PENTAGON PRESS SECRETARY MAJOR GENERAL PAT RYDER: Hey, good afternoon. Can I have a quick comms check? Can you hear me ok?
MAJOR GENERAL RYDER: Great. All right. Well, good afternoon, everyone. This is Major General Pat Ryder, Pentagon press secretary. Thanks very much for joining us today for today's background briefing and update on the situation in Ukraine.
As you may be aware, the Ukraine Defense Contact Group originally scheduled for October 12th has been postponed, so we'll provide updates on that in the near future regarding a date and location for the next UDCG session. However, we thought it would still be useful to provide you with an update on where things stand in Ukraine, to include US support for Ukraine against Russian aggression, and we'll endeavor to host these background briefings on a fairly regular basis since many of you have requested them.
As a reminder, today's call is on background attributable to a senior defense official and a senior military official, not for reporting.
Please note I will call on reporters try to get to as many of your questions as possible in the time we have available. And before we begin, I would ask you to please keep your phones on mute unless you're asking a question. With that, I will turn it over to our senior defense official, followed by our senior military official for an opening.
SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Thanks. Thanks, everyone, for the opportunity to speak with you today. Certainly, I had hoped to brief you ahead of a leader level Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting. But as I'm sure everyone understands, President Biden decided to remain in the United States to coordinate the response to Hurricane Milton.
As you heard during the president's bilateral meeting with President Zelenskyy on September 26th, the administration remains focused on surging security assistance and taking other steps through the end of the term to help Ukraine prevail. I want to begin with a brief discussion of some of our recent security assistance packages.
The president exercised his authority on September 26th to ensure the $5.55 billion of remaining presidential drawdown, or PDA, authority did not expire before the end of the fiscal year, ensuring that the United States can continue supporting Ukraine with this authority. Preserving this authority will allow us to continue our steady support with security assistance to Ukraine via these PDA packages.
In the 66th package announced on September 26th at a value of $375 million, the department will provide Ukraine additional capabilities to meet its most urgent battlefield needs, including air to ground weapons, munitions for rocket systems and artillery, armored vehicles and anti-tank weapons.
President Biden also announced a $2.4 billion Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative package. This package will provide Ukraine with additional air defense, unmanned aerial systems, and air to ground munitions as well as strengthen Ukraine's defense industrial base and support its maintenance and sustainment requirements. Through this package, we will make a significant investment in Ukraine's drone capability, providing thousands of unmanned aerial vehicles and providing components to enable Ukraine's domestic production of drones.
That support has been critical to augmenting Ukraine's successes on the battlefield. Since February 2022, Ukraine has inflicted more than 600,000 casualties on Russian forces. In September of this year, Russia — Russian forces sustained more casualties in terms of both killed and wounded in action than in any other month of the war. Russian losses, again both killed and wounded in action, in just the first year of the war exceeded the total of all Russian losses — Soviet losses in any conflict since World War II combined.
Ukrainian forces also have sunk, destroyed or damaged at least 32 medium to large Russian Federation navy vessels in the Black Sea, forcing Russia to relocate its Black Sea fleet away from Crimea. They have also destroyed more than two thirds of Russia's pre-war inventory of tanks, forcing the Russian military to dig into Soviet era stockpiles and field tanks from World War II.
And most recently, Ukrainian forces have used indigenously produced drones to strike Russian strategic ammunition depots at Toropets and Tihoretsk, making a serious dent in Russian supply lines. The total tonnage of ammunition destroyed in strikes on these facilities represents the largest loss of Russian and North Korean supplied ammunition during the war, with hundreds of thousands of rounds destroyed. Russian efforts to minimize risk to existing ammunition depots probably will force the Russian military to undertake inefficient adaptations that will slow delivery of ammunition to the front.
Now, I am not, however, suggesting that Ukraine has an easy path to victory. Russia does continue to devote significant amounts of resources and, as I underscored earlier, lives toward a grinding campaign, redoubling its efforts in the east despite Ukraine's offensive into Kursk. Russia has also demonstrated time and time again a willingness to do whatever it takes to attempt to force the Ukrainians to capitulate, including purposely targeting Ukrainian civilians and critical infrastructure.
