Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan

June 2016

Report to Congress

Preparation of this report cost the Department of Defense a total of approximately $233,000 in Fiscal Year 2016. This includes $3,000 in expenses and $230,000 in labor.

Generated on May 27, 2016
Ref ID: 5-C8A03CB
This report is submitted in accordance with section 1225 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 (P.L. 113-291) as amended by sections 1213 and 1531 of the NDAA for FY 2016 (P.L. 114-92). It includes a description of the strategy of the United States for enhancing security and stability in Afghanistan, a current and anticipated threat assessment, as well as a description and assessment of the size, structure, strategy, budget, and financing of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. This report is the third in a series of reports required semi-annually through calendar year 2017, and it was prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State.

This report describes efforts to enhance security and stability in Afghanistan from December 1, 2015, through May 31, 2016. It complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to Congress, and is not intended to be the single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its coalition partners, or Afghanistan. A classified annex accompanies this report. The next report will include an analysis of efforts to enhance security and stability in Afghanistan from June 1 to November 30, 2016.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) have begun their third year in the lead for security in Afghanistan and the second year in which they have full security responsibility with limited U.S. or coalition support on the battlefield. During the December 1, 2015, to May 31, 2016, reporting period, the ANDSF addressed key capability gaps as they recovered from a tough 2015, maintained a high operational tempo during the winter months amidst challenging security conditions, and developed and began to implement an offensive campaign plan as they headed into the traditional spring and summer fighting season.

Through Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS), United States Forces – Afghanistan (USFOR-A) continue to conduct two well-defined and complementary missions: training, advising, and assisting the ANDSF through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led Resolute Support (RS) mission and supporting counterterrorism operations against the remnants of al Qaeda and its associates. In recognition of the threat of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (also known as Daesh) outside of its Iraq-Syria base and the emerging foothold of an affiliate in the Afghanistan and Pakistan region, in this reporting period President Obama authorized USFOR-A to conduct offensive counterterrorism operations against the Islamic State – Khorasan (IS-K) (also known as the Islamic State – Khorasan Province), the ISIL affiliate in Afghanistan.

Consistent with the President’s October 2015 announcement that U.S. forces would maintain a force posture in Afghanistan of up to 9,800 military personnel through most of 2016, USFOR-A maintained its forces at or below this level throughout the reporting period. These U.S. forces served alongside approximately 6,876 forces from NATO Allied and partner nations who are committed to Afghanistan’s continued development. In particular, the continued U.S. and coalition presence in Afghanistan is focused on making progress in developing the ANDSF into a more effective, sustainable, and affordable force that can protect the Afghan people and contribute to regional and international security. This force presence will also help prevent threats to the homeland, U.S. allies, and U.S. interests abroad from terrorist actors in the region, particularly al Qaeda, and it will maintain pressure on other terrorist groups such as IS-K.

THREAT ENVIRONMENT AND SECURITY CONDITIONS

The security situation in Afghanistan continues to be dominated by a resilient insurgency; but the Afghan government remains in control of all major population centers and key lines of communication, and the ANDSF continues to deny the Taliban strategic ground throughout the country. Although the Taliban maintained a higher-than-usual operational tempo over the winter, overall levels of violence this reporting period were consistent with historical trends of a seasonal decrease in violence over the winter months and an uptick leading into the traditional spring and summer fighting season. Over the last six months, both ANDSF and insurgent casualties have increased, continuing their upward trend from the previous reporting period.

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1 Per the reporting requirement outlined in section 1213 of the NDAA for FY 2016, because there was no drawdown of U.S. forces during this reporting period, this report does not contain an assessment of the risks to the mission in Afghanistan of such a drawdown.
Increased insurgent fighting in urban areas has also contributed to record-high civilian casualties, primarily caused by insurgent and extremist groups.

During the early part of the reporting period, insurgents maintained consistent pressure in Helmand Province against a diminished Afghan National Army (ANA) 215th Corps and conducted high-profile attacks (HPAs) in Kabul. Although the ANDSF subsequently initiated several successful offensive clearing operations in the spring, the Taliban-led insurgency and extremist groups demonstrated their resiliency with attacks in Nangarhar, Herat, Kunduz, and the provinces north of Kabul. However, due to the operational success of the ANDSF – and the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) in particular – the Taliban have not succeeded in their main effort to retake the city of Kunduz during the early part of the summer of 2016. Within a week of the Taliban’s April announcement of the start of the traditional spring and summer fighting season, it conducted a large HPA in Kabul that garnered a swift public response from the Afghan government.

On May 21, 2016, the Department of Defense (DoD) conducted an airstrike that targeted and killed Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Mansour in a remote area of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. Mansour had been actively involved with planning attacks against facilities in Kabul and across Afghanistan, presenting a threat to U.S. personnel, coalition partners, and Afghan civilians and security forces. Mullah Mansour assumed leadership of the Taliban in July 2015 and contended with organizational fractures throughout his tenure. On May 25, 2016, the Taliban announced that one of Mansour’s deputies, Mullah Haybatullah Akhundzada, would replace Mansour as the new leader of the Taliban. The Taliban also named Mullah Muhammad Yaqub and Sirajuddin Haqqani as Akhundzada’s deputies. Sirajuddin’s role as Taliban deputy will continue the Haqqani Network’s influence within the Taliban movement even as the Haqqani Network remains semi-autonomous.

Although al Qaeda’s core leadership in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region has been degraded, elements continue to seek safe haven on both sides of the border to regenerate and conduct attack planning. The continued development of an al Qaeda affiliate in the region, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), highlights the dynamic nature of the terrorist and militant landscape in the region, posing risks to the mission and to U.S. interests.

Since IS-K’s operational emergence in 2015, the combination of U.S. counterterrorism strikes, increased ANDSF pressure, and competition and violence between IS-K and the Taliban have largely confined IS-K to a few districts in Nangarhar Province in the east. Although IS-K’s operational capacity has been diminished through these efforts, U.S., coalition, and Afghan forces remain focused against the group and on deterring its threat.

Pakistan must play a role in reducing the threat from terrorist and militant groups in the region. Consistent mid-level military-to-military dialogue between Afghanistan and Pakistan on specific issues, such as the shared threat from IS-K, and occasional discussions at higher levels of the military and government early in the reporting period were encouraging. However, sustained Pakistani efforts to pressure the Haqqani Network and the Taliban and to disrupt active threat streams are necessary to help decrease violence in the region, to reduce the threat posed by these groups, and to achieve lasting progress on counterterrorism issues. The United States continues
to support the re-invigorated efforts of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group, which includes the Afghan, Pakistani, and Chinese governments, to set conditions for an eventual Afghan-led, Afghan-owned peace process with the Taliban and other militant groups. However, the prospects for a successful dialogue this reporting period were hampered and complicated by the Taliban’s April 19, 2016, HPA in Kabul, the Afghan government’s subsequent response imploring Pakistan to take more direct action against extremist groups seeking safe haven in Pakistan, and the death of Taliban leader Mullah Mansour. The United States continues to be clear with Pakistan about steps it should take to improve the security environment and deny safe haven to terrorist and extremist groups. These conversations continue to affect not only U.S. dialogue with Pakistan on security and stability in Afghanistan but also during discussion of other issues in the U.S.-Pakistan bilateral relationship such as security assistance.

**ANDSF DEVELOPMENT**

The ANDSF are proving themselves capable in some scenarios while still developing in others – performing unevenly, but on balance continuing to improve. After mixed results and an uneven performance in 2015, advisors worked with the ANDSF to address the most significant deficiencies and gaps to help the ANDSF further develop into a more effective, sustainable, and affordable force. ANDSF performance in the first half of 2016 improved over late 2015, owing in part to the implementation of a sustainable security strategy that better allocates forces across the country, and in part as a result of incorporating lessons learned after the first year of the RS format of the NATO mission.

The ANDSF maintain a significant capability advantage over the insurgency; however, an often reactionary ANDSF strategy, force allocation and posture limitations, and persistent capability gaps in aviation, combined arms integration, intelligence collection and dissemination, and sustainment have hampered more rapid improvement in their ability to maintain security and stability. Despite a challenging threat environment and capability gaps, the ANDSF have accomplished much over the last several months including resetting part of their forces – the ANA 215th Corps in particular – over the winter, defending Kunduz throughout the reporting period, and integrating new aviation capabilities. The Afghans continue to make measurable progress with the continued support of U.S. and coalition forces. The ANDSF have shown resilience, and their leadership has generally demonstrated a commitment to implement difficult but necessary reforms.

U.S. and coalition advisory efforts continue to focus on setting the conditions for ANDSF success. A major focus of train, advise, and assist (TAA) efforts this reporting period was the reconstitution of parts of the ANA 215th Corps in Helmand Province amidst persistent violence. In addition, the ANDSF adjusted their force structure within the limits of their authorized level of 352,000 personnel to respond to dynamic security threats more effectively and to increase offensive combat power and maneuverability. These adjustments included the creation of an additional Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) brigade in Helmand Province, establishing the ANA 20th division headquarters underneath the ANA 209th Corps, developing reserve *kandaks*2 in multiple ANA corps, and adopting a more offensive strategy.

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2 A *kandak*, or battalion, consists of approximately 672 personnel and is typically commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel.
Although the ANDSF have persistent gaps in their capabilities, they continue to demonstrate progress in key areas. The ANA corps are better utilizing their organic indirect fires platforms, such as mortars and D-30 howitzers, to provide ground-based fires; ANA and Afghan National Police (ANP) units increasingly utilize Afghan-derived intelligence to conduct operations; and soldier and police proficiency has improved as a result of an ANA and ANP winter training “surge.” The ANDSF also continue to demonstrate proficiency at planning and conducting large-scale, cross-pillar, offensive operations.

The ASSF remain the most capable element of the Afghan force and one of the best special operations forces in the region. Although U.S. forces often partner with and provide enabling support to the ASSF for counterterrorism operations, the ASSF are capable of conducting independent operations that rely on their organic intelligence and aviation assets. Because of ASSF proficiency, the ANDSF frequently overuse ASSF elements for more conventional mission sets. Ministry of Interior (MoI)-led reforms of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) continued during this reporting period to help improve ALP accountability and effectiveness as part of the overall Afghan security forces.

The Afghan Air Force (AAF) is improving its capabilities in providing airlift, casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), and organic aerial fires. With the fielding of eight A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft and four additional MD-530 attack helicopters during the reporting period, the Afghan aerial fires capability is nearly three times larger than it was in 2015. These additional aviation assets are bolstered by improved aerial fires integration with the development of Afghan Tactical Air Coordinators (ATACs) at the ANA corps level.

MINISTERIAL CAPACITY

USFOR-A, primarily through Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A), is focused on working with the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the MoI to develop the systems and processes necessary to support the ANDSF effectively. The MoD and the MoI have shown an improved capacity to manage complex processes such as procurement and budgeting. However, both ministries continue to struggle with providing logistics and maintenance support to the ANDSF throughout the whole country, overseeing an effective and accountable personnel management and readiness reporting system, and addressing systemic deficiencies that lead to high attrition rates.

Attrition remains a larger problem for the ANA than for the ANP, in part because ANA soldiers are often deployed farther from their homes than are members of the ANP. RS is helping the MoD address its retention challenges with measures such as improving pay and personnel systems, developing an operational readiness cycle to help commanders provide their soldiers

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3 Cross-pillar refers to operations or activities in which more than one ANDSF force component (e.g. ANA, ANP, ASSF), or pillar, participates.

4 CASEVAC is typically conducted in a non-standard vehicle and may or may not provide care en route to a medical facility. MEDEVAC is typically conducted in a dedicated medical vehicle that has equipment designed to provide care en route to a medical facility.

5 ATACs are responsible for aircraft coordination, airspace de-confliction, and oversight of the proper procedures for employment of aerial fires in close proximity to ANDSF ground forces.
with valuable and necessary rest time away from the fight, and focusing training and leadership development effects on improving mid-level leadership. Coalition advisors also continued to focus on the MoD’s underdeveloped logistics and maintenance support systems and on improving the ANA’s organic unit-level maintenance.

During this reporting period, the MoI established a new zone structure for the ANP to help improve command and control, unity of effort across various ANP pillars, and logistics support. The MoI has implemented a number of initiatives to better address corruption within its own ranks as well as conduct anti- and counter-corruption policing activities, but improvement has been limited. The MoI continues to demonstrate a willingness and ability to integrate women into the ANP that has been more successful than MoD efforts to integrate women into the ANA and AAF. Like the ANA’s higher attrition rates, this is also tied to the more widespread deployments that the ANA faces compared to the ANP.

Cross-pillar and cross-ministry coordination remains a challenge for the ANDSF and for Afghan government ministries alike. However, during this reporting period, the ANDSF took several encouraging steps to enhance intelligence and operational information sharing across ANDSF pillars. These include the rapid initial development of the Afghan National Threat Intelligence Center, also known as the Nasrat, the establishment of new Operations Coordination Centers (OCCs) in several regions across the country, and the re-energizing of existing OCCs at the provincial level.

The success of the MoD and MoI are dependent upon the success and stability of the Afghan government. Although the current Afghan government has faced institutional and political challenges, particularly with respect to nominating and confirming MoD and MoI leadership positions, Afghan leaders have made meaningful reforms and progress that have permeated the MoD, the MoI, and the non-security ministries. Together with the MoD and MoI leadership, President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah remain strong and willing partners of the United States and the coalition.

**ANDSF FUNDING**

ANDSF security assistance funding from the United States and international donors, coupled with funding from the Afghan government, is a critical component of the mission in Afghanistan moving forward. In order to maintain donor confidence while improving Afghan ministerial capacity, the RS TAA mission is focused on the appropriate and effective oversight of ANDSF funding. The coalition, through CSTC-A, continues to put in place extensive controls and oversight measures, such as independent audits and conditions on the use of donor-provided funds, in order to counter corruption and enforce transparency and accountability while further enabling Afghan financial management within the MoD, the MoI, and the Ministry of Finance. Complementary to these efforts, and equally critical to maintaining international donor confidence and support, is U.S. and international community emphasis on Afghanistan gradually increasing its ANDSF funding contributions over time. Although President Ghani, Chief Executive Abdullah, and the Afghan government remain committed to increasing their government’s share of security costs over time – and the 2015 and 2016 budgets reflect this
gradual increase—given current economic growth rates, the Afghan government will require significant U.S. and international security assistance funding for the foreseeable future.

LOOKING AHEAD

As the ANDSF continue to take on the significant challenge of a robust counterinsurgency against the Taliban and counterterrorism efforts against extremist groups, they do so in a dynamic threat environment that requires a strong partnership with the United States and coalition partners in conjunction with sustained security assistance funding from the international community. With the help of the coalition, the MoD and the MoI are integrating lessons learned from 2015 and continuously improving their systems and processes to support the ANDSF. Early indications of the ANDSF’s ability to maintain security and stability during the traditional spring and summer fighting season are positive, but it remains to be seen whether this positive momentum can be sustained. The United States and its NATO Allies and operational partners remain committed to their partnership with the Afghan government and will continue to support the Afghan people as the United States pursues its national security interests in regional stability and counterterrorism objectives with the ultimate goal of a sovereign, secure, stable, and unified Afghanistan.
SECTION 1 – STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES

Consistent with President Obama’s October 2015 decision on the U.S. force presence in Afghanistan, the United States currently maintains approximately 9,800 military personnel in Afghanistan. As part of his announcement, the President also reaffirmed that the current U.S. strategy and objectives in Afghanistan are to disrupt threats posed by al Qaeda, support the ANDSF, and give the Afghan people the opportunity to succeed as they stand on their own. During the reporting period, the President expanded U.S. counterterrorism objectives in Afghanistan to include the targeting of IS-K as part of the broader fight against ISIL.

1.1 U.S. STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN

The U.S. strategy in Afghanistan remains centered on working with NATO Allies, operational partners, and the international community to provide financial and advisory support to the Afghan government to enable a well-trained, equipped, and sustainable ANDSF to provide security in Afghanistan; and continuing efforts to defeat the remnants of core al Qaeda and disrupt other extremist groups to ensure Afghanistan does not again become a safe haven for terrorist groups to plan and execute attacks against the United States, U.S. persons overseas, or allies and partners.

The U.S. and Afghan governments agree that the best way to ensure lasting peace and security in Afghanistan is reconciliation and a political settlement with the Taliban. The United States continues to support an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned reconciliation process as the surest path to peace in Afghanistan and supports any process that will include violent extremist groups putting down their weapons. The success of an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned peace process will require the Taliban and other armed opposition groups to end violence, break ties with international terrorist groups, and accept Afghan constitutional safeguards for women and ethnic minorities. As the Afghan government works toward this end, developing ANDSF capabilities, improving MoD and MoI capacity, and supporting Afghan leadership are critical to enabling the Afghan government to secure the country against a persistent insurgent threat.

1.2 U.S. OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN

With support from the Afghan government and the Afghan people, USFOR-A is conducting two well-defined and complementary missions as part of OFS to achieve U.S. objectives and build upon the gains of the last 14 years.6 First, through OFS, U.S. forces are continuing the counterterrorism mission against al Qaeda and its associates in Afghanistan to prevent its resurgence and external plotting against the homeland and U.S. targets and interests in the region. Second, in coordination with NATO Allies and operational partner nations, U.S. forces are conducting a TAA mission to continue building the capabilities and long-term sustainability

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of the ANDSF, the MoD, and the MoI. The U.S. supports the institutionalization of ANDSF gains by conducting functionally based security force assistance (SFA)\(^7\) as part of the NATO-led RS mission. U.S. and coalition forces conduct TAA efforts at the ANA corps level, the ANP zone level, and with MoD and the MoI to improve their ability to support and sustain the fighting force. Reflecting the importance of building Afghan aviation and special operations capabilities, U.S. and coalition forces also train, advise, and assist at the tactical level for the AAF and special operations units.

Approximately 9,800 U.S. military personnel remain in Afghanistan at the invitation of the Afghan government to achieve these objectives.\(^8\) The United States currently plans to draw down to 5,500 military personnel by January 2017. These personnel will maintain a presence at a small number of bases in Kabul and Bagram with regional outstations, including in Jalalabad, Nangarhar Province in the east, and Kandahar Province in the south.

Although the planned reduction to 5,500 military personnel will limit some functions, the United States will be able to tailor TAA efforts to continue developing Afghan ministerial capacity and key ANDSF capabilities in areas such as aviation, intelligence, special operations, logistics, and maintenance, as well as maintain a U.S. capability to deter and disrupt threats in the region. This presence enables a platform that will allow the United States both to pursue counterterrorism targets and to assist the ANDSF in further developing their special operations capability, which has proved increasingly critical to U.S. counterterrorism and broader security interests. This posture reflects a consolidation of U.S. forces and takes advantages of efficiencies gained by working with and sharing functions with coalition partners and the ANDSF.

### 1.3 U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM MISSION

U.S. counterterrorism efforts remain focused on the defeat of al Qaeda and its associates, protecting U.S. forces, and preventing Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for terrorists to plan attacks against the U.S. homeland and against U.S. interests and partners. Counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan have helped to ensure that there has not been another major terrorist attack against the U.S. homeland since September 11, 2001. However, the existence of other extremist groups in Afghanistan, such as IS-K, requires a U.S. presence in the region that can monitor and address threats, even as the United States builds an Afghan capability to deter terrorist exploitation of Afghan territory.

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\(^7\) Functionally based SFA is a term developed by ISAF in 2013 to describe its shift to a primary emphasis on capacity building as its combat mission was winding down. According to the RS Security Force Assistance Guide 3.12, SFA is defined as a unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority. Fundamental guidance for joint forces conducting SFA is published in Joint Doctrine Note 1-13, Security Force Assistance, April 29, 2013. According to this document, SFA consists of “Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions” (Joint Publication 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, July 12, 2010). The activities described as SFA, particularly the advisory effort focused on “essential functions,” are elements of security cooperation activities normally defined by NATO and DoD as defense institution reform and defense institution building.

In addition to the primary U.S. counterterrorism objectives, during this reporting period the President authorized U.S. forces to target individuals based on their status as members of IS-K in order to disrupt and degrade the group’s ability to threaten U.S., coalition, and Afghan government interests. Previously, U.S. forces were only authorized to take direct action against members of IS-K if they posed an imminent threat to U.S. or coalition forces or took a direct part in hostilities against U.S. or coalition forces. Degrading IS-K is part of the U.S. global effort to counter ISIL. In addition to U.S. unilateral efforts, USFOR-A is enabling the ANDSF to conduct independent operations against IS-K and is encouraging more robust intelligence and operational cooperation between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other regional partners to impede the spread of the organization.

The United States remains in an armed conflict against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces. The United States continues to rely on the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force and the President’s constitutional authority as the Commander in Chief as its domestic legal basis for the use of force when required. Beyond operations in support of the counterterrorism mission and enabler support to the ANDSF in limited circumstances, U.S. forces no longer engage in offensive combat operations in Afghanistan; in particular, the United States does not conduct offensive operations against members of the Taliban or members of the Taliban-led insurgency. However, U.S. forces may take appropriate action against those groups or individuals that imminently threaten or directly participate in hostilities against U.S. or coalition forces regardless of their membership in a particular terrorist or extremist group.

The U.S. counterterrorism mission complements the TAA mission to build the capacity of the ANDSF. Limited U.S. direct counterterrorism action, coupled with a stronger and increasingly capable ANDSF, will help preserve the security gains to date and contribute to a robust, enduring counterterrorism partnership. The Special Operations Joint Task Force – Afghanistan (SOJTF-A) supports U.S. counterterrorism efforts by training, advising, and assisting the ASSF and accompanying them on certain operations. The ASSF will continue to conduct operations throughout the country using their growing organic capabilities to address both insurgent and transnational threats. The focus of SOJTF-A TAA efforts remains building the ASSF’s capacity in logistics, command and control, intelligence analysis and sharing, aviation, and interoperability between the ASSF and conventional forces. Tactical-level advising of Afghan special operation units has been essential as U.S. forces assess the operational performance of those partner units to shape future training and development more effectively.

1.4 NATO-LED RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION

The RS mission remains focused on training, advising, and assisting the ANDSF, the MoD, and the MoI in all aspects of their ability to achieve and maintain a stable Afghanistan during a period of conflict. On March 2, 2016, U.S. Army General John “Mick” Nicholson assumed

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9 NATO launched its non-combat RS Mission on January 1, 2015, following the conclusion of the previous NATO-led combat mission of ISAF, and the assumption of full security responsibility by the ANDSF. The legal framework for the NATO presence in Afghanistan is provided by a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which entered into force on January 1, 2015. The SOFA prescribes the terms and conditions under which NATO forces will be deployed in Afghanistan.
command of USFOR-A and of RS after General John Campbell completed his term as the first commander.

At their meeting on December 1, 2015, NATO Foreign Ministers and Foreign Ministers of non-NATO RS contributing nations agreed to continue the RS mission and sustain their current force levels, including the limited regional presence across Afghanistan, during 2016. Given the planned decrease in the U.S. military footprint by January 2017, the United States will continue to consult with NATO Allies and operational partners about the requirements of the RS mission and any follow-on NATO-led effort to ensure that the U.S. and NATO missions are mutually supportive.

During this reporting period, RS increasingly relied on its expeditionary advising teams to maintain progress in building Afghan capabilities in select parts of the country. Beginning in December 2015, approximately 500 trainers and advisors, primarily from the U.S. Army, deployed to Helmand Province to assist with force protection and to bolster existing priority TAA efforts given the continuing security challenges in this traditional Taliban stronghold province. This expeditionary advising effort was conducted within the approved total of 9,800 U.S. military personnel and was conducted within current mission authorities as all training, advising, and assisting occurred inside Afghan institutional training facilities.

The RS mission is based on a limited regional TAA approach and is executed from geographic and functional (e.g. aviation) “spokes” at coalition train, advise, and assist commands (TAACs) in the north, south, east, west, and the capital. In addition to a TAAC in Kabul, the central “hub” includes the RS Headquarters element, ministerial advisors, and two smaller Advise and Assist Cells (AAC). The United States, Germany, Italy, and Turkey serve as “framework nations,” with each nation leading a regional TAAC and responsible for coordinating support and capabilities within its respective command region. The regional TAACs persistently cover four of the six ANA corps as well as regional ANP zone headquarters. The two AACs execute TAA efforts with the two uncovered ANA corps headquarters, the ANA 203rd and 215th Corps. The TAACs and AACs serve as the principal connections between the ministries and fielded forces. They play a central role in the coalition’s ability to assess the efficacy of its ministerial advising efforts, determine how well the ministries support ongoing ANDSF security operations, and provide an outer ring of sensors and security. In support of this mission, and because the ANDSF will continue to suffer from key enabler gaps in the near term, coalition forces provide limited enabler support including primarily aerial fires; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and MEDEVAC to the ANDSF in order to prevent mission failure as they continue to field and develop their organic capabilities.

As of May 27, 2016, RS was composed of military personnel from 37 nations (25 NATO Allies and 12 operational partner nations), consisting of 13,496 NATO and 1,559 partner personnel across 20 bases totalling 15,055 personnel (see Figure 1). The United States remains the largest force contributor in Afghanistan.
**Figure 1: Resolute Support Mission Troop Contributing Nations, as of May 27, 2016***

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<td>9</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>8,179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1,130</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>13,496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-NATO</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>15,055</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Numbers of personnel are approximate as they change daily.

**Functional Advising**

The cornerstone of the RS mission is functionally based SFA, an advisory effort focused on developing functions, systems, processes, and organizational development connected between the ministry and operational levels. Military and civilian advisors work with their Afghan counterparts on three levels of advising:

- **Level One:** Advisors work with their Afghan counterparts on a continuous, persistent (usually daily) basis from either an embedded footprint or in close proximity.
- **Level Two:** Advisors work with their Afghan counterparts on a less frequent basis (determined by commanders) to ensure their continued development. The frequency of this interaction varies based on the proximity to and capability of their Afghan counterpart, the threat level to advisors, and coalition resources.
- **Level Three:** Advisors are no longer co-located with their Afghan counterparts and train, advise, and assist their Afghan counterparts from a centralized location. Expeditionary advising teams and visits are planned and coordinated with Afghan counterparts to assist periodically in terms of operations and sustainment.

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10 Nations in blue indicate NATO Allies and nations in green indicate non-NATO operational partners.
U.S. and coalition advisors focus the TAA mission within the MoD and MoI on generating, employing, and sustaining capabilities within the ANDSF, with advising extending down to the ANA corps, ANP zone, and Afghan Border Police (ABP) headquarters levels. Whereas the previous ISAF mission focused primarily on combat operations with a secondary focus on generating, training, and equipping the ANDSF and building ministry capacity, ministry capacity-building efforts are the main effort for RS.

The RS mission focuses on eight essential functions (EF) and associated sub-functions, as well as gender integration efforts, in order to develop a capable and sustainable MoD, MoI, and ANDSF. A U.S. or coalition general officer or a member of DoD Senior Executive Service is typically the lead for each of the eight EFs. The EF leads unify the efforts of their EF advisors at all echelons, whether at the ANA corps, ANP zone, institutional, or ministerial level. RS advisors focus their efforts on building a responsible and efficient MoD and MoI that can support a self-sustainable, effective, affordable, and credible ANDSF capable of maintaining security in Afghanistan. This reporting period, the RS SFA Center began developing and refining an Advisor Network tool to provide leadership with greater visibility on the actions of the advisors and their Afghan principals and the relationship between those actions and longer-term MoD, MoI, and ANDSF development.

**Essential Function 1: Plan, Program, Budget, and Execute**

EF 1 has three priorities: increase resource management capability within the ministries; build donor confidence and trust that the Afghan resource management process is transparent, accountable, and effective; and set conditions to sustain an effective ANDSF in the future. Resource management includes formulating a defense strategy, generating requirements by determining the products and services that need to be purchased to support that strategy, developing a resource-informed budget to meet prioritized requirements, executing a spend plan by awarding contracts to purchase items from the budget, and monitoring the status of funds being spent. During this reporting period, advising efforts focused on enhancing resource management and procurement capability in accordance with Afghan laws, policies, and regulations; assisting with the drafting and execution of annual funding commitment letters; and helping to prepare the Afghan personnel management and payroll systems for integration via the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS).

**Essential Function 2: Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight**

Ensuring third-party oversight of the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process is an international community-stipulated requirement for continued funding. EF 2 advisors work with the MoD and the MoI to help improve internal controls, as well as to maintain accountability and oversight to help improve transparency. This affects oversight of Afghan financial and non-financial processes, including those pertaining to fuel and salaries. CSTC-A continues to administer measures, such as financial commitment letters that establish performance expectations and implement internal controls over all aspects of resource management, and share lessons learned.

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11 APPS is an enterprise resource planning system that will integrate existing MoD and MoI systems for personnel management and payroll into a single platform providing timely and accurate accountability of all personnel, including civilians, within the MoD and the MoI.
management, to help ensure the Afghan government’s proper use of funds from the United States and international donors.

**Essential Function 3: Civilian Governance of the Afghan Security Institutions and Adherence to Rule of Law**

ANDSF that operate effectively and respect human rights are central to the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, as these traits are integral to a professional ANDSF’s ability to provide security, retain public support, and instill confidence in Afghanistan’s institutions of governance. EF 3 advisors work with the MoD and the MoI to help ensure the ANDSF respect and adhere to the rule of law and operate in accordance with Afghanistan’s constitution, domestic laws, and international obligations. Efforts focus primarily on assisting the ANDSF to prevent and, when necessary, respond properly to gross violations of human rights (GVHRs), such as extra-judicial killings, and significant acts of corruption. RS advisors continue to engage with all levels of ANDSF leadership to reinforce the importance of preventing and responding to GVHRs and all types of human rights violations – not only to maintain long-term viability, but also to retain U.S. and coalition assistance to the ANDSF.

