SENIOR DOD MILITARY OFFICIAL: DTRA [Defense Threat Reduction Agency] is the U.S. government's and the Joint Force's insurance policy against a global dynamic and increasingly complex threat of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction. DTRA has a proud history. It traces its origins all the way back to the Manhattan Project. The agency you know today was formally established in 1998 through the merger of other counter WMD [weapons of mass destruction] agencies around the DOD.
Initially focused on nuclear weapons development and treaty compliance, DTRA's mission expanded to address emerging threats. Basically, we are the department's centralized area nexus when it comes to countering weapons of mass destruction and protecting national security, ensuring a unified approach to deter, prevent and prevail against weapons of mass destruction.
Now you may be thinking when we talk about counter WMD or countering weapons of mass destruction threats, we mean the breadth of activities that DTRA undertakes developing the tools and capabilities to actively counter our adversaries' threats.
We are one of eight DOD organizations authorized by the Secretary of Defense to serve as both a combat support agency and a defense agency. As a combat support agency, we work directly with services and combatant commands to deliver solutions to immediate and emergent problems. And as a defense agency, we provide consistent capabilities across the DOD to maintain the defense posture of the United States.
Our workforce is comprised of military and civilian personnel with a tremendous amount of technical expertise, operational experience, persistence/vision to execute this no fail mission at home and across the globe. DTRA is meeting the administration's vision to achieve peace through strength and streamline operations, bolstering readiness and prioritizing critical missions within the DOD.
As good stewards of the taxpayers' dollars, I really want to emphasize this, we, DTRA, received an unmodified opinion on our fiscal year 2024 audit. So, what does that mean? You know, it's kind of an unsexy term when you say unmodified audit, but essentially, we got a clean audit, and we passed the audit for the Department of Defense. So, we're very proud of the agency and all the great work our teammates did to do that.
We lead DOD efforts in the nuclear surety, logistics and mission assurance area to ensure a strong nuclear deterrent. DTRA manages the DOD's only integrated system to track and report on every facet of the U.S.' nuclear stockpile. We verify and validate all actions related to nuclear weapons and we write, review and validate all technical procedures used by DOD regarding the maintenance of the nuclear stockpile.
We also reduce global WMD threats through training, equipping, material transportation, elimination and disposition. With that, I'd like to provide an example. In 2024, DTRA disrupted a major threat to international security by taking possession of approximately 1 million pounds of interdicted missile precursor chemicals, which DTRA packaged and transported to the United States for safe and secure disposition. For reference, this is enough precursor material to fuel approximately 300 ballistic missiles.
And last, which we will talk about more in depth. DTRA generates customer focused, threat informed, trusted technical solutions to deter and counter critical WMD problems for today and tomorrow. We are the DOD science and technology lead to deliver technology, knowledge and concepts that enable the Joint Force to fight and win in a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear contested environment.
It's important to remember through all of this that it is our people that makes this tremendous technology successful. We have some incredibly gifted and smart people within the DTRA agency, and I would liken them to — if you watch James Bond films, they're kind of like those folks that work in Q that come up with these incredible solutions to difficult problems that have tremendous and successful effects in the end.
In some cases, our experts will work on problems for years or decades so that we have a solution ready when our country needs one. And truly, it's the dedication of these people, some that have decades of experience within these technical areas and certainly within the agency, that turn problems that need to be solved into reality and solution for the warfighter.
Now for more background, which I'm sure you're interested in getting from our DTRA research and development efforts, I'm going to turn this back over to the STAFF and we look forward to your questions later on in the session. Thank you very much.
STAFF: Thank you, sir. You're now going to hear from SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL who is going to be providing details about the operation, and a little bit more about the DTRA mission and the things that — in our research and Development Directorate that they do overall. The floor is yours.
SENIOR DOD OFFICIAL: Thank you. Good afternoon, all. Thank you, STAFF, Senior DOD Military Official, for that introduction and inviting us to join in speaking today. Thank you, press members, for your time this afternoon as well to hear a little bit more about how DTRA supports national security and ensures that our military members are fully equipped to deny possession of and defeat adversary weapons of mass destruction across all domains.
