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Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

October 2014

Report to Congress
In accordance with sections 1230 and 1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended; section 1221 of the NDAA for FY 2012 (P.L. 112-81); sections 1212, 1223, and 1531(d) of the NDAA for FY 2013 (P.L. 112-239); and Senate Report 113-211, to accompany H.R. 4870, the Department of Defense (DoD) Appropriations Bill, 2015

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This report is submitted consistent with sections 1230 and 1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended. It includes a description of the comprehensive strategy of the United States for security and stability in Afghanistan. This report is the fourteenth in a series of reports required every 180 days through fiscal year 2014 and was prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Secretary of the Treasury. This assessment complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to Congress; however, it is not intended to be the single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its coalition partners, or Afghanistan.

This report is an historical document that covers progress in Afghanistan from April 1 to September 30, 2014, and is divided into seven parts. The executive summary highlights the key developments over the six month reporting period. The next five sections outline the progress of Afghanistan in the following areas: security, Afghan security forces, governance, reconstruction and development, and regional engagement. Some data provided in previous reports has been excluded from this unclassified report given operational security concerns for the Afghan National Security Forces as they have taken the lead for security in the country. At the end of the report, a list of acronyms is provided to facilitate the reader’s comprehension.

The next report will include an analysis of progress toward security and stability from October 1, 2014, to March 31, 2015.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

During this reporting period, several milestone events set the stage for ending the U.S. combat mission in Afghanistan by the end of 2014 and transitioning to a train, advise, and assist mission within the context of an enduring U.S.-Afghanistan partnership:

- On September 21, the two candidates to succeed Hamid Karzai as Afghanistan’s president, Dr. Ashraf Ghani and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, concluded an agreement to establish a national unity government.
- On September 29, Dr. Ghani was inaugurated as President and Dr. Abdullah was sworn in as Chief Executive Officer (CEO), a newly created position.
- On September 30, representatives of the United States and Afghanistan signed the BSA and representatives of NATO and Afghanistan signed the NATO SOFA.

The failure of any candidate to win more than 50 percent of the vote in the April 5 presidential election, the disputed outcome of the June 14 runoff election, and former President Karzai’s continued refusal to sign the BSA and NATO SOFA created uncertainty about whether U.S. and coalition forces would remain in Afghanistan after 2014. This uncertainty was one factor that contributed to a slowing economy and declining government revenues, as some Afghans fled and investors moved funds outside the country. The agreement to form a government of national unity, President Ghani’s inauguration, and the signing of the BSA could help mitigate this uncertainty. The new government will, however, face significant challenges in dealing with the ongoing insurgency, potential resistance to its reform agenda, and Afghanistan’s continued reliance on international financial assistance.

Despite these uncertainties, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) remained cohesive and nonpartisan. The Afghan forces increasingly demonstrated their ability to plan and conduct independent and combined operations that employed multiple ANSF capabilities, disrupted the insurgency, and protected the populace. They successfully secured the national elections and

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1 The reporting period for this report is April 1 – September 30, 2014.
2 The BSA is officially designated as the “Security and Defense Cooperation Agreement between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan” (SDCA).
3 The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) is the official designation for Afghan security forces used in the SDCA and is the Afghan government’s preferred designation for the overall force. For the purposes of this report, the term Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) consists of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). The ANA includes the Afghan Air Force (AAF), Afghan National Army Special Operations Forces (ANASOF), and the Special Mission Wing (SMW). The ANP pillars include the General Command of Police Special Units (GCPUS), Afghan Border Police (ABP), Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), and the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA). The Afghan Local Police (ALP) is not officially a part of the ANSF but provides additional security under Ministry of the Interior (MoI) control at the village level.
presidential runoff—the latter taking place in the midst of the fighting season—with minimal support from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

The Taliban continued to test the ANSF, but failed to achieve its objectives, including disrupting both the first and second round of the Afghan presidential elections. Insurgents increasingly mounted massed, opportunistic attacks and were temporarily able to overtake remote checkpoints and a small number of district centers. They were, however, unable to hold any significant terrain and were consistently overmatched when engaged by ANSF enabled by coalition air and intelligence support. They failed to capture or destroy well-defended targets, and were unable to assume control of major population centers. Based on the first five months of the reporting period (April to August 2014), nationwide security incidents fell by approximately 30 percent if compared to the same period last year. However, a direct comparison with previous reporting periods is difficult to make since ISAF has become more reliant on Afghan reporting in the last year. Nonetheless, insurgents continued to sustain influence in many rural areas and continued to conduct high-profile and complex attacks against individuals, population centers, and remote outposts.

The insurgency remained resilient and continued to pose a threat to U.S. and coalition forces and Afghan civilians during the reporting period. ISAF completed the shift from combat advising to functionally based security force assistance (SFA) at the Afghan National Army (ANA) corps level and above and at the equivalent Afghan National Police (ANP) echelons. Protecting the force and countering the threat of insider attacks remained critical considerations; however, U.S. and coalition forces continued to suffer casualties. During this reporting period, the United States suffered 264 wounded-in-action (WIA) and 24 killed-in-action (KIA). Insurgents also remained responsible for most civilian casualties (CIVCAS), largely due to their sustained use of indiscriminate improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

America’s only soldier in captivity from the war in Afghanistan was released during this reporting period. On May 31, 2014, U.S. forces successfully recovered U.S. Army Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl after nearly five years of captivity, in exchange for five detainees from Guantanamo Bay.

**Transitioning to a Long-Term Partnership**

After reviewing options and weighing advice from his national security team, President Obama announced post-2014 U.S. force levels in Afghanistan on May 27, 2014. The United States intends to maintain a military presence of approximately 9,800 personnel in Afghanistan beginning January 1, 2015, to pursue two separate but linked missions. First, the United States will provide the bulk of forces for the NATO-led train, advise, and assist (TAA) mission, known as Resolute Support, to develop further Afghan security institutions (ASI) and their capabilities, enabling them to conduct the various national-level functions that are crucial to generating,

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4 This reporting period, ISAF became more reliant on Afghan reporting due to the drawdown of forces.
5 U.S. Forces – Afghanistan (USFOR-A) provided casualty statistics from April to September 2014. These numbers differ from the Department of Defense Casualty Analysis System (https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/pages/report_oef_month.xhtml), which shows all casualties from Operation Enduring Freedom and is not restricted to the operation in Afghanistan.
resourcing, and sustaining fielded forces. Second, as Operation Enduring Freedom comes to an end on December 31, 2014, the remainder of U.S. forces will continue to put pressure on the remnants of core al Qaeda and its affiliates in the U.S. counterterrorism (CT) mission. By the end of 2015, the United States will reduce its overall force by roughly half and will transition to a Kabul-based mission by the end of 2016 with a robust security assistance component to focus on managing and overseeing continued Department of Defense (DoD) funding for sustainment support of the ANSF.

President Obama made a continued U.S. presence in Afghanistan contingent on the conclusion of a signed BSA that provides the terms and conditions the United States needs to support a future military presence in Afghanistan. Although the BSA text was finalized in November 2013, former President Karzai deferred signing the agreement to his successor. Both presidential candidates, as well as the majority of Afghan people, supported the BSA and a continued U.S. and coalition presence. President Ghani’s government signed the BSA and the NATO SOFA on September 30, 2014, the day after taking office.

**MOVING TOWARDS A POLITICAL TRANSITION**

The presidential election marked a milestone in Afghanistan’s democratic development and began the process towards the first peaceful, democratic transfer of power in Afghan history. Although allegations of fraud marred the election, it was otherwise successful in terms of security, participation, and inclusivity.

Leading up to the election, the ANSF demonstrated their improved capabilities by securing campaign events, many of which had high public turnouts. The Afghan security institutions—the Ministry of Defense (MoD), Ministry of Interior (MoI), and National Directorate of Security (NDS)—coordinated and planned a layered security approach for the presidential and provincial council elections held on April 5, 2014. In part due to these synchronized efforts, Afghans voted in record numbers on Election Day, with a turnout of nearly seven million voters. Neither of the top two candidates, Dr. Ashraf Ghani or Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, secured more than 50 percent of the votes needed under the Afghan constitution to win the election and become President, so a presidential runoff election between the two candidates was held on June 14.

During the presidential runoff, Afghans in large numbers once again defied insurgent threats of violence to cast their ballots. Following credible allegations of significant irregularities in the runoff results, the candidates agreed to a framework for an extensive audit process. U.S. forces assisted by transporting ballots to the audit location and the ANSF provided security at the audit location. The audit included significant international community oversight and assistance. The United Nations (UN) provided expert electoral advisors, and the European Union (EU) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) provided international observers.

On September 21, 2014, the Afghan Independent Election Commission (IEC) officially declared Dr. Ghani would become the next president of Afghanistan. On the same day, Dr. Ghani and Dr. Abdullah publicly signed an agreement to form a government of national unity which included establishing the roles and responsibilities of a new CEO position. The inauguration took place on September 29. Early indications of President Ghani and CEO Abdullah’s working
relationship have been positive with both men engaging in constructive dialogue on the security situation, government appointments, and institutional reforms.

**ANSF IN THE LEAD FOR SECURITY**

While the Afghan government and international community worked through the political turmoil during the election process, the ANSF increased their credibility among the Afghan people by countering and preventing insurgents’ efforts to disrupt the elections, providing security during the election campaigns, and remaining cohesive and nonpartisan during the elections’ aftermath. The ANSF took the lead in planning and conducting comprehensive security operations, and applying lessons learned from the first round of elections to the runoff. Throughout the election process, ANSF leaders consistently demonstrated their ability to maintain unity throughout the force while maintaining their focus on combat and security operations.

During this reporting period, the ANSF passed the one-year mark since assuming the lead role for providing security. The ANSF have remained at just under the full authorized level of 352,000 personnel. Although the ANSF continued efforts to recruit women, progress remained slow due in part to religious and cultural resistance and the threat of harassment or abuse in the ANSF. Overall, the ANSF have proven capable of leading operations at the tactical and operational levels, demonstrating tactical superiority over insurgents with some assistance from U.S. and coalition partners through the elections and fighting season. Afghan forces plan and execute nearly all combat operations, and continue to improve their capacity to execute large, joint combat operations across the country with coalition advice and assistance. By the end of this reporting period, the ANSF led 99 percent of conventional operations and 99 percent of special operations. The only unilateral operations that ISAF now conducts are for force protection, route clearance to maintain freedom of movement, and retrograde and redeployment activities.

The coalition’s role remains critical in supporting ANSF development, which will be the focus of the Resolute Support mission. During this reporting period, ISAF continued to develop ANSF capabilities in intelligence, aviation, and logistics to mitigate the loss of some coalition support in these areas after 2014. The Afghan Air Force (AAF) continues to receive and integrate new aircraft while developing its ability to conduct various missions, including close air support (CAS); casualty evacuation (CASEVAC); human remains recovery; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and support to civil authorities. In August 2014, the DoD began procuring 12 armored and armed MD-530 helicopters and modifying five already in the Afghan inventory, with the goal of providing all such airframes by the middle of 2015 as a partial stopgap until the A-29 light air support fleet is fully operational in 2018.

Special operations are another critical capability gap, but the Afghans have narrowed this gap significantly over this reporting period. The Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) has fielded all subordinate units, with the Military Intelligence Kandak and General Support Kandak both reaching initial operating capability this reporting period. The

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6 The “lead” for a deliberate operation is determined by who planned it and subsequently gave orders. ANSF led operations include those that are unilateral, as well as those enabled and advised by ISAF.
General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU), Special Mission Wing (SMW), and ANASOC commandos displayed improvements, such as routinely executing short-notice, intelligence-driven operations. Such operations included fairly sophisticated night operations of Mi-17 rotary-wing insertions supported by Afghan-manned PC-12 ISR platforms and effective combined operations with supporting NDS, ANA, and ANP units.

The Resolute Support mission will focus on improving the capacity of the MoD and MoI to execute functions such as planning, programming, budgeting processes, resource management, and procurement. Both ministries lack qualified and experienced leadership and suffer from low institutional prioritization of planning and budget functions, in part because the coalition provided the skills for these functions in the past. Enhanced advisory support for sustainment, specifically in transparency, accountability, and oversight procedures, was a key focus for ISAF during this reporting period, and will be an important facet for ensuring continued international community support of the ANSF. Finally, it will be important to continue efforts to make clear the importance of the ASI’s respect for the rule of law.

The Department of Defense is committed to complying with the DoD Leahy Law in Afghanistan and fostering respect for human rights by the ANSF. DoD has engaged with the Afghan government to promote accountability for abuses by Afghan military and police personnel. An ANSF that operates effectively and respects human rights is central to the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, as these traits are integral to the ANSF’s ability to provide security for Afghanistan and retain public support.

**COALITION PREPARES FOR TRANSITION TO THE RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION**

During this reporting period, ISAF shifted its focus from combat advising to “functionally based security force assistance.” Advisors now align with Afghan components performing eight essential functions and associated sub-functions. The eight essential functions include: 1) Plan, program, budget, and execute; 2) Transparency, accountability, and oversight; 3) Civilian governance of the ASI and adherence to rule of law; 4) Force generate; 5) Sustain the force; 6) Plan, resource, and execute effective security campaigns; 7) Develop sufficient intelligence capabilities and processes; and 8) Maintain internal and external strategic communication capability. The focus of capacity development efforts on eight essential functions is intended to develop the long-term sustainability of the Afghan security institutions and security forces.

The drawdown of U.S. and coalition forces reflects the ANSF’s progress over the last decade. In preparation for the post-2014 mission, U.S. forces have continued to decrease their footprint, going from fewer than 32,500 personnel at the beginning of the reporting period to fewer than 24,000 personnel by the end of this reporting period. As forces have redeployed, ISAF has

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7 Section 8057 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2014 (division C of Public Law 113-76).
8 Authoritative DoD doctrine for security force assistance (SFA) does not yet exist but generally agreed-to fundamental guidance for joint forces conducting SFA does exist in Joint Doctrine Note 1-13, *Security Force Assistance*, April 29, 2013. SFA consists of “Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions” (Joint Publication 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*, July 12, 2010). The activities described as SFA—particularly the advisory effort focused on “essential functions”—are elements of security cooperation activities normally defined by NATO and DoD as defense institution reform and defense institution building.
closed, de-scoped, or transferred tactical infrastructure–ranging from large bases to small combat outposts–to the Afghan government.

Force protection remains paramount to the mission. Insurgents continued to attempt high-profile attacks against U.S., coalition, and Afghan forces, as well as DoD civilians, in part to garner media attention. Coalition and Afghan forces have undertaken numerous security measures to reduce the risk of insider attacks (in which Afghan forces attack U.S. or coalition forces), including improved vetting and screening counterintelligence, and are constantly refining their approach. The threat of insider attacks has been mitigated by these measures, but cannot be eliminated. One such high-profile event took place at a Kabul training facility on August 5, 2014, when an ANA soldier killed U.S. Army Major General Harold Greene, the deputy commander of Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A), and wounded 14 others. Although insider attacks have decreased against U.S. and coalition forces since their peak in 2012, the threat of insider attacks continues to be a challenge for the ANSF and will require continued close coordination.

**RESILIENT INSURGENCY UNABLE TO ACCOMPLISH STATED GOALS**

One of the Taliban movement’s primary goals and its main propaganda focus at the beginning of this reporting period was to disrupt both the first and second rounds of the Afghan presidential election. The widespread turnout and desire of the Afghan electorate to vote, combined with a robust ANSF security posture during the electoral period, dampened the Taliban’s ability to disrupt the election. Nonetheless, Taliban morale appeared to remain high, likely bolstered by claims of gains in the press, the release of former leaders from Guantanamo Bay detention, and uncertainty regarding the elections outcome. The insurgency continued to test the ANSF, maintain influence in many rural areas, and present a force protection threat to U.S. and coalition forces. Over the reporting period, the insurgency mounted coordinated attacks but was overmatched when engaged by ANSF. The ANSF have continuously recovered and recaptured a large number of lost positions, often following heavy fighting and significant casualties. During the Taliban’s offensive operations in Helmand Province, Afghan forces organized and executed their operations with little coalition support. The Taliban were unable to turn limited tactical successes into strategic gains, as the ANSF’s ability to mass forces allowed them to regain a majority of lost territory.

The Haqqani Network remained the most potent strain of the insurgency and the greatest risk to U.S. and coalition forces due to its focus on high-profile attacks. The Haqqani Network and affiliated groups share the goals of expelling U.S. and coalition forces, destabilizing the Afghan government, and reestablishing an Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. They will likely remain the most significant threat to coalition forces in the post-2014 non-combat mission, especially if they are not denied sanctuary in Pakistan.
CONTINUED CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN

The resiliency of the Afghan insurgency continues to depend on sanctuary in Pakistan, making an effective relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan critical to long-term stability in the region. Both countries’ leaders have expressed interest in a stronger military-to-military relationship in the post-Karzai era, and Pakistan maintains a public commitment to supporting Afghan-led reconciliation. Nonetheless, Afghan-focused militants continue to operate from Pakistan territory to the detriment of Afghan and regional stability. During this reporting period, however, ongoing Pakistani military operations in North Waziristan disrupted militant networks that relied on this area for safe haven and slowed extremist attack plotting in Afghanistan. Senior Pakistani officials have publicly committed to holding this cleared territory, preventing militant returns, and building a more cooperative relationship with Afghan counterparts along the border. The election of President Ghani and signing of the BSA appears to have created a window of opportunity for improved military-to-military relations and border coordination.

AFGHAN GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES CONTINUE

The ability of Afghanistan’s national institutions to provide constitutional, effective, and responsive governance continued to improve in some areas, such as education, health, access to electricity, and rural development. While setbacks will persist, the overall trend of improved access to many public services, such as education and medical care, has unambiguously improved the quality of life for Afghans over the last decade. Continuation of this trend will depend largely on whether President Ghani is able to implement his reform agenda and build domestic and international confidence that he will make at least some progress in improving transparency and accountability of the use of Afghan government and international donor resources.

Corruption undermines confidence in the economy, security, and government legitimacy, posing a strategic threat to long-term economic development and to the stability of Afghanistan. Additional factors, such as ineffective program monitoring, budget shortfalls at all levels, an inability to generate revenue, and limited public financial management capacity continue to plague the national government. Within the ANSF, reports of corruption range from ANP extortion at illegal checkpoints to higher-level corruption in the Afghan security institutions (e.g., pay-for-position schemes, taking bribes from contractors, and “land grabbing”). All of these activities have hurt the reputation and efficiency of the security ministries. DoD continues to tighten its controls over the funds provided to the MoD and MoI to pay salaries and purchase supplies in response to these concerns.

PROGRESS TOWARD SECURITY AND STABILITY

The Afghan people, the Afghan government, and the international coalition have contributed to significant progress within Afghanistan over the last decade. During this reporting period, ISAF worked with the Afghan government to plan for continued U.S. and coalition financial, materiel, and advisory assistance during the Resolute Support mission to help build the Afghan government’s capacity to maintain these gains and lead the ASI and ANSF towards
sustainability. The coalition is well-postured heading into the Resolute Support mission and the continued period of political and military political transition. The ANSF are on track to assume full security responsibility by the end of 2014 after successfully securing the presidential and provincial council elections and performing well during the fighting season. Yet significant work remains after 2014 to develop the capacity of the MoD and MoI to sustain the ANSF and provide resources toward closing ANSF capability gaps.

A key risk to continued progress toward stability and security is the slowing Afghan economy, with gross domestic product (GDP) growth falling to 3.7 percent in 2013 from over 14 percent in 2012. Through the first eight months of 2014, growth slowed even further, as investment and consumption tendencies remain depressed in the wake of presidential elections and a persistent insurgency. President Ghani’s ability to implement his reform agenda will shape international donor and investor confidence in the Afghan economy, which remains highly dependent on international financial assistance.
SECTION 1 – SECURITY

1.1: U.S. MISSION

During the reporting period, President Obama outlined the U.S. military missions in Afghanistan for 2015 and beyond. On May 27, 2014, he announced that the U.S. objectives for Afghanistan are to disrupt threats posed by remnants of core al Qaeda; support Afghan security forces; and give the Afghan people the opportunity to succeed as they stand on their own. To accomplish these objectives, the United States will participate in a NATO-led non-combat train, advise, and assist mission with the Afghan National Security Forces at the army corps and police zone echelons and above. Simultaneously, the U.S. CT mission will continue to target al Qaeda and its affiliates in Afghanistan to degrade their capability to target the United States and its allies. As the TAA and CT missions continue over the next two years, the U.S. presence in Afghanistan will undergo a phased reduction, from a force level of 9,800 personnel at the beginning of 2015 to the establishment of a DoD-led security cooperation organization based in Kabul by the end of 2016.

Diplomatic efforts will continue to complement military efforts. The United States and the international community continue to encourage Afghan reconciliation efforts as a means to a political solution to the conflict.

1.2: INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE CAMPAIGN STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES

The ISAF mission ends on December 31, 2014, having successfully disrupted terrorist networks and deprived al Qaeda of safe haven in Afghanistan from which it can launch attacks. During this reporting period, ISAF transitioned toward the functionally based capacity development that it began over a year ago and largely ended advising at the tactical and operational levels, setting the conditions for the post-2014 NATO-led Resolute Support mission to train, advise, and assist the ANSF. Much of the transition to this mission is complete; the ANSF are now responsible for providing security for the entire country with minimal assistance from ISAF. The TAA effort is now focused on developing ASI capacity to generate and sustain their forces. Advisors interact with Afghan counterparts responsible for organizations that execute the “five pillars” of the ANSF: combined arms; command and control; leadership; sustainment; and training. Although ISAF has conducted ministerial advising over the last decade, today’s efforts focus on developing ministerial competencies in specific functional capabilities that will lead to the long-term sustainability of the ANSF. The functional approach targets the following eight essential functions:

- Plan, program, budget, and execute
- Transparency, accountability, and oversight
- Civilian control of the ASI and adherence to rule of law
- Force generate
- Sustain the force
• Plan, resource, and execute effective security campaigns
• Sufficient intelligence capabilities and processes
• Maintain internal and external strategic communication capability

The ASI and the ANSF are now providing security for Afghanistan with minimal ISAF assistance. They have demonstrated their ability to plan and conduct combined operations to disrupt the insurgency and protect the populace and are on track to formally assume full security responsibility by the end of 2014. During this reporting period, the ANSF demonstrated these capabilities in successfully securing the presidential and run-off elections, and in challenging insurgents during the 2014 fighting season.

The relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan continues to pose a significant challenge, but there may be new opportunities with the change in the Afghan administration. ISAF has helped to facilitate the development of a constructive military-to-military relationship and provide opportunities for the two sides to come together, which could become a foundational component in a broader strategic partnership between the two countries.

Redeployment and Retrograde

ISAF’s current basing footprint supports strategic and operational objectives and enables ISAF personnel to remain within operational reach of decisive and key terrain. The retrograde of DoD equipment from Afghanistan is on track, and air and ground lines of communication remain adequate to move U.S. personnel and equipment in preparation for Resolute Support starting on January 1, 2015. DoD has focused on keeping open a variety of retrograde routes in order to provide DoD with strategic flexibility.

ISAF made significant progress in executing its redeployment plan during this reporting period. As U.S. and coalition forces have redeployed, ISAF has closed, de-scoped, or transferred tactical infrastructure—ranging from large bases to small combat outposts—to the Afghan government. Coalition bases and outposts now number fewer than 35, from a height of more than 850 in 2012. The closure and transfer of bases represents a positive transition for Afghanistan, a normalization of civil society and a return of territorial control. Between April 1 and September 30, 2014, ISAF transferred or closed more than 65 bases to the Afghan government. These facilities now support the ANSF and other Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) ministries as they deliver security or services to the Afghan population. To protect the infrastructure on large bases transitioned to the Afghan government until ANA units move onto them, ISAF and GIRoA agreed during this reporting period on an Afghan plan to hire civilian guards to protect the bases. DoD will fund their salaries for one year, projected to be about $13 million per year. In exchange, the Afghan government will authorize coalition countries to hire contractor security inside the wire at their bases, a partial relaxation of Afghan Presidential Directive 62 which banned private security companies except for diplomatic missions.
1.3: ISAF COMMAND AND CONTROL

On August 26, 2014, General John F. Campbell assumed command of ISAF from General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr.9

ISAF command and control (C2) structures have continued to evolve in preparation for a shift to a post-2014 TAA mission. Three of the six regional commands (RC)—RC-Central (Kabul), RC-West (Herat), and RC-North (Mazar-e Sharif)—have already formed into TAA Commands (TAACs). ISAF continues to redeploy combat forces and reduce its basing footprint while maintaining operational flexibility, coalition cohesion, and force protection. The current C2 construct is not optimized for the mission beyond 2014, and ISAF anticipates further C2 evolution will be required. ISAF has ongoing processes to evolve C2 to keep pace with the change in mission. The ISAF C2 structure in place at the end of the reporting period is shown below in Figure 1.

Figure 1: ISAF Command and Control, as of September 2014

1.4: NATO-ISAF FORCE LEVELS AND PLEDGES

As agreed to at the Lisbon Summit in 2010, NATO allies and operational partners are bringing the ISAF mission to a responsible close by the end of 2014 and are preparing to transition to the Resolute Support mission. U.S. and coalition personnel numbers have steadily declined, moving

9 Throughout this report, the Commander of ISAF (COMISAF) signifies the commander of ISAF and USFOR-A.
towards approximately 12,000 coalition personnel to meet the projected levels for the Resolute Support mission. Figure 2 shows the breakdown of ISAF military personnel from 48 troop contributing nations (27 NATO and 21 non-NATO countries). During the reporting period, ISAF decreased from approximately 48,000 to 32,000 NATO personnel, and approximately 3,200 to 2,250 non-NATO personnel. U.S. forces in theater decreased from approximately 32,500 personnel to approximately 24,000 personnel during this reporting period. Tonga and El Salvador concluded their troop contributions to the mission.

Figure 2: ISAF Troop Contributing Nations, as of October 2014

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<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>24,050</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

NATO allies and potential operational partners met in July 2014 at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) headquarters for the Resolute Support Mission Force Generation Conference to offer forces for the Resolute Support mission. At the conference, allies and potential operational partners filled a majority of positions (approximately 80 percent) called for under the Combined Joint Statement of Requirement (CJSOR) in areas including training, force protection, enablers and support, and out-of theater reserves. The quality of advisors and
personnel provided will have a direct impact on the continued development of the ANSF security capacity and professionalism.

As of the end of the reporting period, the United States and NATO continue their outreach to allies and potential operational partners to fill the remaining shortfalls in the CJSOR. This outreach will ensure all critical gaps are filled before the Resolute Support mission begins on January 1, 2015. The United States will remain the single largest troop contributor to the NATO mission and will assume duties as the framework nation for TAA Commands South and East. The United States will also maintain a substantial presence in the Resolute Support mission headquarters located in Kabul. Other framework nations include Germany for TAA Command North, Italy for TAA Command West, and Turkey for TAA Command Capital.

1.5: REPORTING PERIOD SECURITY OVERVIEW

The ANSF continue to build on the successes of the previous year and take the lead role in security operations. They are on track to take full responsibility for the security of Afghanistan by 2015 with some support from NATO. The ANSF now lead 99 percent of conventional and special operations, many of which are conducted unilaterally. They have effectively met the high operational tempo demands associated with the national elections, presidential run-off, and fighting season to preserve safety and security in Afghanistan. Even with substantially reduced coalition assistance, the ANSF have led the planning and execution of security and counter-insurgency operations, many of which were complex and cross-pillar, involving ANA and ANP units. ISAF support was limited to providing advice and enabling capabilities to address ANSF capability gaps.

