ENHANCING SECURITY AND STABILITY IN
AFGHANISTAN

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Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan

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Report to Congress

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This report is submitted in accordance with Section 1225 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 (P.L. 113-291), as amended by Sections 1213 and 1531 of the NDAA for FY 2016 (P.L. 114-92) and Sections 1215 and 1521 of the NDAA for FY 2017 (P.L. 114-328). It includes a description of the strategy of the United States for enhancing security and stability in Afghanistan, a current and anticipated threat assessment, and a description and assessment of the size, structure, strategy, budget, and financing of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. This report also includes a description of the new South Asia Strategy, announced on August 21, 2017, during the reporting period. This report was prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State and is the fifth in a series of reports required semi-annually through calendar year 2019. The NDAA for FY 2018, which is pending approval, includes an amendment in Section 1215 that would extend the semi-annual reporting requirement through calendar year 2020.

This report describes efforts to enhance security and stability in Afghanistan from June 1, 2017, through November 30, 2017. This report complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to Congress and is not intended to be the single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its coalition partners, or Afghanistan. A classified annex accompanies this report. The next report will include an analysis of efforts to enhance security and stability in Afghanistan from December 1, 2017, through May 31, 2018.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On August 21, 2017, President Trump announced a new regional U.S. strategy for South Asia. This strategy is a clear signal of U.S. resolve and a break with the previous Administration’s focus on a timeline for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan. The purpose of the U.S. campaign from 2001 to the present has been to prevent future attacks on the U.S. and its Allies homelands; we will not accept the use of South Asia as a sanctuary for terrorist activity and planning. To accomplish this objective, we have sought to stabilize Afghanistan. The goal is a stable, independent Afghanistan at peace with its neighbors.

The U.S. will accomplish this by assisting the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) in their fight against the insurgents. The new strategy does not mean a return to U.S.-led combat operations; instead the key to success lies in improving ANDSF capabilities. We will continue to work by, with, and through the ANDSF to help them defeat their enemies. The objective of the campaign is to convince the Taliban that they cannot win on the battlefield. The war will end in a comprehensive, Afghan-led political settlement that will include all parties, including the Taliban.

We have a willing and able partner in President Ghani. In conjunction with the new U.S. strategy, he launched with the U.S. Embassy Kabul and U.S. Forces in Afghanistan (USFOR-A), a process to create and monitor reforms in four priority sectors: governance, economic development, security, and the peace process. Under the terms of this Kabul Compact, President Ghani appointed new, acting Ministers of Defense and Interior with mandates to improve ANDSF effectiveness and reduce corruption. He also issued a decree creating an honorable mechanism for aging generals and senior officers to retire and clears the way for merit-based promotions. President Ghani’s personal and sustained commitment to reform across the four priority sectors is a major step forward in the campaign to improve the legitimacy of Afghanistan.

The ANDSF have already met the severe test of the last three years in which they have had lead responsibility for security. President Ghani’s reforms will further buttress the ANDSF. In early 2017, President Ghani announced a long-term plan called the ANDSF Roadmap1 to seize the initiative in the fight against insurgent and terrorist forces, further professionalize the ANDSF, modify the ANDSF force structure, and compel the Taliban to seek reconciliation. During this reporting period, U.S., coalition, and Afghan efforts focused on the four ANDSF Roadmap priorities: doubling the size and capabilities of the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF); expanding and modernizing the Afghan Air Force (AAF); improving leadership development; and countering corruption. Under the new South Asia Strategy, we have deployed modest numbers of additional U.S. forces which will support the train, advise, and assist (TAA) and counterterrorism (CT) missions. USFOR-A currently maintains approximately 14,000 uniformed personnel in Afghanistan, an increase of approximately 3,000 during the reporting period.

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1 The “ANDSF Roadmap” focuses on strengthening the Afghan Special Security Forces and aviation forces; improving leadership; increasing unity of effort between the Ministries of Defense (MoD) and Interior (MoI); and reducing corruption within the MoD and MoI.
The ANDSF has endured three challenging fighting seasons; U.S. and Afghan sources indicate this fighting season has been more successful than the last. During this reporting period, the Taliban was unable to threaten any provincial centers, lost control of key districts to include Nawah-ye Barakzai in Helmand, and the ANDSF retained control of all major population centers. In addition, U.S. and ANDSF CT efforts against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) affiliate in the Afghanistan and Pakistan region, ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K), have dislocated and isolated the group in a small number of districts in Afghanistan. While high profile attacks remain largely unchanged year to year, additional U.S. authorities, close air support, changes in the organization of U.S. TAA, and the psychological boost stemming from the new U.S. commitment, improved the effectiveness of the ANDSF in offensive operations this fighting season. USFOR-A supports the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led Resolute Support ANDSF TAA mission. The increase of U.S. forces during the reporting period lowered the risk to the mission, and the U.S. and its coalition partners maintained sufficient numbers of personnel to provide advisors to the ministries, ANA corps, and Afghan National Policy zones.

The hard-won gains in Afghanistan – by the Afghans, the United States, NATO and the international community – remain fragile, but are worth defending. Under the new strategy, U.S. diplomatic, military, and economic resources are aligned in support of a negotiated settlement to this long-running war. We have recommitted to helping the Afghan Government and people navigate through these challenges with a new approach that leverages additional support from allies, partners, and regional actors. Our commitment is enduring but not unlimited; our support is not a blank check. As long as the Afghan Government continues to show real progress and make real reforms, we will continue to support them as our strategic partners in the fight against international terrorism. The Taliban cannot win on the battlefield. They must know that their only path to peace and political legitimacy is through a negotiated settlement with the Afghan Government.
SECTION 1 – STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES

The United States currently maintains approximately 14,000 military personnel in Afghanistan as part of NATO’s Resolute Support (RS) and Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS),2 which includes an uplift of approximately 3,500 personnel from the previous reporting period. These personnel maintain a presence at bases in Kabul and Bagram with regional outstations, Jalalabad, Nangarhar Province in the east, Kandahar Province in the south, Herat Province in the west, and Balkh Province in the north.

This presence enables the United States to pursue CT targets and, as part of the coalition, to develop the ANDSF further, capitalizing on the effectiveness demonstrated by EAPs that provide tailored support to the regional ANDSF commands for both enduring and emergent capability gaps. This posture reflects a consolidation of forces and takes advantage of efficiencies gained by working and sharing functions with coalition partners and the ANDSF.

Our Afghanistan strategy is nested in the new South Asia Strategy announced in August. The uplift of 3,500 personnel will decrease the risk associated with the previously reduced number of U.S. military personnel training at the lower echelon levels. The majority of the uplift personnel will support the RS TAA mission at the tactical level and some of the additional personnel will support the USFOR-A mission.

1.1 U.S. STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN

Under the new strategy, the United States will continue to support the Afghan government and security forces in the fight against the Taliban, al-Qaeda, ISIS, and other insurgents and terrorists to strengthen the Afghan government and prevent the reestablishment of international terrorist safe-havens in Afghanistan. A major change from our previous strategy is the shift from a time-based approach to a conditions-based one. This shift underscores the U.S. commitment to the continued development of the ANDSF, provided that our Afghan partners satisfy their obligations.

The new policy will increase U.S., NATO, and RS partner support to Afghanistan, while simultaneously improving the effects of that support with more tactical-level TAA and combat enablers. More importantly, the strategy integrates U.S. military efforts with the State Department’s diplomatic efforts to ensure sustainable, enduring outcomes.

Our efforts will continue to be channeled “by, with, and through” our Afghan partners as part of the TAA mission. Importantly, our NATO allies and partners remain dedicated to Afghan security and the RS mission. Following the U.S. announcement of the new strategy and the uplift of 3,500 U.S. personnel, 27 other NATO Allies and partners also collectively increased their personnel contributions.

The U.S. military mission in Afghanistan will divide its efforts between missions. The majority of U.S. personnel will remain dedicated to the NATO RS mission and its TAA undertaking. At the same time, the U.S. CT mission will endure. The heaviest burden will continue to be borne by the Afghan people and their security forces. Since 2015, the Afghan security forces have been in the lead for the fight against the Taliban-led insurgency. Under the new South Asia Strategy, the United States will conduct TAA below the corps level in the conventional ANDSF in order to replicate our past success with the Afghan special forces. The additional U.S. forces will serve as combat enablers in support of Afghan operations against the Taliban. The changes in policy and resources do not signify a return to major ground combat operations; rather, these changes optimize the use of U.S. expertise, training, and capabilities in Afghanistan.

The U.S. and Afghan Governments agree that the best way to ensure lasting peace and security in Afghanistan is a durable political settlement that includes the Taliban. The United States supports an Afghan-led reconciliation process and supports any mechanism that leads violent extremist organizations (VEO) to lay down their arms. Crippling the will of the Taliban to continue fighting, thereby compelling them to negotiate with the Afghan Government is the key to new South Asia Strategy. Success in this peace process will require the Taliban and other armed opposition groups to end violence, break ties with international terrorist groups, and abide by the Afghan constitution. As the Afghan Government works toward this end, U.S. and coalition personnel will continue to develop ANDSF capabilities, improve MoD and MoI capacity, and support the Afghan leadership. The combined efforts are critical to enabling the Afghan Government to secure their country against a persistent, externally enabled insurgent threat.

The new strategy calls for a regional approach to stability in South Asia. The pillars of the strategy include: building a broad, regional consensus for a stable Afghanistan; emphasizing regional integration and cooperation; stressing cooperation in an Afghan-led peace process; and holding countries accountable for the use of proxies or other asymmetric means to undermine stability and regional confidence. DoD will be a part of a whole-of-government, regional strategy to isolate the Taliban from sources of external support and to mitigate any malign influence from outside actors. Our military-to-military relationship with Pakistan remains critical to the success of our mutual interests in the region. To move forward, we must see fundamental changes in the way Pakistan deals with terrorist safe-havens in its territory. To induce that change, we will work across the U.S. Government, using a range of tools to expand our cooperation with Pakistan in areas where our interests converge and to take unilateral steps in areas of divergence.

1.2 U.S. OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN

The United States’ interests in Afghanistan include the protection of the U.S. homeland, U.S citizens, and our interests abroad. Our objectives in Afghanistan are in support of that interest. The current U.S. objectives in Afghanistan are to defeat threats posed by al-Qa’ida and ISIS-K, support the ANDSF, and give the Afghan people the opportunity to succeed and stand on their own. The ultimate goal of U.S. and international efforts is to prevent future attacks on the U.S. and its Allies homelands; we will not accept the use of South Asia as a sanctuary for terrorist activity and planning.
To achieve U.S. objectives and to build upon the gains of the last 16 years, USFOR-A conducts two well-defined and complementary missions. First, through OFS, U.S. forces continue the CT mission against al-Qaeda, ISIS-K, and their associates in Afghanistan to prevent their resurgence and any external attacks. Second, in partnership with NATO allies and operational partner nations in the Resolute Support mission, U.S. forces advise and assist the ANDSF. The United States supports the institutionalization of ANDSF gains by conducting functionally-based security force assistance (SFA) as part of the NATO-led RS mission. U.S. and coalition forces conduct TAA efforts at the ANA corps level, the ANP zone level, and with the MoD and the MoI to improve their ability to support and sustain the fighting force. During this reporting period, the President authorized the expansion of the TAA mission for conventional ANDSF below the corps level. U.S. and coalition forces also conduct TAA missions with the AAF and ASSF at the tactical level, underscoring the importance of those two critical capabilities.

An array of operational authorities govern the conduct of U.S. military personnel engaged in the CT and TAA missions in Afghanistan. These authorities address U.S. CT operations and security force assistance in support of the ANDSF in their continued fight against the Taliban and other insurgent groups. U.S. forces are permitted to TAA the ANDSF – including the ASSF, AAF, and conventional ground forces – from the national (ministerial/institutional) to the tactical levels to develop institutional capacity, integrate capabilities (e.g., aerial fires, ISR), and improve tactical proficiency. Operational authorities also address circumstances in which U.S. forces may use force in support of the CT and TAA missions, including U.S. accompaniment and combat enabler support to the ANDSF in support of its fight against the Taliban and other insurgent groups. With the recent modification of Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS) Executive Order, the United States removed some caveats limiting U.S. fires and close air support to close proximity with ANDSF operations. During the period of this report, these authorities helped the ANDSF prevent insurgent groups from gaining operational momentum and boosted ANDSF confidence and its offensive mindset.

1.3 U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM MISSION

U.S. CT efforts remain focused on defeating al-Qaeda and its associates, defeating ISIS-K, protecting U.S. forces, and preventing Afghanistan from becoming a safe-haven for terrorists to plan attacks against the U.S. homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and allies and partners. CT efforts from 2001 to present in Afghanistan have helped the United States avoid another major terrorist

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4 Functionally-based SFA is a term developed by ISAF in 2013 to describe its shift to a primary emphasis on capacity building as its combat mission was winding down. SFA is a unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority (RS Security Force Assistance Guide 3.12). Joint force SFA consists of “Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions” (Joint Publication 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, July 12, 2010, and Joint Doctrine Note 1-13, Security Force Assistance, April 29, 2013). The activities described as SFA, particularly the advisory effort focused on “essential functions,” are elements of security cooperation activities normally defined by NATO and DoD as defense institution reform and defense institution-building.
attack against the U.S. homeland. However, the existence of more than 20 terrorist or insurgent groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan, including ISIS-K, requires an Afghan supported U.S. platform in the region to monitor, contain, and respond to these threats.

U.S. efforts against ISIS-K in Afghanistan are part of the U.S. global effort to defeat ISIS. In addition to U.S. unilateral efforts, USFOR-A is enabling the ANDSF to conduct independent operations against ISIS-K. The United States is encouraging more robust intelligence and operational cooperation between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other regional partners in the effort to defeat ISIS. During this reporting period, ISIS-K faced significant territorial, leadership, and personnel losses in Nangarhar due to ANDSF and USFOR-A targeting. However, as ISIS-K loses space in Nangarhar, it has sought refuge in Afghanistan. Although weakened, ISIS-K will most likely continue to plan and execute high profile attacks in populated areas.

The United States remains in an armed conflict against al-Qa’ida, the Taliban, and associated forces. The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) remains the U.S. domestic legal basis for CT combat operations in Afghanistan. In addition to targeting al-Qa’ida and ISIS-K, U.S. forces may use force against individuals that directly participate in hostilities against U.S. or coalition forces, and U.S. forces always maintain the inherent right of individual and unit self-defense.

The U.S. CT mission complements the NATO TAA mission. Limited U.S. direct action, coupled with a stronger and increasingly capable ANDSF, will help preserve the security gains to date and contribute to a robust, enduring U.S.-Afghan CT partnership. The Special Operations Joint Task Force – Afghanistan (SOJTF-A) supports U.S. CT efforts through TAA with the ASSF and accompanying the ASFF on certain operations. The ASSF will continue to conduct countrywide operations using its growing organic capabilities to address both insurgent and transnational threats. The SOJTF-A TAA efforts remain focused on building the ASSF’s capacity in logistics, command and control, fire support, intelligence analysis and sharing, aviation, and ASSF/conventional force interoperability.

From June 1, 2017, to December 1, 2017, SOJTF-A components advised or enabled 2,450 ground operations and conducted 330 kinetic strikes and 228 Air to Ground (ATG) strikes. These operations included 420 ground operations and 214 air strikes against ISIS-K, resulting in more than 174 ISIS-K killed-in-action (KIA); 1,644 ground operations and 181 air strikes against the Taliban, resulting in 220 Taliban KIA; 68 ground operations and 28 air strikes against members of the Haqqani Network, resulting in 34 Haqqani KIA; and 43 ground operations against other insurgent networks, resulting in 36 enemy KIA.

The ASSF have demonstrated continued improvement in counterterrorism and counternarcotics operations. Between June 1, 2017, and December 1, 2017, ASSF progress in intelligence, aviation, mission command, logistics, and institutional systems and processes contributed to the execution of 2,450 operations. Of these operations, 1,301 were independent, 2172 were ground operations, 948 were advised, and 201 were enabled. In addition, these operations contributed to 450 insurgent and terrorist KIA and the apprehension of 313 detainees.
1.4 NATO-LED RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION

The NATO RS mission remains focused on training, advising, and assisting the ANDSF, the MoD, and the MoI to achieve and maintain a stable Afghanistan during a period of conflict.⁵ The United States continues to consult with NATO allies and operational partners about RS mission requirements and any follow-on NATO-led efforts to ensure that the U.S. and NATO missions are mutually supportive. RS-contributing nations strongly supported the new South Asia Strategy, and welcomed both the U.S. personnel increase and the move to a conditions-based approach.

Following the new South Asia Strategy announcement in August, the United States announced an increase of approximately 3,500 U.S. military personnel. The majority of the additional U.S. forces will support the RS mission, allowing TAA at the tactical-level, and the remaining reinforcements will support the U.S. CT mission under USFOR-A.

The United States, Germany, Italy, and Turkey are the RS mission “framework nations,” each leading a regional Train, Advise, and Assist Command (TAAC) responsible for coordinating support and capabilities within its respective command region. Two regional task forces (TF) conduct TAA missions with the ANSF in the southeast and southwest. During this reporting period, the RS support to the ANSF focused on organizational and functional based TAA.

The regional TAACs cover four of the six ANA corps and the associated regional ANP zone headquarters. The two regional task forces, TF Southeast and TF Southwest, oversee persistent advising with the ANA 203rd and 215th Corps; and ANP Zone 303 and Zone 505, respectively. The TAACs and TFs serve as the principal connections between the Afghan ministries and fielded forces. The field commands play a central role in the coalition’s ability to assess the efficacy of its ministerial advising efforts, to determine the ministries’ ability to support ongoing ANDSF security operations, and to provide an outer ring of sensors and security for the coalition. In addition, coalition forces provide limited non-combat enabler support, primarily Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), to the ANSF as the Afghans continue to field and develop their organic capabilities.

As of November 2017, RS was composed of military personnel from 39 nations (26 NATO allies and 13 operational partner nations) with individual national contributions described in Figure 1. The United States remains the largest force contributor in Afghanistan.

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⁵ NATO launched its non-combat RS Mission on January 1, 2015, following the conclusion of the previous NATO-led combat mission of ISAF and the assumption of full security responsibility by the ANSF. The NATO Afghanistan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which entered into force on January 1, 2015, provides the legal framework for the NATO presence in Afghanistan and prescribes the terms and conditions under which NATO forces will be deployed in Afghanistan.
Figure 1: Resolute Support Mission Troop-Contributing Nations, as of November 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Albania</th>
<th>83</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>874</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
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<td>Romania</td>
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<td>Iceland</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Latvia</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
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<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
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<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>New Zealand</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
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<td>Georgia</td>
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<td>Poland</td>
<td>218</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15,046</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Functional Advising

The cornerstone of the RS mission is functionally-based SFA. As such, the advisory effort focused on developing functions, systems, processes, and organizational development connections between the ministerial and operational levels. Military and civilian advisors work with their Afghan counterparts on one of three levels of advising:

- **Level One**: Advisors work with their Afghan counterparts on a continuous, persistent (usually daily) basis, either from an embedded footprint or in close proximity.

- **Level Two**: Advisors work with their Afghan counterparts on a less-frequent basis (determined by commanders) to ensure their continued development. The frequency of this interaction varies based on the proximity to and the capability of their Afghan counterpart, the threat level to advisors, and coalition resources.

- **Level Three**: Advisors are not co-located with their Afghan counterparts and provide TAA support from a centralized location. Expeditionary advising teams and visits are planned and coordinated with Afghan counterparts to assist periodically with operations and sustainment.

U.S. and coalition advisors focus the TAA mission within the MoD and the MoI on generating, employing, and sustaining capabilities within the ANDSF, with advising extending to the ANA.

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6 As listed on the NATO public website, [http://www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int), accessed on April 25, 2017. Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia by its constitutional name.
corps and ANP zone headquarters levels. The main effort for RS is building capacity within the ministries and the ANDSF at the national and regional levels.

The RS mission focuses on eight essential functions (EF), associated sub-functions, and gender integration efforts to develop a capable and sustainable MoD, MoI, and ANDSF. A U.S. or coalition general officer or a DoD Senior Executive Service member is typically the lead advisor for each of the eight EFs. The EF leads vertically integrate the efforts of their EF advisors across the ANA corps, ANP zone, and at the institutional and ministerial levels. RS advisors focus their efforts on building a responsible and efficient MoD and MoI that can support an effective, sustainable, affordable, and credible ANDSF capable of maintaining security in Afghanistan. During this reporting period, DoD, in concert with USFOR-A, continued to utilize pools of former advisors and regional and functional experts to provide additional expertise and support to functional advisory efforts at the ministerial level.

**Essential Function 1: Plan, Program, Budget, and Execute**

EF 1 has three priorities: 1) to increase resource management capability within the ministries; 2) to build donor confidence and trust that the Afghan resource management process is transparent, accountable, and effective; and 3) to set conditions to sustain an effective ANDSF in the future. Resource management includes formulating a defense strategy; generating requirements by determining the products and services to purchase to support that strategy; developing a resource-informed budget to meet prioritized requirements; executing a spending plan by awarding contracts to purchase items from the budget; and monitoring the status of the funds expended. Advising efforts in this area focus on enhancing resource management and procurement capability in accordance with Afghan laws, policies, and regulations; assisting with the drafting and execution of annual funding commitment letters; and helping the Afghans with the initial integration of various Afghan personnel management and payroll systems into the APPS.\(^7\)

**Essential Function 2: Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight**

One of the four key elements of President Ghani’s ANDSF roadmap is counter-corruption. The MoI and MoD Inspectors General (IG) lead a robust anti-corruption program. EF 2 TAAAs the MoD and MoI IGs to improve policies and procedures in transparency, accountability and oversight. The IGs work to prevent corruption through inspections, investigations, assistance, teaching, and training. EF 2 advisors work with MoD and MoI IGs to develop preventive programs and controls to identify areas vulnerable to corruption and put measures in place to reduce corruption. IGs also work closely with corps and zone commanders to instill a culture in which corruption is not tolerated.

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\(^7\) CSTC-A commitment letters stipulate how the MoD and the MoI can allocate funding for the Afghan fiscal year and under what conditions CSTC-A will provide funding. CSTC-A commitment letters also identify various legal constraints, such as the Berry Amendment and the Leahy law, that apply to U.S. funding.\(^8\)

\(^8\) The Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS) is an enterprise resource planning system that will integrate existing MoD and MoI systems for personnel management and payroll into a single platform providing timely and accurate accountability of all personnel, including civilians, within the MoD and the MoI.
**Essential Function 3: Rule of Law**

To provide security, retain public support, and instill confidence in Afghanistan’s governance institutions, the ANDSF must operate effectively and respect human rights. EF 3 advisors work with the MoD and the MoI to ensure that the ANDSF respects and adheres to the rule of law and operates in accordance with Afghanistan’s constitution, domestic laws, and international obligations. EF 3 efforts focus on assisting the ANDSF to prevent and, when necessary, respond properly to significant acts of corruption and allegations of gross violations of human rights (GVHR), such as extra-judicial killings and child sex abuse. RS advisors continue to engage with ANDSF leaders at all levels to reinforce the importance of preventing and responding to GVHR and all types of human rights violations – not only to maintain long-term viability, but also to retain U.S. and coalition assistance to the ANDSF. RS has established a Counter-Corruption Advisor Group (CCAG) to analyze and target corruption networks in the MoI, MoD, and corruption stemming from criminal patronage and narcotics networks. The CCAG will synchronize counter-corruption efforts among Afghan security institutions, RS, and international partners.

**Essential Function 4: Force Generation**

EF 4 advisors work with the MoD and the MoI to build combat power through recruiting, training, retaining, managing, and developing a professional security force. The ANA and the ANP utilize the Afghan Human Resource Information Management System (AHRIMS) to store human resources information, track recruits, record training, and assign qualified personnel into needed assignments based on force requirements. The force generation TAA mission is an interconnected and mutually supportive five-fold effort: recruit, train, retain, manage, and develop. These five focus areas help the ANDSF build a professional force. EF 4 is advising on the enforcement of an Inherent Law policy, modified in September 2017, that lowers mandatory retirement ages, time-in-service maximums (e.g., 40 years for Generals), and time-in-grade limits (e.g., 8 years for Generals). This effort will open senior leadership positions for the next generation of ANDSF leaders. The RS Capabilities Development Directorate works closely with EF 4 advisors to assist the MoD and the MoI as the ministries develop their official personnel and equipment requirements through the tashkil\(^9\) development process. EF 4 advisors also support the ANDSF transition from the current AHRIMS personnel system to the APPS. With biometric registration and a valid Afghan ID card, the Afghan Personnel Pay System (APPS) will essentially eliminate “ghost soldiers” and improve stewardship of funds.

**Essential Function 5: Sustain the Force**

EF 5 advisors work with the ANDSF to sustain and reconstitute combat power through the development of appropriate maintenance, communications, medical, and logistics systems. EF 5 advisors assist the ANP and the ANA in the logistics and maintenance of vehicles, equipment, and weapons, predominantly at the ANA corps, ANP zone, and national level to help support an affordable and sustainable ANDSF. For medical systems, EF5 advisors assist the ANP and ANA on points of injury care, ground medical evacuation, medical logistics, medical equipment

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\(^9\) *Tashkil* means “organization” in Dari and refers to the official list of personnel and equipment requirements used by the MoD and MoI to detail authorized staff positions and equipment items for each unit.
maintenance, medical support planning, and medical staffing. For communications, EF 5 advisors work with the Afghans providing technical advice and guidance for secure, interoperable, and sustainable ANDSF telecommunications and networked infrastructures.

**Essential Function 6: Plan, Resource, and Execute Effective Security Campaigns**

EF 6 advisors work with the ANDSF to employ all elements of the ANDSF effectively in support of the Afghan Government. EF 6 has two sections: strategic planning and policy, and execution and employment of the force. Strategic planning and policy advisors assist the ANDSF strategic planning efforts at the Office of the National Security Council (ONSC), the MoD, and the MoI. These efforts develop the strategic-level capabilities of the MoD and the MoI to coordinate, plan, and execute campaigns in support of national-level objectives. Once developed, the strategic guidance and objectives are translated into operational and annual campaign plans.

**Essential Function 7: Develop Sufficient Intelligence Capabilities and Processes**

EF 7 advisors work with the ANDSF to develop and integrate intelligence into operations. Advisors work with several organizations, including the Assistant Minister of Defense for Intelligence, the ANA General Staff (GS) Intelligence Directorate, the MoI Directorate of Police Intelligence (DPI), and the Nasrat, also known as the National Threat Intelligence Center, a national-level intelligence fusion center. The EF 7 goal is to help the ANDSF collect, process, analyze, and disseminate intelligence effectively and integrate intelligence into combat operations. RS intelligence advisors work at the national and regional levels to mature Afghan intelligence capabilities, work with analysts as they learn to prepare intelligence estimates in support of military and policing plans and strategies, and help the ANA and the ANP field expanded ISR capabilities. EF 7 advisors also help the ANP and ANA intelligence schools develop a cadre of instructors to train future intelligence personnel. EF 7 has four main lines of effort: intelligence integration with operations, intelligence cycle development, training self-sufficiency, and sustainment of intelligence capabilities.

**Essential Function 8: Maintain Internal and External Strategic Communication Capability**

EF 8 advisors work with the Afghan Government to develop counter-insurgent messaging and a positive narrative for the Afghan people and the international community. EF 8 advisors help Afghan partners speak with one consistent voice, internal and external to their organizations. EF 8 advisors help bridge gaps and overcome challenges to improve communications within the MoD, the MoI, and the ANDSF, while reinforcing successes and seeking opportunities for improvement. Building the MoD and the MoI strategic communications capability depends more on developing human capital and institutionalizing processes than it does on managing resources or developing technical systems.

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10 The DPI tasks and coordinates intelligence at a basic level, produces analysis and intelligence products capable of informing senior MoI leaders and shaping MoI operations, and effectively targets terrorist and criminal networks through the Network Targeting and Exploitation Center (NTEC).
Resolute Support Gender Office

The RS Gender Office conducts TAA with Afghan leadership to integrate UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) and broader gender perspectives into all policy and strategic planning at the ministerial, ANA corps, and ANP zone levels. Although the RS Gender Office is a “stand-alone” advising directorate, it integrates with all 8 EFs as each has gender-related issues integral to the overall EF efforts. Recognizing this interdependency, gender-centric issues are included in all major RS briefings and forums with senior RS and Afghan leaders. The RS Gender Office supports the Afghan Government as it implements the Afghan constitutional guarantee of equal rights to men and women and Afghanistan’s National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325, which addresses the inordinate impact of war on women and the role that women should and do play in conflict management, conflict resolution, and sustainable peace.

Train, Advise, and Assist Commands (TAAC) and Regional Task Forces

RS advisors conduct their TAA mission with the ANDSF at the ANA corps and ANP zone levels through the TAACs and the regional task forces. Turkey currently leads TAAC-Capital (TAAC-C) in the Kabul area, the United States leads TAAC-East (TAAC-E) and TAAC-South (TAAC-S), Italy leads TAAC-West (TAAC-W), and Germany leads TAAC-North (TAAC-N). Personnel at each TAAC conduct training and provide advice and assistance to their Afghan counterparts depending on the need identified by the coalition and their Afghan partners. TF Southwest and TF Southeast provide oversight of TAA efforts for the ANA corps and the ANP zones in their regions, formerly covered by regional Advise and Assist Cells, to ensure full coverage of all ANA corps and ANP zones. Finally, TAAC-Air provides TAA support to the AAF.

The TAACs and TFs assist Afghan units in ANA corps and ANP zone level reporting, while reinforcing the importance of building and improving the systems and processes that support combat operations. With the re-establishment of the ANP zones, the TAACs and TFs focus TAA support at the ANP zone headquarters level rather than at the provincial police headquarters-level. TFs Southeast and Southwest have also succeeded in at strengthening relationships between the MoD, MoI, ANA corps, and ANP zones in areas without a persistent coalition presence. RS relies on the TFs and their expeditionary advising teams to maintain progress in building Afghan capabilities in select parts of the country.

Train, Advise, and Assist Command – Capital

TAAC-C, which includes Kabul Province (except Sarobi District, which falls within the 201st Corps area of responsibility), provides functionally-based SFA to the ANA 111th Capital Division, ANP Zone 101 / Kabul City Police, Afghan Border Police (ABP), and Afghan National Civil Order

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11 UN Security Council Resolution 1325, adopted on October 31, 2000, among other provisions, urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional, and international institutions. Available at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/720/18/PDF/N0072018


13 Additional information on each TAAC’s activities can be found throughout the report.

14 Expeditionary advising teams are composed of a mission command cell to provide command and control for the advising effort; the team is further augmented by select functional advisors as appropriate.
Police (ANCOP) elements operating in Kabul. Turkish forces lead the TAA effort with forces from several other contributing nations. TAAC-C maintains Level 1 advising with the ANA 111th Capital Division and Levels 1 and 2 advising with ANP Zone 101 and the Kabul City Police.

