and they actually are more aggressive? How does that sort of shake out?
DR. RATNER: Yeah, and I should have said, sorry, the second part of what I should have said when I was articulating the data a little bit earlier was that the amount of these risky-owned coercive intercepts that we've seen over the last couple of years is more than we've seen in the decade preceding it. So the overall number of these events has increased significantly. Not going to get into the denominator question as it relates to the exact frequency of our operations, but while it is true that the overall majority of PLA intercepts are standard and professional, one of these is too many, and there have been hundreds. And some of them, extremely dangerous. And, you know, don't ask me. Ask Admiral Aquilino, who's a fighter pilot, and came to the podium to express real concerns about this. And he said the same just out at Reagan last weekend — so this remains, again, a significant concern. It is — the number of these has gone up substantially, and it continues to be a problem.
STAFF: Thank you, sir. Next is Nick Schifrin from PBS NewsHour. Nick?
Q: Hi Ely. Thanks very much.
DR. RATNER: Hi, Nick. Yeah.
Q: Good to see you. One about Chinese behavior and one about the impact of the war in Israel. When NSC was briefing us ahead of the Xi summit, there were kind of three variables given as evidence that the U.S. was ascending, and Beijing was looking at that. One was that Beijing believes Washington is not declining the way it used to, Beijing sees risk differently today and Chinese headwinds inhibit certain activities on Taiwan. Do you agree? And what does that mean? How does that actually translate?
DR. RATNER: Okay, so, not sure I want to characterize that exact framework having not been entirely familiar with it. I will say just a couple of things associated with this, which is, it is certainly the case that the PRC has been driving a narrative of Western and American decline for years. You can spend five minutes on social media and you'll see that. I think we can talk about a couple elements of this. One thing we have seen over the last year and as recently as this morning, is that the PRC is facing significant headwinds. And some of you may have seen Moody's announcement that they downgraded their credit rating for PRC government credit to negative due to their property crisis, due to local government debt, due to weak growth.
And, you know, general assessments are now that the PRC economy may be growing at around 3 percent and 4 percent. If you rewind the tape back, you know, not that many years ago, that would have been unthinkable. So we're in a situation now where the PRC economy is stagnating. Predictions of the PRC overtaking the U.S. economy, as sort of a metric of what we used to talk about as China's rise, is clearly no longer the trend of the time, to use one of their phrases. So that's significant. And that causes tradeoffs in terms of how they're using their resources, where they're spending their money, and where they're spending their focus.
We've also seen significant corruption issues inside the PLA and other domestic political issues. We had a question earlier about the Secretary making a phone call to the PRC Defense Minister. The PRC doesn't have a defense minister right now. And at the same time, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, I think we are seeing a resurgent United States.
Q: But it doesn't sound like you're translating that to change in Chinese behavior, or you're not?
DR. RATNER: Why don't you spin that out a little bit so I understand exactly what you're asking?
(CROSSTALK)
Q: — you know, lots of people in the U.S. government are describing the headwinds Beijing faces. But at the same time, you describe, obviously, strategically, Beijing is not changing its stance. Xi Jinping is not challenged. And, you know, the context for what you're saying is continuing Chinese behavior that you see as negative. So is there any actual translation of headwinds into a change in behavior about Taiwan or anywhere else?
DR. RATNER: I think, again, Nick, at the expense of giving you an answer that's going to be unsatisfying, it's just not the lens through which, at least at the Pentagon, we're looking at the problem, which is that we've articulated the PRC as the pacing challenge. We've articulated why we have, again, a clear-eyed view of their ambitions. I don't think those have changed. They are still engaging in rapid military modernization on a number of fronts. They're still engaging in coercive and destabilizing and risky behavior. And we are committed to building a free and open Indo-Pacific and strengthening deterrence against the use of aggression.
And we're doing that through the investments we're making that are focused on capabilities applicable to operational challenges in the Indo-Pacific. We're doing it through the development of new operational concepts, which is, I would say, as strategically significant as the investments in the capabilities in an area where we're making significant headway in the new operational concepts. We're doing it through our force posture we just described earlier, and we're doing it through our work with allies and partners. And what we are trying to do is cumulatively engage in a set of activities that maintains the stability that we've seen, despite the trends that you're describing, Nick.