I'm going to start by talking a little bit about what we mean by countering weapons of mass destruction, just to make sure that that's very clear. It's a privilege to talk about all that DTRA does to counter the threat of weapons of mass destruction. But there can be a bit to break down.
When we talk about countering, we mean that we're looking to actively develop tools, solutions, policies and programs to get in the way of an adversary action to obtain, to develop or to use weapons of mass destruction through a variety of means. You just heard our acting director talk about some examples of those means.
When we talk about counter weapons of mass destruction or countering those threats, we mean the full breadth of activities that we undertake. Within DTRA's research and development organization. We're developing tools and capabilities to enable the warfighter to actively counter those adversary threats.
Now I'm aware that what likely raised DTRA's profile to all of you was our work in support of Operation Midnight Hammer. The Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed this topic in detail during their press conference two weeks ago. DTRA was part of a broad team that worked collaboratively to achieve very specific objectives in support of Operation Midnight Hammer.
And I can't comment on the parts of the mission that DTRA was not directly responsible for where we were not the primary expert, where we're not a primary source of information. Also, there are other details that I won't be addressing questions that we may not answer because there are additional details that are classified, and we're obligated and committed to the operational security and protection of our warfighters and our team who were involved in that operation.
As I talk about our role in the operation, I'll talk about it in the context of what we're doing for the warfighter. In DTRA the warfighter is the why of what we're doing here. The brave and capable members of all of the military services are who we work for, who we develop capabilities for and who we get our requirements from, including the requirement to develop the capability that DTRA created that was used in Operation Midnight Hammer.
Our work at DTRA is to enable our warfighters to remain the strongest and most lethal force in the world. One of many things that DTRA does is generate customer focused, threat informed, trusted technical solutions to deter and counter critical weapons of mass destruction problems, both for today and for tomorrow.
Our warfighter is the customer and the today that we were meeting the call for was June 21, 2025. That day, as the Chairman said, we were called upon to use some of DTRA's tools and capabilities. We did not fail. The [inaudible] warfighters remain prepared to act on that day. We executed effectively, and for that DTRA's measured success by delivering counter weapons of mass destruction capability and technical expertise to the warfighter in their time of need.
Our approach to countering weapons of mass destruction, in this case, involved developing a capability, the GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator, or MOP weapon system. We worked collaboratively to test and validate that weapon system and then we transitioned that ordnance to the U.S. Air Force. From that point, the MOP capability stood ready and waiting for employment.
DTRA's support to our warfighters did not stop there. For Operation Midnight Hammer, in addition to DTRA having contributed to the development of the MOP capability, which is the world's largest conventional munition, we also provided technical weaponeering expertise and 24-7 technical reach back support, how to use the MOP munition and modeling and simulation support about what the munition will do.
DTRA's work related to defeating the underground target at Fordow, what we call hardened, deeply buried target, and enabled the warfighter to execute their mission successfully. DTRA's approach led to a successful outcome for when that mission requirement knocked on our door.
But before that day came around, there were lots of days preparing for that eventual need, preparing for the warfighter's future tomorrow. This mission was one example, but we also prepare for other missions. The success of Operation Midnight Hammer, while planned and executed in a relatively short period of time, was built on years of analysis, capability, development, modeling and simulation and deep technical expertise invested in addressing this problem set.
As the chairman said in his press conference two weeks ago, DTRA does a lot of things for our nation, but DTRA is the world's leading expert on deeply buried underground targets. And while yes, we are experts in that, and we provided capability and expertise in support to Operation Midnight Hammer, it's only one example of our work.
I'd like to talk a little bit about other things that DTRA does, specifically to develop capabilities in support of the warfighter. We work across the entire spectrum of weapons of mass destruction threats to do the same thing, identify potential threats, look for ways to mitigate those threats and develop the tools and capabilities needed to reduce the risk posed by those threats.
We're often in the background where many of our scientists, engineers, operational integrators and technical experts prefer to be, working day in and out diligently preparing for the day when we need to execute on our part of the mission in support of our warfighters so that they can defend our nation and our allies.