Over this reporting period, the ANA and ANP conducted several large and complex operations across Afghanistan to deny enemy influence and improve security. These operations, some of which are still ongoing, have been conducted by numerous military and police units and demonstrate the ANSF’s increasing operational capabilities to disrupt the insurgency, protect the populace, and conduct operations that employ multiple ANSF pillars.

In late June 2014, the Taliban launched an offensive operation in Helmand Province but did not regain or hold any key terrain, or push the ANSF out of the province. The impetus for such attacks was likely to assess the ANSF’s resiliency as the security lead, and to test ISAF’s commitment in the Resolute Support mission environment. In some cases, the media focused its coverage of the ANSF’s performance on the high number of Afghan casualties rather than ANSF’s overarching successful defense. This was particularly true in Helmand, where despite the negative media coverage, the ANSF defended Helmand effectively after being caught off guard initially by the Taliban offensive. The heavy casualties that the ANSF inflicted on the Taliban were under-reported in the media. The ANSF’s success in withstanding and defeating

10 An operation is considered here as a deliberate operation conducted by security forces. The lead for an operation is determined by who planned it and subsequently gave orders. ANSF led operations include those that are unilateral, as well as those enabled and advised by ISAF. An operation is deemed unilateral, partnered, enabled, or advised based on partner force ratios. An operation is considered unilateral if the ANSF did not have assistance from ISAF. In few instances, ISAF provided enabling or partnering support for Afghan-led operations.
the assault on the eve of Ramadan was a high-visibility event that demonstrated the ANSF’s capability to defend posts and key terrain with minimal ISAF support.

Data Limitations

As the ANSF have taken the lead for security and coalition unit presence alongside Afghan units has diminished, ISAF has become increasingly reliant on Afghan reporting, which typically lacks the depth of detail found in ISAF reporting. With the drawdown of ISAF presence at the tactical level, the ANSF now provides approximately 80 percent of operational reporting. Overall, the data collected by the ANSF is still considered useful and valid when compared to previous years’ metrics. However, as ISAF’s footprint in Afghanistan grows smaller, data may become less accurate due to a smaller area of ISAF coverage. ISAF and the ANSF continue to improve data collection and management processes to capture all available reporting.

U.S. and Afghan Force Casualties

ISAF’s share of total casualties declined as it drew down in preparation for transition to the Resolute Support mission, with the ANSF in the lead. From April through September 2014, 264 U.S. military personnel were wounded-in-action and 24 were killed-in-action.12

The ANSF now have the lead role in security and are sustaining the majority of friendly force casualties in Afghanistan. In general, ANSF casualties have increased as they have taken on a larger amount of responsibility in conducting security and combat operations, and now receive less U.S. enabling capability support, such as counter-improvised explosive device, close air support, and emergency medical evacuation. During this reporting period, ANSF casualties were roughly the same as they were over the same period last year. The ANSF’s monthly overall attrition rates, which take into account killed in action, death, dropped from rolls, retirements, and separations, remained consistent in this reporting period, did not deviate significantly from 2013 levels, and hovered at approximately 2.1 percent.

Security Incidents

Security incidents are insurgent-initiated incidents, which include direct fire (DF) attacks, indirect fire (IDF) attacks, surface-to-air fires (SAFIRE), improvised explosive device and mine explosions, IEDs and mines that were found and cleared, as well as IEDs that prematurely detonated or were turned in to coalition or Afghan forces by the Afghan populace. Comparing April to August 2014 to the same period last year, nationwide security incidents fell by approximately 30 percent. By comparison, nationwide security incidents fell by 10 percent for the April to August 2013 period compared to the same time frame in 2012. These numbers also reflect a growing reliance on Afghan-provided data.

11 Casualties include both KIA and WIA.
12 USFOR-A provided casualty statistics from April to September 2014. These numbers differ from the Department of Defense Casualty Analysis System (https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/pages/report_oef_month.xhtml), which shows all casualties from Operation Enduring Freedom and is not restricted to the operation in Afghanistan.
13 The term friendly force includes U.S., coalition, and Afghan forces.
Enemy-Initiated Attacks

Enemy-initiated attacks (EIAs) are insurgent-initiated incidents against coalition and Afghan forces. Like security incidents, EIAs include DF, IDF, SAFIRE, and IED and mine explosions. EIAs exclude IEDs and mines that were found and cleared (including premature IED detonations and IED turn-ins). As shown in Figure 3 below, EIAs decreased by 27 percent from April 1 through August 31, 2014, as compared to the same period last year. This is an improvement from the decrease of four percent which occurred from 2012 to the same period in 2013, but may also reflect data reporting changes as noted previously.

Figure 3: Nationwide Security Metrics: April 1, 2013 – August 31, 2014, compared to April 1 – August 31, 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>Enemy Initiated Attacks</th>
<th>High Profile Attacks</th>
<th>Direct Fire</th>
<th>IED/ Mine Explosions</th>
<th>Complex/ Coordinated Attacks</th>
<th>Indirect Fire Attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage Year Over Year Change</td>
<td>-27%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>-23%</td>
<td>-34%</td>
<td>-31%</td>
<td>-37%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The majority of attacks comprised direct fire attacks and IED attacks. Insurgents continue to conduct high-profile and complex attacks against individuals, population centers, and remote outposts. The insurgency conducted more than ten high-profile attacks in Kabul District during this reporting period. Although the resulting media coverage has promoted local and international perceptions of insecurity, such attacks have not generated strategic momentum for the insurgency.

From April 1 through August 31, 2014, violence remained highly concentrated with 80 percent of nationwide EIAs occurring in regions where only 46 percent of the population lives (including Kabul District with approximately 13 percent of the population). Fifty percent of nationwide EIAs occurred where approximately 13 percent of the population lives. The ten most violent districts in Afghanistan account for approximately just over three percent of the population and 21 percent of the violence nationwide.

Attacks against ISAF and ISAF-partnered units declined by approximately 60 percent year-over-year from April to August 2014, compared to the same period in 2013. The number of EIAs involving only the ANSF (and ALP) decreased 15 percent in 2014 from 2013. As displayed in Figure 4 below, the percentage of EIAs involving only ANSF units continued to rise, while those involving ISAF units fell.
1.6: INSURGENCY

One of the Taliban insurgency’s primary goals at the beginning of this reporting period, and its main propaganda focus, was to disrupt the presidential election and the subsequent run-off. The insurgents, however, were unable to disrupt the Afghan process due to a robust ANSF election security posture and targeted clearing operations. The high voter turnout, despite repeated threats issued by Taliban media outlets, reflected the insurgency’s limited influence over the population and struggle to match their intent with operational capability.

Following the first round of the election, concern grew that insurgents, having regrouped following their failure to disrupt the first round, would cause significant problems for the presidential run-off election. While these concerns were compounded by the Taliban’s early announcement to start the summer fighting season, few incidents occurred involving civilian casualties during the presidential run-off election. Although the insurgency failed to effectively prevent the election, both the first and second election days were two of the most violent days of the conflict. Overall, insurgent plans to disrupt the election process and dissuade a large portion of the population from participating failed to impact the process.

Following the presidential run-off election, the insurgency was able to capitalize on an overstretched ANSF by massing forces and coordinating attacks targeting rural ANSF checkpoints and rural district centers. In parts of Helmand, Kunar, Kunduz, Faryab, and Nangarhar Provinces, rural terrain remained heavily contested as the ANSF and insurgent forces
exchanged the tactical advantage throughout most of the reporting period. The Taliban were unable to turn limited tactical successes into operational gains, as the ANSF’s ability to mass forces allowed them to regain a majority of lost territory. Currently, the Taliban controls no major urban centers in Afghanistan.

Over the reporting period, the insurgency increasingly mounted massed, opportunistic attacks but was overmatched when engaged by ANSF, generally could not capture or destroy well-defended targets, and was unable to hold significant territory. Nevertheless, the insurgency remained resilient and maintained influence in many rural areas. Insurgents continued to seek to conduct high-profile attacks in population centers and against remote outposts to garner media attention, project a robust image of their capabilities, and expand perceptions of insecurity. Although of limited long-term effect, these attacks allowed the Taliban to reap significant publicity gains and a boost in morale. The insurgents’ morale was also likely bolstered by the release of former leaders from Guantanamo Bay.

Sustained ISAF and ANSF counterterrorism operations prevented al Qaeda’s use of Afghanistan as a platform from which to launch transnational terrorist attacks during this reporting period. Counterterrorism operations restricted al Qaeda’s presence to isolated areas of northeastern Afghanistan and limited access to other parts of the country. These efforts forced al Qaeda in Afghanistan to focus on survival, rather than on operations against the West. Al Qaeda’s relationship with local Afghan Taliban organizations remains intact and is an area of concern.

The Haqqani Network remained the most virulent element of the insurgency and the greatest risk to remaining coalition forces. The Haqqani Network and affiliated groups share the goals of expelling coalition forces, destabilizing the Afghan government, and reestablishing an Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. It led the insurgency in the three eastern Afghan provinces of Paktika, Paktiya, and Khost, and demonstrated the capability and intent to support and launch high-profile, complex attacks against Afghan and coalition forces across the country and in the Kabul region. The Haqqani Network and its affiliates will likely remain the most significant threat to coalition forces in the post-2014 non-combat mission.

1.7: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

Insurgent actions are still responsible for the vast majority of civilian casualties in Afghanistan, largely due to sustained, indiscriminate use of IEDs. The findings of the most recent United Nations report on civilian casualties are consistent with Afghans’ views that insurgents are overwhelmingly to blame for these events.\footnote{United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, \textit{Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: Afghanistan, Mid-Year Report 2014}, July 2014.}

From April 1 to September 21, 2014, insurgents caused approximately 94 percent of all CIVCAS; ANSF caused two percent; ISAF caused less than one percent; and the responsible parties for the remaining incidents are unknown. Over the same period in 2013, insurgent
actions resulted in approximately 3,500 civilian casualties comprising approximately 88 percent all CIVCAS with 55 percent of these CIVCAS caused by IED attacks.

Unlike the Taliban and associated groups, ISAF and the ANSF take extensive measures to avoid civilian casualties. ISAF applies a diverse range of techniques, methods, and weapons to target the insurgency while limiting civilian casualties. This includes targeting procedures that reinforce tactical restraint, training to apply the minimum level of force against the enemy, and calling off operations when there is an assessed risk to civilians. ISAF follows a rigorous standard operating procedure for reporting incidents that may have resulted in civilian casualties (including actions of U.S. Forces – Afghanistan or USFOR-A, ANSF, civilian contractors, and insurgents). ISAF maintains close communication links with Afghanistan’s Presidential Information Coordination Center in order to gather information and cross-validate CIVCAS reports received through the GIRoA reporting chain. Overall, reducing the number of civilian casualties remains a paramount objective for both ISAF and GIRoA. ISAF continues to assist by mentoring and monitoring the full implementation of the Afghan Civilian Mitigation System.

1.8: INSIDER ATTACKS

Since May 2007, coalition forces have suffered 120 confirmed insider attacks, which resulted in 161 killed-in-action and 251 wounded-in-action. Figure 5 shows the trend in insider attacks by year. Comparing the period of April 1–September 15, 2014, with the same time frame last year, insider attacks slightly declined from five to four. One such high-profile event took place at a Kabul training facility on August 5, 2014, when an ANA soldier killed U.S. Army Major General Harold Greene, the deputy commander of CSTC-A, and wounded 14 others.

Despite the decreased frequency of incidents during this reporting period, insider attacks continue to represent a strategic threat to the campaign and jeopardize the relationship between coalition forces and ANSF personnel. Though the insurgency encouraged and influenced many of the insider attacks, the attacker’s motivation is unknown for the vast majority of attacks. Regardless of motivation, the insurgency continues to capitalize on insider attacks to drive a wedge between coalition and Afghan forces.

ISAF continues to interface regularly with NATO and troop contributing nations regarding the insider threat. The protection of coalition personnel remains a cornerstone of the active mitigation measures ISAF has in place to counter the threat. The application of standing force protection measures limits access and opportunity for perpetrators to conduct attacks on coalition bases and personnel. The Theater Force Protection Standard Operating Procedure and the Mitigation of the Insider Threat Standard Operating Procedure provide specific direction to counter the insider threat and establish procedures for investigating and reviewing insider attacks. Additionally, ISAF’s Insider Threat Handbook provides guidance from the Commander of International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF) on insider threat training and mitigation, lessons learned, and best practices for countering the threat. This information has been

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ISAF, ANSF, and GIRoA continue to take a comprehensive approach to mitigate insider threats through a series of measures aimed at increasing understanding of the threat, improving force preparation through cultural and situational training, supporting ANSF vetting and other efforts, and enhancing force protection measures, specifically through the Guardian Angel program. This multipronged approach is assessed to have contributed to the decrease of insider attacks during this reporting period.

Investigation and analysis of insider attacks will continue to shape ISAF’s approach to mitigating the insider threat through educating the force on lessons learned and the enduring evolution of the insider threat. ISAF and the ASI continue to collaborate on improved intelligence and information sharing between ISAF and the ANSF, and among the different elements of the ANSF. The ANSF has implemented intelligence sharing working groups under the direction of the NDS. ISAF continues to employ Joint Casualty Assessment Teams (JCATs) following insider attacks. These teams seek to determine quickly the causes of the attack wherever

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16 *Resolute Support Security Force Assistance Guide 3.1* provides NATO partners and troop contributing nations a common understanding of how ISAF will execute the shift from a unit-based, combat-oriented advisory mission, to a functionally-based SFA mission that focuses on building sustainable ASI and ANSF systems and processes. The guide also provides advisors with a tool for enabling Afghan institutions and security forces to become sustainable and able to operate independently.
possible and to identify any lessons learned for immediate dissemination throughout the battlespace. The JCAT report is the foundation for a more in-depth analyses conducted by the Insider Threat Assessment Board to determine causation, motivation, and additional lessons learned.

ISAF mandates cultural and situational awareness training to help mitigate attacks by educating personnel on behavioral and environmental indicators of impending insider attacks. ISAF continues to work with stakeholders to develop guidance and standards for SFA and insider threat training. This collaborative effort, led by the COMISAF Advisory and Assistance Team, produced an update to the ISAF SFA Guide that incorporated the transition from combat advising to functionally based SFA. The *Resolute Support Security Force Assistance Guide 3.1* has been distributed widely to the U.S. and NATO training centers, ISAF headquarters and subordinate headquarters, and other entities. The guide provides advisors deploying to Afghanistan with COMISAF’s guidance and intent, as well as tips for being effective advisors and mitigating the risks of insider attacks. ISAF engineers conduct Combined Training Center training and associated training assessments. These ISAF-sponsored, institutionalized approaches provide commanders with current guidance that is synchronized with the doctrine-generating organizations in NATO and the DoD.

COMISAF and other ISAF leaders continue to engage with Afghan senior leaders across the Afghan government and security forces, as well as with coalition partners at the ministerial and senior official levels, to ensure a coordinated and high-level response to the insider threat. ISAF headquarters utilizes key leader engagements to impress upon GIROA and coalition nations the military leaders’ commitment to mitigating or preventing the risk of insider attacks. The ANA has continued its re-vetting efforts. ISAF continues to engage both the MoD and the MoI on the requirement for formal personnel screening to be included in official policy at the national level. ISAF and the ANSF also continue to develop the ANSF counter-intelligence capability.

Continued employment of Guardian Angels (a force protection measure consisting of NATO military members whose sole responsibility is to provide security during engagements with ANSF) has likely deterred potential insider attacks and has minimized the effects of the insider attacks that did occur. In 2013 and so far in 2014, ISAF assesses that Guardian Angels both deterred attacks and mitigated casualties in attacks by engaging and killing the attackers; in this respect, the employment of Guardian Angels is successful. However, ISAF also acknowledges that Guardian Angels cannot prevent all attacks.

### 1.9: REINTEGRATION

As the U.S. and coalition footprint grows smaller, the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) has continued steady progress in support of GIROA’s peace narrative by removing insurgent fighters from the battlefield and funding development projects that support reintegration. Since the program’s creation in 2010, over 9,000 fighters have been reintegrated into Afghan society. From January 1 to September 23, 1,404 new individuals enrolled in the program. The backlog of reintegration candidates, who have been fully vetted at the provincial and national levels, still remains; however, the number of reintegrees waiting to be enrolled has
been greatly reduced since the 2014 budget approval. The program supports more than 100 small grant projects and 1,228 line ministry projects that reach 136 districts across 31 provinces, benefiting more than 6,100 reintegrated persons and their communities, which reflects increased capacity since the beginning of the program in 2010.

Funding for the APRP is one of GIRoA’s primary reintegration challenges. The Joint Secretariat emphasized that APRP requires a $79 million budget to operate at its current level. Following international community contributions of $30 million, only $58.1 million is available for the 2014 APRP budget. The $20.9 million funding gap and associated delays in the budget approval process have resulted in delayed biometric enrollment trips to enroll new reintegrees and delayed payments of transition assistance to current reintegrated persons. The shortfall will also preclude the start of new APRP-funded community recovery projects; however, community recovery projects that have already begun will continue to be supported. The $58.1 million budget was finalized in March 2014. Since the release of funds in May, spending has decreased significantly in an effort to stay within the 2014 finalized budget.

ISAF’s Force Reintegration Cell ceased operations in October 2014. Since 2010, ISAF helped GIRoA establish its own reintegration program. Over this reporting period, ISAF elements transitioned from an advise and assist role to a monitoring position without any perceptible reduction in program effectiveness. The Afghan government now runs the APRP with minimal oversight from the international community. While Taliban insurgents remained steadfast in their refusal to talk with the Karzai government, it is unknown whether their policy will change with the Ghani administration.

Afghan Peace and National Unity Week was held September 20 to September 25, with the National Day of Peace recognized on September 21. This event highlighted the spread of GIRoA’s peace narrative. Afghan senior leadership participated in peace-related conferences and millions of Afghan people received GIRoA’s peace message during the week and through the High Peace Council documentary, which was released in July.

1.10: BILATERAL SECURITY AGREEMENT

President Karzai completed his term in office without signing the bilateral security agreement in the ten months after negotiations concluded. On September 30, 2014, the government of his successor, Ashraf Ghani, signed the BSA the day after he was inaugurated. The agreement now goes to the Afghan legislature for ratification. The Ghani administration also signed a status of forces agreement with NATO, a necessary condition for NATO member states to contribute forces to the post-2014 TAA mission in Afghanistan.

The U.S.-Afghanistan BSA is an international agreement between the United States and Afghanistan that provides the terms and conditions the United States needs to support a post-2014 U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. The agreement is an opportunity to sustain the partnership between the United States and Afghanistan and to support Afghans in achieving lasting peace, security, and development. Although the BSA provides similar protections as the 2003 SOFA provided, President Obama had made clear the United States must have an invitation

The BSA provides the United States the following protections:

- A clear statement of U.S. exclusive criminal and civil jurisdiction for U.S. military personnel and DoD civilians in Afghanistan;
- Clear exemptions from taxation on U.S. forces and on the work contractors do in Afghanistan to support U.S. forces, including work performed by subcontractors;
- Clear acknowledgment of U.S. missions – counterterrorism operations against remnants of core al Qaeda and its affiliates, and a mission to train, advise, and assist the ANSF – in language that preserves presidential prerogatives to direct the use of U.S. forces and that preserves the right of self-defense; and
- Rights to access and use necessary facilities, the rights of freedom of movement, import and export, entry and exit, and other necessary daily activities, without intrusive coordination requirements that would undercut those rights.

The BSA does not require the United States to maintain forces in Afghanistan, address the number of U.S. forces that will remain after 2014, or provide for permanent U.S. bases in Afghanistan.

1.11: ELECTION

On April 5, 2014, Afghanistan held the first round of its presidential election and began the process towards the first peaceful democratic transfer of power in Afghan history. A presidential runoff election then followed between the top two candidates, Dr. Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, on June 14, 2014. During the election process, the Afghan Independent Election Commission and the Afghan security ministries led the planning and execution to deliver materials and ensure a credible, inclusive, and transparent election process. The United States provided advising, technical, logistical, financial, and security support to the Afghan-led efforts.

Afghan preparations for the election consistently exceeded expectations, with Afghan electoral institutions and security ministries working in cooperation to ready plans and deliver materials for a credible, inclusive, and transparent election. The level of ISAF support provided to the ANSF on both election days was much lower than many analysts had anticipated, and levels of violence did not accomplish the insurgency’s goal of disrupting the election.

Afghan domestic election observation groups fielded more than 12,000 observers on Election Day. Approximately 300,000 total observers participated, including candidate agents, domestic and international observers, and media. Approximately 200 international observers were present on Election Day, although for security reasons they were deployed only in certain urban centers. USAID funded the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and Democracy International to conduct two independent international election observation missions, while the EU and the Asia
Foundation/Asian Network for Free Elections also fielded observation missions, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) sent a small election support team. Due to security concerns, NDI did not deploy international observers for the first round. Through the Supporting Political Entities and Civil Society program implemented by NDI, the U.S. Government supported the following three Afghan domestic election observation groups: Afghanistan Youth National and Social Organization, Transparent Election Foundation of Afghanistan, and Afghanistan National Participation Organization. USAID trained 2,200 Afghan observers to be deployed nationally on Election Day. In addition, USAID convened a monthly donor domestic election working group in order to coordinate its funded domestic observations with the EU, which funds the Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan to send out 10,000 Afghan observers, covering 70 percent of the country on Election Day.

Election Day was widely considered to be successful with more than 6.6 million votes cast. The most commonly reported complaint was the shortage of ballots across the country, which was attributed partially to the high voter turnout, and partially to fraud. The IEC sent out contingency ballots to many polling centers in response to the reported shortages. Although the IEC suspected that fraud or ballot theft may have played a role, the initial shortage of ballots affected less than 2.5 percent of the polling centers. After the delivery of contingency material, only 0.5 percent of the polling centers lacked sufficient ballots, according to the IEC.

On May 15, the IEC announced the final results for the first round: Dr. Abdullah received 45 percent of the votes, and Dr. Ghani received 31.5 percent. As provided in the Afghan Constitution, the failure of any one candidate to secure over 50 percent of the votes requires a run-off election. In the months leading to the run-off elections, both Dr. Ghani and Dr. Abdullah sought to broaden their bases of support by gaining additional endorsements from the losing candidates and other prominent political leaders.

When it became clear that a run-off election was necessary, there was concern that insurgents would be able to regroup, use lessons learned from their failure to disrupt the first round, and cause significant problems in the run-off. These concerns were compounded by insurgents’ announcement of the start of the fighting season prior to the run-off election. However, decisive efforts by the leadership of the MoD, MoI, and NDS to conduct after-action reviews and develop coordinated plans to provide additional security, helped facilitate a secure run-off. Although there were incidents involving casualties, insurgents failed in their attempts to disrupt the election process by intimidating or dissuading large numbers of voters from participating.

The immediate reaction to the run-off election among both the Afghan and international media was predominantly positive, although an undertone of surprise at the higher reported turnout was expressed in many reports. However, the events following the run-off election revealed that voter fraud and ballot stuffing had occurred, which created a challenge to completing a democratic transition for the Afghan government. The Abdullah campaign accused the IEC of coordinating large scale fraud particularly in Ghani campaign strongholds. The Abdullah campaign argued that in some areas in the south and east, the number of Afghans who reportedly voted for Dr. Ghani exceeded official population estimates for those areas. Following these allegations, on June 18, the Abdullah campaign announced it would withdraw from the electoral process until its demands were met. In addition, campaign members released audio recordings
that implicated IEC Chief Electoral Officer Zia Amarkhil as a participant in the coordination of the fraud. Although the chief electoral officer maintained his innocence, he resigned following the release of the recordings so the process could move forward.

With no agreement on a way forward between the two candidates, the IEC announced preliminary results on July 7, which showed Dr. Ghani with a substantial lead over Dr. Abdullah; many supporters of Dr. Abdullah questioned the legitimacy of this result. On July 12, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry travelled to Afghanistan and facilitated an agreement between the candidates. They agreed to a nationwide audit of 100 percent of the votes cast in the run-off. The candidates also agreed to form a national unity government that would result in the runner-up playing a prominent role in the new government. ISAF and the UN agreed to transport all ballot boxes to Kabul, where they would be audited by the IEC under close supervision by the United Nations. Secretary Kerry travelled to Kabul again on August 7 through 8 to facilitate further discussions. In a joint statement, the two candidates reaffirmed their commitment to a government of national unity following the Secretary’s visit. On September 21, nearly six months after the first round of presidential elections was held, Dr. Ghani and Dr. Abdullah publicly signed an agreement to create a unity government, which included establishing the roles and responsibilities of a Chief Executive Officer and a commitment to a reform agenda. Dr. Ghani was sworn in as the Afghan president on September 29, 2014, and issued a decree appointing Dr. Abdullah as CEO immediately afterwards.
SECTION 2 – AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES GROWTH, DEVELOPMENT, AND OPERATIONS

2.1: ANSF SUMMARY

The ANSF continue to improve as they take the lead role in security operations, and are on track to take full responsibility for the security of Afghanistan by 2015. They have met the high operational tempo demands associated with the national elections and presidential runoff to preserve safety and security in Afghanistan. In particular, they led the planning and execution of security and counterinsurgency operations, many of which were complex, involving ANA and ANP units. The ANA and ANP conducted several large and complex operations across Afghanistan this reporting period to deny enemy influence and improve security. These operations, some of which are still ongoing, have included many different units and demonstrate increasing ANSF operational capabilities to disrupt the insurgency, protect the populace, and employ multiple ANSF organizations. ISAF support was limited to providing advice and air support to augment ANSF operations.

The ANSF led 99 percent of conventional operations and 99 percent of special operations, many of which they conducted unilaterally. Despite a continuous offensive posture, ANSF casualties (not including the Afghan Local Police, or ALP) for the first five months of this reporting period remained essentially the same compared to the same period last year. Meanwhile, the ANSF’s monthly attrition rates remained consistent with those of the last reporting period, did not deviate significantly from 2013 levels, and hovered at approximately 2.1 percent.

ANSF operations seized the initiative from insurgents ahead of the presidential run-off election. The operations conducted prior to the provincial and first round of presidential elections facilitated an environment that encouraged electoral participation from Afghan citizens. The tone set by this initial process carried forward, and the ANSF continued to conduct operations to ensure safety and security prior to and during the presidential runoff. Their performance during the fighting season has also shown improvement. When engaged by insurgents, the ANSF typically overmatched their opposition.

The Afghan security institutions and forces have continued to make significant strides toward achieving operational autonomy. The ANSF are capable of conducting offensive operations, defending areas, and disrupting the enemy at tactical levels, and have shown the ability to plan and execute short-duration, complex security operations. The recent success of the ANSF and ASI in providing security for the elections bolstered their confidence in planning and executing operations, and continued to demonstrate their progress to the Afghan people.

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17 This section is submitted in accordance with section 1231, United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, as amended.

18 An “operation” is considered here as a deliberate operation conducted by security forces. The “lead” for an operation is determined by who planned it and subsequently gave orders. ANSF led operations include those that are unilateral, as well as those enabled and advised by ISAF. An operation is deemed unilateral, partnered, enabled, or advised based on partner force ratios. An operation is considered “unilateral” if the ANSF did not have assistance from ISAF. In few instances, ISAF provided enabling or partnering support for Afghan-led operations.
Figure 6: Percentage of Survey Respondents that have a *Very Favorable* or *Somewhat Favorable* View of the Afghan Government, Afghan Security Forces, and the Taliban

Figure 7: Survey Respondent Answers to Question of “Who Most Brings Security to Your Area?”
As shown in Figure 6 above, Afghan survey respondents continue to have a favorable or somewhat favorable view of the ANSF as they have taken the lead for security. According to ISAF survey data shown in Figure 7 above, Afghan respondents continue to see the ANP providing the bulk of their security.