And there can be parlor games around ‘does the invasion of Taiwan become more or less likely as China faces economic or internal challenges?’ I did a Ph.D. in political science, you could fill this room with books about how domestic trends affect international behavior that would lead you to different answers to that question. And so we're going to continue to strengthen deterrence and stability as best we can. And I think we're making headway, so —
Q: Have you seen any impact of the war in Israel on your discussion with partners in Asia?
DR. RATNER: What I would say is the Secretary had very in-depth discussions with a range of — throughout our trip to India and Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia, including with ASEAN partners. Secretary Austin had in-depth discussions with allies and partners about this issue.
STAFF: Jim Garamone of DOD News is next.
DR. RATNER: Hey, Jim.
Q: Hi, good to see you.
DR. RATNER: Good to see you. We missed you on our last trip. One of our stalwarts on the E-4B.
Q: And that goes to the heart — because I've been traveling with you for more than two years now, and there's one aspect that you always discuss when you talk about the pacing challenge, but it's the centrality of ASEAN. And I've always wanted to ask you this question, what do you really mean by the centrality of ASEAN. And how does it manifest itself? And where do you see the U.S. relationship with ASEAN in five years?
DR. RATNER: Okay, so it's a great question — let me answer the second part and then come back. The U.S. relationship with ASEAN, I would say, is strong and growing stronger. We were just again out in Jakarta, and Secretary Austin was there, as every single U.S. Secretary of Defense has attended the ASEAN Defense Minister Meeting-Plus. Since we first started attending, and that certainly can't be said for a number of other countries in the region. So we've really put forward our commitment. Obviously, we've upgraded our relationship with ASEAN. And the Secretary sat down with all of the ASEAN ministers and met as a grouping out in Jakarta, as he does on the margins of the Shangri-La Dialogue as well. And of course, outside of the military domain, the President has been hosting — has been engaging ASEAN leaders as well.
So I think it's clear that we view it as a really significant institution. And this trip, I mean, when we think about ASEAN centrality, it’s the institution that brings together the region in a way no other institution in the Indo-Pacific does. And just looking back at the trip, we were there just the last couple of weeks. I mean, at this time, given the war in Ukraine, the situation in the Middle East, all that's happening in the Indo-Pacific, it is ASEAN that is bringing together not only the ASEAN members, but the ASEAN-Plus members as well. So that includes the Japanese and the Koreans, the Russians, others, all to sit around a table and hear each other out.
And that has been really important in terms of an opportunity to share perspectives. And also for the ASEAN members itself, ASEAN has been a place where their ability to work together through collective action is going to be far greater than individually. And so I think it remains such an important institution.
And even as the United States is building additional what we sometimes describe as mini-lateral or other types of groupings in the Indo-Pacific, whether it's the Quad, whether it's AUKUS, whether it's our trilateral relationship with Japan, South Korea and the United States, all of these are complementary to ASEAN, and in no way are meant to somehow displace what ASEAN is. So fundamentally important and we're going to keep showing up because we are invested in that institution.
Q: Could I just have a quick follow up? The maritime awareness, at least from my experience, has been crucially important throughout all the ASEAN, frankly, all through the Indo-Pacific. Is there a way that ASEAN could sponsor that maritime awareness and be like, quote, "headquarters" for maritime awareness for the region, so to speak?
DR. RATNER: So there are, I would say, a number of maritime domain awareness centers around the region, including in Singapore. So whether as sort of ASEAN as an institution as you suggest, we have been invested, as I described earlier, in building out maritime domain awareness capabilities bilaterally, but also through the Quad. And one of the major initiatives that came out of one of the President's Quad summits over the last year has been the launching of the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness Initiative through which the Quad partners are working together to provide partners throughout South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Islands with high-grade commercial satellite imagery that allows them to have much more visibility into their littorals. And that program continues to develop and be rolled out. But I think it's exactly the kind of thing we need to be doing with our allies and partners, including in coordination with Southeast Asian partners.
Q: Thank you.
STAFF: Thank you, sir. Tony Capaccio of Bloomberg.
Q: I like your parlor game quote, by the way. Washington, Georgetown parlor games on what could be done, invasion of Taiwan. So Chairman Brown, in his first press conference a couple of weeks ago in Japan, which got no publicity, said, I do think Xi doesn't actually want to take Taiwan by force. He will try to use other ways to do this. What's your take on that? Is that something you share, that an invasion is less likely than other means like blockade that you've studied? Is Brown's view common throughout your policy world?