We're working to stay ahead of the enemy, and we work to enable our warfighters to be ready, modern and prepared to defeat those who may threaten our homelands, partners or allies with weapons of mass destruction.
Our research and development activities at DTRA make science, technology and capability development investments that maintain the U.S. military technological superiority to deter strategic attack against the United States and its allies; to prevent, reduce and counter weapons of mass destruction and emerging threats; and to prevail against WMD armed adversaries in crisis and conflict.
We work closely with the intelligence community to understand our adversaries' intentions with weapons of mass destruction. We use our deep technical expertise to look for vulnerabilities within those adversary activities, and then we work to exploit those vulnerabilities to change what the adversary is doing, be it to disrupt their development of a weapon of mass destruction, to defeat a weapon of mass destruction device, or to destroy their ability to use weapons of mass destruction anytime soon.
We're doing this type of work across the entire chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive, or CBRNE, cyber threat spectrum, working with all combatant commands to ensure that they can achieve and sustain technical superiority against the adversary. We anticipate future threats and deliver technology, knowledge and concepts that enable the total force to fight and win in chemical and biological contested environments.
For example, DTRA, with funding from the Joint Chemical and Biological Defense Program, is researching and developing innovative and operationally relevant next generation boots, suits and masks that will provide the warfighter with innovative and effective protective measures against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats.
DTRA also contributes to nuclear deterrence by researching, developing and transitioning nuclear weapons' affects, survivability, detection and monitoring capabilities to support and enable an effective nuclear deterrent. And in a similar vein to the capability developed for Operation Midnight Hammer, DTRA develops options to enable the warfighter to disrupt and defeat adversary weapons of mass destruction programs and devices.
So, DTRA, and more broadly the Department of Defense and our nation, made continuous investments in solving hard problems related to countering weapons of mass destruction that ended in Operation Midnight Hammer. We did the work to support the threat of tomorrow day after day to ensure the warfighter was ready when that day came.
As the chairman mentioned, DTRA spent years preparing for it. Hard problems do take time to solve and winning solutions take time to develop. DTRA is constantly analyzing threats posed by the nation's adversaries and looking ahead to ensure our warfighters are fully equipped to deny possession of and defeat adversary weapons of mass destruction in any domain.
Our approach is both efficient and robust, agile and aligned and innovative and operationally capable. Ultimately, the approach that we take at DTRA to solving hard CWMD [counter WMD] problems has earned the trust and confidence of our warfighters and the commanders on the ground. The outcome of our approach, having a successful solution when called upon to protect our national security, is something DTRA is proud of. By focusing on our mission, we ensure our military remains the strongest and most lethal force in the world.
As the chairman said, there are other DTRA team members out there studying targets for the same amount of time and will continue to do so. And so, I'll close in reiterating that statement. DTRA will continue to do what we've been quietly doing in the background — providing counter weapons of mass destruction capability to our warfighters as they defend our nation and defeat adversaries who seek to threaten our national security and our way of life.
In and of itself DTRA's work serves as a mechanism for the military to reestablish deterrence. After all, working on a problem or having solved a problem before it knocks on our door, the adversary is much less likely to try to employ such threats. Strategic deterrence remains a top priority for DOD and our nation and DTRA deters, prevents and prevails. The chairman made it clear that DTRA is on it.
Thank you for joining me today to hear a bit more about the critical work that DTRA did in Operation Midnight Hammer, and more broadly in support of our warfighters in our nation. I'll hand it back to you, STAFF.
STAFF: Thank you, Ma'am. OK, we have gotten a lot of questions in and so what we're going to do — don't worry, we're going to now go into the Q&A session and we're going to get to as many questions as we can. We got some questions, and we took note of how the questions came in. So, we're going to first start here with the Wall Street Journal.
You were first. Go ahead, please. If you will unmute yourself and identify yourself and please ask your question. Over. Is the Wall Street Journal — Michael Gordon from the Wall Street Journal, are you on the line?
Q: You need to hit star 6. Does that work?
STAFF: Are you Michael?
Q: Can you hear me?
