Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

October 2011
Cover Image:
A U.S. Army soldier with Delta Company, 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, walks through a valley during a patrol near Malajat, in Kandahar province, Afghanistan, on June 4, 2011. (DoD photo by Sgt. Canaan Radcliffe, U.S. Army)
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY¹

Since the last Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan was released in April 2011, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and its Afghan partners have made important security gains, reversing violence trends in much of the country (except along the border with Pakistan), and beginning transition to Afghan security lead in seven areas. Continued military pressure through partnered operations has allowed joint ISAF-Afghan forces to maintain and expand the security gains made during the previous year, disrupting insurgent safe havens and command and control structures, and expanding security for the Afghan population. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have been integral to this success, demonstrating substantial growth in quantity, quality, and operational effectiveness.

Although security continues to improve, the insurgency’s safe havens in Pakistan, as well as the limited capacity of the Afghan Government, remain the biggest risks to the process of turning security gains into a durable, stable Afghanistan. The insurgency remains resilient, benefitting from safe havens inside Pakistan, with a notable operational capacity, as reflected in isolated high-profile attacks and elevated violence levels in eastern Afghanistan. Nevertheless, sustained progress has provided increased security and stability for the Afghan population and enabled the beginning of transition in July of security responsibilities to Afghan forces in seven areas, comprising 25 percent of the Afghan population.

KEY MILESTONES (APRIL 1, 2011 – SEPTEMBER 30, 2011)

The most significant development during this reporting period is the reduction in year-over-year violence. After five consecutive years where enemy-initiated attacks and overall violence increased sharply each year (e.g., up 94 percent in 2010 over 2009), such attacks began to decrease in May 2011 compared to the previous year and continue to decline (Figure 1).

¹ This report is submitted consistent with Section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended. It includes a description of the comprehensive strategy of the United States for security and stability in Afghanistan. This report is the eighth in a series of reports required every 180 days through fiscal year 2014 and has been prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the Secretary of Agriculture. This assessment complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to Congress; however, it is not intended as a single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its coalition partners, or Afghanistan. The information contained in this report is current as of September 30, 2011. NOTE: This is a historical document that covers progress in Afghanistan from April 1, 2011, to September 30, 2011. The next report will include an analysis of progress toward security and stability from October 1, 2011, to March 31, 2012.
Joint military progress throughout the country enabled the commencement of transition to Afghan security lead during the reporting period. Led by the Afghan Government and in close cooperation with the United States and international community, seven areas, including the major cities of Kabul, Herat, and Mazar-e-Sharif, began the transition process to Afghan security lead in July. Transition remains on track with no demonstrated effort by the insurgency to target the process. As the transition process continues, the ANSF will gradually assume the lead for security responsibility throughout the country, and the Afghan Government will continue to increase capacity with governance and development initiatives. Discussions are currently ongoing to designate the areas that are expected to begin transition in the next tranche.

Also during the reporting period, President Obama announced that recent security progress and the increasing capacity and capability of the ANSF have allowed for the recovery of U.S. surge forces. Ten thousand U.S. troops will be redeployed by the end of the 2011, and the entire surge force of 33,000 personnel will be recovered by the end of September 2012. Approximately 68,000 U.S. troops, however, will remain in Afghanistan following the drawdown, and ISAF is currently developing a recommendation for future force levels. Although force levels will gradually decrease, the United States remains committed to the long-term security and stability of Afghanistan, and negotiations are progressing on a long-term strategic partnership between the United States and Afghanistan.

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2 The faded blue bars in the background depict monthly enemy-initiated attacks. The full-color red and blue bars represent the difference in attacks for the same month in successive years. For example, the last full-color blue bar is the difference between attacks in September 2011 compared to those in September 2010. The rectangular text boxes highlight the most recent three-month period, and equivalent periods in previous years. The arrows and figures show year-over-year change in attacks for the period July to September 2011.
The successful May 2, 2011 raid against Osama bin Laden also took place during the reporting period. This was an important achievement for all partner nations engaged in Afghanistan and sent a signal to all, including the Taliban, that the United States is committed to achieving its objective, which is to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates, and to prevent their return to either Afghanistan or Pakistan. Nevertheless, the effect that this operation has had on U.S.-Pakistani relations, particularly cross-border cooperation, should not be underestimated.

**THE ANSF AND ISAF HAVE SEIZED MOMENTUM**

The security gains highlighted in the previous edition of this report – enabled by the surge in ISAF and Afghan forces throughout 2010 – have been sustained and expanded during the reporting period. ANSF-ISAF success in consolidating security gains in previously-cleared areas confirms that the civil-military counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy has significantly degraded the insurgency’s capability, particularly in Helmand and Kandahar. ANSF-ISAF operations have widened the gap between the insurgents and the population in several key population centers, limiting insurgent freedom of movement, disrupting safe havens in Afghanistan, and degrading insurgent leadership.

Continued, partnered COIN operations by ANSF and ISAF forces, complemented by partnered Special Forces targeting of insurgent leaders, have reduced enemy attacks and violence in Regional Commands Southwest, West, and North. Overall, year-to-date enemy attacks nationwide were five percent lower than the same period in 2010, and attacks continue to decline.

During the reporting period, ANSF-ISAF operations remained focused on southern and southwestern Afghanistan, the heartland of the Taliban-led insurgency. Regional Command Southwest produced the most dramatic security progress during the reporting period, as COIN operations expanded gains in central and southern Helmand Province by disrupting insurgents’ freedom of movement, limiting their access to the population, and eliminating key supply routes. In Regional Command South, Afghan and coalition operations consolidated gains from Operation HAMKARI, with a particular focus on the Highway 1 corridor. Insurgent momentum was also reversed in Regional Commands North and West, where the insurgency had conducted supporting operations during 2009 and 2010 in an effort to divert ISAF resources and attention away from operations in the south. However, in 2011, increasingly effective partnered military operations reversed insurgent gains made in the previous two years, reducing violence and enemy attacks and beginning the process of expanding ANSF-led security into contested areas.