Despite these challenges, the United States and our allies and partners remain committed to supporting Ukraine as it defends against Russian aggression. Thank you, and I look forward to the questions.
MAJOR GENERAL RYDER: Thank you very much.
SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Hey, good afternoon, everyone. Just a couple of things that I'll start out with and then happy to talk more specifics as we go into question and answer afterwards.
But broadly speaking, no major changes in the overall strategy on either side. It's an attritional strategy on the Russian side, and of course the Ukrainians are mounting a strong defense both on the ground and from an air defense perspective.
For the battlefield itself, the two areas that remain most active are up in the Kursk area and then out in Donetsk. I would say that there have been overall minor changes to where the forward line of troops are on the battlefield in both of those areas.
Up in Kursk, there have been some limited counterattacks by the Russians, but really no meaningful gains or exchanges of territory in the last several weeks. And then down in Donetsk, while the Russians did make some advances earlier in the summer, those advances have slowed compared to that time period. And again, I'm happy to go into some more specifics on that during question and answer.
As far as long range strikes, we've seen some successful one way attack drone strikes by the — by the Ukrainians against ammo storage points in Russia. We've also seen some strikes against fuel facilities down in Crimea. We do think that those will have some impact on the battlefield. As most of you would understand, those sorts of deep targets, when they're hit, there'll be a delayed impact on how things are looking on the battlefield, but over time it certainly would manifest. So, we do think that those have been effective, and we'll see when those effects manifest in a meaningful way on the battlefield.
And then finally, I'll just highlight Ukrainian air defense. The Ukrainians do continue to defend their skies with the capabilities that they have. It's a tough fight, with a large number of attacks coming from the Russians each day, but the Ukrainians are doing a sound job of defending their critical infrastructure and defending at the front — on the front lines as well. We, of course, are keeping a very close eye on their inventories of weapons that they have to defend themselves and working that with our policy counterparts to try to increase the stocks that they have on hand for their — for their defense against those attacks.
So, I'll leave it at that as just a broad overview, and then I'd be happy to go into more detail or specifics during question and answer.
MAJOR GENERAL RYDER: Great. Thank you very much to our senior defense official and our senior military official. First question will go to Associated Press, Lita Baldor.
Q: Hi. Good afternoon and thank you both for doing this. Can you — you know, first of all, can you address sort of — at the risk of beating a dead horse here, the Ukrainians continue to press for the permission of the US to do longer range strikes into Russia. Do you see a change in US policy on that coming, and/or do you see any shift that the US will give Ukraine something else that will sort of make up for not allowing that?
And then just quickly, can you give us a sense of sort of how the — both countries are setting up for the winter months and whether one or the other can gain some sort of advantage with this — at this point this year? Thank you.
SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Great. So, Lita, on the long range strike issue, we have not changed the position on this. I think I've spoken with some of you about this before in terms of how we consider, you know, decisions on capability. We always look at kind of risks and benefits. And in this particular case, we certainly have to look at risks in terms of readiness.
This is a — you know, a munition that has, you know, finite quantities. And we also, obviously, have to look at risks of escalation. But in terms of effectiveness, we also have to look at whether the quantities that exist, and again, they are limited, whether they would have the strategic effect.
And we certainly know that many of the capabilities that are of greatest concern, particularly for glide bomb use, for instance, have actually moved out beyond ATACMS range. And we also know that we've seen tremendously effective Ukrainian strikes using their indigenously produced capabilities.
SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Lita, on the question of how they're setting up for the winter months, I think the way I'd characterize it is I expect more of the same from the Russians. I expect them to continue to try to make incremental gains to try to attrit Ukrainian defenses.