During the reporting period, the Afghans created an enhanced security zone within Kabul because of high-profile attacks (HPAs) in the capital, including the May 31 Haqqani car bomb that affected several embassies. The enhanced security zone modifies the physical area of the Green Zone and the requirements for the ANP to secure the area. ANP Zone 101 realigned two kandaks to provide the necessary security force. The two kandaks will have similar training and skills as the Presidential Protection Services Unit and will be able to provide a level of security that prompts the international community to return and keep their embassies staffed.

**Train, Advise, and Assist Command – East**

TAAC-E (Headquarters in Laghman), which includes U.S. and Polish forces, covers Kapisa, Kunar, Laghman, Nangarhar, and Nuristan Provinces. TAAC-E provides functionally-based SFA to the ANA 201st Corps and ANP units in ANP Zone 202. TAAC-E maintains Level 1 advising with all ANDSF pillars at the ANA corps and ANP zone level within its area of responsibility.

**Train, Advise, and Assist Command – South**

TAAC-S (Headquarters in Kandahar), led by U.S. forces, includes Daykundi, Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Zabul Provinces. TAAC-S provides functionally-based SFA to the ANA 205th Corps and ANP units in ANP Zone 404. TAAC-S maintains Level 1 advising with all ANDSF pillars at the ANA corps and ANP zone level within its area of responsibility.

**Train, Advise, and Assist Command – West**

TAAC-W (Headquarters in Herat), led by Italian forces, includes Badghis, Farah, Ghor, and Herat Provinces. TAAC-W provides functionally-based SFA to the ANA 207th Corps and ANP units in ANP Zone 606. TAAC-W maintains Level 1 advising with all ANDSF pillars at the ANA corps and ANP zone level within its area of responsibility.

**Train, Advise, and Assist Command – North**

TAAC-N (Headquarters in Mazar-e Sharif, Balkh Province), led by German forces, includes Badakhshan, Baghlan, Balkh, Faryab, Jowzjan, Samangan, Sar-e-Pul, and Takhar Provinces. TAAC-N provides functionally-based SFA to the ANA 209th Corps and ANP units in ANP Zones 707 and 808. TAAC-N maintains Level 1 advising with all ANDSF pillars at the ANA corps and ANP zone level within its area of responsibility.

**Task Force Southwest**

TF Southwest, formerly TF Forge, led by U.S. forces, includes Helmand Province. TF Southwest provides functionally-based SFA to the ANA 215th Corps and ANP units in ANP Zone 505. TF
Southwest maintains Level 1 advising at the ANA corps and ANP zone level within its area of responsibility.

**Task Force Southeast**

TF Southeast (Headquarters in Paktiya Province), formerly TF Anvil, led by U.S. forces, includes Paktika, Khost, Paktiya, Ghazni, Logar, Wardak, and Bamyan Provinces. TF Southeast provides functionally-based SFA to the ANA 203th Corps and ANP units in ANP Zone 303. TF Southeast maintains Level 1 advising at the ANA corps and ANP zone level within its area of responsibility.

TF Southwest and TF Southeast have both become their own independent General Officer-led commands with target engagement authority (TEA). They serve as a persistent coalition presence rather than serving in an expeditionary role. Over the course of the reporting period, both TFs have become more independent in their logistics and operational functions.

**Train, Advise, and Assist Command – Air**

TAAC-Air is a functional command that covers all of Afghanistan. TAAC-Air’s U.S. and coalition advisors provide functionally-based SFA to the AAF from the ministerial level down to the wing, group, and squadron levels. TAAC-Air’s TAA priorities for this reporting period included: ensuring the timely flow of AAF personnel into formal training programs; improving operational level command and control; encouraging AAF force management and a flying hours program; improving in-country maintenance and logistics; and developing and fully integrating aviation platforms, including the C-130, C-208, A-29, Mi-17, UH-60, UH-60 FFF, and MD-530.

**1.5 INDICATORS OF EFFECTIVENESS**

**The Kabul Compact**

On April 16, 2017, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA) McMaster met with Afghan President Ghani to discuss ways to pursue progress on a number of fronts ranging from security to good governance – areas covered in the U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) signed on May 2, 2012. Following the April 16 meeting, President Ghani directed the creation of four bilateral compact committees to examine ways to improve efforts and measure progress in four areas: Good Governance, Economic Development and Cooperation, Peace and Reconciliation, and Security.

On July 1, President Ghani asked USFOR-A and U.S. Embassy Kabul to work with the Afghan committees and form a Bilateral Commission and related working groups to create a mechanism to hold the Afghan Government responsible for its commitments under the SPA. The bilateral effort resulted in the U.S. – Afghan Compact, commonly referred to as the Kabul Compact. On August 23, two days after the United States unveiled its new South Asia Strategy, President Ghani announced the Kabul Compact, an undertaking by the Afghan Government to hold itself accountable for making progress towards milestones and objectives linked to the desired conditions described in the U.S. conditions-based strategy.
The Kabul Compact evolved over this reporting period. USFOR-A served as the lead agency for measuring progress in security, and U.S. Embassy Kabul was the lead for measuring progress in the other three focus areas. The Joint Steering Committee (JSC), composed of senior U.S. and Afghan leaders, measures progress monthly and assesses whether milestones and timelines had been met. The U.S. State Department released the first overall assessment of Kabul Compact progress via a cable on September 29.15 Although many of the milestones in the security arena are tangible, many milestones in the other focus areas are not. In addition, some milestones are suited to monthly measurements, while others require several months to assess. During the reporting period, the JSC reassessed and amended the compact’s milestones.

Coalition and the associated ministry officials track MoD and MoI progress using mutually-agreed milestones and processes. Each EF lead assesses progress in ministerial development using a program of actions and milestones (PoAM) developed in conjunction with Afghan MoD/MoI counterparts. The PoAMs consist of five categories of information: essential function, system, organization, process, and action. Annex A lists the indicators of effectiveness for the MoD and the MoI under each PoAM. RS advisors developed 12 key work strands (WS) to address projects and tasks across EFs in support of Roadmap activities. Of the 12 WS, 5 were unique to specific EFs, and 7 impacted multiple EFs.

The PoAMs and WS system migrated to a new tracker built by RS advisors to best measure Kabul Compact success. The new tracker removes inherent subjectivity and uses a binary “yes” or “no” to track individual tasks for each milestone and due date. Individual tasks are reviewed monthly. PoAM progress is reviewed quarterly and published bi-annually in RS’s Periodic Mission Review.

EF leaders identify critical processes to develop milestones and measure progress for their EF. These processes are completed over time through the execution of a series of supporting actions or tasks that achieve desired effects and/or preclude undesired effects. Progress toward each milestone is dependent upon the progress made within each of the listed actions or tasks. A five-stage capability and effectiveness scale (see Figure 2) is used to rate overall ministerial progress on actions and milestones, and the associated series of tasks are listed in each EF PoAM.

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Levels three through five are based on a combination of focused advising and reporting, data-informed assessments, and the professional judgement and subjective assessment of the EF lead. Each EF directorate maintains and updates its PoAM assessments using the tracking methodology maintained by the RS SFA Center, which is responsible for the integration, coordination, management, and synchronization of functionally-based SFA across the coalition. The EFs synchronize their PoAMs on a monthly basis by either validating or updating their consolidated PoAM. Every six months, the SFA Center and EF directorates refine the PoAMs to ensure they accurately project the ministries’ ability to achieve functional milestones.

The TAAC and TF commanders account for ANDSF progress quarterly at the ANA corps and ANP zone headquarters level through an ANDSF Assessment Report. The report tracks ANDSF capability development by assessing progress along the five pillars of leadership, combined arms operations, command and control, personnel and training, and sustainment. Similar to the PoAMs, the ANDSF assessment has five capability and effectiveness ratings. The ANDSF assessment is one component of the larger RS mission assessment; it reflects the advisors’ assessments of the ANDSF at the headquarters level.

16 In addition to the ANA corps and ANP zone headquarters, the report also provides an assessment of the AAF headquarters, ANASOC division headquarters, the Ktah Khas at the kandak level, SMW headquarters, General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU) headquarters, and the ALP Staff Directorate within the MoI.

17 Leadership is the ability of the commander and subordinate leaders (including staff primaries) to demonstrate a mastery of their functional area and to provide purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish all assigned tasks and missions while being accountable for their actions and responsibilities. Combined arms operations is the ability to field and integrate new systems and develop the capability to bring all available forces, assets, and enabler systems to bear effectively. Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over all assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Personnel and training is the ability to conduct individual and collective mission-focused training and institutional training, and to assess and maintain proficiency on all critical tasks. Sustainment is the ability to sustain training and operational missions independently.
Advisors at the regional TAACs submit their assessments of ANDSF capabilities to the RS Afghan Assessment Group (AAG), which then combines the assessments into an overarching assessment of the ANDSF as it relates to the campaign plan. MoD and MoI advisors use the EF milestone assessments along with the ministerial leadership’s strategic priorities to develop their focus areas for TAA efforts. Assessments of the ANDSF’s progress on achieving milestones are conducted continuously and are collected by the SFA Center on a monthly basis. Each month, the EF leads provide their assessments to the RS senior advisors to the MoD and the MoI, and synchronize TAA efforts across the multiple functional areas of focus. The AAG and the SFA Center continuously determine methods to improve and streamline reporting and assessment processes. Despite changes to the milestones in the PoAMs, the ANDSF assessment methodology, and advisor reporting mechanisms, the strategic conditions required for the success of the RS mission have not changed.
SECTION 2 – THREAT ASSESSMENT

General Nicholson, Commander of USFOR-A and RS, assesses that the exploitation of ungoverned sanctuaries outside of Afghanistan by terrorists and Afghan insurgents remains the single greatest external threat to the coalition campaign. External sanctuary continues to hamper efforts to bring Afghan Taliban senior leadership to the negotiating table and allows space for terrorist groups like the Haqqani Network to plan coordinated operations against U.S. and coalition forces, the ANDSF, and civilians, and enables the Afghan Taliban to rest, refit, and regenerate.

Afghanistan faces a continuing threat from this externally supported insurgency and the highest regional concentration of terrorist groups in the world. These pervasive insurgent, terrorist, and criminal networks constitute a threat to Afghanistan’s stability. Revenue from drug trafficking, taxation/extortion, illicit mining/agriculture, and foreign financial support continues to sustain the insurgency and Afghan criminal networks. Additionally, extortion and kidnappings by low-level criminal networks continue.

The Afghanistan-Pakistan border region remains a sanctuary for various groups, including al-Qa’ida, al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), the Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), ISIS-K, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Sanctuary on the Pakistani side and presence on the Afghan side remain security challenges for both countries and pose a threat to regional security and stability.

2.1 IMPORTANCE OF AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

The Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship remains tenuous and leaders from each country have accused the other of harboring terrorists and allowing the planning of attacks from their soil. The United States continues to encourage both countries to work together to solve common problems, such as border security, but deep-rooted mistrust remains a significant barrier to progress.

Although Pakistani military operations have disrupted some militant sanctuaries, certain extremist groups—such as the Taliban and the Haqqani Network—retains freedom of movement in Pakistan. The United States continues to convey to all levels of Pakistani leadership the importance of taking action against all terrorist and extremist groups.

Increased collaboration between Afghanistan and Pakistan is critical to maintaining pressure on militant and terrorist groups and for meeting the enduring security requirements on both sides of the shared border. The trust deficit resulting from Pakistan’s support of and inaction against Afghan-oriented extremists, and Pakistan’s concerns about terrorist attacks launched from Afghanistan, hampers the bilateral military collaboration required to achieve enduring security. Since the beginning of President Ghani’s tenure, leaders from both countries have attempted to improve relations and to address mutual security interests, such as the threat from various extremist groups that reside in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region more effectively. These efforts have been inconsistent, interrupted by high-profile terrorist attacks in both Afghanistan and Pakistan and public statements by each government disparaging one another. Each country publicly claims that the other provides sanctuary to certain militant groups and lacks the will to combat them.
Despite tensions in the bilateral relationship, and periodic border closures, Afghanistan-Pakistan border cooperation at the tactical level took positive steps, maintaining constructive dialogue and informally operationalizing border management mechanisms functionally similar to those outlined in the Bilateral Military Coordination Standard Operating Procedures. During the reporting period, multiple general officer-level engagements continued and maintained open communications, enhanced information sharing, and facilitated some military-to-military cooperation along the border. In particular, Pakistan contributed operational support to a U.S.-ANDSF combined operation to combat ISIS-K. RS continues to facilitate meetings between Afghanistan and Pakistan through its Tripartite Joint Operations Center. Meetings focus on border management and security, countering terrorist groups, and countering the threat from improvised explosive devices (IED). In an effort to de-escalate border incidents more effectively, Afghanistan and Pakistan established telephone hotlines for corps commanders that serve across the Durand Line from each other. Three pairs of counterparts have exchanged phone calls, which led to the Pakistan Army’s 11 Corps Commander hosting a delegation of Afghan MoD officials and the ANA’s 203 Corps Commander. The last Corps Commander call between ANA 215th Corps and PAKMIL Southern Command occurred on October 23, 2017. The next step is to make these calls routine to develop and strengthen relationships that will make the hotlines an effective tool for crisis de-escalation. An additional line of effort is to sponsor face-to-face meetings between ANA and PAKMIL Corps Commanders that will contribute to the relationship building.

### 2.2 CURRENT SECURITY CONDITIONS

Afghanistan continues to face an externally enabled and resilient insurgency. As Afghanistan completes its third year of full responsibility for the security of the country, Afghan forces have shown determination and growing capability in their fight against the Taliban-led insurgency. The Afghan Government retains control of Kabul, major population centers, most key transit routes, provincial capitals, and a majority of district centers. In this reporting period, the Taliban was able to contest district centers, but did not seriously threaten provincial capitals, which was a significant milestone for the ANDSF. As of October 2017, RS assessed that the Afghan Government maintained control or influence over approximately 60 percent of the population, while insurgents had control or influence over approximately 10 percent of the population, with the remainder contested. In this reporting period, the ANDSF increased the number of operations compared to the same period 12 months ago. This operational increase resulted in pushing the Taliban from population centers into rural areas and, denied the Taliban their operational goal of capturing provincial centers.

Through the reporting period, the Taliban continued Operation Mansouri. The operation focused on building governance while sustaining violence against the Afghan Government, ANDSF, and foreign military forces. By contrast, the Taliban failed to achieve its major objectives this fighting season. RS attributes the failure of the Taliban’s plan for 2017 to aggressive ANDSF operations, and the Taliban’s need to combat ISIS-K and the ANDSF simultaneously.

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18 The Afghan government suspended negotiations on the Bilateral Military Coordination Standard Operating Procedures (BMCSOP) following high-profile attacks in Kabul in 2014 and 2016. The BMCSOP was intended to replace the 2012 Trilateral Border SOP between the ANA, PAKMIL, and ISAF to improve border control and cooperation that expired at the end of the ISAF mission.
The Taliban and other insurgent groups continue to perpetrate high-profile attacks, particularly in the capital region, to attract media attention, create the perception of insecurity, and undercut the legitimacy of the Afghan Government. From June 1, 2017, through November 20, 2017, the number of HPAs increased in Kabul province and the remainder of the country compared to the same period last year. On September 27, while the Secretary of Defense and the NATO Secretary General were visiting Kabul, ISIS-K launched an unsuccessful high-profile attack against Hamid Karzai International Airport, where the Secretary of Defense and Secretary General had landed just hours earlier.

To move away from the traditional Afghan practice of using private militias and other armed groups to address local security challenges, President Ghani intends to establish an ANA Territorial Force (ANATF). The ANATF is meant to employ locally recruited, nationally trained and led forces in areas where security conditions permit the use of lighter, more affordable forces to provide local security. If successful, the ANATF model will allow the ANA to transition to a smaller, more affordable force in the future, provide some short-term cost savings, and allow for increased support to the ASSF and AAF. An ANATF pilot program will begin in up to three provinces in 2018, with a possible second round of pilot programs in 2019. If successful, the ANDSF plan to incorporate ANATF units into the permanent force structure starting in 2020.

**Influence of Other Regional Actors**

The new U.S. strategy calls for a regional approach to enhance stability in South Asia. This includes building a broad consensus for a stable Afghanistan, emphasizing regional economic integration and cooperation, stressing cooperation for an Afghan-led peace process, and holding countries accountable for the use of proxies or other asymmetric means which undermine stability and regional confidence. DoD is part of a regional whole-of-government approach designed to isolate the Taliban from sources of external support, and to mitigate any malign influence from regional actors.

During this reporting period, the Afghan Government welcomed the new regional approach and continued its own outreach to its neighbors and the international community. Although stability in Afghanistan is important to the security and stability of the region, Afghanistan’s neighbors take different approaches to protect their own interests.

In June 2016, just days after the massive car bombing near many foreign ministries in Kabul, international partners demonstrated their support of the Afghan Government amid serious security concerns. President Ghani hosted 27 countries for the Kabul Process for Peace and Security Cooperation, which focused on how Afghanistan’s partners can support peace and stability in the region and end support for transnational militant and terrorist groups. The United Nations, United States, NATO, troop contributing nations, the EU, regional neighbors, and Russia, China, Iran, and Pakistan all sent representatives. The Kabul Process showcased Kabul as the lead for its own security.
Russia

Russia has security concerns regarding Afghanistan, citing terrorism and narco-trafficking concerns most vocally. Russian-Afghan relations suffered due to Russia’s public acknowledgment of communications with the Taliban and support of the Taliban’s call for coalition withdrawal from Afghanistan. Not surprisingly, Russia publicly called the new South Asia Strategy a “dead end.” During the reporting period, Russia continued to seek ways to undermine U.S. influence in the region by disseminating false information about U.S. objectives, engaging with the Taliban, and putting pressure on Central Asian neighbors to deny support to U.S. and NATO efforts to stabilize Afghanistan.

China

China’s low, but increasing levels of military, economic, and political engagement in Afghanistan are driven by domestic security concerns that violent extremism will spread across the Afghan border into China and China’s increasing desire to protect its regional economic investments. China is a member of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) seeking to support Afghan and Taliban peace and reconciliation efforts. Afghanistan continues to seek Chinese pressure on Pakistan to assist reconciliation efforts and eliminate insurgent sanctuaries. In August 2017, China, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan formalized their membership in the Quadrilateral Counterterrorism Coordination Mechanism, intended to serve as a regional forum to exchange CT information.

Central Asian States

Central Asia continues to be important for U.S. security interests based on our continued need for access via the Northern Distribution Network (NDN). The U.S. must continue steady engagement to maintain our access, support regional sovereignty, build regional capacity against transnational threats, and develop closer ties between the Central Asian states and Afghanistan.

In 2017, the Central Asian States remained concerned about Afghanistan’s stability and terrorist threats to their own stability emanating from Afghanistan, chief among these concerns are returning foreign fighters from Syria, and the potential spread of ISIS-K. Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan positively influence Afghanistan by providing infrastructure, security, and economic assistance to build Afghanistan’s self-sustainability.

Iran

Iran and the United States share certain interests in Afghanistan such as counternarcotics. However, Iran seeks to expand its influence and limit U.S. influence and military presence, particularly in western Afghanistan. Although U.S. and Iranian political dynamics are not conducive to direct coordination on areas of mutual interest in Afghanistan, the United States and its Afghan partners could explore ways to leverage Iran’s interests in support of U.S. and Afghan objectives in the areas of counternarcotics, economic development, and counterterrorism.
Iran’s desire for influence in Afghanistan remains strong. Iran seeks increased influence in Afghanistan through government partnerships, bilateral trade, and cultural and religious ties. Iran’s ultimate goal is a stable Afghanistan where Shi’a communities are safe, economic interests are protected, and the U.S. military presence is reduced.

Iran provides some support to the Taliban and publicly justifies its relationship with the Taliban as a means to combat the spread of ISIS-K in Afghanistan. Iran’s support to the Taliban undermines the Afghan Government’s credibility, adds to instability in the region, and complicates strategic partnership agreements.

**Saudi Arabia**

Afghanistan prioritizes Saudi Arabia’s religious credibility and political support over seeking material support from Saudi Arabia. Particularly, Afghanistan seeks greater recognition of fatwas and statements by the Grand Mufti condemning terrorists and ISIS-K as “incompatible with Islamic values.” Saudi Arabia historically has not provided material or fiscal support to Afghanistan, despite Afghanistan’s entry into the Saudi-led Counter Terrorism Coalition. Saudi Arabia likely views Afghanistan as a theater in its competition with Iran.

**India**

India is Afghanistan’s most reliable regional partner and the largest contributor of development assistance in the region. This assistance includes civil development projects such as the Afghanistan-India Friendship Dam and the Afghan parliament building. India provides significant training opportunities for Afghan officers and enlisted personnel and has frequently offered to increase its burden sharing for Afghanistan. Approximately 130 Afghans travel to India each year to attend various military academy and commissioning programs. India has also donated limited security assistance, most notably four Mi-35 aircraft. The new South Asia policy highlighted our relationship with India and called on India to provide more assistance to the international efforts in Afghanistan. The United States welcomes additional Indian economic, medical, and civic support to Afghanistan.

**Threats from Insurgent and Terrorist Groups**

Collectively, terrorist and insurgent groups continue to present a formidable challenge to Afghan, U.S., and coalition forces. The presence of over 20 terrorist organizations creates the largest concentration of terrorist and extremist organizations in the world.

The externally supported Haqqani Network remains the greatest threat to Afghan, U.S., and coalition forces. Sirajuddin Haqqani’s role as a Taliban deputy solidified Haqqani influence within the Taliban. Sirajuddin Haqqani’s position allowed the Haqqani Network to increase its area of operations within Afghanistan and provided the Taliban with additional operational and planning capabilities. Haqqani and Taliban integration has become so robust that many observers no longer look at them as separate entities, but as factions within the same group. Although the Taliban has stated publicly that it would limit civilian casualties, the Haqqani Network continues to launch attacks in populated areas with civilians.
The capability and influence of ISIS-K have begun to decline since its operational emergence and initial growth in 2015. U.S. counterterrorism (CT) operations against the group, ANDSF operations, pressure from the Taliban, and difficulties in gaining local populace support have disrupted ISIS-K’s growth and diminished its operational capacity. During the last reporting period, ISIS-K had a limited presence in six provinces; however, small ISIS-K contingents have emerged in other areas of Afghanistan. Despite significant losses of territory, fighters, and senior leadership, ISIS-K remains a threat to Afghan and regional security, a threat to U.S. and coalition forces, and retains the ability to conduct high-profile attacks in urban centers.

ISIS-K still conducts low-level recruiting and distribution of propaganda in many provinces across Afghanistan, and local ISIS-K groups have claimed responsibility for attacks against Shias around the country. Command and control and funding from core ISIS elements in Iraq and Syria are limited. Still heavily reliant on external funding, ISIS-K struggles to develop funding streams within Afghanistan. The struggle for resources has brought ISIS-K into conflict with the Taliban and other groups vying to raise revenue from illegal checkpoints and the trade of illicit goods. ISIS-K continues to draw its members from disaffected TTP fighters, former Afghan Taliban, and other militants who believe that associating with or pledging allegiance to ISIS-K will further their interests.

The Taliban has demonstrated increasing capability to threaten district centers, but the ANDSF has also proven its ability to recover district centers lost to the Taliban quickly. Seeking to exploit ANDSF weaknesses and the reduced international military presence, the Taliban maintains control in some rural areas that lack effective Afghan Government representation.

The al-Qaeda threat to the United States and its allies and partners has decreased, and al-Qaeda focuses primarily on its own survival and its efforts to regenerate. The organization has a sustained presence concentrated in east and northeast Afghanistan, with smaller elements in the southeast. Some lower- and mid-level Taliban leaders provide limited support to al-Qaeda, but during this reporting period, there have been no signs of a stronger relationship at the strategic level. In addition, al-Qaeda’s regional affiliate, AQIS, has built a presence in south and southeast Afghanistan and in Pakistan. Whereas al-Qaeda continues to recruit from Arab populations, AQIS is composed primarily of militants from within the broader South Asia region.

**Security Trends**

From June 1 to November 20, 2017, the number of effective enemy-initiated attacks were slightly lower than the previous reporting period (December 2016-May 2017); averaging between 780 per month.
The number of reported effective enemy-initiated attacks was low during the winter months and gradually rose as the Taliban and the ANSF increased operations in the spring. The overall level of reported enemy-initiated attacks during this reporting period was slightly lower than the same period the previous year. Consistent with the two previous reporting periods and the overall trend since the end of the U.S. and NATO combat missions and the transition to OFS and the RS mission, very few effective enemy-initiated attacks on coalition or U.S. forces.

The coalition relies largely on ANSF reporting for all metrics, including effective enemy-initiated attacks, which are a subset of all security incidents. Direct fire remains by far the largest source of effective enemy-initiated attacks, followed by IED attacks and mine strikes (see Figure 4). Consistent with trends over the last several years, indirect fire and surface-to-air fire are the second largest category of effective enemy-initiated attacks. Since ANDSF units often do not report insurgent attacks that do not result in casualties, the number of effective enemy-initiated attacks is the most representative metric of overall security conditions rather than the total number of reported security incidents. Security incidents comprise all enemy action, including enemy-initiated direct fire and indirect fire, such as mortar, rocket, and artillery; SAFIRE and explosive hazard events, including executed attacks (IED explosion, mine strike); and potential or attempted attacks (IEDs or mines found and cleared, premature IED detonations, and IED turn-ins). Security incidents do not include friendly action (e.g., direct fire and indirect fire initiated by friendly forces).

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19 Reports on security incidents and effective enemy-initiated attacks are often delayed by several weeks due to translation and long data base reporting and processing timelines. In addition, ANDSF units frequently do not report insurgent attacks that do not result in casualties, such as indirect fire or attempted IED explosions that do not wound or kill ANDSF personnel.

20 Since ANDSF units often do not report insurgent attacks that do not result in casualties, the number of effective enemy-initiated attacks is the most representative metric of overall security conditions rather than the total number of reported security incidents. Security incidents comprise all enemy action, including enemy-initiated direct fire and indirect fire, such as mortar, rocket, and artillery; SAFIRE and explosive hazard events, including executed attacks (IED explosion, mine strike); and potential or attempted attacks (IEDs or mines found and cleared, premature IED detonations, and IED turn-ins). Security incidents do not include friendly action (e.g., direct fire and indirect fire initiated by friendly forces).
(SAFIRE) remain the least frequent sources of effective enemy-initiated attacks. The number of IED attacks and mine strikes has remained relatively steady over the last 18 months.

**Figure 4: Effective Enemy-Initiated Attacks by Type**

![Effective Enemy-Initiated Attacks by Type](image)

**ANDSF Casualties**

The number of ANDSF casualties suffered while conducting local patrols and checkpoint operations was similar to that of 2016. The number of casualties incurred during planned offensive operations has decreased over the same period. The majority of ANDSF casualties continue to be the result of direct fire attacks; IED attacks, and mine strikes contribute to overall casualties but at a much lower level.

**U.S. Casualties and Insider Attacks**

Although OFS and RS are considered non-combat missions, conducting counterterrorism operations and TAA with the ANDSF still entail risks to U.S. and coalition forces. Since the beginning of U.S. operations in Afghanistan in October 2001, 1874 U.S military personnel have been killed in action (KIA) and 20,363\(^{22}\) have been wounded in action (WIA), as of November 30, 2017. During the reporting period, there were nine U.S. military deaths as a result of hostile actions and 91 U.S. military personnel WIA.

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\(^{21}\) Additional information on ANDSF casualties can be found in the classified annex to this report.

\(^{22}\) Data was reported in the Defense Casualty Analysis System, accessed on December 30, 2017. This number reflects reduction of one WIA from previous reporting period who was elevated to KIA.
On June 11, 2017, in Pekha Valley, Achin, Nangarhar, an Afghan Commando opened fire on friendly forces in an insider attack resulting in three U.S. service members killed in action and one U.S. service member wounded in action.

On June 17, 2017, seven U.S. soldiers were shot by an Afghan commando. The attack took place in the Afghan National Army 209th Corps headquarters at Camp Shaheen, in the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif. The attack resulted in seven U.S. service members wounded in action.

On July 3, 2017, insurgents attacked U.S. Special Forces and ASSF conducting operations in Aynak Village, Nawah District, Helmand Province. The attack resulted in two U.S. service members wounded in action, and one U.S. service member killed in action. The two wounded service members suffered minor injuries and no existing life threatening conditions.

On August 2, 2017, U.S. military personnel operating in Dand District encountered a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED). Four U.S. service members were wounded in action and medically evacuated to Kandahar Air Field. Two U.S. service members were killed in action.

On August 16, 2017, an IED explosion resulted in 17 U.S. military casualties, including one U.S. service member killed in action and 16 U.S. service members wounded in action. Of the 16 U.S. service members wounded in action, 13 personnel suffered superficial shrapnel wounds and returned to duty and 3 personnel required additional medical care.

On October 27, 2017, six U.S. service members were wounded and one killed when an the MH-47 helicopter they were travelling in made a forced landing in the Kharwar District of Logar Province.

On November 4, 2017, one U.S. service member was wounded and later died from wounds after coming under attack during an operation in Baraki Barak District, Logar Province.

During this reporting period, there were four insider attacks against U.S. personnel. U.S. forces and the Afghan Government intensified their efforts to reduce the number of insider attacks (also known as “green-on-blue” attacks). Improvements included the increased use of enhanced screening techniques for existing ANDSF and new recruits. On September 8, 2017 the Afghan MoD signed a new Force Protection / Insider Threat policy. The new policy improves training and procedures on force protection of Afghans and coalition members. The new policy and enhanced screening measures resulted in the removal of 167 ASSF from the force during this reporting period. The MoI is developing a similar policy.

U.S. forces took additional measures to mitigate the threat of insider attacks. USFOR-A created the position of Insider Threat Advisor (ITA) to ensure the MoD and MoI were properly advised on how they could limit the threat. The ITA works with Afghan Army Counter-Intelligence to assist in countering insider threats. U.S. forces received additional in-country force protection (“Guardian Angel”) training. In addition, the Force Protection Working Group (FPWG) and General Officer Steering Committee (FP GOSC) were created as well to ensure proper emphasis and actions take place to mitigate the insider threat.
Although it is impossible to mitigate all risk to U.S. personnel, coalition advisors assess that current force protection measures have been successful in limiting insider attacks. Investigation and analysis of insider attacks will continue to shape the coalition’s approach to mitigating this threat. RS Headquarters employs Joint Casualty Assessment Teams following any insider attack. These teams seek to determine the causes of the attack quickly and to identify any lessons learned for immediate dissemination throughout the command. The Joint Casualty Assessment Team report is the foundation for more in-depth analyses conducted by the Insider Threat Assessment Board to determine causation, motivation, and lessons learned.