During this reporting period, ISAF continued to address ANSF capability gaps in close air support; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; special operations; maintenance; and logistics. ISAF also continued to plan for focusing on further developing these capabilities during the Resolute Support mission.

The Afghan Air Force continued to mature during this reporting period, showing progression in a number of mission areas to include light airlift, casualty evacuation, the transport of human remains, aerial reconnaissance in the form of non-traditional ISR, and the capability to support civil authorities. However, the AAF continues to rely on ISAF to conduct CAS and air to ground fires. DoD is taking measures to address these gaps as discussed in Section 2.6 below.

The Special Mission Wing has 33 percent of its authorized personnel on hand. To increase its manning, the SMW must maintain a close relationship with the AAF to recruit, train, and develop aircrew and maintenance personnel. The SMW has 15 Mi-17 crews fully mission qualified for day operations, and 10 out of 20 required fully mission qualified crews certified on night vision device flight operations. Growth in Mi-17 maintenance personnel remained stagnant over the reporting period, so SMW continues to rely on its on-hand Afghan maintenance personnel and U.S. contract maintenance support.

Fielding and development of the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) is essentially complete, and their overall capability has continued to improve steadily. As of September 2014, 53 percent of ASSF units were rated as capable or fully capable. All 150 Afghan Local Police districts have now transitioned to GIRoA control and have been validated. The ASSF continued to develop its ability to integrate combined arms and special operations kandaks with other ANSF, manage battle tracking, and integrate disruption operations, intelligence, and information operations.

Developing sustainment capacity within the Ministries of Defense and Interior and their forces is one of the most critical challenges that ISAF is addressing with the Afghan government and security forces. Past efforts have resulted primarily in development of appropriate policy and guidance without building the entire end-to-end logistics system down to the operational and tactical levels. To ensure ANSF could participate in operations, ANSF relied on coalition forces logistics and resupply, substituting for development of ANSF capability. With the drawdown of coalition forces and the end of the coalition combat mission, this will no longer be possible. Thus, DoD deployed teams during this reporting period to focus on addressing these organizational shortfalls and to ensure the ANSF would have systems and processes in place to conduct—with appropriate advisory assistance—logistics planning, supply and commodity forecasting, inventory management, scheduled logistics, contract management, and medical support. This will include linking the ANSF supply system to the DoD supply system and life cycle sustainment of ANSF major end items to DoD program managers through foreign military sales (FMS) cases.

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19 ISAF surveys conducted monthly.
2.2: SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

During this reporting period, ISAF shifted its focus from combat advising to functionally based security force assistance. Advisors now align with Afghan components performing eight essential functions and associated sub-functions. The eight essential functions include: plan, program, budget, and execute; transparency, accountability, and oversight; civilian governance of the ASI and adherence to rule of law; force generate; sustain the force; plan, resource, and execute effective security campaigns; sufficient intelligence capabilities and processes; and maintain internal and external strategic communication capability.

ISAF has reorganized to create dedicated leads for each essential function, which is responsible for providing security force assistance at the corps and police zone echelons and above. All advisors who perform TAA actions for the essential function, whether at the corps, institutional, or ministerial level, are aligned to the essential function lead. This is intended to unify advisory efforts at all echelons; previously, advisors for a particular function at the tactical and operational level were in different organizations than the advisors for the same function at the ministerial level, hindering development of vertically integrated processes at all echelons of the ANSF and their ministries. The essential function lead provides technical advice and guidance to the advisors; however, force protection and administrative arrangements are still controlled by the advisor integral organization. When issues are identified within an essential function, the intent is to resolve that issue at the lowest possible level.

Issues that involve action across the essential functions require horizontal coordination and synchronization. Horizontal coordination is accomplished through SFA working groups and in formal tasking; synchronization is achieved through command lead boards that can issue a formal tasking. Horizontal coordination and synchronization occur at every echelon and, when possible, actions are resolved at the lowest level. Strategic-level issues are passed from one echelon to another until they can be successfully resolved in collaboration with Afghan counterparts.

2.3: INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING AND ASSESSMENT

The MoD and MoI continued to make progress this reporting period in balancing force structure, infrastructure, readiness, and modernization within available means and resources. Both ministries published revised strategic documents during this reporting period. They also demonstrated the ability to plan and execute long-term and contingency operations such as providing security for the elections, the Loya Jirga, international visits, and other events. In support of the elections, the MoD and MoI successfully conducted inter-ministerial coordination to execute security operations in support of the elections. In close coordination with the impending political transition of the central government, they simultaneously focused resources and assets on the fighting season campaign plan.

Both MoI and MoD completed a systems upgrade to the Afghan Human Resource Information Management System (AHRIMS) 1.2 for the ANSF in June 2014 and installed a new central server in the Network Operations Center. Additionally, ANSF personnel received training in the
new personnel management processes. The delivery of AHRIMS 1.2 will enable the ministries to automate many of their personnel management processes and better forecast and meet their future manpower requirements. Advisors are encouraging the use of AHRIMS to interface with the Employment Permit System. This will facilitate force development and automatically produce identification cards.

Although many aspects of ministerial capacity are improving, much work remains. The ministries need to continue developing capacity in the eight essential functions as prescribed in the NATO Resolute Support mission. The ministries have limited capability in the areas of logistics, procurement, acquisition, budget, and finance, and continue to lack comprehensive oversight mechanisms.

**Assessment of the Ministry of Defense**

The MoD made progress during the reporting period, but will require sustained coalition assistance in numerous strategic and operational functions to achieve its mission. The MoD demonstrated progress in planning operations and strategic messaging, revising the *National Military Strategy*, and reforming out-of-country training. However, it still requires additional support in developing human capital, implementing contracts and procurement, and developing transparency, accountability, and oversight procedures.

**Areas of Improvement**

The MoD demonstrated progress this reporting period in planning operations and in delivering strategic messaging. It also revised the *National Military Strategy* and took steps to reform out-of-country training.

During this reporting period, MoD senior leaders focused on ensuring a seamless transition from providing security for the elections to providing security through the fighting season. To do so, the MoD initiated a full planning process to support annual operations, which included a mission analysis brief with associated courses of action, a decision brief, and corps commanders’ back-briefs. Summer fighting season operations commenced on June 20, 2014. Strategic messaging through the media has contributed to ANSF operational gains. This is an important aspect of the comprehensive operational approach that the MoD is developing; however, the MoD still lacks a comprehensive strategy to defeat the insurgency. Assistance in developing a valid campaign plan is a critical focus area for advisors.

Following a strategic defense planning seminar in March, MoD Strategic Planning revised the *National Military Strategy*. Ministerial leadership reviewed the revised strategy and published the new document in August 2014. The revised 2014 *National Military Strategy* sets in motion the Minister of Defense’s vision and priorities for shaping the future force in the post transition period, especially beyond 2017. The Minister of Defense’s priorities include three broad areas, to include strengthening the institutional capacity of the MoD and ANA, professionalizing the force, and developing future security relationships. Although this revision is a limited update and a more rigorous review should be completed, advisors have a heightened awareness of issues

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20 MoD capability milestone ratings charts provided in previous reports are no longer produced.
deferred in the *National Military Strategy* and will work with their Afghan counterparts to address these issues in the second document in the Strategic Defense Planning System series on the guidance for operational planning.

Now that the United States and NATO have announced their commitments and future force structures through 2016, the MoD is moving forward on a transition and sustainment plan. Throughout this reporting period, MoD and general staff leadership conducted the first-ever total army analysis, or *tashkil* review, of the current and future ANA force structure. The purpose of this analysis was to develop a workable plan to resource the current force and to identify cost-savings to support new capabilities. The analysis allowed leaders to address force management issues holistically, thereby minimizing the risk of imbalance and wasted resources. The Minister of Defense approved the calendar year (CY) 1393 *tashkil* in May 2014, with extensive enhancements to the force structure over the previously approved draft. These enhancements include new *kandaks*, equipment for the Gamberi Regional Military Hospital, military police re-organization, and refinement of the AAF structure.

In the CY 1393 *tashkil*, the MoD added posts for defense attachés to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, although these are not expected to be filled until the new Afghan government has worked through other priorities. These new appointments will complement the existing defense attaché to Tajikistan. Closer cooperation with these states should help strengthen Afghanistan’s military relations with its neighbors. Work continued with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to develop a regional policy directive, which was due to be published in May 2014. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and MoD Strategy and Policy have been reluctant to advocate a particular strategic direction until the new government is in place.

In conjunction with the *tashkil* review, the MoD has been assessing its current force structure through its annual Command Plan Review and Force Design process. Planning the allocation of forces is based on the country’s national threat assessment, and identifying priorities as it moves into a more resource constrained environment. The MoD has focused staff effort on identifying excess facilities, operating bases, and sustainment costs as it continues to assume more responsibility for the execution of its budget.

The MoD also took steps to pursue the Minister of Defense’s priorities of professionalizing the force and developing future security relationships. In June 2014, the MoD international military affairs office and representatives of the Chief of the General Staff’s office, the General Staff G1 and G7, and Assistant Minister for Personnel and Education engaged with coalition defense attachés and MoD ministerial advisors to initiate reforms to the ANA’s involvement in out-of-country training (also known as International Military Education and Training or IMET). Participants emphasized the expanded role of defense attachés as ISAF transitions to the Resolute Support mission, responsibilities for reconciling the supply and demand of out-of-country training opportunities between donor nations and the ANA, and providing information assurance between host country schools and the MoD.
Areas of Concern

Coalition advisory efforts continued to focus on addressing shortfalls in MoD human capital; contracting and procurement; and transparency, accountability and oversight. President Ghani has signaled that improvements in these areas across the government will be a focus of his administration.

MoD hiring practices sometimes rely on patronage networks rather than qualifications when filling positions of authority. The MoD has a dearth of competent officers in positions of authority; however, a number of senior officers constrain advisors’ ability to develop the capacity of the individual offices and to design and implement needed reforms. The budgetary system is overly bureaucratic, which inhibits the MoD’s ability to resource the force properly, and overly restrictive laws increase the workload associated with contracting and procurement. Continued assignment of junior officers with the requisite training and skills, coupled with the recruitment of appropriately trained and experienced civilians, will help mitigate these shortfalls in the near term. Long-term progress hinges on the continued growth and development of mid-level employees in these offices.

The MoD Acquisition Agency awarded its first multi-year contract in September 2014 after evaluating bids for a contract for all fuel required by MoD for CY 1393-95. The Assistant Minister for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) has stated his intent to put more multi-year contracts in place for other classes of supply, particularly for ammunition and uniforms.

In June 2014, the Special Mission Wing secured a CSTC-A bridging contract for fuel supply through June 2015, which will transition to MoD in January 2015. The bridge contract process is both training and forcing the MoD to establish an Afghan aviation fuel contract through GIRoA by early 2015. If the MoD contract is delayed, the 2014 bridge contract has two six-month options. The MoD procurement will work two separate contracts in parallel (one SMW and one AAF), due to limitations in Afghan contracting law. These contract requirements will be presented to MoD AT&L at the same time for signature. The earliest MoD contract would be January 2015.

The Assistant Minister for AT&L and the General Staff, Logistics, have developed a procurement strategy that includes coalition-approved management controls, in order to ensure that CY 1393 organizational equipment and individual equipment contracts comply with the Berry Amendment where required. This strategy includes advisor involvement, oversight, and training.

A weakness in bottom-up requirement identification and demand-based forecasting continues. From the ministerial to the corps level, there are opportunities for training and education in this area to further the ANA’s ability to sustain its force and manage limited budget resources.

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21 The Berry Amendment specifies that uniforms and uniform component items intended for wear by members of the ANA, ANP, staff and patients at national military hospitals, or by inmates of the national detention facilities which are procured with direct contributions of CSTC-A funds, must be procured from the United States.
Coalition and Afghan MoD AT&L assess these deficiencies through the Class IX (repair parts) working group. In this reporting period, this group developed a detailed process map to guide activity from the corps to the MoD in order to support procurement. A top-level plan of action and milestones has been approved, which includes updates to MoD decrees and implementation in appropriate ANA schools. This process will be presented at the next ANA-sponsored national logistics conference. Included in the plan of action and milestones is a proof of principle to identify current Class IX shortfalls and readiness degraders and execute FMS purchases.

Scheduled ordering is the process of regularly ordering supplies and commodities to meet routine needs. It provides routine replenishment of commodity stocks and augments proper logistics planning and supply forecasting. An important aspect of scheduled ordering is the national procurement of strategic stocks. Until recently, the ANA has relied on coalition forces and coalition force contracts for most of its national acquisition of repair parts. Coalition forces have committed more than $77 million towards repair parts procurement programs to build prescribed load lists and authorized stockage lists at multiple echelons—purchases reviewed and approved by the ANA prior to placement. Starting with ANA kandaks, these purchases were designed to build unit stocks from lower to higher echelons using existing ANA transportation networks to distribute the parts upon arrival in Afghanistan. This effort is effectively building a national inventory and baseline of repair parts for the ANA. The ANA began taking responsibility for the identification and initiation of strategic repair parts procurement this reporting period. This transfer of responsibility includes ANA determination of its requirement, approval of the acquisition, and initiation of the acquisition. It also introduces the ANA to a computer-based FMS ordering system that is expected to reduce the time between part requisition and receipt. This system is expected to make the ANA acquisition process more responsive than traditional FMS case purchases in order to address emerging repair parts requirements.

The MoD continues to struggle in developing transparency, accountability, and oversight procedures. During this reporting period, the MoD established eight additional Transparency and Accountability Committees to counter-corruption. However, the committees are still developing administrative capabilities to properly oversee and report on transparency and accountability issues. ISAF continues to leverage financial controls, such as its fiscal year commitment letter that is designed to ensure MoD compliance with financial budgeting requirements agreed upon by GIRoA and the coalition. The letter incorporates controls to potentially delay or reduce direct contributions based on MoD compliance with the agreement. The MoD has responded positively to these controls and has submitted financial commitment letter for the execution of its budgetary requirements for the upcoming fiscal year. Overall, the process of establishing financial controls is intended to build ANSF ministerial capacity to manage and execute funds while developing acquisition and procurement capabilities.

ISAF advisors continued to work with the MoD to develop a budget and finance system. The MoD continued to struggle to fully execute the direct contributions it receives from the United States and other donor nations to pay for salaries and incentives, food and other consumables, obligating less than half of the $1.6 billion in on-budget support. This low execution is due to several factors, including a delay in receiving the approved fiscal year spend plan; the lack of a mature contracting capability, which results in delays in contract award and closeout; and the continuing focus on executing prior-year contracts.
Assessment of the Ministry of Interior\textsuperscript{22}

The MoI made progress during the reporting period, but will require sustained coalition assistance in numerous strategic and operational functions to achieve its mission.

Areas of Improvement

Some MoI capability development initiatives have demonstrated progress, to include strategic and operational planning, as well as procurement and financial processes.

The MoI continues to progress toward autonomous operations. Of 31 departments, 27 require little to no coalition oversight; 3 operate independently without coalition oversight and 24 operate with minimal coalition assistance or oversight. MoI leaders have shown that they are willing to embrace greater challenges and improve all aspects of their operations to achieve autonomous capabilities. ISAF currently projects that the MoI will be rated as capable of autonomous operations with reduced coalition oversight by the end of 2015.

MoI leadership demonstrates an understanding of both security and sustainability challenges for the ministry and Afghanistan. The Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy has developed and published some baseline strategic documents. During this reporting period, the MoI revised three key strategic documents: the Strategic Planning Directive, National Police Strategy, and National Police Plan. This guidance will foster the continued development of the ANP and facilitate the expansion of operational capabilities to meet current and future challenges to Afghanistan’s stabilization and security.

The Deputy Minister’s General Directorate of Strategy produced a revised Strategic Planning Directive. The directive links strategic guidance to operational planning and explains the responsibilities and duties of MoI deputy ministries and general independent directorates relative to the nesting of strategic, operational, and tactical planning. The revised Strategic Planning Directive is an exclusively Afghan product and represents a considerable improvement over the previous edition.

The General Directorate of Strategy also completed a revision of the National Police Strategy during this reporting period, which provides the strategic guidance necessary to ensure the continued development of the MoI and ANP. Additionally, the National Police Strategy provides the strategic-level guidance necessary to prioritize the Minister of Interior’s 10-year vision imperatives. Like the Strategic Planning Directive, the National Police Strategy is an exclusively Afghan-produced document. It articulates clearly the 13 strategic goals that the ANP is oriented towards achieving during the five-year period of 2014 to 2018.

The General Directorate of Strategy also developed and published a completely revised version of the National Police Plan. The plan introduces two key products: the operational plan (OPLAN), and quarterly report templates. The former is a tool that deputy ministers and inspector general directorates will use to develop their action plans relative to their respective tasks in the National Police Plan. The OPLAN template provides a guideline to document key

\textsuperscript{22} MoI capability milestone ratings charts provided in previous reports are no longer produced.
information necessary to develop implementable plans and, most importantly, requires a projection of estimated costs associated with each action. Cost estimates are a crucial input to the requirements-based programming process that the Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy is implementing. This innovation should help ensure that future budgets are linked to strategic goals. The OPLAN template also adds a requirement to develop performance, evaluation, and results indicators for each task as a means of tracking progress, validating successes, and identifying shortfalls. The quarterly report is another equally significant component of the Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy’s vision to revise the MoI’s strategic planning process. Ostensibly a way to ensure that deputy ministers and inspector general directorates understand strategic guidance, discern equities, and implement respective plans, the quarterly report is a tool to monitor progress, validate evidence of performance, and track expenditure of programmed resources. The Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy views the report as an instrument to enhance oversight and accountability within the MoI.

The General Policy Directorate continues to make steady progress in its capacity to develop policies and procedures. However, it still lacks the capacity to effectively implement and assess policies beyond the MoI level. Additionally, the Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy directed the General Policy Directorate to completely revise its current Policy Development Directive. He also directed changes to policy and procedure formats and content requirements that have been designed to enhance effectiveness, clarity, and standardization. Although the General Policy Directorate has demonstrated a keen ability to design these documents to a level that meets the basic needs of MoI, the deputy minister, drawing on his experience at the local Afghan governance level, is striving towards the delivery of products that more effectively support strategic goals and objectives and provide end users with sufficient guidance. He believes that the revised Policy Development Directive and his directed changes will meet this goal.

A newly created Evaluation and Analysis Directorate was a force structure addition to Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy this reporting period. The new directorate will facilitate the development of more precise strategic guidance by enabling the Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy to assess the effectiveness of strategy by analyzing outputs and indicators. In turn, Strategy and Policy can use these data to adjust processes and guidance to achieve optimal benefit. Though this capability is in the early stage of activation, the Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy will seek access to the MoI personnel who returned from an assessments course conducted this reporting period at the Turkish National Police Academy to form the nucleus of his new directorate.

The MoI is working to adjust its forces to include the convoy security and site security responsibilities of the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), which a presidential directive dissolved in February 2014 (see Section 2.8 for more information on the APPF). The ANP will provide convoy security through the establishment of convoy escort brigades that are designed to provide security similar to the convoy security *kandaks* of the APPF. The APPF Operations Section, which provided site security, has migrated into the ANP and continues to provide this function. The transition of the APPF into the ANP created legal and fiscal challenges related to the payment of ANP soldiers for a contracted service. President Ghani has expressed his desire to reevaluate the decision on APPF. That coordination is ongoing at the time of this report.
The MoI has demonstrated the ability to plan and execute long-term and contingency operations in support of election security, the Loya Jirga, international visits, and other events. MoI leadership improved their procedures between the two election rounds. The MoI recently completed an Operations and Functions Manual, which involved drafting 150 operational policies over two years of consistent effort.

The MoI has also demonstrated some progress in procuring critical services for its security forces. The MoI Procurement Directorate developed a combined CY 1393 national- and provincial-level procurement plan. So far, the directorate has processed 65 contracts, worth 1.65 billion Afghanis. In addition, the MoI has implemented the Afghan Financial Management System (AFMIS) for goods contracts; however, the system requires expanded capabilities for full implementation. The AFMIS and the Procurement Management Information System are used constantly, but the transfer of data to the Ministry of Finance remains an issue. The directorate has also increased advertising and is improving its marketing procurement opportunities to vendors.

Advisors observed considerable improvement this reporting period in MoI financial processes. So far in 2014, miscoding errors amount to $174,000, whereas in 2013 they totaled approximately $60 million. MoI personnel convey a sense of urgency in adhering to guidance and regulations for processing financial transactions. For example, they have committed to identifying and correcting all miscoding errors within 15 days. However, to increase and maintain financial visibility throughout the ministry and improve accountability, MoI must develop a method for reaching out to the provincial and district areas to educate and train personnel on the correct processes and procedures.

**Areas of Concern**

Decision-making and accountability inside the MoI still need to be developed further. MoI’s critical support functions are slowly improving; however, it still has limited capabilities in the logistics, procurement, and finance departments.

The MoI continues to rely on coalition assistance in many areas, but is striving to become capable in self-sustaining equipment, infrastructure, and forces with available resources. It is necessary to develop forecasting, requisition, acquisition, and procurement processes that will ensure that the right supplies are in the right place at the right time. ISAF advisors and trainers are focusing currently on facilities management, maintenance, and logistic system functions; these areas will continue to be priorities for the Resolute Support mission.

The MoI transitioned from a coalition-administered bulk fuels contract to an Afghan-administered two-year, indefinite-delivery indefinite-quantity contract. The first orders were placed with vendors in May 2014 to support the ANP units across the country. The Procurement Directorate is accomplishing its basic procurement mission by obtaining goods and services for the MoI’s budgetary units (e.g., Facilities Directorate, Logistics Directorate) and the provinces.

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23 This total does not include the value of the national fuel contract.
However, the MoI budgetary units and provincial units still do not provide timely or accurate resource requirements to facilitate procurement actions.

The MoI is developing a concept to support transition from coalition force-contracted vehicle maintenance and supply to an organic capability. Recently, the MoI has transitioned management of vehicle and generator fuel through the award and execution of a series of GIRoA fuel contracts. The National Logistics Center – Wardak is the hub for all supply and maintenance activities and is expected by Afghans and advisors to provide significant capacity and capability to perform all levels of maintenance and distribute almost every class of supply. The 25 bunker facility (ammunition storage) is not fully mission capable. The Transportation Brigade headquarters is expected to be completed in January 2015. Supply and maintenance support is further distributed to the provinces through the use of Type A provincial logistics centers (regional support), Type B provincial logistics centers (provincial support), and mobile maintenance contact teams. Recent changes to the logistics center’s force structure, the occupation of recently built logistics facilities, and contractor-provided vehicle maintenance training to ANP mechanics will gradually build the MoI’s organic capability as coalition contract support is phased out by the end of 2015.

Due to unpaid obligations from CY 1392 operations, MoI will have to prioritize paying some of its past obligations with its CY 1393 budget. This will more than likely create an unfunded requirement list that will need to be addressed so that MoI can get out of a cycle of using funds in the current budget to satisfy past obligations. Paying its debts shows that the MoI is making an effort to be financially responsible and accountable. In addition, doing so will re-establish trust with its vendors and build confidence with the international community.

2.4: INSTITUTIONAL TRAINER AND MENTOR STATUS

Of 69 ANSF training and education institutions, 50 have completed transition and are capable and proven in autonomous operations without routine coalition oversight. Of the remaining 25 training and education institutions, 6 will transition by the end of 2014 and the remaining 13 will complete transition by the end of 2016. These institutions are managing student throughput and providing quality instruction, but have limited ability to identify lessons and capture experience to inform doctrine, training, or instructor development. Conflicting direction among ANA training and education stakeholders (General Staff G7, Afghan National Technical, Marshal Fahim National Defense University) continues to slow progress. ANA training systems are capable of force generation at scale, but need to mature. The ANP Training General Command is capable of delivering training through its training centers with minimum coalition oversight. This reporting period, the ANP Training General Command published its first annual training plan, although the training centers have not yet executed the plan. The ANP Training General Command is performing well, but needs to analyze command and control, and to institutionalize the progress it has made thus far.

Both the MoD and MoI continue to develop their effectiveness and have made several advances in a number of systems this reporting period. The MoD and general staff have made steady progress in strategic and operational planning, and inter-ministerial coordination. Inter-
ministerial coordination was evident during the joint security planning for the election where the insurgents clearly failed in their attempts to disrupt the election and intimidate and dissuade voters from participating. Progress has also been made in the execution of the strategic defense planning system, operational planning and execution, force management, regional policy, and international military affairs. The Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy at MoI made progress developing and publishing baseline strategy documents.

ANA training and education organizations have matured, but have not established a centralized systems approach to support coherent professional development. The ANA needs to identify career policies and streams supported by integrated professional development. Limited instructor selection, development, and rotation reduce effective career management and experience captured. There are limited long-term training plans and career streams to support professional development for both male and female personnel.

The ANP Training General Command (TGC) provides professional development to its members primarily through the ANP Staff College. The curricula are developed at the TGC or by coalition sources for the TGC, and then delivered to the ANP Staff College. Although the TGC provides training for a wide range of functions to the ANP, professional development opportunities should be expanded to more of the Regional Training Centers. Increasing the number of female trainers would better diversify the instructional core. Finally, there is a critical need to better track those individuals already qualified as instructors in order to ensure that they are placed in appropriate positions to meet the educational requirements of the force.

More than half of the ANP units are assessed as capable or fully capable of planning and executing training and training management. ANP should continue to focus their training on mission-essential tasks and further develop training activities. Although provincial chiefs of police have not ceased drafting untrained recruits directly into the field entirely, pressure to do so has been effective in reducing the number drafted. ANP TGC has also been effective in offering courses to train drafted individuals to ANP standards. As a result, the number of untrained police was reduced this reporting period.

In April 2014, the ANP Tactical Ground Commander published its first annual training plan with guidance for the next year’s courses laid out by timeframe, location, and capacity. The focus is on ensuring that regional training centers are informed of training plans and are able to effectively execute training in line with guidance. This is a significant step toward ensuring that ANP forces have institutional training capabilities that will endure. The ANP made some progress in the execution of logistics training, and they established formal agreements with the ANA Combat Service Support School to acquire training using ANA sources.

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2.5: ANSF LITERACY TRAINING

Literacy training in Dari or Pashto remains mandatory for all ANA and ANP recruits. During a literacy stakeholder conference on April 29, 2014, both the MoI and the MoD committed to full ownership of the ANSF literacy programs. They will assume responsibility for the programs starting on January 1, 2015, when the NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A) literacy program ends. Since December 2013, 801 Afghan trainers have graduated from literacy programs; these trainers will constitute the core of the ANSF’s literacy training capability.25

The ANSF’s literacy training has a direct relationship with its ability to professionalize its personnel and performance and develop a more experienced force as efficiently and effectively as possible, especially in military occupational specialties that require higher levels of literacy, such as aviation, medical, logistics, and maintenance. The ANSF’s ability to sustain its literacy training capacity will have a direct impact on its present and future capability to grow training cadre from within the force to sustain ANSF training and education institutions.

2.6: AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY DEVELOPMENT

The ANA performed well during security operations over the elections, which anecdotal evidence from the ANA chain of command suggests increased soldiers’ confidence. Advisors noted that the operations made long-term success a more attainable goal, and considered the non-partisan approach taken by the soldiers as significant.