As I know that you're aware, that's a really tall task for them, and that's why we've seen such incremental gains out of the Russians over the last while, despite, you know, a significant force ratio advantage in many places on the front. And so, as a — as the senior defense official mentioned, we do see a large and growing number of Russian casualties as they do this, but I think we'll see more of the same. It's kind of the Russian way of war, that they continue to throw mass into the — into the problem, and I think we'll continue to see high losses.
On the Ukrainian side, I think it's a little bit more nuanced. And of course, it'll be up to the Ukrainians on exactly how this plays out. But in general, I would characterize their thinking as a little bit deeper in time and space, and that they're thinking certainly of how they defend through the winter months and at the tactical front, you know, where are the most defendable lines where they can impose the most costs on the Russians as the Russians advance.
But I'd say that, in my estimation, the Ukrainians are thinking forward to the — 2025 and how they set themselves up for battlefield success then. And so, that includes things like ensuring that the additional brigades can come online as they increase their recruitment, as they get better equipment and training, reconstituting brigades that they're cycling off the front line, and really building up their combat power for the future.
So, I think that's how I would characterize the Ukrainian approach. Certainly, they're focused on how they get through the winter, but they're thinking a little bit longer term about how they set conditions for success next year.
MAJOR GENERAL RYDER: Thank you both. Next question will go to Washington Post, Missy Ryan. Missy, are you there?
Q: Yeah, I'm here, but I actually think Alex Horton is — has a question that he's going to ask.
MAJOR GENERAL RYDER: Ok. We'll go to Alex in Ukraine.
Q: Appreciate that. Yeah, this is for the SDO and Russian losses. You know, this sort of harkens back to Vietnam. It's very General Westmoreland-ish to sort of characterize Russian casualties as some sort of metric for success. So, I was curious if you could put more meat on the bone on what we're supposed to exactly take away from that when we know that, you know, in between Bakhmut and down all the way to Vuhledar, they've gained more territory than they have in the last two years. So, they are trading for bodies for space, and that seems to be working for them at least in terms of the space aspect. So, what exactly is the body count suggesting that is, you know, something we should take away from?
SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: So, Alex, thanks, and glad to hear that you're reporting from Ukraine. I'll look forward to seeing — to seeing your writing. I think that in terms of, you know, mentioning the Russian casualties is not to suggest that this is a definitive metric for the war, but it is an important factor. And, you know, certainly we do know that, you know, Putin is trying to avoid a mass mobilization because of the effect that would have on, you know, Russia's domestic population.
At this point, he has been able to significantly increase the pay of these voluntary soldiers, and he has been able to continue to field those forces without doing a major mobilization. And I think we're just watching very closely how long that stance can actually be one that he can maintain. And I think it's an important one for all of us watch very closely.
MAJOR GENERAL RYDER: Thank you very much. Next question will go to New York Times, Eric Schmitt. Eric, are you there? Ok, nothing heard, we'll go to CBS, Charlie D'Agata.
Q: Yes. Thank you. I wanted to actually follow up from what Alex was saying. Those are extraordinary numbers, 600,000 casualties, and I'm more — paying attention to more casualties in September than exceeded any other month of the war. That in itself says something. Where are these casualties happening? Where is the ferocious fighting happening? As was already pointed out, the Russians are making ground. Is this on Russian territory? Is it along concentrated front lines? And is there a reason for an increase, or is just — is this just a spike in ferocity of the fighting in the past couple of months?
SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Yeah. Charlie, I'll take the first answer to that and let the senior defense official fill in if she'd like. But I would say, you know, the Russians have been — as Alex mentioned, they've been attempting to move on the offensive, and they have had some success with taking minor amounts of terrain.
And as they — the cost of taking that minor amount of terrain, particularly in Donetsk and down around Pokrovsk and Vuhledar, has been the substantial casualties that they've incurred there. So, they have attempted to overcome fires with mass of maneuver. And that, I think, is probably the — that is where I would say most of their casualties have come, is because of that offensive.