STAFF: Yes. Yes, we can hear you.
Q: OK, apologize. I did that once, now I've done it twice. I have a question on your tools and capabilities as you referred to them. 14 MOPs were employed at Fordow and Natanz, but why wasn't the MOP used to strike the underground stores of HEU [highly enriched uranium] at Isfahan, which was attacked by cruise missiles only?
Was it deemed that the MOP would not be effective in destroying the underground tunnels where the enriched uranium was kept at Isfahan? And is it your assessment that the enriched uranium stored at Fordow and the Natanz locations that were attacked by the MOP were destroyed or has been rendered irretrievable?
SENIOR DOD OFFICIAL: Thank you for that question. We do not do the assessment on the effects of the strikes. And so, the question that you ask regarding destruction of the materials is one that will be answered by the intelligence community as they continue to do the battle damage assessment or BDA work.
That said, they've only done initial assessments; that final BDA is not complete and will not be complete for some time as they're still gathering information. So, that will be for the intelligence community, the chairman and the Secretary of Defense to speak to once that BDA is complete. Thank you.
Q: Isfahan, why wasn't the MOP used to detect that target? Did you think it wouldn't be effective against the underground tunnels there?
SENIOR DOD OFFICIAL: Specific strike option decisions are made by the commanders and those with authority to operate, we simply support decision making for them. So, I cannot comment to the decisions made on that. Thank you. Thank you.
STAFF: Thank you, Mr. Gordon. OK, we're going to now go to Robin Wright with the New Yorker. Robin? Robin Wright with the New Yorker. Are you there?
Q: [Crosstalk]
Asked my question.
STAFF: Ah, OK, great. All right, we're now going to go with Mr. Schmidt with the New York Times. Mr. Eric Schmidt. Hello. Mr. Schmidt? All right. OK. We're now going to go to the reporter from the BBC, Manoush. I want to make sure I'm pronouncing that correctly, the BBC.
Q: Yes, do you hear me?
STAFF: Yes, loud and clear. What's your question, please?
Q: Okay, great. Yes, I wanted to ask you about how you — what was exactly the details because we heard that since 2009, the research on Fordow started. Is there any particular information that you can share with us about when was the flag raised about going through just observing and monitoring to deciding that this is something that needs to be looked at in a different way?
SENIOR DOD OFFICIAL: As I said, we at DTRA work closely with the intelligence community and do so on this threat and a number of threats to understand adversary activities, in this case, Fordow being the example, to understand the breadth and depth of those activities and look for vulnerabilities in those systems.
There are a number of factors that go into decisions to take action and that decision ultimately rests with the commanders who have authority to operate and the commander in chief himself to make decisions about when to strike. But we have been working closely with the community writ large and the capability development with the Air Force over many years. Thank you.
STAFF: OK, thank you, Ma'am. OK, our next person on queue is from Al Arabiya News. Please identify yourself, Al Arabiya news. OK? Hello? All right, we have a reporter. The first name is Roy from Roosevelt Group. Roy from Roosevelt Group.
Q: Hello?
STAFF: Yes, do you have a question? Hello? Do you have a question?
Q: No, I don't. No, I don't but thank you.
Q: This is Al Arabiya.
STAFF: OK, yes, please. What's your question?
Q: Yes, sorry, I just — I wanted to ask, I mean what information could either one of the officials on this call share with us as it pertains to the strikes as to why — again, I just want to reiterate why the decision was made now? If there were any flags that were raised? Why the specific — the MOP or other weapons were used in these strikes? I mean what new information can you all share today to us as it pertains specifically to Operation Midnight Hammer? Thank you.
SENIOR DOD OFFICIAL: As you're asking about decisions to employ the MOP, I cannot speak to that. We do not make those decisions. We provide targeting and weaponeering analysis to the decision makers that help them analyze the options. And we provided said information for Operation Midnight Hammer, but we did not make those decisions and therefore do not have additional insight to provide on that point.
Q: That analysis you have provided, was it that this would completely render Iran's nuclear capabilities inoperable or set it back a certain number of years? What was that analysis that you provided the government?