Afghan security forces continue to face attacks from within their own forces (also known as “green-on-green” attacks). During this reporting period, there were 15 “green-on-green” attacks. RS advisors continue to engage both the MoD and the MoI on the requirement for formal personnel screening to be included in official policy at the national level. Insider attacks against the ANDSF and the deaths and the wounded caused by those attacks decreased by over 40 percent compared to the same time period last year.

**Civilian Casualties**

The RS Civilian Casualty Mitigation Team (CCMT) collects information on civilian casualties for the coalition. The CCMT relies primarily upon operational reports from the TAACs and the ANDSF. From June 1, 2017, to November 27, 2017, the CCMT documented more than 4,474 civilian casualties, of which approximately one-third were deaths and two-thirds were injuries. This represents an approximately 13 percent increase compared to the same time one year ago.

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) data from January to November reports 8,019 civilian casualties, of which 2,640 civilians were killed and 5,379 civilians were wounded, a 6 percent decrease from the same three-month time period the previous year. CCMT reports civilian casualties during the same quarter. While CCMT and UNAMA report differing numbers due to different collection methodology, both sources attribute the largest portion of civilian casualties to the actions of insurgents. RS CCMT primarily relies upon operational reports from the Train, Assist and Advise commands (TAACs), other CF headquarters, and ANDSF reports provided by the Afghan Presidential Information Command Centre (PICC). UNAMA compiles its figures from site visits by locally employed staff who speak with victims, witnesses, and local leaders.

Preventing civilian casualties remains a major concern of the ANDSF, the Afghan Government, and U.S. and coalition forces. U.S. and coalition advisors continue to work closely with the Afghan Government to reduce civilian casualties by raising awareness of the importance of civilian casualty prevention and mitigation. The coalition is continuing TAA efforts with the ANDSF on practical measures that they can adopt at the tactical level to prevent civilian casualties. The Afghan Government also continues to host its quarterly Civilian Casualty Avoidance and Mitigation Board to discuss civilian casualty prevention procedures.
Security of Afghan Women and Girls23

Structural barriers, traditional cultural norms, and insecurity remain key challenges facing Afghan women throughout Afghan society and the ANDSF. Relevant indicators such as literacy and employment rates show the disparities between men and women. Afghanistan reports that only 17 percent of women are literate, compared to nearly half of the men, and just 15 percent of women are in paid employment. The lack of security affects Afghans every day and hampers the delivery of services across the country. Conflict, criminality, and narcotics continue to be critical threats to women’s safety, public service delivery, and private investment. Fighting, family economic instability, and conflict-induced displacement all hinder women’s access to education.

A large majority of reported cases of violence against women is the result of domestic abuse within their own homes. To assist woman and child victims of domestic abuse, the MoI established Family Response Units (FRU) across the country. The FRUs are staffed with specialists, such as psychologists and social workers, who interview and screen victims for follow-on physical and mental health treatment. Since establishing 41 FRUs in 2014, the program has expanded to more than 208 FRUs in 2017.

The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), in coordination with the MoD and MoI, is developing an ombudsman program to enable external reporting, oversight, and victim support for female employees of the MoD and MoI. This program will enable members of the ANDSF and the Afghan population to report gender-based violence and human rights abuses safely to the AIHRC, which can take action or assist law enforcement as appropriate. The program will provide an avenue for female employees of the MoD and MoI to seek independent mediation outside of their chain of command, should the chain of command be complicit or fail to act appropriately in such cases. The ombudsman program, while developed and planned, has yet to be funded and implemented.

Security remains a concern for female members of the ANDSF. Women are frequently afraid to wear their uniforms while travelling to work sites for fear of attacks. Once at work, inadequate facilities, and a lack of female changing rooms contribute to an air of exclusion and present opportunities for sexual harassment.

In this reporting period, significant advising efforts continued towards the initiation and implementation of the Resolute Support Gender 4-Year Plan. The Gender 4-Year Plan provides the conceptual framework to link gender initiatives with the ANDSF Roadmap; realigns the tashkil to improve the recruitment for women; provides safe and secure facilities for women; directs the development of the MoD sexual harassment policy; and supports various training education and career development efforts. These lines of effort all lead to the desired end-state stipulated in the Gender 4-Year Plan.

During the reporting period, the Minister of the Interior established the MoI Sexual Harassment Committee with approved Standard Operating Procedures that outline the composition and responsibilities of the committee members. This achievement marks some progress in the

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23 Information on the security of women and girls addresses a reporting requirement outlined in Section 1531(c)(1)(A) of the NDAA for FY 2016.
Ministry’s commitment to reduce and respond to sexual harassment and gender-based violence. However, the committee will require continued TAA to ensure the committee remains robust and focused on the effort to ensure women feel safe reporting incidents of harassment/violence, that reported cases are investigated, and offenders are held accountable through disciplinary and administrative actions.

The Family Response Units (FRU) are adding more female police to existing unit tashkils. The goal is to have an onsite female FRU manager, an additional female police officer to allow for breaks of coverage in the event of multiple simultaneous cases, and a male officer to ensure their safety.

FRU police often assess victims with injuries. A recent initiative requires FRU police to receive First Aid training. Each adequately trained FRU office will then be equipped with first aid kits and supplies for the appropriate level of care police would provide to abuse victims. FRU police have also been enrolled in Domestic Violence Laws, Marriage Laws, Child Abuse Laws, and Case Documentation courses. The first class of female police trainees graduated and received their certificates of completion in August 2017.

### 2.3 ANTICIPATED SECURITY CONDITIONS

Insurgents will continue to focus on their priority targets, such as in Helmand and Kunduz Provinces, seek to expand their influence throughout rural Afghanistan, and conduct attacks in the east and in Kabul. The Taliban will continue to plan high-profile attacks and portray localized tactical successes as strategic victories. In addition, the Taliban will likely continue to focus on capturing a provincial capital.

ISIS-K may continue to plan and carryout high profile attacks with civilian casualties. The group has been responsible for attacks against Shias worshipping at a mosque and against the Iraqi Embassy in Kabul.

While the Government of National Unity (GNU) remains relatively stable, it continues to face political, ethnic, and tribal challenges. If serious divisions emerge, they may threaten the capability and coherence of the government. Ethnic minorities are concerned President Ghani is excluding them from government and consolidating power around the Pashtun elite. This concern has grown with the inclusion of the Pashtun-dominated HIG into the government.

In July, influential leaders of three mainstream political parties from three major ethnic groups, all of whom held senior government positions, formed a coalition against the GNU. The U.S. government continues to emphasize the importance of ethnic and political inclusivity to the long-term stability of the Afghan government.
SECTION 3 – OVERVIEW OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

Operation Khalid continued during this reporting period, encompassing counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, counterterrorism (CT) operations, and other activities associated with the ANDSF Roadmap. Operation Khalid began in Solar Year 1396 (March 2017) and will end in March 2018. The operation marks the inaugural phase of the campaign outlined President Ghani’s ANDSF Roadmap. The ANDSF Roadmap will realign the ANDSF within the Afghan Sustainable Security Strategy (AS3), restructure the force for ASSF and AAF growth, and set the conditions for continued offensive campaigns in 2018.

Operation Khalid is a joint effort of the MoD, MoI, and the National Directorate of Security (NDS). The operation has three objectives: secure provincial capitals; isolate the Taliban in the south and southwest; and defeat ISIS-K in Nangarhar. During this reporting period, the ANDSF demonstrated continued growth and increased capability and resiliency. Despite the Afghan emphasis on reshaping ANDSF force structure, the ANDSF maintained a high tempo of offensive operations and denied the Taliban its most important strategic objectives, the capture of a provincial capital. The changes embodied in the ANDSF Roadmap will increase the lethality and agility of the ANDSF, and enable it to decisively overmatch its Taliban and terrorist opponents.

3.1 STRATEGY

In early 2017, President Ghani announced a long-term plan to seize the initiative in the fight against insurgent and terrorist forces, further professionalize the ANDSF, and modify the force structure so that it can extend security, expand governance and economic development, and compel the Taliban to seek reconciliation. This plan, commonly referred to as the ANDSF Roadmap, seeks to achieve positive strategic results by 2020. The ANDSF Roadmap is a broad-based reform effort with four key elements.

- **Increase Fighting Capabilities.** Reinforce the success of ASSF by increasing the size and capability of the force to increase offensive reach and lethality. Recapitalize the Afghan aviation enterprise to provide a larger, more capable air force through a combination of aircraft acquisition, pilot training, maintenance training, target development, and integration throughout the ANDSF. An organic, relatively large, and highly capable air force will provide the ANDSF with a distinct advantage against its enemies.

- **Leadership Development.** Produce honest, competent, and committed ANDSF professionals by introducing merit-based selection of leaders, better instruction and education, and a unified training system. In addition, the ANDSF will employ improved human resource and personnel management systems to provide appropriate leader development from recruitment through retirement and assign trained leaders to the right positions.

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24 The Afghan Sustainable Security Strategy is USFOR-A’s approach to align and prioritize the ANDSF in which they must fight, hold, and disrupt.
- **Unity of Command/Effort.** Increase unity of command and effort between the MoD and the MoI, starting with a review of command and control structures. Improve unity of effort by transitioning paramilitary portions of the MoI (ABP and ANCOP) to control of the MoD.

- **Counter-Corruption.** Implement reforms to address illicit activity and patronage networks within security organizations in order to reduce corruption and increase ANDSF effectiveness.

The ANDSF intends to move towards a more offensive-oriented and sustainable security strategy. A robust and expanded ASSF will serve as the primary offensive force while the conventional forces protect the population, hold key terrain, and secure critical infrastructure. The Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) and portions of the Afghan Border Police (ABP) will transition from MoI to MoD control, unifying military and paramilitary portions of the ANDSF under one ministry. The MoI will focus on building a competent community police force capable of enforcing the law in permissive environments.

The significant effort and resources required to make the force structure modifications of the ANDSF Roadmap made 2017 a building year, but one in which the ANDSF made important progress and denied the Taliban all of its strategic goals. As the ANDSF Roadmap initiatives progress, the force will become more agile and lethal and offensive operations will increase. The ANDSF plans to increase offensive operations incrementally through 2018 and 2019, and expand security to cover the preponderance of the population by 2020, compelling the Taliban to seek a political settlement to the conflict.

### ANDSF Roadmap Progress

During this reporting period, ANDSF Roadmap implementation began. Although it is too early to assess the overall effectiveness of the plan, ANDSF progress continues along all four lines of effort. Several of the Roadmap initiatives, such as aviation modernization and countering corruption, will undoubtedly extend beyond 2020 when President Ghani intends to have set conditions compelling the Taliban to reconcile. Ongoing operations, political considerations, and competition for finite resources have caused some delays and will continue to challenge progress. Additionally, RS advisors and their counterparts in the MoD and MoI are all committed to a deliberate approach to each Roadmap initiative and do not want to rush to failure in order to meet arbitrary timelines. Despite the numerous challenges, tangible results of efforts to implement the Roadmap are already evident.

### ASSF Expansion

The ANDSF Roadmap calls for a significant increase in size and combat capabilities of the ASSF. When ASSF expansion is complete, the force will have grown from an ANASOC Division with two Special Operations Brigades (SOB) and 30 Commando (CDO) companies, to an ANASOC Corps with four SOBs, 63 CDO companies, two Special Forces kandaks, a National Mission Brigade and organic sustainment and ground support assets. The number of General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU) National Mission Units (NMU) will double from three to six; and the Special Mission Wing (SMW) will increase the number of helicopter and fixed-wing platforms
and crews. The overall result will be an ASSF force with improved command and control, increased depth and capabilities, and improved responsiveness and operational reach.

ASSF expansion, including the increase in aviation capabilities, will result in an overall force increase from 19,022 to 33,896 personnel. The ASSF will grow in size and capability incrementally and steadily increase combat capabilities to meet the Roadmap objectives by 2020. During this reporting period, ANASOC growth started strong due to the completion of new facilities and greater throughput in ANASOC schools and training courses. ANASOC will now graduate four companies of CDOs each year (two in the spring and two in the fall), compared to two companies per year in previous years.

In contrast to the ANASOC growth, NMU growth did not begin as scheduled during this reporting period. Although the ANASOC planned for increased facilities and training capacity prior to the ANDSF Roadmap, the General Directorate Police Special Unit (GDPSU) did not. At present, GCPSU training facilities and infrastructure are only large enough to keep pace with attrition. In order to grow new NMUs, the GCPSU will invest in new infrastructure to increase the size of the training pipeline and increase capacity for the new NMUs.

**Aviation Modernization**

During this reporting period, the AAF took possession of the first UH-60 helicopters intended to replace the aging Mi-17 fleet. When modernization is complete, the AAF and SMW will have 159 UH-60s. AAF modernization will add an additional six A-29s, 30 more MD-530s, and 32 AC-208s. As modernization progresses, the Special Mission Wing (SMW) will operate a mixed fleet of UH-60s, Mi-17s, and PC-12s. The AAF will transition completely to UH-60 helicopters as the Mi-17 fleet declines steadily from 2018 through 2021.

The end-state of full modernization will be 317 total aircraft in the AAF and SMW consisting of:

- 159 lift/armed UH-60s
- 55 MD-530s
- 32 AC-208s
- 25 A-29s
- 24 C-208s
- 4 C-130s
- 18 PC-12s

Coalition advisors anticipate that, in the coming years, the AAF will make strides to improve in critical warfighting functions; however, this will require the continuation of persistent coalition training and advising.

**Afghan Border Police (ABP) and Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) Transfer**

The ANDSF Roadmap calls for the transfer of ABP and ANCOP forces from MoI to MoD control, consolidating the paramilitary police forces with key roles in combatting the insurgency and
terrorist threats under the MoD. ABP and ANCOP transfers will allow the MoD to command and control all offensive security forces, while the MoI focuses strictly on community policing efforts.

During this reporting period, President Ghani signed the decree ordering the transfer and the MoD and MoI finalized the plan to transition the ABP by the end of December 2017. The ABP will be renamed the Afghan Border Force (ABF) and retain its security mission along the Afghan border. The ABF may undergo some additional training and equipment modifications; their mission will not change. Additionally, it appears the MoI will continue to provide some level of administrative and logistical support to the ABF as the ANA work through full integration of the force. As part of the ANA, the ABF will benefit from ANA assets including ISR, intelligence, and aerial fires.

The ANCOP transition is more complicated than the ABP transition. At present, the MoD is considering multiple options as to how to best utilize ANCOP forces. The target date for ANCOP transfer is April 2018; given the complexities and the significance of the initiative, delays are likely. The MoD and RS advisors prefer to focus first on the ABP transfer, and then utilize lessons learned to facilitate the ANCOP transfer.

Beginning January 2018, RS will pay ABF and ANCOP salaries with Afghanistan Security Forces Funds. The United Nations’ Law and Order Trust Fund currently pays these salaries with donor nation funding.

**Leader Development**

During this reporting period, the MoD and MoI made great strides in addressing leadership problems across the ANDSF. Operational Readiness Cycles (ORCs) allowed for training throughout the year, including leader training and development. New leaders replaced ineffective leaders in positions of responsibility. In 2017, 13 senior leaders in the MoI, including the Minister of the Interior himself, were removed and replaced with promising junior leaders. The MoD replaced five of the six ANA corps commanders, lowering the average age of a Corps commander from 62 to 51. Three of the five new Corps commanders have special operations Commando backgrounds and they have already changed the culture within their organizations for the better.

**3.2 BUDGET**

President Ghani allowed the United States, on behalf of the international community, to audit the Ministry of Finance and Da Bank of Afghanistan (DAB) to ensure proper use of international donations, helping Afghanistan become more transparent and increasing international confidence in Afghanistan’s use of donations.

The Afghan Government relies on international funding for the vast majority of its security costs. The requirement to fund the current ANDSF force structure in FY 2017 was $4.263 billion, and increased to approximately $4.937 billion in FY 2018, primarily due to costs associated with aviation modernization and special forces growth. Approximately $993.1 Million of the FY 2017 ASFF was provided directly to the Afghan Government ($793.5 million for the MoD and $199.6 million for the MoI) to fund salaries and incentive pay, equipment, and facilities maintenance. The other $3.269 billion of the FY 2017 ASFF was executed by DoD primarily through contracts on
pseudo-Foreign Military Sales cases. International donors funded $398 million in FY 2017. The FY 2018 ASFF appropriation request is $4.937 billion, which includes $686.4 million ($3.771 billion for the MoD to include funds for aviation transition, and $1.165 million for the MoI) through the ASFF. The remaining $789 million of ANDSF costs will be funded by international donors ($422 million for ANP salaries, information technology, aviation training and maintenance, uniforms, and medical supplies) and the Afghan Government ($500 million, primarily for food and subsistence).

CSTC-A continues to take steps to increase the MoD’s and MoI’s ability to manage international donor funding directly and in a fiscally transparent and accountable manner. CSTC-A has leveraged bilateral funding commitment letters to hold the MoD and MoI accountable for managing programs effectively and to ensure that transparency and accountability remain an important aspect of MoD, MoI, and ANDSF operations. Additionally, CSTC-A continues to work closely with the ANDSF to implement personnel asset inventory (PAI) procedures designed to ensure accurate accountability of assigned personnel and avoid erroneous ANDSF salary payments. CSTC-A is changing ANDSF behavior for the better by limiting salary payments to the list of validated personnel. This example of conditionality proved effective in gaining better accountability and encouraging ANDSF enrollment into the AHRIMS system in advance of the implementation of the Afghan Personnel Pay System (APPS) during this reporting period. The increased accountability gained through the PAIs, enrollment in AHRIMS, and transition to APPS will help solve the problem of “ghost soldiers.”

Once APPS becomes fully operational in 2018, the actual size and strength of the ANDSF will become clearer, lending rigor to oversight initiatives to combat wasteful spending and corruption. Over the last year, media reports of “ghost soldiers” suggested that U.S. and coalition forces are funding salaries well in excess of the number of people actually serving in the MoD and MoI. Soldiers unaccounted for in the AHRIMS system were thought to represent false accounts set up to gain illegal access to funds. In reality, most of the soldiers and police unaccounted for in the system were performing duties and being paid; however, they were not properly enrolled in the AHRIMS system due to poor systems management, missing biometric data, or missing ID cards.

Implementing required initiatives under the ANDSF Roadmap will require additional funding. This will push the anticipated requirement for ASFF funding at roughly $5 billion annually through at least 2023. Increasing the size of the ASSF will cost an estimated $333.3 million (ANASOC $263.9 million, General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU) $12.2 million, infrastructure $57.2 million) in FY 2018. Modernization of the AAF will cost approximately $9.95 billion from FY 2017 to FY 2023 and requires $1.1 billion in FY 2018. Including sustainment, personnel, training, and infrastructure costs, the total cost of the AAF will be $13.2 billion from FY 2017 to FY 2023. The largest element of restructuring the ANDSF command and control is the transfer of ABF and ANCOF from MoI to MoD, and is expected to increase total personnel sustainment costs to $785 million in FY 2019. Additionally, the establishment of a Counter-Corruption Task Force will require $37.9 million.
3.3 FORCE SIZE AND STRUCTURE

During this reporting period, ANDSF began growing its offensive capabilities by initiating the ASSF expansion and AAF modernization efforts under President Ghani’s ANDSF Roadmap. Under the Roadmap, ASSF forces, primarily ANA Special Operations Command (ANASOC), will serve as the main offensive force, enabled by increased Special Mission Wing (SMW) and AAF capabilities. The conventional ANA will serve as the principal “hold” force for terrain, critical infrastructure, and population centers. The ANP will provide community-policing capabilities in population centers and other areas as part of the greater whole-of-government approach to building and maintaining security. To grow the hold force, major portions of the ABP and ANCOP will come under MoD control. To support these major changes, RS advisors are helping ANDSF improve its command and control structures.

The current ANDSF authorized force level as part of the tashkil remains at 352,000 ANA and ANP personnel plus 30,000 Afghan Local Police (ALP). The United States is the sole supporter of the ALP. Although the ALP fall under MoI for oversight, they are not part of the 352,000 authorized ANDSF tashkil.

Over the next several years, ANASOC plans to increase combat power through the integration of the two existing Mobile Strike Force Vehicle (MSFV) Brigades, adding a fourth Commando Company to the existing Special Operations Kandaks (SOKs), and building two additional Special Forces kandaks. The addition of the MSFV Brigades will provide the ANASOC with an organic ground assault force capability, and will reduce reliance on conventional ground forces and aerial fires to support special operations missions. The increased personnel authorizations required for the ANASOC growth will come from realigning mostly vacant tashkil positions from the conventional forces. To provide the appropriate level of command and control, the ANASOC division expanded to a corps with four brigades and a National Mission Brigade. The ANASOC School of Excellence will expand to enable this growth, and add general support kandaks to the brigades to enable the ANASOC to support themselves logistically rather than relying on logistical support from conventional ANDSF forces.

The MoI role in supporting the ANDSF Roadmap is to transfer approximately 13,000 ANCOP and approximately 19,558 ABP to the MoD. This plan will move the paramilitary and civil order functions to the MoD to eliminate the problems associated with ANA-ANP coordination fighting insurgents and allowing the MoI to focus on community policing and enforcing the rule of law. The MoI retains control of its GCPSU and continues to work with the ASSF to add three more NMUs.

Under the ANDSF Roadmap, the SMW will also expand to provide additional helicopter crews, consolidate the PC-12 aircraft into a new fixed-wing kandak, and create an aviation support kandak. The AAF will more than double the size of its fleet by 2025 as a result. The Afghan Air Force received its first two UH-60s in late September 2017.

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25 The authorized strength of 352,000 includes 195,000 ANA and 157,000 ANP.
The MoD continued to explore options to optimize the conventional ANA and improve its ability to hold key terrain and protect the population in rural areas where the Taliban seek to gain influence. Several ANA corps worked to recruit former ANA soldiers who served honorably to rejoin the ANA on one-year contracts. The MoD will begin recruiting new soldiers to serve as part of the ANA Territorial Forces. The ANATF concept relies on locally recruited, nationally trained, and nationally led forces to provide security in districts where the security environment is more permissive, but still requires an ANDSF presence. ANATF soldiers will serve in their home areas and be led by the existing ANA officer and non-commissioned officer corps’ for direction. The first ANATF units will serve as pilot programs in 2018 in areas yet to be determined. If successful, the ANATF could provide a model for an effective, affordable, and sustainable ANA in the future.

During this reporting period, the first kandak of the MSFV Brigade, now assigned to the ASSF, began Commando training. MSFV soldiers will cycle through Commando training while the majority of the force remains available for combat operations throughout the training cycle. Given the increased capacity for Commando training resulting from new infrastructure, each cycle of Commando training will include two ANASOC companies and one mobile strike kandak. This will allow ANASOC to field additional companies, replacements for the existing ANASOC force, and to create and sustain the new mobile strike kandaks.

On July 21, the ASSF activated its National Mission Brigade (NMB) as part of the ASSF expansion plan. The NMB is now the primary command element for two kandaks of the Ktah Khas and one other Special Operations Kandak (SOK). The NMB is a national-level asset capable of deploying anywhere in Afghanistan in response to a crisis or Afghan security priorities. In August, the ASSF activated the new ANASOC Corps headquarters to serve as the central command and control organization for the current and future ANASOC forces. Prior to the standup of the ANASOC Corps HQ, an ANASOC division headquarters served as the highest echelon of command and control.

In December, 19,000 ABP personnel and the border security mission will transfer from the MoI to the MoD. The ABF will maintain its current mission set; however, the ABF cannot make arrests under MoD authorities. ABF soldiers can detain personnel, but they must eventually transfer detainees back to MoI police control. ABF’s full integration into the ANA will be incremental and the MoI and remaining ABP will assist with administrative and logistical support during the transition period. Lessons learned from this transition will inform the transfer of the ANCOP currently scheduled for April of 2018.

Attrition

Attrition remains a larger problem for the ANA than for the ANP, in part because ANA personnel management policies do not allow soldiers to serve in their home areas in order to decrease the potential for local influence. While these policies are intended to insulate the ANA from local

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26 Attrition is unplanned and planned total losses, including Dropped from Rolls (DFR), Killed in Action (KIA), Separation, and Other [disappearance/captured, disability, death (not in action), retirement, exempted (i.e. AWOL or permanent medical), or transfer to the ANA/ANP] losses. Attrition rate uses the current month’s attrition numbers (total losses) divided by the previous month’s strength numbers.
political influence, these policies have the unintended effect of increasing transportation costs and creating additional obstacles for soldiers attempting to take authorized leave. These difficulties lead to soldiers being dropped from rolls. Additionally, soldiers grow disillusioned with leaders who fail to take care of them with leave, promotion and pay in accordance with standing policies.

The ANA and ANP both have policies to prevent personnel from going absent without leave; enforcement remains inconsistent. Coalition advisory efforts continue to focus on the ANDSF’s ability to regenerate forces through recruitment and operational readiness programs. Despite these challenges, the size of the ANDSF has remained relatively stable over the past year, although it is several thousand personnel below the authorized level of 352,000 personnel.

Poor leadership is the most commonly cited cause for these consistently high attrition rates. Three tangible initiatives launched over the past six months have begun to address this long-standing issue: (1) the MoI High Ranking Officer Board; (2) the MoD leader assessment operation executed under direction of the recently formed Leadership Development Working Group; and (3) the ANDSF Officer Force Balancing plan. The purpose of these three programs is the identification and removal of corrupt and/or incompetent current leaders and the immediate promotion of high-performing officers with demonstrated potential.

Progress in each line of effort over the next 12-24 months will reveal the Afghan Government’s true level of commitment to eliminating corruption, embracing merit-based selection principles, and ensuring the nation’s top talent fills the ANDSF’s most influential posts.

**Force Posture**

The reduction of static checkpoints continues to be an area of concern for the ANDSF. There is significant social and political pressure to maintain checkpoints around villages and along highways. However, an abundance of checkpoints reduces the available combat power for maneuver. What is more, many of these checkpoints are tactically unsound, and offer the enemy ready opportunities. President Ghani instructed the MoD and MoI to reduce the number of permanent, fixed checkpoints in order to increase the available combat power of the ANDSF to support combined arms operations.

The MoD has agreed to reduce the number of permanent fixed checkpoints across Afghanistan. ANA Corps will employ no more than 25 percent of their forces in the operational phase of the ORC in permanent static checkpoint positions. In spite of these stated goals, the ANA did not make any significant reduction in checkpoints, during this reporting period. The ANA will scrutinize its remaining checkpoints to determine if they are resourced appropriately and tactically sound.

The ANA continued offensive operations through the summer and into the fall as part of Operation *Khalid* and *Hamza*. These are operations designed to protect population centers, including provincial capitals, and degrade ISIS-K. At a time when the ASSF put some field forces in Commando training, the ANDSF increased its rate of offensive operations. Throughout the reporting period, the ANA shifted its main effort from Kunduz in the north, to the south, and then the southwest as the fighting season progressed.
During this reporting period, the ANDSF demonstrated a remarkable ability to focus aviation, fire support, and mobile strike assets at the points of need across Afghanistan as the main effort shifted. This ability to shift combat power, coupled with proactive use of Expeditionary Advisory Packages (EAPs), provided by U.S. and NATO forces, proved extremely effective against the Taliban. In 2016, the Taliban threatened four provincial capitals and temporarily controlled Kunduz. In 2017, the Taliban proved unable to threaten any provincial capitals, lost control of key districts, including Nawah-ye Barakzai in Helmand, and had to shift its focus to districts in sparsely populated areas of the country. The ANA also demonstrated significant progress in its ability to integrate air strike missions into ANA ground operations. After only two years of experience providing aerial fires to ground forces, the ANDSF regularly conducts effective airstrikes with little to no coalition assistance.

In eastern Afghanistan, ASSF forces, combined with U.S. CT forces, maintained constant pressure on ISIS-K. Throughout the reporting period, U.S. and Afghan forces combined to eliminate ISIS-K leadership, and degrade and disrupt ISIS-K forces. At the end of the fighting season, ISIS-K forces were isolated in a small number of districts. Although ISIS-K suffered from persistent ANDSF and USFOR-A targeting, small ISIS-K factions fled from their stronghold in Nangarhar to other areas of Afghanistan.

3.4 CAPABILITIES

While the ANDSF operational trends continue to be positive, particularly in units led by quality leaders, major challenges remain. Poor leadership, corruption, misuse of ASSF, and improper utilization of specialty personnel continue to hamper progress in too many units. On a positive note, the initial implementation of ORCs, improved collective training, and improved logistics planning and execution indicate that the ANDSF are learning from previous campaigns.

Operational Capabilities

There have been promising changes in the MoI in the wake of the replacement of the three top posts within the ministry, there have promising changes in the MoI. The new Minister of the Interior, appointed in mid-August, and the First Deputy Minister and Deputy Minister of Security, also appointed during this reporting period, are making a positive difference. At lower levels, the replacement of 13 Deputy Ministers and senior officers in May 2017, was necessary and promising. Over recent months, the MoI has made real progress in developing an organizational structure optimized to carry out neglected ministerial functions (policy, strategy, administration and support). The ANDSF Roadmap will enhance MoI capability and address critical reforms in police reorganization, civil outreach, leadership development, and counter-corruption.

Interagency cooperation continues to progress, helped by the appointment of a First Deputy Minister and Deputy Minister Security from the MoD. Although the best example of the interagency cooperation remains the Kabul Garrison Command (KGC), there are encouraging

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27 Additional information on ANA and ANP force component capabilities and MoD and MoI capacity and ministerial support to the ANDSF are detailed in the relevant sections below.
signs that all security ministries are operating together in an increasingly joint manner. The KGC is responsible for the security of the city of Kabul and is made up of ANA, ANP, and Afghan intelligence personnel. The joint design of the KGC and its singular purpose have resulted in increasing levels of success over the last two years. At the Zone and Provincial level, there are reports and mounting evidence that the ANA and ANP are working together increasingly well.

The ANP’s ability to execute evidence-based operations and to enforce rule of law throughout Afghanistan is essential if they are to gain and maintain the Afghan people’s trust. The MoI recently stood up a Community Outreach Commission to focus on effective and coordinated public engagement. The planned transfer of the ANCOP and ABP to the MoD will help the MoI focus on its community outreach efforts and enforce the rule of law across Afghanistan.

Enabler integration, such as attack aviation, ISR, and indirect fires, is essential for the ANDSF to close the important capability gaps. Enabler synchronization and employment is improving, but still incomplete. The ANDSF regularly conduct airstrikes with A-29s with limited Coalition assistance, relying instead on Afghan Terminal Air Coordinators (ATAC) to control fires through direct communication with Afghan A-29 pilots. The ANDSF continues to train ATACs and conduct collective training on combined arms maneuver to integrate air assets into operations more effectively. Additionally, Afghan target development and prioritization continues to improve as the Nasrat intelligence center, also known as the National Threat Intelligence Center, under the direction of the National Directorate of Security and Joint Special Operations Coordination Center (JSOCC), mature. Both ASSF and AAF forces benefit from this improved relationship as assets are allocated based on command priorities, not the order they were received.