**Essential Function 4: Force Generation**

EF 4 advisors work with the MoD and the MoI to build combat power through recruiting, training, retaining, managing, and developing a professional security force. The ANA and the ANP utilize the Afghan Human Resource Information Management System (AHRIMS) to store human resources information, track recruits, record training, and assign qualified personnel into needed assignments based on force requirements. The force generation TAA mission is grounded in an interconnected and mutually supportive five-fold effort: recruit, train, retain, manage, and develop. These five focus areas help the ANDSF build more professional forces. The RS Capabilities Development Directorate also works closely with EF 4 advisors to assist the MoD and the MoI as they develop their official personnel and equipment requirements through the *tashkil* process.12

**Essential Function 5: Sustain the Force**

EF 5 advisors work to help the ANDSF sustain combat power through the development of appropriate maintenance, medical support, and logistics systems. EF 5 is divided into three parts. The primary focus of EF 5 is assisting the ANP and ANA in logistics and maintenance of vehicles, equipment, and weapons predominantly at the ANA corps, ANP zone, and national levels to help them support an affordable and sustainable ANDSF. Advisors in EF 5 also assist the ANP and ANA on points of injury care, ground medical evacuation, medical logistics, medical equipment maintenance, medical support planning, and medical staffing. Finally, EF 5 advisors work with the Afghans in the fields of communications, information, and infrastructure to develop a sustainable communications network. The RS Combined Joint Engineering team also provides support in this functional area through engineering TAA efforts in support of ANDSF sustainment.

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12 *Tashkil* means “organization” in Dari and refers to the official list of personnel and equipment requirements used by the MoD and MoI to detail authorized staff positions and equipment items for each unit.
**Essential Function 6: Plan, Resource, and Execute Effective Security Campaigns**

EF 6 advisors work to help the ANDSF effectively employ all elements of the ANDSF in support of the Afghan government. It is divided into two parts: strategic planning and policy, and execution and employment of the force. In support of developing strategic planning and policy, advisors assist with strategic planning efforts at the Office of the National Security Council (ONSC), the MoD, and the MoI. These efforts are designed to develop the capability of the MoD and the MoI to coordinate, plan, and execute in support of national-level objectives while strategic guidance and objectives are in turn translated into operational and seasonal plans supported by effective security campaigns. EF 6 was restructured at the beginning of 2016 to better align with the RS Headquarters organizational structure.

**Essential Function 7: Develop Sufficient Intelligence Capabilities and Processes**

EF 7 advisors work to help the ANDSF develop and integrate intelligence into operations. Advisors work with several organizations, including the Assistant Minister of Defense for Intelligence, the ANA General Staff (GS) Intelligence Directorate, the MoI Directorate of Police Intelligence (DPI), and the Nasrat. The goal of this effort is to help ensure that the ANDSF collect, process, analyze, and disseminate intelligence effectively and integrate intelligence into combat operations. RS intelligence advisors work at the national and regional levels to help Afghan intelligence capabilities mature, work with analysts to help prepare intelligence estimates in support of military and policing plans and strategies, and help the ANA and the ANP field ISR capabilities. Additionally, advisors assist the ANP and ANA intelligence schools with developing a cadre of instructors to train future intelligence personnel. EF 7 has four main lines of effort: intelligence integration with operations, intelligence cycle development, training self-sufficiency, and sustainment of intelligence capabilities.

**Essential Function 8: Maintain Internal and External Strategic Communication Capability**

EF 8 advisors work with the Afghan government to help develop counter-insurgent messaging and offer a positive narrative to the Afghan people and the international community. Advisors seek to help Afghan partners speak with one consistent voice, both within their own organizations and externally. EF 8 advisors focus on bridging gaps and overcoming challenges to improved communications within the MoD, the MoI, and the ANDSF while continuing to reinforce successes and look for opportunities to improve. Building the MoD and the MoI strategic communication capability depends more on developing human capital and institutionalizing processes than on managing resources or developing technical systems.

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13 The DPI tasks and coordinates intelligence at a basic level, produces analysis and intelligence products capable of informing senior MoI leaders and shaping MoI operations, and effectively targets terrorist and criminal networks through the Network Targeting and Exploitation Center (NTEC).
The RS Gender Office seeks to train, advise, and assist Afghan leadership to ensure that an appropriate gender perspective is incorporated into planning for all policies and strategies within the security ministries and through implementation at the ANA corps and ANP zone levels. The RS Gender Office is considered a “stand alone” advising directorate, but because gender issues are cross-cutting, each EF has a gender focal point to ensure functional advising efforts factor in gender issues. Gender issues are included in all major RS briefings and forums with senior RS and Afghan leaders.

The RS Gender Office provides support to the Afghan government as it implements the Afghan constitutional guarantee of equal rights to men and women and its recognition of the importance of empowering women within Afghan society as well as Afghanistan’s National Action Plan on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325), which addresses the inordinate impact of war on women. The Afghan government developed and completed two critical documents this reporting period that support women in the ANDSF and the UNSCR 1325 National Action Plan: the UNSCR 1325 Implementation Plan and the Monitoring and Evaluation Plan for Afghanistan’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2016 – 2023. These documents ascribe key responsibilities and accountability to Afghan government ministries and agencies and are designed to ensure that the Afghan government continues to focus on implementing UNSCR 1325.

Overall progress on women within the ANDSF is improving, but fragile. Although larger urban areas such as Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif, and those in Herat Province have demonstrated modest progress in protecting women’s rights, many parts of rural Afghanistan remain extremely conservative and actively oppose any initiatives to improve the status of women within the community. A range of historical, institutional, cultural, and religious barriers continue to hinder female representation and influence within the ANDSF. Many women in the ANA and the ANP, as well as their family members, receive threats and are subject to harassment. Once finally in the ANDSF, women face additional barriers associated with the patriarchal attitudes of some senior male ANDSF and local leaders. For instance, in the more conservative parts of Afghanistan, supervisors may prevent female police officers and soldiers from driving vehicles, carrying weapons, or undertaking other routine duties due to the supervisors’ personal views. Mitigating these challenges and finding innovative ways to increase the representation of women in the ANDSF are key objectives for the RS mission and the RS Gender Office.

Gender issues remain a priority for RS and Afghan senior leaders. During this reporting period, the Women in Security Advisory Committee (WISAC), which the Commander, RS, chairs along with honorary co-chair Mrs. Rula Ghani, President Ghani’s wife, has been reinvigorated. WISAC meetings continue periodically with both the Ministers of Defense and Interior attending.

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14 Additional information on the security of women and girls in Afghanistan and within the ANDSF in this subsection and the RS Gender Office sub-sections in sections 4.1 and 5.1 of this report address a reporting requirement outlined in Section 1531(c)(1)(A-B) of the FY 2016 NDAA.


16 UNSCR 1325 and the National Action Plan also address the role women should and do play in conflict management, conflict resolution, and sustainable peace.
on a regular basis. As a demonstration of the current focus on gender integration efforts, MoD and MoI leaders have initiated a number of programs and activities that have begun to gain traction and support including dedicated allowances for female personnel to use for childcare, financial incentives for women who join the ANDSF and re-contract, and several new opportunities for basic and advanced skills training. In addition, the MoI recently approved a transportation stipend for women in the ANP, and the ANA is finalizing a similar transportation subsidy program. Although infrastructure for training and housing women in the ANDSF previously limited their participation, the MoD and MoI have increased their women-focused infrastructure and both now have ample capacity for training and housing female personnel to support current recruitment and retention rates.

Opportunities for the development and advancement of women within the ANDSF are limited but continue to grow. The MoD and MoI have each created more than 5,000 dedicated women-only or gender-neutral positions in their tashkil to ensure that women have opportunities to serve meaningfully, progress in rank, and work in occupational areas that match their skill-set. These tashkil slots also include 88 positions specifically for special operations roles such as female engagement teams and as members of operational support teams for both ANA and ANP operations, reflecting the MoD’s and the MoI’s increasing understanding of the effectiveness and unique capabilities that women can provide to the ANDSF.

The MoD and the MoI are also working with other Afghan government ministries to finalize plans for a new agency, the Afghan Human Rights Ombudsman, to support gender efforts further. This new organization will enable members of the ANDSF and the broader Afghan population to report on gender-based violence and human rights violations anonymously and safely to the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, which can take action or assist with law enforcement or legal processes as appropriate. The Afghan Human Rights Ombudsman will also provide education and training on the prevention of sexual abuse and human rights violations. The agency’s proposed budget includes programs for marketing and outreach to all of Afghanistan’s provinces, particularly remote areas where the population has limited access to government services.

**Train, Advise, and Assist Commands**

RS advisors conduct their TAA mission with the ANDSF at the ANA corps and ANP zone levels through the TAACs. The four coalition framework nations maintain a central “hub” in Kabul and a regional presence in four “spokes” in the north, south, east, and west regions of the country through the TAACs. Turkey leads TAAC-Capital (TAAC-C) in the Kabul area, the United States leads TAAC-East (TAAC-E) and TAAC-South (TAAC-S), Italy leads TAAC-West (TAAC-W), and Germany leads TAAC-North (TAAC-N). Personnel at each TAAC conduct training and provide advice and assistance to their Afghan counterparts depending on the need identified by the coalition and their Afghan partners. In addition, the Advise and Assist Directorate (AAD) provides oversight of regional AACs that cover two ANA corps and the ANP

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17 Previous attempts at supporting women in the ANDSF through collective transportation systems (e.g. dedicated buses) were rejected and discarded as they were deemed them too dangerous due to insurgent targeting.

18 Additional information on each TAAC’s activities can be found throughout the report.
zones in those areas with expeditionary advising support while TAAC-Air provides TAA support to the AAF.

The TAACs and the AACs enable the coalition to verify and validate Afghan reporting as best as possible at the ANA corps and ANP zone level while reinforcing the importance of building and improving the systems and processes that support combat operations. With the establishment of the new ANP zones, the TAACs are focusing TAA support at the ANP zone headquarters level rather than at the provincial police headquarters level. The AACs have also proven successful at strengthening relationships between the MoD, the MoI, the ANA corps, and the ANP zones in areas without a persistent coalition presence.

**Train, Advise, and Assist Command – Capital**

TAAC-C provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 111th Capital Division, ANP Zone 101 / Kabul City Police, ABP, and ANCOP elements operating in Kabul. TAAC-C includes Kabul Province (except Sarobi District). Turkish forces lead the TAA effort with forces from several additional contributing nations. TAAC-C maintains Level 1 advising with the ANA 111th Capital Division and Level 1 and 2 advising with ANP pillars.

TAAC-C activities included a focus on reducing the number of overall ANDSF checkpoints and transitioning them to the Kabul City Police, improving the Kabul Garrison Command’s command and control of the ANA 111th Capital Division, and improving all ANDSF units’ ability to conduct intelligence-driven, cross-pillar operations. Areas for continued TAA focus within the TAAC-C area of responsibility include helping the ANA 111th Capital Division reduce their attrition rates, enhancing logistics support to deployed ANA *kandaks*, and addressing Kabul City Police challenges with enhancing the consistency of its fuel supply and consumption rates.

**Train, Advise, and Assist Command – East**

TAAC-E, which includes U.S. and Polish forces, covers the provinces of Kapisa, Kunar, Laghman, Nangarhar, and Nuristan. TAAC-E provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 201st Corps and ANP units in ANP Zone 202. TAAC-E maintains Level 1 advising with all ANDSF pillars at the ANA corps and ANP zone level within its area of responsibility. During this reporting period, TAAC-E also gained operational control over AAC-SE activities.

TAAC-E activities included implementing an operational readiness cycle, advising ANA and ANP leaders on reducing checkpoints, improving the ANDSF’s ability to generate combat power, and assisting with the establishment of the ANP Zone 202 headquarters. Recently, both ANA and ANP units under TAAC-E have focused on increasing their strategic communication and information operations capabilities to combat insurgent messaging. Areas for continued TAA focus within the TAAC-E area of responsibility include improving ANP Zone 202 readiness reporting, particularly at the provincial level, ANA and ANP logistics capability, and the integration of combat enablers such as aviation, artillery, counter-improvised explosive device (IED) capabilities, and ISR assets.
**Train, Advise, and Assist Command – South**

TAAC-S, led by U.S. forces, includes the provinces of Daykundi, Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Zabul. TAAC-S provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 205th Corps and ANP units in ANP Zone 404. TAAC-S maintains Level 1 advising with all ANSF pillars at the ANA corps and ANP zone level within its area of responsibility. During this reporting period, TAAC-S also gained operational control over AAC-SW activities.

TAAC-S activities included train-the-trainer programs on counter-IED and indirect fires support for tolai\(^{19}\) leaders in the ANA 205th Corps; improving ANA leave, medical care, and salary policies; and advising on integrating intelligence into operational planning. ANA 205th Corps and the ANP Zone 404 units maintain some of the lowest attrition and highest retention rates in the ANDSF. Areas for continued TAA focus within the TAAC-S area of responsibility include enhanced visibility of ANP Zone 404 officer manning, equipping Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) and ALP units, and implementing enterprise systems such as Core-Information Management System (Core-IMS)\(^{20}\) and AHRIMS.

**Train, Advise, and Assist Command – West**

TAAC-W, led by Italian forces, includes Badghis, Farah, Ghor, and Herat provinces. TAAC-W provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 207th Corps and ANP units in ANP Zones 606 and 707. TAAC-W maintains Level 1 advising with all ANSF pillars at the ANA corps and ANP zone level within its area of responsibility.

TAAC-W activities included advising and assisting the ANA 207th Corps with a recruiting and re-contracting campaign, reducing ANA 207th Corps use of static checkpoints, and assisting with the establishment of the ANP Zone 606 headquarters. TAAC-W conducted several training courses with the ANA 207th Corps to enhance their ability to identify threats and integrate targeting to support operations, improve ANP capabilities to conduct mobile check points and searches, and train ATACs on proper air control procedures. ANP units in TAAC-W are generally capable of managing security within their area and conducting cross-pillar operations with their ANA counterparts. Areas for continued TAA focus within the TAAC-W area of responsibility include conducting mobile training for National Information Management System (NIMS)\(^{21}\) utilization, improving the use of artillery and other combat and non-combat enablers, and increasing counter-IED and explosive ordnance disposal capabilities for all ANDSF units.

**Train, Advise, and Assist Command – North**

TAAC-N, led by German forces, includes the provinces of Badakhshan, Baghlan, Balkh, Faryab, Jawzjan, Kunduz, Samangan, Sar-e Pul, and Takhar. However, current TAA efforts are limited

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\(^{19}\) Tolai refers to an Afghan company of approximately 100 personnel and typically commanded by an ANA Captain.

\(^{20}\) Core-IMS is a flexible, web-based system designed to address a comprehensive set of warehouse inventory management needs from inventory initialization through order processing across multiple warehouses. Core-IMS provides efficient asset visibility at all levels in the inventory.

\(^{21}\) NIMS is a secure, web-based, reporting, data basing, and dissemination tool intended to be the primary information-sharing tool for the entire Afghan intelligence enterprise.
primarily to the Mazar-e-Sharif area. TAAC-N provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 209th Corps and ANP units in ANP Zones 707 and 808. TAAC-N maintains Level 1 advising with all ANDSF pillars at the ANA corps and ANP zone level within its area of responsibility.

During the reporting period, TAAC-N activities included assisting with the establishment of the ANP Zone 707 and 808 headquarters, conducting collective training with the ANA 209th Corps, and improving readiness reporting across all ANDSF units. Within the large TAAC-N area of responsibility ANP pillars are now better at dividing up regions and separate policing responsibilities, and a new ABP 7th Brigade headquarters has assisted with ANP command and control in the region. Areas for continued TAA focus include personnel and equipment resourcing to the ANA 209th Corps and cross-pillar coordination, particularly in Kunduz Province.

Advise and Assist Directorate

The AAD oversees special advising teams to the ANA operations and plans departments and the National Police Coordination Center among other components of the ANDSF. Although the AAD also maintains oversight over the AACs, during this reporting period operational control of AAC-SW and AAC-SE were re-aligned underneath TAAC-S and TAAC-E respectively to streamline collective TAA efforts and command and control in each region. The AACs will frequently conduct short-term, expeditionary advising missions with the ANA corps and at the ANP zone level typically focused on either sustaining ANDSF progress to perform the eight EFs or assisting with typical warfighting functions and operations. Expeditionary advising efforts in Helmand Province to support ANDSF operations and help the ANDSF pillars reset this reporting period demonstrate that expeditionary advising efforts are critically important for coalition visibility of the ANDSF not directly covered by the TAACs. Based on the AACs’ employment during 2015, RS has increased the number of operations and intelligence-focused advisors in AAC-SE and AAC-SW.

Advise and Assist Cell – Southwest

AAC-SW is responsible for functionally based SFA to the ANA 215th Corps (responsible for Helmand and Nimroz provinces) and ANP Zone 505.

AAC-SW’s major focus this reporting period has been the reconstitution of components of ANDSF pillars in Helmand and helping the Afghans prepare for spring and summer operations. As part of the overall U.S.-led NATO Task Force Forge operation to support the 215th Corps, AAC-SW has been forward deployed to Camp Shorab in Helmand Province since early December 2015. AAC-SW was a critical component of efforts to re-train and equip four ANA infantry kandaks in the 215th Corps; assist with the effective employment of MD-530s and Mi-17s in support of operations; and enhance ANA-ANP coordination.

Additional AAC-SW activities included assisting ANA and ANP units to consolidate checkpoints into defensible tolai-sized bases and addressing high attrition and poor leadership across the area of responsibility. Areas for sustained TAA focus within AAC-SW include continuing to address corruption in the ANA 215th Corps, improving ANA and ANP equipment
readiness rates and logistics support capacity and capability, and establishing the ANP Zone 505 headquarters.

**Advise and Assist Cell – Southeast**

AAC-SE is responsible for providing functionally based SFA to the ANA 203rd Corps (responsible for Paktiya, Paktika, Khost, Ghazni, Wardak, Logar, and Bamyan provinces), the ANP Zone 303, and associated policing elements. AAC-SE maintains level 2 advising with all ANDSF pillars at the ANA corps and ANP zone level within its area of responsibility.

During the reporting period, AAC-SE activities included assessing and developing the ANP Zone 303 headquarters, assisting in checkpoint reduction planning for both ANA and ANP units, helping improve ANA 203rd Corps vehicle readiness rates, and improving their contracting capability. Areas for continued TAA focus within the AAC-SE area of responsibility include fully equipping ANA 203rd Corps kandaks, improving the air-ground component of combined arms operations and integration of ATACs into the ANA corps, and addressing challenges with ANP Zone 303 command and control over ANP forces.

**Train, Advise, and Assist Command – Air**

TAAC-Air is a functional command that covers all of Afghanistan. RS advisors provide functionally based SFA to the AAF from the ministerial level down to the wing, group, and squadron level. TAAC-Air’s advising priorities for this reporting period included ensuring the timely flow of human capital into formal training programs, improving operational level command and control, encouraging AAF force management and a flying hours program, improving in-country maintenance and logistics, and developing and fully integrating aviation platforms including the MD-530 and A-29 capabilities.

Over the reporting period, TAAC-Air assisted with the fielding of eight A-29s and an additional four MD-530 aircraft that will help improve ANDSF aerial fires capabilities. TAAC-Air advisors have focused training efforts on how to plan, employ, and maintain these capabilities. In addition, TAAC-Air worked with the AAF to integrate aerial fires by assisting with training and embedding ATACs and Air Liaison Officers with the ANA corps. Furthermore, TAAC-Air established training programs to improve air-to-ground integration and worked to improve AAF CASEVAC and MEDEVAC capabilities.

### 1.5 INDICATORS OF EFFECTIVENESS

Assessments of ministry progress are built around the completion of mutually agreed processes or outcomes with the associated ministry. Each EF lead is accountable for progress in ministerial development through actions identified in a program of actions and milestones (PoAM) developed in conjunction with Afghan counterparts in the MoD and the MoI. The PoAMs each consist of five categories of information: essential function, system, organization, process, and action. Annex A lists the most recent indicators of effectiveness for the MoD and the MoI under each PoAM.
Each EF lead identifies critical processes to develop milestones to measure progress for their EF. These processes are completed over time by the execution of a series of supporting actions or tasks that achieve the desired effect or preclude undesired effects. Progress toward each milestone depends on the progress made within each of the listed actions or tasks. Overall ministerial progress toward actions and milestones and their associated series of tasks listed in each EF PoAM are rated against a five-stage capability and effectiveness scale listed below in Figure 2.

**Figure 2: Program of Actions and Milestones Capability and Effectiveness Scale**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Scoped and Agreed Upon</td>
<td>The scope of the specific action has been agreed with the relevant Afghan organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Initiated</td>
<td>The relevant Afghan organization has commenced work on the specific action defined in the PoAM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Partially Capable/Effective</td>
<td>The relevant Afghan organization has completed or almost completed the work on the specific action defined in the PoAM and the result is considered as being partially effective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Fully Capable/Effective</td>
<td>The relevant Afghan organization has completed the work on the specific action defined in the PoAM and the result is considered as being fully effective; however it may still require some coalition forces support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Sustaining Capability</td>
<td>The relevant Afghan organization has completed the specific action defined in the PoAM and the result is considered as being sustainable such that no further coalition force support is required.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The last three stages are based on a combination of focused advising and reporting, data-informed assessments, and ultimately the professional judgement and subjective assessment of the EF lead. The final stage, “sustaining capability,” indicates that Afghan systems are in place, functioning, and being used effectively, and that the associated processes will be carried forward by Afghans without any advising or other coalition involvement. Each EF directorate maintains and updates their PoAM assessments using the tracking methodology maintained by the RS SFA Center, which is responsible for the integration, coordination, management, and synchronization of functionally based SFA across the coalition.

Every six months the SFA Center and EF directorates refine the milestones within each PoAM to ensure they accurately project the ANDSF’s ability to achieve functional milestones and take into account feedback from the TAACs on how the ANDSF are integrating systems and processes below the ministerial level. After an assessment of the PoAMs in February 2016, each EF adjusted its respective PoAM to reflect the current operating environment, mission progress, and ANDSF development.

In addition to the indicators of effectiveness for the EF advising, the TAAC and AAC commanders account for TAA efforts at the ANA corps and ANP zone headquarters level through the Monthly ANDSF Assessment Report (MAAR). Although the PoAMs are focused

In addition to the ANA corps and ANP zone headquarters, the MAAR also provides an assessment of the AAF headquarters, ANASOC division headquarters, the Ktah Khas at the kandak level, Special Mission Wing (SMW) headquarters, General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU) headquarters, and the ALP Staff Directorate.
primarily on assessing ministerial functions that support Afghan security forces, the MAAR tracks ANDSF capability development. The MAAR assesses ANA and ANP capability in warfighting functions and the five functional pillars of leadership, combined arms operations, command and control, personnel and training, and sustainment\(^{23}\) that align with the respective EFs. Similar to the PoAMs, the MAAR also has five capability and effectiveness ratings (see Figures 3 and 4). The MAAR is one component of the larger RS assessment process and does not represent a definitive “grade” of ANDSF or ALP progress. In line with the current mission, the MAAR reflects the advisors’ assessment of the ANDSF at the headquarters level.

**Figure 3: Monthly ANDSF Assessment Report Capability Rating Definition Levels**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>In Development</td>
<td>Tasks/milestones (conditions) scoped and agreed to between advisors/advisees; efforts to develop baseline capability and measures in progress, but not complete.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Partially Capable</td>
<td>Baseline design to achieve capability and associated measures initiated by ANDSF unit; plan to move forward is sound and ready for implementation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Capable</td>
<td>Development conditions in progress/incomplete; ANDSF unit is partially capable/effective. Measures have been designed and partially implemented, but are neither fully operational nor adequately effective. Conditions can be achieved by the end of RS; advising will continue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Fully Capable</td>
<td>Developmental conditions nearly achieved/incomplete. ANDSF unit fully capable but still requires attention to improve effectiveness and to solidify the day-to-day use of processes and systems that will lead to sustaining capability. Condition on track to be achieved by the end of RS; advising will continue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Sustainable</td>
<td>Condition fully achieved. ANDSF unit possesses requisite capabilities and actively employs them effectively, taking time to refine and improve associated processes and systems as needed to drive continued growth/progress. Advising will only continue on this effort as requested by ANDSF counterparts and as opportunity and resources permit.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As of May 1, 2016, RS revised the MAAR capability rating definition titles and descriptions to align better with the PoAM capability and effectiveness scale to enhance unity of effort within the EFs and other RS advising directorates. Figure 4 below includes the revised MAAR capability and effectiveness ratings with summary descriptions.

\(^{23}\) *Leadership* is the ability of the commander and subordinate leaders (including staff primaries) to demonstrate a mastery of their functional area, and provide purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish all assigned tasks and missions while being accountable for their actions and responsibilities. *Combined arms operations* is the ability to field and integrate new systems and develop the capability to bring all available forces, assets, and enabler systems to bear effectively. *Command and control* is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over all assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. *Personnel and training* is the ability to conduct individual and collective mission-focused training, institutional training, and to assess and maintain proficiency on all critical tasks. *Sustainment* is the ability to sustain training and operational missions independently.
### Figure 4: Monthly ANDSF Assessment Report Capability Rating Definition Levels (Revised as of May 1, 2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Agreed</td>
<td>Scope of action agreed with Afghan unit, but unit still largely dependent on coalition forces for core functions to prevent mission failure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>In Development</td>
<td>Systems and processes in place and successfully communicated to unit personnel, but implementation gaps leave unit dependent on CF support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Partially Capable</td>
<td>Unit personnel perform core tasks successfully with moderate reliability. Indications of basic support from ANDSF. Unit requires CF support to implement systems and processes, but only intermittent support for core tasks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Fully Capable</td>
<td>Unit personnel can perform core tasks and conduct operations requiring coordination of key warfighting functions and coordination across ANDSF essential functions. CF support minimal for operations and provided only upon request, usually for complex tasks/processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Sustainable</td>
<td>Unit sustains rating of “Fully Capable” for three continuous months demonstrating effective mission planning, successful utilization of unit processes, and coordination across essential functions. Unit requires CF support only for integration of new systems or for advanced operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Advisors at all echelons deliver their assessments of progress through the Afghan Assessment Group within RS, which then synthesizes them into an overarching assessment of the ministry and Afghan security force as it relates to the campaign plan. The analysis is conducted through a series of weekly, monthly, and quarterly assessments, based on EF milestones and the PoAMs. The Afghan Assessments Group, which develops the criteria for the MAAR, and the SFA Center continuously determine methods to improve and streamline reporting and assessment processes. Despite changes to the PoAMs or the MAAR assessment methodology, the strategic conditions for the success of the RS mission have not changed.
SECTION 2 – THREAT ASSESSMENT

Afghanistan faces a continuing threat from both the Afghan insurgency and extremist networks, including the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and to a lesser extent al Qaeda, and other insurgent and extremist groups, which continue to attempt to reassert their authority and prominence. These pervasive insurgent, terrorist, and criminal networks constitute a threat to Afghanistan’s stability. Revenue from opium trafficking continues to sustain the insurgency and Afghan criminal networks. Additionally, extortion and kidnappings by low-level criminal networks has increased in some areas of Afghanistan.

The Afghanistan-Pakistan border region remains a sanctuary for various groups. These include the Taliban, al Qaeda, AQIS, the Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e Tayyiba, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, IS-K, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. This sanctuary and these groups remain a security challenge for both countries and pose a threat to regional stability and security. In particular, security in Kunar Province deteriorated over the previous few months due to a series of recent attacks and limited ANSF presence along the province’s 160 mile-long border with Pakistan.

2.1 IMPORTANCE OF AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

The Afghan government’s relationship with Pakistan remains a critical aspect of enhancing security and stability in Afghanistan. Since the beginning of President Ghani’s tenure, leaders from both countries have made a concerted effort to improve relations and better address mutual security interests, such as the threat from various extremist groups that reside in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. At the December 2015 Heart of Asia Conference in Islamabad, Pakistan, President Ghani and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif reaffirmed their commitment to Taliban peace talks. Although some of the tensions from the second half of 2015 have abated with the resumption of bilateral dialogue, the results of this dialogue have been mixed.

Pakistan’s ongoing counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and other areas reduce some militant groups’ ability to use Pakistani territory as a safe haven for terrorism and a base of support for the insurgency in Afghanistan. Additionally, Pakistani military clearing operations in the FATA have increased military presence on both sides of Afghanistan and Pakistan’s shared border. Addressing the challenge of militant safe havens in the border region requires greater transparency and cooperation among RS and the Afghan and Pakistani militaries to avoid misunderstandings as well as to prevent displaced militant groups from relocating into Afghan territory.

Despite some obstacles to a stronger bilateral relationship, such as intermittent cross-border firing incidents during this reporting period, Afghanistan and Pakistan maintain regular contact at the most senior levels of government and within the military. RS advisors continue to leverage the ability of the coalition to encourage more robust bilateral communication at all levels through the Tripartite Joint Operations Center. Military-to-military engagements this reporting period trended positively, although they remain vulnerable to setbacks. Major engagements included multiple meetings at the two-star general officer level on the threat IS-K poses to regional security, Pakistani military and ANA corps commander-level conferences,
tripartite conferences with RS staff on countering the threat from IEDs, and continued discussions to complete and implement the Bilateral Military Coordination Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). This latter agreement is designed to expand and promote development of the bilateral military-to-military architecture at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. In addition, after Pakistani Chief of Army Staff General Raheel’s visit to Kabul in December 2015, Afghanistan and Pakistan established a direct military hotline between the two countries. The hotline is a confidence building measure intended to improve coordination and de-escalate cross-border tensions and has already been used several times to defuse potential conflicts and misunderstandings along the border.

Early in the reporting period both Afghanistan and Pakistan intensified their efforts to revive peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban. Beginning in January 2016, the Quadrilateral Coordination Group consisting of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the United States, and China initiated a set of talks aimed at setting the conditions for an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned peace process between the Afghan government and the Taliban that would lead to a political solution to the conflict. However, after two events late in the reporting period, the April 19, 2016, Taliban attack against the National Directorate of Security (NDS) building in Kabul and President Ghani’s subsequent public statements imploring Pakistan to take more direct action against extremist groups seeking safe haven in Pakistan, and the May 21, 2016, U.S. airstrike that killed Taliban leader Mullah Mansour, the prospects for a successful dialogue that would lead to eventual peace talks were limited during this reporting period. Underscoring the Afghan government’s commitment to the overall peace process, of note, near the end of the reporting period the Afghan government advanced its peace talks with the Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin group.

2.2 CURRENT SECURITY CONDITIONS

The security situation in Afghanistan continues to be dominated by a resilient insurgency; however, in their second year with full security responsibility for their country with limited U.S. and coalition support, Afghan forces have proved their determination, willingness, and ability to make the necessary adjustments to improve in their fight against the Taliban-led insurgency. The Afghan government retains control of Kabul, major transit routes, provincial capitals, and a vast majority of district centers, while the Taliban continue to contest district centers in Helmand and in various provinces in the east and southwest.