SENIOR DOD OFFICIAL: We don't provide the details of that analysis because it involves specific targeting and weaponeering packages, and that information is not shared under operational security measures.
SENIOR DOD MILITARY OFFICIAL: Yes, this is Senior DOD Military Official here. I just want to reiterate what the Senior DOD Official has said. I know there's a lot of curiosity out there because we hear a similar theme to the questions that you have. And so DTRA provides these capabilities and options to the decision makers and the National Command Authority and then they decide what they're going to do with that.
So, we do not make those decisions. You know, as far as what the president decides to do and certainly what commanders ultimately implement. We, you know, have a tremendous team that provides technical solutions across a whole host of areas. But the ultimate use of the capabilities that we provide are not made by DTRA.
They're just provided to the National Command Authority and to the decision-makers in that cycle. Just to kind of emphasize that point because I know there's a lot of questions hovering around that area. I'm not trying to, you know, avoid the answer. It's just not our answer to give. Thank you.
STAFF: Thank you, Sir. Okay, we're going to now go to — oh, I'm sure you have a follow-up question. Okay. We're now going to go to Courtney Kube with NBC News, and then we're going to go to Tony Capaccio with Bloomberg afterwards. Courtney, are you on the line?
Q: Can you hear me?
STAFF:
Yes.
Q: Can you hear me?
STAFF: Yes, I can hear you now.
Unmute yourself. To anyone, be aware — start now.
Q: Can you — you mentioned that part of the development of this was — was testing the GBU-57. And I wonder, in the testing of the MOP, did you simulate the exact conditions as the U.S. knows them at Fordo? So, things like the depth, the reinforced concrete — there was talk of maybe, like — like steel and things — and then this, this 300 ft. And then I'm curious, in those tests, were you able to successfully prove that the MOP, or determine how many MOPs it would even take, to break through Fordo?
I mean, was it real-world testing based off of your knowledge and your studying that Gen. Cane laid out of Fordo?
SENIOR DOD OFFICIAL: So, this is a great question. Obviously, we did not build Fordo in the United States and test it.
What we do try to do is test in what we call a threat-representative environment. And in this case, we built a test site to test the munitions against, in collaboration with the Air Force and test organization, to try to ascertain the effects that the MOP would have in certain environments. We've continued to do tests over time to then determine what those effects are, and then we use that information to support our modeling and simulation programs.
Those models that we've built include the weapons effects that we saw during all of the testing events and include a number of other factors that our experts have brought to bear. That model is also part of that targeting and weaponeering support that we talked about. So, in addition to the threat-representative testing that we did, we were able to see how does the MOP act in certain situations and certain geographies and architectures, if you will. We also then use that information to support our further modeling and simulation to lead to our best targeting analysis to support those decision-makers.
So, it's a great question.
Q: In the testing of the MOP then, you basically simulated something that would be equivalent to what it would take to punch through something like Fordo. I mean, Gen. Cain laid out in a lot of detail that there were these analysts, and they spent 15 years doing nothing but looking at Fordo and vulnerabilities and how things were built and whatnot.
So, is it actually accurate, just to put it in very plain English, to say that DTRA, in conjunction with the Air Force, tested the MOP in a situation that would have accurately portrayed what they would be facing at Fordo. And then again, was it successful? Were you able to successfully use the GBU-57 to penetrate something that would be equivalent to what you faced — they faced — at Fordo?
SENIOR DOD OFFICIAL: So, I can't speak to the actual equivalency and don't want to misstate anything here. But I will say that the reason the GBU-57 is in the arsenal is because it achieved its goals in testing. So, all of the threat-relevant test environments that we built and tested it against, it achieved its goals. So, it was successful in achieving the test objectives.
SENIOR DOD MILITARY OFFICIAL: I have a question for Tom. Thanks.
Q: Yes, Tony Capaccio with Bloomberg. I had a quick question.
STAFF: Sure, go ahead, Tony.
Q: Okay, a couple of quickies. In the modeling and simulation of Fordo, was AI not used in any context?
SENIOR DOD OFFICIAL: We are not leveraging AI to make command decisions at that level, no.