During this reporting period, the ANDSF continued successful integration and employment of the Afghan National Tracking System (ANTS). ANTS enables real-time tracking of ANDSF vehicles and personnel in a manner similar to the U.S. Blue Force Tracker. ANTS has improved ANDSF battle tracking and clearance of fires for coalition air support in support of ANDSF offensive operations.

In June 2017, the Afghan Air Force conducted their first operational aerial resupply to ANDSF ground troops from an AAF C-208. This new capability increases support to ANDSF forces enabling ground troops to secure key territories. However, the AAF faces a difficult transition over the next 24 months, fielding the replacement for the Mi-17 helicopter, the UH-60 Blackhawk, which began in September 2017. AAF offensive operations have seen multiple successes, with the MD-530 helicopter and A-29 attack aircraft increasingly utilized for strike missions and better integrated into ANA ground operations.

With the Aviation Modernization program, the AAF will rely heavily, and at great cost, on Contract Logistics Support (CLS) to sustain more than 227 new aircraft. New pilot training pipelines will be heavily stressed and the pipelines for most other specialties will not be able to keep up. In the short-term, this will drive heavy reliance on CLS to sustain combat operations as the required quantity of trained Afghan maintainers will not be available for several years. Additionally, with the explosive growth in personnel, the potential for insider threats via the recruiting pipeline will also increase. TAAC-Air actively advises the AAF on security and vetting; even so, the large number of new airmen pose a significant risk.
Intelligence collection and sharing continues to improve in both the MoD and the MoI. The three primary intelligence fusion centers – the Network Targeting and Exploitation Center (NTEC) within the MoI, the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC) in the ANA, and the Nasrat – share intelligence regularly, and jointly develop of targeting packages. The MoI is in the nascent stages of consolidating all of its intelligence into a single organization – the Afghan Anti-Crime Police. Separately, the MoI is working on a lawful intercept program; once it is operational, the program will be integrated into the national intelligence cycle. The National Police Coordination Center in Kabul is implementing serialized reporting that can be stored, retrieved, shared, and referenced – another significant step forward for the MoI.

Although intelligence sharing is an established strength across the ANDSF, intelligence analysis remains a weakness. However, in this reporting cycle, advisors note that the ANDSF made progress on integrating different sources of intelligence, such as geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), ISR, and open source intelligence, as a part of all-source analysis. As systems develop, TAA efforts will focus on the use of all source analysis to develop kinetic targets to meet military objectives. MoI and MoD personnel with access to intelligence undergo rigorous screening procedures and RS advisors also emphasize counter-intelligence screening.

The ANDSF ability to use ISR to plan and, to a lesser extent, control combat operations is limited, but improving. The ANA are successfully using ScanEagle at four ANA Corps sites (201st, 205th, 209th, and 215th) for both force protection and targeting support. The 215th Corps Detachment at FOB Shorab in Helmand Province is the most advanced, routinely utilizing their ScanEagle Detachment to support their Corps targeting efforts. The 209th Corps also relies heavily on their ScanEagle Detachment at Camp Pamir in Kunduz Province to action their own targets. The 205th Corps ScanEagle Detachment, which reached IOC on October 13, 2017, is unique in that it operates as a hub and spoke. The Detachment is based out of Kandahar Airfield (the hub) and has a Ground Control Station (GCS) at Tarin Kot (a spoke), which can take control of aircraft while in flight. The newest ScanEagle Detachment for the 201st Corps at FOB Gamberi in Laghman Province reached IOC on 1 November 2017.

The use of indirect fires from Afghan artillery and mortar systems lags behind other enablers. The primary obstacle to the use of indirect fires is the lack of trained forward observers and competent fire-direction controllers. Artillery and mortars are used primarily as direct-fire systems or counter-fire systems following insurgent rocket attacks. The ANDSF prefer aerial fires, if available, to indirect fires during offensive operations.

The implementation of operational readiness cycles (ORCs) with a focus on collective training has increased Afghan capabilities. Some advisors have experienced difficulties convincing the ANDSF to embrace the concept of continued training during combat operations, but some ANA corps have maintained a robust ORC in the midst of heavy fighting. Overall, we see more progress in implementing ORCs within the ANA than the ANP. Some ANA corps and ANP zone leaders have met expectations, while others demonstrated little progress. The MoD and MoI collective training requirement instructed ANA corps to conduct exercises at the platoon, toliai, and kandak levels. Senior MoI officials directed that the ANP execute small-unit and individual training. All ANA corps succeeded in executing their first ORC, some more successful than others. Due to
weak leadership skills at the tolai level, training often did not achieve intended results. A lack of command emphasis on training was also an issue for both the 207th and 209th Corps. There is a risk that headquarters, whose units most need collective training, will use their high operational tempo as a reason not to conduct collective training. While having more units operating in the field is desirable, there is an unavoidable tradeoff in terms of long-term readiness.

Some ANDSF corps headquarters continue to misuse attached ASSF despite both the MoD and MoI having signed formal CPAs validating their intent to curb such misuse. Too often, commanders push ASSF into conventional roles, at checkpoints or as personal security detachments. This undermines the ORC and does not hold ANA and ANP units accountable.

The ANDSF demonstrated significant improvements in its planning capabilities throughout the planning process for Operation Khalid. Although both the ANA and ANP received advice and guidance from RS personnel, the campaign was an ANDSF plan. The ANDSF commanders clearly designated main and supporting efforts and allocated resources and enablers appropriately. ANDSF conducted the formal planning briefs to senior leaders with RS personnel only observing. Once the planning cell had completed the plan and issued the order, the CoGS held a conference for corps and zone commanders to afford them the opportunity to discuss their understanding of their respective parts of plans for the campaign. The conference was a powerful event as zone and corps commanders came to Kabul to inform each other of their respective plans.

Logistical operations and sustainment of the force remain the largest and most critical capability gaps. The ANDSF still struggles to maintain its weapons, vehicles, and equipment. The lack of professional logistics leaders and the institutionalization of key processes have long hamstrung the ANDSF. Poor situational awareness of vehicle and equipment maintenance status, inaccurate logistics reporting, and inadequate coordination between headquarters weigh heavily on the combat performance of the ANDSF force.

Although the MoD and MoI lack certain logistics and sustainment core competencies, they made discernable improvements during this reporting period. Ammunition consumption reports became more reliable due to daily submission requirements. During Operation Khalid, the National Transportation Brigade (NTB) identified shortfalls and cross-leveled ammunition across the force based on accurate consumption reporting. Sustainment Advisory Teams (SAT) and Medical Support Advisory Teams (MAT) helped the ANDSF identify critical logistics, sustainment, and medical deficiencies and develop plans to address them.

In August, the MoI Office of the Surgeon General (OTSG), the Medical Command (MEDCOM) commander, and the ANA Deputy Minister of Defense for Health Affairs signed the Combat Casualty and Disease Non-Battle Injury Committee Charter. This charter sets the course for ANDSF medical leaders to collaborate and make data-based decisions to enhance medical support to ANDSF for preservation of the force. The MoI and MoD medical leaders expressed keen interest in working and meeting each month to facilitate improvements to medical logistics management and to share best practices.

During this reporting period, the MoD and MoI made strides in expanding communications and information technology (IT) infrastructures. Both ministries participated in joint training,
including radio communications, network management, and cyber security. RS advisors proposed a plan to consolidate communications and IT training at the centralized ANDSF Unified Training Academy and to capitalize on the University of Kabul’s IT and cyber programs. Graduates of these courses would provide professionally educated personnel to the ministries. This proposal includes a “pay for service” concept that provides scholarship payments to students in specialized cyber security tracks requiring employment in a ministry for two years. President Ghani’s chief IT advisor expressed great interest in the proposal and requested follow-up discussions with the Ministry of Information Technology and Communications.

The National Maintenance Strategy (NMS), focused on improving the overall maintenance capability of the ANDSF, was launched during this reporting period. The NMS consolidated existing vehicle maintenance contracts under one contract to improve near-term maintenance while building long-term Afghan maintenance capacity. The NMS contains provisions for building the capacity of ANDSF and Afghan contractors to take control of maintenance over a four-year period. For the MoD, the goal is to build the ANA capacity to conduct most of its own maintenance augmented by contracted support performed by an increasing number of Afghans. Within the MoI, the overarching goal is to transition away from coalition contracts to Afghan-contracted support.

The ASSF remains a bright spot in ANDSF capabilities. When senior ANDSF leaders employ them properly, the ASSF consistently overmatch the enemy on the battlefield. During this reporting period, the ASFF focused on building combat power; achieving unity of effort across the wider Afghan Security Infrastructure (ASI); leadership development; counter-corruption; and disciplined operational readiness cycles (ORC) to improve ASFF effectiveness during the 2017-18 Annual Operational Plan (AOP) and future annual plans.

**Leadership Challenges**

In September, President Ghani implemented the “Inherent Law,” which mandates that MoD and MoI officers retire upon reaching a specified time in service, time in grade/rank, or age limits. Execution of the Inherent Law, combined with President Ghani’s dedication to firing corrupt or ineffective leaders, will remove senior leaders entrenched in positions of power, and clear the way for merit-based promotion of junior leaders across the force. Many MoD and MoI senior leaders were Soviet trained and had difficulty adapting to U.S. and NATO training and doctrine. The junior leaders who will replace the retirees are products of U.S. and Coalition TAA efforts have and gained their experience on the front lines of the current fight. Resolute Support advisors believe this leadership re-set will be a significant advancement for the ANDSF.

The first round of retirements and promotions will begin in January 2018. Leaders with specified years of service, specified years in a current rank or grade, or who are over an age specific to their rank will begin exiting the force. Officers who meet mandatory retirement criteria have the option to retire voluntarily by November 30. Officers choosing voluntary retirement will receive a financial severance package and enhanced retirement benefits upon leaving the service. In 2018, to avoid problems associated with massive leader turnover in the midst of combat, President Ghani can retain up to 30 percent of the leaders designated for retirement for an additional year. President Ghani can retain up to 20 percent of such leaders in 2019, and up to 10 percent in 2020. Beginning
in year four, and each year thereafter, President Ghani may retain up to 5 percent of leaders meeting retirement criteria each year.

President Ghani has appointed several new ANA Corps Commanders this year, as well as a new Army Chief of Staff and a new Minister of Defense. RS has noted that leadership reform in MoI is ongoing, but slower than MoD’s other leadership reforms.

RS advisors worked with ANDSF leaders to place a priority on professional education and leadership training, especially within the ANP, to build a cadre of experienced leaders. A lack of professional leader training and education has contributed to the ANDSF’s leadership challenges. Many educational opportunities outside of Afghanistan require Afghan leaders to speak English. A shortage of English-speaking Afghan leaders, coupled with increasing absence without leave (AWOL) incidents involving Afghans training in the United States, have decreased ANDSF leader training opportunities abroad and created a demand for creative approaches to training in Afghanistan.

Corruption, patronage, and an inability and unwillingness to remove ineffective leaders erodes confidence in the ANDSF and ultimately reduces the combat capability of the force. MoD actions against corruption have demonstrated small, but positive steps. A number of corps and zone commanders have initiated investigations into leaders whose actions warrant suspicion.

**Ministerial and ANA-ANP Coordination**

Ministerial coordination continues to improve at the national level and, to an increasing degree, at the corps and zone levels. Weak personal relationships on the ground, coupled with a lack of trust between leaders of the ANDSF institutions, has limited overall ANA and ANP cooperation in some corps and zone areas. The ANDSF Roadmap calls for the ANA to assume the role as the lead “hold” force and push the ANP to focus on community policing. Under that construct, ANA-ANP coordination will remain important; however, the need for coordination should decrease. In high-threat areas, out of necessity, the ANA and ANP coordinate well. In other low-threat areas, or where enemy attacks are episodic, ANA-ANP coordination remains problematic.

In most circumstances, ANDSF personnel still bypass the Operations Coordination Center (OCC) in their area of operations. Although the OCCs are specifically designed and staffed to improve communication and coordination between the pillars, ANA and ANP personnel prefer to interact with higher authorities within their own ministries, this performance inevitably complicates support during ANA-ANP operations and crisis response. Although standard operating procedures exist to correct these problems, personnel rarely use them below the ministerial level.

When utilized appropriately, the OCC–Regional (OCC-Rs) have generally enhanced unity of effort, provided a common picture of the force dispositions across their respective regions, and promoted the integration of all ANDSF functions into the planning process. Similar to other ANDSF institutions, the degree of functionality depends on the selection and empowerment of capable leaders. Tactical coordination between ANA and ANP forces through the OCC–Provincial (OCC-P) is not as effective, the result is often confusion over the designation of the appropriate lead agency at the district level. As the OCC-Ps develop their capability to manage
information, they suffer from inadequate manning, equipment, and ministerial-level guidance, and from conflicts with existing local and informal command and control arrangements. The ANDSF Roadmap calls for command and control reforms, including the creation of Regional Joint Commands (RJC) designed to subsume the OCC structure and allow for better cooperation between ANDSF forces on the ground. The RJC's and the National Joint Command (NJC) have not materialized, and the timeline to establish this command and control structure has yet to be determined.

Coordination on strategic communications provides an example of strong coordination between the MoD, the MoI, and the Afghan Presidential Palace. The Government Media Information Center (GMIC) director chairs a weekly strategic communications meeting to synchronize messaging on security issues with the MoD and the MoI. As a result, the Afghan Government is better able to counter insurgent information operations. The ANA runs a recurring and effective information operations working group, which synchronizes many non-lethal capabilities and assets of the MoD and ANA, including religious leaders, Psychological Operations, Public Affairs, Civil Affairs, Operations Security, and Military Deception. Additionally, with the inclusion of the Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs, Ministry of Information and Culture, High Peace Council, and Afghan civil society organizations in the information operations working group, there is great promise and hope for greater strategic communication success across Afghanistan.

This progress has come with inevitable setbacks. In August, USFOR-A conducted a leaflet drop in Parwan that unintentionally offended and enraged the local population. The combined crisis response efforts from local government and MoI and MoD forces on the ground served as an example of how well the ministries and government can work together in a crisis. MoI authorities and the provincial governor (PGOV) ordered the ANP to pick up and dispose of the leaflets immediately. The PGOV then held a provincial shura to explain that the leaflet’s offensive content was unintentional there was no need for violent behavior. MoD units helped deter violent demonstrations and deployed the chief of Religious and Cultural Affairs (RCA) to engage local mullahs and conduct consequence management. Although the leaflet drop provoked widespread condemnation, the teamwork by Afghan Government leaders on the ground prevented violence and quickly de-escalated the situation.

### 3.5 ASSESSMENT

During the reporting period, the ANDSF’s performance in combat operations improved and there is reason for optimism going forward. This reporting period marks the completion of the second year of a sustainable security strategy that focuses combat power across the country. During the first two years of the strategy, the ANDSF prevented the Taliban from accomplishing any of its stated operational objectives including the takeover of major population centers. As they enter 2018, the ANDSF is better-trained and increasingly configured to increase offensive spirit and lethality.

Increased use of ISR and aerial fires during this reporting period improved the overall effectiveness of ANDSF operations. Improved leadership in key positions within MoI and MoD, including

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28 The classified annex to this report contains ANDSF assessments by force pillar.
ANA corps and ANP zones, provided quick improvements in the culture and overall performance of ANDSF units. Additionally, the use of proactive EAPs to set conditions for shifting of the main effort mission prevented the Taliban from mounting major offensives and limited them to attacks on lightly defended districts in rural areas.

The ASSF and AAF remained the most effective ANDSF forces and were the recipients of the largest investment of resources in accordance with the ANDSF Roadmap. The ASSF made up a small fraction of the overall ANDSF force, but conducted a majority of the offensive operations over the past year. The AAF continued to improve exponentially and provide an overmatch on the battlefield that the Taliban and ISIS-K are struggling to counter. As the AAF grows in size and experience, ANDSF performance overall will continue to improve.
SECTION 4 – MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

4.1 MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

The MoD oversees the ANA, the AAF, and the MoD’s pillars within the ASSF: the ANASOC, the \textit{Ktah Khas}[^29], and the SMW (see Figure 5). Major General Tariq Shah Bahrami was appointed Minister of Defense in April 2017, having served as the MoI Senior Deputy Minister prior to his appointment. President Ghani has consistently touted Minister Bahrami’s leadership as critical to MoD’s progress on counter-corruption, ANDSF Roadmap initiatives, and in the ANA transformation into a more mobile, effective fighting force. Lieutenant General Mohammad Sharif Yaftali was promoted from Commander, 203rd ANA Corps, to CoGS in April 2017. During this reporting period, the MoD’s main focus areas included eliminating corruption; professionalizing of the military; campaign planning and execution; improving resource planning, programming, budgeting, and execution; improving force protection; increasing transparency and accountability; and implementing civilianization policies.

\textit{Figure 5: Ministry of Defense Organizational Chart}

[^29]: The \textit{Ktah Khas} is a light infantry special operations \textit{kandak} accomplished in conducting intelligence-driven counterterrorism raids, particularly against high-value individuals, and vehicle interdictions utilizing both ground and air mobility platforms.

[^30]: As of November 2017, the Afghan MoD’s appointment was still pending confirmation from Parliament.
The MoD-authorized end-strength includes positions for the MoD headquarters, various command staffs, the ANA, the AAF, and elements of the ASSF (see Figure 5). The MoD also includes an additional 5,502 authorized civilian positions that augment military forces for certain duties, build institutional knowledge and experience within the ministry, and free up soldiers to perform inherently military functions.

Figure 6: Ministry of Defense Manning Authorization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MoD Echelons</th>
<th>FY 2015-16</th>
<th>FY 2016-17</th>
<th>FY 2017-18</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Defense Headquarters</td>
<td>2,765</td>
<td>2,308</td>
<td>2,247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Staff</td>
<td>6,243</td>
<td>6,392</td>
<td>6,492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate Commands</td>
<td>25,365</td>
<td>26,382</td>
<td>27,888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Commands</td>
<td>119,252</td>
<td>119,651</td>
<td>119,814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
<td>11,651</td>
<td>11,669</td>
<td>11,924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force and SMW</td>
<td>7,981</td>
<td>8,407</td>
<td>8,626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTHS Accounts</td>
<td>13,359</td>
<td>13,359</td>
<td>13,359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unassigned Resources</td>
<td>8,384</td>
<td>6,832</td>
<td>4,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Authorized</strong></td>
<td><strong>195,000 military (includes R coded positions)</strong></td>
<td><strong>195,000 military and 8,004 civilians</strong></td>
<td><strong>195,000 military and 5,502 civilians</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Resource Management and Procurement

The MoD continues to struggle with identifying requirements below the corps level. Greater expansion and utilization of the Core-Information Management System (Core-IMS) system, a system of record used for tracking inventory, will afford opportunities to better identify requirements at the corps and zone levels. However, the General Staff and ministry budget personnel remain unable to consolidate and prioritize requirements within the budget. On a positive note, the MoD will identify funding and program requirements over a three-year horizon, as opposed to the current one-year outlook. The MoD successfully formulated its annual budget, and included prioritized unfunded requirements remaining from FY 2016-17.

The FY 2017-18 spending and procurements plans were not finalized until after the start of 2017. Subsequently the plans did not promote efficient acquisition planning, and they lacked focused prioritization. CSTC-A advisors used the FY 2018-19 plan to focus on setting priorities that

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31 Although the MoD and MoI budget process coincides with the Afghan fiscal year, the tashkil process coincides with the Afghan solar year. The Afghan fiscal year follows the SY numbering system, but is offset by one quarter. FY 1396 runs from December 21, 2016 – December 20, 2017.

32 TTHS denotes training, transient, holding, and students.

33 “R” coded positions denotes positions currently filled by military personnel that will revert to civilian positions once they are vacated.

34 Core-IMS is an internet-based system used to track inventory. The system currently connects the MoD and MoI to supply depots, but not units in the field. Core-IMS is described in greater detail in the Logistics and Maintenance section below.
provide emphasis on ANA readiness and key Roadmap initiatives to include ASSF growth. The
MoD is making steady progress on its FY 1396 budget execution, with 68 percent of its $785.8
million budget executed. As of NOV 8 2017, MOD Requirements Approval Board (RAB) had
approved 140 contracts identified in the FY 1396 Procurement Plan. MoD has awarded 85 FY
1396 contracts totaling $5.4B. Finally, MoD has successfully awarded 2 of its 5 framework
contracts.

MoD struggles with the procurement process are the result of its own bureaucratic processes. The
acquisition process that takes approximately 224 days to complete due to mistrust and fear of
corruption within the organization. Every acquisition or procurement request must navigate a
myriad of offices, the requests are often misplaced or wrongly prioritized, and approval authorities
take too long reviewing them. RS advisors continue to work with the MoD to streamline the
process; however, the lengthy procurement and acquisition process is the single greatest
contributing factor to timely execution of the MoD spend plan.

Legal Affairs

During this reporting period, the MoD began making better use of its legal assets signaling growth
and maturity within the ministry. Operational Law (OPLAW) legal experts were included as
permanent members of MoD targeting boards to provide legal guidance on targeting
determinations. Legal advice includes guidance regarding collateral damage, civilian protection,
the potential for Gross Violations of Human Rights (GVHR), and the authority to use force. During
this reporting period, GS Legal and the ANA Legal School began using mobile training
teams (MTT) to conduct sustainable internal Human Rights (HR), ethics, and Law of Armed
Conflict (LOAC) training. MTTs routinely deploy to ANA Corps headquarters where they train
experts to teach basic HR, ethics, and LOAC principles to every member of the force.

The MoD Inspector General (IG) is the lead agency for advising and assisting MoD leaders on
readiness, effectiveness, and the well-being of the force through objective and impartial
inspections, assessments, and investigations. The MoD IG published the MoD Counter- and Anti-
Corruption (CAC) Plan in 2016, which outlines MoD’s long-term plan for eliminating corruption,
and ensuring transparency, accountability, and good governance. The CAC Plan allows the MoD
to synchronize internal efforts to achieve transparency, accountability, and oversight. These
efforts include the Ministerial Internal Controls Program that identifies and mitigates sources of
corruption and enforces asset declarations by senior leaders. The plan also provides guidance for
counter-corruption, including the reporting of corrupt activities. Recently, the MoD IG updated,
and Acting Minister of Defense Bahrami signed, the 1397 (2017/18) anti-corruption plan for
execution beginning in December 2017.

Weekly CAC meetings within the General Staff are progressing well. There are currently 23 active
Transparency and Accountability Committees (TAC), consisting of Corps/Brigade level
Commanders, GS G2, GS Inspector General (IG), and GS Legal, from across the entirety of the
force. Unit TAC meetings occur monthly, with discussion issues/notes forwarded to the GS
Inspector General (GS IG) for review/analysis, consolidation, and further discussion at the Chief
of General Staff (CoGS) TAC meetings, which include the CoGS, the GS Legal, the GS G2 and
the GS IG.
Additionally, the Minister of Defense holds anti-corruption action meetings on a recurring basis. Historically, the Minister of Defense has demonstrated strong leadership during these meetings and made them a priority. However, during this reporting period, Minister of Defense Bahrami postponed or cancelled several of the anti-corruption action meetings. Coalition advisors hope to persuade the MoD to prioritize these meetings in the coming months.

In addition to the MoD-IG Anti-Corruption plan, CSTC-A reinforces counter- and anti-corruption efforts on a quarterly basis by asking the MoD sign a commitment letter. The 2017-18 MoD Commitment Letter contains the conditions that include, but are not limited to, implementation of the Ministerial Internal Control Program (MICP), publication of an Annual Inspection Plan (AIP), and enforcement of Asset Declaration (AD). In 2017, for the first time, as required by Afghan law, high-ranking military officers were required to provide their asset declarations to the High Office of Anti-Corruption (HOOAC), the government entity responsible for vetting and validating asset declarations.

The MoD IG has established processes to receive and respond to complaints from the ANA and the MoD. The IG began distributing complaint calling/business cards and placed complaint boxes and Transparency, Accountability and Oversight (TAO) posters at various unit locations throughout the country. The IG reported a fourfold increase in the number of verbal and written complaints submitted to the IG since it started distributing cards and hanging TAO posters. The increase is likely a result of greater awareness of the mechanisms for submitting complaints, and may demonstrate an increase in public trust in the Afghan Government’s capacity to resolve issues.

The MoD continues to show progress towards identifying, investigating, and appropriately responding to GVHR allegations. The MoD has also improved its ability to take remedial actions in cases of credible allegations of GVHR. Through EF3 TAA efforts, MoD Legal is on the verge of obtaining the Minister of Defense’s signature on an International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Human Rights Policy that addresses IHL/HR violations to include GVHR and torture. MoD Legal is finalizing the Dari and Pashto language translations and preparing to brief the Minister of Defense. The new policy mandates appropriately tailored annual LOAC training for all MoD personnel, and enhances the MoD’s ability to satisfy Afghanistan’s commitments under both international and domestic laws. There were no credible GVHRs reported to MoD in the reporting period (i.e., GVHR allegations that are determined to be credible through U.S. processes).

**Personnel Management**

As part of its effort to build a sustainable, efficient security force, the MoD and ANA took several steps to reduce the size of its officer corps, enforcing merit-based promotion practices, and eliminating the presence of “ghost soldiers” on the ANDSF payroll. During this reporting period, the MoD began enforcing mandatory officer retirements. Under President Ghani’s Inherent Law policy, officers are subject to mandatory retirement upon reaching a specified time in service and or time in rank, or if the officer exceeds a specific age tied to his or her rank. For years, the MoD and ANA retained significantly more general officers and senior leaders than the tashkil authorizes. For example, the ANA tashkil authorizes 1,001 colonels, yet, as of September 2017, there were 2,703 colonels serving in the ANA. Many excess colonels serve in positions designated
for junior officers. The result of this practice is that many senior leaders have received significantly higher salaries for performing duties well below their rank.

During the reporting period, the MoD and ANA made progress in encouraging merit-based promotions. This started with an increased emphasis on officer efficiency reports across the force. Additionally, throughout the rating period, MoD and senior ANA general officers toured ANA units, built relationships with leaders in the field, and required officers to assess themselves, their leaders, and subordinates. This feedback will inform officer promotions and leader selections in the future.

The MoD continues its “civilization” effort to transition some senior leader, ANA positions from military to civilian billets. This effort will provide civilian oversight of the force, bring in subject matter expertise, and build continuity within the organization. Implementation of the civilianization plan remains slow for several reasons. Transitioning a position from military to civilian threatens the job security of senior leaders. Culturally, the idea of civilians working alongside combat soldiers has not resonated with many ANDSF decision-makers. The MoD completed seven of ten internal hiring actions for senior civilian leadership positions over the past year. Although processing positions through the civil service commission for approval has been slow, and key stakeholders have made repeated attempts to circumvent merit-based procedures, three of the remaining four hires are now in progress. RS advisors have focused on improving the recruitment processes and filling positions that will bring the MoD closer to the civilianization goal.

Efforts are underway to improve existing leadership manuals through the employment of the ANA-Zero Doctrine development process and collaboration between ANA Training Education and Doctrine Command (ANATEDC), Military Research and Doctrine (MRD) Branch, Marshall Fahim National Defense University (MFNDU), and Command & Staff Academy (CSA). MoD’s engagement with the CSA, the principal ANA higher education institution, is crucial to disseminating guidance and enhancing strategic and operational planning at the Corps, Brigade, and Kandak levels. As of this year, the CSA is incorporating Air Ground Integration into planning exercises for Operational Courses for senior Afghan officers. The MFNDU and the University of Kabul are currently discussing the development and integration of the National Research and Education Network (NREN) to allow ANA officers at MFNDU to access research tools and connect with the University of Kabul to enhance the learning at the ANA’s higher education institution.

Although personnel accountability remains a concern, the MoD, along with U.S. and coalition advisors, continue to rely on implementation of the APPS system, PAIs, and AHRIMS to reduce personnel management problems and eliminate “ghost soldiers” from the ANDSF. Throughout the reporting period, the MoD and advisors conducted PAIs at each ANA corps location to update and validate soldier data in the AHRIMS and ensure personnel data accurately populates in the APPS system. MoD continues to transfer AHRIMS data to the APPS personnel module in advance of full APPS implementation. Soldiers must provide personal data, possess an identification card, and have biometric data on file to be validated. The extensive PAI effort will increase the accuracy of personnel data and limit the abuse of the ANDSF payroll.
The first phase of PAI data collection for MoD, which included all Kabul-based units and four of the six ANA Corps, concluded in October 2017. A final round of PAI is scheduled for all corps starting in December 2017. The overall enrollment rate—members claimed to exist by MoD in monthly personnel reports physically verified via biometric identification—is approximately 93 percent. Soldiers not verified in AHRIMS will not be paid when their data is migrated to APPS until they provide all necessary information, including biometric data.

On January 1, 2017, CSTC-A began funding the monthly ANA and ALP payroll disbursements from the validated personnel records within AHRIMS. Accordingly, CSTC-A withheld funds for those personnel not accounted for in AHRIMS. From January 1, 2017 through June 30, 2017, CSTC-A withheld an average of $6.6 million in ANDSF salaries each month due to discrepancies between personnel reported and personnel accounted for in AHRIMS across the entirety of the ANDSF. This salary withholding forced Afghan leaders to place renewed emphasis on the thorough and deliberate PAI process to validate all Afghan soldiers. During this reporting period, CSTC-A withheld $3.4M in MoD payrolls due to discrepancies between personnel reported and personnel actually accounted for in AHRIMS.

In November 2017, four MoD headquarters directorates implemented the APPS system after achieving initial operational capability (IOC) in July 2017. APPS incremental implementation will continue until all MoD units are operational by April 2018. APPS ongoing, 4-week operator training classes graduate approximately 100 students per month. After the 4-week class, over-the-shoulder (OTS) training will occur at each unit for 4-8 weeks, including comparisons of pay calculations between APPS and AHRIMS before APPS becomes the system of record. APPS requires ANA personnel to be assigned to an approved tashkil position in order to be recognized as a valid member of the force and receive pay. RS continues to encourage stronger oversight of reported personnel numbers by linking funding for ANA personnel to approved tashkil positions. As of November 22, 2017, 91 percent of the ANA was assigned to valid tashkil positions.

The benefits of APPS extend beyond payroll system improvements. RS advisors and the ANDSF gained much greater understanding of personnel information through the PAI and AHRIMS updates. APPS will improve the accountability process by generating real-time reports, reducing the number of personnel required to process AHRIMS data, and conducting personnel and equipment transactions. In APPS, all aspects of the tashkil are visible and will be tracked more effectively by the ANDSF and their advisors.