The ANDSF are generally capable and effective at protecting the major population centers, preventing the Taliban from maintaining control for a prolonged period of time, and responding to Taliban attacks. At the same time, the Taliban have proven capable of taking rural areas, returning to areas after the ANDSF have cleared but not maintained a holding presence, and conducting HPAs and attacks that undermine public confidence in the Afghan government’s ability to provide security. As a result of the higher operational tempo during the winter months and the increase in violence during the early part of the traditional spring and summer fighting season, both the ANDSF and the Taliban continued to sustain a high number of casualties this reporting period.

From December 1, 2015, to May 20, 2016, there were ten HPAs in Kabul and 50 across the rest of Afghanistan. This represents a 41 percent decrease in Kabul HPAs when compared to the
same time period in 2015. Despite this decrease, the Taliban are still capable of conducting larger HPAs in Kabul that garner media attention and a major Afghan government response as evidenced by the April 19, 2016, attack on an NDS building in Kabul that resulted in more than 60 killed and 300 injured Afghan government and ANDSF personnel and civilians.

Although the number of HPAs in Kabul and across Afghanistan has decreased in comparison to the last two years, the number of both ANDSF and civilian casualties caused by HPAs has increased. This demonstrates the increased lethality of insurgent attacks – person-borne and suicide vehicle-borne IED attacks in particular – as well as a transition towards an increasingly urban conflict. These increasingly lethal HPAs underscore the importance of HPAs to the insurgency’s ability to sway public opinion regarding the Afghan government’s ability to secure the population.

The violence and high casualty rate for all parties to the conflict in Helmand Province continued throughout this reporting period. In addition, beyond the traditional levels of violence in the south and west of the country, there was an increase in fighting east of Kabul. For example, during February and March 2016 the ANA 201st Corps experienced its highest number of enemy-initiated attacks since September 2014, while the ANA 11th Capital Division also experienced a higher number of attacks than the previous reporting period and when compared to the same time period in 2015.

The continued violence during the winter of 2015-2016 and the early part of the traditional fighting season in 2016 was reflected in public perceptions of security as well. Perceptions of security remain near all-time lows. Twenty percent of Afghans say that security in their community is good. This is down from 39 percent during this time last year. Forty-two percent of Afghans say that security is worse now than during the time of the Taliban. This historically high percentage is a continuation of a trend from last reporting period.

Since late 2015 private militias and other non-state actors are playing a more public role in maintaining security in their respective regions as there is a tendency for local and provincial government officials and warlords to employ these groups to address local security challenges. This negatively impacts the ANDSF’s and the Afghan government’s credibility and effectiveness, particularly since these groups have limited accountability, limited regard for human rights, and often exacerbate tribal and ethnic tensions in an area.

**Threats from Insurgent and Terrorist Groups**

Collectively, terrorist and insurgent groups continue to present a formidable challenge to Afghan, U.S., and coalition forces. Insurgent forces have been able to demonstrate increasing capability

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24 Enemy-initiated attacks are defined as attacks against coalition forces, the ANDSF, or civilians. An attack is considered “effective” if it results in a combat-related casualty.

25 Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research (ANQAR) Survey, Wave 31, March 2016. The ANQAR survey is a NATO-sponsored public opinion survey conducted each quarter. Field teams conduct interviews in all 34 provinces, however, where the security situation prevents the random selection of interviewees, interviews are conducted with residents of inaccessible areas as they are traveling to and from neighboring areas. As with any public opinion survey, the data validity is affected by sample size, response rate, and statistical margin of error.
to threaten district centers, particularly multiple district centers simultaneously. Seeking to exploit weaknesses in the ANDSF and take advantage of the reduced international military presence, the Taliban continue to expand their influence, especially in rural areas of the country that lack effective Afghan government representation. Although al Qaeda is degraded, it provides limited support to insurgent groups targeting Afghan and coalition forces. Despite some internal violence within the Taliban and between the Taliban and IS-K, there remains tactical-level cooperation between many groups.

Al Qaeda remains focused on survival, regeneration, and planning and facilitating future attacks, and it remains a threat to the United States and its interests. The organization has a sustained presence primarily concentrated in the east and northeast with smaller elements in the southeast. Some lower- and mid-level Taliban leaders provide limited enabling and facilitation support to al Qaeda, but there have been no signs of a stronger relationship at the strategic level. In addition, al Qaeda’s regional affiliate, AQIS has built a presence in the south and southeast of Afghanistan and in Pakistan. Whereas al Qaeda continues to recruit from Arab populations, AQIS is composed primarily of militants from within the broader South and Central Asia region.

Of the groups involved in the Taliban-led insurgency, the Haqqani Network remains the greatest threat to U.S., coalition, and Afghan forces and continues to be a critical enabler of al Qaeda. Haqqani Network leader Sirajuddin Haqqani’s elevation as Taliban deputy has further strengthened Haqqani influence within the Taliban. Sirajuddin Haqqani’s role has likely allowed the Haqqani Network to increase its area of operations within Afghanistan and provided the Taliban with additional operational and planning capabilities.

Despite a high operational tempo throughout the reporting period, threats to the Taliban’s cohesion impacted the group’s effectiveness and distracted from its focus on the ANDSF. After publicly taking over as Taliban leader in July 2015, Mullah Mansour contended with rival factions that questioned his legitimacy as the emir of the movement. Anti-Mansour factions led by senior Taliban leaders including Mahamood Rasool and Mullah Mansoor Dadullah clashed with Taliban loyalists throughout the reporting period including during an incident on March 10, 2016, in Shindand District, Herat Province, that resulted in more than 200 fighters killed. These and other rival factions undermined Mansour’s legitimacy within the movement; however, Mansour managed to largely consolidate his power over the group. The death of Taliban emir Mullah Mansour and announcement of Mullah Akhundzada as leader of the movement in late May 2016 will likely further impact cohesion.

The Taliban maintained a higher than normal operational tempo during the winter compared to the previous two years. Though its more aggressive operations were largely confined to Helmand Province, the Taliban conducted attacks in other provinces as well as HPAs in Kabul, including a person-borne IED explosion at the MoD on February 27, 2016, and a complex attack against an NDS building on April 19, 2016. The Taliban also demonstrated its effectiveness at conducting major offensive attacks on December 8, 2015, with a day-long assault on the ANA section of Kandahar Airfield, an attack that killed at least 50 people, including 38 civilians, 10 ANA soldiers, and 10 ANP personnel. In addition to persistent attacks in Farah and Helmand provinces, the Taliban conducted operations in the northern provinces of Jowzjan, Kunduz, and Baghlan, which stretched ANDSF forces and caused heavy casualties for both the Taliban and
the ANDSF. Finally, in January 2016 the Taliban sabotaged a major power line in Baghlan Province that cut off electricity to Kabul. The Afghan government required more than three weeks to restore power to many parts of Kabul, which undermined public confidence in the Afghan government’s ability to provide basic services as well as security.

On April 12, 2016, the Taliban announced the start of the traditional spring and summer fighting season naming the campaign “Operation Omari” in honor of former Taliban leader and founder Mullah Mohammad Omar. The Taliban stated that it would try to avoid killing civilians and destroying civilian infrastructure as it conducts “large-scale attacks,” suicide attacks, assassinations, and uses other tactics aimed at undermining the Afghan government and the ANDSF’s morale. The announcement was also notable for its inclusion of U.S. and coalition forces as a Taliban target. As expected, there was an initial uptick in violence and both ANDSF and Taliban casualties for the first few weeks after the announcement.

IS-K has regressed since its initial growth and operational emergence in 2015. Several factors have disrupted IS-K’s growth strategy and diminished its operational capacity including U.S. offensive counterterrorism operations against the group after receiving expanded targeting authorities, ANDSF operations, pressure from the Taliban, and difficulties gaining local community support. During the last reporting period, IS-K had a limited presence in nearly six provinces; however, it is now largely confined to a handful of districts in southern Nangarhar. Nonetheless, IS-K remains a threat to Afghan and regional security and a threat to U.S. and coalition forces. IS-K claimed responsibility for its first attack on a major city on January 13, 2016, when it attacked the Pakistani Consulate in Jalalabad, Nangarhar Province and killed at least seven members of the ANDSF.

Although IS-K is attempting low-level recruiting and distributing propaganda in various provinces across Afghanistan, it does not have the ability to conduct multiple operations across the country at the same time. Moreover, command and control and funding from core ISIL is limited. Rather than relying on external funding, IS-K is attempting to develop its funding streams within Afghanistan, which has put it into conflict with the Taliban and other groups vying to raise revenue from illegal checkpoints and the trade of illicit goods. IS-K continues to draw its members from disaffected Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan fighters, former Afghan Taliban, and other militants who believe that associating with or pledging fealty to IS-K will further their interests.

**Security Trends**

The total number of effective enemy-initiated attacks – that is, attacks that resulted in casualties – from December 1, 2015, to May 20, 2016, was 4,480 with a monthly average of 794 (See Figure 5 below). By comparison, the total number of effective enemy-initiated attacks during the December 2014 to May 2015 reporting period was 4,913, a monthly average of 818, and the total number of effective enemy-initiated attacks during the June 2015 to November 2015 reporting period was 5,822 with a monthly average of 971.
Reflective of the historical decrease in violence during the winter, the number of effective enemy-initiated attacks decreased when compared to the previous reporting period. However, as expected given seasonal trends, effective enemy-initiated attacks increased gradually in the weeks preceding and during the start of the traditional spring and summer fighting season. Consistent with the previous reporting period and the overall trend since the end of the U.S. and NATO combat missions and the transition to the RS mission, very few effective enemy-initiated attacks involved coalition or U.S. forces.

The coalition relies largely on ANDSF reporting for all metrics, including effective enemy-initiated attacks, which are a subset of all security incidents. Although the data collected and compiled by the ANDSF is still considered useful and is consistent with UN reporting and other sources, coalition analysts continue to refine metrics to assess the security situation accurately.

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26 Reports on security incidents and effective enemy-initiated attacks are often delayed by several weeks due to translation and long reporting timelines through the ANDSF chain of command. In addition, ANDSF units frequently do not report insurgent attacks that do not result in casualties such as indirect fire or attempted IED explosions that do not wound or kill ANDSF personnel.

27 Security incidents comprise all enemy action including enemy-initiated direct fire and indirect fire, such as mortar, rocket, and artillery; surface-to-air-fire (SAFIRE) and explosive hazard events including executed attacks (IED explosion, mine strike); and potential or attempted attacks (IEDs or mines found and cleared, premature IED detonations, and IED turn-ins). Security incidents do not include friendly action, e.g., direct fire and indirect fire that are initiated by friendly forces. Due to this change in reporting since the ISAF mission, the number of effective enemy-initiated attacks is the most representative metric of overall security conditions rather than the total number of reported security incidents. This change in reporting metrics for security trends is indicative of the challenges associated with the coalition’s increasing reliance on the ANDSF for nearly all types of reporting data.
Direct fire by far remains the largest source of effective enemy-initiated attacks, followed by IED explosions and mine strikes (see Figure 6). Consistent with recent trends, indirect fire and surface-to-air fire remain the least frequent source of effective enemy-initiated attacks. The number of IED explosions and mine strikes this reporting period has shown a modest, but steady decline when compared to the same time period last year and over the last two years. However, insurgent use of direct fire has increased when compared to the same time period one year ago as the Taliban more frequently used massed attacks to overwhelm vulnerable ANA and ANP checkpoints and fixed positions.

Figure 6: Effective Enemy-Initiated Attacks by Type

![Effective Enemy-Initiated Attacks By Type](image)

**ANDSF Casualties**

The majority of ANDSF casualties continue to be the result of direct fire attacks and IED explosions. Although casualties from IED attacks have declined for the ANA, the ANP continue to incur the same level of casualties from IED attacks, which could be attributed in part to less protective measures. ANDSF and ALP casualties this reporting period were higher than during the same time period one year ago.

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28 Additional information on ANDSF casualties can be found in the classified annex to this report.
U.S. Casualties and Insider Attacks

Although OFS and RS are designed as non-combat missions, conducting counterterrorism operations and training, advising, and assisting the ANDSF still entail risks to U.S. and coalition forces. Since the beginning of U.S. operations in Afghanistan in October 2001, 1,843 U.S. military personnel have been killed-in-action (KIA) and 20,131 have been wounded-in-action (WIA) as of May 31, 2016. During the reporting period, there were 7 U.S. military KIA and 37 U.S. military WIA.

On December 21, 2015, six U.S. airmen were KIA and two were WIA after they were attacked by a suicide bomber on a motorcycle while on a force protection patrol near Bagram Airfield. On January 5, 2016, one U.S. soldier was killed and two were wounded when their unit was attacked by enemy small arms fire in Marjah District, Helmand Province during a joint U.S.-Afghan special operations mission.

Force protection remains a top priority for USFOR-A and RS leadership. The number of insider attacks continues to decline from the peak in 2012, but coalition advisors are still at risk as they train Afghan forces. A number of initiatives by the Afghans and the coalition have reduced, but not eliminated, the risk of insider attacks on coalition advisors. Insider attack risk mitigation measures include the employment of “guardian angels,” coalition personnel whose sole responsibility is providing security during engagements with the ANDSF; vetting processes for ANDSF personnel within the Afghan security ministries; and enhanced force protection measures as directed by the Theater Force Protection SOP and the Mitigation of the Insider Threat SOP.

During this reporting period, there was one insider attack against U.S. personnel. On February 9, 2016, an ANDSF member fired upon U.S. personnel as they were leaving the Ministry of Commerce in Kabul; U.S. military personnel returned fire and wounded the ANDSF member who later died from his injuries. There were no U.S. casualties as a result of this incident.

Given the reduced number of insider attacks, coalition advisors assess that current force protection measures have been successful in limiting the number of insider attacks, although it is impossible to mitigate all risk to U.S. personnel. Investigation and analysis of insider attacks will continue to shape the coalition’s approach to mitigating the insider threat. RS Headquarters employs Joint Casualty Assessment Teams following any insider attack. These teams seek to determine the causes of the attack quickly, wherever possible, and to identify any lessons learned for immediate dissemination throughout the command. The Joint Casualty Assessment Team report is the foundation for more in-depth analyses conducted by the Insider Threat Assessment Board to determine causation, motivation, and additional lessons learned.

Afghan security forces also remain at risk for insider attacks from within their own forces (otherwise known as “green-on-green” attacks). RS advisors continue to engage both the MoD and the MoI on the requirement for formal personnel screening to be included in official policy at the national level. Compared to the previous reporting period and to the same time period last year, insider attacks against the ANDSF and the casualties caused by those attacks have decreased slightly.
Civilian Casualties

The RS Civilian Casualty Mitigation Team (CCMT) collects information on civilian casualties for the coalition. CCMT primarily relies on operational reports from the TAACs and the ANDSF. From January to May 2016, CCMT documented 2,496 civilian casualties including 760 deaths and 1,736 injuries. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) also tracks civilian casualty reporting, and UNAMA’s data from January to March 2016 (their latest available data) reports a higher rate of civilian casualties than CCMT data for the same three-month time period. This is likely attributable to UNAMA’s different collection methodology, however, both sources indicate rising civilian casualties compared to both the previous reporting period and the same time period in 2015.

As fighting and suicide attacks have increased in more populated areas, the number of women and children included among the civilian casualties has also increased. According to UNAMA, the main causes of total civilian casualties (fatalities and injuries) are ground fighting in and around populated areas, followed by IEDs, suicide, and complex attacks. Ground engagements are the leading cause of conflict-related civilian fatalities followed by targeted and deliberate killings. The vast majority of civilian casualties continue to be caused by the Taliban and other insurgent and militant groups. Despite repeated Taliban pledges to exercise greater caution when conducting attacks, in 2015 civilian casualties increased to their highest levels since UNAMA began systemic documentation of them in 2009.

Preventing civilian casualties remains a major concern of the ANDSF, the Afghan government, and U.S. and coalition forces. U.S. and coalition advisors continue to work closely with the Afghan government to reduce civilian casualties by raising awareness of the importance of civilian casualty prevention and mitigation. The coalition is continuing TAA efforts with the ANDSF on practical measures they can adopt at the tactical level to prevent civilian casualties. The Afghan government also hosted its first Civilian Casualty Avoidance and Mitigation Board in January 2016. This board is scheduled to meet quarterly to discuss civilian casualty prevention procedures. In addition, the Afghan government, with coalition support, is developing a national civilian casualty prevention policy. Senior leaders from the MoD, the MoI, and the ONSC have approved the current draft, and President Ghani is expected to sign it in the second half of 2016.

30 UNAMA obtains information through direct site visits to hospitals and medical facilities by locally employed staff, physical examination of items and evidence gathered at the location of incidents, and information and reports gathered by the other UN entities and non-governmental organizations. This collection methodology allows UNAMA to obtain civilian casualty data on women and children, a level of granularity CCMT cannot obtain due to its reliance on ANDSF operational reporting. Despite different collection methodologies, definitions, and terminology, overall trends of a continued increase in civilian casualties are consistent between both UNAMA and CCMT.
31 The UNAMA definition of “complex attack” is a deliberate and coordinated attack that includes a suicide device, more than one attacker, and more than one type of device (e.g. IED and mortars). All three elements must be present for an attack to be considered complex.
2.3 ANTICIPATED SECURITY CONDITIONS

The stability of the Afghan government and the performance of the ANDSF throughout the rest of 2016 will have a significant impact on the future threat environment in Afghanistan, particularly in light of the combat losses incurred in 2015, higher than normal operational tempo during the winter, and expected high operational tempo during the traditional spring and summer fighting season. Collectively, terrorist and insurgent groups will present a formidable challenge to Afghan forces as these groups continue their offensives into the traditional fighting season. Both Taliban and ANDSF operations are expected to continue at a high tempo until winter 2016-2017. The insurgency’s strategy will continue to include exploiting vulnerabilities in ANDSF force posture by conducting massed attacks against lightly defended checkpoints, challenging the reach of the ANDSF into rural areas, isolating areas by staging smaller attacks in the surrounding areas, and impeding ground lines of communication ahead of attacks against district or provincial centers.

The Taliban likely will continue to test the ANDSF aggressively throughout the rest of 2016. Insurgents will likely focus on traditional areas of operation, such as Helmand Province, while also attempting to spread their influence throughout rural Afghanistan, and conducting HPAs and other attacks in areas across the north, east, and in Kabul. Complex and high-profile attacks will likely continue throughout the 2016 fighting season, and the Taliban will continue to portray localized, temporary tactical successes as strategic victories through the media.
SECTION 3 – OVERVIEW OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

After a tough fight in 2015 the ANDSF focused on resetting and refitting the force during winter 2015-2016 ahead of the traditional fighting season in 2016. However, higher-than-normal insurgent violence during the winter months hampered the ANDSF’s ability to reset their forces as planned and highlighted the continued challenges and shortfalls in several ANDSF capabilities. Shortfalls that directly impacted the ANDSF’s effectiveness include operational readiness and cross-pillar coordination, a lack of sufficient organic aerial fires capabilities, leadership challenges (particularly at the kandak level and below), deficient logistics processes, and a still-developing combined arms employment capability.

The ANDSF maintained their high operational tempo with both offensive operations to gain and maintain the initiative around key terrain and reactive operations in response to insurgent violence. Given this operational tempo and the challenges of resetting the force during the winter months while continuing to hold off the insurgency, USFOR-A worked with the MoD and MoI to incorporate lessons learned from the 2015 campaign to improve ANDSF posture, readiness, and strategy for the first half of 2016 and moving forward. These measures included the rebuilding of four kandaks in the ANA 215th Corps in Helmand Province; continued fielding and employment of organic aerial fires capabilities; development of a campaign plan that supports strategic priorities and reduces ANDSF overstretch; implementation of an operational readiness cycle; and further training to improve leadership, logistical support, maneuver operations, and the integration of combined arms capabilities.

3.1 STRATEGY

The Afghans have made modest progress in moving towards a more offensive-oriented and sustainable strategy, but they continue to struggle with proactively pursuing the Taliban and holding areas once cleared. Coalition advisors have been working with ANDSF leaders on implementing a more sustainable security strategy that capitalizes on force consolidation to generate offensive combat and policing power and maneuverability and that ensures the ANDSF are postured to provide security to key areas of the country. In addition, ANDSF, MoD, and MoI leadership are now beginning to drive long-term transformations across the force as evidenced by their ongoing development and refinement of a five-year National Military Strategy (NMS) for the ministries and the force pillars. This five-year plan outlines three primary joint actions: reintegration, security, and stability.

The ANDSF focused on three main lines of effort during their 2015-2016 winter campaign: enhancing security, rebuilding the force, and gaining and maintaining the initiative. The short timescale for rebuilding the force, the poor condition of the ANDSF after a challenging 2015, and persistent insurgent offensive operations made implementing this winter strategy a challenge. Consequently, the main emphasis of coalition TAA support this reporting period was on helping the Afghans develop and implement this strategy, with a particular focus on rebuilding components of all ANDSF pillars in Helmand Province.
The ANDSF’s 2016 spring and summer campaign plan, Operation Shafaq, which covers March through November 2016, calls for a more offensive strategy than the major plans and strategies implemented in the previous reporting period. Key aspects of the campaign include prioritizing ANDSF operations in areas with recent and consistent insurgent activity such as Kunduz, Helmand, and Nangarhar provinces; improving force management through initiatives such as implementing an operational readiness cycle; continuing to reduce checkpoints and increase offensive maneuver; and better integrating new capabilities such as intelligence collection assets and A-29 and MD-530 aircraft. Operation Shafaq also included a significant strategic communication annex to ensure the ANDSF utilized all of their capabilities to support operations. Although the development of this strategy represents a positive step in ANDSF development, the ANDSF’s nascent planning capability, delayed planning timelines, and challenges with execution below the ANA corps and ANP zone levels may make full implementation of this plan challenging. In addition, because ANDSF units on rotation to a region or province often end up employed on static checkpoints in that region, it may be difficult for the ANDSF to maintain force maneuverability to implement later phases of the campaign.

The ONSC, the MoI, the MoD, and the General Staff continue to develop national-level defense plans, campaign plans, and associated resource allocations with RS support. This reporting period the ONSC approved the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Campaign Plan (NCP) in January and April 2016 respectively. With the completion of the NSS and the NCP, the Afghans have now completed the four primary strategic-level documents that comprise the Afghan National Strategic Planning System: the National Threat Assessment (NTA), the National Security Policy (NSP), the NSS, and the NCP. In a positive sign this reporting period, ONSC-drafted and coordinated documents now include greater emphasis on intelligence sharing and fusion across all Afghan security ministries. While the completion of these strategic planning documents will help provide guidance to the ANDSF, successful and consistent implementation below the ministerial level remains a challenge. To assist in this process, the ONSC hosted a national conference in May 2016 to showcase and explain these strategic guidance documents to various government ministries and to ensure that subordinate policies adhere to national-level strategy and guidance.

### 3.2 BUDGET

The Afghan government relies on international funding for the vast majority of its security costs. Continued foreign funding is necessary to support the ANDSF at the appropriate size and with the requisite capabilities to secure Afghanistan. The requirement to fund the current ANDSF force structure in FY 2016 is $5.01 billion and is expected to decrease to approximately $4.72 billion in FY 2017. For FY 2016 the United States funded $3.65 billion of the cost of the ANDSF ($2.60 billion for the MoD and $1.05 billion for the MoI) through the Afghanistan

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32 The NTA and the NSP were signed in June and July 2015 respectively. The NTA analyzes the strategic threats facing Afghanistan and describes the operational environment of the Afghan government’s policies, strategies, and plans, forecasting trends over the next five years. The NTA informs the development of the NSP and the NSS. The six pillars of the NSP include: realizing peace and stability, improving security, establishing good governance and the rule of law, strengthening national unity, conducting effective foreign policy, and achieving economic development. The NSP provides direction for the implementation guidance set out in the NSS. The NCP details the coordination and development of security requirements across the security sector and prescribe the means to translate the goals, objectives, and tasks of the NSS into an executable plan.
Security Forces Fund (ASFF). Approximately $1.762 billion of the FY 2016 ASFF was provided directly to the Afghan government ($1.29 billion for the MoD and $472 million for the MoI) to fund salaries and incentive pay, equipment, facilities maintenance, and fuel costs. The other $1.887 billion of the FY 2016 ASFF is executed by DoD primarily through contracts on Foreign Military Sales cases. The remaining $1.36 billion of ANDSF costs were funded by international donors ($860 million for ANP salaries, information technology, aviation training and maintenance, uniforms, and medical supplies) and the Afghan government ($500 million, primarily for food and subsistence).

The United States, along with international partners, is working closely with the Afghans to reduce ANDSF costs further through a number of cost savings initiatives, most notably the divestiture of excess facilities. The MoD and the MoI have signed plans committing themselves to divesting 90 of 160 MoD facilities and 104 of 205 MoI facilities in Afghan FY 1395.\(^{33}\) The divestment of excess facilities will reduce operations and maintenance costs and ensure the ANDSF are maximizing facility utilization. The ANDSF have also made noteworthy improvements in their ability to contract for food and domestic fuel to ensure that products and services are provided for the ANA and ANP at fair and reasonable prices. Moreover, CSTC-A continues to take steps to increase the MoD’s and MoI’s ability to manage international donor funding directly and in a fiscally transparent and accountable manner. Finally, CSTC-A is able to leverage bilateral funding commitment letters to hold the MoD and the MoI accountable for managing programs effectively and to ensure that transparency and accountability remains an important aspect of MoD, MoI, and ANDSF operations. Given the continued requirement for significant ANDSF security assistance funding by international donors, tangible progress in ministerial capability, budgetary transparency, and gradual ANDSF cost reduction will be critical to maintaining donor confidence moving forward.

### 3.3 FORCE SIZE AND STRUCTURE

The current ANDSF authorized force level as part of the \textit{tashkil} remains at 352,000 ANA and ANP personnel plus 30,000 ALP. The ALP is funded solely by the United States, and although it is overseen by the MoI, it is not part of the 352,000 authorized ANDSF \textit{tashkil}.

During this reporting period, the ANDSF made several changes to their force structure within the confines of their authorized 352,000 \textit{tashkil} in order to respond better to major contingency and response scenarios. The MoD is in the early stages of developing a National Mission Brigade out of elements of the 6\textsuperscript{th} ANA Special Operation Command (ANASOC) \textit{kandak} and the \textit{Ktah Khas}. This additional national-level capacity would help to avoid the potential misuse of the ASSF as holding forces. The ANA has also piloted a new initiative to create reserve \textit{kandaks} in some ANA corps to supplement existing forces and address attrition issues. Additional major force structure changes by the MoI this reporting period include the creation of the 9\textsuperscript{th} ANCOP Brigade in Helmand Province and the establishment of the ANP zone headquarters.

\(^{33}\) The official calendar of Afghanistan follows the Afghan solar year (SY). The current SY 1395 runs from March 20, 2016 – March 20, 2017. The Afghan fiscal year follows the SY numbering system, but is offset by one quarter. The current FY 1395 runs from December 21, 2015 – December 20, 2016.
Attrition

Overall ANDSF monthly attrition\(^{34}\) this reporting period is 2.4 percent, an increase when compared to the previous reporting period. However, attrition has remained close to its three-year historical average of 2.2 percent. Although ANA attrition varies dramatically by the corps, overall ANA monthly attrition was just below 3 percent of the force, compared with 2.5 percent over the last reporting period and 2 percent during the same time period last year. ANP monthly attrition is 1.9 percent and has remained relatively stable over the last several years. AAF and ASSF units continue to maintain the lowest attrition rates and highest retention rates of all ANDSF pillars. The number of ANDSF personnel dropped from the rolls continues to be the single largest category of attrition, while voluntary separations account for the second largest group. Persistently high attrition rates require additional resources that must be devoted to recruiting, training, and retaining personnel. Furthermore, persistently high attrition also degrades combat effectiveness.

ANA soldiers and ANP police officers who are dropped from the rolls rarely return to duty. Although policies exist to prevent personnel from going absent without leave, they are often unenforced. Moreover, commanders frequently welcome personnel back without exercising any formal discipline. In an acknowledgement of these attrition challenges, on January 7, 2016, President Ghani issued a decree stating that ANDSF personnel who returned to their units in the six months after the decree would not be prosecuted for desertion or going absent without leave.

Challenges that cause ANDSF personnel to become dropped from the rolls and contribute to overall attrition include deficient and unaccountable leadership, corruption, poor equipment provision and support, and “quality of life” issues such as compensation, insufficient casualty and martyr care, absence or misunderstanding of leave policies and procedures, and inadequate living and working conditions. In addition, units in high-threat areas are often not granted leave due to operational requirements or are not managed efficiently within an operational readiness cycle, which leads to combat weariness and fatigue. Although the casualty rate is only one component that contributes to overall ANDSF attrition, many advisors report combat weariness as a major factor that leads to attrition, especially in young Afghan leaders. Coalition advisors continue to work with the ANDSF on addressing these issues by helping the Afghans improve leadership through merit-based selection and assignment of Afghan commanders, enhanced leadership development and training, and building ministerial capacity in areas such as personnel accountability and management and developing and implementing operational reporting and readiness cycles. In spite of these challenges, the overall size of the ANDSF has remained relatively stable, although it is several thousand personnel below the authorized 352,000 level.

\(^{34}\) Attrition rates account for all losses to the force. This includes both planned factors such as separation from military service and retirements and unplanned factors such as ANDSF personnel who are dropped from the rolls, killed-in-action, non-hostile fatalities, and exempted service members. Individuals are dropped from the rolls when they leave their units without authorization for more than 30 days. Some personnel who leave without authorization, including those dropped from the rolls, eventually return to their units.
Force Posture

Although the ANDSF and MoD and MoI leadership recognize the force protection advantage and additional offensive combat power they gain by adjusting their force posture, ANDSF progress on checkpoint consolidation and the appropriate allocation of forces across the country is still uneven. Implementation of various force consolidation initiatives remains a challenge due to political pressure from local officials, complaints from the local population in an area, public perceptions of security, and concerns that insurgents can exploit terrain that does not have a fixed ANDSF presence. Moreover, local commanders are reticent to consolidate checkpoints because, in some instances, they provide the commanders with illicit income. Beyond the resistance from provincial governors and local powerbrokers, senior MoD and MoI leaders have been either unwilling or unable to enforce President Ghani’s continued directives to posture the force more effectively and to reduce reliance on static positions.