I mean, if you look at the salient around Pokrovsk or pointing toward Pokrovsk, the number of Russian forces in there is astounding. It's tens of thousands of forces that they've put into that very small area. And as you know, when you have that many forces in a very small area, indirect fire of any kind or any — or direct fire, for that matter, it's a target rich environment. So, that's what I think is the proximate cause or one of the leading proximate causes of those casualties.
MAJOR GENERAL RYDER: Thank you. Let's go to —
Q: Wait. Can I just follow up that? Is this artillery war that we're seeing? Is this the kind of fight? And more to that point, as the time that I've spent in Ukraine, they were begging for more artillery shells. Where's the equipment pinch if any, at the moment?
SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: So, I'll allow the senior military official to talk about kind of the nature of the fight. But we are co-chairing the Artillery Capability Coalition with France to support Ukraine's artillery needs, both for today but also for the future. And what we have seen in the past six months of assiduous work to both increase production, and the US has really led the way here, with increased production of 155 millimeter artillery shells, but also in terms of, you know, increased procurement, increased donations from stocks, and the Czech initiative, which is really sourcing ammunition from around the world, we have seen a much more steady supply of artillery munitions for the Ukrainian forces, and it really has tangibly changed the situation on the battlefield from what you saw, you know, as much as a year ago in terms of the shortages that were being experienced. But there may be more detail from the SMO.
SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: I don't know, Charlie, that I have too much to add except, yeah, there is, as you know, a huge amount of artillery that's being exchanged back and forth.
I would just note, and again, this is probably fairly obvious to all, that if you're undergoing an artillery barrage while you're on defense, that's a little bit better than if you're undergoing an artillery barrage while you're on the offense and you're exposed. You have to leave from, you know, the revetments that you're hiding behind, the berms, etc., and move out across open terrain. So, I think that that — those two factors combine to add up to what we're seeing in terms of casualty producing effects.
Q: Thanks to both.
MAJOR GENERAL RYDER: Thanks. Let's go to Chris Gordon, Air and Space Forces Magazine.
Q: Thanks, Pat. And thank you to the officials. For the senior military official, how are Ukraine's F-16s being used? What sort of missions is Ukraine conducting with its F-16s, and how much are they still reliant on their Soviet era fleet?
And then secondly for either official, the US announced last month it will train 18 Ukrainian F-16 pilots next year. Where will those pilots be trained? What's the timeline for that training? What is the experience level of the pilots that will be trained? Could it include newer pilots, if we have any more fidelity on that announcement? Thank you.
SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Hey, Chris, thanks. I'll take the first part of the question. You know, I can't go into a lot of detail on exactly how the Ukrainians are using their F-16s, except to say, you know, it is a different kind of weapon system, as you're well aware, from the Soviet and Russian technology that they've employed in the past, and so there is a bit of a transition there.
Our — you know, the overall recommendation is, whenever you're adopting a new technology to make sure that you're mastering it, you know how to use it, you've got the appropriate amount of experience with it before you try to do too much with it. And I'll just leave it at that.
You know, as far as how they're — as far as how they're employing it, etc., I really can't go into those details here. But I do think that over time, as they increase their proficiency, as the numbers increase, as the pilots that the senior defense official will give you a little bit of background here on a second increases, you'll see the battlefield effects that that platform is able to provide increase.
And, you know, I would also just highlight, you know, the F-16 program, many of us seem to — we tend to think of it as what is its immediate impact going to be. But this is really about the long term security of Ukraine and how we set them up to be — interoperability with Western forces over the longer term and how they can defend their airspace over the longer term. So, some of it certainly is going to apply to the current battle, but I think of this as a much more longer term project.
SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Great. And the 18 pilots, this is really just the latest number of pilots that we are pulling into the F-16 training pipeline. As you may recall, the Air Force Capability Coalition is a co-led effort by the Netherlands, Denmark and the United States. And working with the Ukrainians and those allies, we actually work together to identify slots in multiple countries.