**Institutional Training**

Institutional training within the MoD remains a critical deficiency. Throughout the history of the U.S. and Coalition TAA mission, efforts to build strong training institutions have largely failed. Traditionally, TAA resources and efforts have gone to field units rather than the institutions that train and develop ANDSF forces at the beginning and throughout their careers. When U.S. forces partnered with MoD forces in the field, the effort to build institutions was minimal. Today, the focus is shifting towards building stronger institutions; however, U.S. and Coalition forces lack the presence in the field to evaluate the product of training within the ranks.
ANA branch schools such as the Infantry, Artillery, and Logistics schools lack the persistent involvement of trained, professional advisors and are doing very little to build Afghan subject matter expertise necessary to handover the instruction. Advisor involvement at the institutional level has been episodic at best over the last few years. However, the recent U.S. personnel uplift enabled the RS Army Institutional Advisory Team (AIAT) to provide more instructors to some schools as they seek an enduring solution that is less reliant on Coalition partners committing institutional trainers in the future.

Human resource and career path management are also underdeveloped. Currently, there is no system to ensure soldiers are assigned to positions of need and there is no system to ensure soldiers and leaders benefit from professional military education or additional training as their careers progress. Although schools and courses such as the Command and Staff School and Pre-Command Courses exist, the personnel management system does not identify the right candidates to attend the schools. Seats in these courses are often apportioned based on relationships and graduates typically are not assigned to critical positions where their new skills can make the greatest impact. Although efforts are underway to build stronger institutions, there has been little effort to rectify the human resource and career path management problems. The weak institutions and poor personnel management issues are inextricably related and require significant attention to rectify.

On a positive note, MoD intends to establish the Unified Training, Education, and Doctrine Command (UTEDC) in 2018, providing the MoD with an organization responsible for developing doctrine and training programs to inform activity within branch schools and professional military education institutions. Additionally, the MoD has mandated that a minimum of 50 percent of the kandak commanders complete the Pre-Command Course by the beginning of 2018, with a future goal of 100 percent.

**Logistics and Maintenance**

The MoD continues to demonstrate limited, but increasing capacity to maintain accurate equipment accountability, but still lacks a clear view of equipment serviceability. Inconsistent and inaccurate equipment readiness reporting has limited the MoD’s ability to identify equipment shortages and build procurement plans. Increased use of Core-IMS has improved accountability and visibility into key commodities at the MoD and ANA corps levels to a limited degree. Linking Core-IMS to the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP) system, allows U.S. material purchased for the Afghans through pseudo-FMS cases to populate directly into the Core-IMS system.

Core-IMS allows the MoD to track transfers of equipment out of national warehouses to corps forward supply depots. In the past, equipment shipped from the MoD required manual re-entry by the corps upon receipt. Now, equipment transferred from the MoD automatically generates a receipt at the forward supply depot so the receiving ANA corps knows the contents and expected arrival date of the shipment. Core-IMS does not extend to levels below corps; however, the MoD has contracted for fiber-optic cable to connect Core-IMS to 17 different sites, including all ANA Corps headquarters. Extension of the fiber-optic cable began in October 2017. Until Core-IMS connects the ANA corps and units below the corps, the MoD cannot use the system to maintain accurate accountability and serviceability.
In addition to connecting ANA corps to the supply depots, the MoD has sought to account for the significant amount of material in storage at the depots. Contracted personnel currently manually enter all equipment stored at supply depots into Core-IMS to enable proper materiel tracking. As with any automated system, effectiveness depends on the quality of the data provided. At the corps level, inconsistent and inaccurate reporting of equipment readiness through the Core-IMS system inhibits the MoD’s ability to identify equipment shortages and build procurement plans. Full integration of Core-IMS at the ANA corps and connectivity back to MoD Headquarters will provide greater visibility into the supply system in its totality.

During this reporting period, ANA corps demonstrated better weapons and equipment accountability due primarily to ANDSF Roadmap initiatives. ASSF growth, and the requirement to equip a larger ASSF force, remains a top ANDSF priority. The MoD has begun canvassing the force to identify excess equipment above unit authorizations. In the past, many ANA units over-reported on-hand equipment due to either lack of due diligence in updating inventories or out of a belief that over-reporting would result in greater logistical support from higher headquarters. Now, with equipment earmarked for transfer to the ASSF, ANA units report on-hand equipment more accurately out of fear they will lose what they have.

MoD cannot currently implement an effective life cycle management (LCM) program. Although the MoD Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) section contains a small LCM section, it is under-staffed, lacks the institutional training and subject matter expertise required to thoroughly review weapons and vehicle fleet densities, conduct regression analysis based on expected economic useful life models, and develop appropriate LCM equipment replacement plans. MoD remains reliant on CSTC-A EF 5 (Sustain the Force) to perform LCM on its behalf.

The MoD has demonstrated increased capacity to undertake logistics planning and execution. However, significant TAA is still required as logistics planning remains a vulnerability to the mission. During this reporting period, the introduction of partnered Sustainment Advisory Teams (SATs) helped identify shortcomings in logistics planning and coordination between MoD and the ANA corps’ headquarters. SATs included logistics and sustainment advisors from RS and senior MoD sustainment and logistics personnel. Trips to the ANA corps allowed for greater insight of logistics and sustainment issues at the corps and MoD level resulting in action to better support supply of repair parts, clothing and individual equipment, and other commodities from MoD depots to the point of need.

Similar to the SATs, the introduction of partnered Medical Advisory Teams (MATs) improved unit level medical capabilities with courses to increase ANA capabilities and improve patient care at the point of injury. MATs began work with local and regional hospitals to provide training to ensure ANA soldiers receive better care once evacuated. Training sessions at some hospitals, developed in collaboration with U.S. forward surgical assets, provide additional clinical skills in trauma resuscitation and trauma clinical care. Physicians, physician assistants/nurses, and medics attended these sessions focused on bedside procedures and team-based trauma resuscitation concepts.
The planning and execution of logistics plans by operational commanders requires significant and sustained effort. However, the GS G4 and GS Technology improved the delivery of critical supplies, particularly food, fuel, and ammunition this fighting season; as a result, commanders and planners had good visibility and control of corps stock-levels and implementing operational and strategic reserves. Organic maintenance capability remains hampered by a lack of effective maintenance management systems, production planning, and poor coordination for the distribution of repair parts resulting in unit reluctance to present vehicles for maintenance. As a result, the timely and accurate delivery of critical repair parts remains a challenge. RS advisors continue to work with the National Transportation Brigade (NTB) to professionalize vehicle drivers, increase leadership focus on preventative maintenance, and pre-use inspections to extend the fleet life cycle.

On a positive note, the MoD took steps to improve its ammunition management. During Operation *Khalid*, the MoD utilized the NTB to cross-level ammunition across ANA corps and keep the main effort units supplied. Additionally, the MoD agreed to build strategic and operational ammunition reserves consisting of one year’s supply of ammunition available in a crisis.

### Strategic and Operational Planning

During Operation *Khalid*, the MoD demonstrated significant improvement in its ability to identify future issues and generate contingency planning. During the reporting period, the MoD primarily focused on protecting major population centers and provincial capitals. Understanding that portions of the ASSF must rotate from the battlefield to schools to further Roadmap initiatives, the MoD focused combat power in specific geographic areas. Despite RS advice to the contrary early in Operation *Khalid*, the MoD focused a large contingent of its forces in northern Afghanistan, near Kunduz. This decision proved prescient, as the Taliban had hoped to seize the provincial capital of Kunduz. Throughout the reporting period, the MoD shifted the main effort and worked with RS advisors to use EAPs, and denying the Taliban any strategic victories.

The ANDSF improved its capability to conduct ministerial coordination for planning operations in advance of Operation *Khalid*. The ANA-led planning process incorporated plans from the MoI, the NDS, the Independent Directorate of Local Governance, the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, the Ministry of Public Works, and the Ministry of Cultural Affairs. Although RS advisors assisted the ANDSF with the planning process, the GS led the planning effort.

At the ANA corps level, strategic and operational planning capability continues to improve. The 215th, 201st, and 203rd Corps have shown the greatest consistency in their ability to plan operations. Their continued success is due to improved leadership and a long history of U.S. and Coalition advisor support. The 215th Corps successfully implemented ORCs, placing special emphasis on leader involvement in collective training.

During the reporting period, the 215th and 205th Corps demonstrated the greatest improvement in their planning abilities. MG Emam Nazar, demonstrated a unique ability to plan for and employ MSFVs and other wheeled assets, enabling the 205th Corps to keep the Taliban from capturing and holding key district centers.
As Operation *Khalid* moved into the winter reset period, MoD and ANA planners met with MoI and other government agencies to begin planning for election security in 2018. Unlike in previous elections, U.S. and Coalition partners do not anticipate dedicating significant forces to provide election security. ANDSF planners have spearheaded the election security initiatives and they will participate in the election security planning meetings scheduled for December 2017.

**Intelligence**

On July 29, 2017, the MoD appointed a new permanent General Staff Director of Intelligence after the position went unfilled for four months. Since the new GS G2’s arrival, the directorate has become more receptive and responsive to TAA efforts. According to RS advisors, the new GS G2 embraces technology and demonstrates keen interest in the more technical systems, such as the National Information Management System (NIMS), Persistent Ground Surveillance System (PGSS) aerostats, Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID) towers, the Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System (PCASS), ScanEagle, and the Wolfhound Electronic Warfare System. Additionally, the new GS G2’s leadership and personal involvement in operations generated a spike in information-sharing between leaders from the MoD and CoGS, and corps, brigade, and Military Intelligence kandak commanders.

At the institutional level, GS G2 and GS G7 Inspection Teams rated the ANA Intelligence Training Center (ITC) at Sia Seng, Kabul, the ANA’s best school. The ITC still requires additional instructors to train a projected 12,000 ANDSF intelligence officers over the next 4 years. Additionally, the current capacity of the ITC will not support the throughput of ANA students that require refresher training on technical intelligence systems. To address this issue, EF7 advisors are working with the new GS G2 to establish Afghan-led Mobile Training Teams (MTT) to deploy to the ANA corps and conduct on-site training, which will significantly increase their intelligence readiness.

The ANDSF is improving its use of basic signals intelligence (SIGINT) in operations. Within the 215th Corps area of operations (AOR), ANDSF personnel demonstrated progress in utilizing and integrating SIGINT. Advisors note that the 215th Corps can use SIGINT to cue ScanEagle coverage of targets, a significant milestone in integrating intelligence in support of military operations. RS advisors attribute these achievements to a strong Corps Commander and the presence of TF Southwest and U.S. Marines who emphasize the daily integration of intelligence into the operations cycle.

ScanEagle allows for target surveillance, air-to-ground integration for aerial fires, and battle damage assessments after strikes. Plans to increase the number of ScanEagle detachments from two to four are underway. In this reporting period, there was a 40 percent increase in targets engaged based on intelligence gained from ScanEagle use. ScanEagle operators are now included in the tashkil, but the ANDSF still needs to determine the career progression for ScanEagle operators. Additionally, the cost of continued U.S. training and maintenance on the system is not sustainable. ANDSF will work to transfer technical sustainment from contractors to Afghans over the next two to three years.
The 215th and 209th Corps Commanders are very involved in ANA ScanEagle operations. The corps units are learning to integrate ScanEagle-derived intelligence into operations and targeting. The 215th Corps ScanEagle Detachment has been particularly successful in enabling effective A-29 and MD-530 strikes against enemy targets. Additionally, the ANA ScanEagle crews, trained and advised by U.S. contractors, are gaining valuable experience and making progress towards independent operations. The ANA ScanEagle is an emerging and important capability for target development and prosecution. However, there are several obstacles that threaten sustainable independent operations. They include training; improved flight discipline and safety; and better understanding of ScanEagle capabilities and limitations on the part of ANA leadership. Continued U.S. technical and TAA support is required for the Afghans to sustain the program and eventually conduct safe, independent operations.

Intelligence sharing is a major area for improvement. The National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC) continues to work diligently at producing analytical intelligence products addressing enemy activities, plans, and operations. The appointment of a new NMIC Director who favors intelligence sharing bodes well for increased dissemination. TAA efforts continue to focus on predictive analysis and expanding dissemination of intelligence products. The new Director approved the formation of a monthly NMIC Intelligence Officer Professional Development program to ensure NMIC officers maintain intelligence skills, integrate training for newly assigned officers, and promote leadership development and cross training. Proper Intelligence TAA to obtain the goals outlined in the ANDSF Roadmap is labor intensive, and Intelligence TAA Manning will need to remain steady, if not increase, to achieve the envisioned end-state.

The ANA continue fielding the ScanEagle ISR system after completing the fielding of 6 Aerostats, 22 RAID towers, and 120 Wolfhounds.35 Forward Operating Bases (FOB) at Gamberi, Laghman, and Kandahar Airfield, Kandahar will add additional ScanEagle systems. ScanEagle training is progressing well. Twenty students from the 201st Corps, including pilots, mission commanders, and maintenance technicians, graduated from the ScanEagle Training Facility at Camp Shaheen in October and now operate the ScanEagle site at FOB Gamberi. The next cadre of 20 students from the 205th Corps is currently attending pre-ScanEagle training, and will begin training at Camp Shaheen in December.

**Strategic Communication**

During this reporting period, the MoD continued to improve its strategic communications. In the third quarter of 2017, the MoD issued a strategic communications plan, that coordinated the array of themes and messages provided by the President and CEO’s representatives, the MoI, and other Afghan security and civil ministries. Weekly meetings at the Government Media and Information Center (GMIC) ensured synchronization of messages across the Afghan government. Improved policies and procedures for strategic communication that empower information operations at the corps and brigade levels aided in crisis response efforts during Operation Khalid. The MoD recognizes the importance of strategic communication and public messaging in securing public

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35 The AN/PSS-7 Wolfhound is a lightweight radio direction finding system that targets VHF and UHF radio bands. With the Wolfhound, users can listen to and locate Push-To-Talk radios from a mobile configuration with the custom backpack.
understanding and support for the Afghan Government. MoD Stratcom also understands the importance of the new South Asia Strategy.

During this reporting period, the MoD increased its engagements and legitimacy with the media, by delivering information on a regular and timely basis. However, MoD still faces challenges in the clear communication of potentially unpopular topics, such as the ABP / ANCOP transfer. MoD did successfully coordinate with MoI in a crisis communication/consequence management effort in August and September, following a leaflet drop in Parwan that unintentionally offended the local population.

During this reporting period, the MoD worked through the GMIC to increase the use of television and social media to message the public. Daily press conferences ensured the MoD built trust with the public and the local and international media. MoD regularly participated in as many as five television interviews and ten phone interviews per day, which further helped improve the credibility of the ANDSF with the press. Multiple social media posts each day using a wide variety of platforms such as Twitter and Facebook provided increased opportunities to communicate, although the material posted often focused on enemy killed rather than how the Ministry and Afghan Government were protecting and providing for the population.

The ANA Corps made slow but steady improvement in conducting their own media operations, independent of direction from the MoD Strategic Communication Office. The current MoD strategic communication policy allows corps commanders to engage the media directly about issues in their specific areas of operation, and to make better use of Radio-in-a-Box (RIAB) assets. A RIAB includes a complete set of equipment needed to broadcast a message that can be monitored by local citizens on the radio. Implementation of the policy had been slow because of the reluctance of corps commanders and their public affairs personnel to engage the media without direction from the Afghan Government and because the MoD Strategic Communication Office did not have the capability to direct and receive media operations information from the corps level.

There was noticeable improvement in corps-level media operations. Although not yet standardized across the ANA, several corps commanders and their spokesmen actively engaged media and improved relationships with the provincial governors and their spokespersons, enabling constant and consistent messaging to the press and populace. Communicators from the 201st Corps, in particular, were very effective in their engagement with the media and population.

**Gender Office Efforts**

Although circumstances have improved for Afghan women since 2001, sexual abuse, harassment, and gender-based violence threaten the successful integration and long-term retention of women into the ANDSF. To mitigate these risks, the MoD’s Gender Integration Office actively develops policies and processes to prevent and report sexual misconduct. The office also develops systems to provide support and assistance to male and female victims of sexual misconduct. The Gender Integration Office will continue to focus on improved training in the management, and investigation. The successful prosecution of sexual misconduct crimes is a key element of prevention.
The ANDSF lacks a significant cadre of senior women in Afghanistan’s security and military sectors to serve as inspirational role models for the younger generations of Afghan women. Further compounding the issue, units continue to fill P3 positions (women-only positions) with males in an effort to avoid integrating females into the ranks.

The draft FY 2017-18 Bilateral Financial Commitment Letter will invoke up to a 5 percent penalty of total allocated funds per month against noncompliant units that do not appoint women to authorized P3 positions. Further, CSTC-A will levy a 5 percent penalty of total allocated funds if a women’s recruitment plan is not completed. This includes recruiting, training, and placing 500 women per year (125 per quarter) in positions by their career management field.

Additional initiatives to address the ANA gender imbalance include recruiting and training programs. ANA recruiting initiatives include an undergraduate sponsorship program, the Gender Occupational Opportunity Development (GOOD) program, overseas training programs, and a robust advertising and publicity campaign. Childcare provisions and retention bonuses also help retain women in the ANA. Although top echelons of ANA and government leadership have displayed a strong and enduring commitment to these efforts, unfortunately, many MoD gender inequalities have yet to be addressed. The ANA facilities for women remain largely inadequate or misused, (e.g. men occupying new facilities intended for women) even in the MoD headquarters. In some instances, men have broken the locks to female restrooms and used the restrooms for themselves, leaving the women with no immediate access to the facilities. Elsewhere, despite plans and funding, substandard facilities remain in disrepair.

To address these problems, RS developed commitment letters with the MoD and MoI to ensure secure female facilities are built, maintained, and utilized properly. Under the commitment letters, CSTC-A reserves the right to withhold 34 million Afghanis, assessed on budget lines of the coalition’s choosing, per compound found in sub-par condition or improperly utilized. CSTC-A will release the funds upon mitigation of the problems or an exception granted by the minister. CSTC-A withheld funds in 2017 due to misuse of women’s facilities and this practice will continue when the next round of letters are released for this reporting period.

The commitment letters hold the MoD and MoI responsible and accountable for the proper use and long-term sustainability of facility upgrades and new projects underway across a range of military installations designed to provide a safe and secure work environment for women. These projects include efforts to increase the number of facilities and accommodations, provide women’s bathrooms and toilets, and establish segregated recreational areas and training facilities. Some of the upgrades include:

- Kabul National Military Hospital Pediatrics and Women’s Wellness Clinic
- Ministry of Defense Headquarters daycare renovation and addition
- Afghan Air Force Academy women’s barracks
- Kabul Military Training Center daycare
- Camp Zafar daycare
- Marshal Fahim National Defense University women’s gym; conference center; and daycare
- National Military Academy of Afghanistan women’s gym
During this reporting period, the MoD built a family response unit (FRU) at MoI headquarters, which can be used by female employees. Although progress is slow due to changing Afghan building regulations, the MoD has a countrywide plan to build more women’s facilities that will include bathrooms, a gym, conference rooms, and classrooms. The MoD made progress with women’s uniforms and will order winter uniforms and boots in women’s size and cuts.

The MoD continues to provide women in the ANA with training and education opportunities, including the Gender Occupational Opportunity Development (GOOD) training program, an ASFF-funded program that has trained more than 600 ANA military and civilian participants in literacy and English, computer skills, and office administration. During this period, over 55 ANA military and civilian women participated in the GOOD program at Camp Zafar (Herat) and at the Afghan Air Force. The GOOD program trained 197 women at the Kabul National Military Hospital in May 2017, and training for 41 women began at the MoD Headquarters in July. Literacy training for more than 40 women began at the ANA Sewing Factory in August and English classes began at Camp Scorpion in September. This training will improve the women’s proficiency in their current duties and improve their career prospects.

During this reporting period, several ANA women completed the first year of the Dunya University Scholarship program. Currently, 191 ANA women are working towards a Bachelor’s Degree in Law and Political Science; Business Administration; or Computer Science. To ensure women have the appropriate training to succeed in their assigned positions, in October 2017, the MoD sent 75 women to Turkey for advanced training in their career management fields – finance, human resources, and logistics.

Unfortunately, such programs often lack the security necessary to succeed. Instructors are sometimes unable to travel outside of Kabul for classes because of a lack of Guardian Angels at RS. As a solution to the security issue, the GOOD program will hold classes at ANP sites, including five pilot sites in the Kabul area. Outside of Kabul, the GOOD program will hire local instructors to reduce the force protection burden.

4.2 AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

The ANA GS provides command and control over all of Afghanistan’s ground and air forces, including the ANA conventional forces, the AAF, the SMW, and the ANASOC. In total, the ANA consists of 24 combat brigades, 3 combat air wings, 24 branch and basic training schools, and additional support facilities (e.g., depots and hospitals).

Afghan National Army Strength

Recruiting and re-contracting have been adequate to offset overall losses over the past 3 years. The October 2017 re-contracting rate was 74 percent; this was stable across recent months and represents a considerable success for the ANA engaged in continuous military operations. Human Resource Management (HRM) advisors attribute this success in part to the recruiting and re-
contracting Roadshows delivered by EF 4/HRM advisors and ANA G1 personnel at Corps Headquarters (HQs). After an 8-month pause, a 2-day visit to the 203rd Corps HQ in mid-July re-invigorated the re-contracting program. In October 2017, HRM personnel went to the 207th Corps in Herat and the 201st Corps in Jalalabad. These Roadshows expose corps personnel managers to G1 attrition reports, updated ANA policies, and revamped Martyred and Disabled information. Most importantly, the Roadshows effectively remedy widespread soldier ignorance regarding bonuses and incentives related to re-enlistment.

Relationship Building Items (RBIs)—shirts, shoes, pens, radios, and other small items intended to alert and inspire young Afghans to government service—are effective tools for recruiters. Unfortunately, in recent years, there has been a shortfall of RBIs available for recruiters and HRM advisors have not been able to remedy this problem. A typical recruiting scenario involves a recruiter visiting a village or neighborhood and meeting with the local elder to convey the need for recruits. Later, the recruiter returns to the village/neighborhood and the elder presents the young men and/or women who have volunteered to serve. Currently, the recruiter has no tangible way to express appreciation on behalf of GIRoA. HRM has submitted a request for FY 2018 funds to supply RBIs to ANA and ANP recruiting commands.

**Afghan National Army Structure**

The largest ANA elements are the six regional corps. Each corps is typically composed of a headquarters *kandak*, three to four infantry brigades, and various specialty *kandaks*. The 201st Corps, 203rd Corps, 205th Corps, 207th Corps, 209th Corps, and 215th Corps are responsible for their geographic regions that follow the provincial boundaries (see Figure 6). The 111th Capital Division is independent from any corps and is responsible for security in Kabul.
Figure 6: ANA Corps and 111th Capital Division Boundaries

Afghan Air Force

The AAF is the primary air enabler for the ANDSF, responsible for air mobility and aerial attack missions across Afghanistan. The AAF can independently plan for and provide air assets for logistics, resupply, humanitarian relief efforts, return of human remains, MEDEVAC, casualty evacuation (CASEVAC),\textsuperscript{36} non-traditional ISR, air interdiction, close air attack, armed overwatch, and aerial escort missions. The AAF headquarters is in Kabul and provides command and control of 11 detachments and three wings: the Kabul Air Wing, the Kandahar Air Wing, and the Shindand Air Wing. TAA at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of the Afghan Air Force primarily occurs in three locations: Kabul, Kandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif.

The AAF has some of the highest retention and lowest attrition rates in the ANDSF. Attrition is consistently less than 1 percent of the force, and 89 percent of AAF pilots and maintenance personnel re-contract when their tour is complete. Recruiting individuals with the requisite education and language skills remains a challenge. Training pilots and maintenance personnel takes time. In many instances, the training programs and infrastructure lack the capacity to

\textsuperscript{36} MEDEVAC differs from CASEVAC in the level of care provided to the patient and the type of vehicle or aircraft used. MEDEVAC missions typically have en route care provided by a medic, and make use of dedicated or specialty vehicles. CASEVAC missions are usually on an ad hoc basis, often without medical care provided en route, and in vehicles or aircraft not specifically designated for patient transfer.
produce enough trained pilots to keep pace with the new aircraft joining the fleet. Given these challenges, any recruiting shortfall or higher than anticipated trainee attrition rate would limit the AAF’s ability to operate and maintain its growing force.

On August 7, 2017, the MoD published an order directing the AAF to develop a standalone AAF recruiting policy separate from the ANA. The AAF policy must take into account the technical nature of AAF flight and maintenance operations and provide for a higher assessment and selection standard for new recruits. NAC-A will continue to insist on a merit-based training selection process. Additionally, advisors will ensure the AAF properly documents training progress and records competencies against tashkil positions to ensure the right personnel have the appropriate training.

Some senior AAF personnel feel threatened by effective and energetic junior leaders. Advisors have identified junior leaders who merit appointment to senior positions and will work with MoD and AAF leadership to identify and replace ineffective senior leaders. Advisors designed a Training and Exercise (TREX) program to improve senior level AAF leadership decision-making regarding the development, sustainment, employment, integration, and command and control of the AAF. A series of Table Top Exercises (TTXs) will educate the CoGS and AAF leaders on airpower capabilities, targeting process improvement, and effective asset employment. Previous TTX results revealed the need for thorough target development, deliberation, and collateral damage assessment and mitigation. Advisors will increase the frequency of TTXs to reach a broader audience, reinforce learning objectives, and expand the discussion beyond the targeting process.

**Airframes**

As of November 30, 2017, the AAF has 117 aircraft of which 94 are operational. Fixed-wing platforms include C-208s, C-130s, and A-29s. Rotary-wing platforms include Mi-35s, Mi-17s, MD-530s, and UH-60s. The AAF is now authorized an additional 30 MD-530 helicopters, 6 A-29s, and 32 AC-208 aircraft to bolster its aerial fires capabilities. Although the AAF continues to develop pilots, some platforms are limited by insufficient flight engineers or other personnel required to assemble fully-trained flight crews.

As part of the ANDSF Roadmap objective to increase fighting capability, the AAF will grow in both capacity and capability. According to the current aircraft delivery schedule, the total AAF fleet will reach 203 aircraft by the end of 2020, including the following additional aircraft: 54 UH-60, 22 UH-60 fixed forward firing (FFF), 55 MD-530, 25 A-29, 14 AC-208 (3 aircraft will remain SMW aircraft are not included in this total.

37 The Government of India donated four Mi-35s to Afghanistan. The AAF’s prior Mi-35 fleet reached the end of its service life and is not included in the official tashkil. The coalition does not provide TAA support to the Mi-35 aircraft or their crews.

38 The Government of India donated three Cheetah helicopters during the first half of 2015. The coalition does not provide TAA support to the Cheetah aircraft or their crews.

39 The C-130 crew complement is three pilots, two loadmasters, and one engineer. The C-208 flight crew complement is two pilots. The A-29 crew complement is one pilot. The Mi-17 crew complement is two pilots, two gunners, and one flight engineer. The MD-530 crew complement is two pilots.
in the US for training), 24 C-208, and 4 C-130 aircraft. Of note, the first UH-60As arrived in Kandahar in September 2017, and the first six Afghan Pilots began training on the Black Hawks in early October 2017. Figure 7 details the number of AAF airframes, fully trained pilots, and fully trained flight crews currently on hand.

Figure 7: Summary of AAF Airframes, Pilots, and Aircrews*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Aircraft</th>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Inventory</th>
<th>Qualified Aircrews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fixed Wing</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-208</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC-208</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rotary Wing</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-17</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD-530</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-60</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-35</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>No coalition TAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheetah</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>No coalition TAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>315</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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41 This reflects the number in Afghanistan available for combat operations. There are currently seven additional aircraft at Moody Air Force Base, Georgia, used for training Afghan pilots and maintenance personnel. One A-29 crashed during a March 6, 2017, training mission near Moody Air Force Base.

42 This number does not include the additional Mi-17 helicopters used by the SMW.

43 The AAF will receive 119 UH-60 and 40 UH-60 FFF aircraft by 2023 as part of the plan to transition from Mi-17 to UH-60 helicopters.
The C-130 transport aircraft provides a medium- airlift capability in support of personnel and equipment transport, CASEVAC, and return of human remains.

C-130s operate from Kabul and conduct operations throughout Afghanistan to locations with improved airfields. AAF C-130s are used primarily as a strategic airlift capability for large passenger movements and CASEVAC operations. In addition, they are used to transport cargo too large or unsuitable for the C-208 or Mi-17 aircraft, such as maintenance equipment and parts, bombs, and weapons.

Aircraft availability currently limits C-130 operations. The current logistics support contract requires that one C-130 aircraft is ready to fly missions every 12 hours (assuming two aircraft are mission capable). The AAF has four C-130 qualified crews and is capable of flying two aircraft in a 12-hour period. TAAC-Air and the AAF will modify the contract to allow for greater aircraft availability while accelerating the growth of flight engineers and loadmasters through in-country training. There are currently four pilot candidates undergoing vetting prior to training.

Small fleet size (only 4 C-130 aircraft) limits the strategic impact of this platform. During this reporting period, AAF crews, with coalition support, delivered aircraft to and from depot maintenance in Portugal. International operations like these improve overall capability.

Logistics and maintenance of the C-130 are two areas where the AAF are completely reliant on CLS support. While the AAF are nearly self-sufficient with respect to Mi-17s, they are nowhere near self-sufficient with the C-130.
The C-208 aircraft provides light-lift, personnel transport, CASEVAC, and recovery of human remains for the ANDSF. TAAC-Air continues to expand the C-208 employment envelope by developing soft field landing and airdrop capabilities to free Mi-17 helicopters for other mission sets and more demanding operating environments for which it is uniquely designed.

C-208s operate from Kabul, Kandahar, and Shindand. C-208s can forward deploy to improved and some unimproved airfields throughout the country. The C-208 fleet relies on a mix of CLS and organic maintenance, and will do so for the foreseeable future.

The AAF added a C-208 airdrop mission set as a new capability developed and initially trained by TAAC-Air advisors. In January 2017, the AAF C-208 initial cadre successfully conducted several airdrop training missions earning certification to conduct aerial resupply missions. The Afghan pilots dropped bundles within 30 meters of the desired aim point. In June 2017, without coalition assistance, the AAF completely planned and executed the first operational airdrop in the Patika region. Additionally, the AAF has demonstrated increased capability for overall maintenance of Mi-17s and C-208s, without coalition or CLS assistance. Currently, the AAF completes 60 percent of C-208 maintenance, with the remaining 40 percent completed by CLS. Finally, TAAC-Air is in the early stages of introducing an Afghan-led aircraft parts storage and distribution system starting with a small number of C-208s in 2017.
The AAF uses the A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft to attack targets of strategic significance and provide close air attack in support of ground forces. The A-29 can carry Mk-81 250-lb bombs, Mk-82 500-lb bombs, rockets, and two .50 caliber machine guns mounted in the wings. The A-29 can employ laser-guided bombs, but employment training is delayed due to technical issues with front seat targeting and aircraft performance limitations. However, the A-29 pilots continue to achieve high accuracy with unguided bombs and there has been no operational impact due to the delays in laser-guided bomb training.