Q: Okay, the other — the other one. You've had — you've been trying for the last few years to develop a large penetrator smart fuze. You've had construction — kind of weird — but you've had construction issues with building a test site. What's the status of that fuze? And was that, in fact, used on the — on the raid, this new large penetrating smart fuze?
SENIOR DOD OFFICIAL: I'm not going to get into the specifics of whether or not the smart fuze was used. And you're correct, we've had some struggles with construction. The things that we want to build are complex, and it is difficult to find the expertise we need, and the volume of expertise we need, to build some of these large test sites.
So, thank you for flagging that. Hopefully, that's something that we can continue to work on.
Q: Is that — so that's still an open issue in terms of the test facility to test this new smart fuze? That's still an open issue.
SENIOR DOD OFFICIAL: Building test facilities for any type of threat-representative environment is resource-intensive — from both dollars, but then also personnel and time. It's a big challenge, and we have great people who help us do those things, but it's always a lengthy process.
Q: I'll take that as a yes. Thanks.
SENIOR DOD MILITARY OFFICIAL: I would say, you know, we are continuing over time, as we, you know, continue to receive new data from the intelligence community, to evolve our testing capability so that we are current and fresh to what is out there. And as that happens, as the Senior DOD Official said, you know, it takes resources, it takes a tremendous amount of talent.
And so, you know, we are in a race for talent just like everybody else is. And so, we try to acquire that talent and apply them to very — to the world's most complex problems, of which this could be considered one. And so, we are continually evolving our processes and our abilities to test these solutions.
Q: Okay, thanks.
STAFF: Okay, we're now going to go to Alex Horton with The Washington Post. Alex, are you on the call? And also, if there's an Associated Press reporter, go ahead and get ready on deck if you have a question. Alex Horton, are you on the call?
Q: Yes, I got you. Awesome.
STAFF: Awesome.
Q: The fun process. Yes, so my question was about fuzes. So, I mean, the prelude to that then is it safe to say that fuzes that can detect voids and are programmed to deliver the ordnance at a certain level — those were not used at Fordo?
SENIOR DOD OFFICIAL: Again, we are not going to speak to the specifics of the variants that were used there. Thank you.
Q: So, all right, this might be a futile question then. So, you know, Gen. Cain did talk about like the different fuzes selected for different environments and different options. So, can you — can you walk us through what you can about the different settings that are available to you and what you wanted to accomplish at different strikes when you used, you know, the first one through 12 at Fordo? What were some of the options that you were going for in terms of reaching different kinds of targets, deep underground?
And what do you think happened as a result of those settings?
SENIOR DOD OFFICIAL: I appreciate the curiosity about this point, but given operational security concerns, we won't be discussing those details. That level of detail is not at play for this conversation. Thank you.
Q: Okay, I got a follow-up there then.
SENIOR DOD OFFICIAL: Go ahead.
Q: So, you know, once — can you give us an understanding of that first GBU 57 that was used to go down into the — into the — the shaft? What was the purpose of that first initial one? What did that allow you to do after that in terms of the following 11 that you — that you dropped there?
Again, I appreciate the curiosity about this, but getting into the level of detail about the effects achieved and why we choose certain approaches is tipping our hand of our understanding of things in a way that I'm not comfortable doing. Thank you.
Q: Thanks.
STAFF: Okay, we're now going to go to Patrick Tucker from Defense One. Patrick, are you on the call?
Q: Hey.
STAFF: Hey.
Q: Yes.
Hi, can you hear me?
STAFF: Yes, we can hear you.
Q: Yes, okay, great. So, following up a little bit on Courtney's question. Can you give us a sense — you know there's this fuze issue, but also the degree to which you guys modify specifically depending on different mission parameters? Like how much of a — of a variety of modes can — if you can bracket it — are available for different — for different missions, or is it not quite like that?
And, more importantly from this — you said that you guys are sort of continually innovating and refining this — this capability. Can you speak to, even in a general way, data that you were able to take from this experience and how that's going to change your work? Or how that's going to result in changes to the capability going forward? Like how do you improve on this thing based on what you learned from this?