The ANA has completed fielding its programmed kandaks. The Chief of General Staff (CoGS) is focused on developing the professionalism of the Army and an apolitical and non-ethnic officer corps. The focus of the ANA this reporting period has been to build and, where necessary, reduce the force to authorized levels. The ANA’s overall strength during the reporting period remained above 80 percent of the tashkil strength. The ANA is adjusting soldier, non-commissioned officer (NCO/bridmal), and officer strengths to meet the target strengths for each component rather than for the ANA as a whole. Attrition continues to challenge the force with monthly attrition rates averaging above the acceptable rate of 1.4 percent. Much staff effort has been focused on identifying and addressing the causes of attrition.

Retention and reducing attrition are key factors to professionalize the force. There is an increasing trend in the number of experienced soldiers opting out of re-enlistment, accounting for about a third of all attrition. Leadership must refocus their efforts on increasing re-enlisting and reducing attrition. Enforcing a rotation policy could mitigate re-enlistment issues by allowing re-contracted soldiers to transfer away from the front line or nearer to their home.

Advisors have worked with MoD leadership this reporting period to develop a plan to increase the number of women in the ANA. In May 2014, the Minister of Defense ordered a comprehensive effort to double the number of women in the ANA by May 2015. The MoD then

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25 New basic literacy training program goals have been established for the end of 2014, which are expected to be met. By the end of 2014, a minimum of 300,000 ANSF should have received literacy training of at least level 1 (basic literacy) and a minimum of 100,000 should have achieved level 3 (functional literacy).
created a comprehensive annual recruiting and training plan to maximize female throughput at training facilities, which it indicated was feasible using existing facilities. It also submitted a proposal on May 11, 2014, to use a portion of $25 million allocated by the U.S. Congress for gender integration efforts. The proposal included requirements for a female recruiting public affairs campaign and for facilities and infrastructure. Advisors are currently validating the proposal and plan to modify it to increase the proportion devoted to recruiting and publicity, and to focus on more cost-effective facilities improvements, a streamlined recruiting process, and more female recruiters and instructors, in order to develop a larger group of women in the security sector. The first female NCO course in Turkey ended in March 2014 and was a significant success; 94 trained female NCOs returned to the force to assume positions of leadership and training.

MoD leadership states that institutional barriers to the recruitment of women stems from traditional and cultural biases. Additionally, they claim that many families do not want their daughters to join the ANA because of concerns for their security. There are four main challenges with integration. The first challenge is achieving the goal of recruited and trained women in accordance with the Annual Accession Plan approved by the Minister of Defense, which states that the ANA will recruit and train 485 women per year. The second challenge is identifying permanent positions for women within the force. The third challenge is ensuring that all military establishments have adequate female facilities. Finally, the fourth challenge is delivering a safe environment for women at those establishments.

The ANA continues to develop trained combat medics and combat lifesavers. Since the last reporting period, the ANA added 106 combat medics and 296 combat lifesavers, boosting the respective strengths to 96 percent and 47 percent of authorizations. ISAF Joint Command (IJC) completed the distribution of 12,168 combat life-saver kits, which equip each combat lifesaver graduate from the ANSF program. ISAF is procuring an additional 5,500 combat lifesaver kits to fill the anticipated demand for this fighting season and overcome short-term shortages that may result from the immature ANSF re-supply system.

The development of ground medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) capabilities continues to be a high priority for ANSF leadership. The ANSF has fielded all of their authorized ground ambulances. Coalition forces delivered ground ambulance kits to augment the capabilities of the ANSF fleet. Since March 19, 2014, GiRoA has received 225 kits for the ANP and 100 for the ANA. However, due to distribution challenges, not all of the kits have arrived at the fielded units. During the last reporting period, the ANA initiated procurement of an additional 937 ground ambulance kits, which are beginning to arrive. With this capability, the coalition will encourage and support the development of a more robust ground-based MEDEVAC and lift/transportation system for ANSF and provide continued mentoring to ensure that ANA and ANP are effectively utilizing their MEDEVAC assets. In addition, this will reinforce the principle that ground-based MEDEVAC in Afghanistan is the operational norm. Even though the ANSF have some limited air assets, such as C-130, C-208, and Mi-17 aircraft, the concept and systems are underdeveloped, and casualty evacuation is only one of several operational tasks competing for these limited aircraft and operating hours.
All air-transportable treatment units (ATTUs) have been fielded to the ANA corps and the capital division. Fifteen personnel assigned to the newly established Gamberi Regional Military Hospital completed Afghan-led ATTU training. As a result, Gamberi’s ATTU was deployed in support of the April 5 election. The ANA Medical Command also directed that regional military hospitals send six personnel to one of two ATTU courses based on their duty positions. The first course targeted surgeons, pharmacists, medical logistics, radiologists, operating room nurses, biomedical technicians, quartermasters, and administrative staff, while the second course provided instruction for anesthesia staff, laboratory technicians, patient administration nurses, intensive care unit nurses, radiology technicians, and the administrative officer, designer, and installation staff. This training ensured that each regional military hospital could deploy an ATTU to support corps operations during the fighting season and the presidential run-off election.

The MoD and ANA medical leadership are developing the personnel authorization documents to staff the Gamberi Regional Military Hospital, which has 100 beds. Newly identified fills for the Gamberi Regional Military Hospital personnel authorizations are attending a hospital management orientation course at the Armed Forces Academy of Medical Science. Two rotations have been completed, and 73 of 234 personnel have been trained. The remainder will be trained over two rotations during the next quarter. This course will be administered annually to all regional military hospital personnel. Additionally, a 40-bed regional military hospital in Helmand Province (215th Corps) is currently under construction, and its personnel authorizations are pending approval. The ANP is still developing its medical health care system; currently it has only one functional hospital in Kabul.

This reporting period, the ANSF increased their capacity to conduct medical planning at the strategic and operational levels. At the national and provincial levels, the ANSF medical leadership engaged in multi-agency elections support planning without the assistance of the coalition and successfully executed the plan. The success and lessons from election support were applied to the ANA seasonal order and to planning for the election run-off on June 14. The ANA and ANP Surgeons General recognize the need for data-driven decision-making. Both offices collect patient data, but they fail to effectively use the information to develop resource requirements, particularly in budget decisions. The Command Surgeon assigned a Ph.D.-trained scientist to advise the ANA Medical Command and the Office of the Surgeon General statistics departments. The ANA did use data collected during the current program objective memorandum cycle to provide more accurate planning factors for upcoming budget requests. This was an important first step toward self-sustainability.

The number of capable ANA brigades decreased after the last reporting period’s significant increase, but it remains slightly higher than the historical range. Challenges that hinder advancement for brigades in the 201st Corps include the absence of a regional military training center. Other factors limiting progress include the inability to implement a rotational operational cycle and poor planning and management.26

ANA training and education institutions are managing student throughput and providing quality instruction. The ANA Combat Service Support School is currently offering a 15-week senior

26 RASR Report, ISAF Joint Command, Kabul, Afghanistan, June 2014.
engineer equipment maintenance course, but—for a variety of reasons, including the unavailability of students and funding—only 14 students across all of the ANSF are enrolled. Most institutions have matured to autonomous operation without routine coalition oversight. If this momentum continues, the ANA should make further progress in its ability to manage force generation and training to meet operational needs. The ANA has conceptualized a centralized training and education headquarters; however, without adjustments to structure and rank organization, it will be unable to implement this concept.

The ANA conducted a capability demonstration on April 30, 2014, at 111 Capital Division. This event was well-attended and included prominent guests such as the First Vice President, parliamentarians, and a large media contingent. Approximately 500 guests observed a well-coordinated combined-arms simulated attack that incorporated aviation, commandos, helicopter assault, mechanized infantry, and armor. While the pace of the demonstration was slow, the ANA delivered a credible performance with limited advance notice or preparation.

The preventative maintenance checks and services (PMCS) program continues to make progress. Since the last quarter, PMCS training has been completed at 205th Corps. In total, 11 brigades have been trained across the 203rd, 205th, and 215th Corps. Training for the remaining Corps and special units still needs to be determined, and an assessment of the ANA’s ability to sustain this practice needs to be conducted.

Last quarter, the ANA officially transformed the catalogue division into the National Codification Bureau – Afghanistan (NCB-A). This allowed the ANA to participate in the NATO codification system, to follow a set of common standards and techniques, and to assign NATO stock numbers to its inventory. The NCB-A schedule was originally forecast for April 15, 2014, but slipped 90 days due to delays in contracting from the program office. The system initial operational capability was operational on June 1, 2014.

**Manning**

The ANA authorized end strength increased from 187,000 to 195,000 on August 20, 2014. At that time, ANA manning was approximately 165,000 personnel (slightly below its 195,000 cap), to include approximately 6,000 AAF personnel. The attrition rate in the ANA continues to pose challenges to ANSF development. The ANA averaged approximately 2.2 percent attrition for the past 12 months with a low of 1.8 percent in March 2014 and a peak of 3.3 percent in December 2013 and April 2014. In the first quarter of 2014, ANA average monthly attrition rate was 2.6 percent. Until December 2013, the ANA was authorized to staff to 115 percent of the tashkil authorizations for enlisted soldiers. Directives in December 2013 and January 2014 rescinded this and authorized payment only up to 100 percent manning levels. This policy resulted in a slight increase in near-term attrition, but overall attrition in the ANA was stable for the past 12 months. ANA recruitment potential will allow it to balance the force and replace losses from attrition. This process could result in slight fluctuations of ANA end strength from month to month.
The main causes of attrition include high operational tempo, sustained risk, soldier care and quality of life, and leave issues. Afghan casualties increased since the ANSF took the lead for security in June 2013. Although combat losses comprise a relatively small percentage of total ANSF attrition numbers, reducing ANSF casualties remains both a top morale and operational priority for ISAF and ANSF leaders.

In addition to enemy action, casualties in the 2014 fighting season could be contributed to several other factors, such as lack of medical training and medical kits, casualty evacuation delays, and the overall condition of Afghan medical capabilities. ISAF and the ANSF are aggressively addressing several ways to improve casualty care, such as training combat lifesaver skills and distributing medical kits so that soldiers can give self-aid and buddy-aid at the point of injury; using Mi-17 helicopters for casualty evacuation; and improving Afghan medical capabilities and long-term care. The ability to reduce casualties is related to the ANSF’s warfighting capability, which ranges from a commander’s competency, to a unit’s ability to integrate combined arms. ANSF leaders are working hard to improve these areas.

Although the overall attrition rate is higher than optimal, it is not directly affecting operations in the short-term, as the ANSF remains sustainable numerically due to robust recruitment.
However, attrition is always a concern, especially NCO attrition, given the loss of key military experience this represents. Urgent action is therefore being taken to address the root causes of attrition beyond combat casualties and to develop a culture of leadership accountability in the ANSF. Attrition management is focused on balancing the force at *tashkil* authorization levels for the targeted mix of officers, NCOs, and soldiers in authorized military occupational specialties.

As part of this effort, ANSF senior leadership established a Joint Attrition Working Group (JAWG). The JAWG reviews attrition figures and issues within the ANA and proposes courses of action to the Attrition General Officer Steering Committee for ratification prior to presentation to CoGS for approval. This cycle is repeated on a 75-day basis and ensures senior leadership is informed and responsive to issues that contribute to high attrition rates. Another significant area of progress in combating high attrition rates was the development of the MoD Attrition Review Cycle and ownership of the issue by the senior MoD leadership. The Vice Chief of General Staff, as lead for ANA attrition issues, developed an attrition review cycle with MoD MAG assistance.

Overall, the ANA remains ethnically balanced, as shown in Figure 9. The ANA officer corps and NCO corps reflect the ANSF’s overall ethnic distribution. Individual ANA battalions, or *kandak* units, are balanced ethnically. There is a slight overrepresentation of forces from northern and eastern Afghanistan, with slightly less from the south. Yet the demographics of each unit represent the nation as a whole, and there are no exclusively Tajik or Pashtun units.

**Figure 9: ANA Ethnicity, as of August 2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pashtun</th>
<th>Tajik</th>
<th>Hazara</th>
<th>Uzbek</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>42.5%</td>
<td>40.9%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer Delta</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>-1.8%</td>
<td>-3.3%</td>
<td>-9.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCOs</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
<td>34.0%</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldiers</td>
<td>40.3%</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Force</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>-4.3%</td>
<td>-7.7%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>-6.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ANA Ethnic Breakout Requirement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pashtun</th>
<th>Tajik</th>
<th>Hazara</th>
<th>Uzbek</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Afghan National Army Equipment**

The ANA equipment roll ups, shown in figures 10-13, are designed to provide a broad overview of Afghan equipment acquisitions and capabilities. The roll ups represent equipment totals only, and do not represent operational readiness or maintenance rates. The figures below report on the total numbers of equipment required, 27 acquired, 28 and delivered. 29 The total required is taken from the Afghan *tashkil*, an organizational document which dictates equipment and personnel

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27 A piece of equipment is *required* if it is listed on the *Tashkil* 1391v2 (including the approved float), if it is part of an approved enabler initiative, or if it has completed the Afghanistan resource and requirement validation process (AR2VP).

28 A piece of equipment is *acquired* with the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) if a memorandum of request has been submitted and a letter of acceptance has been implemented for said equipment.

29 A piece of acquired equipment is *delivered* when it has arrived at the Afghanistan depot for which it is destined.
authorizations for the ANSF. The equipment list is broken down into four sub-sections: weapons, vehicles, communications, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).

Overall, the ANA fielded its weapons authorizations in accordance with Tashkil 1391 v2. As shown in figure 10 below, an additional 7,355 weapons were delivered to the ANA since the last reporting period. This increase consisted of over 6,000 individual NATO standard small arms, with the remainder consisting of a variety of NATO indirect fire and crew served weapons.

Figure 10: ANA Weapons Roll Up

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANA Weapon Status Summary</th>
<th>Total Required</th>
<th>Tashkil 1391 v2 (plus float)</th>
<th>ASFF Acquired</th>
<th>Over/Under (Required)</th>
<th>Total Delivered</th>
<th>ASFF Delivered</th>
<th>Transferred</th>
<th>Over/Under (Required)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATO Individual Weapons</td>
<td>221,072</td>
<td>1,788</td>
<td>217,911</td>
<td>(4,949)</td>
<td>208,707</td>
<td>11,155</td>
<td>(2,998)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Crew Served Weapons</td>
<td>12,667</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>12,916</td>
<td>(244)</td>
<td>10,563</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>(2,110)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Indirect Fire Weapons</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>969</td>
<td>1,173</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>1,173</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-NATO Standard Weapons</td>
<td>7,453</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>55,291</td>
<td>47,825</td>
<td>55,291</td>
<td>54,835</td>
<td>102,660</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>241,332</td>
<td>2,253</td>
<td>287,291</td>
<td>42,696</td>
<td>275,734</td>
<td>66,497</td>
<td>97,636</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ANA fielded its vehicles authorizations in accordance with Tashkil 1391 v2. As shown in figure 11 below, an additional 4,586 vehicles were delivered to the ANA since the last reporting period. These deliveries consisted of mostly light and medium tactical vehicles, but also including the final deliveries of the mobile strike force vehicles and the first deliveries of mine-resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles.

Figure 11: ANA Vehicles Roll Up

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANA Vehicle Status Summary</th>
<th>Total Required</th>
<th>Tashkil 1391 v2 (plus float)</th>
<th>ASFF Acquired</th>
<th>Over/Under (Required)</th>
<th>Total Delivered</th>
<th>ASFF Delivered</th>
<th>Transferred</th>
<th>Over/Under (Required)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Light Tactical Vehicle</td>
<td>17,834</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>18,781</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>17,970</td>
<td>(369)</td>
<td>(303)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>(170)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(192)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Strike Force Vehicle</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Tactical Vehicle</td>
<td>6,310</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>7,447</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>7,347</td>
<td>(536)</td>
<td>283</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humvee Variants</td>
<td>9,021</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>13,166</td>
<td>3,875</td>
<td>13,169</td>
<td>3,527</td>
<td>(315)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Vehicle and Fire Variants</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>869</td>
<td>(26)</td>
<td>869</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer Equipment</td>
<td>1,424</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>1,838</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>1,425</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(206)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trailers</td>
<td>5,801</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6,065</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>6,118</td>
<td>(84)</td>
<td>708</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material Handling Equipment</td>
<td>819</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>859</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>(25)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buses</td>
<td>1,184</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,383</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>1,224</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>178</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1,161</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2,175</td>
<td>969</td>
<td>1,747</td>
<td>(830)</td>
<td>(289)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>43,948</td>
<td>1,683</td>
<td>53,256</td>
<td>7,625</td>
<td>51,268</td>
<td>(1,951)</td>
<td>3,686</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ANA fielded its communications authorizations in accordance with Tashkil 1391 v2. As shown in figure 12 below, an additional 3,735 additional communication devices were delivered to the ANA since the last reporting period. These deliveries consisted of mostly high frequency radios.

Figure 12: ANA Communications Equipment Roll Up

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANA Comm Status Summary</th>
<th>Total Required</th>
<th>Tashkil 1391 v2 (plus float)</th>
<th>ASFF Acquired</th>
<th>Over/Under (Required)</th>
<th>Total Delivered</th>
<th>ASFF Delivered</th>
<th>Transferred</th>
<th>Over/Under (Required)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HF Radios</td>
<td>11,615</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>14,047</td>
<td>2,119</td>
<td>15,367</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3,448</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VHF Radios</td>
<td>72,082</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>73,563</td>
<td>(640)</td>
<td>71,816</td>
<td>1,567</td>
<td>1,180</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VHF/LHF Radios</td>
<td>2,231</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>3,318</td>
<td>837</td>
<td>3,318</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>837</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night Vision Device</td>
<td>9,896</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>12,497</td>
<td>2,158</td>
<td>10,830</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>743</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Comm</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>96,093</td>
<td>1,139</td>
<td>101,708</td>
<td>4,476</td>
<td>101,614</td>
<td>1,828</td>
<td>6,210</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Finally, as shown in figure 13, the ANA did not deliver any new EOD equipment during this reporting period but did acquire additional MMP-30 robots for bomb detection and disposal.

**Figure 13:** ANA Explosive Ordnance Disposal Equipment Roll Up

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANA EOD Status Summary</th>
<th>Total Required</th>
<th>Tashkil 1391v2 (plus float)</th>
<th>Enabler/AR2VP</th>
<th>ASFF Acquired</th>
<th>Over/Under (Required)</th>
<th>ASFF Delivered</th>
<th>Total Delivered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Binoculars</td>
<td>15,430</td>
<td>15,430</td>
<td>15,430</td>
<td>15,430</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blasting Machine M34</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD Bomb Suit w/ Helmet</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firing Cable and Reel</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,631</td>
<td>2,088</td>
<td>2,631</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M2 Crimper</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Detector (Vallon &amp; CEIA)</td>
<td>5,748</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>6,300</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6,300</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pigstick w/ stand</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMP-30 Robot</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>863</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symphony Jammer</td>
<td>1,286</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,261</td>
<td>1,261</td>
<td>1,261</td>
<td>1,261</td>
<td>1,261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test Set, MS1 Blasting Cap</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hook &amp; Line Kit PT 1&amp;2</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD Tripod</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIP PERS</td>
<td>7,202</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7,202</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7,202</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Rollers</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>33,866</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>37,731</td>
<td>3,313</td>
<td>36,914</td>
<td>2,496</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Logistics and Sustainment Capabilities**

The ANA showed modest improvement across the sustainment enterprise over the last reporting period; however, it continues to struggle in this area. Many of the improvements needed for long-term sustainability and independence must be made at the national and ministerial level. National improvement focus areas are planning, forecasting, inventory management, and scheduled logistics.

The MoD has started a few initiatives to improve its capabilities. The MoD General Staff Logistics fielded a mobile training team to provide instruction on preventive maintenance procedures to each corps. This included distributing PMCS handbooks. In April 2014, planners from the National Military Command Center, under the mentorship of coalition partners, began developing the ANA Operation Fatah summer/fall seasonal order. Likewise, ANA corps and division planners partnered with members of the ISAF regional commands to develop regional-level sustainment plans for Operation Fatah. These partnerships enabled the ANA sustainment planners to better understand the importance of including logistics-specific elements (e.g., priorities for units, classes of supply, maintenance, and reporting requirements) into their orders. The effects of these programs remain to be seen.

Sustainment issues at the brigade level continue to revolve around the lack of effective command maintenance programs, improper use of trained personnel, a shortage of trained mechanics, and the lack of requirement forecasting. The ANA struggles to identify and direct the lateral transfer of equipment between units. Despite having a doctrinal process to cross-level equipment across units, ANA and MoD leadership have thus far proven unable or unwilling to direct the transfer of equipment from units possessing excess quantities to units with shortages. There have been some improvements though, such as ANA’s work on refinement and further development of their fuel ordering, approval, and voucher settlement processes, and willingness to require consumption reports for fuel and ammunition requests. They have also shown improvement in the management of depots for processing battle-damaged equipment and maintaining a reserve.
vehicle fleet. However, there is still a need for ISAF to provide training, advising, and assistance in the area of sustainment and logistics.

In June 2014, the Special Mission Wing secured a CSTC-A bridging contract for fuel supply through June 2015, which will transition to the MoD in January 2015. The bridge contract process both trains and forces the MoD to establish an Afghan aviation fuel contract through GIRoA by early 2015. In case a MoD contract is delayed, the 2014 bridge contract has two six-month options. The MoD procurement officer will work two separate contracts in parallel (one for SMW and one for AAF), due to limitations in Afghan contracting law. These contract requirements will be presented to MoD AT&L at the same time for signature. The earliest MoD contract would be January 2015.

Special Operations Forces

During this reporting period, Afghan Special Security Forces grew their operational reach. Utilizing the Special Mission Wing to implement an internal air allocation process to de-conflict support to the ANA Special Operations Command, the National Mission Units (NMUs), and National Interdiction Units (NIUs), the ASSF enables counterterrorism and counternarcotics missions throughout Afghanistan.

As an operational headquarters, ANASOC continues steady progress toward manning, training, equipping, and executing mission command. During this quarter the ANASOC special operations advisory group focused on assisting the ANASOC two-star headquarters in establishing a viable mission command capability. The division’s role in the campaign is evolving from tactical-level targeting to operational-level planning. The majority of tactical-level targeting is conducted by subordinate maneuver formations. Logistically, ANASOC improved sustainment of subordinate units through liaison officers and personal relationships at the Central Supply Depot and Regional Logistics Support Centers. ANASOC attained an 84 percent tashkil fill for equipment fielding, with rates above 80 percent in every category except new radio equipment and vehicle counter-IED jammers.

The ANASOC has fielded all subordinate units, with the Military Intelligence Kandak and General Support Kandak both reaching initial operating capability this reporting period. ANASOC stands close to authorized manning levels. The General Support Kandak is currently on track for full operational capability by mid-October 2014. Full operational capability for the Military Intelligence Kandak is expected no earlier than 2015.

ANASOC manning is at 88 percent of tashkil authorization, buoyed by an overall monthly attrition rate of only 1.2 percent, which is below the 1.4 percent goal. ANASOC soldiers who are wounded in action also show a high propensity for returning to the formation, demonstrated by their 0.5 percent monthly attrition rate. ANASOC demonstrated considerable success in retaining commandos and special forces soldiers who complete their contracts, by achieving a 40 percent retention rate. This increase is due to the expanded capability and usage of AHRIMS to forecast end-of-contract personnel for retention processing. Other factors are the high quality of NCO leadership and policy and process improvements in the leave system.
During this reporting period, the General Command of Police Special Units and ANA Special Forces and Commando units conducted over 900 unilateral operations. In comparison, ISAF SOF conducted fewer than 25 unilateral operations. ISAF continued to advise ASSF by leading some partnered operations and advising when ANSF were in the lead. ISAF advised over 300 ANSF-led operations during the reporting period. Areas of continued focus by ISAF advisors include enhancing interoperability with other defense and police forces, including planning joint operations. ISAF advisors continued to advise partnered units during planning for major operations and facilitated development of professional relationships among Afghan commanders to mitigate instances of ANA commanders using ANASOF for missions more suited to conventional infantry.

The ANASOC continues to develop its ability to integrate combined arms and special operations kandaks with other ANSF units. The ANASOC Operations Directorate has improved battle tracking through its new tactical operations center. Through weekly targeting meetings, the Operations Directorate now consistently integrates disruption operations, intelligence, and information operations.

The Afghan Special Security Forces have also taken the lead for training and sustaining their force generation. The ANASOC School of Excellence has initiated classes to prepare forces for the 2015 fighting season and anticipates filling ANASOC and ANA Special Forces to nearly 100 percent; ASSF’s stabilized attrition plays an important role in reaching its target strength.

**Afghan Air Force**

The Afghan Air Force continues to develop operational capabilities; however, its resources remain limited. Without advisors, the AAF is capable in a number of key mission areas, such as light airlift, CASEVAC, human remains recovery, aerial reconnaissance in the form of non-traditional ISR, and support civil authorities. The AAF has demonstrated the ability to routinely conduct CASEVAC and human remains recovery operations using the Mi-17, C-208, and C-130. However, within the Mi-17 fleet in particular, the AAF cannot produce enough missions to meet the demand from the corps.

The Mi-17 helicopter continues to be the workhorse of the AAF, with notable performance in support of both the primary and run-off elections. In total, the Mi-17 fleet completed 2,632 operational missions in the first eight months of 2014 (to include 791 CASEVAC and 317 human remains recovery missions). The Mi-17 training mission is manned at six of the required eight instructor pilots. AAF Mi-17 aircrew personnel on hand include 100 pilots and 42 crew chiefs.

The AAF increasingly executes CASEVAC, human remains recovery, and other missions. The AAF successfully executed resupply operations in support of 201st Corps, moving cargo, passengers, and two CASEVAC patients. As in the initial assault, AAF Mi-35s provided continuous aerial escort and armed over-watch for these missions, remaining on standby to provide additional presence patrols as requested. Organic CASEVAC capability grew as the AAF and SMW continued to field aircraft, and the ground forces fielded and integrated ambulance kits.
The AAF demonstrated increased command and control and operational flexibility, as shown when it scrambled aircraft on June 13, 2014, to provide local flood relief for civilians stranded near the river on the north side of Jalalabad. The AAF executed multiple airlifts to rescue 234 Afghan civilians to higher ground when a sudden storm flooded area roadways and wadis (valleys). This successful humanitarian assistance mission demonstrated improved AAF C2 capabilities to re-task assets with increased effectiveness. AAF operations during the reporting period highlighted the AAF’s capability to train, fight, and sustain aircraft operations, and its ability to respond to natural disasters when tasked.

The AAF’s aerial photography/ISR program is still developing. The corps have shown a rudimentary ability to task the AAF for overhead imagery. Approximately 15 missions have been flown as of June 2014 supporting AAF, ANA, and ANA SOC. A new aerial photography course was created in June 2014, and a new geospatial course was created in April 2014. This capability should increase significantly in the future.

**Figure 14: AAF Strength, Recruiting, Retention, and Attrition**

The overall strength of the AAF continued to approach its target goal, by maintaining an average monthly attrition rate below 1 percent for this reporting period. Since December 2013, NATO
Air Training Command-Afghanistan has provided U.S. Air Force recruiters to train, advise, and assist the AAF recruiting teams. NATC-A advisors worked with the AAF Director of Personnel to develop a recruitment model to meet the desired end strength of the AAF. The first success of this process was the recruiting to fill 200 positions for Officer Candidate School. In this effort, the AAF screened over 2,000 candidates for language proficiency, medical status, and the Afghan defense screening test. Recruitment numbers will remain on track as long as the ANA recruiting service adheres to the directive from the CoGS, which specifies the caliber of AAF candidate recruits. The high technical standards required for AAF service tend to disqualify many ANA recruits.