Twelve A-29s are in Afghanistan along with their Afghan pilots and associated maintenance personnel. Seven additional Afghan A-29s are at Moody Air Force Base (AFB), Georgia, to support pilot and maintenance training. No additional A-29s were delivered to the AAF this reporting period; however, delivery of the seven A-29s from Moody AFB to Afghanistan will be synchronized with graduating classes of pilots and maintenance personnel. The current schedule builds the AAF A-29 fleet to 19 airframes by the end of 2018 and to 25 airframes as construction allows. Procurement of an additional six A-29s has been approved.

Three A-29 pilots returned to Moody AFB this reporting period to attend the Instructor Pilot Upgrade (IPUG) course. IPUG training is an important step in creating an Afghan-sustainable training program. Additionally, the AAF Air Operations Department (AOD) in Mazar-e-Sharif began controlling Afghan-only combat operations this reporting period.
During this reporting period, the AAF has conducted 323 A-29 air strikes. Since commencing combat missions on 01 Jun 2017 through to 26 November 2017, A-29s flew 895 missions, and delivered strikes on 323 of those missions enabling key ANDSF tactical and operational successes. The A-29 fleet flew 171 more strike missions in this period than in all of 2016. The A-29 fleet provides the AAF the capability to strategically strike targets across the country and is critical to solidifying ANDSF gains. The A-29 pilots continue to show disciplined restraint in not dropping on targets with ambiguous parameters or the possibility of CIVCAS. The U.S. and other coalition forces require the ground force commander to assume responsibility for an air strike. In Afghanistan, the pilot assumes full responsibility for an air strike contributing to the restraint shown by A-29 pilots.

Aircrew manning remains an issue for the A-29 fleet, with crew ratios below 30 percent of authorized levels. Some pilots are currently undergoing NVG flight training. The AAF has a plan to send some pilots to an instructor course to help expand the pilot training program and take full advantage of this year’s winter training program.

Because A-29 programs are still in the early stages of a rapid operational fielding, aircraft maintenance capabilities remain a challenge. As aviation maintenance training continues, the AAF will require CLS and supporting training contracts to maintain combat capability in these newer airframes over the mid-term. Currently the AAF completes 40 percent of A-29 maintenance, with CLS providing the other 60 percent.
**Mi-17 Helicopter**

The Mi-17 helicopter conducts day and night personnel transport, MEDEVAC, resupply, close-combat attack, aerial escort, and air assault missions. Making up just fewer than half of total AAF aircraft, the Mi-17 is the “workhorse” of the AAF. The AAF is capable of deploying and operating Mi-17s throughout the country.

Thirteen Mi-17s can be configured for a fixed forward-firing capability, including 11 capable of employing rockets. Armed Mi-17s accounted for more than 17 percent (207/1206) of the aerial fires missions tasked in support of ANSF operations during the reporting period, a significant decrease over the last report. This drop reflects the increased operations tempo from the MD-530 and A-29 fleets, including their ability to operate from forward locations. Using the Mi-17s as armed gunships limits the AAF’s ability to employ Mi-17s in support of other mission sets, such as MEDEVAC and aerial resupply.

The AAF has proven more than capable of maintaining the Mi-17. The AAF are largely self-sufficient with the Mi-17, including the completion of a 1,500-hour inspection of the Mi-17 on their own during this reporting period. Better maintenance and more disciplined use of the Mi-17 aircraft resulted in better maintenance and lower-than-expected attrition during this reporting period.
The MD-530 helicopter provides close air attack and aerial escort to the ANSF. The MD-530 has two weapons pylons, capable of firing .50 caliber machine guns and rockets.

The AAF currently relies on CLS for MD-530 sustainment; however, the AAF is building an organic maintenance capability for the MD-530. TAAC-Air is working with the AAF to increase the number of MD-530 pilot and maintainer students in training to maximize independence and sustainability of the fleet. Full aircrew manning is forecasted for 2018.

MD-530s have made significant contributions between June 1 and November 26, 2017, conducting 576 air strikes while participating in Afghan-led aerial escorts, close air attacks protecting troops in contact, and deliberately planned strike missions. Aircrew manning remains an issue for the MD-530 fleet, with crew ratios below 30 percent of authorized levels. Aviation maintenance training is ongoing and progressing well. Currently, the AAF has the capability to support MD-530 operations at forward deployed locations for short intervals without CLS presence. Nevertheless, the AAF will continue to require CLS and supporting training contracts to maintain combat capability in the mid-term. Currently the AAF completes 35 percent of MD-530 maintenance, with CLS completing the remaining 65 percent.
The UH-60 Black Hawk is a medium-lift, multi-role utility helicopter in the process of being introduced to the AAF. Once fielded, the UH-60 will perform air assault missions, personnel transport, MEDEVAC, resupply, and other lift missions. The U.S. and coalition partners have utilized the UH-60 for several years in the Afghanistan operational environment and this aircraft will be deployable to the vast majority of the country.

The first four UH-60s available for training are currently operating at Kandahar Air Field. TAAC-Air advisors are training current Afghan Mi-17 aircrew how to fly and operate the Black Hawk. Beginning in January 2018, two operational UH-60s will be delivered to Afghanistan per month until at least June 2018, for 16 total UH-60s in Afghanistan by June. TAAC-Air has identified the first 36 pilots to convert from the Mi-17 to the UH-60; each class of 6 pilots will take approximately 8 weeks to complete the training. The first 6 pilots began their conversion training at Kandahar on October 2, 2017.

**Training**

Pilot training remains an issue. The lack of qualified candidates with the necessary technical skills to complete training presents a challenge. Finding suitable candidates with English skills remains difficult, although there has been a steady flow of candidates entering the aircraft maintainer pipeline. A focused training program has shown some success in producing additional pilots. Unfortunately, there have been multiple cancellations of courses at the Afghan Air University have caused elevated threat levels. These cancellations have interrupted multiple classes (including
English language training, a prerequisite for nearly all other training pipelines). The AAF has sufficient capability to execute its current mission sets and enough personnel to operate the on-hand aircraft. What the AAF does not have is the capacity to meet the ANA’s growing demands for air support in its various forms.

In recognition of the capacity shortfalls, the AAF is pursuing several avenues to train new pilots. More than 200 students are currently enrolled at the Afghan air academy, Academie-e-Hawayee (AH), 25 at Moody Air Force Base for A-29 pilot and maintainer training, and 6 at Fort Rucker for rotary-wing pilot training; five at Columbus Air Force Base for pilot and leadership training; and 11 at the Defense Language Institute for language training prior to pilot and maintainer training.

During this reporting period, the AAF C-208 program became increasingly capable of performing day and night airdrop missions. Using C-208 platforms to drop supplies to ANDSF in the field reduces that mission requirement for the aging Mi-17 fleet of helicopters. Additionally, the AAF now embeds added Air Liaison Officers (ALO) teams in four corps, on a rotational basis, to provide 24/7 Air-Ground Integration support, planning, and coordination. The ALO teams will help ground forces commanders understand how to integrate air assets into operations.

Additionally, NAC-A seeks a refined recruiting policy specific to the AAF and continues to conduct deliberate nighttime and NVG flight training. TAA efforts will focus on educating leadership on the proper application of airpower and assets to ensure aircraft and personnel are properly employed. At the senior level, NAC-A is designing a training/exercise program to improve senior level AAF leadership decision-making for the development, sustainment, employment, integration, and command and control of the AAF within the ANDSF.

**Sustainment**

The AAF has improved its aircraft maintenance capability greatly for some aircraft in the fleet, particularly Mi-17s and C-208s. During this reporting period, the AAF increased its capability to maintain Mi-17s and C-208s, with limited to no coalition or CLS support. Afghans also conduct most interval inspections of Mi-17s and C-208s on their own.

Beyond the Mi-17 and C-208, the Afghans still rely heavily on CLS to perform nearly all maintenance tasks. Aircraft, such as the C-130 and A-29, are more complex and building maintenance capabilities for those platforms remains a challenge. The incoming UH-60s will pose a similar challenge to the C-130. As in the case of the C-130, the AAF will likely rely on CLS for nearly all UH-60 maintenance. The AAF has demonstrated an increased ability to maintain MD-530s on their own, for a limited time, at forward deployed locations.

**Operations**

As the MD-530 and A-29 effectiveness has increased, Air-to-Ground Integration (AGI) has become increasingly paramount to effectively coordinate and employ air power in support of the ANDSF. This reporting period, the AAF demonstrated improved AGI capability by integrating A-29s, MD-530s, Scan Eagle ISR, and Afghan Tactical Air Coordinators (ATACs) to coordinate
and conduct kinetic strikes in support of ANDSF counterinsurgency operations. Unfortunately, research shows that trained ATACs are rarely used in their roles for AGI duties. A recent survey found that only 11 of 290 trained ATACs were actually employed in their assigned ATAC role. In a number of cases, trained ATACs filled roles as armed security at ANA checkpoints and other duties.

Although the AAF has been effective in using a Mission Planning Cell (MPC) for kinetic strikes, MoD leaders must continue to gain familiarity and comfort with the targeting process. Shifting objectives – often changing on a daily basis – has led to a truncated and unpredictable targeting process.

AAF MEDEVAC capability continues to evolve and improve. Over the past three years, total AAF MEDEVAC missions have increased significantly, from 1,243 missions in 2014, to 3,169 in 2015, and to 3,289 missions in 2016. Between June 1, 2017 and November 26, 2017, the AAF executed 5,435 CASEVAC missions. This increase in operational capacity is partly due to the training and fielding of 15 of 20 planned new AAF medics in 2016. The medics attended a two-month MEDEVAC course in the winter of 2016 and emerged fully-trained for the 2017 spring campaign.

The AAF continues to demonstrate the capability to conduct aerial resupply missions using C-208 aircraft following a series of tests of airdrop resupply. C-208 aerial resupply missions reduce the burden on the overtasked Mi-17 aircraft, freeing them up for other missions and alleviating some maintenance concerns. Afghan pilots can drop bundles with a high degree of precision, validating the method as a viable means to resupply forces. The AAF airdrop capability grew throughout 2017 as more aircraft were modified with the requisite roll-up doors. C-208 crews conducted three airdrops during this reporting period and TAAC-A and NAC-A continue to encourage increased utilization of this new capability as a means to quickly resupply ANDSF forces in the field.

**MoD Afghan Special Security Forces**

Afghan special operations forces are considered among the best in the region, and they continue to mature with coalition assistance. The ASSF have proven their ability to conduct counterterrorism raids successfully and are furthering their capability to analyze and exploit intelligence gained from these operations. Expanding the ASSF is a key pillar in the ANDSF Roadmap, and the ANDSF will look to make the ASSF the primary offensive force capable of striking anywhere in the country.

MoD’s ASSF components rely primarily on MoD elements and typically the closest ANA corps headquarters and regional logistics node for sustainment support. Part of President Ghani’s 4-year plan involves restructuring the ASSF and adding general support *kandaks* (GSKs) to ANASOC brigades to make them less reliant on conventional ANA logistics systems and units. Planning for the addition of ANASOC brigade support *kandaks* is ongoing. In all likelihood, GSKs will be smaller than conventional support *kandaks*, and focus primarily on the distribution of supplies from the supply depots to ANASOC units. In the interim, the ASSF plan to establish logistical nodes at the forward supply depots and regional logistics centers to take possession of material before it enters the unreliable logistics supply networks of the MoD and MoI.
Despite some improvement and signed CPAs to eliminate such practices, the ANA continues to misuse and overuse the ASSF. The ANA often employs the ASSF in conventional roles, such as checkpoints or personal security detachments. This misuse undermines the ASSF ORC and fails to hold ANA units accountable for their training and performance. Corps commanders also routinely employ the SMW on improperly assigned missions, detracting from its ability to fulfill its pre-planned and authorized missions.

**Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC)**

The ANASOC’s mission is to increase the Afghan Government’s ability to conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations, and, as directed, execute special operations against terrorist and insurgent networks in coordination with other ANSF pillars. ANASOC is now a corps headquarters responsible for command and control of all ANA special operations forces. The ANASOC is currently authorized 16,040 personnel and is organized into four Special Operations Brigades (SOB), 10 battalion-sized ANA Commando SOKs and a National Mission Brigade (NMB). The SOKs are ANASOC’s primary tactical elements and they conduct elite, light-infantry operations against threat networks in support of the regional corps’ COIN operations and provide a strategic response capability against strategic targets. Each SOK contains eight ANA Special Forces teams and several support elements. Nine of the ten SOKs are aligned with a specific ANA corps. The 6th SOK, located in the Kabul area, functions as the ANA’s national mission unit, and it was assigned to the National Mission Brigade when it reached initial operating capability in May 2017. Although the ANASOC comprises a very small percentage of the ANA manning, it conducts a majority of the ANA’s offensive missions. The NMB consists of a brigade-level HQ with a deployable mission command package, including the 6th Special Operations Kandak, Ktah Khas (KKA), and two Special Forces Kandaks. Liaison personnel from the MoI and National Directorate of Security (NDS) serve in the NMB HQ to ensure ANA-ANP coordination. The SMW and the Afghan Air Force (AAF) provide priority support to the NMB.

ANASOC’s largest challenge remains the misuse and overuse of its forces by the MoD. Misuse is the employment of ANASOC forces outside of their designed mission set, while overuse is the tasking of ANASOC forces at a rate that precludes rest and recovery cycles. The MoD and ANA corps headquarters often request more commandos than are available, causing ANASOC to commit forces designated for a rest and recovery cycle.

As part of the ANDSF Roadmap, the ANASOC division is expanding from a division of 11,300 personnel to a corps with four brigades and a National Mission Brigade, totaling 22,994 personnel. One of two MSFV brigades completed transition from the conventional ANA to the ANASOC with the second MSFV brigade due to transition in 2018. The first MSFV brigade’s personnel are in training to become Commandos. Once MSFV transition and training are complete, the ANASOC will form two Mobile Strike Kandaks (MSK). Nine of the ten SOKs will add an ANASOC Commando company, and each Special Operations Brigade (SOB) will gain a General Support Kandak (GSK).

The ANASOC School of Excellence graduated more than 1,178 students from more than 20 courses since June 2017. On Dec 6, 2017, ANASOC began a 14-week Commando Qualification
Course with 1,081 students. Expansion efforts are underway in preparation for a doubling of course sizes in summer 2017 to meet the requirements of the ASSF growth plan.

The establishment of the ANASOC Mobility School is a major improvement to ANASOC's training and education system. Fielding MSKs, and training their soldiers as commandos, allows for mounted and dismounted combined arms maneuver operations from armed troop carriers and provides SOKs a unique organic, direct fire capability. The Mobility School plans to produce two MSKs per training year, which will be a significant component of the newly formed SOBs over the course of the Roadmap.

**Ktah Khas**

The *Ktah Khas* is a light infantry SOK consisting of three operational companies, a training company, an engineer company, a military intelligence company, a support company, and a headquarters company. These additional companies support the *Ktah Khas* training cycle and support operations, including transportation for the *Ktah Khas* strike forces, explosive ordnance disposal to conduct counter-IED (C-IED) operations, and supporting the female tactical platoon, which enables interactions with women and children on missions. *Ktah Khas* platoons and companies conduct successful intelligence-driven counterterrorism raids, particularly against high-value individuals, and vehicle interdictions utilizing both ground and air mobility platforms. A focus on recruiting and retention has enabled the *Ktah Khas* to remain near full strength.

*Ktah Khas* recruiting is a two-month process where incoming recruits, selected primarily from recent ANA, ANP, or National Directorate of Security basic course graduates, are screened and selected to enter a thirteen-week *Ktah Khas* basic course. The *Ktah Khas* course focuses primarily on physical fitness, marksmanship, mobility, medical, and small-unit tactics to prepare candidates for integration, training, and deployment. Between the recruiting and basic training process, candidates for the *Ktah Khas* have a pass rate of approximately 12 percent.

*Ktah Khas* is capable of executing a well-planned ORC. The *Ktah Khas* ORC is a 32-week cycle that consists of “Red, Amber, and Green” phases. During the red cycle, units focus on individual training tasks and individual combat specializations. The amber cycle includes collective training tasks, such as a platoon live-fire exercise, full mission profiles, fire support coordination, and a validation exercise. Lastly, the green cycle is when the units focus on deployment and are available to execute missions. The three *Ktah Khas* companies are staggered in their cycles to have one company in each phase of the ORC at all times. Each cycle is separated from the next by one week, allowing soldiers to take leave; each member of *Ktah Khas* has an additional four weeks available for leave after companies return from an operational deployment.

**Special Mission Wing**

The SMW is a special aviation wing that provides persistent reach for the ASSF during counterterrorism (CT) and counternarcotics (CN) missions designed to disrupt insurgent and drug smuggling networks in Afghanistan. The SMW supports helicopter assault force raids and provides resupply, close-combat attack, CASEVAC, and ISR support for ASSF and ANA conventional forces. The SMW is the only ANDSF organization with night-vision, rotary-wing
air assault, and fixed-wing ISR capabilities. The SMW consists of four squadrons, two located in Kabul, one in Kandahar Airfield, and one in Mazar-e-Sharif, providing the ASSF with operational reach across the country.

Recruiting standards for the SMW are higher than for the AAF or other ANDSF pillars. Both the MoD and the coalition vet all SMW recruits to ensure that they are capable of maintaining a high standard of operations and professionalism. The SMW struggles to find qualified candidates to fill pilot and maintenance personnel slots.

Airframes

The SMW now possesses 110 percent of authorized Mi-17s, and 100 percent of authorized PC-12s. The goal is for SMW to have 40 Mi-17s authorized but those authorizations are not currently approved. During this reporting period, there was no increase in the number of fully trained Mi-17 pilots and a 15 percent increase in qualified Mi-17 aircrews. There were no changes in the number of PC-12 pilots or aircrews.
**PC-12 Aircraft**

The SMW utilizes the PC-12 fixed-wing aircraft to conduct ISR in support of counterterrorism and counternarcotics operations, including overwatch of ASSF ground assault forces and helicopter assault force raids during both daytime and nighttime operations.

Currently, 18 PC-12 aircraft are operational, providing the ANDSF with day and night surveillance and air-based signals intelligence capabilities. The PC-12 can send full-motion video (FMV) to a ground station and the onboard crew can perform real-time analysis of collected data. Despite these capabilities, SMW personnel require training to improve the integration of intelligence into combat operations.

The SMW is now considered FOC for the PC-12 and no longer requires enduring support from AFSOC’s 6th Special Operations Squadron. However, with no enduring lifecycle management program for the PC-12, U.S. program managers must determine how best to provide the required upgrades and critical modifications necessary over the life of the aircraft.

**Mi-17 Helicopter**

The primary mission of the SMW Mi-17 fleet is to conduct responsive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and precision helicopter assault, by day and night, in support of the full-spectrum, partnered and unilateral, MoD, MoI, and NDS-mandated activity to secure Afghan
citizens, interests, and property. Additionally, the Mi-17s conduct resupply operations, CASEVAC, quick reaction force missions, and personnel movement.

**Training**

The SMW makes use of multiple training opportunities under its CLS contract, including maintenance training, English language training, and flight training. All SMW personnel attend English classes, including conversational, aviation, and maintenance vocabulary.

Through the Kabul Security Assistance Office, the SMW makes use of extensive International Military Education and Training program opportunities. The SMW has sent one soldier to National Defense University, one to the U.S. Marine Corps Warfare Course, and three to the Building Partnerships Aviation Capacity Course Seminar.

During this training period, the SMW also conducted monthly training sessions with ASSF ATAC personnel to improve air-to-ground integration (AGI). The training sessions, known as Tolo AFTAB, allowed trained ATACs to communicate with and direct various types of aircraft in training scenarios designed to replicate combat operations, including understanding intelligence and guiding munitions onto targets.

**Sustainment**

The SMW reports directly to the MoD and receives new recruits from the ranks of the AAF. Beginning in April 2017, coalition advisors established a recruiting and retention incentive program for the SMW. Mentors also recommended the addition of two positions for recruiting to the SMW 2017-18 tashkil.

The SMW is slowly increasing its ability to conduct independent maintenance actions, particularly involving regularly scheduled 25-hour and 50-hour Mi-17 maintenance services. The SMW conducted 48 Mi-17 services and 3 PC-12 services without coalition assistance during the reporting period. There were also significant increases in the number of partnered maintenance services during the reporting period, involving Afghans and contract support.

On May 15, 2017, the SMW completed its first ever 100-hour aircraft inspection at Mazar-e-Sharif. Maintainers at Mazar-e-Sharif are still reliant on specialty tools from Kabul to perform services. The SMW received delivery of the tools in June 2017, allowing the unit to complete maintenance services without assistance.

**Operations**

The SMW operates four squadrons capable of conducting independent missions in support of ASSF elements. They continue to demonstrate improvements in operational effectiveness and efficiency, as well as independence. During this reporting period, the Afghans executed 95 percent of all SMW operations independently.
Most SMW missions during this reporting period were CT operations, with air movements, CASEVAC, and a smaller number of CN operations. The SMW remains agile and capable of executing increasing numbers of planned and short-notice missions in support of ASSF.

The SMW is capable of fielding helicopter assault forces at night and from multiple locations. From June 1 to November 23, 2017, the SMW conducted 538 deliberately planned operational missions. Of these missions, 99 percent were counterterror missions and one percent were counternarcotics missions.
SECTION 5 – MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

5.1 MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

The MoI oversees the ANP, which includes four main groups and three secondary groups that focus on security for specialized mission sets, investigations, and support to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations (see Figure 8). Sweeping changes within the MoI leadership during the reporting period, including the top three positions: the Minister of the Interior, the First Deputy Minister, and the Deputy Minister of Security. On August 13, 2017, Wais Ahmad Barmak, the acting Minister of the Interior, replaced General Taj Mohammed Jahid. Barmak was the former Minister of National Disaster Management where he influenced national policies in rural development and budget implementation. Since May, President Ghani replaced 16 of the most senior MoI officials. Although it is too early to gauge the full impact of these reforms, advisors already observe structural changes that may indicate improved delivery of ministerial functions (policy, strategy, administration, and support).

Figure 8: Ministry of Interior Organizational Chart

In addition to RS, eight other organizations and several bilateral advising programs focus on MoI institutional reform and improvement of the ANP’s professionalism. These organizations include the UN Development Program, UNAMA, the German Police Project Team, and U.S. Government departments and agencies, including the Department of State and the Department of Justice. The European Union Police mission officially ended its support for the RS mission in early 2017. Several of the organizations coordinate their efforts through the International Community Advisor Steering Council, which meets weekly in Kabul.
The MoI’s authorized uniformed end-strength includes positions for the MoI headquarters and the ANP pillars (see Figure 9). The Afghan Government also funds more than 9,500 civilian positions for the MoI. Beginning in 2015-16, the MoI adjusted its *tashkil* to account for the Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP) under the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) authorized level. However, the AACP remains a separate pillar and retains a separate command and control system.

**Figure 9: Ministry of Interior Manning Authorization**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Police by Pillar</th>
<th>FY 2015-16</th>
<th>FY 2016-17</th>
<th>FY 2017-18</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Border Police</td>
<td>23,315</td>
<td>23,599</td>
<td>23,219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan National Civil Order Police</td>
<td>16,203</td>
<td>17,202</td>
<td>17,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU) HQ and NMUs</td>
<td>1,934</td>
<td>2,097</td>
<td>1,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Uniformed Police (includes Afghan Anti-Crime Police and PSUs)*44</td>
<td>100,402</td>
<td>103,681</td>
<td>101,135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Interior HQ &amp; Institutional Support</td>
<td>15,144</td>
<td>10,121</td>
<td>13,901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTHS Accounts*45</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unallocated Resources</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Police Authorized</strong></td>
<td><strong>157,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>157,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>157,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Resource Management and Procurement**

The MoI continues to struggle with identifying of resource requirements to build annual budgets. To alleviate prior resource issues, the MoI signed its 2017-18 *tashkil* in April 2017; however, the MoI has not prioritized its requirements after the *tashkils* signature. Subordinate organizations have failed to follow the requirements submission process; with many organizations bypassing the local, provincial, or commanding headquarters. When requirements are collected, the Program and Analysis Division is effective at consolidating the requirements for review, although only slightly effective at hosting working groups and general officer steering committees to prioritize programs to allocate funding. Plans to expand of Core-IMS down to zone and below levels afford opportunities to improve in this area; however, the ministry budget personnel remain unable to consolidate requirements effectively.

MoI made steady progress on its FY 1396 budget execution, with 40 percent of its $190 million budget executed. The lack of sufficient technical specifications and clear requirements continue to slow the submission of requirement packages to the Requirements Advisor Board (RAB). CSTC-A Budget Unit Advisors continue to work with the MoI to prioritize budget requirements.

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*44* Beginning in SY 1394 the MoI and ANP began counting the AACP as part of the AUP on its *tashkil*, although it remains a separate force pillar.

*45* In SY 1395 the MoI and ANP adjusted the training, transient, holding, and student account on their *tashkil* to account for those members participating in out-of-country training for periods greater than six months.
to improve the quality and timeliness of requirement packages and increase execution rates. As of November 18, 2017, the RAB has approved 92 of 92 requirements totaling $89,623,130.37. Six of eight FY18 Procurement Plans have been signed, with the remaining two plans pending final review. All six FY18/19 Framework contract requirements have been through the RAB and are waiting to be approved by the National Procurement Authority (NPC). MoI will extend the current 2016-18 Framework contracts for up to 3 months to ensure coverage until the 2018-20 contracts are awarded.

The MoI continues to make use of the Subject Matter Expert (SME) program to hire experienced, college-educated, and technically proficient Afghans to provide skilled civilian support to the MoI. CSTC-A funded up to 300 SMEs to work on one-year contracts for the MoI to meet critical needs and enforce the eventual transition of the positions to typical civil servant positions funded by Afghanistan. Currently, 33 SMEs have transitioned to civil servant positions.

The suspension and turnover of senior members of the MoI left procurement offices without senior leadership, experience, and knowledge. In October 2016, the National Procurement Authority fired many MoI procurement department officials and removed the ministry’s procurement authority. The Director of Procurement billet remains vacant. Applicants for the position took a written test and interviewed in September 2017. The MoI hired new leadership and enlisted the help of several SMEs to reestablish the organization and regain procurement authority. With CSTC-A assistance, the MoI recruited and filled 66 senior level positions and over 90 mid-level positions through merit-based hiring tied to the SME program.

Legal Affairs

The Anti-Corruption Justice Center (ACJC) docket accelerated during this reporting period. During a three-week period in July and August 2017, the ACJC tried seven major primary court cases, including four in one week, demonstrating an ability to handle a robust docket. Since its inception in October 2016, the ACJC has held 24 primary court trials (91 total defendants) and 20 appellate court hearings (64 total defendants). During the summer of 2107, the ACJC moved to permanent facilities at Camp Heath. The ACJC facilities are adequate and appropriate for their mission.

On August 13, the ACJC tried five MoD senior officials, including LTG Moeen Faqeer, the former 215th Corps commander. The ACJC found LTG Faqeer guilty of fuel embezzlement and misuse of power and sentenced him to over five years in prison. The ACJC also convicted BG Fazil Rahman, LTG Faqeer’s former commander of 1st Brigade, 215th Corps, and sentenced him to over three years in prison. As part of the ruling, the ACJC required both officers pay restitution for the embezzled funds.

On August 15, the ACJC convicted six of nine defendants accused of misuse of authority, embezzlement, and producing false documents to steal over $38 million in fuel and oil contracts. Abdul Ghafar Dawi, the CEO of Dawi Oil and husband of the Afghan Ambassador to Norway, was convicted along with three other Ministry of Transportation employees and sentenced to over nine years in prison and forced to pay $21 million in restitution.
Although the ACJC handles many corruption cases, the Afghan Attorney General’s Office (AGO) tries the majority of the corruption cases. There is no RS TAA mission with the AGO.

The MoI’s Counter and Anti-Corruption (CAC) Plan, a framework document to establish, implement, and enforce processes to prevent and fight corruption throughout the MoI, was signed in April 2016; however, comprehensive implementation, monitoring, and evaluation remains slow. The array of MoI offices with assigned responsibilities and confusion over leadership roles has complicated implementation; however, the MoI IG is developing a written implementation plan.

Under the auspices of the CAC Plan and with RS advisor assistance, the MoI IG began implementation of the Ministerial Internal Control Program (MICP). The MICP offers MoI leadership an opportunity to improve their processes while decreasing the potential for fraud, waste, and abuse. The MoI plans to expand the MICP to other MoI organizations after training the Deputy Ministers to implement the MICP effectively.

Within the MoI, Transparency, Accountability, and Law Enforcement (TALE) committees, active at the ministerial, IG, and ANP zone levels, seek to address corruption, elevate significant issues to senior leaders, and disseminate decisions downward, as appropriate. The TALE meetings foster information sharing and promote collaboration across the MoI. Although TALE meetings have been sporadic, when convened, they have been productive and informative. RS advisors continue to encourage the IG to schedule more meetings.

The MoI IGs have developed processes to receive and respond to complaints, including a national hotline for complaints about corruption and other issues. In the past, the poor relationship between the Call Center Chief and the MoI IG relationship hindered the success of these initiatives. As late as March 2016, the Call Center would not forward many, if any, corruption complaint calls to the IG for investigation. Lack of communication, lack of trust, and past failures to act upon complaints contributed to the dysfunction. During this reporting period, the relationship between the Call Center and the MoI IG improved. Corruption complaint calls now go to the IG for processing. In August 2017, the Call Center forwarded 53 corruption complaints to the IG.

The MoI GVHR identification program continues to show improvement. During this reporting period, no new GVHR cases were reported, and work is being done to reduce the number of pending GVHR cases. MoI is preparing closure letters for an additional five cases, which would lower the number of open cases to 21. The MoI has been proactive, requiring additional information from subordinate offices, and dealing directly with cases alleging GVHRs. In addition to corruption cases, the AGO also handles GVHR cases. As stated above, RS does not have an advisory relationship with the AGO, but is assessing whether such a relationship would be beneficial.

**Personnel Management**

Efforts to gain full accountability of all MoI personnel remain a high priority within the MoI and the Afghan Government. As in the MoD, “ghost police” is a politically charged issue and this undermines efforts to build legitimacy and eliminate corruption within the ministry. The APPS system promises to provide unprecedented levels of transparency and accountability once
implemented. The MoI, working to ensure a smooth transition to APPS, must physically account for its personnel and confirm their enrollment in the AHRIMS system. As with the MoD, countrywide PAI efforts continued during this reporting period.