Broadly emplaced checkpoints spread the ANDSF too thin and create challenges for logistics, supply management, and the provision of reinforcements. Combined, these factors make fixed positions vulnerable to insurgent attacks and therefore contribute to the high ANDSF casualty rate. RS assessments have found that a high number of static checkpoints in a province directly correlates with higher ANDSF casualties in that province.

As of the beginning of the reporting period, the ANA maintained an estimated 1,100 static checkpoints or fixed positions, while the ANP pillars, not including the ABP, maintained an estimated 7,300 static checkpoints or fixed positions. A key component of Operation Shafaq is the continued reduction of these checkpoints. The goal of coalition advising in this area and Afghan government, MoD, and MoI force consolidation initiatives is not focused on a percentage reduction in the number of fixed positions, but rather on increased offensive combat power and force maneuverability. The ANA 209th Corps and 111th Capital Division remain the least reliant on static positions, while the ANA 201st and 215th Corps are the most reliant. In areas where the ANA have planned to reposition its forces, however, ANA units often are left waiting for ANP and ALP forces to provide reinforcements or take up positions holding previously-cleared areas. Additionally, irregular and contradictory reporting from the district and provincial level has also exacerbated the ANP’s struggle to reduce checkpoints.

Even as the number of checkpoints has decreased over the last year and over the reporting period, there has not been an overall increase in ANDSF maneuver capability due to uneven implementation. Furthermore, ANDSF personnel who come off checkpoints are often unprepared to maintain area security because they are untrained in conducting offensive, intelligence-driven operations. The coalition is focusing TAA efforts in this area to demonstrate to the ANDSF how to develop and maintain a security strategy that does not overstretch the force. These initiatives include training the Afghans to replace fixed positions with mobile checkpoints and patrols and helping the ANA corps and ANP zones implement MoD and MoI leadership directives.

35 Data on ANDSF static checkpoints and fixed positions is derived from ANDSF reporting; coalition advisors at the TAACs and within the AACs are only able to validate this reporting at the ANA corps and ANP zone level.
3.4 CAPABILITIES

The ANDSF’s need to reset key components of the force during the winter highlights the persistent capability gaps in critical areas and in the non-combat enabling and ministerial functions that support them. Areas of improvement for the ANDSF include maneuver capability, maintaining operational readiness, cross-pillar coordination and cooperation, and the need to increase offensive, intelligence-driven operations to seize and retain the initiative from the insurgency. One of the drivers of the ANDSF’s overreliance on both combat and non-combat enablers is the ANDSF’s systemic challenges with sustainment at all levels. ANDSF logistics nodes continue to suffer from shortfalls in logistics systems and processes due to human capital limitations as well as a reluctance to transition from legacy to more modern systems. In addition, resource management and personnel management processes remain areas for further development that could positively affect the force’s operational capability.

Operational Capabilities

Although further coalition advisory support is necessary for continued development of the ANDSF, the Afghans continue to demonstrate their ability to learn and develop as a force. This reporting period, the ANDSF effectively fielded and employed enablers in support of combat operations such as A-29 aircraft, armed Mi-17s, MD-530s, ATACs, and increased use of ISR to support operations, all while maintaining a required focus on force generation, personnel management, and improving transparency and accountability during the winter.

ANA conventional forces are gradually improving their integration of ground-based fires platforms, including D-30 howitzers and 60mm mortars, into combat operations. This improved ground-based fires capability reduces the need for organic aerial fires from the AAF; however, ANA units are still reluctant to conduct offensive operations without ASSF support because of the combat-enabling support – in particular aerial fires – which the coalition provides to the ASSF. With the A-29s now operational and with several months of experience integrating the MD-530s into combat operations, the AAF continues to grow in its ability to provide organic aerial fires and close air attack support capability in support of ground forces. The ANA, with coalition support, has also improved its IED route clearance capability. RS advisors continue to train and equip the Afghans with mine rollers, electronic countermeasure devices, remote controlled inspection units, and hand-held mine detectors and bomb suits. Building the ANDSF’s counter-IED and route clearance capability supports the overall ANDSF strategy by enhancing ground force mobility and maneuverability.

The ANDSF continue to enhance their ISR capabilities through multiple systems, including the use of Wolfhound radio monitoring systems, Aerostat-based surveillance platforms, and the further integration of NIMS. While the fielding of these capabilities continues, the ANDSF, and specifically the ANASOC, have progressed in their ability to incorporate these capabilities into operational planning and execution. Beyond ISR, the ANDSF are showing signs of progress at integrating other enablers at the tactical level, such as ATACs, but have struggled with

\[^{36}\text{Additional information on ANA and ANP force component capabilities and MoD and MoI capacity and ministerial support to the ANDSF are detailed in the relevant sections below.}\]
sustainment planning and execution at the ANA corps and ANP zone level and below. Although ANA and ANP forces have counter-attacked and re-taken checkpoints and district centers, their reactions were often delayed due to challenges in planning and cross-pillar synchronization. The ANDSF frequently rely on its most proficient and well-developed force pillar, the ASSF – and in particular the ANASOC kandaks – in crisis response scenarios.

Major operations during the reporting period that demonstrated the ANDSF’s growing operational proficiency included protecting and reinforcing major district centers and cities in Helmand, counterterrorism operations in Nangarhar against IS-K, clearing operations in Baghlan and Badakhshan provinces in the north, and responding to Taliban attacks in Kunduz. Operation Eagle / Shaheen 18 in February and March 2016 demonstrated improved cross-pillar coordination as elements of the ANA 201st Corps backed by AUP forces pushed IS-K elements out of Achin and Shinwar districts in Nangarhar Province. Combined with concurrent U.S. counterterrorism operations in the area, Operation Eagle / Shaheen 18 degraded IS-K’s capacity with an estimated 200 IS-K killed. In addition, Operation Tufaan in Kandahar and Uruzgan consisted of units from ANA, AUP, and ALP in both provinces in support of the ANA 205th Corps summer campaign plan objectives. Finally, in a demonstration of the importance of increased maneuverability and force consolidation, during operations in Helmand Province, the ANA 205th Corps and ANCO 2nd Brigade from ANP Zone 404 provided approximately 600 personnel to help secure the province. This helped provide additional freedom of maneuver for ANA 215th Corps units to continue clearance operations and to reconstitute throughout the reporting period.

To enhance the ANDSF’s operational capabilities and combat effectiveness, RS and the Afghan government are developing a Common Policy Agreement on Operational Conditions. This agreement is currently under review at the MoD, MoI, and within RS. Once completed, it will define ANDSF operational goals and establish a framework of responsibilities between the ANDSF and RS. The agreement includes 12 conditions for the MoD and 10 for the MoI that are focused on improving operational readiness, better utilizing the ASSF, personnel manning, enhancing the rule of law across all of the ANDSF, and force optimization initiatives to help generate additional offensive maneuver capability.

**Leadership Challenges**

ANDSF leadership remains a key concern for the MoD, the MoI, and the coalition. RS officials continue to emphasize that effective and accountable leadership is the only way to ensure that the ANDSF continue to improve and that gains are sustained. The selection, placement, and empowerment of the right military and civilian leadership within the security ministries are essential to ANDSF success. At the ministerial level, delays in resource management and strategic planning processes due to leadership challenges hinder the MoD and MoI’s ability to support the ANDSF. Moreover, senior leaders often still intervene on tactical and operational-level issues to compensate for leadership shortcomings at the lower levels.

Deficient leadership hinders ANA and ANP unit performance. Leadership remains uneven across the force with some ANA corps, such as the 205th and 215th, continuing to replace leaders this reporting period and a wide variance in leadership effectiveness across ANP pillars and the
new ANP zone headquarters. The MoD removed or moved more than 40 general officers this reporting period, while the MoI moved or removed 23 senior leaders from across the various police forces for corruption and other issues. At the lower levels of the ANDSF, commanders frequently do not participate in training with their soldiers and police officers, leaving the units less capable as a group. RS advisors and training efforts continue to focus on improving the ANDSF’s technical and tactical capabilities, but more robust professional development is required to build and retain a professional force.

**Ministerial and Cross-Pillar Coordination**

RS continues to help the MoD, the MoI, and the ANDSF embrace a more cross-pillar approach to the planning and execution of operations, but these efforts require substantial leadership at all levels in order to be effective and sustainable. The establishment of the new ANP zones and associated headquarters that generally align with the ANA corps areas will assist in improving coordination across all ANDSF pillars. In a sign of early progress, ANA corps and ANP zone headquarters staff have already conducted exchanges of planning officers to coordinate planning mechanisms better. Additionally, the inclusion of ANP components in ANA winter campaign planning meetings, cross-pillar coordination in the northern provinces between ANA 209th Corps and ANP Zones 707 and 808, and joint planning at the ministerial level for Operation Shafaq were also encouraging signs this reporting period. However, one of the major challenges of cross-pillar coordination remains synchronizing efforts across the ANDSF when the Afghans are responding to insurgent activities or major crises.

In January 2016, the Afghan government signed the Operations Coordination Centers Regional and Provincial directive establishing OCCs at the regional level (OCC-R) and reinvigorating existing OCCs at the provincial level (OCC-P). The OCC-R/Ps are intended to be mechanisms for the ANDSF pillars to share intelligence and tactical operations information in order to de-conflict operational activities, prioritize the allocation of enabler support, and improve intelligence-driven planning. Although there has been some improvement in the effective use of the OCC-Rs, ANDSF senior leaders frequently bypass the OCC-Rs to coordinate enabler support directly and duplicate OCC-R activities within their own headquarters. OCC-R performance has also been uneven due to limited standardization across the centers, unclear authority from the MoD and the MoI, and nascent coordination capability.

An additional cross-ministerial and cross-pillar coordination mechanism is the *Nasrat*. Although still in its early development stages, the *Nasrat* has proved to be a capable national-level intelligence fusion and counterterrorism targeting center. The *Nasrat* has steadily advanced its capability to receive, analyze, and integrate intelligence information from the MoI’s NTEC, the MoD’s National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC), and the NDS and to provide targeting information to various ANDSF pillars for action.
3.5 ASSESSMENT

The ANDSF are a still-developing, but increasingly capable force. By incorporating lessons learned after the first year of the RS format of the NATO mission and by implementing a sustainable security strategy that better allocates forces across the country, the ANDSF has improved its performance in the first half of 2016 when compared to late 2015. The ANDSF have shown an ability to provide security for the majority of the population; conduct large-scale, cross-pillar, planned, offensive operations; and secure the Afghan government with limited coalition support. Although challenges remain, the ANDSF have persevered and continue to prevent the insurgents from achieving their strategic objectives of taking key urban centers and significantly undermining and overthrowing the Afghan government.

Progress on conducting combined arms operations is uneven, and aerial fires remain a capability gap. The ANDSF requires continued coalition support to incorporate capabilities such as D-30 artillery fires effectively to alleviate the reliance on U.S. aerial fires, better integrate organic aerial fires into operations with the use of ATACs, and develop their organic ISR and ISR enabler capabilities. Despite the continued integration of MD-530s and the addition of A-29s this reporting period, AAF organic aerial fires capability will remain a gap in the near term.

The recently established police zone headquarters have helped to address cross-pillar coordination challenges. However, progress is limited and will require continued TAA efforts at the ANP zone level. Moreover, ANDSF commander emphasis on cross-leveling supplies, property accountability, and fuel and ammunition consumption reports is limited while corruption continues to impact readiness down to the unit level.

Although they are improving, the ANDSF continue to struggle with short-term operational planning in response to insurgent offensives and appropriate force employment. The ANDSF effectively use ASSF units – ANASOC kandaks and Ktah Khas units in particular – to increase their capability to neutralize terrorist networks and deny terrorist safe havens with limited coalition support. However, the ANDSF rely heavily on the ASSF for conventional operations where the ANA or ANP would be more appropriate. Additionally, after successful ASSF counter-attacks, poorly planned and executed ANA and ANP holding operations have resulted in the Taliban or other groups’ quick return to an area. Within the ANA, combat capabilities such as artillery and the Mobile Strike Force brigades are not sufficiently coordinated and integrated into operational planning. Moreover, Mobile Strike Force brigades are often used in defensive operations or employed in static positions, which hinders their intended use as an offensive maneuver capability. Despite enhanced accountability mechanisms and improved command and control systems, police forces across the MoI continue to be misemployed for personal security or for mission sets outside their intended scope. This detracts from ANDSF combat capability and effectiveness against the insurgency and terrorist networks.

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37 Assessments of the ANDSF by force pillar can be found in the classified annex to this report.
38 Mobile Strike Force brigades consist of wheeled medium armored vehicles that provide a rapidly deployable mechanized infantry capability to undertake and reinforce operations in support of ANA missions.
SECTION 4 – MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

4.1 MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

The MoD oversees the ANA, which includes the AAF and the MoD’s pillars within the ASSF: the ANASOC, SMW, and the Ktah Khas (see Figure 7). Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai served as Acting Minister of Defense from his nomination in May 2015 until May 10, 2016. On May 5, 2016, President Ghani nominated Lieutenant General (LTG) Abdullah Khan Habibi, previously the Director of the Army General Staff, as the next Minister of Defense. He began serving as Acting Minister of Defense on May 10, 2016, while his nomination is pending parliamentary confirmation. The Ministry of Defense and the ANA General Staff are focused on implementing a number of constructive policies and systemic processes that are beginning to take hold. The MoD completed its move to a new headquarters building on February 14, 2016, which has resulted in improved command post operations, increased information sharing between intelligence and operations directorates, and enhanced cross-pillar coordination through mechanisms such as a daily morning security meeting that includes leadership from all MoD force pillars. However, this increased level of coordination and implementation of MoD initiatives across ministerial functions has not fully translated to the ANA corps level and below.

During this reporting period, the MoD replaced more than 40 general officers, primarily in the ANA 215th Corps in Helmand and the 205th Corps in Kandahar Province, as well as across the ministry and General Staff. These changes, combined with efforts late in 2015 to remove or reassign other ineffective or corrupt leaders, have resulted in a nearly 40 percent turnover of the entire ANA general officer corps in the last year, which has started to manifest itself in improved ministerial functions, such as better outcomes from senior leader meetings and a more proactive approach to persistent challenges. The MoD is also slowly progressing in its efforts to increase the number of civilians within its workforce. The 2014 U.S.-Afghan Bilateral Civilianization Agreement expired in December 2015, and the MoD is developing a new policy and implementation plan to revise its civilianization program to make it more sustainable over the long term.
The overall MoD authorized end strength includes positions for MoD headquarters, various command staffs, the ANA, the AAF, and elements of the ASSF (see Figure 8 for MoD authorized end strength for the current reporting period and the previous two Afghan solar years). The MoD also includes an additional 8,004 authorized civilian positions that were chosen to augment the military force for certain duties, build institutional knowledge and experience within the ministry, and free up soldiers to perform inherently military functions.

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39 Although the MoD and MoI budget process coincides with the Afghan fiscal year, the tashkil process coincides with the Afghan solar year.
Figure 8: Ministry of Defense Manning Authorization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MoD Echelons</th>
<th>Solar Year 1393</th>
<th>Solar Year 1394</th>
<th>Solar Year 1395</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Unassigned Resources</td>
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<tr>
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<td><strong>195,000</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>(military only)</em></td>
<td><em>(includes R coded positions)</em>&lt;sup&gt;41&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td><em>(includes R coded positions)</em></td>
<td><em>(includes R coded positions)</em></td>
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Resource Management and Procurement

During this reporting period, the MoD increased its capacity and capability to develop a core budget and in the finance and procurement functional areas. During February and March 2016, resource management and procurement personnel managed successful processes to close out the FY 1394 budget and transition into FY 1395 execution with coalition support. Despite this positive momentum and progress, a reluctance to implement technical systems and processes, reliance on informal networks or inefficient processes, and centralized decision-making authority continue to hinder effective MoD resource management and procurement capability. Additionally, due in large part to the National Procurement Commission’s oversight and approval function for all Afghan government contracts,<sup>42</sup> MoD financial and contract execution rates are improving, although at a slower rate than expected. Coalition advisors worked closely with their MoD counterparts to ensure that the new Afghan procurement law passed on January 12, 2016, maintained high standards for accountability while also allowing for efficient procurement processes.

After developing its FY 1395 Draft Prioritized Procurement Plan (DPPP) during the previous reporting period, the MoD submitted the DPPP through the Requirements Approval Board (RAB)<sup>43</sup> process with adequate time to modify and improve programs with coalition advisory support. MoD senior leaders are taking a more proactive role in this area with the First Deputy

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<sup>40</sup> TTHS denotes Training, Transient, Holding, Students.

<sup>41</sup> “R” coded positions denotes positions currently filled by military personnel that will revert to civilian positions once they are vacated.

<sup>42</sup> Following a major fuel contract scandal in January 2015, President Ghani dissolved the government-wide procurement system and instituted a presidentially chaired National Procurement Commission to oversee all government contracts above the Afghan equivalent of $300,000.

<sup>43</sup> The RAB consists of members of CSTC-A and the Afghan government; the purpose is to conduct an independent validation of a contracting or procurement requirement to ensure it is compliant with Afghan law. Procurements valued greater than approximately $35,000 U.S. dollars must be submitted to the RAB prior to consideration by the National Procurement Commission.
Minister of Defense holding weekly meetings in support of the RAB. In another positive step, MoD Medical Command successfully developed its annual requirements for medical supply items and submitted them on time through the formal planning process.

Although there has been modest progress on long-term planning, there is still room for improvement on current budget execution. As of March 2016, the MoD had identified 46 critical contracts valued at $72.5 million to transition into FY 1395 operations and maintenance contract frameworks and had already approved 295 of 320 contracts necessary to execute the FY 1395 budget. By the end of the fifth month of FY 1395 (mid-May 2016), the MoD had executed approximately 25 percent of its total FY 1395 budget of $1.3 billion, a good pace of execution early in the Afghan fiscal year. Coalition advisors continue to assist the MoD in awarding the long-delayed MoD ground fuel contract. This prolonged delay resulted in a $49 million gap in expected fuel purchases and escalates the risk to ANA and other MoD force pillar readiness.

In addition, the MoD struggles with addressing complex contract administration and execution responsibilities properly. For instance, during this reporting period a major MoD contracted fuel vendor ceased fuel deliveries due to questionable MoD payment actions and the implementation of an additional performance condition not included in the original contract. This was particularly problematic as it occurred prior to the traditional fighting season. Finally, to help address contract administration and budget execution inefficiencies, CSTC-A has been helping the MoD transition from single-year and complex contracts to multi-year and “framework” contracts that allow sub-contracts (e.g. one MoD food contract with sub-contracts for each province).

To address systemic challenges in resource management and procurement capability, RS advisors and the MoD have implemented a number of initiatives to develop further the necessary workforce to support these critical functions. By May 2016, more than 60 Functional Area Support Team (FAST) members, young Afghans recruited primarily out of Afghan universities and technical programs to serve as subject matter experts across the MoD, had begun working across the ministry. Initial reporting indicates that ministry staff already relies heavily on FAST personnel due to their proficiency and educational backgrounds. Over the next three years this program will expand to as many as 330 FAST personnel. In addition, as of May 31, 2016, more than 150 MoD personnel completed training on the Afghanistan Financial Management Information System (AFMIS) at five of the six ANA corps headquarters and 14 of 18 MoD Finance and Procurement offices in Kabul.

Legal Affairs

The MoD has demonstrated modest progress in implementing processes to increase transparency. MoD and ANA leadership are now more actively involved in counter-corruption panels, commissions, and working groups. In addition, after President Ghani’s 2015 initiative to encourage all senior government leaders to publicly declare their personal assets, nearly 60 percent of senior MoD and ANA officials have complied as of April 2016. This leadership focus has also resulted in a greater commitment to legal training at the ANA corps level, an increased

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44 AFMIS is the Afghan government’s budget and accounting system, which is managed by the Ministry of Finance and used by the MoD, the MoI, and other government ministries.
commitment to improve and formalize investigation procedures, and a greater willingness to pursue prosecutions for corruption-associated misconduct under the ANA legal system, although the latter often requires coalition advisor support and guidance. Nevertheless, MoD leadership focus is inconsistent, and corruption and accountability remain challenges at lower levels of the ANA.

MoD personnel and resources are sufficient to support the increased emphasis on corruption investigations and prosecutions. However, information sharing within the MoD between the GS G2 (Intelligence), GS Inspector General (IG), and GS Legal regarding major corruption allegations is still sporadic and senior leaders display limited willingness to investigate cases fully and prepare investigations for appropriate prosecutions. In the instances where the political will to pursue corruption exists, corruption cases involving civilian leaders and employees of the MoD must be sent to the Attorney General’s Office (AGO) for investigation and prosecution where AGO-MoD coordination is still limited. This further erodes MoD willingness to pursue corruption cases since they frequently do not see the results of their efforts. Nonetheless, there are some signs of progress as the GS IG directed a special investigation into several ANA 215th Corps corruption allegations over the last several months. Allegations against ANA 215th Corps leaders ranged from facilitating drug trafficking and selling supplies to requiring bribes for contracts, maintaining “ghost” soldiers in payroll and personnel systems, and failing to properly track supplies. Although many of these were mid-level leaders, cases against 10 leaders are now in various stages of prosecution. In another positive step this reporting period, a major fuel corruption case involving ANA 205th personnel advanced through the Afghan court system successfully.

With coalition support, the MoD continues to implement several accountability and oversight mechanisms to combat corruption within the ministry and the ANA. Senior leaders continue to participate in a Counter Corruption Working Group and in this reporting period the MoD established additional issue-specific Transparency Accountability Committees to raise awareness of ongoing challenges and divert resources appropriately to address them. During this reporting period, the MoD approved its annual inspection plan focused on ammunition and fuel, and GS coordination with the ANA corps Inspectors General on inspection schedules is ongoing. RS advisory efforts with the MoD have also focused on the development and implementation of the Ministerial Internal Controls Program, on the Annual and Organizational Inspection Programs, and on helping the GS IG train lower level ANA staff on proper inspections and accountability procedures.

The MoD has the personnel and training to investigate and prosecute GVHRs effectively, and its capacity to conduct sustainable internal human rights and Law of Armed Conflict training is expanding. The MoD has shown slow but steady progress towards identifying, investigating, and appropriately acting on GVHR allegations, but there remains room for improvement. In a positive development, there have also been improvements in ANA self-reporting and investigating alleged GVHRs. While there are positive indications of MoD and ANA willingness to investigate, this can vary significantly between ANA corps commanders who possess significant authority and control the investigative bodies. The MoD has demonstrated an uneven ability to influence ANA corps commanders who choose to not pursue a particular allegation.

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The ANA Legal School is advancing in its capacity to train MoD investigators and legal professionals. Training programs this reporting period included an International Committee of the Red Cross trained and certified mobile training team that provided corps level commanders and junior leaders training on human rights law and the prevention of GVHRs, as well as a new investigator training program. The ANA Legal School has become proficient enough to begin to reach across ministerial boundaries to train ANP personnel on investigative laws. In addition to the primarily MoD and ANA-led training in this functional area, the coalition conducted several training programs this reporting period including TAAC-E’s work with ANP units in Laghman Province on investigative techniques and effective investigations procedures.

**Personnel Management**

Effective AHRIMS implementation is an important step in enhancing the MoD’s personnel management capacity, improving pay systems and accountability mechanisms, and addressing retention by identifying the eligible population. Improving pay and personnel systems is also critical to addressing corruption, which is particularly acute in the ANA 215th Corps. Without effective automated systems, ANA commanders in the 215th Corps and other corps are able to provide funds directly to paymasters or siphon funds for themselves. The coalition is addressing this by helping the ANA move from manual rolls to AHRIMS, which will assist in the use of electronic funds transfer systems. As of May 12, 2016, MoD AHRIMS slotting for the SY 1394 *tashkil* was 134,052 (69 percent) slotted and 61,048 (31 percent) unslotted. During development of the SY 1395 *tashkil*, the MoD added additional personnel to support the AHRIMS management capability; however, the MoD will require several months to realize this additional capacity due to manning and training requirements.

Implementation of the APPS and the new MoD biometric identification card will improve visibility and oversight of the MoD and ANA force pillars. Ahead of APPS full implementation in 2017, the MoD now has 50 full-time contractors to input and clarify AHRIMS data. In addition, mobile teams have been traveling to ANA corps headquarters across the country to collect biometric data (e.g. finger prints and iris scans) from *kandaks* in each region to register all ANA soldiers before they can begin receiving identification cards. As of May 2016, approximately 70 percent of all ANA personnel had been registered in the biometric database.

A major focus of coalition efforts this reporting period was improving the MoD’s operational readiness reporting, particularly as it applies to personnel readiness. The Vice Chief of the General Staff and Chief of the General Staff now chair regular meetings on readiness with ANA corps commanders where they discuss readiness reporting and the current status of the force. As the ANA implements a more comprehensive operational readiness cycle, it will alleviate its force generation challenges. ANA corps commanders have also begun briefing readiness reports to the MoD on a monthly basis. MoD and ANA initiatives on implementing leave for personnel and increasing collective training are also encouraging initial steps towards enhancing overall personnel readiness.

The MoD is beginning to recognize the challenges of its limited leadership training and development program and the importance of investing in the future of the ANA. The MoD established two leadership training programs this reporting period: a general officer-level
capstone course with elements of training in the United States and Afghanistan and a pre-
command course for future kandak and brigade commanders. The kandak pre-command course
covered topics such as the law of armed conflict and combat readiness, training management,
leadership and military decision-making, and command and control, among other topics.
Although these initiatives are in the early stages and the MoD struggles to identify the
appropriate candidates for these programs based on merit, they are positive steps as the MoD
begins to develop a systematic, institutionalized leadership development program.

During this reporting period, the MoD and ANA training schools generated nearly 1,000
graduates in eight different advanced training courses.45 Despite this growing training capacity,
ANA corps commanders and senior leaders are reluctant to send soldiers to advanced individual
training in order to maintain their force strength. This contributes to low class size for advanced
individual training. For instance, specialty training courses often have only three to four students
when there is capacity for 50. Moreover, lack of ANA soldier attendance is exacerbated by the
ANA corps’ limited ability to track soldiers by specialty and the advanced training required to
build their skill sets and advance their career.

Logistics and Maintenance

Logistics and maintenance support remains one of the biggest challenges for the MoD. Although
there have been marginal improvements in sustainment capabilities, the MoD and ANA forces
lack the organizational capacity and the will to govern and enforce management controls,
contract oversight, and reporting. Although coalition advisors have helped the Afghans develop
the processes and procedures to increase the timeliness and volume of logistical support to the
ANA corps, TAA efforts at the ANA corps level have not filtered down to lower levels or been
implemented fully. Moreover, organizations such as the MoD Acquisition, Technology, and
Weapons Office continue to be staffed minimally despite increases to the size of the office
within the tashkil. A major focus of TAA efforts over the last several months has been
improving the equipment readiness rates of the ANA 215th Corps.

The MoD submitted and approved a change to the MoD and ANA logistics structure in the SY
1395 tashkil. The Regional Logistics Supply Centers at each ANA corps are now divided into
two entities: the Forward Supply Depot (FSD) focused on supply parts and distribution, which is
aligned under the ANA Logistics Command,46 and an ANA corps support battalion (CSB),
which will consist of separate maintenance and distribution elements. The change to the force
structure is designed to improve the linkage and relationship between the FSD and the Central
Supply Depot as well as to improve the maintenance focus and capacity at the corps level. As a

45 After ANA soldiers complete basic warrior training they are assigned to one of the ANA corps or the 111th
Capital Division before eventually completing advanced individual training at the ANA Training and Education
Command (ANATEC). Each ANA corps has an associated Regional Military Training Center (RMTC), which is
the primary site for initial soldier and military specialty training of Afghan soldiers. The Kabul Military Training
Center (KMTC) and additional specialized schools provide added training capability, including support to the corps
via mobile training teams.
46 ANA Logistics Command, located in northern Kabul, is responsible for national-level resupply and maintenance
support for ANA ground forces. Two national-level organic sustainment nodes include the Central Workshop
maintenance facility and the Central Supply Depot warehouse. The Materiel Management Center is a national-level
administrative support element.
result, the ANA Logistics Command now has operational control over the FSD. As this change is fully implemented, it will help reduce ongoing problems with ANA corps headquarters’ hoarding equipment and supplies for their own needs.

Coalition advisors are continuing to work with the ANA Logistics Command elements to adopt and correctly use the Core-IMS logistics management system. Core-IMS is now functional across the country at national level logistics nodes and at ANA CSBs. However, supply data is often entered incorrectly due to lack of literacy or proficiency on the system, and some ANA CSBs are reluctant to improve accountability. When Core-IMS has been successfully adopted with proper training it has enabled a more efficient inventory management process and improved the processing of MoD-14 forms. For instance, during this reporting period, the ANA 201st Corps completed a 100 percent inventory of all its equipment and uploaded all items in Core-IMS, which provided the corps commander with full asset visibility into his inventory. To assist with Core-IMS implementation, the coalition is assisting the MoD to hire 86 Afghans through the FAST program to train and assist the ANDSF with inventory management and data entry at the Central Supply Depot. Additionally, CSTC-A has worked to establish a standalone Core-IMS capability at the regional level, allowing work to proceed during power outages and periods of no connectivity. The hardware required for standalone capability (18 servers and 165 computers) arrived in December 2015, and installation began in phases in January 2016.

Core-IMS adoption is also an important aspect of enhancing transparency and accountability to avoid corruption. In February 2016, the ANA 215th CSB commander in Helmand Province was removed after it was discovered he was stockpiling six kandaks’ worth of basic soldier supplies, uniforms, boots, blankets, and weapons magazines. The commander and his senior staff refused to use Core-IMS for accountability and were exploiting shortcomings inherent in paper-based processes.

Distribution remains a challenge across the MoD logistics systems. The Central Supply Depot has been inconsistent with receiving inbound shipments, efficiently processing outbound shipments, and distributing supplies in a timely, predictable, and transparent manner to ANA corps units. Another challenge is that the national-level depots often ship 100 percent of their stocks to the ANA corps leaving no ability to meet urgent operational requirements and surge resources when necessary. Because regional logistics nodes are largely unwilling and unable to cross-level supplies and equipment, this exacerbates the problem of the ANA having sufficient parts and equipment but not having them in the right places.