The AAF is still in the nascent stages of building a long-term, sustainable, pilot generation process. Pilot development within the AAF increased in capability and is now over 50 percent of its target strength with 203 of 246 required trained pilots. In addition, over 50 percent of the required instructor pilots (36 out of 61) were trained by August 2014. The goal is to achieve a one to one crew-per-aircraft ratio. The Kabul Air Wing entered another crew into qualification in June 2014.

The AAF is growing its training programs and instructor base in the following areas:

- **C-208 Aircrews:** A difficulty with maintaining C-208 aircrews is that some pilots have been reassigned to enter A-29 training or to support the SMW PC-12 program. C-208 instructor pilots exist at each operating location, providing sufficient organic capability to continue to upgrade aircrew and perform missions as a day-only, clear weather, light lift aircraft. The AAF C-208 primary pilot training program produced over 80 percent of the required pilots and over 80 percent of required instructor pilots.

- **C-130 Aircrews:** The AAF C-130 pilot training program has produced nearly all required eight C-130 pilots. Further, the AAF recently trained its first complete C-130H crew, which allowed an all Afghan crew to complete C-130H passenger transport, CASEVAC, and human remains recovery missions.

- **Afghan Tactical Air Coordinator:** During the reporting period, the AAF trained approximately 60 percent of its target end strength.

Coalition airpower currently provides most of the ANSF aerial fires for troops in contact, however, this support will be significantly reduced under Resolute Support rules of engagement. The AAF owns a fleet of helicopters that can be used to provide aerial fires. This fleet, which consists of 56 Mi-17s, five Mi-35 helicopters, and five MD-530s, may be used to provide aerial fires until the 20 fixed-wing A-29 light air support aircraft reach full operational capability in 2017. The first two A-29 aircraft were delivered by the manufacturer to the U.S. Air Force, which is preparing to begin Afghan pilot training at Moody Air Force Base in February 2015. The first four trained Afghan pilots are projected to return with their aircraft to Afghanistan by the end of 2015 to begin operations.

The AAF received shipments of new Mi-17 helicopters from Russia in September and October 2013. The AAF’s fleet was distributed among the air wings and is well suited for Afghanistan’s environment. The number of Mi-17s accounts for all operational helicopters and does not take into account previously procured Mi-17s that either have been retired or are no longer flyable. The number of Mi-35s was adjusted based on operational capability. The Mi-17’s 25-year
service life, adherence to robust inspection, and maintenance cycles will ensure fleet availability and sustainability for future operational and training missions.

During this period, DoD delivered a third C-130H as a sale from U.S. Air Force stock. In response to concern expressed by the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR), General Dunford, then COMISAF, decided to delay the delivery of the fourth and final C-130H pending a requirements review, which is ongoing. As part of its inquiry into the DoD decision to provide C-130H aircraft to the AAF, SIGAR raised concerns about limitations on the ability of the AAF to conduct medium-lift cargo missions due to a lack of trained loadmasters.

Also during this reporting period, COMISAF asked DoD to procure an additional 12 MD-530 helicopters and to install weapons and armor on these helicopters, as well as on five MD-530s currently in AAF inventory in order to provide a CAS capability following the drawdown of coalition enablers. Delivery of these DoD-funded aircraft is scheduled to begin in 2015. In addition, some Mi-17 helicopters were modified with forward-firing machine guns.

In April 2014, DoD notified Congress of the intent to use the authority in section 1531 of the NDAA for FY 2014 to treat the 20 G-222 medium-lift aircraft originally procured for the AAF as DoD stock. Sixteen of these aircraft had remained parked at Kabul International Airport for the last several years; due to a lack of a supply chain for parts and other factors, the aircraft were no longer serviceable and had been permanently grounded. After considering all options, DoD determined that retrograde and drawdown timelines necessitated disposal of the aircraft in Afghanistan, which was completed during this reporting period. DoD is currently evaluating options before deciding on the disposition of the remaining four aircraft located at Ramstein, Germany.

Improving AAF maintenance management is critical for the AAF to become independent and self-sustainable. AAF organic maintenance and logistics capability continued to develop, and AAF personnel are slowly maturing to the levels needed to sustain the force. A sustainable AAF maintenance program was a SFA focus area during the reporting period. As of June 2014, the AAF has 506 qualified maintainers out of an estimated requirement of 1,370 personnel. Most of these maintainers are at a basic level of training and stationed in Kabul. NATO Air Training Command – Afghanistan (NATC-A) is advising the AAF to spread maintainers to locations outside Kabul. Additionally, NATC-A and the AAF are aggressively pursuing training options to grow more experienced maintainers. The vast majority of experienced maintainers are rotary-wing trained. NATC-A is working with the AAF to identify an initial cadre of fixed-wing maintainers to attend training.

As with any modern air force, the AAF will continue to rely on contracted logistics support for much of its fleet sustainment. The AAF made strides in reducing future contracting costs through a four-day logistics *shura* where it developed a plan of action to train logistics personnel, and began the development of a ready and sustainable logistics system for the four major airfields.
Special Mission Wing

The Afghan Special Mission Wing provides rotary-wing (Mi-17) air mobility and fixed wing (PC-12) ISR capability to support counterterrorism and counternarcotics (CN) operations designed to disrupt insurgent and drug smuggling networks in Afghanistan. This capability allows the ANSF to project power at night over broader distances with the precision required to support the high-risk CT and CN missions critical to Afghan and U.S. security interests. Due to the topography and security environment of Afghanistan, this aviation support remains a key enabler to deny freedom of movement and safe haven in remote areas to insurgents, terrorists, and drug trafficking networks.

As of September 30, SMW has conducted more than 150 independent missions and has proven its ability to provide organic ISR, target development, and mission over-watch during the infiltration and exfiltration of SMW Mi-17s and ground personnel. The continued development of SMW will facilitate the transition of critical enabler support from ISAF to the ANSF, consistent with the campaign and U.S. national security objectives.

Throughout the fighting season, the SMW sustained an operational tempo of multiple missions per week, including mission intelligence planning in support of ANASOC, GCPSU, NMU, and the Ktah Khas. During this time, SMW forward-deployed Mi-17s and PC-12s to Kandahar Province twice, to support operations in Kandahar, Zabul, and Helmand Provinces. The SMW also demonstrated its ability to respond to emergent requirements by deploying assets to Badakhshan in May, and to Hisarak in August.

When it reaches full operational capability in 2017, the SMW will have 30 new Mi-17s and 18 PC-12s. These aircraft and crews will be organized into four squadrons stationed at Kabul International Airport (KAIA), Kandahar Airfield, and Mazar-e-Sharif. Currently, the SMW program has received 27 of the 30 new Mi-17s and nine of the 18 PC-12s, all of which are currently located at KAIA. By the end of the reporting period, 18 Mi-17s were delivered, with three helicopters scheduled for delivery to complete procurement. In total, the SMW has 32 Mi-17 helicopters on hand which consist of donated, legacy, on loan from the AAF, and ASFF procured aircraft. Many of the SMW aircraft are older or on loan and because some of the new aircraft are pending some modifications about half of the SMW aircraft are combat ready. The new aircraft deliveries have allowed SMW to begin transferring nine loaned aircraft back to the AAF. It is estimated that all rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft will be received and operational by June 2015 (for additional detail on logistics milestones, see the DoD Report on the SMW submitted in August 2014 in response to House Report 113-76, which accompanied the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, P.L. 113-76).

Over the last several months, the SMW has progressed in both sustainment and training. In May 2014, MoI and MoD signed a revised Air Charter and committed to meeting the authorized Manning requirements. SMW maintains a close relationship with the AAF to recruit, train, and develop pilots, co-pilots, crew chiefs/mission system operators, and maintainers. Training new pilots presents a significant challenge, as they require almost two years of training and certification before and after arrival at the SMW. However, assuming the current personnel assigned meet all vetting requirements, the SMW should meet almost 98 percent of the required
rotary-wing pilots. Crew chiefs/mission system operators and maintainers remain the greatest shortfall. The number of SMW Mi-17 maintenance personnel remained flat during this period. SMW maintainers are highly capable but more are needed to support SMW’s planned growth, specifically with the activation of SMW squadrons at Kandahar and Mazar e-Sharif. COMISAF remains engaged with the AAF to assist in reducing this critical gap. Overall, retention is not problematic for the SMW because of the extensive vetting process, the incentives provided, the high unit morale, and the specialized mission SMW conducts.  

SMW showed remarkable progress in training, illustrated by the success of numerous Afghan independent Mi-17 and partnered PC-12 operations conducted in this quarter. SMW’s internal, organic training capability is limited, but its personnel are capable and integrated into SMW’s aircrew training program. SMW has several challenges it must overcome on the training side, such as: contract delays affecting the start of PC-12 maintenance training; personnel shortfalls; and the long-lead times required to train rotary-wing and fixed-wing pilots and crew.

The SMW continues to focus on generating its forces in support of operational requirements. As of August 2014, for the Mi-17, the SMW has 15 fully mission qualified aircrews for day operations and ten (out of 20 required) fully mission qualified aircrews certified on night vision device flight operations, as well as six partnered PC-12 crews. There will be a significant focus on the PC-12 program over the next reporting period as the new contract vehicle is put in place.

2.7: Afghan National Police Development

The focus of the Afghan National Police this reporting period has been to build the force and continue to ensure that all personnel are trained. The recruiting directorate recruited sufficient numbers to maintain the force structure at an average of 152,000 personnel during the reporting period. However, the ANP lacks a system to track retention rates by career fields or specialties, and lacks a mechanism to establish recruiting or attrition goals by career field. In addition, the ANP lack a robust development program to grow NCOs and officers. The ANP would benefit from more targeted retention and better career paths.

ANP command and control continues to be a significant challenge. Progress, while slow, is being made toward issuing new policy regarding the AUP headquarters structure.

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30 Loyalty and cohesion within SMW is very high. The squadron has significant pride in the fact that it is the only aviation organization with night vision goggle air assault and day/night traditional ISR capability. The organization is run as a meritocracy where personnel are promoted based on capability. As the ‘joint’ tashkil is approved and implemented, this cohesion will be tested as a large number of new individuals join the unit. This growth is required to expand SMW and ASSF operational reach, but it must be balanced by personnel integration plans to ensure unit cohesion and loyalty.

31 The majority of SMW Mi-17 missions are Afghan independent. ISAF personnel accompany them on combat missions only when risk or policy dictates. The SMW will have partnered PC-12 crews through 2015, and potentially into 2016, due to the extensive training program for PC-12 pilots.
Manning

The ANP’s overall strength for the reporting period hovered around 98 percent of targeted end strength. As shown in Figure 15, the average monthly attrition rate remained below two percent for the reporting period.

**Figure 15: ANP Strength, Recruitment, Retention, and Attrition**

![ANP Strength, Recruitment, Retention, and Attrition](image)

Under the leadership of the current Minister of Interior, the MoI is taking steps to better protect and empower female police and female MoI staff. The CY 1394 *tashkil*, released in April 2014, included an increase in female positions from 3,422 to 5,000. Recruiting has been slow, with the total number of female police at 2,182, which includes 280 officers, 886 NCOs, and 950 patrolmen, with 66 in training. Women remain approximately 1.3 percent of the ANP.

The ANP continues to develop its trauma assistance patrolmen (TAP). Since the last reporting period, the ANP has significantly increased the number of TAP to 1,096, or 58 percent of authorization. Similarly, the ANP has made gains in combat lifesaver training with 1,605 personnel added since the last reporting period, increasing their total to 3,418 personnel, or 62 percent of the 5,225 authorizations filled. The primary challenge that the ANP faces with respect to TAP-generation is the low importance that commanders place on the position. This position is treated as an additional duty for patrolmen rather than as their principal duty. ANP commanders face a difficult choice when they must release patrolmen for the eight week TAP course, which effectively reduces their force.

As shown in Figure 16, the ANP remains representative of the full range of ethnicities and tribal dynamics that populate Afghanistan.
Figure 16: ANP Ethnicity, as of August 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pashtun</th>
<th>Tajik</th>
<th>Hazara</th>
<th>Uzbek</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Percentage of Officer Force</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Percentage of NCO Force</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Percentage of PM Force</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Target (based on census)</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Afghan National Police Equipment

Like the ANA equipment roll ups, the ANP’s equipment roll ups, shown in figures 17-20, are designed to provide a broad overview of Afghan equipment acquisitions and capabilities. The roll ups represent equipment totals only, and do not represent operational readiness or maintenance rates. The figures below report on the total numbers of equipment required,32 acquired,33 and delivered.34 The equipment list is broken down into four sub-sections: weapons, vehicles, communications, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).

Figure 17: ANP Weapons Roll Up

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANP Weapon Status Summary</th>
<th>Total Required</th>
<th>Tashkil 1391v2 (plus float)</th>
<th>Enabler/AR2VP</th>
<th>ASFF Acquired</th>
<th>Over/Under (Required)</th>
<th>ASFF Delivered</th>
<th>Transferred</th>
<th>Over/Under (Required)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Standard Individual Weapons</td>
<td>97,437</td>
<td>1,925</td>
<td>91,580</td>
<td>(7,782)</td>
<td>87,587</td>
<td>10,328</td>
<td></td>
<td>(-1,447)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-NATO Standard Weapons</td>
<td>256,671</td>
<td>2,541</td>
<td>112,782</td>
<td>(146,430)</td>
<td>112,432</td>
<td>144,736</td>
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<td>(2,044)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>354,108</td>
<td>4,466</td>
<td>204,362</td>
<td>(154,212)</td>
<td>200,019</td>
<td>155,064</td>
<td></td>
<td>(3,491)</td>
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</table>

Figure 18: ANP Vehicles Roll Up

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANP Vehicle Status Summary</th>
<th>Total Required</th>
<th>Tashkil 1391v2 (plus float)</th>
<th>Enabler/AR2VP</th>
<th>ASFF Acquired</th>
<th>Over/Under (Required)</th>
<th>ASFF Delivered</th>
<th>Transferred</th>
<th>Over/Under (Required)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Light Tactical Vehicle</td>
<td>25,611</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>26,133</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>26,133</td>
<td>173</td>
<td></td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Tactical Vehicle</td>
<td>1,627</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>1,875</td>
<td>381</td>
<td></td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMMWV Variants</td>
<td>5,511</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>6,178</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>6,180</td>
<td>243</td>
<td></td>
<td>846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Vehicles</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>(63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trailers</td>
<td>1,614</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,695</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>1,667</td>
<td>227</td>
<td></td>
<td>280</td>
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<tr>
<td>Material Handling Equipment</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td></td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles/ATVs</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3,603</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>3,603</td>
<td>372</td>
<td></td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covert Vehicles</td>
<td>7,085</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6,233</td>
<td>(852)</td>
<td>6,233</td>
<td>852</td>
<td></td>
<td>(568)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Busses</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1,153</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>1,153</td>
<td>129</td>
<td></td>
<td>180</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other vehicles</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>46,947</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>47,994</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>47,227</td>
<td>1,977</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,632</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 19: ANP Communications Equipment Roll Up

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANP Comm Status Summary</th>
<th>Total Required</th>
<th>Tashkil 1391v2 (plus float)</th>
<th>Enabler/AR2VP</th>
<th>ASFF Acquired</th>
<th>Over/Under (Required)</th>
<th>ASFF Delivered</th>
<th>Transferred</th>
<th>Over/Under (Required)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HF Radios</td>
<td>4,530</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>5,497</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>5,391</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>94</td>
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<tr>
<td>VHF Radios</td>
<td>78,344</td>
<td>822</td>
<td>88,505</td>
<td>9,339</td>
<td>88,505</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>9,339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VHF/UHF Radios</td>
<td>6,604</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6,881</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>6,945</td>
<td>0</td>
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</table>

---

32 A piece of equipment is **required** if it is listed on the *Tashkil 1391v2* (including the approved float), if it is part of an approved enabler initiative, or if it has completed the AR2VP.

33 A piece of equipment is **acquired** with ASFF if a memorandum of request has been submitted and a letter of acceptance has been implemented for said equipment.

34 A piece of acquired equipment is **delivered** when it has arrived at the Afghanistan depot for which it is destined.
The ANP presently lacks an organic maintenance capacity and instead receives vehicle maintenance through contracted support. Although its vehicle readiness and repair times are manageable now, the ANP needs to build an organic or contract vehicle maintenance capability for future sustainability. Key sustainment areas of concern are highlighted as enduring risks to mission success: logistics and maintenance management, medical capability including CASEVAC, and the operational deployment cycle.

The majority of assessed ANP units are able to sustain themselves for at least 48 hours. However, the ANP still lacks an organic maintenance capacity and instead receives vehicle maintenance through a contract company. As of February 2014, almost all units were assessed as capable or fully capable of self-sustainment for at least 48 hours. The primary sustainment issues across the ANP include poor record keeping and reporting, and the lack of requirements forecasting.

### Police Special Forces

The General Command of Police Special Units fielded most of its subordinate units. The only GCPSU units still not fully fielded and at initial operating capability are the new Provincial Response Companies (PRCs). Dependent on the outcomes of tashkil considerations, the planned future expansion in PRCs to a desired end state of one per province is likely to be a process extending into 2015 and 2016.

As of September 17, GCPSU fielded 74 percent of the police special unit (PSU) tashkil and 79 percent of overall target strength. Monthly attrition thus far in the 2014 fighting season is low at 1.6 percent of the formation. Unit manning shortages demonstrate the observation of high standards in recruitment, training, and requirements. GCPSU are some of the best equipped units in the ANP.

PSU members come from different regions of the country, which mitigates collaboration with local insurgent networks. Regarding specialty skill manning and fielding, special police are
trained according to specific requirements for their positions. Shortfalls exist with qualified personnel and training on the targeting and intelligence cycle, but these are improving through mentorship and integrated training. GCPSU recruits attend the foundation course at the Special Police Training Center for introductory skills required for service. The top 20 percent are selected to attend a National Unit Operator Course at the Special Policy Training Wing.

Members of the AUP, in general, view the GCPSU as a more capable unit and often aspire to be GCPSU special policemen or policewomen. This generates positive recruitment from within the AUP and assists the GCPSU as it receives personnel who have already been trained in basic policing and understand evidence-based operations and the Afghan rule of law.

The GCPSU has shortfalls in equipment maintenance and resupply. Personnel lack the required training and equipment for basic maintenance and have no organic logistics capability. The resupply process is slow, but improving. Although high operational tempo continues, the wear on GCPSU equipment appears minimal and current consumption rates are sustainable.

**Afghan Border Police**

The Afghan Border Police, under the current CY 1393 *tashkil*, is authorized a target end strength of approximately 22,000 personnel. The ABP are responsible for the security of the Afghan border, which includes a 50 km area of operation from the border inside Afghanistan, as well as the control of all entry control points (e.g., border crossings, railroad entry points, and airports) in and out of Afghanistan. The ABP headquarters is in Kabul, and the unit operates with brigade level units assigned to 6 zones throughout the country. The ABP are manned, trained, and equipped to provide security and interdiction along the border with rifles, light and heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, and 82mm mortars.

Along a large portion of the border, the Afghan Border Police operate in some of the most rugged and remote terrain in the world. This leads to a number of administrative and logistical challenges that are not common in the majority of the ANSF formations. Many of their checkpoints and outposts along the eastern border with Pakistan are accessible only during favorable weather and require extensive planning and coordination in order to resupply with basic life support items. Those locations still require the MoI to use the pay agent system to distribute pay since there is no access to banking facilities for the policemen to receive their salary.

The ABP are improving their capabilities, albeit slowly. Logistics, personnel management, and fundamental police skills are in place, but will need to continue to be developed over time. ABP leadership has demonstrated improved coordination since Lieutenant General Fazli was named the new chief of the ABP in January 2014. Additionally, the ABP has some very capable senior leaders within the command structure. The ABP are working to modernize the border entry points into Afghanistan through the use of biometric technology, the use of dogs, weigh scales, and vehicle and personnel scanners.
Afghanistan National Civil Order Police

Afghanistan National Civil Order Police units are assessed as the most confident forces in the ANP due to their specialized training and unique recruitment. ANCOP units maintain a paramilitary structure and more closely resemble the ANA than a civil order organization. ANCOP units are confident in their training, equipment, and leadership to combat the insurgency and hold cleared terrain.

Approximately 14,755 ANCOP personnel are currently assigned with the primary mission of conducting high intensity policing operations after ANA clearing operations and before the security situation stabilizes to the point that AUP forces can perform in a normal policing role. The ANCOP are capable of rapid deployment in support of its own mission or the missions of other ANSF units. The ANCOP are a regionally based, nationally deployable force whose primary role is to maintain the rule of law and order utilizing armed capability and special tactics. Because its units are nationally deployable, the ANCOP should be less susceptible to local power brokering than other branches of the ANP, which should contribute to its overall effectiveness.

The most significant area of concern for the ANCOP is the incorrect employment of its force. The ANCOP are frequently deployed piecemealed as a reserve force. Undue political influences have resulted in the ANCOP performing missions that should be conducted by other branches of the ANSF. The units are frequently deployed to locations where their capability is wasted on checkpoints or to assist with AUP workload. This misuse causes challenges in coordination and joint operations with the ANA and NDS. A consolidation and re-employment of the ANCOP in a true gendarmerie role, in conjunction with ANA clearing operations, is necessary to effectively establishing continuous GIRoA control over contested districts.

2.8: AFGHAN PUBLIC PROTECTION FORCE

During the reporting period, the Ministry of Interior continued implementing President Karzai’s February 2014 cabinet meeting decision to dissolve the Afghan Public Protection Force and transition some of its personnel and functions into the MoI. The APPF is no longer a term of reference for a security force that provides contracted site or convoy security in Afghanistan. The ANP’s convoy escort brigade now provides convoy security. As of July 2014, former APPF personnel were providing site security, but the MoI referred to them as police and soldiers instead of APPF guards.

Although the Afghan presidential decree for the dissolution of the state-owned enterprise APPF was issued in February 2014, it still exists under the APPF name within GIRoA. Convoy security is now operational under the MoI as the Convey Transportation Guard Brigade (CTGB), within the Deputy Minister Security Pillar.

35 This section is submitted in accordance with section 1531(d), Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (Afghan Public Protection Force), of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013.
APPF convoy security guards were not integrated into the ANP. Their employment was terminated. Some guards have been hired into the CTGB. Guards are considered contract civilian employees of the MoI, not the ANP. The officers in the CTGB have been selected from the ANP Reserves, and they remain employees of ANP Reserves. Many APPF headquarters civilian positions have been transferred to MoI ANP personnel.

The command and control structure of the convoy business is in transition. The CTGB reports to the chief of Plans and Operations, who reports to the chief of AUP within the MoI. The APPF National Operations Center is currently responsible for scheduling and tasking convoys. These schedules are given to the National Police Coordination Center, which coordinates convoy operations with carriers, issuing invoices for convoy services provided, collecting remittances, and paying guards. MoI had plans to issue a no-cost contract to a risk management company to take over the role of the state-owned enterprise, performing the functions of the APPF Directorate of Finance and Business. The Minister of Interior and the National Security Council recently rejected this plan due to corruption concerns. Site security operations remain under the management of APPF. The Directorate of Finance and Business is responsible for client contracting, invoicing, fee collection and personnel salary disbursement.

Approximately 3,400 APPF guards were dismissed when the convoy security unit within APPF was shut down. Some guards have been hired by the CTGB; however, no data have been provided by MoI. Most civilian personnel working at the APPF headquarters were dismissed and replaced by uniformed MoI personnel.

APPF headquarters and site security current strength is reported as 16,015 personnel against an organizational plan of 16,981. The APPF continues to provide site security services to government, commercial, and international customers. The authorized manning level of the CTGB is 3,500 personnel. Reliable statistics on the actual size of the CTGB are not currently available.

The APPF’s ability to train new site security guards has been severely degraded by the closing of its regional training center. The entire training staff was dismissed. APPF has moved to a model that requires the customer to pay for the training of its guard force. Private local companies then provide the manning.

2.9: LOCAL DEFENSE INITIATIVES

The Afghan Local Police have become an integral part of the ANSF’s layered security plan. By the end of this reporting period, the number of ALP Guardians deployed in transitioned ALP districts had nearly reached 30,000 authorized by the tashkil. ALP Guardians have deployed to 150 transitioned districts (up from 145 in March 2014) across 29 provinces, where they operate under MoI direction. GIROA now manages more than two-thirds of the ALP units. The ALP continued to be the focus of insurgent attacks. In most cases, ALP Guardians stood their ground, protected their villages, and prevailed in firefights with insurgents. The ALP showed resiliency in the face of high-casualty attacks, with spikes in recruitment following such events.
The newly MoI-certified ALP program of instruction is integrated into the curriculum at the regional and provincial training centers. The four-week training program ensures a national standard, addresses some of the ethical concerns about the ALP cited by international organizations, and enhances the credibility of the ALP with both the MoI and the international community. The program is 140 hours long and now includes modules on human rights and ethics, logistics, and administrative processes. Thus far, nearly 4,000 Guardians have completed the program. The ANP Training General Command is working to allocate ALP training slots in order to ensure the training centers have a yearly ALP throughput capacity of over 5,000 Guardians.

The logistics capabilities of ALP headquarters continue to improve. The greatest sustainment limitation is insufficient communication with the districts. In order to identify logistical shortfalls, the ALP headquarters relies to a large extent on coalition advisors’ abilities to connect to the ALP districts. The ALP logistics directorate collaborates with other MoI entities, including the MoI logistics department, MoI procurement section, provincial logistics officers, and MoI’s national logistics center, which has enabled ALP headquarters to resolve logistical problems without coalition assistance. Visits to the Regional Logistics Commands in Kandahar and Nangarhar Provinces and reporting from the district and provincial augmentation teams indicate that logistics processes are understood at the commands and higher, but the provincial headquarters and below still struggle to understand commodity requisition and maintenance procedures. For example, a shortage of ammunition in the field continues to be a challenge. There appears to be plenty of ammunition in the supply system, but district and provincial requests go unfilled.

**Ongoing Challenges**

*Oversight.* The Afghan Local Police program requires greater district-level oversight from Kabul and the MoI to ensure ALP sustainment and to curtail the impact of predatory patronage networks that degrade popular support for the ALP. Major initiatives, such as *tashkil* redistribution, saw little progress during this reporting period. The physical separation and lack of communication pose challenges in managing this program from Kabul. Additionally, the ALP headquarters has little input into district and provincial security plans and decisions because of the lack of ownership by provincial and district chiefs of police. In order to address these issues, ALP headquarters conducted staff assistance visits and inspections to address challenges and discrepancies at the provincial level. Two successful staff assistance visits were conducted in August and September of 2014, to Helmand, Nangarhar, and Balkh Provinces.

*Survivability.* Effectiveness of ALP units is related to district headquarters and provincial headquarters leadership understanding the employment of ALP units. Without proximate ANP or ANA forces as reinforcements, defensive ALP units are susceptible to coordinated attacks and overwhelmed by insurgents equipped with more powerful weapon systems, such as mortars and rocket-propelled grenades. ALP effectiveness this fighting season has been degraded by a chronic inability to provide ALP units with timely support for resupply, reinforcements, or maintenance.
Leadership. At the ALP headquarters level, most officers are effective at their jobs and show initiative to address issues affecting the ALP headquarters and ALP Guardians. However, provincial and district chiefs of police are responsible for pay, employment, and sustainment of the ALP. Failures by some of these leaders resulted in critical sustainment issues over the reporting period that went unresolved until ALP headquarters staff assistance visits.

2.10: ANSF ASSESSMENT

Since 2002, ISAF and its predecessor headquarters have trained and assisted Afghan security forces. Since 2010, ISAF employed a centralized system of unit assessments to evaluate these ANSF units over time. The latest iteration of this assessment system is the Regional Command ANSF Status Report (RASR), which is better adapted to Security Force Assistance Advisor Team (SFAAT) resource constraints as well as the growing need for focused cross-pillar assessments of corps unit clusters. Previous RASR reports have focused on assessing 85 key ANA and ANP headquarters and units. The SFAATs/RCs assess and rates the key ANA and ANP unit capabilities utilizing a unit-specific set of rating definition levels (RDLs).