Thanks.
SENIOR DOD OFFICIAL: Sure, so I think that we — as I said, we don't conduct the BDA here, but we eagerly anticipate the intelligence community completing BDA on this so that we can assess the models, vice what actually happened according to their analysis, and then take a look at how accurate the projections were so we can use information there to improve our modeling output and our targeting decision support packages that we put together.
We also will be able to assess whether or not the weapon performed as planned, according to the BDA. So again, we're waiting for all of this, but then that information may go into future iterations of the technology. So just as you said, we're constantly evolving and trying to leverage new technology as we do. So, we will take this information and determine: did things work the way that we wanted them to, in which case, how can we continue to improve upon it? Or did things not work exactly as planned?
And how can we fix that so that in the future our next-generation capabilities work that much better? We don't have that information yet, but we look forward to receiving it so that it can inform our next investments in this arena. Thanks.
Q: Okay, so real quick, quick follow-up on Tony. So, I understand that AI doesn't play a role in the ultimate command decision to employ this thing. You mentioned modeling, and obviously AI plays a big role in current best practices for modeling. Does that play any role in how you sort of designed or modified this particular version of the device,
In terms of achieving the effect that you wanted to, and a little bit more on how maybe that now allows you to increase the efficiency and the timeliness of modifications you might make to future versions?
SENIOR DOD OFFICIAL: So, you raised a great point, and AI is a capability that is constantly growing, changing, and being incorporated into more and more of our technologies. We are not, within our research and development portfolio, developing AI in and of itself, but we are leveraging AI and related tools to improve our capability delivery and continue to explore the best ways to do so. I won't get into any specifics here, but it's definitely a technical capability that we are looking to leverage in smart ways, ethical ways, and ways that inform decision makers effectively, while still ensuring that we are using the best of our technical prowess to give them the best possible information to make decisions.
Q: Okay, thank you.
STAFF: Okay, folks, we're going to take just a few. Oh, yes, go ahead, Tara. Just very quickly, we're going to take a few more questions. Tara, you go ahead. If Fox News is on the line, Fox News, go ahead and get on deck, and we also want to ask Jeff Schogol for, I believe that's correct, from Task and Purpose.
Please go ahead, AP over.
Q: Okay, first I just wanted to also follow up on Courtney's question. So you all have not received any BDA or any sort of data right now to let you know whether the munitions performed as they had been designed, is that correct?
SENIOR DOD OFFICIAL: We have received initial assessments, and the more completed assessments will come in over time.
Q: So, with the initial assessments, what is it that you have concluded about the munitions?
SENIOR DOD OFFICIAL: As the chairman said in his press conference two weeks ago, we concluded that we were successful in achieving the objectives we had set.
Q: So, you do think that each of the munitions you designed was able to penetrate the depth — to the depth that you had engineered it to do.
SENIOR DOD OFFICIAL: For exact depth information, I believe we'll still be awaiting further detail in the full BDA assessment information.
Q: So, you don't know if the munitions actually reached the depth that they had been engineered for?
SENIOR DOD OFFICIAL: That's a level of detail that we don't have access to at this point in time.
Q: Okay, and then just on the overall kind of post-analysis, does DTRA have any role right now in taking any sort of — any of the raw data with your experts and generating conclusions about how the program performs?
SENIOR DOD OFFICIAL: Again, we do not do BDA. I liked how the chairman put it two weeks ago, where he said we don't analyze ourselves. We don't check our own homework, I think is how the SecDef said. We will take that information and we will use it to help inform improvements in our models, as I talked about, or improvements in our future capability development, but we are not contributing to that analysis.
The intelligence community does that analysis.
Q: Okay, and then just based on the initial feedback that you got, were there any surprises as far as the types of materials that the munition had to punch through or the way it performed?
SENIOR DOD OFFICIAL: We don't have any information on that point yet.
STAFF: Okay, we're going to now move over ahead to Fox News. Do we have Fox News on the line? Going once, going twice. Okay. We're going to circle back here. Jeff Schogol with Task and Purpose.
Q: Thank you. Can you hear me?
STAFF: Yes, we can hear you loud and clear.