The current MoD vehicle fleet of approximately 51,000 vehicles is composed of 68 major model types with over 200 variations. Due to the size of the fleet, there are almost 20,000 documented repair parts, making it a challenge to stock, track, maintain, or issue parts even in a fully automated system. Moreover, of the total fleet, approximately only 17 percent are combat systems, such as armored High-Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) and Mobile Strike Force vehicles, with the majority of the ANA fleet consisting of light tactical vehicles and pickup trucks that lack armor. CSTC-A is working with ANA logistics elements to simplify the ANA vehicle fleet by eliminating some vehicle types to reduce sustainment costs. Additionally, TAA efforts this reporting period focused on improving the ANA’s estimated cost

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47 The MoD-14 is the basic form used to request items and supplies within the ANA Logistics Command.
of damage (ECOD) process by providing incentives and assessing penalties for improving or declining maintenance, training the Afghans on how to account properly for minor damage, and helping them determine which issues can be addressed with regular maintenance or specific repairs rather than a complete vehicle overhaul or disposal. This reporting period the ANA 203rd Corps became the first ANDSF unit to utilize the ECOD process successfully.

The MoD has struggled to build its organic maintenance capability. In many ANA corps, maintenance personnel and technical specialists are not serving in their slotted positions because commanders use them for other personnel needs such as infantry. This lowers equipment readiness rates since mechanics are not receiving the proper training and experience to improve their maintenance capabilities. Overall the ANA is approximately 600 personnel below the approximately 3,500 mechanics required to maintain its fleet of more than 51,000 vehicles. The National Maintenance Strategy contract,⁴⁸ which will help address long-term ANA maintenance deficiencies, is expected to be awarded in April 2017. In the interim, the current “bridge” contract is providing training for ANA mechanics, supply specialists, and maintenance supervisors at each ANA CSB to help improve organic maintenance capability.

**Strategic and Operational Planning**

Across the MoD, the ANA corps demonstrated an improved ability to plan corps-level operations, and ASSF units maintained their ability to plan and ultimately execute offensive operations. The MoD and the ANA have demonstrated their ability to conduct planned and deliberate operations, but are often unable to maintain the initiative through final-phase planning for holding and stability operations. In addition, short-term and emergent operational planning also remains a significant challenge – especially in the ANA 209th Corps, which covers nine provinces – and with ANA corps commanders continuing to misemploy ASSF units in crisis situations.

On December 1, 2015, former-acting Minister of Defense Stanekzai signed three key MoD strategic planning documents: the NMS, the Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG), and the Defense Capability Planning Guidance (DCPG). The DCPG is a foundational planning document that informs the MoD budget and is central to the direction of resources, force structure design, and procurement guidance for the ANA. In January 2016, MoD leaders used the DCPG to begin the FY 1396 budget building process. While the approval of these documents was delayed by several months, these are encouraging signs as the MoD progresses in its strategic planning capability. Beyond these strategic-level documents, MoD leaders have recognized the need for better long-term planning and have begun developing plans for the remainder of the 2016 summer campaign, the follow-on 2017 campaign, and balancing the competing priorities of conducting combat operations versus maintaining readiness and reconstitution efforts.

The ability of ANA general officers to issue clear planning guidance to their staffs to enable cross-functional planning is limited, but it is improving with the support of RS advisors. For

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⁴⁸ The National Maintenance Strategy consists of a logistics support maintenance contract at 23 key national and regional nodes to conduct maintenance and supply chain management operations and training and support for the ANDSF leadership and operators in maintenance and supply chain management operations.
example, on March 9 and 10, 2016, the ANA conducted its semi-annual Corps Commanders Conference to examine outcomes from the winter planning process and discuss priorities for the 2016 spring and summer campaign. At the lower levels of the ANA, implementation of strategic and operational planning processes varies by corps leadership, local political influence, and the regional security situation. For instance, TAAC-S worked closely with the ANA 205th Corps to help it interpret strategic-level planning documents for Operation Shafaq and produce orders to subordinate units.

At the operational level, the MoD, in concert with coalition advisory efforts, identified several priority issues including the improvement of force allocation and consolidation to generate more combat power in support of a more offensive strategy. For example, EF 6 advisors supported MoD efforts to synchronize operations between the ANA 205th and ANA 215th Corps as part of the southern component of the spring and summer campaign plan. Due to a lack of specificity in the Afghan national-level operational planning documents for Operation Shafaq, TAAC-S provided significant assistance to the ANA 205th Corps for mission analysis, planning, and producing orders to subordinate units.

**Intelligence**

Although ANA elements are still developing their ability to conduct intelligence-driven operations, the MoD continues to grow its intelligence collection, analysis, and ISR enabler capabilities. This reporting period, the GS G2 (Intelligence) improved its management of intelligence collection needs, the quality of its analysis and briefs, and its overall contributions to the planning process in preparation for the 2016 spring and summer campaign plan. The GS G2 and the NMIC have improved their collaboration with the GS G3 (Operations and Plans); however, overall coordination and communication with external intelligence elements such as the NDS or ANA forces in the field is an area for further improvement. The NMIC’s move into the new MoD headquarters building, along with increased assignment of intelligence personnel within the authorized *tashkil*, have also facilitated improved intelligence coordination within the MoD.

EF 7 advisors continue to build the MoD and ANA’s intelligence capability through dedicated training programs. In February 2016, TAAC-N conducted a networking analysis course with the ANA 209th Corps that helped ANA students identify the enemy’s key support areas and facilitation routes based on a depiction of the enemy’s terrain-based networks. This successful course was later used as a model for mobile training teams to conduct similar courses with the ANA 201st and 203rd Corps. RS advisors and experts from U.S. Central Command also hosted several intelligence collection and analysis seminars in January 2016 for more than 30 students from the GS G2 and ANASOC along with other intelligence elements such as the MoI’s DPI and the *Nasrat*. Finally, the MoD is now increasingly conducting training independent of coalition advisors. For example, in January 2016, an ANA GS G2 geospatial analyst led fellow MoD and ANA intelligence analysts in familiarization training and practical exercises focused on converting raw geospatial intelligence into graphics and images that could be shared with the Afghan intelligence community or briefed to senior ANA leaders.
The ANA is becoming more adept at deploying critical ISR enablers and collection equipment such as Aerostat balloons, Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID) towers, RF-7800W high-capacity line-of-sight radios, and Wolfhound radio monitoring systems to improve field communications, protect forces and bases, and collect intelligence. During this reporting period, the ANA fielded two new Aerostat systems and 12 additional RAID towers in support of force protection at Afghan bases. The CSTC-A ISR team conducted Aerostat and RAID tower training courses with the ANA 201st, 203rd, 205th, and 207th Corps at the Intelligence Training Center in Sia Seng. Challenges associated with the RAID tower program include violence in areas around RAID tower construction sites, as is the case in Helmand Province; increasing ANA reliance on Afghan field service representatives for sustainment support; and ensuring that trained operators of this persistent surveillance system are not reassigned for other tasks. Beginning in March 2016, the MoD made a major push to field 128 RF-7800W radios to increase ANA intelligence data and communications capability and to expand connectivity to the MoD computer network. The MoD currently lacks a capable NIMS program office to staff the NIMS program with sufficient personnel. This, coupled with uneven implementation at the ANA corps headquarters, has hampered the use of this important intelligence sharing network.

The ANA fielded its first ScanEagle surveillance drone in March 2016 for use in Shorab District, Helmand Province, in support of the ANA 215th Corps. U.S. forces trained ANA officers on the use of ScanEagle in the United States and additional training was conducted in Mazar-e-Sharif in the north. Contractors are conducting initial operations support for the ANA and aircraft sustainment. The contractor will continue this level of support for at least three years as the ANA builds the skills of its new 174-person authorization for ScanEagle operations and sustainment under the taskil.

**Strategic Communication**

Strategic messaging is critical for the MoD’s ability to recruit personnel as well as to present the ANDSF as the best alternative to the Taliban to provide security, stability, and hope for Afghans, regional neighbors, and the international community. Although there have been some positive gains in the MoD and ANA’s strategic communication, public affairs, and information operations effectiveness, the MoD continues to struggle in these areas. The insurgency is typically more proactive in their use of the information space and with different media. A combination of HPAs and fast, frequent use of social media by the Taliban and other insurgent groups dominates news and public awareness. This forces the ANDSF and MoD strategic communication elements into a consequence management role and detracts from their ability to communicate their narrative effectively.

Nonetheless, MoD messaging is improving, and the frequent use of Minister and spokesman-level joint press conferences and events are having a positive effect on changing Afghan public and media narratives. This reporting period, strategic communication elements increased their coordination with other aspects of the MoD, and although strategic communication imperatives were not fully integrated into the MoD’s winter campaign plan, Operation Shafaq in the spring and summer included a comprehensive strategic communication plan. This annex to the primary campaign plan included public affairs guidance for ANA corps and religious and cultural affairs outreach initiatives. Moreover, the MoD dispatched rotating strategic communication
assessment teams to the ANA corps to support, implement, and evaluate regional-level outreach and communications initiatives in support of ANA operations.

During the early part of the reporting period, former-acting Minister Stanekzai issued guidance to his commanders and communicators to increase their travel across the south and encouraged MoD and ANA leaders at all levels to increase engagement with the public and media. The MoD has made a concerted effort to conduct more outreach to religious scholars and mullahs, particularly in support of the spring and summer 2016 campaign plan, though it is too early to determine whether the increased emphasis on civic and religious engagements is having a noticeable effect on public perception and messaging. Increased leadership emphasis in this area is also slowly becoming institutionalized. For instance, the MoD created strategic communication-specific budget codes and authorized additional communications equipment, such as the radio-in-a-box maintenance contracts, in the FY 1395 budget. As a result, the MoD was able to realize the results of that planning with additional communications capability this reporting period.

Below the ministry level, the ANA is still growing in its ability to integrate and utilize their nascent strategic communication capability; however, there were several encouraging developments over the last six months. The MoD Strategic Communication Office established a five-month strategic communication plan that included an increased number of press conferences and an emphasis on disseminating press releases more focused on touting ANA capabilities than reporting on casualties and security incidents. Independent of coalition TAA support, the MoD hosted a public affairs conference from April 11-14, 2016, to plan support operations for Operation Shafaq and conduct continuing education for public affairs officers.

Finally, the ANA continues to improve its information operations capability. In the aftermath of a large insurgent attack against Kandahar Airfield in December 2015, the ANA 205th Corps conducted several communications initiatives to counter negative insurgent messaging and provide the civilian population with positive messaging. Recent ANA information operations efforts also include providing counter Taliban and IS-K messaging and promoting the ANDSF’s Islamic legitimacy to the public. In support of ANDSF operations in Helmand and Badakhshan against the Taliban and in Nangarhar against IS-K, the MoD worked to get local and international media personnel to all three provinces, created joint media events that included local and provincial officials along with ANA and ANP leaders, and coordinated religious leader engagement.

**Gender Office Efforts**

Gender integration within the MoD and the treatment and support for female ANA soldiers continues to lag behind the MoI and ANP; however, the MoD and ANA have made significant strides over the last several months. RS gender office advisors work closely with their MoD counterparts on their ongoing development of policies and strategies to support women’s recruitment, training, retention and progression in the ANA. This reporting period former-acting Minister Stanekzai appointed a senior advisor on gender issues, internationally-recognized Afghan human rights and gender expert Ms. Wazhma Frog, to assist the MoD as it implements several key reforms. The MoD has also refined the current 5,240 dedicated women-only and
gender-neutral positions in the *tashkil* to identify and categorize them by ANA specialty. This will help ensure that women have opportunities to serve meaningfully, progress in rank, and assist the MoD in tracking career progress for women within specific specialties. These *tashkil* positions have also already helped drive recruiting efforts that target certain skill-sets; for instance, in February and March 2016 the ANA recruited more women than during all of 2015.

During this reporting period, the MoD began addressing some of its long-term challenges associated with increasing women’s recruitment, retention, and training capacity. The ANA Recruiting Command (ANAREC) approved 57 new female recruiting positions to support women’s recruitment across the country, and now female ANA recruiters are implementing women-focused media and marketing campaigns that target women in girls’ schools, high schools, and universities throughout Afghanistan. In addition, there has been significant early interest in a pilot program for women’s educational scholarships. The ANA women’s scholarship program will help women pay back previous education costs or pay for current education programs. It is targeted primarily at women seeking bachelor’s degrees in high-need areas such as accounting, communications, marketing, and journalism. Separately, the ANA also recently established a Medical Pathways Program that provides scholarships and subsidies for women seeking degrees in medical fields and has appointed a senior ANA liaison for gender issues throughout ANA Medical Command to support these efforts.

Modeled after the successful ANP women-only training program in Sivas, Turkey, the MoD and ANA are developing separate out-of-country training programs for female ANA soldiers in Antalya, Turkey, and in India. The MoD has earmarked $2 million initially for these two pilot programs and has begun recruiting approximately 200 women to fill the training classes. The first class of between 100 and 150 non-commissioned officers and soldiers will begin training in Antalya, Turkey, on May 30, 2016, and between 50 and 100 women will begin training in India in August 2016. With this increased training capacity, the MoD will eventually be able to train up to 485 new recruits per year. To ensure continued progress in this area, one of the RS commitment letters for FY 1395 includes a stipulation that MoD must recruit and train female ANA soldiers up to their full recruiting and training capacity.

During this reporting period, the ANA Officer Academy began a new initiative to increase the number of female officers. Thirteen new female officers graduated from the academy in February 2016 and 24 graduated in March. Prior to the February 2016 class there had been only two other classes that included women since 2014. For the first time ever, all of the women underwent a formal selection process to ensure the quality and standards of recruits were equivalent to men’s standards – the February 2016 class included two women among the top-10 graduates. RS advisors have also helped the MoD Office of Gender Equality develop and increase the number of women-only capability building courses in literacy, English, and computer skills. The MoD’s Office of Gender Equality also worked with the MoD’s Finance Directorate to establish a one-on-one budget and mentoring program for ANA women to improve the MoD’s accounting and budgeting systems and processes. Additional training efforts this reporting period include the provision of first aid and human rights law training for local female police officers in concert with the International Committee of the Red Cross and hand-to-hand combat training for female ABP police officers.
4.2 AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

The ANA General Staff provides command and control over all of Afghanistan’s ground and air forces, which include the ANA conventional forces in the ANA corps, the AAF, the ANASOC, and the SMW. In total, 24 combat brigades, three combat air wings, 24 branch and basic training schools, and additional support facilities (e.g. depots, hospitals) comprise the ANA.

Afghan National Army Strength

The ANA is authorized up to 195,000 personnel as part of its *tashkil*. As of May 31, 2016, ANA manning was approximately 171,100 personnel. This includes more than 7,100 AAF personnel and nearly 820 women between both the ANA and AAF. See Figure 9 below for authorized *tashkil* level, current end strength, and gain/loss for each month over the last year.

In January 2016, the GS G1 (Personnel), in collaboration with the ANATEC and the ANAREC, published their goals for recruitment during SY 1395 of over 67,000 new recruits as well as more than 12,000 “re-contrats” from separated personnel. This goal (approximately 4,800 new recruits each month) reflects inputs and advisory support from the RS Manpower Working Group and a growing consensus that the number of applicants has reached a threshold or saturation point with the military-aged population, especially in isolated provinces. In addition, the RS Manpower Working Group has helped ANAREC and the GS G1 adjust recruiting and training forecasting to compensate for seasonal changes given the traditional fighting season and harvesting time. President Ghani has also encouraged provincial governors to reach out to tribal and local officials to help drive ANA recruiting with modest success. To further address challenges to increasing the ANA end strength up to the *tashkil* level, in January 2016 the MoD raised the age limit for new ANA recruits from 35 to 40 years old to help address recruitment targets.

During the reporting period, monthly attrition rates varied between 2.39 and 3.49 percent, continuing the upward trend from the previous reporting period. Although the MoD has taken some positive steps to increase recruiting and improve re-contracting rates, this significant attrition rate has marginalized these gains. Some of the most common causes cited for retention and attrition challenges include quality of leadership and several soldier “quality of life” issues, such as compensation, insufficient casualty and martyr care, absence or misunderstanding of leave policies and procedures, and inadequate living and working conditions. Another factor affecting ANA attrition is the location of ANA soldier deployment. Current ANA personnel management policies do not allow soldiers to serve in their home areas in order to decrease the potential for local influence. However, these policies have the second-order effect of increasing transportation costs and creating additional obstacles for soldiers attempting to take authorized leave, which contributes to soldiers going absent without leave.

ANA retention rates vary widely across the ANA corps. Some ANA corps maintain retention rates as low as 20 percent, while units such as the 111th Capital Division maintain relatively high retention rates. The AAF and ASSF pillars have also maintained their retention rate of well over 90 percent, underscoring the positive impacts of strong leadership and coalition TAA at the tactical level.
Figure 9: ANA Strength

Note: The ANA military strength depicted above includes the military members of the AAF, which is a component of the ANA.

* Attrition encompasses all unplanned and planned losses.

** Gain includes all gains (recruits, re-accessions, and return from dropped from the rolls) to ANA strength.

Afghan National Army Structure

The ANA is divided into one division and six regional corps: 111th Capital Division, 201st Corps, 203rd Corps, 205th Corps, 207th Corps, 209th Corps, and 215th Corps (see Figure 10 for their respective areas of responsibilities); two Mobile Strike Force brigades; and the National Engineer Brigade. Each ANA corps is typically composed of a headquarters kandak, three to four infantry brigades, and various specialty kandaks. In addition, the two Mobile Strike Force brigades consist of seven Mobile Strike Force kandaks based in Kabul and Kandahar Province.

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ANDSF personnel strength, recruiting, retention, and attrition information is derived from Afghan reporting. RS analysts interpret the Afghan data and rectify discrepancies and inconsistencies.
This reporting period, the ANA instituted several structural changes at the ANA corps level and below. After recognizing the heavy burden emplaced on the ANA 209th Corps last reporting period given its wide geographic area across the northern provinces, the ANA established a new division and division headquarters, the 20th, under the ANA 209th Corps that provides command and control for the 209th’s easternmost brigades. The ANA 209th Corps now also has a Deputy Corps Commander to increase the headquarter’s span of control. To address emergent operations and personnel management challenges more effectively, the ANA has also begun to establish reserve kandaks in many corps. In March 2016, the ANA 201st Corps became the first corps to establish a reserve unit, while the ANA 209th Corps is scheduled to have its reserve kandaks operational by the summer of 2016. The SY 1395 tashkil also adjusted regional-level logistics nodes to improve the relationship between ANA corps logistics elements and the Central Supply Depot, as well as to improve the ANA Logistics Command’s operational control. RS advisors also continue to support ongoing Afghan government efforts to establish the Kabul Garrison Command, which is intended to improve command and control of ANDSF units in and around Kabul. Although this is a joint headquarters that resides under the command of the President and the ONSC, the MoD provides personnel, equipment, and sustainment support for the Kabul Garrison Command. These changes during the reporting period and for the SY 1395 tashkil did not affect the ANA’s overall 195,000 authorized level.

50 The Kabul Garrison Command is composed of elements of the 111th Capital Division, Kabul City Police, AUP units in and around Kabul, and units from the NDS.
Afghan Air Force

The AAF is the primary air enabler for the ANDSF, responsible for air mobility and close air attack across all of Afghanistan. The AAF can independently plan for and provide air assets for logistics, resupply, humanitarian relief efforts, human remains return, CASEVAC, non-traditional ISR, air interdiction, armed overwatch, and aerial escort mission sets. The AAF headquarters is located in Kabul and provides command and control of three wings, the Kabul Air Wing, Kandahar Air Wing, Shindand Air Wing, and eleven detachments, five of which have aircraft assigned (Mazar-e Sharif, Jalalabad, Shorab, Gardez, and in Herat Province). TAAC-Air provides tactical level train, advise, and assist support to the AAF at Kabul and Kandahar.

The AAF is authorized up to 8,019 personnel as part of its tashkil. During this reporting period, AAF end strength remained close to 7,100 personnel (See Figure 11 below for authorized tashkil level, current end strength, and gain/loss for each month over the last year). This figure includes 228 civilians and 58 women. To help increase the number of women within the AAF, the SY 1395 tashkil opened up an additional 103 positions to women. There are currently 160 fully-trained pilots in the AAF. This does not include fully-trained pilots currently in training to transition to another aircraft. The AAF currently has more than 722 maintenance personnel with various levels of training and experience. Additionally, the AAF gained 20 new flight medic positions in its SY 1395 tashkil and is working to fill positions from upcoming medic training school graduates.
The AAF has some of the highest retention and lowest attrition rates in the ANDSF. Attrition is consistently around one percent of the force and nearly 90 percent of AAF pilots and maintenance personnel re-contract when their tour is complete. However, recruiting individuals with the requisite education and language capabilities remains a challenge. Furthermore, the timeline required to train both pilots and maintenance personnel is significant. Given these challenges, any shortfall in recruiting or a higher than anticipated training attrition rate causes a major effect on the AAF’s current ability to operate and to maintain the future force. To help address this issue, the AAF continues to employ public affairs and recruiting teams focused on drawing new talent into the force.

In partnership with coalition and international partners, TAAC-Air continues to expand capacity to train pilots and maintenance personnel in locations including the United States, the Czech Republic, and the United Arab Emirates. This construct of conducting an increasing amount of training abroad enables the AAF to focus on combat operations while continuing to develop human capital.
**Airframes**

As of May 31, 2016, the AAF has a total of 104 aircraft, a 13 percent increase over the last reporting period. Fixed-wing platforms include C-208s, C-130s, and A-29s; rotary-wing platforms include Mi-35s, Mi-17s, MD-530s, and Cheetahs. During the reporting period, the U.S. delivered eight A-29 Super Tucano aircraft (fixed-wing light attack aircraft) to Afghanistan, and deliveries of the remaining 20 aircraft will continue through 2018. Although the AAF continues to develop pilots, some platforms are limited by an insufficient number of flight engineers or other personnel that comprise a fully trained flight crew. As a result, the AAF may sometimes employ its aircraft without a full flight crew. Figure 12 details the number of AAF airframes, fully trained pilots, and fully trained flight crews.

**Figure 12: Summary of AAF Airframes, Pilots, and Aircrews***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Aircraft</th>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Inventory</th>
<th>Fully Trained Pilots</th>
<th>Qualified Aircrews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Wing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-208</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-29</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8(^{55})</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotary Wing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-17</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>47(^{56})</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD-530</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15(^{57})</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-35</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheetah</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*as of May 31, 2016

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\(^{51}\) SMW aircraft are not included in this total.

\(^{52}\) The Government of India donated four Mi-35s in December 2015, three of which had been delivered as of May 31, 2016. The AAF’s previous fleet of Mi-35 aircraft have reached the end of their service life; they are no longer included in the official *tashkil* and the coalition does not provide TAA support to these aircraft or their crews.

\(^{53}\) The Government of India donated three Cheetah helicopters during the first half of 2015. The coalition does not provide TAA support to these aircraft or their crews.

\(^{54}\) The C-130 flight crew compliment is three pilots, two loadmasters, and one engineer. The C-208 flight crew compliment is two pilots. The A-29 flight crew compliment is one pilot. The Mi-17 flight crew compliment is two pilots, two gunners, and one flight engineer. The MD-530 flight crew compliment is two pilots.

\(^{55}\) This reflects the number in Afghanistan available for combat operations. There are currently 11 aircraft at Moody Air Force Base, Georgia being used for training Afghan pilots and maintenance personnel.

\(^{56}\) This number does not include the additional Mi-17 helicopters used by the SMW.

\(^{57}\) Two of these MD-530 remain in the United States for weapons system integration testing.
The C-130 tactical transport aircraft provides a medium- airlift capability in support of personnel and equipment transport, CASEVAC, and human remains return capabilities.

C-130s operate from Kabul and can conduct operations throughout Afghanistan to improved airfields. Contract logistics support (CLS) provides sustainment for the C-130 fleet. The contract includes an AAF maintenance personnel training component to help build the AAF’s organic maintenance capability. There are currently 55 AAF maintenance personnel in training for the C-130.

AAF C-130s have been used primarily as a strategic airlift capability for large passenger movements and CASEVAC operations. In addition, they have been used to transport cargo that is too large or unsuitable to be transported in C-208 or Mi-17 aircraft such as maintenance equipment and parts, bombs, and weapons.

C-130 operations are currently limited by a shortage in qualified aircrew members. TAAC-Air and the AAF are working hard to accelerate the growth of flight engineers and loadmasters through in-country training. There are adequate numbers of pilots at various stages of the training pipeline and crew manning levels will significantly improve in 2016.
The C-208 aircraft provides light-lift, personnel transport, CASEVAC, and human remains recovery capabilities for the ANDSF. TAAC-Air is working to expand the employment envelope for the C-208 by developing a soft field landing capability. This in turn will free up Mi-17s for other mission sets and operating environments for which it is uniquely designed. This reporting period the AAF also demonstrated the ability to employ C-208s in a basic, non-traditional ISR role; however, this mission set is nascent.

C-208s operate from Kabul, Kandahar, and Shindand and can forward deploy to improved and some unimproved airfields throughout the country. A mix of CLS and organic maintenance provides sustainment support for the C-208 fleet. Full organic C-208 maintenance capability is forecast to be achieved in 2018.

A shortage of qualified aircrew members limits the number of C-208 operations the AAF can conduct. This shortage is primarily due to reassignment of C-208 pilots to A-29 and PC-12 aircraft. Low pilot manning numbers will improve as the training pipeline increases pilot output throughout 2016. Recent training efforts in the C-208 include aircraft commander, instructor pilot, and evaluator pilot upgrades in support of building a self-sustaining force.
The AAF use the A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft to provide critical air support, such as aerial fires, to ground forces. Four A-29s arrived in Kabul in February 2016 and four aircraft arrived in March 2016. These first eight A-29s, along with their Afghan pilots and maintenance personnel, achieved initial operational capability in April 2016. Although there are 12 more A-29s in the pipeline, given pilot training requirements, these aircraft will not be available during summer 2016.

The first class of AAF pilots and maintenance personnel graduated from their training program at Moody Air Force Base, Georgia, in December 2015, and arrived back in Kabul in early 2016. As aircraft come off of the assembly line they will be sent to Moody Air Force Base in support of Afghan aircrew training. The aircraft will then be delivered to Afghanistan with subsequent graduating classes of pilots and maintenance personnel. The current schedule builds the AAF A-29 fleet to 12 by the 2017 fighting season and is set to achieve a fully operational capability of 20 airframes and 30 pilots by the end of 2018. In addition, 90 maintenance personnel will be trained over this timeframe, and the AAF is forecast to achieve organic maintenance capability for the A-29 by 2022.

The first four U.S.-trained Afghan A-29 pilots made their maiden flight in Afghanistan on January 31, 2016. The AAF used the A-29s to provide support to the ANDSF throughout the reporting period, including in support of ANA 209th Corps operations with the A-29s first combat airstrike in Badakhshan Province on April 14, 2016. Initially, the AAF will rely on CLS to sustain the A-29s while Afghan maintenance personnel continue to be trained in the United States.
Mi-17 Helicopter

The Mi-17 helicopter conducts day and night personnel transport, CASEVAC, resupply, close combat attack, aerial escort, and aerial assault missions. Making up just less than half of total AAF aircraft, the Mi-17 is considered the “workhorse” of the AAF. The AAF is capable of deploying and operating Mi-17s throughout the country.

Twelve Mi-17s are configured with a fixed forward firing capability and seven of those are also capable of employing rockets. Armed Mi-17s accounted for over 81 percent of the aerial fires missions tasked in support of ANDSF operations during the reporting period. Using the Mi-17s as armed gunships limits the AAF’s ability to employ Mi-17s in support of other mission sets such as CASEVAC and aerial resupply.

AAF capability to maintain Mi-17s is adequate with more than 270 AAF maintenance personnel, but the AAF relies on CLS for heavy work and aircraft overhauls. Given the AAF’s high Mi-17 utilization rate, CLS is critical to absorbing the extra phase maintenance work required for the AAF to maintain an operational fleet. Moreover, with the Mi-17s high attrition rate, the number of AAF Mi-17s available for the second half of 2016 and 2017 will be significantly diminished.

The AAF has adequate numbers of Mi-17 aircrew to operate the current fleet but is not projected to reach full manning until 2017. During the reporting period, Mi-17 gunship qualified aircrews expanded from 19 to 26, including two qualified AAF instructor pilots.
The MD-530 helicopter provides close air attack and aerial escort capability to the ANSF. On January 23, 2016, four MD-530s were delivered to Kabul after undergoing upgrade modifications in the United States, bringing the total to 18 delivered since March 2015. Planned deliveries through the end of 2016 will bring the total AAF MD-530 fleet to 27. Currently, the MD-530 weapons load is limited to two .50 caliber machine guns. However, TAAC-Air is working with the AAF to add a rocket-firing capability to all aircraft over the course of 2016. Building upon progress during the last reporting period, the AAF has developed and executed limited expeditionary capability for the MD-530 facilitating operations outside of Kabul, including in Kandahar Province, Shorab in Helmand, and Tarin Kowt in Uruzgan.

The AAF currently relies on CLS for MD-530 sustainment but is building its organic maintenance capability. As of May 16, 2016, there are 32 AAF maintenance personnel for the MD-530. TAAC-Air is working with the AAF to increase the number of MD-530 students in the training pipeline in order to maximize utility of the fleet. Full aircrew manning is forecast to be achieved by 2018.

**Training**

The development of human capital remains a critical component of overall AAF progress. The AAF has not yet trained sufficient operations and maintenance personnel for its current and projected fleet. The pipeline for potential pilots remains limited but is growing. On average, it takes three to four years to train a pilot and five to seven years to train an expert maintainer.
As of May 31, 2016, 172 students are enrolled in 18 U.S.-funded training programs that support AAF development. This is a 13 percent increase over the last reporting period. Training courses cover basic pilot training, aviation safety, and language training, in addition to airframe-specific training for aircrew and maintenance personnel.

The AAF continues to struggle with identifying candidates in sufficient time to complete the complex, multi-agency vetting process prior to training start dates and with adequate English language skills to begin training. Training effectiveness is assessed using metrics based on completion of English language training accomplished at the Defense Language Institute (DLI) and completion of the associated technical training. All C-130 loadmasters, flight engineers, maintenance personnel, and pilots, as well as A-29 pilots and maintenance personnel, require 55 out of 100 on the English Comprehension Level exam prior to departing for training in the United States. Once there, all AAF trainees go to DLI to improve their English language scores until they reach the proficiency level required for each position. Additionally, there is an English language training contract in Afghanistan with 18 instructors – 17 in Kabul, 1 in Kandahar – that provide English language instruction to improve the proficiency and scores of those Afghans awaiting training.