With the reduction in SFAAT coverage, ISAF modified the RASR to a “RASR-lite” construct. The “RASR-lite” construct maintains assessments of all ANP units (i.e., ABP, AUP, and ANCOP) with one primary modification: the report limits the ANCOP assessment to the headquarters and does not address individual brigades or specialty kandaks within the ANA corps. This report provides ANA unit assessments at the corps level, maintains the use of narratives, and provides assessments for Regional Operation Coordination Centers (OCC-Rs), Regional Logistics Support Centers (RLSCs), and Regional Corps Battle Schools (RCBS).

Figure 21: ANSF RASR-Lite Ratings, as of September 2014

Of the 40 units assessed, 33 (83 percent) are rated as capable or fully capable, which is in line with the six-month average of 85 percent (see figure 21 above). The 215th Corps’ RLSC was the

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36 This section is submitted in accordance with section 1221, Benchmarks to Evaluate the Progress Being Made toward the Transition of Security Responsibilities for Afghanistan to the Government of Afghanistan, of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. Now that the ANSF are fully in the lead for security, ISAF considers individual unit ratings as sensitive information.
only ANA unit not assessed. Additionally, ABP Zone 604 and AUP Helmand were the only ANP units not assessed. The SFAATs for these units, both in RC-Southwest, are no longer present to provide assessments. For the future Resolute Support mission, ISAF is in the process of developing a different reporting scheme to focus on the eight essential functions.

2.11: ANSF PARTNERING AND OPERATIONS

As of September 2014, 99 percent of conventional operations and 99 percent of special operations were ANSF-led. The lead for an operation is determined by who planned it and subsequently gave orders. ANSF led operations include those that are unilateral, as well as those enabled and advised by ISAF. An operation is deemed unilateral, partnered, enabled, or advised based on partner force ratios. An ANSF unilateral operation does not include assistance from ISAF. In few instances, ISAF provided enabling or partnering support for Afghan-led operations. The only unilateral operations that ISAF now conducts are for force protection, route clearance to maintain freedom of movement, and retrograde and redeployment activities. The remaining conventional and special operations that were not led by the ANSF were either combined operations (which included ANSF, but were ISAF led), or ISAF unilateral operations necessary to secure ISAF bases and redeploying forces.

2.12: BUDGET

The ANSF are funded primarily through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund and international community donations to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) and the NATO Afghan National Army Trust Fund (ANA TF). The Afghan government provides the remainder of funds.

Afghanistan Security Forces Fund

The Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) is a Title 10 authority to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANSF. The ASFF is the key enabler and primary funding source for the U.S. mission, providing the money and authority necessary to succeed in Afghanistan. For FY 2014, Congress appropriated $4.7 billion for ASFF, a decrease of $3 billion from the President’s budget request of $7.7 billion. FY 2014 is the first year the DoD Leahy Law applies to ASFF funding. As such, DoD was delayed in executing FY 2014 funds, pending DoD execution guidance to ensure ASFF was used in accordance with the Leahy Law.

Department of Defense Leahy Law

Section 8057 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2014, provides that no DoD-funded training, equipment, or other assistance may be provided to members of a unit of a foreign security force if the Secretary of Defense has credible information the unit has committed

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37 Now that the ANSF are fully in the lead for security and are leading the majority of operations, ISAF considers the percentages of each type of operation (by month) as sensitive.
a gross violation of human rights (GVHR). ASFF exists for the sole purpose of “providing assistance to the security forces of Afghanistan,” and therefore all assistance provided through the ASFF appropriation is subject to the DoD Leahy Law.

DoD is committed to complying with the DoD Leahy Law in Afghanistan and fostering respect for human rights by the ANSF. DoD has engaged with the Afghan government to promote accountability for abuses by the Afghan military and police. An ANSF that operates effectively and respects human rights is central to the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, as these traits are integral to the ANSF’s ability to provide for Afghanistan’s security and retain public support for itself and other institutions of governance.

Senior MoD officials understand that failure to respond decisively to allegations of extra-judicial killings and gross violations of human rights is inconsistent with operating under the rule of law and potentially undermines MoD’s sustained international community support. However, a weak and corrupt judiciary and unpopular detention policies by the Afghan administration have led some ANSF commanders to order subordinates to kill rather than capture insurgent operatives in order to avoid what they see as a pipeline from the judiciary system back to the battlefield. A capable, non-corrupt, and accountable judiciary is critical to ensuring the ANSF operate within the bounds of international laws and norms on human rights. The ANSF’s goal is to have no incidents of extra-judicial killings and gross violations of human rights, and to ensure that any incidents that do occur are investigated and appropriate response measures are taken. The ANA needs to increase its operational law manning level and develop the abilities to meet this goal.

TAA efforts at the ministerial level continue to focus on these risks and to emphasize the importance of preventing and effectively responding to allegations. ISAF continues to engage with all levels of ANSF leadership to reinforce the importance of preventing GVHR to not only maintaining long-term viability, but also to the continuation of U.S. assistance to the ANSF. Additionally, ISAF continues to assist the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), the Attorney General’s Office (AGO), and the Supreme Court. ISAF supported the development of the GIRoA’s National Priority Program 5, “Law and Justice for All,” which outlines the GIRoA’s justice sector priorities over the next three years, and will now work to support its implementation.

Respect for human rights by the ANSF will remain a central theme in engagements between DoD officials and their Afghan counterparts, and in the event that credible information of gross violations of human rights by the ANSF becomes available, U.S. forces will engage Afghan officials and encourage investigations and, as appropriate, removal and/or prosecution.

**International Community Funding**

During the September 4-5 NATO Summit in Wales, the international community committed to continue funding the ANSF through the end of 2017 and support to the ANSF through the transformation decade to 2024. International donors reconfirmed over $1 billion in annual contributions to sustain the ANSF through the end of 2017. Donors provide funding for validated ANSF requirements through bilateral or multi-lateral channels. The two multi-lateral channels are the UNDP LOTFA and the NATO ANA TF.
The Afghan government has recommitted to providing approximately $500 million in 2015 toward the ANSF. This amount is expected to increase progressively until Afghanistan assumes full financial responsibility for its security forces by 2024.

CSTC-A and DoD manage the NATO ANA TF on behalf of international donors to provide support and sustainment of the ANA. Since the beginning of the NATO ANA TF, 23 nations have contributed more than $900 million. The DoD will continue managing the ANA TF during the post-2014 Resolute Support mission. It is anticipated that approximately half of all international contributions for ANSF sustainment reconfirmed at the NATO Wales Summit will flow through the ANA TF with the remainder supporting the ANP through the UNDP LOTFA.

**Direct Contributions to the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior**

CSTC-A continues to work with the Afghan government to ensure appropriate oversight of direct contributions to the MoI and MoD. During this reporting period, CSTC-A implemented a comprehensive bilateral financial agreement. This bilateral financial agreement, known as the Commitment Letter, stipulates how the MoD and the MoI will allocate funding for the fiscal year, identifies various legal constraints (such as the Berry Amendment), and instructs GIROA on the use of the automated accounting systems at the five-digit accounting level in order to advance its management of the funding.

During the reporting period, CSTC-A signed three separate commitment letters with the MoD, the MoI and the UNDP’s LOTFA. Each of these bilateral financial arrangements defined CSTC-A’s commitment to develop ministerial capabilities and capacities while supplementing GIROA’s CY 1393 security budgets. Disbursements are provided to the Ministry of Finance and later allocated to the respective security ministry as required based on, but not limited to, actual expenditure rates, procurement plans, and estimated expenditure forecasts.

As of September 1, 2014, $3.3 billion in ASFF was provided in direct contributions to the MoI and MoD to fund primarily salaries, consumables, equipment, recurring services, and the repair of facilities. CSTC-A has taken steps to increase Afghan capacity and capability to responsibly manage direct contributions. These steps include hiring a surge of contractors with expertise in military financial management who will work as advisors within the MoI and MoD to improve Afghan financial processes.

During the reporting period, CSTC-A disbursed $1.5 billion in direct contributions to the MoD for the ANA; $409 million in direct contributions to MoI, primarily for the ALP and Senior Leader Protection program; and $154 million in direct contributions to LOTFA for salaries for the various Afghan police forces. CSTC-A works closely with its Afghan counterparts in the MoI and MoD to ensure the oversight of Afghan financial systems. This includes providing advising in financial management to the Afghan ministries to build enduring sustainment capabilities in planning, programming, budgeting, and acquisition. The CSTC-A audit division continues to perform and assist independent assessments and audits to ensure appropriate scrutiny of Afghan financial processes and make recommendations for improving Afghan capability.
The DoD Inspector General (IG) audited GIRoA’s internal controls to ensure a transparent and accountable fiscal process for direct contributions provided on budget for the sustainment of the ANSF. This audit identified $260.4 million in funding that was subject to weak internal control processes, such as lack of documentation, not reconciling payments with personnel data, and incorrectly charging budget accounts. The audit recommended that CSTC-A increase the visibility of the MoD’s and MoI’s execution of ASFF, improve accountability for pension contributions, and strengthen payroll processes; CSTC-A concurred in all of the DoD IG’s recommendations.

CSTC-A has begun implementing the audit’s recommendations, including adding additional advisors within MoD and MoI to improve financial management with adequate controls, transparency, and greater accountability. Improving the ability of the MoD and MoI to provide appropriate oversight and accountability of international funding for the ANSF and developing Afghan capability in financial management will continue to be a core focus of the post-2014 TAA mission.

2.13: ANSF INFRASTRUCTURE

Figures 22 through 25 summarize ANA and ANP infrastructure spending from 2005 through the end of the reporting period. At the end of the reporting period, the ANSF infrastructure program represented a $9 billion investment with 382 ANA and 730 ANP projects, of which 91 percent are complete, 8 percent are under construction, and 1 percent are in the planning phase.

Figure 22: ANA Infrastructure Spending, FY 2005 – FY 2014
Figure 23: Status of ANA Infrastructure Projects

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Figure 24: ANP Infrastructure Spending, FY 2005 – FY 2014

![ANP Funding Budget Profile](image)
2.14: WOMEN IN THE ANSF

DoD and ISAF maintain a robust program dedicated to improving the recruitment, retention, and treatment of women in the ANSF, and to improving the status of Afghan women in general. The implementation of a gender policy within Afghanistan’s armed forces and police is a complex, long-term project; still, slow progress occurred during the reporting period.

Barriers to recruiting women include a lack of proper facilities and programs to support women, including a lack of child care centers and programs; latrines and dormitories; adequate career paths for women; training that will provide women with skills equal to their male colleagues to accomplish their daily tasks as a police personnel; and education at all levels to address the change of the male attitudes and behavior towards women in the force. Violence against women in society and in the security forces is still a prevalent issue, and proper disciplinary policies and procedures should be introduced, together with the proper complaint mechanism. Perpetrators should be prosecuted in accordance with domestic law in order to combat impunity.

As part of the NDAA for FY 2014, Congress directed that not less than $25 million in funds appropriated for ASFF shall be for recruitment and retention of women in the ANSF. U.S. gender advisors to the MoI and the MoD assembled the list of requirements based on the needs submitted by the respective ministries. The priorities for both ministries include: female recruiting and advertising campaigns aimed at influencing public opinion and changing the perception of female participation in the security forces; transportation; technical and security equipment; construction and renovation of facilities; food allowance; performance awards; and training (e.g., self-defense training, anti-harassment training, violence in the workplace training, confidence building, driving training and weapons training).

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38 This section is submitted in accordance with Recruiting and Retention of Women in Afghanistan National Security Forces in Senate Report 113-211, accompanying H.R.4870, the DoD Appropriations Bill, 2015.
The participation of women in the ANSF is crucial for a sustainable and stable society and ensures that the ANSF is representative of all Afghan people. Cultural barriers are often used as an excuse for not recruiting women into the force; however, women were part of the security forces over 30 years ago and constituted half of the working force in 1960s and 1970s. The primary obstacle for slow progress in this area remains the lack of will of Afghan leadership to implement approved policies.

**The Ministry of Defense**

The ANA and AAF staffing goal for women is ten percent of their combined *tashkil*. However, as in many militaries, women are not eligible for many combat positions. At the end of the August 2014, there were 737 female soldiers in the ANA and 48 female airmen in the AAF. Women make up around 0.4 percent of total ANA forces and 0.7 percent of the AAF, far below the established goal but indicative of minor progress over the reporting period.

MoD leadership states that institutional barriers to the recruitment of women stems from traditional and cultural biases. Additionally, they claim that many families do not want their daughters to join the ANA because of concerns for their security. Some of the leadership claims
that the ten percent goal is not realistic and that coalition advisors have imposed it, while others state that they are committed to the approved goal but assess that more time for implementation is needed.

MoD advisors continually work with senior MoD leadership to implement the female accession management policy in order to support their efforts and overcome the barriers so that women can actively and meaningfully serve in the Afghan security forces. The MoD embarked on a three-part plan to increase the numbers of women in the ANA and to provide better facilities for them. The policy seeks to reinforce the Afghan Constitution while addressing practical cultural concerns, to identify non-combat military occupational specialties for women, and to provide women the opportunity to select a geographical location so that they may live with their families. The ministerial order regarding the female recruiting, training, assignment, reassignment, and working facilities within the ANA states that women are “qualified to provide service in the headquarters of Assistant Ministers, central departments of MoD and General Staff, in logistics, finance, communication, human resources, Air Force, legal, inspection, other admin positions and in the headquarters of training centers.”

The first component of the plan, which is completed, includes submission of detailed facilities and recruiting requirements to be funded by the not less than $25 million in the NDAA for FY 2014 set aside to support women in the ANSF. The second component includes issuing an MoD order stating that women requiring assignment have priority to fill the identified 19,500 positions open to women on the tashkil. Such an order will assist in meeting the MoD’s stated goal of a ten percent female force in the ANA. The third component of the plan is the creation of a comprehensive annual recruiting/training/accession plan that specifies the dates of classes at all of the ANA’s female training facilities in order to maximize female throughput at each of those facilities throughout the year. The MoD approved the annual female accession/recruitment plan in April 2014. The plan states that 485 women will be recruited and trained in one year at all the female training facilities. However, the implementation of the plan has been slow and not in the accordance with the perceived timeline (at the beginning of September 2014, only 78 women were in training instead of 245). Furthermore, during a Congressional delegation visit in May 2014, MoD officials made a pledge that 700 women would be accessed by May 2015, which will not happen if continued at this pace. These types of pledges may have been made to obtain funds for female recruitment, training, and retention.

The MoD Human Rights and Gender Integration (HR&GI) Directorate itself continued to make slow progress over the reporting period. The HR&GI worked with external organizations in order to garner support for training and education for the ANA on human rights and gender integration issues. Besides the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Afghan Women’s Network, which offered gender training to the ANA, the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) offered human rights and gender training. It will initially conduct ten trainings in Kabul and different provinces in accordance with the signed memorandum of understanding between MoD and AIHRC.

The ANA Officer Academy at Camp Qarga accepted the second round of women in its class in September 2014, and currently 78 women are attending training (out of a planned 245). However, based on the lessons learned from the first round, significant efforts should be taken to
recruit female officer candidates. In order to enhance the process and empower the ANA Recruitment Command (ANAREC), a meeting between all stakeholders, to include a Minister of Defense for Personnel and Education, HR&GI, Religious and Cultural Affairs, Public Affairs Office will be organized. Advisors suggest this course of action because their Afghan counterparts do not perceive the importance of mutual coordination and exchange of information. The future advertising and recruitment campaign (as the priority among requirements for not less than $25 million) and assignments of women in ANAREC as recruiters, among other actions, should help to overcome this barrier.

**Ministry of Interior**

Under the leadership of Minister Daudzai, the Afghan MoI showed significant support for women in the MoI and is taking steps to protect and empower female police and female MoI staff. The MoI announced that the number of female police officers serving in the ANP would reach 5,000 recruits by the end of the Afghan year (February 2015), 10,000 in the next five years, and ten percent of the police force in the long term. Currently, 2,173 women are in the ANP, and an additional 200 will be recruited and sent for training to the training center at Sivas, Turkey, in November 2014. The “train the trainer” course opened at the end of September 2014 in the Kabul training center to enlarge the number of female trainers, which should boost further recruitment and training. This is an ambitious goal considering progress in recruiting women to date, but one that ISAF fully supports.

Progress in expanding the number of women in the MoI has slowed to some extent, by the MoI’s wider focus on securing the election and on hiring and training enough female searchers by the presidential run-off elections. In comparison to the previous report, and based on the *Strategy for the Management of the Affairs of ANP Female Personnel* (dated January 6, 2014), the MoI developed the implementation plan for the strategy. The plan was signed by the Minister of Interior on August 13, 2014. The plan was developed in close cooperation with the United Nations Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and European Union Police (EUPOL) Mission in Afghanistan. The *National Police Plan* recognizes female integration into the ANP as the fourth goal and also refers to the implementation plan. Collectively, these steps indicate that the proper policy and planning documents are in place and it is time to move to the implementation phase.

The requirements for not less than $25 million in ASFF were submitted to the U.S. advisor to the MoI and were merged with the requirements from the MoD. In addition to these funds, which are intended to provide an incentive for measurable progress on female integration in the ANP, Afghan counterparts on all levels are being advised to include allocations for female recruitment, training, facilities, promotions, and uniforms in the regular budget.
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SECTION 3 – GOVERNANCE

3.1: ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL GOVERNANCE

Afghanistan’s national institutions continue to improve their ability to provide constitutional, effective, and responsive governance at a slow pace. Gains in education, health, access to electricity, and rural development continued during this reporting period. Although the Afghan government is slowly increasing its technical capacity to govern, complications surrounding the results of the presidential election decreased government productivity throughout the reporting period.

Corruption, budget shortfalls, limited revenue generation capacity, and limited public financial management capacity are ongoing challenges to the national government. Weak cooperation between national and sub-national levels of the government hampers significant long-term sustainability and limits access to public goods. At the sub-national level, official government services are largely restricted to provincial and district centers, despite efforts to improve capacity and extend government services to rural areas.

The executive branch of the Afghan government wields the most power and often directs legislative and judicial action. Still, there is increased collaboration across the branches to address important governance issues. The passage of the national budget demonstrated cooperation between the executive and legislative branches to work toward a common goal. The judicial branch, with the assistance of the international community, is making incremental progress in the training and staffing of sub-national judicial positions. Even while the rule of law expands, security concerns often impede freedom of movement, especially at the district level.

Lengthy periods required for formal dispute resolution through the government feed the perceptions that the government is ineffective and inaccessible to many rural Afghans.

Progress towards Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework Milestones

The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF) serves to guide relations between donors and GIRoA. The Afghan government made some positive progress in the areas of accountability and stewardship, underpinning ISAF’s support of security and political transition, but struggled to fulfill its commitments on gender and human rights. Parliament passed anti-money laundering and countering financing of terrorism laws, as well as a new mining law that should improve regulation of the extractive sector. International donors and the new Afghan administration will participate in the London Conference on Afghanistan in November 2014 to discuss the TMAF’s core goals and reaffirm both sides’ mutual commitment to the framework process and Afghan sustainability.

Declining revenues put into question GIRoA’s ability to meet its Chicago Summit commitments, specifically to provide $500 million by 2015 (CY 1394), and continue to pay for an increased percentage of the overall security budget until 2024, when the Afghan government will be responsible for 100 percent of its own security costs. After strong real (non-opium) GDP growth of 14.4 percent in 2012, a number of factors contributed to a considerable slowdown of growth in the Afghan economy to 3.7 percent in 2013, and will further dampen growth prospects in 2014 to
about 1.5 percent. These include a delay surrounding the presidential transition, a reduction in border tariff collection, and reduced funds by ISAF and NATO spent through the Commander’s Emergency Response Program.

Corruption

Transparency International’s “Corruption Perceptions Index for 2013” placed Afghanistan among the most corrupt nations, tied with North Korea and Somalia. Corruption dampens Afghan economic growth. Investors are reluctant to risk their money without assurances that their rights will be protected. Patronage structures along political and ethnic lines continue to facilitate corruption. GIRoA has demonstrated little political will to implement strict measures to fight corruption and continues to struggle with increasing transparency, accountability, and the rule of law.

Anti-corruption bodies, such as the Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee and the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption, can collect evidence, but they have no prosecutorial authority or the independence to act against corrupt individuals or officials. Significantly, in one of his first acts after being inaugurated, President Ghani ordered the re-opening of the investigation into fraud at Kabul Bank.

3.2: ASSESSMENT OF SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNANCE

The effectiveness of sub-national authorities varies significantly. GIRoA’s structure remains highly centralized, with the Ministry of Finance and other central ministries in Kabul controlling budgeting and spending authority. Line directorates implement service delivery in the provinces, with little input from provincial councils or governors. Vacancies in key sub-national government positions, marginalization of civil society, and poor communication between Kabul and local authorities constrain the execution of sub-national governance objectives. Therefore, the effectiveness of sub-national authorities varies significantly.

At the national level, a disparate legal and institutional framework regulates local governance. The Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) and Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development set administrative and legal guidance for sub-national governance activities. Members of Parliament represent their provinces in Kabul, while governors, appointed by the central government, are chief administrators of the provinces. Members of local councils, including provincial councils, are elected at the sub-national level and serve their terms among their constituents, but have unclear responsibilities and powers. The executive branch’s authority to appoint all provincial and district governors can reduce the responsiveness of those officials to local concerns and perpetuate patronage relationships.

Sub-national authorities differ widely in the ability to deliver services to the population. The effectiveness of governors, parliamentary representatives, and provincial council members often depends on their access to key decision-makers in Kabul and their ability to publicize efforts to

secure funding for local areas. Budget preparations are made most often in Kabul, with limited structured input from provincial governments. This lack of coordination causes problems when preparing provincial budgets.

On one of his first days in office, President Ghani met with the IDLG and said benchmarks would be set for gubernatorial appointments and the provinces would have planned budgets. The IDLG was directed to work together with other relevant institutions to develop a comprehensive strategy for achieving the targets, including improving the efficiency of provincial governors and mayors and good governance.

3.3: REVENUE GENERATION AND BUDGET EXECUTION

The Ministry of Finance currently forecasts a fiscal deficit of between $500 million and $1 billion for 2014. Actual domestic revenue ran 26 percent below the monthly targets for the first eight months of 2014. Leakages and corruption, particularly with customs duties—customs revenues for the first six months of 2014 are down 13 percent—along with unrealistic budgeting, and economic uncertainty associated with the protracted election process, have all exacerbated Afghanistan’s fiscal outlook.

Without increased revenues, the country’s financial needs will increasingly outstrip resources. International assistance, which currently comprises 64 percent of Afghanistan’s total revenue for its core budget, is expected to decline in the coming years, requiring Afghanistan to pay a greater percentage of its operating costs. Security spending, in particular, is expected to increase, putting additional strain on Afghanistan’s financial solvency and limiting the government’s ability to fund non-security development and services. The World Bank estimates the gap between revenues and expenditures will reach 25 percent of GDP in 2018 and remain at 20 percent of GDP until at least 2025. Key legislative measures, such as the recently enacted mining law, value-added tax (VAT), and customs laws, are projected to be Afghanistan’s greatest revenue generators.

Despite the presence of a deficit, GIRoA continues to struggle with budget execution. The Afghan government executed 93 percent of its operating budget in 2013, while the execution rate for the development budget rose to about 52 percent in 2013. Under the TMAF, GIRoA is expected to improve its budget execution rate to 75 percent by 2017 – although this will be challenging. The Tokyo Agreement also commits that 50 percent of donor funding will be “on-budget” and 80 percent of donor funding aligned with approved National Priority Programs. GIRoA cites capacity constraints at the national and sub-national levels; weak planning and budget formulation; donor earmarking of funds and funding delays; and communication challenges across ministries, donors, and sub-national entities as key challenges.

A recent World Bank report, *The Export Opportunity*, offers some actions that GIRoA can take to regain fiscal stability:

- Immediate reforms to improve revenue performance:
  - Reduce leakages and strengthen tax and customs enforcement
  - Implement the new value-added tax of ten percent
• Direct additional resources to cover the unfinanced gap:
  o Increase the revenues as a percent of GDP from 8.7 percent (2014) to 9.6 percent (2015) to 12.8 percent (2018)
  o Search for other ways to close the gap, or Afghanistan will have trouble paying for civilian salaries and critical operating and development spending.

3.4: RULE OF LAW

The Department of State serves as the lead coordinator for U.S. rule of law efforts in Afghanistan, working with U.S. Government stakeholders, including DoD, USAID, and the Department of Justice (DoJ). Department of State and USAID rule of law programs continue to support the informal and formal justice sector at national and sub-national levels. The Department of State funds projects that focus on six lines of effort: formal justice sector capacity building; corrections reform; major crimes; legal education; civil society and access to justice; and gender justice. Related projects train and build the capacity of Afghan justice officials, including judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, criminal investigators, and prison staff. Department of State funding assists juvenile justice, anti-corruption efforts, and the case management system. USAID’s rule of law program has three main components: building the capacity of the formal justice and traditional dispute-resolution systems; promoting governmental and civil society anti-corruption measures; and promoting human rights. The rule of law portfolio has both national and sub-national impact and promotes rule of law institutionally and at the grassroots level.

The new Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) went into effect on June 5, 2014. During the reporting period, the Department of State began providing training to judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and criminal investigators on the law. Test scores of legal professionals attending the training, however, indicated a low level of understanding on the content of the CPC. Reports indicate the code is not yet being used in many courts.

The Joint Legal Center (JLC) was decommissioned on July 27, 2014. The JLC previously conducted legal operations for the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF) 435, with the specific mission of training, advising, and assisting coalition and Afghan forces to ensure U.S. compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and to strengthen the Afghan rule of law. Since its decommissioning, the JLC’s legal operations were assumed by the legal cell of the Rule of Law Development Team. This node provided executive level mentorship and assistance to Afghan partners at the Justice Center in Parwan (JCIP).

The JCIP is an enduring National Security Court with Afghan judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, and criminal investigators. It was created to prosecute Afghans who were detained by U.S. forces under the law of war and then transferred to Afghanistan. The court has tried more than 7,200 cases to date and achieved a 75 percent overall conviction rate. Of significance, the court regularly demonstrated its ability to adjudicate terrorism cases fairly and issue appropriate, lengthy sentences. The juvenile court was reestablished at the JCIP in June 2014. Additionally,

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40 Ibid., p. 41.
several Afghan training team events were conducted to ensure that Afghan JCIP prosecutorial and investigative practices and lessons learned were shared throughout the Afghan provinces.

On September 29, 2014, CJIATF 435 was deactivated, and the Rule of Law Development Directorate (RoLDD) assumed responsibilities for providing functionally based security force assistance. The directorate will provide assistance to the National Security Justice Center (NSJC), which encompasses the JCIP and Afghanistan National Detention Facility – Parwan, in support of the Resolute Support mission. However, through DoD’s advisory efforts, the NSJC is positioned to endure as GIRoA’s central platform and institution for rule of law training, detention, investigation, and prosecution of national security threats post-2014.

Rule of Law Relating to MoD and MoI

The MoD has a robust military justice system through the appellate level and a non-judicial punishment system, which promotes discipline within the military. Likewise, the MoI has a functioning discipline system, although current efforts are being made within MoI to update, consolidate, and clarify laws, regulations, and policies in order to further strengthen the police discipline system. The Afghan president must approve any criminal prosecution of senior ANSF officials. Currently, senior officers are not being held accountable for malfeasance.