DR. RATNER: So my response to that question would be that when I look at the challenge that you're describing, number one, leaders in Beijing have been crystal clear about their ambitions toward Taiwan. Number two, they have already been engaged in an intensive pressure campaign and coercive campaign that includes economic, political, military pressure against Taiwan, and they have yet to renounce the use of force. So they are working across the spectrum.
And I see my job as, in part, ensuring that the United States is prepared for all of those, without somehow determining that one is more likely than the other. We have said, you have heard department leaders say, repeatedly over the last year that we do not believe that an invasion of Taiwan is either imminent or inevitable. We believe deterrence is real and strong, and it's our job to keep it that way. And that's going to take real focus, real energy, real resources, and real urgency in the years and decades ahead. So we have to deal with questions of deterrence against invasion, and we have to deal with potential contingencies below the threshold of conflict.
You described blockade, that's an issue I had a chance to discuss with the House Armed Services Committee when I was asked for testimony. So you heard my response there, which is there are significant risks associated with the PRC trying — for the PRC in trying to execute and implement a blockade of Taiwan. There are ways through which Taiwan could continue the provision of necessary materials and supplies, and the escalation potential is extremely high. And as I've said publicly a number of times, Beijing would likely be finding itself in the position of whether it wanted to start shooting at commercial vessels. So I don't see that as a low-risk option. In fact, it's a very high-risk option. And I think all of — as you look at the spectrum, as we think about deterrence, there is very high risk for Beijing associated with any of those.
Q: A tactical question. Back in April, I guess, in the Camp David agreements, there was going to be a shared air defense construct set up by the end of the year between Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. Where does that stand and how will that — what will that look like?
DR. RATNER: So — and again, during the trilateral meeting that Secretary Austin held with Minister Shin, Minister Kihara was calling in virtually from Tokyo, just to be clear on that. But the ministers held a secure trilateral discussion while Secretary Austin was in Seoul. They checked in on this particular initiative. And the nature of the initiative is for the U.S., Japan, and the [ROK] to be sharing early warning missile data trilaterally. And the goal was to get that operational before the end of the calendar year. And we will meet that goal. And I'll —
Q: What does it look like, though? Will NORTHCOM, Northern Command have feeds from South Korean radar and Japanese Aegis radar into —
DR. RATNER: Let me — in order to be perfectly precise about that, let me take that for the record, and I'll ask my team to provide you with the sort of more technical nature of that. But what I will say is there were two major announcements, so that's one, we're on track, and that one, that goal will be met.
And that is extremely significant for these three countries from an operational perspective and also a political perspective to be sharing the data. The other major announcement that came out of Camp David related to the U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral relationship was an agreement to develop a multi-year exercise plan between the three countries. We have had episodic trilateral military cooperation, at times in response to DPRK provocations and activities. The goal here is to regularize those and institutionalize them. And we're on track for that as well.
So these are — I should just say that again for folks who maybe don't live and breathe the Indo-Pacific, this is a historic evolution in how we think about maintaining security in the region in terms of the cooperation between Japan and Korea, and then trilaterally with the United States. And really huge credit to leaders in Tokyo and Seoul for making that happen.
Q: The echoes of World War II doesn't sound like it's still resonating between South Korea and Japan in terms of comfort women, reparations issues, and the atrocity issues that the Koreans had associated with Japan over the decades. I don't get that sense of still a pacing factor.
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DR. RATNER: These are still highly resonant issues. And in that context, the leaders have agreed to deepen this cooperation, so —
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DR. RATNER: This has been, again, bold leadership by Tokyo and Seoul.
STAFF: Shinichi Akiyama of Mainichi Newspapers.
Q: Hi. Thank you for this opportunity. So last year's NDAA required to establish a joint headquarters in the Indo-Pacific. And what is the current discussion there? What will this headquarters look like? Where will be the location?
DR. RATNER: Nothing to share on that this morning, I will say. But I will say — which outlet did you say you were from?
Q: Mainichi Newspapers.
DR. RATNER: Okay. So we are certainly cognizant that the SDF is setting up its own new joint headquarters in Japan. That's a significant evolution for the Japanese military, and we — the United States, are thinking about the best way to integrate with that. So I think that is — it's sort of tangential to your question, but it's an important part of our work with Japan right now is thinking about — as Japan is setting up its new joint operational headquarters, what's the right mechanism for the United States to work alliance issues through there.
STAFF: Thanks. We have a lot more questioners, but we're almost at the hour mark, and I will save a couple of minutes for the Secretary. Last question goes to Mike Brest of the Washington Examiner. Mike?