Development of a cadre of ATACs is an important aspect of ensuring the AAF’s growing capabilities are utilized to support ANDSF ground forces. The second class of 14 students under an improved syllabus graduated from the four-week ATAC training at Air University on January 24, 2016.58 This training also includes live fire exercises where ATACs practice identifying targets and calling in aerial fires support from MD-530s and A-29s. As of May 31, 2016, the Afghans have a total of 34 fully trained ATACs, and there are also 115 additional personnel in the ANA corps trained to utilize ATAC equipment and procedures to bolster air-to-ground integration. TAAC-Air also implemented a program to train and equip ATACs with hand-held radios, global positioning system devices, and laser range finders and to set up a train-the-trainer program at the Afghan Air University to develop additional ATACs. During this reporting period, the AAF also continued instruction at the Air University with the third class of 185 students in the officer candidate school expected to graduate in September 2016.

**Sustainment**

The AAF faces difficulties with sustaining its maintenance capability at all bases across Afghanistan. During this reporting period, the AAF continued to rely heavily on CLS to support its elevated operational tempo. While the AAF has challenges with conducting expeditionary operations due to limited sustainment capability, maintenance support within the Kabul area is sufficient due to CLS presence and coalition advisory support.

All AAF aircraft platforms will require varying degrees of CLS through at least 2023. The long-term RS advising objective is to help the Afghans develop a mix of organic and contract maintenance and logistics management support, allowing organic maintenance to conduct routine maintenance and time-based (e.g. phased) inspections while contract maintenance

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58 ATACs, or *Hamahangee Tacticce Hwayee*, receive basic training at *Pohantoon-e-Hawayee* Air University in Kabul.
performs heavy, depot-level repairs and aircraft overhauls. Additionally, as coalition advisors draw down, the ability of the AAF to order parts and sustain its systems will present a challenge, as it currently lacks the planning and discipline required to sustain the fleet and continues to rely primarily on paper-based rather than automated systems such as Core-IMS.

The AAF also suffers from insufficient infrastructure and an inadequate ability to maintain it. For example, on February 8, 2016, due to poor ground fuel inventory forecasting and higher than expected consumption rates, Kabul AAF air base was forced to ration electrical power to support AAF sustainment operations. However, ongoing infrastructure improvement projects, such as the addition of munitions covers and ramp and parking improvements to support the A-29, are continuing with slow but steady progress.

**Operations**

With the additional four MD-530s and eight A-29s delivered this reporting period, the AAF has more than double the number of close air attack-capable platforms available to support the ANDSF compared to 2015. Continuing a trend from the last reporting period and the traditional fighting season in 2015, daily execution is the strength of the AAF. From December 2015 until April 2016, Mi-17 flying hours were comparable to the same time period a year ago. This continued elevated operational tempo came in spite of fewer available aircraft due to the high Mi-17 attrition rate. MD-530 usage has also increased. The AAF utilized the MD-530s for 1,456 flight hours this reporting period, a significant increase compared to 668 flight hours during the same time period one year ago. C-208 and C-130 flying hours decreased this reporting period despite a similar number of aircraft in inventory as the previous reporting period. However, this is likely due to the slight decrease in operational tempo during the winter months at the beginning of the reporting period when there are fewer requirements to move troops and cargo.

The AAF now provide almost all aerial fires in support of ANDSF operations, relying on its small number of fixed forward firing modified Mi-17s, armed MD-530 light attack helicopters, and recently acquired A-29 light attack aircraft. After the AAF conducted its first combat strike operation using the A-29 in April 2016, the AAF has increasingly utilized the A-29 to support ANDSF offensive operations during the traditional fighting season. Advances such as these will boost ANDSF confidence in the growing effectiveness of AAF aerial fires capability. The AAF is forecast to reach full operational capability in aerial fires mission sets by early 2019.

The AAF continues to utilize its Mi-17s at a very high rate. Two negative effects of this high operational tempo has been a reduction in training for AAF maintenance personnel as CLS personnel have been shifted to pure maintenance work and a high Mi-17 accident rate that is partially attributed to a lack of training flights for aircrews. TAAC-Air has advised the AAF on fleet management methods to correct the trend seen during the first half of 2016, but there is a tension between the need for training and the combat demand placed on the AAF fleet.

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59 Based on the transition to the RS mission, coalition aerial fires support to independent ANDSF operations has been significantly curtailed. However, U.S. and coalition aerial fires are employed when necessary to provide enabling support to the ANDSF as authorized by NATO and U.S. authorities granted to Commander, RS, and Commander, USFOR-A, respectively.
The AAF also demonstrated increased ability to plan and deploy forces in support of both ANDSF campaign plans and crisis response operations. This included providing air support to operations in northern Helmand, Logar, and Wardak provinces. In each instance, the AAF proactively allocated and staged Mi-17s and MD-530s for pre-planned, rather than reactive, support to ANDSF operations. This reporting period the AAF deployed Mi-17 aircraft to Kunduz Province in support of ANA 209th Corps operations; it also deployed aircraft based out of Kandahar to Tarin Kowt to facilitate ANA 205th Corps operations in western Uruzgan. Finally, the continued development of ATACs and reliance on Air Liaison Officers within the ANA corps has improved aerial fires integration with ground units. In particular, the ANA 201st Corps has improved its allocation and use of aviation assets.

Additionally, the AAF has made progress in its capacity and capability to provide CASEVAC and MEDEVAC in support of the ANDSF via C-130, C-208, and Mi-17 aircraft. However, the clinical skills of medical aircrew continue to confine MEDEVAC to only clinically stable patients moving between medical treatment facilities. As of April 2016, approximately 2,727 CASEVAC/MEDEVAC missions were conducted by the air during this reporting period. In comparison, there were 1,944 CASEVAC/MEDEVAC missions during the same time period one year ago. Although the AAF has demonstrated its increased capacity to conduct CASEVAC missions and its response times have decreased dramatically, a portion of the increased missions can be attributed to the higher ANDSF operational tempo and the resulting casualties. Although the AAF continues to prioritize CASEVAC missions in its command and control doctrine, requests far exceed available capacity.

**MoD Afghan Special Security Forces**

The MoD ASSF components – the ANASOC, the Ktah Khas, and the SMW – continue to demonstrate that they are the most capable forces within the ANDSF and as a result have the highest operational tempo. Afghan special operations forces are widely considered to be some of the best in the region and are increasingly maturing with further coalition assistance. They have proven their ability to successfully conduct counterterrorism raids and they are furthering their capability to analyze and exploit intelligence gained from these operations. SOJTF-A and NATO Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) tactical-level TAA efforts with Afghan special operations forces have resulted in an increase in the number of Afghan independent and enabled operations. As the ASSF increase their organic operational capacity, ASSF operations are expected to outpace coalition advised and unilateral operations. The ASSF maintains the lowest attrition rate amongst all ANDSF pillars with between a 90 and 95 percent reenlistment rate.

The ASSF maintained a high operational tempo throughout the reporting period. On February 28, 2016, ASSF elements conducted a raid to free 35 hostages, including 25 children, being held by the Taliban. In a display of ASSF proficiency, the Afghans conducted the operation without any coalition force enabler or advisory support, at night, and without sustaining any injuries to hostages or Afghan forces. In addition, ASSF forces – in particular ANASOC kandaks and Ktah Khas units – have been effective at degrading insurgent capacity to conduct HPAss in Kabul by interdicting materials necessary to create IEDs and disrupting facilitation networks. Despite
these successes, the continued misemployment of ASSF units to perform conventional-type clear and hold operations remains a coalition concern as it degrades combat effectiveness, capability, and readiness over time. For instance, while under temporary control of an ANA corps for a specific operation, ANA corps commanders and senior Afghan government officials tend to employ ASSF units to augment extended conventional operations.

MoD ASSF pillars rely primarily on MoD elements and typically the closest ANA corps headquarters and regional logistics node for sustainment support. ASSF units – primarily the ANASOC – rely heavily on HMMWVs and Mobile Strike Force vehicles with heavy armor to provide a protected mobility capability and carry large caliber weapons such as the M2 .50 caliber machine gun; however, the maintenance and acquisition processes necessary to sustain these vehicles are still developing. In addition, difficulties in keeping on-hand equipment in a fully-mission-capable state of readiness arise from a lack of spare parts and access to qualified maintenance personnel.

A lack of fully developed enablers (e.g., aviation, ground mobility, fires, and intelligence) hinders the ASSF’s ability to move quickly and effectively. Enhanced cross-pillar coordination and resource allocation will better enable the ASSF to improve its mobility and maneuverability across Afghanistan. In addition, the ASSF’s National Mine Reduction Group is increasingly capable of clearing routes critical to ASSF mobility and maneuverability; however, continued development is required to maximize its impact on ASSF operations. Sustained coalition TAA and enabler support is critical to maintaining the ASSF’s operational and institutional capacity to advance both the United States and the Afghan government’s long-term counterterrorism objectives.

**Afghan National Army Special Operations Command**

The ANASOC’s mission is to increase the Afghan government’s ability to conduct counterinsurgency, stability operations, and, as directed, execute special operations against terrorist and insurgent networks in coordination with other ANDSF pillars. ANASOC is a division-level headquarters responsible for command and control of all ANA special operations forces. The ANASOC is currently authorized 11,700 personnel and is organized into ten battalion-sized ANA Commando Special Operations Kandaks (SOKs). Each SOK contains eight ANA special forces teams and several division-level support elements. Nine of the ten SOKs are aligned with specific ANA corps. The 6th SOK, located in the Kabul area, functions as the ANA’s national mission unit.

ANASOC kandaks rely on ANA corps for re-supply and logistics support. However, because their command structure places them outside of the typical ANA corps chain of command, the SOKs lack the necessary influence with the ANA corps headquarters to ensure they routinely secure adequate logistical support. ANA corps headquarters support to the SOKs is largely dependent on the relationship between the individual ANA corps and the SOKs as well as on connections amongst leadership. In addition to helping address these logistics issues, coalition advisory efforts have also focused on improving the ANASOC School of Excellence’s programs to improve soldier proficiency, including courses on advanced mortar training and medical training to increase lethality and CASEVAC support capabilities. Over the last six months,
ANASOC leadership has also shown greater initiative in coordinating planning with other ANDSF components, developing stronger lines of communication through cross-pillar planning involving joint operations in multiple locations, and hosting combined planning conferences between the MoD and the MoI ahead of major operations.

**Ktah Khas**

The *Ktah Khas* is a light infantry special operations *kandak* consisting of three operational companies, a training company, a military intelligence company, a female tactical platoon, and several sections that enable and support the strike forces. The *Ktah Khas* is authorized 1,050 personnel and remains close to full strength. *Ktah Khas* platoons and companies are accomplished in independently conducting intelligence-driven counterterrorism raids, particularly against high-value individuals, and vehicle interdictions utilizing both ground and air mobility platforms. This reporting period *Ktah Khas* units demonstrated that they are able to execute operations in and around the Kabul area quickly and effectively.

*Ktah Khas* leaders are capable of conducting operational planning with limited coalition support; however, *Ktah Khas* units continue to be utilized at an operational tempo that is unsustainable over the long term. Moreover, MoD leadership often employs the *Ktah Khas* as a conventional clearing force rather than as a targeted strike force. After receiving missions and tasks from MoD leadership, *Ktah Khas* execution of operations is often delayed due to reliance on their weak logistical system for transportation and life support.

The *Ktah Khas*’s high operational tempo contributes to reduced readiness and combat effectiveness and exacerbates existing logistical and maintenance challenges. NSOCC-A and SOJTF-A advisors are assisting the *Ktah Khas* to refine its auditing and property book management processes to address some of their logistical and equipment readiness challenges. In addition, the *Ktah Khas* also lack adequate ground assault force teams and dedicated helicopter assault force support, which limits their effectiveness by restricting their operational reach.

The *Ktah Khas* recently established an education and training center, a tactical radio repair facility, and a new joint operations center. In recent months the *Ktah Khas* have graduated several combat air controllers, explosive ordnance disposal technicians, and NIMS database specialists through these new training centers and other MoD training schools.

**Special Mission Wing**

The SMW is a special aviation wing that provides expeditionary reach for the ASSF for counterterrorism and counternarcotics missions designed to disrupt insurgent and drug smuggling networks in Afghanistan. The SMW enables helicopter assault force raids and provides resupply, close air attack, CASEVAC, and ISR support for ASSF and ANA conventional forces. The SMW is the only ANDSF pillar with night-vision, rotary-wing air assault, and fixed-wing ISR capabilities. In February 2016, the SMW established a fourth

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60 Female *Ktah Khas* personnel typically assist with interrogating women and assisting with cordoning off areas for women and children during and after operations.
squadron located in Mazar-e-Sharif. This new squadron joins the SMW’s existing three squadrons, two located in Kabul, and one at Kandahar Airfield. The SMW is now permanently based in northern, central, and southern Afghanistan providing the ASSF with operational reach across Afghanistan.

The SMW currently has approximately 620 personnel out of an authorized 858 person end strength. Due to increased recruiting efforts and a consistently low attrition rate, the SMW end strength has gradually increased over the last year. Recruiting standards for the SMW are higher than for the AAF or other ANDSF pillars. Both the MoD and the coalition vet all SMW recruits to ensure they are capable of maintaining a high standard of operations and professionalism. The SMW struggles to find qualified candidates to fill pilot and maintenance personnel slots. Although the SMW is sending 30 pilots to AAF training during the summer of 2016, these pilots will not complete training for another 18 months.

With a fleet half the size of the AAF, there is competition within the ANDSF for use of the SMW’s limited capabilities. The emergence of a higher-priority mission can often result in the cancellation of a previously planned or ongoing mission. In addition, the SMW is often tasked with resupply and CASEVAC missions better suited for the AAF. The Joint Special Operations Coordination Center (JSOCC) Air Tasking Cell centralizes authority and establishes clear command relationships, authorities, or timelines to help allocate SMW assets as efficiently and effectively as possible. Coalition TAA efforts have focused on increasing the SMW’s ability to enable ASSF movements and operations, including sustaining its night vision goggle training program, further developing a fixed forward firing capability, increasing its in-flight medical training, and assisting in its aircraft maintenance capability.

Airframes

The SMW now possesses 29 of 30 authorized Mi-17 V5s, 3 of 6 authorized Mi-17 V1s, and 17 of 18 authorized PC-12s. The Mi-17 V1s are used primarily for counternarcotics missions. The final PC-12 is scheduled for delivery in August 2016. Figure 13 details the number of SMW airframes, fully trained pilots, and fully trained flight crews. In addition to the number of pilots listed below, there are currently four PC-12 co-pilots in training.

Figure 13: Summary of SMW Airframes, Pilots, and Aircrews*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Aircraft</th>
<th>Inventory</th>
<th>Planned</th>
<th>Fully Trained Pilots</th>
<th>Qualified Aircrews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mi-17</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC-12</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*as of May 31, 2016

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61 This includes the Mi-17 V5 and Mi-17 V1 variants.
Mi-17 Helicopter

The primary mission of the Mi-17 fleet is to enable ASSF helicopter assault force raids for both counternarcotics and counterterrorism missions. Additionally, the Mi-17s are used to conduct resupply operations, CASEVAC, quick reaction force and personnel movement, and provide reconnaissance support. The SMW is currently manned with 42 Mi-17 pilots. All of the rotary-wing pilots have graduated from initial entry rotary-wing training or previously have been rated as Mi-17 or Mi-35 pilots.

Two of the Mi-17 V5 airframes will undergo heavy, depot-level maintenance during the summer of 2016. In addition, one of the counternarcotics-focused Mi-17 V1s is scheduled to undergo a cockpit modification in the summer of 2016. To add aerial fires capability to the SMW, the SMW, with coalition support, is initiating a program to arm a limited number of Mi-17 V5s with fixed forward firing capability, although this program is in its early stages.
PC-12 Aircraft

The SMW utilize the PC-12 fixed-wing aircraft to conduct ISR in support of counterterrorism and counternarcotics operations, including overwatch of ASSF ground assault forces, and conducting helicopter assault force raids during both daytime and night time operations.

Seventeen PC-12 aircraft are currently operational providing the ANDSF with day and night surveillance and air-based signals intelligence capabilities. The PC-12 can send full motion video to a ground station, and the onboard crew can perform real time analysis of data being collected. Despite these capabilities, SMW personnel still require training to improve the integration of intelligence into combat operations.

Sustainment

SMW organic logistics and maintenance capacity is growing and is stronger than AAF maintenance capability due to higher standards and better training; however, it remains limited. Contractors are required to perform all maintenance on the PC-12 fleet, while a combination of contractors and approximately 165 SMW maintenance personnel provide sustainment support for the Mi-17 fleet. SMW maintenance personnel are capable of conducting between 20 and 30 percent of scheduled service maintenance for the Mi-17 but cannot conduct the complex, depot-level maintenance required to sustain the aging Mi-17 fleet over the long term.
The SMW is building its maintenance capacity to support the PC-12. In February 2016, the SMW graduated its first class of 12 maintenance personnel qualified to provide maintenance support for the PC-12. This training continued throughout the reporting period and has included introductions to depot-level maintenance of the PC-12 with contractor support. To develop its organic maintenance capacity further, the SMW has developed a five-year maintenance plan that will aim to have it independent of coalition and contractor support by December 2020.

In a demonstration of the SMW’s increasing sustainment capability, after an accident at a training facility rendered an Mi-17 inoperable, SMW aircrews, maintenance personnel, and contract crews changed out the blades of the helicopter, conducted a track and balance on the aircraft, and flew it home with assistance from coalition advisors. This marked the second time in the past year that the SMW was able to recover a damaged aircraft with limited coalition support.

Operations

The SMW is increasingly capable of conducting independent missions in support of ASSF elements. During this reporting period, more than 84 percent of the SMW’s Mi-17 missions and more than 90 percent of PC-12 missions were conducted unilaterally with no coalition advisor or enabler support. From December 1, 2015, until May 31, 2016, the SMW’s Mi-17 fleet has logged more than 2,700 flying hours for training and missions while the PC-12s have completed more than 2,670 flying hours.

The SMW has shown gradual progress towards conducting intelligence operations independently, but it remains partially dependent on coalition forces for general intelligence and exploitation analysis support. The SMW also remain reliant on the AAF for administrative and Manning support. Nearly all of the SMW’s missions during the reporting period were in support of counterterrorism operations rather than counternarcotics missions. In addition, the SMW has reached 90 percent of its tashkil for its medical section. This has helped to create a new CASEVAC capability of 23 flight medics and 5 flight surgeons.
SECTION 5 – MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

5.1 MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

The MoI oversees the ANP, which includes four pillars and three sub-pillars that focus on providing security for specialized mission sets, investigations, and supporting counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations (see Figure 14 for MoI organizational chart). On April 9, 2016, the *Wolesi Jirga* confirmed former ANA 207th Corps Commander Major General Tah Mohammad Jahid as the new Minister of Interior. Minister Jahid succeeded Minister Nur ul-Haq Ulumi who began his term in January 2015. In addition to a new minister, General Abdul Rahman replaced General Salangi in the important position of Deputy Minister for Security during this reporting period. The departure of both Minister Ulumi and General Salangi in quick succession will pose a challenge for the MoI as it continues to implement organizational and structural reforms.

As part of the MoI’s restructuring plan, the MoI has started the process of establishing the new position of First Deputy Minister. This will free up the Minister and the Deputy Minister for Security who currently help run the ministry staff in addition to their primary responsibilities. To enhance its oversight capacity and improve efficiency, the MoI has increased its appointment of civilians in senior ministerial positions with over 71 positions funded through the UN Development Program (UNDP) Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA). This change is part of a broader emphasis on increasing the number of civilians throughout the MoI. Although construction was completed on the new MoI headquarters building in Kabul this reporting period, MoI staff have not moved in due to installation delays for information technology, power, and other necessary infrastructure for the main building and auxiliary buildings that will house ministry staff. As this construction work is completed, MoI staff are expected to move into the new headquarters building in phases during the second half of 2016.

In addition to RS advisory efforts, eight other organizations, as well as several nations’ bilateral advising efforts, continue to focus on the institutional reform of the MoI and on the professionalization of the ANP. These organizations include the European Union Police mission, the UNDP, UNAMA, the German Police Project Team, and other parts of the U.S. Government such as the State and Justice Departments. Many of the international organizations coordinate their efforts through the International Community Advisor Steering Council, which meets every week in Kabul.

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62 Afghanistan’s Parliament includes the *Wolesi Jirga* (lower house) and *Meshrano Jirga* (upper house).
The overall MoI authorized end strength includes positions for the MoI headquarters and the ANP pillars (see Figure 15 for MoI authorized end strength for the current reporting period and the previous two Afghan solar years). The Afghan government also funds more than 9,500 civilian positions for the MoI. Beginning in SY 1394, the MoI adjusted its *tashkil* to begin counting the Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP) under the AUP authorized level. However, the AACP remains a separate pillar and retains a separate command and control system.
Figure 15: Ministry of Interior Manning Authorization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Police by Pillar</th>
<th>Solar Year 1393</th>
<th>Police by Pillar</th>
<th>Solar Year 1394</th>
<th>Solar Year 1395(^{63})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Border Police</td>
<td>22,955</td>
<td>Afghan Border Police</td>
<td>23,315</td>
<td>23,315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan National Civil Order Police</td>
<td>15,223</td>
<td>Afghan National Civil Order Police</td>
<td>16,203</td>
<td>16,203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Anti-Crime Police &amp; General Command of Police Special Units</td>
<td>10,864</td>
<td>General Command of Police Special Units</td>
<td>1,934</td>
<td>1,934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Uniform Police</td>
<td>90,299</td>
<td>Afghan Uniform Police (includes Afghan Anti-Crime Police(^{64}))</td>
<td>100,402</td>
<td>100,402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Interior HQ &amp; Institutional Support</td>
<td>14,659</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior HQ &amp; Institutional Support</td>
<td>15,144</td>
<td>15,146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTHS Accounts</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>TTHS Accounts(^{65})</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unallocated Resources</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Unallocated Resources</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Police Authorized</strong></td>
<td><strong>157,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total Police Authorized</strong></td>
<td><strong>157,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>157,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Resource Management and Procurement**

Implementation of sound finance and procurement business practices is uneven across the MoI. To address these challenges, RS advisors are working with the MoI to implement automated systems to assist in managing resources and increasing accountability as well as developing the human capital necessary to support these systems. In addition, CSTC-A continues to assist the Deputy Minister for Security and other senior leaders to centralize and maintain oversight over contracting processes to prevent MoI and ANP staff at the provincial levels from circumventing transparent and accountable processes.

Building on the positive trajectory during the last reporting period, in May 2016 the MoI’s subject matter expert program surpassed 286 hires with approximately 260 personnel employed across the country and approximately 120 personnel supporting MoI headquarters or national

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\(^{63}\) As of May 31, 2016, the MoI had not approved its SY 1395 tashkil; however, the final authorized level is not expected to deviate from this information significantly.

\(^{64}\) Beginning in SY 1394 the MoI and ANP began counting the AACP as part of the AUP on its tashkil although it remains a separate force pillar.

\(^{65}\) Beginning in SY 1394 the MoI and ANP removed all training, transient, and holding personnel and students from their official authorization documents.
level elements. In addition, in February 2016, the MoI, in concert with the MoD, established 19 training sites to develop MoI workforce proficiency with the AFMIS that tracks purchases and provides an accounting and budgeting capability for the ministry.

The MoI lagged behind the MoD in its transition from the FY 1394 to the FY 1395 budget, but it made strong progress during the second half of the reporting period. Heading into FY 1395 the MoI had more than 30 major contracts that were at risk of lapsing. During this reporting period, coalition advisors assisted MoI procurement and contracting officials identify the most critical contracts and supported MoI and Afghan government procurement processes to award them. Similar to efforts with the MoD, CSTC-A has helped the MoI simplify its contracting process, transitioning 318 separate contracts into 10 larger framework contracts that allow for sub-contracts in each province for specific items such as food and fuel.

The MoI’s budget planning capability remains limited. The MoI submitted its DPPP for FY 1395 in February 2016 – nearly three months late – and required continued assistance at all levels to generate the ANP contracting requirements that drive the procurement planning process. As a result of these delays, CSTC-A assessed nearly $1 million in penalties to reinforce financial management responsibility as part of the FY 1395 commitment letters. This four month delay will also adversely affect and delay FY 1395 budget execution.

The Kabul City Police in particular continue to struggle with internal controls and accountability of resources, fuel supply, delivery, and the consumption processes for police departments. In addition, vendor companies often delay the delivery of fuel in the hopes that daily changes in the oil prices will result in a higher profit. Because of their limited procurement and resource management capability, Kabul-based police departments frequently meet their fuel needs from non-traditional sources that contribute to the risk of corruption in the procurement process.

Legal Affairs

Despite limited capacity to combat corruption and report, investigate, and act upon allegations of GVHR, the MoI has taken positive steps to improve transparency, ministerial oversight, rule of law, and to reduce corruption by implementing various structural reforms and by terminating or suspending several key officials. During this reporting period, the MoI created a number of steering committees and associated programs, such as the Transparency and Accountability in Law Enforcement (TALE) committee, and developed a Counter and Anti-Corruption Plan, to better coordinate its efforts internally. Furthermore, the MoI removed the head of the Special Intelligence Unit within the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) and terminated more than 100 officials within the Central Prisons Directorate for incompetence and corruption, illustrating its commitment to reform in this area. Finally, after a corruption scandal, in February 2016 MoI leadership removed the commanding general of the Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) and transferred the entire organization to the AACP, which is better suited for the MCTF’s criminal investigation and counter-corruption mission.

Unlike the MoD, which relies on the ANA’s court martial system, the MoI is dependent on the AGO for prosecution of allegations of corruption and GVHR. On February 24, 2016, President Ghani nominated the former head of Afghanistan’s Human Rights Commission, Mohammad...
Farid Hamidi, as the Attorney General. After several months without an Attorney General, this appointment and new leadership focus has helped the AGO better support the MoI’s legal affairs needs. Additionally, as of January 2016, the MoI IG has gained access to the AGO’s case management system, which facilitates tracking of corruption and other cases.

The decentralized nature of the MoI contributes to the higher propensity for corruption as compared to the MoD. Several divisions within the MoI will initiate corruption investigations but their work is not well coordinated or synchronized. With coalition support, the MoI is instituting a number of anti- and counter-corruption initiatives to address this challenge. The recently established TALEs are intended to enhance coordination, effectiveness, and oversight of law enforcement initiatives and corruption investigations and programs by providing an open forum for the MoI IG, Central Prisons Directorate, Intelligence, MCTF, and Criminal Investigations Division. RS advisors, EUPOL, and other international organizations participate as observers for TALE meetings. EF 3 advisors are also examining mechanisms to streamline the number of MoI offices that conduct investigations and have placed a greater emphasis on helping the MoI standardize investigation procedures before referring cases to the AGO. In an encouraging step this reporting period, the MoI IG successfully conducted fuel, ammunition, and other inspections in several provinces without any coalition support.

Another significant anti- and counter-corruption initiative this reporting period was the overhaul of the MCTF. RS advisors placed conditions on advisor support to the MoI that included the removal of the Commanding General, realignment of the MCTF under the AACP, the provision of additional operational funds, and enhanced counter-corruption training. The MCTF is moving in a positive direction as new leadership has begun to reverse the decline in this organization’s efficacy and capability. For instance, the MCTF conducted multiple undercover operations in January and February 2016 that resulted in the arrest of a senior MoI officer on corruption charges, the interdiction and recovery of stolen gemstones valued at over $500,000, and the discovery and disbandment of multiple human trafficking and narcotics smuggling rings.

During this reporting period, the MoI instituted a new GVHR policy, which established a multi-disciplinary committee with clear responsibility for reporting and tracking GVHR investigations. The GVHR committee has met several times, which has resulted in increased awareness and responsiveness across the ministry about the importance of this issue. The MoI Legal Affairs Department has sufficient staff and resources to provide GVHR refresher, reinforcement, and remediation training across the police pillars and provinces. However, MoI Legal Affairs personnel at the provincial level that are trained on human rights obligations are frequently not certified or used correctly to train police personnel at the provincial level or below. In addition, due to the MoI’s reliance on the AGO for prosecution, GVHR cases that arise from the ANP often become stalled due to bureaucratic processes within the MoI or the AGO. The MoI has not demonstrated the resolve independently to push the AGO to prosecute cases, and there is little evidence that allegations of GVHRs committed by the ANP are appropriately reported or that MoI senior leaders are emphasizing incident detection.
Personnel Management

The current disconnected and manual payroll and personnel management systems make it impractical for the MoI to account for and manage its personnel in a timely and accurate fashion. The MoI identification card systems and AHRIMS do not interface directly and are unable to exchange data in real time. Moreover, the MoI also utilizes the UNDP-developed Web-Enabled Payroll System, but it too is not connected to AHRIMS or the identification card system. Despite these technical and systems challenges, the MoI has demonstrated proficiency with its tashkil management office, which is able to make changes to the personnel system using AHRIMS. This was particularly helpful as the MoI established the ANP zone headquarters that required several major ANP personnel management adjustments. Implementation of the APPS system will help address these challenges as it will connect all personnel management, identification card, and payroll systems to one, unified, overarching system. The MoI is adopting the APPS in phases over the next 18 months beginning with the tashkil module in May 2016. MoI staff, with RS support, has already installed six regional servers at various ANP provincial headquarters that will support APPS. These servers are redundant with a central server in Kabul and will ensure the connectivity across the ANP for this new system.

The MoI continues to enter personnel management data into the AHRIMS system to assist with the eventual adoption of all APPS modules. As of May 28, 2016, 126,902 (86 percent) of the MoI forces were slotted into a SY 1394 tashkil position and 21,265 (14 percent) were unslotted. As of May 28, 2016, more than 22,443 ALP members, also known as Guardians, had active personnel records in AHRIMS. The ALP now has 11,413 personnel slotted against SY 1394 tashkil positions. In addition, the MoI is completing the collection of biometric data from all ANP police officers ahead of the distribution of new MoI identification cards in the second half of 2016 to support APPS adoption and implementation.