MoI has legal affairs advisors at headquarters and within each province that are responsible for training ANP on laws and human rights. The legal affairs advisors provide operational advice to the provincial chiefs of police. The MoD has both civilian and military attorneys, but few are trained in operational law. Current efforts are underway to authorize operational law attorneys to provide legal advice and training in order to comply with international obligations.

The Ministers of Interior and Defense are appointed by the Afghan President. Other positions in both MoI and MoD are staffed by politically appointed civilians. The international community is encouraging the Afghan security institutions to increase the number of civilians in leadership positions in order to improve professionalism. The CY 1393 CSTC-A commitment letter for the Minister of Defense, which provides guidance, direction, and constraints on budget execution, and sets specific goals to further adjust the organizational structure with some military positions becoming civilian, and vice versa.

Rule of Law Relating to Afghan Special Security Forces

Although the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command is still a relatively new command, it has developed procedures to document, investigate, and react to criminal incidents. ANASOC leadership must seek approval from the MoD to punish individuals who are guilty of corruption, but the ANASOC Division decides the penalty.

The General Command of Police Special Units improved internal mission planning after partnered operations were temporarily suspended in April 2014. National Mission Unit commanders were under investigation, in part because of the perception that NMU operations did not comply with Afghan law. One allegation was that NMUs were improperly using the “time sensitive target” and “retrospective warrant” exceptions to conduct operations without a
signed warrant. Previous methods of obtaining post-operation warrants have been subsumed by an MoI mandate for full warrant-based operations.

The intelligence-gathering agency is required to provide GCPSU with both a warrant and a *saranwahl* (prosecutor) for operations. The Kabul provincial chief of police and the Network Targeting and Exploitation Center offered to provide one NMU with *saranwahls* for warranted operations. As of June 2, 2014, the director of the Anti-Terrorism Prosecution Department agreed to consider a request from the commander of GCPSU for additional *saranwahl* support to the NMUs; most of the dedicated NMU *saranwahls* have arrived at their respective units.

ANASOC validated internal court-martial procedures during this reporting period as well. In a June division-level court-martial in front of visiting judges from 203rd Corps, ANASOC provided prosecution and defense teams for five 8th Special Operations Kandak commandos accused of assaulting their platoon leader and using hashish during an operation. In this open trial, four of five defendants were found guilty on both charges, while the fifth was found guilty of only the assault charge. The four received two-year confinement sentences, while the fifth will serve 18 months.

Conditions required to ensure the transparent accountability of wrongdoers include thorough criminal investigation, and effective prosecution. ISAF continues to promote a good working relationship between ANSF and AGO prosecutors in their efforts to approach security threats through a criminal framework, and to end pervasive corruption. The ISAF team now chairs the rule of law/transparency, accountability, and oversight bi-weekly international community information-sharing meeting, which promotes ISAF security interests through the international community’s efforts to implement rule of law and transparency, accountability, and oversight. The progress made to date on evidence-based operations and the use of forensic evidence in the judicial process will likely remain limited to major population centers, but ISAF is working with other international community partners to improve the use of forensics and other intelligence-based evidence to support criminal prosecutions.

Human rights concerns continued to surface. U.S. and NATO advisors are engaged in active efforts to prevent, investigate, and encourage the prosecution of extra-judicial killings and GVHR by the ANSF, in an effort to increase public confidence in Afghan security forces and the formal justice system.

**Justice Sector**

Justice sector security, which is always a challenge in Afghanistan, remains a critical vulnerability. Many Afghan justice officials are forced to rely upon ad-hoc security arrangements at the provincial and district levels. Judicial officials and prosecutors face continuing attacks, and insurgents aggressively target justice sector employees. The lack of security affects the number of judges and prosecutors willing to work in more rural and less secure provinces and districts as targeted assassinations of justice sector personnel, general threats to physical safety, and the lack of personal security while traveling or in courthouses are continuing challenges.
Positive emphasis on the formal justice system remains an important overarching goal of rule of law efforts. The Afghan population continues to struggle with embracing the often cumbersome formal justice process, compared to the familiarity and immediacy of informal systems of justice, although there are signs of progress. In the past, the populace relied on the Taliban’s system of justice when formal courts were absent or perceived to be corrupt. Now there is some data that shows more Afghans were using the formal justice system than the informal justice system for the first time. In addition, noted progress in rule of law efforts included Afghan involvement in ensuring that transparent, fair and corruption free justice was administered at the JCIP.

Rule of Law and Long Term Stability

Real long-term stability in Afghanistan depends on top-level GIRoA support for the rule of law. ISAF continues to assist the MoD, MoI, MoJ, AGO, and the Supreme Court. ISAF supported the development of the GIRoA’s National Priority Program 5, “Law and Justice for All,” which outlines the Afghan government’s justice sector priorities over the next three years, and will now work to support its implementation. A new Afghan criminal procedure code was passed and became effective on June 5, 2014. Numerous international community partners are working with the Ministry of Justice and other Afghan justice ministries to provide training and to provide additional implementing guidelines for the new code which passed after seven years of drafting. The Criminal Law Reform Working Group, made up of Afghan legal professionals and the international community, continues its rewrite of the Afghan criminal penal code, and it is anticipated that an initial draft will be complete by December 2014, ready for consideration in the legislative process. Once the code is complete, the procedure code and penal code will support ANSF law enforcement efforts.

3.5: PARLIAMENT

Afghanistan’s Parliament demonstrated an increasing capacity during this reporting period, but both chambers slowed down considerably in the midst of the election crisis. Parliamentarians used their positions to urge for calm and national unity and called for investigations into allegations of fraud.

USAID’s Assistance to Legislative Bodies of Afghanistan project continued to work toward the four key programmatic objectives of strengthening the legislative process, improving legislative oversight, increasing outreach capacity, and increasing institutional development of the National Assembly.

During the reporting period, Parliament debated and voted on more than a dozen pieces of legislation and passed two international cooperation agreements. Among the most influential of these were the Commercial Contracts Law and the Money Laundering Law. The Wolesi Jirga also passed the Value Added Tax Law, Mining and Minerals Law, CPC, and Access to Information Law.
3.6: BANKING AND FINANCE

During the reporting period, serious backsliding occurred on financial reform. The presidential election and the ensuing controversies diverted much of the focus away from routine governance issues. During the reporting period, Afghanistan was unable to meet the necessary conditions to complete another review of its International Monetary Fund (IMF) program, missing several structural benchmarks and failing to meet domestic revenue targets. Afghanistan’s IMF Extended Credit Facility program has been stalled now for over two years and will expire in November 2014. Due to the delayed inauguration of a new president, the IMF has had to wait to negotiate a follow-up program, but continues to monitor the situation closely.

Afghanistan has been the subject of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) listing and monitoring process since June 2012. At the FATF Plenary in June 2014, Afghanistan managed to avoid being blacklisted by the FATF due to progress on its Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Counter Funding of Terrorism (CFT) legislation. The AML was officially promulgated on June 25, and the CFT law on July 3, by presidential signature, although the laws have not yet been published in the official gazette. To avoid downgrade to the FATF Public Statement (“the blacklist”) at its next plenary on October 20-24, 2014, Afghanistan needs to issue adequate CFT regulations, as well as have compliant AML and CFT laws that are fully in force.

Afghanistan has a very small and relatively weak banking sector that does not lend much money to the private sector. Most Afghan banks keep a large portion of their assets as deposits in foreign banks. Their loan-to-deposit ratio is just over 20 percent. A very large portion of their income is generated by transaction fees. The U.S. Government is not directly or indirectly involved in auditing Afghan banks or the process of financial supervision. However, serious concerns remain about the health and stability of the Afghan banking system and the supervisory capacity of the Central Bank.

Kabul Bank

According to DoJ officials closely following this issue, efforts to recover Kabul Bank assets continue. Recovery of cash assets stalled at approximately $150.5 million; this amount is unlikely to increase without embezzlement or money laundering convictions sufficient to trigger confiscation mechanisms for cash held in foreign accounts. During the reporting period, Ariana Airlines assumed custody of the assets of Pamir Airlines, which has a purported book value of roughly $24 million (excluding potential liabilities from the recent crash of one of its fleet). GIRoA claims title to non-cash assets that may push the recovery amount as high as $225 million. There is still reason to doubt GIRoA’s evaluation, its methods for conversion, as well as its ability to liquidate the assets (particularly those located in Dubai) without challenge by other claimants. There has been little effort by GIRoA to take any action on either the Kabul Bank case or recovery of assets following the November 2013 Appellate Court order calling for a shareholder meeting to resolve disagreements of asset valuation and apportionment of recovery proceeds among defendants.

At the time of this report, the criminal case remains pending before the Kabul Appellate Court. DoJ, along with the Departments of Treasury and State, is engaged in an international effort to
set new Kabul Bank lodestars in the upcoming Tokyo Mutual Assistance Accord benchmark revisions.

Following his inauguration, President Ghani issued a presidential decree that reportedly ordered the Supreme Court to “pursue” the Kabul Bank case, and make a decision on the charges, including the money laundering charges, within 45 days. The decree also ordered the arrest and indictment of all the individuals listed in the Primary Court’s original order, including former Afghan President Karzai’s brother Mahmoud Karzai, and the now deceased former First Vice President Marshal Fahim Khan’s brother; required debtors to clear their debts; and ordered the Attorney General’s Office and Ministry Kabul Bank assets held abroad to be frozen. Notably, the decree was issued a day before the Eid holiday, and in a break with tradition, the AGO issued the arrest warrants during the holiday. Although it is uncertain how aggressive the Afghan law enforcement community will be in complying with the presidential decree, the decree’s issuance provides a basis for hope that the new leadership in the Palace will be less tolerant of corruption among the ruling political and governmental elite.

3.7: COUNTER-CORRUPTION AND TRANSPARENCY

Law enforcement in Afghanistan continues to struggle with a culture of corruption, despite improvements in building the capacity of the justice sector. Little progress was made in counter-corruption efforts over the past six months owing to a lack of political will at senior levels, coupled with reluctance at lower levels to aggressively pursue corruption cases in the midst of the unresolved presidential election process. In cases where police elected to go forward with investigation and arrest, it was not unusual for the arresting officials to receive pressure from GIRoA officials to release the suspect. Even where the police did not release the suspect, cases were often not prosecuted because of corruption within the AGO, or were dismissed because of corruption within the court system.

Optimism for counter-corruption efforts is higher since the inauguration of President Ghani. In his inauguration speech, President Ghani specifically stated that he would combat corruption and has since issued an order that the Kabul Bank case be re-opened. Major Crime Task Force investigators are now cautiously optimistic that they will be able to pursue higher-level corruption cases that were previously untouchable.

An audit report released in July by the U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction outlined concerns about ANSF weapons accountability. The SIGAR found shortcomings in the inventory management system that the ANSF uses to track weapons that DoD has bought for them and recommended that DoD conduct a 100 percent inventory check of weapons transferred to the ANSF. Although DoD has no authority to require an inventory of weapons now owned by the Afghan government, DoD will engage Afghan leaders to encourage such an inventory be done and is considering making future transfers of weapons contingent on performance of such checks.
Developments by the Ministries

Ministry of Defense

MoD made limited progress towards implementing effective transparency, accountability, and oversight policies and processes during this reporting period. Although the MoD’s Inspector Generals have annual inspection plans, they have difficulty executing them due to resource, process, and system constraints, and the challenge of holding personnel accountable for corrupt acts.

Transparency and Accountability Committees (TACs) were established during the reporting period at eight locations within the Kabul Zone Cluster. When combined with the TACs in the ANA corps, the MoD has developed the ability to receive, analyze, and decide on matters brought to its attention. The TACs have room to improve in providing clear direction and consistent agendas, coherent messages, regular schedules, and headquarters reporting mechanisms. In an effort to improve the functionality of the TACs and coordination between subordinate units and the MoD IG, the Minister of Defense signed an order in early May directing that the TACs directly report to the MoD IG.

The General Staff and MoD IG offices have shown willingness and initiative to professionalize their personnel and performance. However, General Staff and MoD inspectors and auditors do not have basic IG skills, particularly in the area of effective inspections and investigations. Continual training is essential to effective IG oversight, particularly for budget execution, personnel, pay, and resource management. Although the IG holds quarterly training seminars, neither the General Staff nor the MoD IG office has developed a comprehensive training system.

Finally, many policies and procedures prescribe inspection and auditing processes, but none of these processes has been mapped. Two related initiatives have yet to be implemented: an organizational inspection program, and a case-tracking system. The counter-corruption working group has indicated that it intends to implement the Department of Justice Sector Support Program – Afghanistan Case Management System. Procurement of facilities, equipment, and training for the system is pending.

As one example of the MoD’s failure to ensure accountability oversight, the Afghan Special Security Forces’ loss of night vision devices, which the MoD failed to report to CSTC-A in accordance with an agreed Night Vision Device Control Plan, resulted in a temporary ban of night vision device transfers to the ANSF. However, on September 4, 2014, the MoD provided the required information surrounding the losses as well as actions taken to stem future occurrences. ANASOC conducted investigations of two commandos, who had lost night vision devices during operations. One soldier was tried and convicted in the Afghan court system, and was sentenced to four months’ imprisonment and a fine of 202,230 Afghani. The second commando defected to the Taliban in October 2013 and remains at large. Based on the MoD’s detailed report concerning the losses and planned steps to stem future occurrences, the ban preventing transfers of night vision devices to the MoD has been lifted.
The subordinate directorates within the MoI Office of the Inspector General have the potential to conduct adequate investigations, inspections, and audits. The *tashkil* structure across the MoI is robust, and subordinate units have acceptable policies, procedures, and plans. However, staff capabilities are questioned, due to the absence of standardization across the organization and a poorly synchronized approach to execution. The MoI has an outdated anti-corruption policy and strategy, no concerted approach to internal controls, and limited commitment to providing transparency and accountability. The MoI IG continues to play a limited role inside the ministry by executing only these activities that the Minister of Interior personally directs. Most initiatives are not implemented; hence, the ministry is not making significant progress in the areas of transparency, accountability, and oversight.

The MoI IG subordinate directorates include: the Anti-Corruption Unit, which is responsible for corruption investigations; the Professional Standards Unit, which is responsible for inspections and policy oversight; and the Documents Inspection Unit, which is responsible for document audits. All of these units have acceptable policies and procedures to guide their missions, and they have produced a comprehensive annual plan. However, their annual plan is not synchronized to a MoI oversight and internal controls strategy, and it is only loosely linked to the national police strategy and plan. The MoI IG has instead consolidated and focused his resources on reacting to spontaneous Minister of Interior directed internal affairs issues.

These issues should improve as the Attorney General's Office strengthens its performance. Efforts have begun to develop a professional police; however, without strong and effective IG and AGO functions, it will be difficult to enforce and institutionalize these principles.

The MoI has implemented electronic management control systems such as AHRIMS, AFMIS, and the Employment Permit System. If personnel are adequately trained and the systems are properly utilized, these systems can help GIRoA curb corruption by providing information for oversight and accountability.

### 3.8: COUNTERNARCOTICS

Over the past decade, the Departments of Defense, State, USAID, Justice, Homeland Security, and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) have collaborated to build Afghanistan’s counternarcotics capacity. The focus has been, and will continue to be, on creating Afghan solutions that the Afghan government can sustain and build upon. Curbing the growing threat of the Afghan opiate trade will require a long-term, multifaceted commitment in partnership with the Afghan government.

The narcotics trade in Afghanistan remains large, and insurgent penetration of that market is extensive and expanding. Successful CN interdiction operations in one region or area may be offset by insurgents increasing revenues by other means, such as kidnaps for ransom or through donations, which are difficult to affect. GIRoA regularly collaborates with U.S. and international organizations to target narcotics traffickers and facilities. As part of the ISAF CN
campaign plan, ISAF coordinates with DEA and other U.S. Government departments and agencies to reduce the ability of the insurgency to draw support from the narcotics industry.

Afghan security and law enforcement forces conducted 84 operations from April 1 to September 2, 2014. These events included patrols, cordon and search operations, vehicle interdictions, and deliberate detention operations. Leading this effort was the GCPSU, which participated in 14 operations that seized approximately 23,638 kg of various narcotics and precursor chemicals and detained approximately 40 individuals. The combined operations of the ANSF resulted in the seizures of 18,137 kg of opium, 52 kg morphine, 1,849 kg of heroin, 1,004 kg of hashish/marijuana, and 12,850 kg of precursor chemicals, as well as detaining 130 individuals. The U.S. military provided general logistics and intelligence support, while the DEA provided mentorship and support to specialized Afghan investigative units. The U.S. intelligence community provided supplemental targeting and analytical support to coalition mentors.

The number of operations by the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) and other Afghan CN agencies declined during the reporting period due to the loss of ISAF supported enablers and the reduced number of ISAF partnered operations. Security efforts in some contested southern provinces with increased poppy cultivation and counternarcotics units were redirected to assist with Afghanistan presidential election security. During the second half of the reporting period, most interdiction activities occurred in RC-East and RC-Central. Previously, interdictions were concentrated in RC-South and RC-Southwest, where the majority of opiates are grown, processed, and smuggled out of Afghanistan. This shift is likely a result of the coalition drawdown, as the threat to interdiction forces in RC-East and RC-Central is generally less than the threat in the South and Southwest.

**Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan Specialized Units**

The Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan is the ANP component responsible for CN operations throughout Afghanistan. CNPA headquarters is located in Kabul, and the CNPA has officers stationed in all 34 provinces, including four forward operating bases located throughout Afghanistan. DoD supports the CNPA through capacity building to establish an Afghan institution that can capably counter the narcotics trade and resist corruption.

The CNPA Development Unit (CDU), which is funded by DoD but implemented by the Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, continued to assist the CNPA in preparing for transition. As the mission of the U.S. Government and ISAF changes, so will the CDU’s mission. Its transition plan will develop a roadmap to continue the strategic institutional development of, and build sustainability into, the CNPA. The key component of the transition will be mentoring the CNPA Strategic Planning Unit, to take over the function of the CDU to facilitate Afghan-led solutions for future CNPA institutional development; further the Afghan government’s strategic frameworks for CN; and guide the CNPA toward achieving its objectives. At the conclusion of this effort, the Strategic Planning Unit will replace the CDU in its advising, programming, and development capacities.

The DEA’s CN efforts concentrated on building and sustaining the capability and capacity of specialized vetted units, such as the National Interdiction Unit, Sensitive Investigative Unit...
(SIU), and Technical Investigations Unit (TIU) of the CNPA to address the illicit drug trade. These vetted units are essential to U.S. CN efforts in Afghanistan. DoD, DEA, and Department of State capacity-building efforts included training, provision of equipment and infrastructure, and mentorship by DEA enforcement, intelligence, and training personnel.

DEA’s Office of Training and the DEA Kabul Country Office are committed to developing the CNPA. DEA provides advisory support and oversight for the Counter Narcotics Training Team (CNTT), previously known as the Afghanistan Regional Training Team. The CNTT, funded by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), provides basic and advanced training to members of the specialized Afghan units, to include the NIU, SIU, and TIU. The Kabul Country Office also provides informal operational training and shoulder-to-shoulder mentorship for the SIU and TIU.

The CJIATF – Afghanistan made substantial progress in assisting the ANSF with investigating the targeting both individuals and networks at the nexus of insurgency, counternarcotics, and criminal patronage. The task force developed targeting packets and illustrative intelligence products, which are releasable to GIRoA. These tools have been used to provide security force assistance to ANSF organizations to further operational activities and tactical success.

**Afghan Special Mission Wing Support to Counternarcotics**

During FY 2014, the SMW completed receipt of 30 new Mi-17 helicopters and eight new PC-12 airplanes of a total requirement of 18. The PC-12s will be used primarily to provide ISR support to operations. In addition to its mission responsibilities to support CT and ASSF, the SMW continues to provide aviation support to the DEA and Afghan CN law enforcement organizations. DEA liaison officers with the SMW and coalition special operations forces ensure DEA aviation requirements are considered and appropriately supported in the special operations allocation and tasking process. The unit conducted several Afghan-planned, led, and fully executed tactical missions in support of CN and CT objectives, including 29 night vision device and seven day multi-aircraft tactical missions. In FY 2014, SMW missions resulted in the destruction or seizure of 10 drug labs, 1,693 kg of opium, 145 kg of heroin, 5,042 kg of hashish, 250 kg of morphine, and 24,900 kg of poppy seeds.

**Border Management**

DoD’s partnership with the U.S. Embassy Kabul Border Management Task Force (BMTF) is an essential element in the professionalization of Afghan border and customs police officials. BMTF mentors taught a number of classes at the Kabul International Airport to improve airport security. Border mentors provide training and mentorship to Afghan border officials at key border crossing points. This support will continue to reduce as U.S. military forces pull back from border locations. From April through September 5, 2014, the BMTF and ABP seized 591 kg of heroin and 130 kg of opium, and detained 14 individuals.

**Afghanistan Threat Finance Cell**

Led by the DEA in partnership with DoD, the Afghanistan Threat Finance Cell (ATFC) has identified and disrupted sources of insurgent and terrorist funding in Afghanistan since 2008.
DEA and DoD are working on a post-2014 transition plan for the ATFC. DoD is working to maintain its counter-threat finance initiatives beyond 2014, in order to target and disrupt the financial support networks of insurgents and terrorists operating in Afghanistan and the region.

The ATFC presently includes uniformed and civilian DoD personnel working to investigate and disrupt key financial nodes. As the U.S. military presence decreases in Afghanistan, the uniformed military contribution to the ATFC also will decrease, and some of DoD’s counter-threat finance capabilities at the ATFC will shift to other working locations.

The narcotics trade undermines economic development, enables corruption, erodes government legitimacy, facilitates transnational organized crime, and threatens stability, security, and rule of law in Afghanistan and across the region. A successful and sustainable security transition to Afghan forces will rest in part on limiting insurgents’ access to drug-related funding and support, and on reducing the financial capacity of anti-government elements to undermine the credibility and stability of Afghanistan’s government.
SECTION 4 – RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

4.1: OVERVIEW

As the ISAF mission draws to a close, many reconstruction and development activities, in which coalition military forces played a significant role, are being reviewed to determine if they can or will be assumed by other U.S. Government or international donor organizations. The U.S. Embassy, in consultation with international partners, will continue to prioritize and realign programs across all industry sectors to build a more self-reliant, financially independent Afghanistan.

Afghanistan’s development depends largely on donor support, and is likely to remain so through the near-term. As stated in Section 3, the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework guides assistance priorities in Afghanistan for the international donor community. Under the TMAF, the United States and other international partners agreed to provide $16 billion in assistance through 2015 and to sustain support at or near levels of the past decade through 2017. Donors pledged to move 50 percent of development assistance on-budget. However, for this to be achievable, Afghanistan committed to improve financial accountability and the integrity of public financial management, transparency in government. GIRoA also committed to continue building the foundations for sustainable economic growth, as well as protecting individual rights for all political, ethnic, and religious groups.

Transition poses significant challenges for Afghanistan’s socio-economic, security, and political stability. Some challenges relate directly to the security environment while other challenges result from business and regulatory structures, which are not fully developed. In some cases, the challenges of transition will be the result of moving from a conflict or post-conflict reconstruction environment to a traditional development footing.

A key objective for the United States, as well as for the larger international donor community, is to reduce Afghanistan’s dependence on international assistance to levels consistent with other less developed nations. With declining levels of international assistance, an increased focus will be directed to strengthening the government’s capacity to generate and collect revenue. A “business friendly” environment must be nurtured that will attract both domestic and international investment, and a political will fostered that will mitigate the corrosive impact of corruption. Further aims entail consolidating peace and stability in Afghan communities through effective development goals and objectives, delivery of substantive government services, and the promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights.
4.2: Economic Growth and Development

Afghanistan’s economy has slowed considerably over the last 18 months, with GDP growth falling to 3.7 percent in 2013 from over 14 percent in 2012. Through the first eight months of 2014, growth has slowed even further, as investment and consumption tendencies remain depressed in the wake of presidential elections and an intransigent insurgency.

Agriculture is responsible for nearly 25 percent of Afghanistan’s GDP and employs 60-80 percent of the Afghan workforce. Afghanistan imports most consumer goods and nearly 75 percent of its fuel and electricity. Afghanistan exports primarily raw materials (unprocessed agricultural products) and carpets. Afghanistan suffers from a lack of skilled labor, stemming in part from a literacy rate of 28 percent. Further, 36 percent of the population lives on less than $25 a month.

Future economic growth will depend on a variety of factors, including the security environment, political stability, improvements in the business climate, and the trajectory of international assistance. The extractive industries provide a potential source for Afghan revenue generation, but it remains to be seen whether the mining sector can overcome the challenges facing Afghanistan’s economy. Geographic isolation and a poor transportation infrastructure make it difficult to get products to market. A limited banking sector and relative lack of indigenous energy production also constrain growth. Private sector investment will be critical to Afghanistan’s long-term economic potential, but concerns over ongoing security and political transitions dampened investor interest over the last 12 months for which data is available (April 2013 – March 2014).

Afghan Governance and Development

Effective governance, improved rule of law, and sustainable economic development continue to be requirements for long-term stability in Afghanistan. Factors hindering progress include widespread corruption, limited education and skill levels, and security concerns limiting access to rural areas. At the political level, limiting factors have included uncertainty over the future presidency, lack of coordination between the central government and the provinces and districts, and uneven distribution of power among the judicial, legislative, and executive branches.

Although the Afghan government’s capacity to provide stable and responsive governance continues to develop, progress remains slow. Revenue generation is not on target, and execution of the development budget is lagging. The Afghan government is highly centralized, with revenue, budgeting, spending, and service delivery authority residing with the central ministries in Kabul. This centralized authority impedes the development of effective service delivery at the provincial and district levels.

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41 Much of the data derived for this section is from the World Bank. It asserts that “collecting reliable data on Afghanistan is extremely difficult. Moreover, much of the information that is available is subject to large margins of uncertainty, as well as often problems of incompleteness, incomparability, etc.” World Bank, Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014, May 2012.
Economic growth and development in Afghanistan will continue to be influenced by agricultural yields and growth in the services sector, which are significantly linked to donor and ISAF spending. The full economic effect of the reduction in ISAF personnel during the previous reporting period remains unclear, but the World Bank estimates that growth in Afghanistan slowed dramatically to 3.6 percent in 2013.\(^\text{42}\)

Donor funding commitments made in Tokyo provided an important signal from the international community that its continued funding post-2014 will support the Afghan economy’s development and mitigate the effects of transition. However, investor fears about political risk and the security situation make it particularly important for Afghanistan to show progress in regulatory and policy reforms. According to the World Bank’s “Doing Business Index,” Afghanistan rose in country rankings from 170 in 2012, to 164 in 2013. However, private sector levels of investment continue to proceed slowly.

Mining accounts for a marginal share of Afghanistan’s GDP, but has the potential to expand. Legislation was enacted to modernize the rules and regulations governing this sector.

Challenges in governance and sustainable economic development have slowed the reinforcement of security gains. As noted in Section 3, the government’s failure to address corruption effectively hampers long-term economic growth. Likewise, ongoing insurgent operations and influence continue to inhibit economic development and improvements in governance.

**Agriculture**

Sixty to eighty percent of Afghanistan’s labor force is dependent upon agriculture, making the sector a significant target area for U.S. and international assistance and a priority for stabilization efforts. In order to promote economic growth and increase food security for a rapidly growing population, Afghanistan requires adequate and consistent agriculture production. The Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL), has been charged with formulating agriculture policy and ensuring its alignment with the country’s overall economic strategy. USAID’s agriculture strategy contributes substantially to the improvement in agricultural production and food security. The strategy is grounded in partnership with MAIL with an emphasis on self-reliance and building ministry capacity to deliver services to farmers, and promoting private-sector agribusiness to further strengthen food security and economic growth.