MoI completed the first and main phase of PAI data collection at the end of May 2017. PAI teams visited dozens of Zone and Provincial HQs as well as several lower echelon facilities during the primary phase of the operation. Throughout this reporting period, PAI teams re-visited selected ANP units that had relatively lower turnout during the main phase. This provided a "last chance" for members not previously able to reach a PAI center due to operational and/or transportation constraints. As of October 28, 2017, the 77 percent of the ANP are PAI enrolled; 69 percent of the ALP; 43 percent of the ABP; 76 percent of the AUP; and 92 percent of the ANCOP. Proper assignment of MoI personnel to valid tashkil positions has slowed the enrollment process and delayed the transition to APPS. As of November 30, 2017, after an aggressive four-month TAA period, 71 percent of the ANP are in valid positions on the current tashkil. Given the pending reorganization of the MoI and MoD, and subsequent modifications to the tashkil, further delays are expected. Personnel must be assigned to a valid tashkil position to earn pay. The PAI operation is validating the existence of MoI/ANP/ALP members across the country. PAI results are shared with NATO budget personnel and United Nations Development Program (UNDP) stakeholders for use in determining the amount of funding provided to the Afghan Government for ANP and ALP salary payments.

The MoI began APPS training in June 2017, and all data in AHRIMS was migrated to APPS during this reporting period. In November, a handful of MoI headquarters units implemented the APPS system. The MoI will implement APPS incrementally until all MoI units operate under APPS by April 2018. APPS operator training is ongoing and consists of 4-week classes graduating approximately 100 students per month. After the 4-week class, over-the-shoulder (OTS) training will occur at each unit for 4 to 8 weeks, including comparisons of pay calculations between APPS and AHRIMS before APPS becomes the system of record. APPS requires assignment of MoI personnel to an approved tashkil position to be recognized as a valid member of the force and receive pay. RS continues to encourage stronger control of reported personnel numbers by allocating funding only for those ANP personnel per approved tashkil positions.

APPS relies on automated payments to verified bank accounts as a counter-corruption measure. Three mobile banking platforms in Afghanistan help promote financial inclusion and push banking services to formerly unserved areas of the country, including 49 districts in 10 provinces that lack retail banks. Cellular service, and three separate mobile money platforms My Money, M-Paisa, and mHawala, reach much of the rural population. My Money and M-Paisa are used to pay civil servant salaries. Although there is no data on the percentage of Afghans excluded from the financial sector because of the lack of banks in rural areas and banking fees, My Money provides greater access to finance for approximately 14,100 local and national police (approximately 14 percent of the force).

The Ministry of Finance (MoF) piloted the My Money platform in 2009 for 1,200 MoI police with funding from two sources: CSTC-A for the ALP and the NATO Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) for the ANP. The MoF brokered a relationship between New Kabul Bank (NKB) and Afghan Wireless Communication Company (AWCC) to facilitate the development of
My Money. NKB and AWCC built internal systems capable of communicating account balances and notifying mobile users of account information. The MoF’s Treasury Department administers My Money for MoI, and it now has 10,500 ALP and 3,600 ANP as active users.

Because NKB is a state-owned institution, the MoF can direct Afghanistan’s central bank, Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB), to transfer salary funds directly into the My Money system, providing users with rapid access to their salaries. My Money offers a variety of banking services and users can withdraw money from any NKB branch or ATM, or from any AWCC branch or certified dealer. Additionally, My Money has several layers of security, including the use of near-field communication (NFC) technology, PIN codes, and fingerprint identification.

According to the MoI, many challenges remain in the My Money platform. For example, there is a lack of coordination between NKB and AWCC, insufficient Afghani currency for AWCC distributions, technical problems at NKB, and routine late payments in the provinces.

The presence of several different funding mechanisms — the Afghan government, LOTFA, and CSTC-A — hinders efforts to harmonize MoI salaries across the civil service pay scale. The Afghan government funds the baseline salaries of 66 senior-level and 125 mid-level civilian positions, with additional LOTFA funds added to their salaries through the Capacity Building for Results initiative. This has created a salary differential between the MoI civilians hired on as “experts,” with LOTFA funds added to their salaries, and their traditional civil service counterparts conducting the same tasks at the lower, base civil service pay rate. The Afghan government funds the remaining 9,640 civil servant positions in the MoI and the SME program is funded by CSTC-A. The deputy ministers have used the SME program to circumvent requirements to employ more civilians by consistently requesting SME extensions rather than developing integration plans to transition the positions to the civilian workforce.

During this reporting period, the MoI police training enterprise continued to struggle with planning and budgeting for basic services such as food, fuel, training supplies, and uniform items for their Regional and Provincial Training Centers (RTC and PTC). Corruption and the inability to forecast demands prevented MoI from programming, budgeting, and executing the necessary logistics to sustain training operations. After the MoI demonstrated a complete inability to prevent corruption within the fuel procurement and delivery system, CSTC-A took over fuel procurement operations. Despite U.S. involvement, the MoI still delivers the fuel and fuel theft remains a significant issue.

Transparency and accountability are the keys to overcoming corruption. Efforts to improve the programming, budgeting, and execution processes have largely failed due to MoI leaders’ unwillingness to make necessary reforms. Despite promises to increase transparency and accountability, MoI officials have not delivered. The effects of the corruption and dysfunction are readily apparent at training facilities where RTCs often have inadequate or spoiled food, unclean living conditions, and insufficient training material. Despite in-person appeals to MoI leadership by RTC commanders, the problems persist. The Kandahar RTC, for example, has not had a working washing machine for three years, and students are routinely issued soiled linens.
Institutional Training

The MoI’s institutional training remains a critical deficiency and lags far behind institutional training in the MoD. Despite U.S. and Coalition TAA efforts, strong training institutions have not emerged. MoI field units did not benefit from partnered TAA efforts in the same manner as in the MoD. The combination of weak institutions and resource shortfalls in the field resulted in a mediocre police force. MoI training efforts have vacillated between combat training and law enforcement training as U.S., Coalition, and Afghan leaders struggled to determine the best use of the police force. Even today, the focus has not shifted towards building strong institutions the way it has in the MoD. Efforts such as the MoD’s Unified Training, Education, and Doctrine Command UTEDC are absent as the MoI struggles to determine the way ahead.

MoI schools beyond initial training at Regional Training Centers (RTCs) are non-existent. The MoI does not exercise any authority over training at RTCs. ANP zone commanders own the RTCs and training at RTCs is not standardized. RS advisor involvement is critical; however, according to the RS Police Institutional Advisory Team (PIAT), there is no plan in place to increase advisor involvement. Future efforts to build MoI institutions is largely reliant on Coalition partners willingness to commit institutional trainers in the future.

The absence of human resource and career path management is just as worrisome as the lack of strong institutions. Aside from funneling new personnel through RTCs, there is no system to assign trained police to positions of need and no system to provide additional education or training opportunities to police as their careers progress. Schools, such as the MoD’s Command and Staff School and Pre-Command Course, do not exist in the MoI.

Logistics and Maintenance

The MoI continues to lack the systems and capabilities to procure equipment. Outdated equipment tashkils and significant disagreements within the MoI regarding approved equipment levels. The 2018-19 tashkil became the document of record in October and solved part of the problem; however, significant leadership turnover within MoI continues to hamper the process. Internal MoI disagreements and disagreements between MoI and RS advisors regarding tashkil fill levels led CSTC-A to assume control of the MoI tashkil development process during this reporting period. By baselining requirements, advisors are developing MoI’s capacity to conduct equipment procurement planning.

The MoI also lacks the capability to conduct effective life-cycle management (LCM) of its equipment. MoI logistics leaders lack the institutional training and experience required to review weapons and vehicle fleet densities, conduct regression analysis based on expected economic useful life models, and develop appropriate equipment life-cycle replacement plans. Like the MoD, the MoI remains reliant on CSTC-A to perform LCM on its behalf.

Coalition advisors continue to emphasize logistical planning and execution. Major challenges include a lack of timely and accurate reporting of inventory levels and consumption across key commodities, and resistance to sharing and cross-leveling supplies and equipment. Although the MoI published a zone SOP in 2016 to make zone commanders the single point for the submission
of logistical reports and requisitions, implementation and adherence to the SOP has been uneven at best.

On a positive note, the MoI improved its ability to plan and distribute organizational clothing and individual equipment (OCIE). Last year, the MoI failed to outfit its personnel with the proper winter equipment in a timely manner and required significant RS advisor assistance. During this reporting period, the MoI planned appropriately for the winter months as part of Operation *Khalid* and distributed more than 90 percent of the winter OCIE to its personnel by October.

Additionally, the MoI improved its use of the Core-IMS system to track inventory during this reporting period. Core-IMS is an internet-based inventory management system with the capability to manage the receipt, storage, and distribution of commodities. Integration of Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP) and Core-IMS provided for better inventory management of FMS shipments to Afghanistan. The integration of these two capabilities has improved inventory management practices as they relate to the transfer of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases to host nation supply depots. The process allows for automated tracking of SCIP FMS cases up to the point of issue from the depot. The July 2017 Support High Council for MoI approved the implementation of a Core-IMS Program Management Office (PMO) to oversee all Core-IMS transactions and policy implementation. This PMO will provide senior level guidance and oversight to all Core-IMS actions within MoI and increase Core-IMS user rates across the theater.

The transition to NATO standard weapons continued during this reporting period, but at a reduced pace. During this reporting period, the MoI returned over 10,000 AK-47s for re-issue to Afghan Local Police (ALP), exchange for NATO standard weapons, or for demilitarization at a DLA authorized site, including more than 7,000 AK-47s already demilitarized and another 450 pending demilitarization. The initiative to grow the ASSF resulted in prioritizing the issuance of NATO standard weapons to the ASSF over conventional MoI and MoD forces. NATO standard weapons on-hand and on order will address ASSF expansion first, followed by replacement of MoI AK-47s and other weapons. Although the MoI does not have a weapons commodity officer available to provide oversight, RS MoI advisors are working with the MoI to establish this position.

**Strategic and Operational Planning**

MoI leadership changes improved overall planning efforts. In August, President Ghani named Wais Ahmad Barmak as acting Minister of Interior and appointed a First Deputy Minister and Deputy Minister for Security. These appointments brought much-needed structure that was lacking under the previous MoI administration. Under the current construct, the First Deputy Minister for Security consolidated personnel, administrative, procurement, logistics, and other non-security functions under his control. The Deputy Minister for Security focused his organization on MoI forces in the field and strategic and operational planning. The MoI has not progressed beyond a baseline strategic planning level, but it is poised for growth.

MoI planners are deeply involved in election security planning for 2018 and they will remain involved as Operation *Khalid* nears completion and planning begins for the next operation. Although MoD and ANA planners have the lead on the transfer of the ABP to the MoD in
December 2017 and the ANCOP to the MoD in April 2018, MoI planners remain involved in the process.

Despite improved ability to conduct operational planning, reporting by ANP zone headquarters is generally poor. Commanders do not enforce proper reporting procedures and routinely bypass chains of command to address issues directly with senior leadership. As a result, zone headquarters rarely have acceptable situational awareness of the status of their units.

**Intelligence**

The Ministry of Interior (MoI) continues to expand intelligence capabilities while battling organizational friction and leadership shortfalls. Over the next two calendar years, MoI intelligence capabilities will increase with the addition of a Counter Threat Finance (CTF) capability within the Network Targeting and Exploitation Center (NTEC); Lawful Intercept Program (LIP) capability; the improvement and expansion of the Kabul Surveillance System (KSS); and a significant increase in the Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System (PCASS) capability. These additions will expand the MoI’s ability to collect information on the corruption, crime, and insurgency nexus. This, in combination with an effective network for targeting, counter-intelligence, and basic training structures, forms a solid foundation for future growth.

Following the success of its screening program to prevent insider threats and support counter-intelligence, the MoI extended the program to screen personnel placed in senior and other critical positions. In March, the MoI ordered screening for all high-level MoI positions, including general officer promotion boards and National Procurement Authority senior positions and promotions. The screening program proved successful during this reporting period. The Intelligence Investigation Directorate (IID), organized within the Directorate of Police Intelligence, successfully countered insider threats within the MoI. IID has organized and deployed PCASS and cellular exploitation (CELLEX) teams to vet police in most provinces, and respond rapidly to high profile attacks, providing screening of suspected personnel. The IID also added counter-espionage and counter-subversion question sets to their PCASS to utilize the system to vet personnel suspected of espionage and corruption.

The MoI’s primary analytical center, Department 41 of the Directorate of Police Intelligence (DPI), produces products in response to national and ministerial level RFIs. However, there are no products developed to support zone level operational decisions or, when produced, the products do not reach the desired consumer. RS advisors offered two explanations for poor intelligence dissemination. First, higher headquarters are reluctant to share information for fear of not getting full credit for the organization’s work. Second, the National Information Management System (NIMS) is not employed to its full capability that would result in the timely dissemination of analyzed intelligence and the timely ingestion of raw information for analysis. These same issues prevent intelligence sharing between Ministries.

Information and intelligence sharing between National Police Coordination Center (NPCC) and the National Military Command Center (NMCC) has improved significantly during this reporting period. The two organizations share daily intelligence summaries and conduct weekly
coordination meetings. Communication between NPCC Intelligence and the Kabul Garrison Command (KGC) also improved significantly. The KGC now shares daily briefings and intelligence summaries with the NPCC; in return, the NPCC shares all national-level and Kabul-centric reports with the KGC. There are also efforts to increase communication between the NPCC Intel Director and the National Security Council to allow a more complete national-level threat picture. RS advisors are working to consolidate all of MOI’s intelligence into a single organization under the Afghan Anti-Crime Police.

The establishment of a MoI Lawful Intercept Program (LIP) continued to progress, with the implementation of a Bi-Weekly Working Group composed of members from the Coalition and NTEC, an Afghan prosecutor, and an Afghan Investigator from the Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF). This group is developing personnel hiring criteria and standard operating procedures (SOPs) in preparation for program implementation in the second quarter of FY18.

**Strategic Communication**

Massive turnover at the highest levels of the MoI hindered efforts to improve strategic communications throughout the ministry. Former MoI spokesman, Mr. Sediq Sediqi, became to the head of Afghanistan’s Government Media Information Center (GMIC) earlier this year and the MoI has faced challenges in finding an adequate replacement. However, the Deputy Minister for Policy and Strategy, Masood Azizi, has assumed a more active role in guiding MoI strategic communications; this move may result in significant improvements over the next six months to a year. Mr. Azizi is expected to create structures and install personnel that will help MoI overcome challenges in producing and disseminating themes and messages that resonate with the Afghan people and are nested with the Afghan government strategic communications.

The gap in leadership meant MoI participation in weekly security coordination meetings at the GMIC waned during this reporting period. MoI communicators also failed to follow-through with communications activities, missing opportunities to improve the Ministries negative public image. At the zone level and below; however, communications and messaging efforts were much better. Zone commanders actively coordinate with ANA corps commanders and Afghan Government officials. ANP zones synchronize themes and messages with the ANA and government messages and these often resonate at the local level.

**Gender Office Efforts**

Approximately 3,000 women serve in the Afghan National Police. The MoI recently approved the 2017-18 procurement packages for female recruitment campaign items. The MoI recruitment target is 600 women per year, with a long-term goal of having 5,000 women in the MoI. As part of the recruitment and awareness campaign, the Gender Office distributes backpacks with ANP logos, pens, and notebooks to high school girls throughout the provinces. These efforts help reach students and young women in outlying zones and provinces beyond the reach of radio and television advertisements. Other recruitment efforts include incentives and bonuses, including recruitment bonuses, re-contracting bonuses, educational allowances, referral bonuses, childcare allowances, and other incentives help recruit and retain women in the ANP.
A lack of adequate facilities remains one of the largest obstacles to recruitment of women into the ANP. Basic requirements such as separate bathrooms and toilets, segregated recreational areas, and training facilities, have negatively impacted female recruitment despite $590 million being spent on female ANP initiatives.

To address these problems, RS developed commitment letters with the MoD and MoI to ensure adequate facilities are built and available for women, are not misused by men, and are subject to the withholding of 34 million Afghanis, on budget lines of the coalition’s choosing, per compound found in violation. CSTC-A will release the funds upon mitigation of the problems or approval of exception from the minister. CSTC-A withheld funds in 2017 due to misuse of women’s facilities, and the next round of letters are scheduled to go out in this reporting period.

MoI facility upgrades and development projects include:

- MoI HQ Women's Participation Program Compound
- Renovation of Parwan facility to include training and daycare building
- Renovation of Gardez female training facility to provide offices, billeting and daycare
- Renovation of Nangahar facility to provide changing rooms with lockers and bathrooms
- Construction of Pamir daycare and billeting

Support and enforcement of existing policies for recruiting, training, and placing women into the ANP tashkils continue to lag behind expectations. The draft FY2017-18 Commitment Letter for MoI reflects a five percent penalty per month until the Deputy Minister Administration, Training and General Command and Director of Human, Child and Women’s Rights Directorate develops and approves a training and career plan approved by the Police Development Board.

The full introduction of the APPS will provide the more reliable and timely data necessary to recruit and place females in valid tashkil vacancies. This will make possible a targeted recruiting and training approach so women receive appropriate training for their initial assignment and their skill sets are properly utilized.

The MoI trains women in areas such as basic police training, radio maintenance, and C-IED training. During this reporting period, 156 new recruits were identified to attend basic police training in Turkey and there are currently 2 females attending the National Police Academy in Afghanistan; MoI has established a goal of 10 percent female representation in each new recruiting class beginning in 2018. In another first for the MoI, four women attended and graduated from the C-IED course; they will be the first females certified to train others. The MoI also conducts training for women in basic computer skills, literacy, understanding human rights, laws related to violence against women, women’s rights according to Islam, self-defense, and sexual harassment and assault awareness.

The Police Institutional Advisory Team (PIAT) and Gender Office work closely to resolve concerns regarding the women recruited in Afghanistan and trained in Sivas, Turkey, who return without detailed knowledge of Afghan-specific laws and procedures. Too often, such women return from training and are assigned to positions without the proper technical training or are not assigned at all due to a lack of proper skill sets. The desired end-state is to recruit women for
specific tashkil vacancies and train them in Afghanistan with the technical skills required for initial assignments. The offices would like the training completed in Afghanistan so the program can have more oversight; however, the UNDP, not RS, controls the funding.

The MoI expressed interest in leveraging the existing MoD GOOD program with a pending contract proposal to conduct training at the MoI HQ, the Afghan National Police Academy, Central Training Command, Balkh Sergeant Training Center and the Afghan National Police. The ASFF-funded GOOD program will be available for ANP women beginning in FY 2018. This program provides literacy, English language training, computer skills, and office administration training to ANP military and civilian members. An additional initiative is underway to incorporate ANP women into the Dunya University scholarship program allowing eligible females to attend undergraduate degree programs. As discussed above, the GOOD program suffers from of a lack of security support for the instructors. As a result, they cannot travel outside of Kabul for classes for lack of RS Guardian Angels.

The Family Response Units (FRU) are in the process of adding more female police on existing unit tashkils to mitigate challenges presented by staffing issues. As discussed in Section 2 above, the goal is to have an onsite female FRU manager, an additional female police officer to allow for breaks of coverage, and a male officer to ensure their safety. This will also alleviate some of the challenges faced by victims when reporting domestic and sexual abuse. FRU police often assess victims with injuries and a recent initiative requires enrollment in First Aid training and equipping FRUs with the appropriate medical supplies. Police also enrolled in Domestic Violence Laws, Marriage Laws, Child Abuse Laws, and Case Documentation courses. The first class of female police graduated Family Response Unit (FRU) training on August 5, 2017, and the presence of women in the FRU will enhance ANP’s image in the community.

The MoI established a Sexual Harassment Committee with procedures to report and respond to sexual harassment complaints. This achievement reflects the MoI’s commitment to reduce sexual harassment and gender-based violence. However, RS advisors must ensure the committee remains focused on the effort to ensure women feel safe reporting incidents of harassment/violence, allegations are investigated, and offenders are held accountable.

5.2 AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

The ANP mission is to maintain civil order; reduce corruption; prevent the cultivation, production, and smuggling of illegal narcotics; provide security for individuals and the community; and safeguard legal rights and freedoms. Although the ANP currently focuses on working with and alongside the ANA to fight the insurgency, the long-term goal as described in the ANDSF Roadmap is to transition the ANP to a more traditional community police force.

One of the key initiatives in the ANDSF Roadmap involves the transfer of ANCOP and elements of the ABP to control of the MoD. ANP forces remain on the front lines augmenting the ANA during the “hold” phase of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations; however, with limited or no crew-served weapons, anti-armor weapons, armored vehicles, or ISR assets, the ANP are not sufficiently trained or equipped for traditional COIN tactics. The ANP’s focus and employment
in COIN military functions have hindered their development of sufficient anti-crime and other community policing capabilities. The ANP is several years behind the ANA in its development.

**Afghan National Police Strength**

The ANP have an authorized end strength of up to 157,000 personnel. The ANP recruiting/recontracting strategy remains informal, and ad hoc. Monthly casualty reports drive recruiting. ANP recruiters generally make trips to zones/districts where losses were greatest the previous month and where replenishment of personnel is most needed to maintain end strength. Although the ANP continues to demonstrate positive recruiting rates, reenlistment remains the primary challenge to maintaining effective strength. As in the ANA, the number of ANP personnel dropped from the rolls continues to comprise the largest portion of overall ANP attrition. The combination of frequent and lengthy deployments to remote checkpoints with minimal provisions and equipment, difficult living conditions, and the near-constant prospect of combat contributes to high ANP attrition.

**Afghan National Police Structure**

As described in Figure 9 above, the ANP is comprised of four pillars (AUP, ANCOP, ABP, and AACP) and three sub-pillars (ALP, Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), and Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA)). There are plans to transfer the ANCOP and the ABP to the MoD by the end of this year, allowing the MoI to focus its resources and efforts on counter-corruption campaigns and law enforcement.

The GCPSU is the MoI’s component of the ASSF. While they too provide security, and fall under MoI control, the ALP and the APPF are not counted as part of the 157,000 *tashkil*; however, they provide additional security under the MoI. The ALP are funded by ASFF, while the APPF do not receive any U.S. funding. The ANP is divided into eight zones that generally align with the ANA corps areas of responsibility. There are eight ANCOP brigades, one in each ANP zone and an additional brigade located in Helmand Province (see Figure 10).
Figure 10: ANP Zones

Afghan Uniform Police

With its current end-strength of approximately 89,000-people, the AUP is the largest police agency in Afghanistan and the primary police force the local populace encounters in their daily lives. The AUP consists of the traffic police, the fire and rescue departments, and a provincial police headquarters in each of the 34 provinces.

The AUP mission is to maintain the rule of law, provide security and civil order, prevent cultivation and smuggling of narcotics, and prevent the smuggling of weapons and other public property, such as historical and cultural relics. Other AUP duties include the detention of criminal suspects to be handed over to the judicial system, maintenance of reliable security measures for key infrastructure including roads and facilities, intelligence collection, and the provision of firefighting and rescue services during natural or man-made disasters. Leadership across AUP units varies, but generally senior MoI and AUP leaders do not empower lower level leaders to make decisions. Moreover, local AUP units and leaders are susceptible to influence by local power brokers and government officials.
**Afghan Local Police**

The ALP provide security within villages and rural areas to protect the population from insurgent attacks and to protect facilities. ALP personnel are recruited in concert with local elder approval and employed within villages to provide local security and prevent the spread of insurgent influence and activity in that area. NATO Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) provides TAA support to the ALP at the ALP Staff Directorate level.

During this reporting period, 963 ALP personnel were trained, all of whom were new recruits. In 14 of 31 provinces, between 91-99 percent of ALP are trained. Four provinces (Logar, Khost, Balkh, and Jowzjan) reported 100 percent of the ALP trained. To encourage retention, ALP are enrolled in the AHRIMS to maintain contract timelines, electronic funds transfer, and mobile money plans to ensure proper pay distribution. RS advisors reinforce these efforts at the ministerial level to ensure these requirements are properly resourced. Enrolling all of the ALP into AHRIMS poses some significant challenges. Seventeen districts where the ALP operate do not have the infrastructure required to support AHRIMS. Over the last year, some ALP personnel were killed travelling from their duty locations to areas where they could participate in PAIs and enroll in AHRIMS. Despite these challenges, 69 percent of the ALP are enrolled in AHRIMS. Current funding for the ALP is limited to the personnel enrolled in AHRIMS based on the policy only to fund salaries for verified ANDSF.

During this reporting period, there was no reallocation of ALP billets. During the last rating period, the former MoI redistributed 1,500 ALP billets to different areas based on political pressure from provincial governors. With frequent redistribution of ALP positions throughout the police zones by the ministry leadership, there is no long-term stability within the ALP tashkil. The reallocations negatively affect the ability of the MoI to implement and follow the ALP reforms properly, resulting in personnel and equipment accountability challenges.

ALP performance varied during this reporting period. The ALP performed extremely well in some areas, but not so well in others. In Nangarhar, where the program has been in place for several years with experienced ALP, ALP forces outperform conventional ANA and ANP. In contrast, relatively new and untrained ALP in Kunar performed poorly. The areas with new personnel did not benefit from the training and partnership offered by U.S. special operations forces during the Village Stability Operations (VSO) timeframe.

Throughout the reporting period, the ALP headquarters and ALP field commanders continued to work towards professionalizing the force. The ALP’s reputation has been damaged by allegations of human rights violations and the conflation between the ALP and local militias. The ALP vetting and training programs clearly separate them from other armed groups; however, a persistent messaging campaign is required to maintain national and U.S. support for the program.

**Afghan National Civil Order Police**

The ANCOP provides the ANP’s primary offensive capability. The ANCOP mission includes dealing with civil unrest, reacting to insurgent activities in remote and high-threat areas, conducting civil order presence patrols, and providing crisis response to public unrest and terrorist
attacks in urban and metropolitan areas. ANCOP units support the ANA during clearing operations by providing intelligence, tactical support, and manpower to secure seized terrain.

The ANCOP consists of eight brigades, largely aligned with the ANP zones. Because ANCOP units receive a higher level of training than typical AUP units or other ANP pillars and have an often-misunderstood mission set, local police commanders and political officials frequently misemploy ANCOP units. The MoI plans to transfer the ANACOP to the MoD as a commando unit by 2018.

The goal for the ANCOP transfer is the creation of a sustainable and effective force, able to significantly project the rule of law into contested areas and contribute to the wider ANDSF mission. Suggestions for the use of the ANCOP include acting as a military/police Gendarmerie force, use as a highway security force, employment as an ANA reserve force, or absorption into the main force to form part of the regular ANA.

The ANCOP is the foundation of the Afghan Government’s civil order response is built. As such, the ANCOP’s capability to respond effectively to civil disorder has influenced its role after transfer to the MoD. The next steps in the transfer process include the development of a draft transfer concept, an implementation plan, and a draft Presidential decree. The ANCOP will transfer the majority of its force to MoD in April 2018. An ANCOP force of around 2,500 will remain under the MoI’s control.

**Afghan Border Police**

The ABP secure and safeguard national borders, provide security at Afghanistan’s international airports, and maintain security in the border security zone – which extends 30 miles into the territory of Afghanistan – to deter terrorists, criminal groups, and smugglers. The ABP mission includes securing and patrolling border and control entry ports, such as airports and border-crossing points, and guarding against the illegal entry of persons, weapons, narcotics, and other goods. Along certain portions of the border, ABP forces are equipped with rifles, light and heavy machineguns, rocket-propelled grenades, and 82mm mortars.

The ABP headquarters is located in Kabul, and brigade-level units are assigned to seven zones throughout the country that align with the ANP zones. RS advisors continue to provide TAA support to the ABP at the headquarters and ANP zone levels.

The ABP have two distinct mission sets: a paramilitary mission and a traditional border police-type mission. This dual mission supports the overall ANDSF model of achieving layered security and unity of effort with ABP and ANA forces along the borders. The paramilitary mission provides security in the 30-mile zone along Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan. The MoI plans to transfer portions of the ABP structure and mission to the MoD by 2018 to serve as a combat organization. Once under MoD control, the new organization will be called the Afghan Border Force (ABF).

The end-state for the ABP transfer is a sustainable and effective force successfully operating under the MoD. Transferring the ABP to the MoD will allow the MoI to focus on community policing
efforts, counter-corruption, rule of law enforcement across Afghanistan. U.S. and coalition advisors are coordinating this MoD-led planning effort, with MoI in support, establishing a comprehensive plan that integrates both military and policing effects. Only an Afghan-led, inclusive, robust battle-coordinated joint planning effort between the MoD and MoI will generate positive planning outputs. Interactions between ministries, through engaged leadership at all levels, has proven effective in planning the transfer. The TAA and ministerial planning efforts have resulted in a signed Presidential decree that provides sufficient direction and guidance with the transfer, expected to be complete by the end of 2017. The successful transfer of the ABP will help shape the concept and set the conditions for the transfer of the ANCOP.

Afghan Anti-Crime Police

The AACP provides specialist police expertise and counterterrorism, anti-corruption, criminal investigation, biometrics, forensics, and specialized security detail support. Coalition subject matter experts work alongside their Afghan counterparts in the AACP’s forensic and biometric programs to support evidence-based operations. AACP personnel also work closely with criminal investigators, prosecutors, and judges to ensure the police, not the military, remain the primary face of the rule of law. AACP structures include the AACP headquarters, the Criminal Investigation Directorate, and the Counterterrorism Police division. The AACP also includes the Major Crimes Task Force.

Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan

The CNPA is the lead ANDSF pillar for counternarcotics (CN) efforts. The CNPA has regular narcotics police and specialized units located in all 34 provinces. Specialized units include the Sensitive Investigation Unit (SIU), the National Interdiction Unit (NIU), and the Intelligence Investigation Unit. The CNPA has approximately 2,000 personnel assigned, with approximately half in Kabul and half spread throughout the Afghan provinces.

The MoI’s NIU and SIU demonstrate their capability through interdiction operations that target senior narcotics traffickers. During this reporting period, the NIU and Commandos found and destroyed over $76 million worth of narcotics revenue, equipment, precursors, and refined narcotics. Such operations demonstrate the significant capability of the NIU and Commandos to conduct successful CN operations to disrupt the enemy’s revenue stream. NSOCC-A supports the NIU for joint CN and CT operations, training, and sustainment. These advisors collaborate with other U.S. Government departments and agencies, including the Department of State and the Drug Enforcement Agency.

46 Evidence-based operations entail arresting individuals for whom there is sufficient unclassified evidence to attain a conviction in an Afghan court of law.
Afghan Public Protection Force

The APPF is a state-owned enterprise under MoI’s authority originally established to provide contract-based, facility and convoy security services.\(^47\) The APPF’s current end-strength is approximately 11,189 personnel. The APPF currently guards key infrastructure, facilities, governmental and non-governmental public welfare projects, and other international projects. The APPF also escorts and protects convoys against insurgent attacks and provides security for non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations with diplomatic immunity, and political agencies of foreign countries located in Afghanistan. The APPF also protects facilities donated to the Afghan Government by international organizations and the private sector. No set tashkil authorization exists for the APPF, and the force is largely funded by billing customers for contracted work. Currently, NATO and U.S. forces do not support the APPF, except through the security contracts already in place, and the coalition does not advise the APPF as part of the RS mission.