Q: Down here. Thank you. So, to go back to the APEC conversation, is this post-meeting playing out the way DOD envisioned as it relates to setting up that initial meeting? And then can you point to any specific or tangible effect that DOD has seen since the meeting as it relates to China's military behavior?
DR. RATNER: Demetri asked a version of that earlier on the former — I would just say similar answer, which is that we are in the process of working with — talking with PRC counterparts about what the sequencing and calendar of events is going to look like. And we're working toward that. So again, we're — nothing to announce this morning, but folks are hard at work trying to deliver on what our leaders have agreed to.
Q: Is this sort of what you guys expected this process would look like?
DR. RATNER: I don't know that I had particular expectations, but yes, it is working through very traditional channels in terms of who's communicating with whom and the manner in which we are proposing particular engagement.
Q: Can I just ask — you said you're in the process of talking, so does that mean there will be conversations? I think we're just trying to find out, like, has there been any initial conversations, even at very low level?
DR. RATNER: Yes. Working level discussions, whether it’s between our defense attache in Beijing with his counterparts or our defense relations team here in Washington, have been ongoing —
Q: Just prior to APEC.
DR. RATNER: — prior to APEC. And they are currently engaged in discussions about what the sequencing of events might look like. So it's —
Q: I think —
DR. RATNER: — less mysterious than it sounds.
Q: Yeah. I think there's been a lot of talk that there's been no movement on this since APEC. I think that's why a lot of people are interested in it. That there's been no movement at all. And I got to think like —
DR. RATNER: That would be a mischaracterization, that there has been no movement. I think both sides are working to fulfill the commitments of our leaders. And again, from the perspective of the Pentagon, we're looking to deliver on what President Biden agreed to. And we're in the process of doing that right now and we'll look forward to sharing specifics when we have them.
STAFF: Great. Thank you, sir, for your time, for sharing your wisdom. Thanks to your staff for your support. Any final comments? The floor is yours.
DR. RATNER: You know, maybe just one thing that we haven't talked about yet, which we've talked about in bits and pieces, but I think to me is one of the most important trends in the region, which is the increasingly again — sometimes folks use the word mini-lateral, but the emergence of really significant groupings and networking among U.S. allies and partners and we've seen this in a couple of different ways. Again, we've talked a little bit in depth about the U.S., Japan, Korea relationship. These are some of our closest allies, most advanced militaries, most advanced economies technologically, and are now cooperating militarily like never before. And I expect 2024 to be a big year in that regard.
We have also seen, obviously, AUKUS making huge strides both as it relates to — what is sometimes described as Pillar One effort, the submarine part of the effort for Australia, as well as the advanced capabilities effort Pillar Two. And the readout from the Secretary's meeting over the weekend, trilateral meeting provides detail about some of the efforts therein.
We have also seen significant development in the trilateral relationship between the United States, Japan and Australia. Those two countries themselves over the last year have signed a Reciprocal Access Agreement, meaning their militaries can access each other's facilities. And over the last several months, Japanese F-35s have visited Australia and Australian F-35s have visited Japan. And we have agreed trilaterally — for Japanese forces to integrate into U.S. Force posture initiatives in northern Australia.
These are profoundly significant developments in the region in terms of the degree to which allies and partners are working together and with one another in different constellations. We have seen with the Philippines increasing its cooperation with Australia, increasing its cooperation with Japan, and looking toward more mini-lateral, multilateral cooperation there in Japan, including with the United States.
Of course, we have the Quad, not a defense-focused initiative. It has been working on issues like maritime domain awareness and others. And to me, these are the pieces that are building the future security architecture in the Indo-Pacific and are ultimately going to answer the question of how we are going to maintain peace and stability into the future. It is not — I will underscore — it is not an Asian NATO. It is not a singular anti-China or counterbalancing coalition. It is something different. It is something that is tailored to the security requirements of the Indo-Pacific. And we are now in the, I think, beyond nascency of this initiative, of this trend into something that is becoming real.
And I talked about force posture last year, I think, won't make any predictions, but I would say for 2024, watch this space, because this is, I think, the most exciting, interesting, and strategically important trend in the Indo-Pacific. And it's real in a way that it's never been real before. And I'll stop there.
STAFF: Well, thank you for a very thought-provoking hour. And on that exact point, I'll put in an early invitation now to come back in a year and give us your AAR for 2024.
DR. RATNER: I would love to do that. And thank you for everyone's time and attention this morning.
STAFF: Great. Thanks, everybody.