As of May 7, 2016, an estimated 7,000 ANP personnel remained untrained. These untrained ANP include primarily new recruits and officers who had previously been serving in roles without sufficient basic training. After a major MoI training surge as part of the winter campaign that continued into the spring, more than 95 percent of ANP personnel had received basic training as of May 31, 2016. To help prevent the annual recurrence of such a large portion of untrained police, RS instituted a condition in its FY 1395 commitment letter for MoI funds mandating that the MoI develop a policy requiring that new personnel are trained immediately after recruitment. Additional training initiatives this reporting period included over 100 ANP students participating in training on personnel and vehicle search techniques, explosive ordnance disposal classroom training, and robot driving at the ANP Capital Training Center in Kabul. Several select high-potential ANP leaders attended the ANA’s first kandak pre-command course in February 2016, and the MoI intends to continue sending personnel as the MoD and ANA further develop this leadership development program.

Currently MoI leadership does not require that all MoI force pillars provide reports on their personnel readiness status. For those pillars that do provide reports, standard reporting procedures are not enforced, and subordinate commands frequently do not submit reports in a timely manner. AUP Commander LTG Mohammad Salim Ehsas has reinforced the importance of existing readiness reporting mechanisms to the new ANP zone headquarters to address this
issue. In addition, in February 2016, the MoI began instituting a readiness reporting pilot program that will provide ministry leadership with much-needed visibility for both equipment and personnel readiness below the provincial level. MoI personnel management, force generation, and readiness personnel will rely on the lessons learned from this program to develop a feasible implementation plan for all MoI security forces from March until August 2016. Accurate readiness reporting is critical to understanding and managing the combat effectiveness of personnel. For instance, the ANCORP and GCPSU continue to be deployed at a rate that is unsustainable over the long term, contributing to unnecessary attrition in these important MoI force pillars. During the winter campaign, RS advisory efforts focused on increasing ANCORP and GCPSU policing power by rebuilding readiness and manpower ahead of the spring and summer campaigns.

**Logistics and Maintenance**

The MoI manages the ANP sustainment capability through a system of national and regional-level elements, which generally function adequately, though these logistics hubs are heavily reliant on contractors for a majority of maintenance support and coalition advisors for specific areas with deficiencies. Due to the myriad force pillars it must support, the MoI logistics and maintenance system lacks timeliness, mission focus, and a sense of Afghan ownership that will enable the MoI to provide effective and responsive support to ANP forces. Despite increased authorized personnel in the SY 1395 tashkil, the MoI Security Assistance Office is understaffed and remains disconnected from the major elements of the MoI logistics chain.

The MoI has demonstrated modest improvement in its use of Core-IMS and the MoI-Form 14 process to maintain inventory and request supplies. The MoI is currently 91 percent complete with its upload of Class V items for SY 1395, and the coalition is continuing to monitor actively the MoI’s progress in uploading additional commodities information into Core-IMS. For instance, ANP Medical Logistics Command has shown the ability to identify its annual requirement for Class VIII supplies and upload them into Core-IMS. In addition, during this reporting period, all ANP units were able to complete successfully the necessary MoI-14 Forms necessary to receive ammunition, AK-47s, and organizational clothing and individual equipment.

Currently, less than 15 percent of the MoI’s over 47,000 vehicle fleet is composed of tactical vehicles including protected mobility vehicles. EF 5 advisors are focused on increasing the MoI’s tactical vehicle ratio while retaining local mobility, which is critical for the MoI force pillars because they are often much farther from urban centers or major lines of communication.

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66 The national-level MoI Logistics Department oversees the MoI Support Command, Materiel Management Center, Transportation Battalion, National Logistics Center, 22 bunkers, and the Regional Logistics Centers. Due to the National Logistics Center location in Wardak Province west of Kabul, the coalition is only able to provide direct, on-site TAA support on a monthly basis. The ANP have nine Regional Logistics Centers, each with one Regional Maintenance Center, that provide the ANP with regional field maintenance and supply chain management capability. Each region has Core-IMS and logistics specialists to train and assist in receipt, storage, and issue tasks. Logistics specialists assist at the national level in gaining asset visibility and garnering accountability of national level stocks.

67 The MoI-14 is the basic form used to request items and supplies within the ANA Logistics Command.

68 Class V items are ammunition.

69 Class VIII items include medical equipment and consumables.
and transportation than their ANA counterparts. Similar to the MoD, this effort includes reducing the size and diversity of the fleet to make it simpler to sustain. TAA efforts over the last six months have also been devoted to providing the MoI and ANP forces with additional HMMWVs given how frequently ANP units are engaged in serious fighting against the Taliban. The MoI relies primarily on CLS for maintenance support, which continues to result in high operational readiness rates for its fleet. The MoI will also transition to the National Maintenance Strategy along with the MoD in 2017.

In February 2016, the MoI planned, scheduled, and led a two-day logistics seminar with minimal coalition support. During the seminar, MoI leadership discussed several issues including the process and plan for removing vehicles from the battlefield through the ECOD process. Although the MoI has improved in this area, there is a major backlog of vehicles that require demilitarization. In conjunction with EF 5 advisors, the MoI has identified over 1,500 vehicles as uneconomical to repair. For those vehicles that are repairable, the MoI has improved in its ability to conduct minor repair procedures with its organic maintenance capability, although further coalition advising is required. Additional TAA efforts this reporting period focused on establishing improved understanding of existing equipment inventory and implementing an improved equipment tashkil management process.

### Strategic and Operational Planning

Overall deficiencies in the MoI planning process reflect the challenges associated with the decentralized nature of the MoI and its various force pillars, the limited ability of ANP staff at the operational and tactical level to implement strategic guidance, and competing priorities and external influencers at the lower levels. Institutional and structural changes within the MoI have helped to improve its strategic level planning capability, but this capability requires further development. At the operational level, the ANP continues to struggle. Although ANP leaders have begun working more closely with their ANA counterparts on deliberate, planned operations, ANP operational planners are often less involved in planning for larger counter-offensive operations and crisis situations. Nevertheless, the MoI has displayed progress in some areas during this reporting period including the timely initiation of an MoI-wide policy review, the establishment of Deputy Minister-level strategic board meetings, and the approval of several strategic planning documents.

Early this reporting period the MoI made significant progress in completing its foundational strategic documents and assessing key ministry priorities. In January 2016, the MoI instituted a quarterly Ministerial Development Board meeting to help coordinate planning efforts across the ministry. This meeting includes key senior MoI and ANP leaders and staff and informs the development and revision process for MoI strategic planning documents. For instance, in December 2015, the MoI published its Strategic Planning Directive and in February 2016 published the Ministry of Interior Strategy (MIS). In addition, MoI planning staff, with coalition support, successfully completed the annual revision to the Ministry of Interior Strategy Plans (MISP) in March 2016. This document is essential to the MoI programming and budgeting processes. RS advisors assisted the MoI in developing its monitoring and evaluation capacity to assess how ANP forces implement and execute the MIS and MISP. This is particularly
important because mid- and lower-level ANP leaders may not implement MoI plans due to local political or tribal influences.

Improvements in the MoI operational planning capability have lagged behind the recent gains in strategic planning. Mid-level and lower-level ANP commanders are not proficient at translating ministerial-level guidance into operational plans for the ANP to execute and coordinate with their ANA counterparts. Operational planning ability varies across the new ANP zones established in January 2016. For instance, ANP Zones 101 and 707 headquarters’ have demonstrated strong initial progress, while ANP Zone 202 headquarters has shown a limited ability to plan operations due to inaccurate reporting mechanisms and an insufficient capacity to analyze intelligence and operational information. The MoI’s ongoing development and implementation of ANP zone headquarters SOP will help standardize the zones and improve the MoI’s cross-pillar planning capability.

**Intelligence**

MoI forces are progressing in their intelligence capabilities; however, there is much room for improvement. Specialized units such as the GCPSU and the AACP utilize intelligence effectively, but integrating intelligence is a capability gap across all other ANP pillars and the new police zones. Despite this gap, there were several areas of improvement during this reporting period, including a number of MoI intelligence organizations with growing capacity. The NTEC remains the most capable and effective MoI intelligence unit and is increasingly proficient at providing intelligence to the Nasrat in support of the JSOCC-led targeting process. Coordination within the ministry is also improving as the DPI continues to enhance intelligence sharing with other MoI intelligence units. The DPI has also demonstrated proficiency at using the Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System to screen MoI personnel to protect against insider threats. However, because of this screening process, lower level commanders and police officers do not always work well with DPI personnel for fear that the intelligence unit may be collecting information about the police officers. Lastly, the establishment of the JSOCC has further enhanced prioritized national targeting and the coherent allocation of police special operations resources.

The Police Intelligence Training Center (PITC) is creating courses in the Open Source Intelligence program and financial crimes investigation intelligence to train DPI and other ANP intelligence unit personnel. PITC established a long-term training plan for calendar year 2016 that will include NIMS courses in addition to a mobile training team capability to conduct police intelligence training courses in outlying provinces. The PITC has also developed a program that utilizes current experts from across the MoI intelligence community to serve as assistant instructors to introduce current and real-world applications into training courses. Although the MoI continues to build its intelligence collection, analysis, and sharing capability through these and other training programs, intelligence personnel are frequently tasked with different assignments or to serve in different specialty areas. This degrades overall MoI intelligence capabilities as well as technical support for ISR systems; RS advisors are working with ANP commanders through the ANP zone headquarters to help address this issue.
One cause of the MoI’s infrequent use of intelligence to drive operations is its limited use of ISR assets and intelligence enabling systems. The MoI has few tashkil slots for ISR equipment and enabling systems and therefore must rely on ANA intelligence collection assets and information sharing across ANP pillars to increase its use of intelligence. For instance, the MoI has attempted to use intelligence collected by ANA-managed Aerostat balloons. However, ANA corps are reluctant to share information. Intelligence sharing is occurring through the OCC-P/Rs and the Nasrat, but not directly between ANA and ANP units. In a positive step, the MoI has increased its adoption and usage of NIMS throughout ANP forces, and the DPI remains the most advanced user of the system amongst MoI intelligence units. However, NIMS connectivity across most ANP forces remains limited because the MoI does not have a focused NIMS program office to oversee expansion of this important intelligence tracking and sharing network. The MoI is also working to expand the signals intelligence capability of the MCTF, DPI, Criminal Investigation Directorate, and Counterterrorism Police Directorate of the AACP to enhance the ministry’s counterterrorism, criminal investigations, and counter-corruption capabilities. Finally, Kabul-based police units continue to utilize an ISR enabling system, the Kabul Surveillance System, to identify and recognize license plate numbers to help prevent HPAs in the city.

Strategic Communication

The MoI’s strategic communication capability is one of its strongest ministerial functions. Until this reporting period, the MoI had been performing many of the Presidential Palace’s public affairs functions because of the MoI’s proficiency, particularly that of MoI spokesperson Sediq Seddiqi, and because of the palace’s limited effectiveness. However, as the palace communications operation has improved, the MoI has returned to its primary focus of supporting the ministry and ANP forces. Challenges across the MoI’s strategic communication capability include a lack of coordination with other ministries in response to contingency situations, an insufficient number of public affairs personnel at the police zone headquarters, and the need to utilize strategic communication more effectively to support recruiting.

Beginning with the SY 1395 tashkil, the MoI’s Media and Public Affairs Directorate (MPAD) has its own independent budget and programming capability. However, the office remains constrained by limited authorized personnel numbers. Moreover, after LOTFA discontinued supporting the salaries of 22 national technical advisors within the MPAD in March 2016, the MPAD’s output and proficiency has declined. This reduced capability is expected to continue until the MoI completes hiring actions for civilian personnel slots already on the tashkil that had been going unfilled.

MPAD operations continue to focus more on high-profile issues such as GCPSU and other specialized police units’ paramilitary-type operations rather than highlighting more traditional policing and public safety issues. As a demonstration of its growing capability, however, after heavy rains in and around Kabul caused heavy flooding in late March and early April 2016, the MPAD was effective at publicizing and championing the Kabul Fire Department’s response to flooding in key areas.

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70 The Kabul Fire Department is part of the Kabul City Police, which is an AUP unit.
The MoI has also taken steps to increase and improve further its strategic communication capability with limited coalition support. Modeled after a successful MoD public affairs conference in April 2016, the MPAD is developing plans for its own public affairs conference in July 2016 to conduct training for ANP strategic communication personnel. The ANP zone headquarters now have public affairs personnel slots in their tashkil and they are starting to fill those positions. This will help further empower the ANP zones and bolster the MoI’s strategic communication capability outside of Kabul.

The MoI has increasingly emphasized the use of information operations to combat insurgent messaging. During this reporting period, advisors focused on increasing the quality and volume of messaging in addition to strategic communication coordination between the ANA and ANP. ANP Zone 202 in particular demonstrated increasing strategic communication proficiency with its use of radio, print, and social media over the last several months. In another sign of progress, the Kabul City Police successfully transitioned the Kabul City Police 100 call center to a toll free number. This is an important mechanism for public affairs requests and information dissemination throughout Kabul.

Gender Office Efforts

The MoI maintains a much higher proportion of women within the ministry and ANP forces than the MoD and the ANA. The MoI has been more successful in part because it has been able to demonstrate and articulate the policing-capability need for more women in the ANP and the value they provide to the police forces in which they serve. Women bring unique skill-sets to the ANP such as community outreach and the ability to speak to female victims of crimes since Afghan women are often not permitted to speak to men outside of their families, which detracts from the female population’s ability to report even basic crimes. Despite this progress, gender integration efforts within the MoI and the ANP still have room for improvement.

Early this reporting period, then-Minister Ulumi instituted a women’s recruiting commission to enhance oversight of women’s recruiting activities. One of the major outcomes that had been under development for several months was the establishment of a new “recruit to area” program for ANP women. The MoI is now instituting a plan that will focus recruitment on 17 different parts of the country and ensure that women recruited for the force will serve as police officers in their home areas after they have completed training. Female recruits for this program and their families sign a contract that assures the recruit of their ANP unit location and includes a clause that the families must help to repay a portion of training costs if the recruits break the contract. This will help ensure accountability and addresses a recent challenge of women receiving training but then leaving the ANP because their deployment was too far away from their home. The “recruit to area” program is especially important in the more conservative regions of Afghanistan where families may not be willing to allow their daughters and wives to serve far from home. To assist with recruiting, the MoI has also instituted a policy where women who are estranged from their families or who do not have any male relatives can sign up without their family’s permission.71

71 Afghan cultural norms and customs require that women who sign up for the ANDSF must have their family’s permission.
The women’s only training program in Sivas, Turkey, continues to be successful at increasing the number of women in the ANP and creating a training environment free of harassment or other challenges associated with training in Afghanistan. From December 2013 until December 2015, the number of women in the ANP has more than doubled, primarily due to the success of this program, and it continues apace.

Women within the MoI are often offered fewer training and leadership development opportunities than men, as a result women frequently lag behind men in promotions and career mobility. Of the nearly 6,000 positions women-only or gender neutral positions in the ANP’s tashkil, only approximately 2,600 were filled by women as of March 2016. Most of these women serve in Kabul and in major cities in Herat and Badakhshan provinces. The remaining positions, notably leadership positions, are typically filled by men or left vacant.

5.2 AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

The ANP maintain civil order, reduce corruption, and prevent the cultivation, production, and smuggling of illegal narcotics. The role of the ANP is to meet the expectations of the Afghan public regarding the security of individuals and the community, and the safeguarding of legal rights and freedoms. While the current focus of the ANP is to combine its capabilities with the ANA to fight the insurgency, the long-term goal for the ANP remains the transition to a more traditional community police force. Currently, ANP forces are often on the front lines during the “hold” phase of counterinsurgency operations. However, they are not sufficiently trained or equipped for traditional counterinsurgency tactics as they have limited or no crew-served weapons, anti-armor weapons, armored vehicles, or ISR assets. The ANP is generally recognized to be several years behind the ANA in its development.

Provincial chiefs of police and other local officials often misuse ANP forces for missions outside of their intended scope. In addition, ANP forces are often influenced by local power brokers or employed as personal bodyguards. The creation of the new ANP zone structure in January 2016 is intended to address this and other command and control issues by centralizing command from the MoI to zone commanders who oversee all ANP force pillars in their region.

Afghan National Police Strength

The ANP have an authorized end strength of up to 157,000 personnel. As of May 2016, the ANP had approximately 148,000 personnel. This end strength does not include approximately 6,500 students in the police academy and other training centers inside and outside of the country. Although the number of women within the ANP continues to increase and is now over 2,600, women comprise only 1.8 percent of the total ANP end strength. See Figure 16 below for authorized tashkil level, current end strength, and gain/loss for each month over the last year.

Similar to the ANA, attrition levels can be attributed to poor Afghan leadership and the failure of consistently granting leave to lower enlisted personnel. In addition, the ANP have sustained a disproportionately higher number of casualties than the ANA due to inadequate training and equipment, poor planning processes, and a sub-optimal force posture that leaves ANP forces...
vulnerable at static checkpoints. This casualty rate and its proximate causes also contribute to the ANP’s 1.9 percent monthly attrition rate. Although the ANP overall does not suffer from a shortage of new recruits, more successful re-contracting rates would result in improved policing and combat effectiveness by retaining experienced personnel.

Figure 16: ANP Strength

Note: The ANP strength depicted above includes the AUP, the ABP, the ANCOP, and the AACP.
* Attrition encompasses all unplanned and planned losses.
** Gain includes all gains (recruits, re-accessions, and return from dropped from the rolls) to ANP strength.

Afghan National Police Structure

The ANP is composed of four pillars – the AUP, the ANCOP, the ABP, and the AACP – the GCPSU, and three additional sub-pillars – the ALP, the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), and the CNPA. The ALP and the APPF are not counted as part of the 157,000 tashkil but provide additional security under the MoI. The ANP is divided into eight zones that generally align with the ANA corps areas of responsibility. There are eight ANCOP brigades, each aligned with an ANP zone, and an additional brigade located in Helmand Province that was established in March 2016 (see Figure 17 for ANP zones).

72 ANDSF personnel strength, recruiting, retention, and attrition information is derived from Afghan reporting. RS analysts interpret the Afghan data and rectify discrepancies and inconsistencies.
73 The AUP includes the Provincial Police Headquarters, District Police Headquarters, Police Precincts, Traffic Police, and the General Directorate of Firefighting and Emergency Response.
The new ANP zones were established on November 24, 2015, and progress in establishing the zone headquarters and reporting structures for equipment, personnel, and facilities is ongoing. Development of the zone headquarters in ANP Zones 707 and 808 in the north lags behind the other six zones. The impact of the new zone structure has also been uneven, although visits from MoI leadership and official ciphers have begun to address implementation challenges. Some zone commanders have had greater success than others at establishing positional authority over provincial chiefs of police who previously retained authority over all ANP forces in their province as well as over other security and government officials in their area of responsibility. Other issues include the mis-ranking of staff positions, which creates challenges for command authority. For instance, the ANP Zone 404 commander is a two-star general while an existing provincial chief of police in his region is a three-star general. The ANP is developing an ANP zone SOP document that will help streamline and standardize the process for establishing zone headquarters.

In addition to the creation of ANP zone headquarters, there were several major changes to the SY 1395 ANP personnel tashkil. These changes include the new 9th ANCOP Brigade in northern Helmand, increasing the size of each Provincial Special Unit (PSU) to 150 personnel, reorganizing the GCPSUs to gather intelligence more efficiently and effectively, three new district headquarters in Kunduz, and establishing an operational and support kandak each for the ABP and ANCOP.

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74 The previous ANP structure included provincial police headquarters, which were categorized by different types based on size with Type A headquarters as the largest. The intent was for provincial chiefs of police at Type A headquarters to be responsible for coordinating ANP operations across the surrounding provincial borders; however, in practice this coordination was limited.
Afghan Uniform Police

With its current approximately 86,000-person end strength, the AUP is the largest police agency in Afghanistan and the primary police force that the local populace will encounter in their daily lives. The AUP consists of the traffic police, the fire and rescue departments, and a provincial police headquarters in each of the 34 provinces.

The mission of the AUP is to maintain the rule of law and provide security and civil order, prevent cultivation and smuggling of narcotics, and prevent the smuggling of weapons and other public property like historical and cultural relics. Other duties of the AUP include the detention of criminal suspects to be handed over to the judicial system, maintenance of reliable security measures for key infrastructure including roads and facilities, intelligence collection, and the provision of firefighting and rescue services during natural or man-made disasters. Leadership across AUP units varies, but generally senior MoI and AUP leaders do not empower the lower levels to make decisions. Moreover, local AUP units and leaders are susceptible to influence by local power brokers and government officials.
Afghan Local Police

The ALP is designed to provide security within villages and rural areas to protect the population from insurgent attacks, protect facilities, and conduct local counterinsurgency missions. ALP personnel are recruited in concert with local elder approval and employed within villages to provide local security and prevent the spread of enemy influence and activity in that area. The current ALP end strength is approximately 29,800 out of an authorized end strength of 30,000. This reflects increased recruiting efforts over the last several months after several personnel accountability and management reforms were implemented. Despite the alignment of the ALP more directly underneath the AUP in June 2015, in practice, provincial chiefs of police have maintained operational control or influence over many ALP units. To help address this issue, the ANP zone headquarters’ staffs are now conducting ALP-focused video teleconference meetings on a regular basis as part of their coordination meetings with MoI headquarters. NSOCC-A provides TAA support to the ALP at the ALP Staff Directorate level.

As part of a series of MoI-led reforms after the ALP’s realignment in June 2015, the MoI conducted assessments of all 177 ALP districts with a focus on personnel accountability, basic equipment checks, payrolls systems, and overall ALP unit capability. RS conditioned funding for ALP salaries on the MoI completing all of the district assessments by December 20, 2015; however, due to mobility and security constraints the MoI conducted 33 district assessments by telephone rather than in person. On December 29, 2015, RS began withholding base pay, stipends, and incentives for ALP Guardians until the remaining 33 districts were physically assessed per an RS-MoI agreement in September 2015. The MoI completed all remaining ALP district assessments by March 2016, and RS has resumed payment of all ALP salaries.

ALP personnel accountability discrepancies identified during the district assessments included ALP Guardians working under local powerbroker control and “ghost” personnel being listed on personal management and payroll documents and systems. On January 16, 2016, two full districts identified as working for local powerbrokers were disestablished, and their 1,036 tashkil positions were reallocated to other districts. In total, over 2,000 ALP Guardians were removed to reduce local powerbroker influence during the reporting period. Separately, the district assessments revealed 2,235 “ghost” personnel that have since been removed from the AHRIMS and other paper-based systems. ALP personnel accountability is also a critical component of ALP operational effectiveness. ALP units under powerbroker control can not only detract from security, they can also contribute directly to insecurity if they abuse their power or perpetrate human rights abuses against the local population.

Moving forward, the MoI intends to prevent “ghost” personnel through mandating enrollment into AHRIMS, the use of the electronic funds transfer system, and the use of MoI-issued and biometrically linked identification cards. The FY 1395 commitment letters for the MoI included a condition that at least 16,000 ALP should have been slotted and enrolled in AHRIMS by March 31, 2016; however, with only 11,029 records slotted and 2,139 records loaded by the deadline, the MoI failed to meet this target and has subsequently been penalized by CSTC-A.

75 ALP district assessment teams were composed of officers form the ALP, AUP, MoI Logistics Command, and MoI General Recruiting Command. The teams assessed ALP equipment, number of personnel, recruiting, training, personal protective equipment, payroll systems, logistics, vehicle maintenance, and tactical employment.
The ALP has had more success decreasing the use of “trusted agents”\textsuperscript{76} for salaries. As of March 15, 2016, the total number of ALP registered for either the electronic funds transfer system or the mobile money system was over 20,000. MoI-led efforts to enroll the ALP into electronic funds transfer systems and AHRIMS are part of the broader MoI effort to distribute new identification cards and begin adopting and implementing APPS over the course of 2016.

To enhance accountability within the ALP further, the FY 1395 commitment letters require that the MoI conduct ALP district assessments on an annual basis. In addition to the focus areas of the previous district assessments, the new assessments will include an increased emphasis on properly cataloging and serializing all ALP equipment, weapons, and vehicles in order to develop an ALP property management system. Given that NSOCC-A provides TAA support at the headquarters level, funding commitment letters are an important lever to encourage implementation of these and other necessary reforms. AUP Commander LTG Ehsas has demonstrated his commitment to reforming the ALP, and he is personally engaged with the Commander, RS and MoI leaders on this ongoing effort. Furthermore, the MoI IG is now conducting its own assessments that mirror the conditions in the RS commitment letters as the ministry is sensitive to the potential loss of funding.

The ALP continues to make progress on efforts to decrease the number of untrained ALP Guardians. As of April 20, 2016, approximately 4,400 ALP Guardians had been trained\textsuperscript{77} during the reporting period, with an estimated 6,600 remaining untrained. This winter and spring training surge lagged behind the broader ANP surge due to both ANP zone commander and provincial chiefs of police reluctance to release personnel for training in order to maintain their unit end strength in addition to the challenge of transporting ALP units from remote areas. In March 2016, the MoI sent a cipher to the MoD requesting ANASOC’s assistance to complete ALP basic training. The Nangarhar provincial chief of police has also piloted a mobile training team program to reach ALP units in remote areas of the province. If successful, RS advisors will encourage adoption of this technique in other provinces. NSOCC-A is validating the completion of ALP training by requesting photo and video evidence from ALP district chiefs. LTG Ehsas has issued several orders to provincial and district chiefs of police to assist with compliance. Finally, to address ALP leadership deficiencies, over the last several months MoI and ANP leadership have conducted a number of leadership training and development seminars in Kabul and at ANP zone headquarters that focused on personnel accountability, ALP unit employment closer to their local villages, and additional reform efforts.

During the reporting period, the ALP was expected to assume a larger role in security as the ANDSF implemented a force optimization strategy. This was particularly true in Helmand Province as the ANA and ANP units in the province underwent a large readiness reset and re-training program during the winter. However, the ALP struggled to fill the security gap in many places due to frequent unit misemployment, limited capability to plan for deliberate offensive operations proactively, and challenges with receiving adequate logistics support from district and

\textsuperscript{76} Trusted agents are personnel charged with personally delivering salary payments to the recipients in cash.

\textsuperscript{77} ALP training consists of a four week “program of instruction” on basic policing techniques. This training also includes a brief module on human rights training from International Committee of the Red Cross-trained ANP trainers.
provincial chiefs of police. As a result of these lingering deficiencies and limited training, the ALP continue to endure a higher casualty rate than other ANSF pillars.

ALP Guardians at the checkpoints suffer from logistical issues created by the ANP provincial headquarters’ hoarding and infrequent distribution of equipment. Although logistics support to the ALP from the MoI national level logistics nodes has improved recently, the provincial headquarters frequently have challenges maintaining accountability of equipment and supplies – particularly motorcycles and pickup trucks intended for ALP units. NSOCC-A advisors are working with the ANP National Logistics Center at Wardak to ensure it is providing direct support to ALP units as required. In addition, during this reporting period the ALP support tashkil was adjusted to improve operational and logistics accountability below the ANP zone and provincial headquarters level and to improve equipment distribution. Finally, the MoI Deputy Minister for Security and Deputy Minister for Support released a cipher directing that all ALP supplies and equipment received at MoI Regional Logistics Centers must be signed for and distributed by an ALP district chief or his or her designee.

**Afghan National Civil Order Police**

The ANCOP provides the primary offensive capability within the ANP. The ANCOP mission includes dealing with civil unrest and reacting to insurgent activities in remote and high-threat areas. The ANCOP also conducts civil order presence patrols and provides response capabilities to handle crisis or counterterrorism events in urban and metropolitan areas and to mitigate violent public incidents. ANCOP units support the ANA during clearing operations providing intelligence, tactical support, and manpower to hold and secure terrain as it is seized. With approximately 15,000 personnel, the ANCOP current end strength has remained close to its authorized manning level. The ANCOP consists of nine brigades, eight of which are largely aligned with the new ANP zones. In March 2016, ANCOP established a ninth brigade with tashkil authorizations from three other ANCOP brigades and recent Helmand Police Training Center graduates to provide additional security in northern Helmand. This brigade is intended to be provisional until the security situation in Helmand Province stabilizes, at which time these personnel will return to other ANCOP brigades. Because ANCOP units receive a higher level of training than typical AUP or other ANP pillars and have an often misunderstood mission set, local police commanders and political officials frequently misemploy ANCOP units for tasks outside their mission set.

Over the last several months, the ANCOP improved its implementation of an operational readiness cycle, refit and rebuilt its primary brigade in Helmand Province, and reduced the number of checkpoints to increase its maneuverability and available combat power for offensive operations. RS advisors have also assisted the MoI and ANCOP standardize kandak and brigade sizes and personnel structures.

ANCOP units have limited organic explosive ordnance disposal and counter-IED capability as well as limited ability to clear transportation routes. Given the ANCOP’s mission set to support crisis and counterterrorism events in high-threat areas, these limited capabilities are a critical area for further improvement. Moreover, ANCOP personnel devoted to these areas suffer from high attrition and a high casualty rate due to inadequate training and management. Beginning in
December 2015, coalition advisory efforts with the ANCOP included mortar and counter-IED training. Finally, the ANCOP suffers from insufficient resourcing from the MoI, particularly for its intelligence needs.

**Afghan Border Police**

The ABP is strategically arrayed to secure and safeguard national borders, provide security at Afghanistan’s international airports, and maintain security in the border security zone – which extends 30 miles into the territory of Afghanistan – in order to deter terrorists, criminal groups, and smugglers. This includes securing and patrolling border and control entry ports, such as airports and border-crossing points, and guarding against the illegal entry of persons, weapons, narcotics, and other goods. ABP forces along the border are trained and equipped with rifles, light and heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, and 82mm mortars. The ABP current end strength is approximately 21,500 personnel out of an authorized strength of 23,315. The ABP headquarters is located in Kabul, and brigade-level units are assigned to six zones throughout the country that nest under the ANP zones. RS advisors continue to train, advise, and assist the ABP at the headquarters level through the ANP zones.

ABP responsibilities are categorized into two distinct sets: a paramilitary mission and a more traditional border police-type mission. This dual mission supports the overall ANDSF model of achieving layered security and unity of effort with both ABP and ANA forces along the borders. The paramilitary mission involves providing security in the 30 mile zone around Afghanistan’s border. The policing mission involves providing border security and customs operations at crossing points and airports. Although the Afghan Customs Police currently fall under the ABP, it will eventually be transferred to the Ministry of Finance.