So, the US is hosting some, but there's other countries that host other pieces of the training pipeline, and that includes everything from, you know, the English language training that is typically necessary at the front end to basic pilot training to the more advanced F-16 pilot training. So, we work together to construct a pipeline that makes sense for the skill level of each individual pilot.
And it is a mix. Some have been experienced pilots, and we still are, you know, receiving more experienced pilots, but there's also those that do not have that kind of pilot training and experience.
Q: Can I just clarify one thing you said there? Of those 18, are those a mix of countries, or are those all in the US?
SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: It's — there's a mix of locations for the different pieces of the training pipeline. And that's true not just of the 18, that's true across the board. And I won't get into the specific details of exactly who is training in which location out of respect for operational security.
MAJOR GENERAL RYDER: Thank you. Let's go to NBC, Courtney Kube.
Q: Hey, I'm sorry. We had some technical problems on our end early, so forgive me if you've already addressed this. But can you tell us anything about the South Korean announcement that some North Korean troops may be joining Russia to fight in Ukraine? Have you seen any seen any indications of that, whether it's individuals or equipment that's moving in that direction?
And then on the — on F-16s in general, I wonder has Ukraine I guess briefed you on the F-16 crash from several weeks ago on the cause of that yet? Can you share anything that you've learned on that?
SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: So, I'll just say on the question about the reports coming out, including the one from South Korea, we don't have anything additional to add. In the past, we have spoken about the support that North Korea has provided Russia in terms of munitions. But I don't have anything to add to this latest — this latest news report.
And in terms of F-16s and the specific investigation, we would refer you to the Ukrainians on anything they may want to offer on that.
Q: When you say you don't have anything to add on the North Korea, I mean, do you — does that mean that the US doesn't have any indications that's true? Are you — I mean, are you — it's from South Korea, a close US ally. So, I mean, is it that you just haven't seen anything of that, or do you not think that it's actually accurate?
SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: So, I don't have any other specific information to add beyond what you have seen in the — in the media reporting.
MAJOR GENERAL RYDER: Ok. Thank you very much. Let's go to Defense News, Noah Robertson.
Q: Hey, thank you both for doing this. I have two questions. The first is on the discussion of Ukrainian made drones that you had at the top. As early as this summer, some senior US military officials were saying, including in interviews that I did, about Ukrainian drones are more of a nuisance rather than a capability that could replace some of the precision strikes being provided by the US. I now hear a more positive tone coming from the two officials on this call. I'm wondering if you can describe, A, whether anything has changed with the advanced nature of their capabilities, or B, whether the Ukrainians are just getting better at integrating these capabilities in counter EW operations? And then I have a second question. Thank you.
SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL Noah, thanks. Thanks for the question. I certainly am more positive than some of that — some of the other officials that you are referencing. I do think the Ukrainian made drones are doing very well. And we've seen — you know, there's clear evidence of that with some of the one-way attack drone. Attacks against the ammo storage points is a very easy example to leverage.
I think — you know, I would say it's a little bit of both. I would say that there's some capability enhancements, and I wouldn't want to go into the details of those for operational security reasons. But I know, of course, that the Ukrainians are rapidly innovating on the battlefield with their capabilities. The pressure of war will have that effect on any military. And so, there certainly are capability enhancements that have happened very rapidly.
And also, they are getting just, you know, more sophisticated in their tactics, techniques and procedures. And so, I think it's a combination of both of those things that have — if there has been an increase of effectiveness, which, again, I think it's reasonable to say that there has, and that these will continue to improve in effectiveness over time. It's for those two reasons.
Q: A second question is on the provision of aid by China. I know to this point US officials in the Pentagon have described this as dual use aid. Kurt Campbell went out publicly and said that it went beyond that last month. Do you have indications that China is providing direct lethal aid, or has that still not changed?
SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: So, I don't have any new information beyond what the administration has released previously on China's support for Russia.
Q: Is it fair to say that it's increased at least?
SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: I think it depends on what time frame you look at. I wouldn't be able to give you a specific sense of kind of quantitative or even qualitative over time. But certainly, we are concerned about China's support for Russia in the midst of this horrific war.