MoI Afghan Special Security Forces

General Command of Police Special Units

The GCPSU is the MOI component of the ASSF, and it provides the ANP with a capability to conduct high risk rule of law operations such as counter terrorism, counter narcotics and counter organized crime, based on evidence in accordance with Afghanistan’s Criminal Procedure Code. These operations include both the execution of high-risk arrests and crisis response operations including hostage recovery. Due to its employment in these situations, the GCPSU incurs a higher rate of casualties than other specialized ANP units, which contributes to combat fatigue, higher attrition, and challenges with maintaining overall personnel and equipment readiness.

The GCPSU is responsible for the command and control of all MoI special police units, including three National Mission Units (NMUs), 33 PSUs that operate in direct support of the provincial chiefs of police, and 25 Provincial Intelligence (J2) Detachments. In practice, because provincial chiefs of police and provincial governors oversee payroll systems and salaries for the PSUs, they are frequently more responsive to provincial officials’ directives than to the GCPSU chain of command.

The GCPSU Special Police Training Center (SPTC) and Special Police Training Wing (SPTW) provide basic and advanced special police training respectively. SPTC routinely conducts three basic police operational courses each year with 450 students per class, whilst SPTW routinely conducts four advanced special police operational courses per year with 40 students in each class. GCPSU recruits are typically drawn from other AUP units and are chosen specifically for their skills and experience. During this reporting period, a number of high-risk arrest operations demonstrated the ability to conduct complex, independent helicopter and ground assault force

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\(^47\) The APPF was established subsequent to Presidential Decree #62, signed on August 17, 2010. The decree’s intent was to decrease the presence of private security contractors operating in Afghanistan. However, in August 2015, President Ghani signed Presidential Decree #66, which allows U.S. forces, NATO, and their respective contractors to use private security contractors outside of NATO and U.S. facilities or if they are in “direct support” of the ANDSF.
operations. However, the GCPSU remain reliant on coalition enablers, including ISR support, to be effective.

The ANDSF Roadmap calls for the expansion of the GCPSU HQ and Training Directorate, an increase in the number or Provincial J2 Detachments and the creation of three additional NMUs as part of ASSF expansion. The new NMUs are intended to provide crisis response, high profile attack prevention and reaction, and high-risk arrest capabilities to areas in western, northern, and eastern Afghanistan. The first 360 personnel destined for one of the new NMUs began training in September.

To expedite the growth of the NMUs, the GCPSU will expand its training infrastructure. Potential locations for new training sites include abandoned and/or underutilized facilities in northern Afghanistan near existing bases and training centers. Additionally, the RS Special Operations Advisory Group (SOAG) will increase the number of personnel assigned to the GCPSU by as many as 32 in addition to the increased Special Operations Advisory Teams who will train, advise and assist new NMUs. New recruits along with a small number of personnel serving in PSUs will undergo 4 phases of training in order to stand up the new NMUs.

During Phase 1, new recruits will complete the four-month GCPSU non-commissioned officer (NCO) course immediately followed by the two-month National Unit Operators Course (NUOC) in Kabul. Typically, GCPSU personnel serve a minimum of two years in PSU units gaining experience before entering NUOC; however, timelines for NMU growth demand acceleration of the training.

Upon completion of the NCO and NUOC course, a quantity of graduates will be transferred to existing PSU and NMUs in order to cater for natural and battlefield attrition. Graduates selected to form the new units will conduct collective continuation training in three cohort groups affiliated with each of the three new NMUs. Cohort units must successfully complete operational evaluations (OP EVALS) before the group is certified. Once certified, the group will become the foundation of the first of four squadrons in their new NMU.

Once graduated from OP EVALS, new squadrons will incorporate leaders selected from existing NMUs into its ranks to provide leadership and experience. Additionally, an entire squadron of NMU personnel from one of the original three (CRU 222, CF 333 or ATF 444) will serve alongside the new squadron for a period of no less than three months and until the next cohort squadron can join the formation allowing return to their parent NMU.

The NMU growth plan is designed to grow each of the three NMUs simultaneously. All three NMUs should be IOC in December of 2018 and FOC in February of 20.
SECTION 6 – FINANCING THE AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

The ANDSF continue to be funded primarily through annual congressional appropriations to the DoD via the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF). This annual appropriation enables the Secretary of Defense, to provide assistance to the security forces of Afghanistan with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, and supports the equipping, sustainment, training, and operations of Afghanistan’s security forces. NATO allies and partner nations also play a prominent role in the financial support of the ANDSF by contributing to the NATO ANA Trust Fund (NATF), which supports the ANA, and the UNDP-administered LOTFA that pays the salaries of police and builds MoI capacity. In addition, the Afghan Government draws upon its domestic revenues to contribute to ANDSF sustainment operations for ANDSF personnel. The ANDSF will continue to depend on coalition security and advisory assistance and donor financial assistance for 2018 and beyond. At the July 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, the Afghan Government reiterated its original commitment made at the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago to increase financial contributions to the ANFDSF incrementally each year to its own security forces.

6.1 HOLDING THE AFGHAN MINISTRIES ACCOUNTABLE

CSTC-A makes use of bilateral funding conditionality letters, commitment letters, and the CPA to hold the MoD and MoI accountable for ASFF-funded equipment and services and for direct contributions of ASFF funding provided to them. CSTC-A manages accountability through executing agreed-upon performance metrics in the letters. During this reporting period, CSTC-A signed an agreement with the Afghan Ministry of Finance (MoF) to establish MoD and MoI specialty accounts for apportionment of U.S. and donor funds prior to consolidation into a Treasury Single Account for use. This will facilitate routine audits and allow for greater transparency and accountability. CSTC-A also imposed a penalty of 280,000,000 Afghans on the MoD and MoI for failure to meet agreed-upon May 2017 building and infrastructure divestment benchmarks. CSTC-A also continues to withhold funds from both the MoD and MoI for their Customs and Revenue Departments’ lack of cooperation regarding taxation exemptions of trucks providing U.S. support and for insufficient numbers of personnel properly enrolled in APPS (e.g., AHRIMS data, biometrics, identification card). CSTC-A utilizes a single commitment letter with the MoD regarding the NATF, focused on literacy and English language training.

During this reporting period, CSTC-A reduced the number of commitment letters from 130 to 30. The 130 original commitment letters proved too difficult to enforce and track accurately. In addition, the imposition of penalties, as drafted in the original letters, would often detract from the combat effectiveness of the ANDSF. For example, penalties such as withholding fuel allocations inhibited unit mobility. Successful penalty constructs – such as withholding senior leader travel pay – now serve as the core of the commitment letters and create the incentive to comply without negatively affecting ANDSF capabilities.
6.2 U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS

The United States provides the bulk of funding necessary to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANDSF through the ASFF. The ASFF provides the ANDSF with the resources needed to fund ongoing ANDSF operations while developing the ANDSF into an effective and independent force capable of securing Afghanistan, protecting the Afghan people, and contributing to regional security. The majority of ASFF funding is executed through DoD contracts on pseudo-FMS cases; the remainder is provided directly to the Afghan Government primarily to fund ANA pay, logistics, and facilities sustainment contracts. The FY 2018 ASFF appropriation request is $4.937 billion, which includes $686.4 million for Afghan aviation transition. The ANDSF Roadmap, including ASSF growth, was finalized after the submission of the FY 2018 Justification Book; for this reason it does not include ANDSF Roadmap initiatives, including ASSF growth, were included. During this rating period, CSTC-A began reprioritizing funding efforts to cover ANDSF Roadmap costs; however, CSTC-A does not intend to seek additional FY 2018 funding for these priorities. Since FY 2005, Congress has appropriated more than $75 billion for ASFF. The yearly ASFF request is based on the overall ANDSF force structure that the United States is willing to support; the aim of the ASFF is to ensure Afghanistan can provide security to its population.

6.3 INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS

At the July 2016 Warsaw Summit, the international community agreed to “continue national contributions to the financial sustainment of the [ANDSF], including until the end of 2020.” This extended prior commitments made at the 2012 Chicago Summit, where donors agreed to support the training, equipping, financing, and capability development of the ANDSF until the end of 2017. At Warsaw, donor nations pledged about $900 million in annual funding for the ANDSF for the years 2018-2020, totaling approximately 93 percent of the contributions pledged at Chicago. The United States does not commit to a specific amount but funds the majority of ANDSF requirements by annually seeking an ASFF appropriation from Congress.

International donors provide funding either on a bilateral basis or through one of two multi-lateral channels, NATF and LOTFA. Approximately one-half of annual international contributions pledged at Warsaw are expected to flow through the NATF, with the remainder through LOTFA. U.S. funding is not part of the Warsaw commitment. To provide transparency and accountability, donor nations can participate in the Kabul-based ANDSF Funding Oversight and Coordination Body, co-chaired by the Afghan MoF and representatives from major international donors, which receives regular updates from the Afghan Government and CSTC-A.

DoD manages NATF on behalf of international donors to provide support and sustainment of the ANA. At the May 2017 NATF Board meeting in Brussels, DoD reaffirmed its commitment to managing the NATF for an additional three years. Since the NATF’s inception in 2007, 33 nations have contributed more than $1.9 billion. For calendar year 2018, 33 nations have thus far pledged $533 million to the NATF. Since Afghan FY 1394 (December 2014 – December 2015), CSTC-A has enforced a NATF commitment letter with the MoD and MoI that relies on the same stringent controls included in ASFF commitment letters.
The UNDP has managed LOTFA since its inception in 2002. In FY 2017, the international contributions apportioned for LOTFA was $455.7 million. The UNDP receives and manages donor contributions through LOTFA to pay the salaries of up to 157,000 members of the ANP. CSTC-A coordinates closely with the UNDP regarding the use of LOTFA and donor nations can participate in the LOTFA Project Board, which provides oversight over LOTFA-funded activities.

6.4 AFGHAN GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS

At the 2012 Chicago Summit, the Afghan Government committed to providing an annual minimum of 25 billion Afghanis, or $500 million at the 2012 exchange rate, to support the ANDSF. The international community’s expectation is that Afghanistan’s contribution would gradually increase over time to assume greater financial responsibility for the ANDSF by 2024. The 2016 Afghan national budget allocated 24.7 billion Afghanis ($387 million) for the ANDSF. Due to persistent security challenges and limited economic growth, the United States and the international community accept that the Afghan Government is meeting its obligations. CSTC-A recognizes GIRoA’s annual progress to meet its committed contribution of 25 billion Afghanis per year. The Afghan Government exceeded that amount through its planned budget projections for FY 2017 of 26.1 billion Afghanis ($408 million) and its ability to exceed that goal by executing 30.5 billion Afghanis ($478 million).

Efforts to Increase the Afghan Government’s Financial Responsibility for the ANDSF

Increasing revenue from the Afghan Government is important to long-term ANDSF sustainment and to the stability of the Afghan Government. The ability of the Afghan Government to assume increased financial responsibility for the ANDSF is tied closely to the growth of the Afghan economy. During this reporting period, the Afghan Government took important steps to increase legitimate government revenue and to facilitate economic growth, but the prospects for robust near-term economic growth remain limited. The United States, the international community, the Afghan Government, and civil society organizations continue to prioritize sustainable growth in the Afghan economy as Afghanistan enters its second year as a member of the World Trade Organization.

CSTC-A continues to work with the Afghan Government to ensure appropriate oversight of direct contributions to the MoI and the MoD. The FY 2018 commitment letters consolidated, eliminated, or refined 85 of the original 170 conditions in the FY 2016 commitment letters. Additional changes include structuring incentives to encourage the Afghan government to meet its Chicago Summit commitment of 25 billion Afghanis annually and to increase its annual ANDSF funding contribution as its economy and revenues grow, with the aim of assuming financial responsibility for the ANDSF by the end of the “Decade of Transformation” in 2024. The commitment letters set the conditions for the Afghan Government’s use of ASFF contributions. The FY 2018 commitment letters focus on improving and implementing enduring ANDSF processes and

48 In a strong signal of international support, donor nations pledged $15.2 billion for development for Afghanistan through 2020 (though down from $16 billion for 2013-2016). The funding is not a commitment but an intention based upon GNU’s progress on economic and social reforms necessary to remove constraints on private-sector investment to spur economic growth and job creation, enabling Afghanistan to realize its potential and achieve self-reliance.
systems directly linked to strengthening the accountability of equipment, weapons, ammunition, fuel, personnel, and pay – all areas of opportunity for corruption and graft.

In FY 2017, Afghan Government tax and nontax revenue continued its upward trend. The Afghan Government estimates that it will collect 156 billion Afghanis before the end of the fiscal year on December 20, 2017 — a 4 percent increase over the previous year. The Afghan Government’s revenue collection continues to increase; however, this is has more to do with the sale of state-owned assets and tax rate increases than the expansion of the tax base, which remains small and concentrated on imports and large and medium-sized businesses. The MoF, specifically the Afghan Revenue Department (ARD), is taking aggressive steps to identify companies operating in Afghanistan under licenses to ensure they are properly filing annual tax returns, whether there is a tax liability or not, to assist Afghan Government efforts to hold commercial entities liable for tax responsibilities. ARD works with the licensing authorities to suspend license renewals until it can determine whether an entity has paid its tax liability.

In addition, as electrical power generation and distribution expand throughout the country, the Afghan Government will increase its capability to generate additional revenues for power supply supporting economic growth and generating additional tax revenues to support the ANDSF. The MoD and MoI’s use of framework contracts contributed to cost reductions in contracted goods and services as a direct result of open-tender bidding and regionalizing contracts by provinces. The MoF projects $5 billion (350 billion Afghanis) in total revenue for 2017, which includes $2.7 billion (188 billion Afghanis) in donor grants, leaving a fiscal gap of $110 million (7.6 billion Afghanis) that will be mostly funded by Afghanistan’s cash reserves or possibly via loans. Domestic revenues are projected to increase to $2.3 billion (161.6 billion Afghanis) in 2018, a 4.9 percent increase over 2017, and are projected to account for roughly 48 percent of the budget (up from an estimated 40 percent in 2017), with international donors funding much of the remaining gap. International donor funding is projected to decrease 18 percent. The Afghan budget assumes 2017 GDP growth of 3.1 percent – higher than the World Bank’s revised 2.5 percent forecast – and estimates that it will accelerate to at least 4 percent by 2021.

CSTC-A, the U.S. State Department, and USAID are working on programs to develop Special Economic Zones (SEZ) to encourage foreign commercial investment, around major airfields throughout Afghanistan. These SEZs will generate local revenue for the areas and generate tax income for the Afghan Government through expanded commercial growth.

Afghan Government counter-corruption measures have improved transparency of government funds and contributed to its ability to better sustain the ANDSF. At the direction of President Ghani, the MoF is leading a special committee with the Afghan Supreme Court to establish an effective mechanism to collect court fees, fines, and penalties. This committee will improve transparency related to the collection of fees, penalties, restitution payments, and other Supreme Court fees, and ensure proper accountability and management of those funds.

The Afghan Government continues to implement a range of economic, governance, and anti-corruption reforms. Adopted at the Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan in 2012, the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF) to support economic growth and development in Afghanistan provides a construct to guide Afghan-led economic reforms to sustain the international
community’s continued high levels of economic assistance by ensuring the Afghan Government has delivered on reform. The TMAF was replaced by the “Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework (SMAF),” adopted at the Senior Officials Meeting in September 2015. The SMAF outlines the Afghan Government’s reform commitments through 2018 and the agreed-upon principles of effective international donor assistance. During the October 2016 Brussels Conference on development assistance for Afghanistan, the Afghan Government presented its renewed SMAF and Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework, which detail the government’s strategic plan for achieving self-reliance and provide benchmarks for reform efforts. Other international forums, such as the Asian Development Bank-sponsored Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation program, the Heart of Asia Istanbul Process, and the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan, provide opportunities for regional leaders to remove trade barriers, increase cross-border investment, and expand trade routes in Central and South Asia.

Finally, CSTC-A is helping the MoD and MoI develop their resource management and procurement capacity. This effort focuses on strengthening the MoD and MoI’s ability to manage their fiscal resources more effectively while providing oversight of U.S. and international funds spent by the Afghans. For example, CSTC-A will integrate all ASFF- and LOTFA-funded forces into APPS to account for all ANDSF personnel disbursements. Initiatives, such as the implementation of APPS, will help automate and streamline the payroll process. CSTC-A ensures salaries are paid only to enrolled ANDSF personnel by integrating biometrics data, personnel records, and the Afghan identification system. CSTC-A will continue to support the Afghan’s ongoing, country-wide personnel asset inventory (PAI) to validate and properly enroll all ANDSF personnel in AHRIMS/APPS. CSTC-A continues to perform and assist with independent assessments and audits to ensure appropriate scrutiny of Afghan financial processes and make recommendations for improving Afghan capabilities. Improving the MoD and MoI oversight and accountability of international funding, and developing Afghan capability in financial management will remain a core focus of the RS TAA mission.
# ANNEX A – INDICATORS OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Essential Function</th>
<th>Indicators of Effectiveness</th>
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</table>
| **EF 1: Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution** | - The MoD and MoI are able to identify requirements, programs, and funding accurately over a three-year horizon based on strategic guidance.  
  - The MoF provides timely guidance to enable the MoI and MoD to develop a budget.  
  - The MoD and MoI are able to formulate an accurate annual budget to meet internal and external requirements.  
  - The MoD and MoI are able to develop an executable procurement plan and execute their spend plan within budget and stipulated timeframes.  
  - The MoD and MoI are able to submit, award, and complete contracts to ensure execution as planned.  
  - The MoD can fully pay all of its employees accurately, timely, and in a secure fashion.  
  - The MoF provides timely approvals, in-year guidance, and funds to the MoI and MoD.  
  - The MoD and MoI possess an effective and efficient system to recruit and hire subject matter experts. |
| **EF 2: Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight** | - The MoD’s Ministerial Internal Controls Program is effectively implemented and sustainable.  
  - The MoD and MoI IG has an effective accountability oversight program for sustainability.  
  - GS IG has an effective accountability oversight program for sustainability.  
  - Critical items (the “big four” issues – fuel, ammunition, food, and pay) are managed by transparent, accountable, and sustainable processes to the appropriate organizational level.  
  - Ensure the appropriate engagement of relevant external and internal agencies to establish transparency, accountability, and oversight within the Afghan Government. |
| **EF 3: Rule of Law and Governance** | - The MoD and MoI have appropriately staffed and qualified units to prevent or address extra-judicial killings and other GVHR.  
  - The MoD and MoI identify, investigate, and appropriately act upon acts of major corruption and GVHR.  
  - The MoD and MoI conduct inter-ministerial cooperation with the Attorney General’s Office on corruption adjudication and GVHR allegations. |
| **EF 4: Force Generation** | - The MoD utilizes AHRIMS down to the corps level to manage the force, and the MoI utilizes AHRIMS down to the provincial headquarters level to manage the force. |
| EF 5: Logistics and Maintenance | The MoD meets civilianization goals and objectives as outlined in the bilateral agreement.  
MoD and MoI manpower plans are developed and used to project future manpower requirements that inform recruiting goals, mitigates attrition rates, and achieve the desired end-strength.  
The MoD and MoI establish systems to integrate lessons learned; tactics, techniques, and procedures; doctrine; and programs of instruction.  
All untrained ANP receive formal police training, and the MoI prevents future untrained police by forecasting training requirements and scheduling courses to accommodate recruit intakes.  
The ANA has established a system for training in air and ground coordination; capability is established and used for information operations delivery.  
Training is delivered that results in reduced casualties.  
Measurement and reporting has command emphasis.  
The ANDSF documents processes for generating and capturing requirements.  
The ANDSF has adequately executed a demand-based inventory management system.  
ANDSF organic maintenance is supplemented by contractors.  
The MoI assumes responsibility for equipment maintenance, which is transitioned from the coalition-funded AMS contract.  
The MoD has developed an operational medical resource optimization process that is sustainable.  
The MoD and MoI have sufficient numbers of trained and qualified health care personnel to fill tashkil.  
The MoD and MoI have an operational and sustainable medical logistics process.  
The ANP operates inventory management processes, including cold chain management for medicines.  
The Afghan Government-backed Afghan Medical Council establishes and sustains ANDSF and Afghan national healthcare.  
The MoD is capable of managing its portion of the frequency spectrum for the Afghan Government.  
The MoD and MoI are able to identify and sustain key information and communications technology infrastructure.  
The MoD is able to sustain information management systems throughout their lifecycles.  
The MoD implements fundamental cybersecurity structures and processes to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of critical information and information systems.  
The MoD is able to produce and sustain information and communications technology forces that are manned, trained, and equipped to conduct operations. |
The MoI is capable of managing its portion of the frequency spectrum for the Afghan Government.

**EF 6: Command and Control Operations**

- The Assistant Minister of Defense for Strategy and Policy lead delivers strategic documents (National Military Strategy and Guidance for Operational Planning) in time and of sufficient quality (focused, threat-informed, and resource-aware) to inform subordinate planning.
- Assistant Minister of Defense for Strategy and Policy lead delivers the Defense Capabilities Planning Guidance in time and of sufficient quality to inform and drive the departmental capability development process.
- The GS Plans Directorate delivers planning guidance and a coherent, synchronized campaign planning process.
- The MoI Deputy Minister of Strategy and Policy delivers strategic documents (MIS, MIP, and Strategic Programming Guidance Directive) in time and of sufficient quality (focused, threat-informed, and resource-aware), monitors implementation, and manages change through a robust force management process.
- The MoI Deputy Minister of Strategy and Policy monitors MICP and strategic plan implementation and delivers guidance to ensure a robust departmental force management process.
- The ANA has an established and sustainable capability to conduct combined arms operations.
- The ANA has an established and sustainable capability to conduct operations in coordination with the ANP.
- The ANA has assessed its capability gaps at the operational level and implemented improvements to address the gaps.
- The ANA has a sustainable capability to prepare detailed plans and orders at the corps level from strategic guidance from the MoD.
- The ANP has an established and sustainable capability to coordinate ANP inputs to ANA operations.
- ANASOC develops as a strategic MoD asset capable of manning, equipping, training, employing, and sustaining the force.
- ANASOC is able to synchronize special operations brigade and special operations kandak operations within the framework of corps security operations in support of the Afghan government and MoD objectives.
| EF 7: Intelligence | ▪ The SMW develops as a strategic Afghan government organization capable of manning, equipping, training, employing, and sustaining a force to conduct special operations force air assault and airborne ISR capability in support of the ASSF.  
▪ The AAF has developed sustainable enterprise manning, a sustainable aerial fires capability, and a sustainable theatre mobility system.  
▪ The Afghan police intelligence model effectively engages security issues.  
▪ MoD intelligence integrates into MoD strategic decision-making and into ANASOC and ANA corps-level operations.  
▪ DPI human intelligence institutes a sustainable human intelligence network that can action and report on intelligence requirements and tasking.  
▪ Establish NMIC as an operational intelligence center capable of retrieving and analyzing information obtained from various intelligence sensors and developing products that support Afghan government intelligence operations.  
▪ DPI trains technically proficient personnel for intelligence operational needs and manages intelligence sustainment requirements to meet operational needs.  
▪ Establish an enduring and sustainable organic intelligence capability at the Intelligence Training Center, ANA corps, and ANASOC. |
| EF 8: Strategic Communication | ▪ Develop and sustain events and mechanisms designed to facilitate cross-ministerial coordination and delivery of strategic communication guidance, priorities, and direction.  
▪ The National Unity Government develops and distributes strategic communication guidance; guidance will be utilized to develop respective MoD and MoI communication plans and products.  
▪ GS Operations Directorate Information Operations has the knowledge and capability to submit effectively (and modify as necessary) yearly (personnel and equipment) *tashkil* inputs, as well as to plan and submit its yearly budget requirements, which will enable MoD information operations capability throughout the country. |
| Gender | ▪ The MoI and MoD/ANA implement approved strategies and plans on gender integration.  
▪ The MoI and MoD provide safe training and working environments (facilities) for women.  
▪ The MoI and MoD take actions to eliminate gender-based violence and other types of violence and sexual harassment of women. |
ANNEX B – ACRONYMS

AACP  Afghan Anti-Crime Police
AAF  Afghan Air Force
ABP  Afghan Border Police
ACJC  Anti-Corruption Justice Center
AGO  Attorney General’s Office
AH  Academie-e-Hawayee
AHRIMS  Afghan Human Resource Information Management System
AIAT  Army Institutional Advisory Team
AIHRC  Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission
ALP  Afghan Local Police
ANA  Afghan National Army
ANA-0  Doctrine Development System Manual
ANASOC  Afghan National Army Special Operations Command
ANATEDC  ANA Training Education and Doctrine Command
ANCOP  Afghan National Civil Order Police
ANDSF  Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
ANP  Afghan National Police
ANTS  Afghan National Tracking System
APPF  Afghan Public Protection Force
APPS  Afghan Personnel and Pay System
AQIS  Al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent
ASFF  Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
ASSF  Afghan Special Security Forces
ANATF  ANA Territorial Force
ATAC  Afghan Tactical Air Coordinator
AT&L  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
AUP  Afghan Uniform Police
BSA  Bilateral Security Agreement
CAC  Counter- and Anti-Corruption
CASEVAC  Casualty Evacuation
CCMT  Civilian Casualty Mitigation Team
CDO  Commando
C-IED  Counter-Improvised Explosive Device
CLS  Contract Logistics Support
CNPA  Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan
CoGS  Chief of General Staff
Core-IMS  Core-Information Management System
CPA  Common Policy Agreement
CSA  Command and Staff Academy
CSTC-A  Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan
CTF  Counter Threat Finance
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPI</td>
<td>Directorate of Police Intelligence</td>
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<td>EAP</td>
<td>Expeditionary Advisory Package</td>
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<tr>
<td>EF</td>
<td>Essential Function</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRU</td>
<td>Family Response Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCPSU</td>
<td>General Command of Police Special Units</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOOD</td>
<td>Gender Occupational Opportunity Development</td>
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<td>GS</td>
<td>General Staff</td>
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<td>GVHR</td>
<td>Gross Violation of Human Rights</td>
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<td>HPA</td>
<td>High Profile Attack</td>
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<tr>
<td>HOOAC</td>
<td>High Office of Anti-Corruption</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<tr>
<td>IG</td>
<td>Inspector General</td>
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<tr>
<td>IID</td>
<td>Intelligence Investigation Directorate</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISIS-K</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria - Khorasan</td>
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<td>ISR</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance</td>
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<td>KGC</td>
<td>Kabul Garrison Command</td>
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<td>KIA</td>
<td>Killed In Action</td>
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<td>KSS</td>
<td>Kabul Surveillance System</td>
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<td>LIP</td>
<td>Lawful Intercept Program</td>
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<td>LOTFA</td>
<td>Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan</td>
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<td>MAT</td>
<td>Medical Advisory Teams</td>
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<td>MCTF</td>
<td>Major Crimes Task Force</td>
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<td>MEDEVAC</td>
<td>Medical Evacuation</td>
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<td>MFNDU</td>
<td>Marshall Fahim National Defense University</td>
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<td>MICP</td>
<td>Ministerial Internal Controls Program</td>
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<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
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<td>MoF</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
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<td>MoI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
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<td>MRD</td>
<td>Military Research and Doctrine</td>
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<td>MSFV</td>
<td>Mobile Strike Force Vehicle</td>
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<td>MSK</td>
<td>Mobile Strike Kandak</td>
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<td>NATF</td>
<td>NATO ANA Trust Fund</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDAA</td>
<td>National Defense Authorization Act</td>
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<td>NIMS</td>
<td>National Information Management System</td>
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<td>National Interdiction Unit</td>
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<td>NMB</td>
<td>National Mission Brigade</td>
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<td>NMIC</td>
<td>National Military Intelligence Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>NMS</td>
<td>National Maintenance Strategy</td>
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<td>NMU</td>
<td>National Mission Unit (ASSF portion of GCPSU)</td>
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<td>NPCC</td>
<td>National Police Coordination Center</td>
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<td>NSOCC-A</td>
<td>NATO Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan</td>
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<td>NTB</td>
<td>National Transportation Brigade</td>
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<td>NTEC</td>
<td>Network Targeting and Exploitation Center</td>
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<td>NUOC</td>
<td>National Unit Operators Course (GCPSU)</td>
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<td>NVG</td>
<td>Night-Vision Goggles</td>
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<td>OCC</td>
<td>Operations Coordination Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCC-P</td>
<td>Operations Coordination Center – Provincial</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCC-R</td>
<td>Operations Coordination Center – Regional</td>
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<tr>
<td>OFS</td>
<td>Operation Freedom’s Sentinel</td>
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<td>OIP</td>
<td>Organizational Inspection Program</td>
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<td>ONSC</td>
<td>Office of the National Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>ORC</td>
<td>Operational Readiness Cycle</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAI</td>
<td>Personnel Asset Inventory</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCASS</td>
<td>Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIAT</td>
<td>Police Institutional Advisory Team</td>
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<td>PoAM</td>
<td>Program of Actions and Milestones</td>
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<td>PSU</td>
<td>Police Special Unit (non-ASSF portion of GCPSU)</td>
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<td>RAB</td>
<td>Requirements Approval Board</td>
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<td>RAID</td>
<td>Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment</td>
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<td>RS</td>
<td>Resolute Support</td>
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<td>SAFIRE</td>
<td>Surface-to-Air Fire</td>
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<td>SCIP</td>
<td>Security Cooperation Information Portal</td>
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<td>SFA</td>
<td>Security Force Assistance</td>
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<td>SMAF</td>
<td>Self-Reliance Through Mutual Accountability Framework</td>
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<td>SME</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert</td>
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<td>Special Operations Brigade</td>
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<td>SOJTF-A</td>
<td>Special Operations Joint Task Force – Afghanistan</td>
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<td>SOK</td>
<td>Special Operations <em>Kandaks</em></td>
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<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedure</td>
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<td>Solar Year</td>
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<td>TAA</td>
<td>Train, Advise, and Assist</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAC</td>
<td>Transparency and Accountability Committee</td>
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<td>Transparency, Accountability, and Law Enforcement</td>
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<td>TF</td>
<td>Task Force</td>
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<td>TMAF</td>
<td>Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>TTHS</td>
<td>Training, Transient, Holding, Students</td>
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<td>TTP</td>
<td>Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan</td>
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<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
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<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<td>USFOR-A</td>
<td>U.S. Forces – Afghanistan</td>
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<td>UTEDC</td>
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<td>WIA</td>
<td>Wounded in Action</td>
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<td>WS</td>
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