The USAID agriculture portfolio focuses on building relationships between farmers, agribusinesses, and the MAIL to increase the adoption of new technologies and practices to increase productivity, create farm and off-farm employment, increase incomes, and strengthen Afghans’ confidence in their government. Investments are focused on regional economic zones to maximize geographic impact. Alternative development remains a priority and focuses on promotion of licit agricultural value chains as part of a holistic counternarcotics policy. Activities are also implemented in coordination with the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement’s counter-narcotic objectives.

\(^{42}\) World Bank, April 9, 2014.
During the reporting period, USAID has awarded new contracts to strengthen agricultural production and the capacity of the MAIL, begun the design phase of upcoming programs, and also cancelled two programs. The Regional Agricultural Development Programs in the north and west were recently awarded. The programs will strengthen key value chains in the wheat, livestock, and horticultural subsectors, and increase the production, processing, and sale of these important products. The Capacity Building and Change Management Program was recently taken over and extended from the U.S. Department of Agriculture. This program will continue critical capacity building activities within the MAIL by strengthening its administrative and technical skills. The Regional Agricultural Development Program in the East, the Agricultural Extension Program, an irrigation and watershed management program, and an agricultural research program are currently under design. Together these programs will continue to improve agricultural production, extension, and research and improve the livelihoods of Afghan farmers.

### Mining

The extractive industries (both hydrocarbons and mining) account for a marginal share of Afghanistan’s GDP. It could become a significant source of future revenue growth (royalties and business taxes) for Afghanistan, if the country can tackle key security, technical, infrastructure, regulatory, and investment hurdles. Under the World Bank’s “Natural Resource Corridor” development model, the activity surrounding a cluster of mines and/or oil and gas fields could jumpstart economic activity, such as logistical support and food services. GIRoA adopted updated mining legislation during the reporting period that adheres more generally to international standards. The law should, in the short-term, provide a boost to investment, although investors’ concerns persist about local content requirements written into the law.

### 4.3: INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS

During the reporting period, USAID and DoD, in coordination with the Afghan government, continued to focus on existing, high-priority infrastructure projects and building the capacity of GIRoA to maintain donor-built infrastructure after completion. GIRoA’s ability to provide essential services – including reliable, sustainable power – is critical for Afghanistan’s economic growth and long-term stability.

USAID remains focused on completing four major construction projects: installation of the third turbine at Kajaki Dam (Kajaki Unit 2), the Gardez-Khost Highway, Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity, and Sheberghan Gas Development. The focus is now shifting to providing the technical assistance to GIRoA to ensure sustainability of investments made to date.

Contracts for the construction of the first segment of a transmission line that will connect Kabul to Kandahar, and the management of Kajaki Dam Unit 2 installation, have been awarded by Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS), Afghanistan’s power utility, using on-budget support from USAID. Contractors have also started providing technical assistance to DABS to reduce losses, increase revenues, improve maintenance and operation of assets, and improve financial and corporate management. DABS is increasingly self-sufficient; revenues have increased more than 300 percent in four years, and DABS now operates without government subsidies.
DoD continued to implement several priority energy-sector projects with the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF), including the rehabilitation and expansion of Afghanistan’s Northeast and Southeast Power Systems. DoD transferred $179.5 million from the AIF to USAID’s Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity program to complete the final 370 km section of the transmission line connecting Kabul and Kandahar. USAID will implement the project on-budget with DABS, which manages Afghanistan’s power generation, transmission, distribution, and importation.

Also during this reporting period, DoD began tapering fuel subsidies under the Kandahar Power Bridging Solution – an effort to supply fuel for diesel-powered generators in Kandahar. In consultation with GIRoA, DoD is gradually declining monthly subsidies over an eighteen-month period to allow DABS to slowly adapt to the change. Afghanistan is transitioning away from subsidies by charging consumers for the electricity they consume, and will let normal economic forces determine the market price. The goal of both the U.S. and Afghan governments is to make Afghanistan’s power sector self-financing.

In December 2013, the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum signed a $37 million contract with the Turkish National Petroleum Company to drill natural gas wells in the Juma and Bashikurd gas fields. USAID is financing this project, but the ministry is managing and overseeing the contract.

In transportation, USAID awarded a $33 million contract with an Afghan company to construct the final 25 km of the Gardez-Khost Highway, a $21 million contract to provide technical assistance to the Ministry of Public Works (MoPW) for a Road Authority and Road Fund, a contract with a local firm to provide routine maintenance on the Salang Passage roads and tunnel, and is in discussions with other donors about establishing a program that could leverage other donor funds to provide the MoPW with incentive financing and encourage greater roads operations and maintenance.

**4.4: HEALTH**

During this reporting period, U.S. Government health programs in Afghanistan continued to directly support the joint U.S.-Afghan goal of achieving national health targets, as outlined in the Afghanistan National Health and Nutrition Sector Strategy, Afghanistan National Development Strategy, and National Priority Program “Health for All Afghanistan.” The Basic Package of Health Services and Essential Package of Hospital Services are the cornerstones of the strategy for the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) and all donors. USAID strengthens MoPH leadership and management capabilities to support the delivery of the Basic Package of Health Services and Essential Package of Hospital Services in 13 of the country’s 34 provinces, primarily through non-governmental organization service providers. This collective effort gives essential medicines and contraceptives to one half of the Afghan population and provides health services to more than 1 million Afghans per month, 75 percent of whom are women and children.
Communicable diseases account for 60 to 80 percent of all outpatient visits and more than half of all deaths in Afghanistan, making control of communicable diseases one of the highest priorities for the MoPH. USAID’s Disease Early Warning System (DEWS) monitors 15 priority infectious diseases through selected sentinel sites (health facilities) operating in 34 provinces and reports weekly to the national surveillance directorate. As of the end of this reporting period, the total number of outbreaks reported since the establishment of DEWS is 1,844. Among the total outbreaks, 96.3 percent were investigated and responded to within 48 hours of the notification.

USAID supports the World Health Organization’s Acute Flaccid Paralysis Polio Surveillance Network in Afghanistan, which operates at the national, regional, provincial, and district levels. Along with local non-governmental organizations, the Acute Flaccid Paralysis network includes more than 10,000 reporting volunteers (mullahs, traditional healers, pharmacists, and shrine keepers) in the communities, who are linked to nearby health facilities. The network gathers essential information about polio risk and vaccination and helps to identify needed community interventions and vaccination campaigns. Through the United Nations Children’s Fund, USAID helped disseminate polio messages through the media. Outreach efforts also included sending social mobilizers and communication officers to high-risk communities.

The MoPH’s National Tuberculosis Program, with support from USAID and other donors, manages Afghanistan’s tuberculosis response. USAID ensures universal and comprehensive access to tuberculosis services, including: the expansion to public and private health facilities in Kabul and to underserved and remote areas in 13 USAID-assisted provinces; tuberculosis infection control; health system strengthening; and improved monitoring, evaluation and research.

The most recent Asia Foundation’s surveys, from polls conducted in 2011 and 2012, showed that the Afghan government’s provision of health care is viewed positively by one-half of Afghan respondents. Fifty-two percent of respondents rated the availability of clinics and hospitals as good or very good. Fifty percent of respondents rated the availability of medicine as good or very good. The 2013 survey will be released in late 2014.

4.5: Education

Education remains an important foundation for progress for the people of Afghanistan. Since 2002, the Afghan populace has experienced a dramatic increase in access to basic education. The Afghan Ministry of Education (MoE) projects that it will provide access to basic education to more than 77 percent of the school age population by 2015. The Asia Foundation survey, Afghanistan in 2013, shows that 72 percent of Afghan respondents rate the availability of education for children as good or very good.

U.S. Government assistance supported a range of education initiatives closely aligned with the MoE’s National Education Strategic Plan. USAID supported 30,557 teachers nationwide with

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in-service training to improve their classroom performance and further their professional development. More than 34 million textbooks were printed during the last year as a component of a three-year, on-budget activity with the MoE. USAID continued operational support of a project management team to support the MoE in delivering quality education services throughout the country. USAID also provided administrative support to 36 community-based education officers, enabling monitoring and operational services at the provincial level.

In the higher education sector, the U.S. Government provided faculty training, revised curricula, developed master’s degree programs in education and public policy, built capacity of civil servants and university administrators, and expanded vocational education. USAID assistance to the Ministry of Higher Education improved the quality of university instruction at Kabul University, Kabul Education University, and at provincial universities in 17 provinces. During the reporting period, 335 faculty members, including 90 women, received training in modern pedagogical methods. Now 30 trainers of pedagogy, including eight women, can deliver faculty development training in their institutions of higher learning on a sustainable basis.

4.6: WOMEN IN AFGHANISTAN

Circumstances for Afghan women and girls improved significantly since 2001; gains remain tenuous, however, and civil society organizations are concerned that progress will be reversed. Despite advances, the challenges of poverty, illiteracy, weak security, and poor health care continue to affect women disproportionately, and solutions will require a long-term, sustained effort. Many Afghan women view a possible reconciliation process with the Taliban skeptically and have legitimate concerns as to what peace talks might mean for the progress they made over the last 13 years. The U.S. Government takes these concerns seriously and recognizes that promoting security for Afghan women and girls must remain a priority.

U.S. policy supports the principle of equality for men and women and GIRoA’s implementation of the Bonn Agreement, UN Security Council Resolution 1325, and the Elimination of Violence against Women law. The U.S. Government is committed to removing constraints on women’s potential and views their contributions to Afghan society as essential; these goals are also reflected in the Afghan Constitution, the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, and the National Action Plan for Women of Afghanistan. In July 2014, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Directorate of Human Rights and Women’s International Affairs released to the donor community for review a draft of the Afghan government’s long awaited National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security.

Women face entrenched societal discrimination and limits to their freedom. Violence against women is widespread. The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission reported that the number of cases of violence against women in 2013 rose by 28 percent compared with 2012. Data for 2014 has not been released and it remains very difficult at this point to draw any conclusions from this rise in reported violence. Although reports increased, it is not clear if this
is the result of an actual increase reporting or in violence against women. Afghan women may be better informed about their rights under the legislation and therefore more willing to report incidents of abuse. If this is the case, it implies that educational and outreach programs are working. Despite this increase in registered cases, violence against women remains under-reported.

According to ISAF surveys, results of which are shown in figures 27 and 28, Afghan female respondents noted a decrease in security in their *mantaqa* (community) during this reporting period. As shown in figure 29, female respondents also noted a slight decrease in security outside their communities.

**Figure 27: Afghan Female Respondents’ Views of the Security Situation in their Community**
Figure 28: Change in Afghan Female Survey Respondents’ Perceptions of Security in their Community Over Six Months

Figure 29: Afghan Female Survey Respondents’ Perceptions of Security Outside their Communities
Although the Department of State and USAID administer the majority of women’s initiatives, DoD also oversees several programs focusing on women. These programs include assistance to the Department of Women’s Affairs in Kandahar and the District Development Assembly for Women’s Affairs in Parwan District. Additionally, coalition forces continue to incorporate Female Engagement Teams with general purpose forces on patrol, in order to engage women and children of local communities in open communication. This facilitates civil-military interaction and builds trust, cooperation, and security. Similarly, U.S. special operations forces have employed Cultural Support Teams to provide an enduring female engagement capability in support of special operations, village stability operations, and ALP expansion.

**Election Support and Women**

Overall, women’s and human rights organizations have praised the level of female participation in the April 5 elections, though their representation in the provinces reportedly was much weaker than in the cities. Out of the 2,595 provincial council candidates, 299 were women (11.5 percent); 97 female candidates were provisionally elected to provincial council positions pending final results. There were three female vice presidential running mates.

High women’s participation in both the provincial and the two rounds of presidential elections is a promising sign of increased women’s empowerment. Female participation in the April 2014 presidential and provincial election was estimated at 36 percent; the June 14 run-off election saw a slight increase to 38 percent. A number of domestic and internationally funded campaigns were aimed at encouraging women to vote.

The MoI’s Female Searcher Program recruited women to staff the 5,859 polling centers with female polling stations, requiring at least 11,718 female searchers. Reports indicated that 9,844 female searchers participated in the first round and 10,812 deployed for the presidential runoff. MoI officials hope that the trained female searchers will show interest in joining the ANP, though the United Nations notes that many of the volunteers are already government employees, either in the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development or as teachers. Paying the female searchers was a problem due to the need to generate a master list of their names before payment could be rendered. The production of multiple lists added to the difficulty of payment. The United Nations reported that all outstanding payment issues were resolved by September 2014.
SECTION 5 – REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT

Afghanistan shares a border with six states: Pakistan, Iran, China, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. These states, as well as Russia, India, and the Gulf Cooperation Council, have varying levels of engagement with the Afghan government, and different degrees of importance to the ongoing mission and overall stability of Afghanistan. The Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship is especially vital to the long-term peace of the region. However, this relationship has been marked by distrust and even military aggression across the shared border. Afghanistan’s relationship with the rest of the region is generally positive, with most states seeking a stable and peaceful Afghanistan that can contribute to regional trade, counter terrorist networks, and limit narcotics shipments through its borders.

5.1: PAKISTAN

The United States continues to seek a constructive relationship with Pakistan that advances both U.S. and Pakistani interests. Pakistan’s relationship with the United States remains constructive, and both nations continue to acknowledge the importance of maintaining bilateral cooperation in areas of mutual concern and engaging on areas of divergence. Taliban attacks in Afghanistan launched from sanctuaries in Pakistan remain a serious problem. These sanctuaries exist primarily in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Baluchistan.

Pakistan and the United States cooperate on areas of mutual interests, including providing essential support to U.S. retrograde operations from Afghanistan. In addition, Pakistan continues to cooperate with the United States on some CT activities. Pakistan’s military made gains against the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan and foreign fighters in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa during a major military operation. Afghan- and Indian-focused militants continue to operate from Pakistan territory to the detriment of Afghan and regional stability. Pakistan uses these proxy forces to hedge against the loss of influence in Afghanistan and to counter India’s superior military. These relationships run counter to Pakistan’s public commitment to support Afghan-led reconciliation. Such groups continue to act as the primary irritant in Afghan-Pakistan bilateral relations.

Pakistan’s government has sought to increase engagement with Afghanistan. However, suspicion has surrounded the relationship between Kabul and Islamabad, inhibiting bilateral cooperation on border security protocols. It is possible that the new Afghan President, Dr. Ghani, will seek to change this dynamic, which Pakistan is likely to welcome. Although stability in Afghanistan is in the interest of Pakistan, Pakistan also seeks sufficient Pashtun representation in the Afghan government to prevent Pashtun discontent along the Afghan-Pakistan border and limit India’s influence. Pakistan made some progress on interdicting and disrupting the production of IED components, but still falls short despite greater engagement and recent cooperation. A significant portion of the materials, which perpetuate the conflict, continue to emanate from or transit through Pakistan. Cross-border incidents and lingering mistrust remain points of tension in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. Both countries continue to question each other’s commitment to advancing a political settlement in Afghanistan.
The relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan continues to pose a significant challenge to the stability of the region. During this reporting period, there have been several border incidents that have heightened tensions, to include; artillery shelling, Pakistani construction of trenches, the arrest of Pakistani nationals in Afghanistan, and increased rhetoric from national leaders on both sides. Pakistan also hosts one of the largest refugee communities in the world, estimated at several million Afghans, who are blamed for strains on the local economy and security threats. Despite these setbacks, ISAF will continue to support the development of a constructive military-to-military relationship and provide venues for the two sides to come together with the intent of improving the poor state of their relations. However, convincing both sides to cooperate on a range of security issues will take a concerted and sustained effort by the international community.

5.2: INDIA

The Indian government continues to support GIRoA, believing a secure and stable Afghanistan will benefit the region and facilitate economic corridors into Central Asia. India and Afghanistan signed a strategic partnership declaration in 2011, which formalized cooperation on governance, economics, commerce, education, public administration, and security and law enforcement. Subsequent engagements are reinforcing the positive relationship between Afghanistan and India.

India supports a variety of high-visibility projects and initiatives in Afghanistan. These ventures are focused primarily on major infrastructure projects, including electricity generation and transmission, road construction, and mining. India has shown increased interest in Afghan security assistance, though activities in this area remain limited. India currently offers India-based training to ANSF personnel across a number of specialties, and the Indian government committed to expand this program. India does not provide direct military support or training in Afghanistan.

In May of this reporting period, the Indian consulate in Herat Province was attacked by a group of four heavily armed militants. The attack came three days prior to the swearing in of the new Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi. Prime Minister Modi is perceived as being close to Hindu nationalist groups, a fact that may have played into the timing of the attack. In June, the U.S. Department of State announced that the terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba was responsible for the attack. Following the attack, former Afghan President Karzai denounced the attack and made strong statements supporting relations with India.

5.3: CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

The Central Asian States host portions of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), a logistics network that utilizes multiple ground and air transportation routes into and out of Afghanistan for commercial carriers and U.S. military aircraft. Maintaining the NDN lines of communication is

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45 The Central Asian states include Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan.
important to sustain ongoing operations in Afghanistan and will also be used to support the
drawdown of ISAF. The Republic of Kyrgyzstan terminated bilateral agreements with the
United States for airfield access and defense cooperation; accordingly, U.S. operations at the
Manas Transit Center in Kyrgyzstan ceased on July 11, 2014.

Separate from the NDN, the Central Asian States contributed to the development of
Afghanistan’s infrastructure and economy. As Afghanistan’s infrastructure continues to develop,
expanded road, rail, electrical power, and air networks may serve to facilitate increased
commercial activity between Afghanistan and its northern neighbors.

Illicit narcotics, arms trafficking, and smuggling are the primary transnational threats in the
Central Asia region. These activities threaten regional stability, legitimate commerce, and the
flow of strategic resources. The Central Asian States are also concerned about Afghanistan’s
stability after 2014, fearing return of such extremist groups as Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
and Islamic Jihad Union into Central Asia from the Afghanistan and Pakistan border region.

5.4: CHINA

DoD assesses that the primary interests of the People’s Republic of China in Afghanistan are
security and economic development. Beijing has given no indication of plans to commit security
personnel in Afghanistan, although it does have a program to train Afghan police.

Chinese companies will likely continue investment in Afghanistan, most notably to develop
Afghanistan’s mines and infrastructure. The PRC began development of a section of the Amu
Darya oilfield and is currently conducting a feasibility study for a rail system to support
extraction efforts at the Aynak Copper Mine. However, concerns over increased narcotics
trafficking into western China and threats against its Afghanistan-based development workers is
causing the PRC to move cautiously. Moreover, an insufficient system of recording and
transferring property rights, coupled with concerns over disturbing antiquities, has stalled
Chinese efforts to move forward on some mineral extraction projects.

Diplomatic engagement between Afghanistan and China increased in recent months. As part of
this effort, China appointed its first special envoy for Afghanistan and will host the next Istanbul
Process Ministerial Conference. Beijing voiced its support for reconciliation efforts between the
Afghan government and the Taliban. Early signs are that China intends to maintain this level of
support and cooperation with the new government of President Ghani.

Afghan-Sino security cooperation remains limited. Although China has not engaged in security
operations within Afghanistan, Beijing provided ANSF personnel a variety of PRC-based
training. Training for the ANP conducted at People’s Armed Police municipal training facilities
covered policing skills, crowd and riot control, criminal investigations, and internal security
duties. The PRC also offered basic, advanced, and senior military courses for ANSF officers at
People’s Liberation Army military training colleges and universities.
5.5: Russia

Russia seeks a stable Afghanistan to minimize the threat of terrorism and stem the flow of narcotics through Central Asia and the Northern Caucasus into Russia. Russia has also supported Afghan-led reconciliation and reintegration efforts. Based on a commitment from the November 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon, Russia expanded the types of cargo shipped by rail and air through the Northern Distribution Network into and out of Afghanistan.

Russia recognizes terrorism as closely intertwined with narcotics trafficking and sees direct benefits from the NATO-Russia Council’s counternarcotics training project, which trains CN personnel from Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan in Russia, Turkey, and through mobile training teams. Russia is interested in expanding CN cooperation and continuing its participation in multilateral meetings and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime programs, calling for greater international support for CN efforts in Afghanistan.

Russia supported Afghanistan’s bid for observer status within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. This highlights the increasing emphasis Russia places on regional cooperation mechanisms for economic development and security in Afghanistan as ISAF draws down. GIRoA increasingly looked to Russia for military support—particularly donations of military hardware—but Russia has thus far remained noncommittal.

Russia’s occupation of Crimea resulted in the suspension of a significant amount of cooperation between the United States and Russia, as well as the suspension of the NATO-Russia Council’s activities. However, Russia has not threatened the NDN or other U.S. and NATO logistics resources since the Crimea dispute. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated in mid-August that Russia would not sever access to the NDN.

5.6: Iran

Iran’s goals in Afghanistan remain focused on maintaining friendly relations with the Afghan central government, preventing a Taliban return to power, and minimizing western presence and influence. Tehran’s strategy includes employing a soft-power campaign to promote a pro-Iranian and pro-Shia sentiment within Afghanistan through a $1 billion donor aid program to upgrade infrastructure, provide humanitarian, cultural/religious support, and economic assistance. Concurrently, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—Qods Force provides calibrated lethal aid to the Taliban to attrite ISAF and expedite force withdrawal. Tehran opposes the establishment of permanent U.S. bases in Afghanistan. However, Iran fears that a precipitous departure of NATO forces will increase instability on its border and perhaps lead to the return of the Taliban. At a minimum, Iran seeks to ensure its security concerns are addressed by maintaining pressure on GIRoA officials and seeking its own security agreement with Kabul.

Since 2001, Iran pledged more than $1 billion in aid to Afghanistan and actually paid out more than $500 million. Iran’s reconstruction and development efforts are largely concentrated in western Afghanistan. Iran intends to increase its influence among the local population in order to foster pro-Iranian sentiment. Iran also wants to expand its sphere of influence beyond border
regions into other parts of Afghanistan, particularly Kabul. Iran maintains its embassy in Kabul and consulates in Herat, Jalalabad, Kandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif, and is considering opening additional consulates in Bamiyan and Nimroz Provinces. Iran participates in the regional Istanbul Process.

At the same time, Iran continued to provide lethal assistance, including light weapons and training, to elements of the Taliban and other insurgent groups. Since 2007, coalition and Afghan forces interdicted several shipments of Iranian weapons.

Beyond economic and security issues, the protracted Afghan refugee situation continues to be a contentious issue between Iran and Afghanistan. Approximately one million registered Afghan refugees and at least 1.4 million Afghan migrants (non-refugees) currently reside in Iran. During this reporting period, Iran did not forcibly expel or return registered refugees. Iran continued to deport undocumented Afghans (non-refugees), although at a slightly reduced pace compared to previous years.

5.7: GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL STATES

Member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) continue to provide support to Operation Enduring Freedom and are working to provide financial support in the interest of a stable Afghanistan. Private GCC state citizens remain a source of considerable funding for Taliban and other insurgent and terrorist groups operating in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

GCC states provide the United States key basing facilities and access in support of the mission. Many of the GCC countries provide important air bases and over-flight and transit rights for operations in Afghanistan and logistical support of these operations. These bases and cooperation from GCC nations are especially critical as ISAF retrogrades equipment and withdraws forces from Afghanistan. GCC countries host USCENTCOM’s three forward-based headquarters: the Combined Air Operations Center, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command Headquarters, and U.S. Army Central Command Headquarters (Third Army). GCC countries host key air and naval facilities and provide staging capability for combat, ISR, and logistics operations in support of U.S. and coalition operations in Afghanistan.

Further, GCC nations support humanitarian operations in Afghanistan, including establishing refugee camps in Pakistan, financial assistance, and aid for Afghan refugees. GCC countries are likely to continue support to Afghanistan after 2014. GCC nations are also supportive of various conflict resolution initiatives.

Gulf countries and their ongoing large-scale construction projects provide opportunities for migrant labor. Afghans participate in this labor force and could continue to be a major source of remittances, further contributing to the economic development of Afghanistan. A number of

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46 GCC members are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
wealthy Afghan expatriates live in GCC states, deepening the economic, political, and familial ties between the countries.
**ANNEX A: ACRONYMS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAF</td>
<td>Afghan Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABP</td>
<td>Afghan Border Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFMIS</td>
<td>Afghan Financial Management System</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGO</td>
<td>Attorney General’s Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>AHRIMS</td>
<td>Afghan Human Resource Information Management System</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIF</td>
<td>Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIHRC</td>
<td>Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>Afghan Local Police</td>
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<td>AML</td>
<td>Anti-Money Laundering</td>
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<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANA TF</td>
<td>Afghan National Army Trust Fund</td>
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<td>ANAREC</td>
<td>ANA Recruitment Command</td>
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<td>Afghan National Army Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>Afghan National Army Special Operations Forces</td>
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<td>ANCOP</td>
<td>Afghan National Civil Order Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
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<td>ANDSF</td>
<td>Afghan National Defense and Security Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANSF</td>
<td>Afghan National Security Forces</td>
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<td>APPF</td>
<td>Afghan Public Protection Force</td>
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<td>APRP</td>
<td>Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program</td>
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<td>AR2VP</td>
<td>Afghanistan Resource and Requirement Validation Process</td>
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<td>Afghan Security Institutions</td>
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<td>ASSF</td>
<td>Afghan Special Security Forces</td>
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<td>AT&amp;L</td>
<td>Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics</td>
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<td>ATTU</td>
<td>Air-Transportable Treatment Unit</td>
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<td>AUP</td>
<td>Afghan Uniform Police</td>
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<td>BMTF</td>
<td>Border Management Task Force</td>
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<td>BSA</td>
<td>Bilateral Security Agreement</td>
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<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
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<td>CAS</td>
<td>Close Air Support</td>
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<td>Casualty Evacuation</td>
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<td>CNPA Development Unit</td>
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<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>Central Command</td>
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<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
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<td>CIVCAS</td>
<td>Civilian Casualties</td>
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<td>CJIATF</td>
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<td>CJSOR</td>
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<td>CN</td>
<td>Counternarcotics</td>
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<td>CNPA</td>
<td>Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>JCIP</td>
<td>Justice Center in Parwan</td>
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<td>JLC</td>
<td>Joint Legal Center</td>
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<td>KAIA</td>
<td>Kabul International Airport</td>
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<td>KIA</td>
<td>Killed-in-Action</td>
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<td>LOTFA</td>
<td>Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan</td>
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<td>MAIL</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock</td>
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<td>MEDEVAC</td>
<td>Medical Evacuation</td>
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<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
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<td>MoE</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
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<td>MoI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
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<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
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<td>MoPH</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Health</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoPW</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Works</td>
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<td>MRAP</td>
<td>Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected</td>
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<td>MSF</td>
<td>Mobile Strike Force</td>
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<td>NATC-A</td>
<td>NATO Air Training Command – Afghanistan</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NCB-A</td>
<td>National Codification Bureau – Afghanistan</td>
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<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non-Commissioned Officer</td>
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<td>NDAA</td>
<td>National Defense Authorization Act</td>
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<td>NDI</td>
<td>National Democratic Institute</td>
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<td>NDN</td>
<td>Northern Distribution Network</td>
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<td>National Engineer Brigade</td>
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<td>National Interdiction Unit</td>
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<td>National Mission Unit</td>
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<td>OCC-R</td>
<td>Regional Operation Coordination Center</td>
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<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operational Plan</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>PL</td>
<td>Public Law</td>
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<td>Preventative Maintenance Checks and Services</td>
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<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<td>Train, Advise, and Assist</td>
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