**Afghan Anti-Crime Police**

The AACP provides specialist police expertise and counterterrorism, anti-corruption, criminal investigation, biometrics, forensics, and specialized security detail support. Coalition subject matter experts work side-by-side with their Afghan counterparts in the AACP’s forensic and biometric programs to support evidence-based operations. AACP personnel also work closely with criminal investigators, prosecutors, and judges to ensure that the police remain the primary face of the rule of law. AACP structures include the AACP headquarters, the Criminal Investigation Directorate, and the Counterterrorism Police division. With approximately 100 police officers, the AACP manning has stayed close to its full end strength as authorized under the tashkil.

In December 2015, then-Minister of Interior Ulumi issued a cipher realigning the MCTF underneath the AACP to reenergize its critical mission set supporting anti-crime and anti-corruption efforts. The cipher also directed the MoI and AACP to provide additional operational funds and required supplies, provide for new MCTF leadership, advocate for the creation of a counter-corruption court, and support enhanced counter-corruption training.

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78 Evidence-based operations entail arresting individuals for whom there is sufficient unclassified evidence to attain a conviction in an Afghan court of law.
**General Command of Police Special Units**

The GCPSU provides the ANP with a capability to conduct rule-of-law operations based on evidence in accordance with Afghanistan’s Criminal Procedure Code, execute high-risk arrests, and respond to HPAs. The GCPSU also often provides rapid response to critical situations such as emergencies or hostage scenarios. Due to its employment in these situations, the GCPSU incurs a higher rate of casualties than other specialized ANP units which contributes to combat fatigue, higher attrition, and challenges with maintaining overall personnel and equipment readiness.

The approximately 6,000-personnel GCPSU is responsible for the command and control of all MoI special police units, including three National Mission Units (NMUs), 33 PSUs that operate in direct support of the provincial chiefs of police, and 19 Investigative and Surveillance Units. In practice, because provincial chiefs of police and provincial governors oversee payroll systems and salaries for the PSUs, they are frequently more responsive to provincial officials’ taskings than to the GCPSU chain of command.

The GCPSU Special Police Training Center provides both basic and advanced infantry training. There are two advanced infantry courses per year with 25 students in each class. Since December 2015, the Special Police Training Center has provided training to more than 500 personnel. However, due to the challenging nature of the course, the graduation rate is close to 50 percent. GCPSU recruits are typically drawn from other ANP units – usually AUP – and are chosen specifically for their skills and experience.

The GCPSU is developing a stronger mission command structure, and recently, division-level leadership has proven effective at providing guidance and coordinating with other ANDSF components. The GCPSU has proven itself as an operationally effective ASSF component and is anticipated to be able to function independently by the end of 2016. It independently plans and coordinates responses to HPAs in the Kabul area, and the NMU and PSU effectively conduct high-risk arrests against national-level and provincial-level targets. GCPSU operational and tactical elements have proven capable at conducting evidence-based operations; however, continued coalition advisory support is necessary to improve cross-functional planning teams and enhance command and control elements.

The GCPSU struggles with integrating intelligence into operations and with sustainment support. The MoI is unable to provide adequate supplies to the GCPSU to complete routine missions. Tactical units frequently face significant sustainment challenges that disrupt operations and limit the GCPSU’s operational tempo. Moreover, the GCPSU has limited connectivity with the MoI computer network and NIMS, which limits its ability to synchronize and coordinate operations effectively. GCPSU personnel often utilize unsecure commercial phone and email systems for communication between and across operational and tactical elements.
Afghan Public Protection Force

The APPF is a state-owned enterprise under the authority of the MoI and was originally established to provide contract-based facility and convoy security services;\(^7^9\) its current end strength is approximately 16,000 personnel. The APPF currently guards key infrastructure, facilities, governmental and non-governmental public welfare projects, and other international projects. The APPF also escorts and protects convoys against insurgent attacks and provides security for NGOs and international organizations with diplomatic immunity and political agencies of foreign countries located in Afghanistan. In addition, the APPF is responsible for protecting facilities donated to the Afghan government by international organizations and the private sector. No set *tashkil* authorization exists for the APPF, and the force is largely funded by billing customers for contracted work. Currently, NATO and U.S. forces do not support the APPF financially except through the security contracts already in place, and the coalition does not advise the APPF as part of the RS mission.

Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan

The CNPA is the lead ANDSF pillar for counternarcotics efforts. It consists of regular narcotics police and specialized units that are located in all 34 provinces. Specialized units include the Sensitive Investigation Unit, National Interdiction Unit, and the Intelligence Investigation Unit. The CNPA has approximately 2,800 personnel assigned, with approximately half in Kabul and the other half in the provinces.

As of February 2016, NSOCC-A advisors provide TAA support to the CNPA in addition to RS’s advisors to the MoI. A recent focus of NSOCC-A efforts has been to improve CNPA coordination with the SMW to ensure aviation support for counternarcotics raids. This partnership has already proven valuable. For example, in April 2016, CNPA officers, with support from the SMW, arrested Haji Watan, the number one drug trafficker in eastern Afghanistan and one of the top drug traffickers in the country.

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\(^7^9\) The APPF was established subsequent to Presidential Decree #62 signed on August 17, 2010. The decree’s intent was to decrease the presence of private security contractors operating in Afghanistan. However, in August 2015 President Ghani signed Presidential Decree #66 which allows U.S. forces, NATO, and their respective contractors to use private security contractors outside of NATO and U.S. facilities or if they are in “direct support” of the ANDSF.
SECTION 6 – FINANCING THE AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

The ANDSF continue to be funded primarily through annual congressional appropriations to the DoD via ASFF, which supports the equipping, sustainment, training, and operations of Afghanistan’s security forces. NATO Allies and partner nations also play a prominent role in the financial support of the ANDSF by contributing to the NATO ANA Trust Fund (NATF), which supports the ANA, and the UNDP-administered LOTFA, which pays the salaries of police and builds MoI capacity. In addition, the Afghan government draws upon its domestic revenues to contribute to ANDSF sustainment and operations and to pay for food for ANDSF personnel. The ANDSF will continue to depend on coalition security and advisory assistance and donor financial assistance for 2016 and beyond, although at the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago the Afghan government committed to increasing financial support incrementally year over year to its own security forces through 2024, also known as the “decade of transformation.”

6.1 HOLDING THE AFGHAN MINISTRIES ACCOUNTABLE

CSTC-A continues to oversee measures to ensure the Afghan government’s proper use of funds from the United States and international donors. Good stewardship of U.S. taxpayer dollars remains a top priority for USFOR-A, which has incorporated the recommendations of independent agencies, the DoD IG, and SIGAR into its processes. CSTC-A continues to place stringent financial controls on U.S. and international contributions through a series of financial commitment letters with the MoD and the MoI. The FY 1395 commitment letters are comprehensive and address critical conditions the ANDSF must meet to help ensure continued progress towards increasing Afghan capacity, capability, and self-sustainment. The FY 1395 commitment letters include more than eighty conditions that will encourage transparency and accountability of equipment and resources. These letters establish expectations for the responsible management of direct contributions from ASFF, NATF, and LOTFA. If the criteria spelled out in the commitment letters are not met, funds can be decremented from total direct contributions or withheld until corrective steps are taken. These enforcement mechanisms underpin U.S. messaging to Afghan leadership that they must demonstrate accountability and transparency in the expenditure of donor funds.

6.2 U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS

The United States provides the bulk of funding necessary to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANDSF through ASFF, an annual appropriation made available to the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, for the purpose of providing assistance to the security forces of Afghanistan. ASFF is a key enabler and critical component of the U.S. mission, providing the funding necessary to establish an effective, sustainable, and affordable ANDSF. The FY 2016 ASFF appropriation is $3.652 billion, and the President’s FY 2017 budget request includes $3.448 billion requested for ASFF. Since FY 2005, Congress has appropriated more than $63 billion for ASFF.
6.3 INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS

At the 2011 Bonn Conference, the international community agreed to support the training, equipping, financing, and capability development of the ANDSF beyond December 31, 2014. At the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago, the international community reaffirmed its commitment to this process and to the financial sustainment of the ANDSF. Financial commitments made during or in the run up to the Chicago Summit totaled more than $1 billion per year for 2015, 2016, and 2017 (in 2012 dollars), divided between NATF and LOTFA. At the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, the international community reaffirmed its commitment to the financial sustainment of the ANDSF, and nations renewed their financial pledges through 2018.

International donors provide funding either on a bilateral basis or through one of two multilateral channels, NATF and LOTFA. Approximately one-half of all international contributions for ANDSF sustainment, which were reconfirmed at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, are expected to flow through the NATF, with the remainder through LOTFA. To provide transparency and accountability of donor funding, donor nations have the opportunity to participate in the Kabul-based ANDSF Funding Oversight and Coordination Body, co-chaired by the Afghan Ministry of Finance and representatives from major international donors, which receives regular updates from the Afghan government and CSTC-A.

DoD manages NATF on behalf of international donors to provide support and sustainment of the ANA. Since the beginning of the NATF in 2007, 31 nations have contributed more than $1.4 billion. For calendar year 2016, 26 nations have pledged $408.2 million, and as of May 2016, NATF had received $191.2 million in contributions. Since Afghan FY 1394, CSTC-A has enforced a NATF commitment letter with the MoD and the MoI that relies on the same stringent controls included in ASFF commitment letters.

The UNDP has managed LOTFA since its inception in 2002. The UNDP receives and manages donor contributions through LOTFA to pay the salaries of up to 157,000 members of the ANP, and CSTC-A coordinates closely with the UNDP regarding the use of LOTFA. Donor nations have the opportunity to participate in the LOTFA Project Board, which provides oversight over activities funded by LOTFA.

6.4 AFGHAN GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS

The primary responsibility for sustaining the ANDSF in the future rests with the Afghan government. The 2012 NATO Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan specifies that “as the Afghan economy and the revenues of the Afghan government grow, Afghanistan’s yearly share will increase progressively from at least $500 million in 2015, with the aim that it can assume, no later than 2024, full financial responsibility for its own security forces.” Given Afghanistan’s persistent security challenges and limited economic growth, fulfilling this commitment will be a challenge. However, the DoD and international donors agree that the

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80 Commitments at the Chicago Summit were made in Euros and other national currencies. Due to fluctuations in exchange rate and the increased strength of the U.S. dollar, the value of funding to be provided by international donors in FY 2016 is estimated at approximately $930 million based on November 2015 exchange rates.

81 Donor commitments can be found in the classified annex to this report.
Afghan government should continue to increase its ANDSF funding contributions over time so as to assume significant financial responsibility for the ANDSF by 2024.

The Afghan government committed to providing $500 million, or 25 billion Afghans, at the 2012 exchange rate, in support of the ANDSF starting in 2015 with the expectation from the international community that this contribution would gradually increase over time. The 2015 Afghan national budget allocated 25.3 billion Afghanis ($369 million) for the ANDSF, and the 2016 Afghan national budget allocates 26.8 billion Afghanis ($393 million). Although this is below the original $500 million pledged at the Chicago Summit due to the decline in the Afghani’s value over the last several years, the United States and international community accept that the Afghan government is meeting its obligations in its local currency and that the government is showing a gradual increase in its ANDSF contributions from 2015 to 2016. The United States is also working with the ANDSF to bring costs down to a level sustainable for the United States and international community in the near term and the Afghan government over the long term.

Efforts to Increase the Afghan Government’s Financial Responsibility for the ANDSF

Increasing Afghan government revenue is important to long-term ANDSF sustainment and to the stability of the Afghan government. During 2015 the Afghan government increased its total revenue through measures such as stronger tax collection, crackdowns on corruption and fraud, reform of the customs department to increase customs duties through electronic payments, and additional new taxes. Given the security environment, stagnant economy, and political challenges, it remains to be seen whether the Afghan government can continue this positive momentum throughout 2016.

The ability of the Afghan government to assume increased financial responsibility for the ANDSF is also closely tied to the functioning and growth of the Afghan economy. The United States, the international community, the Afghan government, and civil society organizations work together in mutually reinforcing ways to support a sustainable Afghan economy. The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF) provided a construct to help guide Afghan-led reforms, many related to economic and financial development, as international donors continue providing extraordinary levels of assistance. The TMAF was replaced by the “Self-Reliance Through Mutual Accountability Framework,” (SMAF) adopted at the Senior Officials Meeting in September 2015. The SMAF outlines the reform commitments of the Afghan government through 2018 and lays out agreed principles of effective international donor assistance. Other international fora, such as the Asian Development Bank-sponsored Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation program, the Heart of Asia Istanbul Process, and the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan provide opportunities for regional

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82 In 2015 the Afghan government also allocated additional security funding to security institutions that DoD and international donors do not consider to be eligible ANDSF expenses, such as the NDS and the Presidential Protective Service, for the purposes of the Chicago Summit funding commitments. The United States and international donors will continue to hold the Afghan government to its commitment to increase its contributions toward Chicago Summit-eligible ANDSF expenses over time.

83 Since 2012, the value of the Afghani has fallen roughly 22 percent relative to the U.S. dollar.
leaders to break down trade barriers, increase cross-border investment, and improve trade routes in Central and South Asia.

Most assessments suggest that Afghanistan’s economy will not grow rapidly enough in the next five years to allow the Afghan government to assume a significantly larger share of the cost of their security. Adjusting earlier forecasts, the World Bank now projects an economic growth rate of 1.9 percent in 2016, and continuing slow recovery in the medium term that is dependent on political stabilization and stronger reform efforts. However, a deterioration in the security environment could weaken any economic recovery efforts. Assuming Afghan government revenues were to grow in line with this modest GDP growth, at current and expected cost and force levels the Afghans would be unlikely to contribute significantly to the total cost to support ANDSF sustainment in the medium term.

President Ghani’s broad-based reform agenda that seeks to encourage a sustainable economy has helped to bolster confidence to some degree; however, international development assistance is required in order to promote President Ghani’s economic development agenda. It is crucial that the Afghan government delivers on its pledges to generate sustainable economic growth. The Afghan government has implemented a variety of incremental reforms that lay the foundation for its wider anti-corruption and economic development objectives, which include improving the investment climate and increasing revenues. For instance, on February 18, 2016, President Ghani signed a comprehensive value-added tax that, among other things, replaces an existing tax on imports and the business receipt tax. Implementing a value-added tax was a component of the original TMAF commitment, as well as Afghanistan’s World Trade Organization commitments, however, it was not included in the 2015 SMAF. Additionally, to control non-security expenditures, the government passed a budget for SY 1395 that decreases revenue assumptions to more realistic levels, curtails discretionary development spending, and minimizes year-on-year spending increases. The government has also pledged to move to a multi-year budget framework to enable better strategic planning and use of the budget as a policy tool.

CSTC-A continues to work with the Afghan government to ensure appropriate oversight of direct contributions to the MoI and the MoD. During this reporting period, CSTC-A continued to place conditional controls and requirements tied to funding in MoD and MoI commitment letters to facilitate and promote full transparency, accountability, and oversight of international donor and U.S. funding. Based on lessons learned from the FY 1394 commitment letter process, CSTC-A refined its commitment letters for FY 1395 to improve enforcement, including by structuring incentives to encourage the government to meet its Chicago commitment of $500 million annually. The conditions for Afghan government use of ASFF contributions within the 2016 commitment letters focus on improving and implementing enduring ANDSF processes and systems directly linked to strengthening accountability of equipment, weapons, ammunition, fuel, personnel, and pay – all areas of opportunity for corruption and graft.

85 CSTC-A commitment letters stipulate how the MoD and the MoI allocate funding for the Afghan fiscal year and under what conditions CSTC-A will provide funding. CSTC-A commitment letters also identify various legal constraints, such as the Berry Amendment and the Leahy law, on U.S. funding.
CSTC-A continues to improve the use of commitment letters to enforce conditionality and provide additional accountability over the use of ASFF. By the end of the first quarter of FY 1395 on March 19, 2016, CSTC-A determined that the MoD and the MoI had achieved satisfactory progress for over 60 percent of the 47 MoD-specific conditions and 48 MoI-specific conditions outlined in the FY 1394 commitment letters. For the 40 percent of conditions that were not met or enforced, CSTC-A deemed that the MoD or the MoI capacity had not matured as anticipated, the conditions were insufficiently measureable or assessable, or enforcing the penalties could have affected the ANDSF’s ability to execute 2015 spring and summer fighting season operations.

The MoD and the MoI signed their respective FY 1395 commitment letters in December 2015 and January 2016. The FY 1395 commitment letters consolidated, eliminated, or refined 85 of the original 170 conditions in the FY 1394 commitment letters. Since the end of the first quarter of FY 1395 on March 19, 2016, the coalition has begun conducting quarterly reviews at the two-star general officer level to measure compliance and determine responses as appropriate when the Afghans do not meet conditions.

Finally, CSTC-A is assisting the MoD and the MoI as they develop their resource management and procurement capacity. This effort focuses on strengthening the MoD and the MoI’s ability to manage their fiscal resources more effectively while helping to provide oversight of U.S. and international funding being spent by the Afghans. For instance, CSTC-A is integrating all ASFF- and LOTFA-funded forces into the AHRIMS in order to account for all personnel disbursements to ANDSF. Initiatives such as the MoI subject matter expert program, the MoD’s nascent FAST program, and implementation of the APPS will help automate and streamline the payroll process and reduce the incidence of “ghost” soldiers receiving pay. As the ANA implements the APPS, CSTC-A plans to provide full funding only for authorized tashkil positions that are paid electronically and fund all other positions at 80 percent of the authorized amount. During this reporting period, CSTC-A continued to perform and assist with independent assessments and audits to ensure appropriate scrutiny of Afghan financial processes and make recommendations for improving Afghan capabilities. Improving the ability of the MoD and the MoI to provide appropriate oversight and accountability of international funding for the ANDSF and developing Afghan capability in financial management will remain a core focus of the RS TAA mission.
ANNEX A – INDICATORS OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Essential Function</th>
<th>Indicators of Effectiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **EF 1:** Planning, Programming Budgeting, and Execution | - MoD and MoI are able to identify requirements, programs, and funding accurately over a three-year horizon based on strategic guidance  
- Ministry of Finance provides timely guidance to enable MoI and MoD to develop a budget  
- MoD and MoI are able to formulate an accurate annual budget to meet internal and external requirements  
- MoD and MoI are able to develop an executable procurement plan and execute their spend plan within budget and stipulated timeframes  
- MoD and MoI are able to submit, award, and complete contracts to ensure execution as planned  
- MoD can fully pay all its employees accurately, timely and in a secure fashion.  
- Ministry of Finance provides timely approvals, in-year guidance, and funds to MoI and MoD  
- MoD and MoI possess an effective and efficient system to recruit and hire subject matter experts |
| **EF 2:** Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight | - MoD Ministerial Internal Controls Program is effectively implemented and sustainable  
- MoD and MoI IG has an effective accountability oversight program for sustainability  
- GS IG has an effective accountability oversight program for sustainability  
- Critical items (the “big four” issues – fuel, ammunition, food, and pay) are managed by transparent, accountable, and sustainable processes to the appropriate organizational level  
- Ensure appropriate engagement of relevant external and internal agencies to establish transparency, accountability, and oversight within the Afghan government |
| **EF 3:** Rule of Law and Governance | - MoD and MoI have appropriately staffed and qualified units to prevent or address extra-judicial killings and other GVHR  
- MoD and MoI identify, investigate, and appropriately act upon acts of major corruption and GVHR  
- MoD and MoI inter-ministerial cooperation with AGO on corruption adjudication and with AGO on GVHR allegations |
| EF 4: Force Generation | - MoD utilizes AHRIMS down to the corps level to manage the force, and MoI utilizes AHRIMS down to the provincial headquarters level to manage the force  
- MoD implements civilianization goals and objectives as outlined in the bilateral agreement  
- MoD and MoI manpower plans are developed and used to project future manpower requirements that inform recruiting goals, mitigates attrition rates, and achieve desired end strength  
- MoD and MoI establish systems to integrate lessons learned; tactics, techniques, and procedures; doctrine; and programs of instruction  
- All untrained ANP receive formal police training, and MoI prevents future untrained policy by forecasting training requirements and scheduling courses to accommodate recruit intakes  
- The ANA has established a system for training in air and ground coordination; capability established and used for information operations delivery  
- Training delivered that results in reduced casualties |
| EF 5: Logistics and Maintenance | - Measurement and reporting has command emphasis  
- ANDSF documents processes for generating and capturing requirements  
- ANDSF has adequately executed a demand based inventory management system  
- ANDSF organic maintenance is supplemented by contractors  
- MoI assumes responsibility for equipment maintenance, which is transitioned from the coalition-funded AMS contract  
- MoD has a developed an operational medical resource optimization process that is sustainable  
- MoD and MoI have sufficient numbers of trained and qualified health care personnel to fill tashkil  
- MoD and MoI have an operational and sustainable medical logistics process  
- ANP operate inventory management processes, including cold chain management for medicines  
- The Afghan government-backed Afghan Medical Council establishes and sustains ANDSF and Afghan national healthcare  
- MoD capable of managing its portion of the frequency spectrum for the Afghan government  
- MoD and MoI able to identify and sustain key information and communications technology infrastructure  
- MoD able to sustain information management systems throughout their lifecycle  
- MoD implements fundamental cybersecurity structures and processes to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability |
- MoD able to produce and sustain information and communications technology forces that are manned, trained, and equipped to conduct operations
- MoI capable of managing its portion of frequency spectrum for the Afghan government

### EF 6: Command and Control Operations

- ONSC delivers national security guidance through the national strategic security document set (*National Threat Assessment, National Security Policy, National Security Strategy*, and *National Campaign Plan*)
- Assistant Minister of Defense for Strategy and Policy lead – deliver strategic documents (*National Military Strategy* and *Guidance for Operational Planning*) in time and of sufficient quality (focused, threat informed, and resource aware) to inform subordinate planning
- Assistant Minister of Defense for Strategy and Policy lead – delivers the Defense Capabilities Planning Guidance in time and of sufficient quality to inform and drive the departmental capability development process
- GS Plans Directorate deliver planning guidance and a coherent, synchronized campaign planning process
- The MoI Deputy Minister of Strategy and Policy – delivers strategic documents (MIS, MIP, and Strategic Programming Guidance Directive) in time and of sufficient quality (focused, threat informed, and resource aware), monitors implementation and manages change through a robust force management process
- The MoI Deputy Minister of Strategy and Policy monitors MIS and MISP implementation and delivers guidance to ensure a robust departmental force management process
- ANA has an established and sustainable capability to conduct combined arms operations
- ANA has an established and sustainable capability to conduct operations in coordination with ANP
- ANA has assessed its capability gaps at the operational level and implemented improvements to address the gaps
- ANA has a sustainable capability to prepare detailed plans and orders at the corps level from strategic guidance from the MoD
- ANP has an established and sustainable capability to coordinate ANP inputs to ANA operations
- ANASOC develops as a strategic MoD asset capable of manning, equipping, training, employing, and sustaining the force
- ANASOC is able to synchronize special operations brigade and special operations *kandak* operations within the framework of corps security operations in support of the Afghan government and MoD objectives
- SMW develops as a strategic Afghan government organization
| EF 7: Intelligence | • Afghan police intelligence model effectively engages security issues  
• MoD intelligence integrates into MoD strategic decision-making and into ANASOC and ANA corps level operations  
• DPI human intelligence institutes a sustainable human intelligence network that can action and report on intelligence requirements and tasking  
• Establish NMIC as an operational intelligence center capable of retrieving and analyzing information obtained from various intelligence sensors and developing products that support Afghan government intelligence operations  
• DPI trains technically proficient personnel for intelligence operational needs and manages intelligence sustainment requirements to meet operational needs  
• Establish enduring and sustainable organic intelligence capability at Intelligence Training Center, ANA corps, and ANASOC |
|---|---|
| EF 8: Strategic Communication | • Develops and sustains events and mechanisms designed to facilitate cross-ministerial coordination and delivery of strategic communication guidance, priorities and direction.  
• National Unity Government develops and distributes strategic communication guidance; guidance will be utilized to develop respective MoD and MoI communication plans and products  
• GS Operations Directorate Information Operations has the knowledge and capability to submit effectively (and modify as necessary) yearly [personnel and equipment] *tashkil* inputs, as well as to plan and submit its yearly budget requirements, which will enable the MoD information operations capability throughout the country |
| Gender | • MoI and MoD/ANA implement approved strategies and plans on gender integration  
• MoI and MoD provide safe training and working environment (facilities) for women  
• MoI and MoD takes actions to eliminate gender-based violence and other types of violence and sexual harassment of women |
## ANNEX B – ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAC</td>
<td>Advise and Assist Cell</td>
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<tr>
<td>AACP</td>
<td>Afghan Anti-Crime Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>AAC-SE</td>
<td>Advise and Assist Cell – Southeast</td>
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<tr>
<td>AAC-SW</td>
<td>Advise and Assist Cell – Southwest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAD</td>
<td>Advise and Assist Directorate</td>
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<tr>
<td>AAF</td>
<td>Afghan Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABP</td>
<td>Afghan Border Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGO</td>
<td>Attorney General’s Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>AHRIMS</td>
<td>Afghan Human Resource Information Management System</td>
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<td>ALP</td>
<td>Afghan Local Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANAREC</td>
<td>Afghan National Army Recruiting Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANASOC</td>
<td>Afghan National Army Special Operations Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANATEC</td>
<td>Afghan National Army Training and Education Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANCOP</td>
<td>Afghan National Civil Order Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANDSF</td>
<td>Afghan National Defense and Security Forces</td>
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<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANQAR</td>
<td>Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research</td>
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<td>APPF</td>
<td>Afghan Public Protection Force</td>
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<td>APPS</td>
<td>Afghan Personnel and Pay System</td>
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<td>AQIS</td>
<td>Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent</td>
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<td>ASFF</td>
<td>Afghanistan Security Forces Fund</td>
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<td>ASSF</td>
<td>Afghan Special Security Forces</td>
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<td>ATAC</td>
<td>Afghan Tactical Air Coordinator</td>
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<td>AUP</td>
<td>Afghan Uniform Police</td>
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<td>BSA</td>
<td>Bilateral Security Agreement</td>
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<td>CASEVAC</td>
<td>Casualty Evacuation</td>
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<td>CCMT</td>
<td>Civilian Casualty Mitigation Team</td>
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<td>CLS</td>
<td>Contract Logistics Support</td>
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<td>CNPA</td>
<td>Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan</td>
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<td>Core-IMS</td>
<td>Core-Information Management System</td>
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<td>CSB</td>
<td>Corps Support Battalion</td>
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<td>CSTC-A</td>
<td>Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan</td>
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<td>DCPG</td>
<td>Defense Capability Planning Guidance</td>
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<tr>
<td>DLI</td>
<td>Defense Language Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPI</td>
<td>Directorate of Police Intelligence</td>
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<td>DPPP</td>
<td>Draft Prioritized Procurement Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOD</td>
<td>Estimated Cost of Damage</td>
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<td>EF</td>
<td>Essential Function</td>
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<td>FAST</td>
<td>Functional Area Support Teams</td>
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<td>FSD</td>
<td>Forward Supply Depot</td>
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<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCPSU</td>
<td>General Command of Police Special Units</td>
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<tr>
<td>GS</td>
<td>General Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>GVHR</td>
<td>Gross Violation of Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>HMMWV</td>
<td>High-Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>HPA</td>
<td>High-Profile Attack</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<tr>
<td>IG</td>
<td>Inspector General</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>ISIL</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant</td>
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<tr>
<td>IS-K</td>
<td>Islamic State – Khorasan</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSOCC</td>
<td>Joint Special Operations Coordination Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>Killed-in-Action</td>
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<td>KMTC</td>
<td>Kabul Military Training Center</td>
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<td>LOTFA</td>
<td>Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan</td>
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<td>LTG</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
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<td>MAAR</td>
<td>Monthly ANSF Assessment Report</td>
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<td>MCTF</td>
<td>Major Crimes Task Force</td>
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<td>MEDEVAC</td>
<td>Medical Evacuation</td>
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<td>MIS</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>MISP</td>
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<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPAD</td>
<td>Media and Public Affairs Directorate</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATF</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization Trust Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCP</td>
<td>National Campaign Plan</td>
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<td>NDAA</td>
<td>National Defense Authorization Act</td>
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<td>NDS</td>
<td>National Directorate of Security</td>
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<td>NIMS</td>
<td>National Information Management System</td>
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<td>NMIC</td>
<td>National Military Intelligence Center</td>
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<td>National Military Strategy</td>
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<td>National Mission Unit</td>
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<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<td>NSOCC-A</td>
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<td>Network Targeting and Exploitation Center</td>
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<td>OCC</td>
<td>Operations Coordination Center</td>
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<td>OCC – P</td>
<td>Operations Coordination Center – Provincial</td>
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<td>OCC – R</td>
<td>Operations Coordination Center – Regional</td>
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<tr>
<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
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<td>OFS</td>
<td>Operation Freedom’s Sentinel</td>
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<td>ONSC</td>
<td>Office of the National Security Council</td>
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<td>PITC</td>
<td>Police Intelligence Training Center</td>
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<td>PL</td>
<td>Public Law</td>
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<td>PoAM</td>
<td>Program of Actions and Milestones</td>
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<td>PSU</td>
<td>Provincial Special Unit</td>
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<td>RAID</td>
<td>Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment</td>
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<td>RMTC</td>
<td>Regional Military Training Center</td>
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<td>Resolute Support</td>
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<td>Surface-to-Air Fire</td>
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<td>Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction</td>
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<td>Special Operations Kandaks</td>
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<td>Standard Operating Procedure</td>
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<td>SPG</td>
<td>Strategic Planning Guidance</td>
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<td>SY</td>
<td>Solar Year</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
TAA
Train, Advise, and Assist

TAAC
Train, Advise, and Assist Command

TAAC-Air
Train, Advise, and Assist Command – Air

TAAC-C
Train, Advise, and Assist Command – Capital

TAAC-E
Train, Advise, and Assist Command – East

TAAC-N
Train, Advise, and Assist Command – North

TAAC-S
Train, Advise, and Assist Command – South

TAAC-W
Train, Advise, and Assist Command – West

TALE
Transparency and Accountability in Law Enforcement

TMAF
Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework

TTHS
Training, Transient, Holding, Students

TTP
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan

UN
United Nations

UNAMA
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

UNDP
United Nations Development Program

UNSCR
United Nations Security Council Resolution

USFOR-A
United States Forces – Afghanistan

WIA
Wounded-in-Action

WISAC
Women in Security Advisory Committee