Q: Thank you. A question for the senior defense official. In your opening remarks, you described a successful outcome and said the weapons were effective. Can you elaborate what you mean?
SENIOR DOD OFFICIAL: I mean that, as the chairman said, we achieved the objective that we had set. We provided the information to the decision makers who made decisions with their national command authority to make those strikes. The president authorized, and they achieved the effects intended. That's the success I was claiming.
Q: When you say you achieved the affects you intended, does that mean you destroyed the facilities?
SENIOR DOD OFFICIAL: Sir, we're awaiting full battle damage assessments.
Q: Okay, then what effects did you achieve?
SENIOR DOD OFFICIAL: As the chairman said, we were able to strike the facilities as planned and strike where intended, we don't have full battle damage assessment to go beyond that.
Q: What was the objective?
SENIOR DOD OFFICIAL: From our perspective, we provided information to enable them to strike where they wanted to strike, and they intended where struck.
SENIOR DOD MILITARY OFFICIAL: As far as the objective, that kind of goes beyond the scope of questions that we can answer. I think if you refer back to the Secretary's statements during the press conference and the chairman's statements during the press conference in general, it was to, you know, diminish the capability of the Iranian nuclear program.
And anything more beyond that to the specifics goes back to what the Senior DOD Military Official has said — goes to battle damage assessment, which is an intelligence community responsibility that we look forward to hearing more from as we continue to iterate on the options that we develop here at DTRA for whatever may happen in the future.
Thank you.
STAFF: Thank you, Senior DOD Military Official. Okay, we're going to take the last question from the Guardian, and that's Hugo Lowell. The last question on today's backgrounder from Hugo Lowell. Hugo, are you on the call?
Q: Hey, can you guys hear me?
STAFF: Yes, we can hear you. Go ahead.
Q: All right, thank you. I don't know if this is something you can speak to, but I was wondering if you could share whether your assessment prior to the strikes was that the GBU 57s would completely destroy the facility or whether it was like an idea of the shockwaves would destroy the centrifuges. Like, was it an assessment by DTRA that the actual facility would be caved in or otherwise unusable?
SENIOR DOD OFFICIAL: We do not share the specifics of the analysis that we do, so I cannot get into detail there. Thank you.
Q: And I just have one follow-up, which is, for other underground facilities such as, you know, facilities like Hainan in China – does DTRA think the GBU 57s would penetrate to that — to that depth, while you're looking for new weapons for even deeper facilities?
SENIOR DOD OFFICIAL: I think that we are constantly analyzing the ability of the GBU 57 to operate in relevant environments, but we do not speak to the specifics of its capabilities beyond what's already been made public. Thanks.
Q: Thank you.
STAFF: Okay. All right, this concludes the Q&A portion for today's event. If you all have any follow-up questions from today's session, please feel free to email the OSD Public Affairs Office, or you can email us here at the Public Affairs Office directly. I'm going to now turn it over to Senior DOD Military Official for some closing remarks.
Senior DOD Military Official, over to you, sir.
SENIOR DOD MILITARY OFFICIAL: Thanks, STAFF and Senior DOD Official, thank you for the great work today to educate the team on the work that DTRA does, especially in this specific case. I just want to thank everyone again for taking the time to learn more about the Defense Threat Reduction Agency — tremendous impact and capability here at the agency, both military and civilian teammates that provide a capability that's not always seen every single day on the front page of the newspaper, but certainly, when called upon, has tremendous capability to produce effects that positively affect our national security and help secure our allies and partners around the world.
So, I'm tremendously proud of this team. Certainly, if there's more that you want to learn, I know the STAFF has offered the OSD and her public affairs information to you. But rest assured, DTRA is continuing to work hard every single day to not only address the threats that are present today but certainly looking forward into the future.
And we look forward to your continued engagement. Thank you very much.
STAFF: All right, thank you, Sir. To members of the press, as a reminder, today's transcript will be posted later on defense.gov. And also, if there are any follow-up questions, please feel free to reach out to us. On behalf of all of the leaders here at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, thank you so much for joining us today.
And we're out.