MAJOR GENERAL RYDER: Ok, we've got time for just a couple more. Let's go to Fox News, Jen Griffin.
Q: Thank you, Pat. I wanted to ask about the Ukraine Contact Group and whether the postponement or canceling has anything to do with the fact that it is harder and harder to get donations of weaponry. Anything that you can quantify in terms of difficulties in getting weaponry right now for Ukraine?
SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Absolutely not, Jen. I would say that this is really just all about the president wanting to take care of his responsibilities here in the United States as Hurricane Milton bears down on US territory, and it has absolutely nothing to do with international support.
We were really looking forward to a host of countries participating and also making new donation announcements. So, I see continued very strong support from the donor community, both in terms of individual donations but also, increasingly, in terms of participation in these capability coalitions, where you see countries coming together to coordinate how they are making future procurements for Ukraine's future force and giving Ukraine a better sense of predictability about its weapons supplies over time.
MAJOR GENERAL RYDER: Ok. And last question. We'll go to Bloomberg, Tony Capaccio.
Q: I think Tony just stepped away, so I'm going to take it for us if that's ok, Natalia Drozdiak. Thanks so much for doing this. I just have two questions. For the SMO on Kursk, are you still confident that Ukraine can hold that territory through the winter, given the likely difficulties they're going to have in terms of maintaining supply lines?
And then secondly, for the senior defense official, about the aid package to support Ukraine's drone production, was that the first time that the US was investing directly in Ukraine's industrial production? And if so, have there been any sort of conditions set around that, like when it comes to preventing corruption or anything? Thanks.
SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Hey, thanks, Natalia. On the Kursk question, my assessment is that the Ukrainians will be able to maintain their position in Kursk for some amount of time here into the future, I think several months and potentially beyond. You know, the battlefield is ultimately unpredictable.
But if I look at the combat power ratios, you know, you mentioned supply issues for the Ukrainians, I haven't seen a significant supply issue on their side. I would tell you I've — I would argue that, because this is not the main area where major Russian combat formations have been operating, they have significant logistical issues on their side in terms of repositioning troops and organizing themselves to go on the offensive, etc.
So, I still think — as I mentioned, there have been some uneven counteroffensives, some limited counteroffensives by the Russians, but there's been nothing that would indicate to me that they're ready to make a major play toward taking Kursk back. And I don't think they'll be able to do it anytime soon.
SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: So, in terms of your question about kind of investments in Ukrainian defense industry, we have cooperated with Ukrainian defense industry in the past. And I think it's important to note that, with our Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative authorities, these are contracting mechanisms, so these are procurement mechanisms in which we have contract with companies. So, it's a very um kind of rigorous way of accounting for the procurement. And we will do the same with this as we would do with any other procurement.
And I would say that we — the experiences that we've had most recently with Ukraine defense industry in the context of the war that have been tremendously successful revolve around our — what we call our FrankenSAM project. So, it's the project where we combined Soviet type air defense systems with Western technologies and munitions. And we actually partnered US companies with Ukrainian companies and engineers to devise this very creative way forward that has helped Ukraine deal with massive shortages in air defense interceptors and systems. So, from that experience, we took away a very positive sense of the possibilities of cooperating with Ukraine's defense industry.
MAJOR GENERAL RYDER: All right. Well, thank you.
Q: This is Phil Stewart. Is there any way — is there any way we could just clarify, because I think a lot of people are confused, if the senior defense official was confirming that there are North Korean soldiers fighting in — alongside Russia and Ukraine?
SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Sorry, Phil. No, I am just saying that the only information I have is this open source information, and I do not have additional information to offer.
MAJOR GENERAL RYDER: Right. In other words, we have nothing to corroborate those reports, if that makes sense. Ok. All right.
Well, again, I want to thank our senior defense official, our senior military official. As a reminder, this discussion today was on background. Thank you for joining us. That's all the time we have. Out here.