The security situation in Regional Command East, however, remains tenuous. Cross-border incidents have risen during the reporting period as a result of the sanctuary and support that the insurgency receives from Pakistan. In Regional Command Capital, the ANSF has established a layered defense system in and around Kabul, which has resulted in improved security, and the ANSF continues to respond effectively to threats and attacks. Nevertheless, Kabul continues to face persistent threats, particularly in the form of high-profile attacks and assassinations.
**INCREASINGLY CAPABLE, THE ANSF CONTINUE TO MAKE PROGRESS**

The ANSF remains a key element to the long-term security and stability of Afghanistan. During this reporting period, the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) continued to develop into capable security providers, improving in quantity, quality, and operational effectiveness.

In order to support the transition process and ensure security gains are sustainable, the Afghan Government approved an increase in force end-strength in June from a planned strength of 305,600 personnel (171,600 ANA and 134,000 ANP) by October 2011 to 352,000 personnel (195,000 ANA and 157,000 ANP) by October 2012. As of the end of this reporting period, the ANA reached 170,781 soldiers and the ANP reached 136,122 policemen; both the ANA and ANP remain on track to achieve their respective growth goals for October 2012.

As the ANA and ANP achieve their growth targets, ISAF and the Afghan Government are placing an additional emphasis on force professionalization as well as the development of key enabler and logistics capabilities. During the reporting period, the ANSF literacy training program produced its 100,000th graduate, and the last of the twelve ANSF branch specialty schools opened in May. Further, the Afghan Government continues to improve its ministerial and institutional capacity, as evidenced by the nomination of two departments – one each from the Interior and Defense Ministries – to begin the transition process to independent operations.

Force growth and professionalization efforts are translating into a more capable and effective ANSF. ANA effectiveness improved, as the number of units rated “Effective with Assistance” or better rose from 52 percent of units in September 2010 to 72 percent of units in September 2011. The ANP also made significant progress during the reporting period; for example, operational effectiveness in the Afghan National Civil Order Police improved significantly, as 70 percent of *kandaks*³ were rated “Effective with Assistance” or better in September 2011, up from 40 percent in September 2010. These improvements have enabled the ANSF to assume greater responsibility throughout Afghanistan, as indicated by the increase in ANSF-led operations during the reporting period. Notably, the ANA initiated the first Afghan-led, *kandak*-level operation in Helmand Province in July, effectively complementing ISAF clearance operations in several districts in the Central Helmand River Valley.

Even with this progress, the growth and development of the ANSF continues to face challenges, including attrition above target levels, leadership deficits, and capability limitations in the areas of staff planning, management, logistics, and procurement. The ANSF continues to require enabling support, including air (both transport and close air support), logistics, ISR⁴, and medical, from coalition resources to perform at the level necessary to produce the security effects required for transition. The influence of criminal patronage networks on the ANSF also continues to pose a threat to stability and the transition process. Further, the drawdown of U.S. and international forces increases the risk of a shortfall of operational partnering resources, which could reduce ANSF-ISAF operational partnerships and may impede ANSF development.

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³ “Battalion”
⁴ Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
INSURGENTS INCREASINGLY UNABLE TO ACHIEVE OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN, BUT REMAIN CAPABLE

ANSF-ISAF operations continue to reduce the influence and operational capacity of the insurgency. The disruption of safe havens within Afghanistan, the significant loss of low- and mid-level insurgents, and the disruption of command and control structures have largely stunted the Taliban’s spring and summer campaign, preventing it from achieving a significant strategic effect on security conditions throughout the country. The effective interdiction of supplies and the reluctance of some Pakistan-based commanders to return to Afghanistan contributed to the insurgents’ failure to mount the level of operations that they had planned and that ISAF had expected.

However, the Taliban-led insurgency remains adaptive and resilient with a significant regenerative capacity. As insurgent capacity to contest ANSF-ISAF gains erodes, insurgents have turned to asymmetric efforts in order to avoid direct engagement with ISAF and ANSF forces, including the increased use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), high-profile attacks, and assassinations of Afghan Government officials.

These tactics require less infrastructure in Afghanistan and do not need the support of the Afghan people; however, they do require command and control, training, and logistics support from safe havens, which the insurgents have in Pakistan. For example, IED material storage and construction facilities formerly based in Afghanistan have now been moved to Pakistan, specifically in the border town of Chaman, Baluchistan Province. The assassinations and attacks directed from the safe havens in Pakistan – especially the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of North Waziristan and the settled area of Chaman – while reflecting the weakness of the Taliban in Afghanistan, have the potential to have a significant political effect in Afghanistan as well as coalition countries.

With the continued disruption of key insurgent safe havens in Afghanistan, safe havens in Pakistan have become the most important external factor sustaining the insurgency, and continue to present the most significant risk to ISAF’s campaign.

WEAK AFGHAN GOVERNMENT CAPACITY PUTS PROGRESS AT RISK

The comprehensive, civil-military COIN strategy continues to expand security for the Afghan population, providing the necessary conditions for the Afghan Government to extend effective governance and promote economic and social development. During the reporting period, the Afghan Government continued to build the human capital necessary to establish effective governance throughout the country. Successful job fairs in Ghazni and Kandahar recruited hundreds of new civil servants to fill important district- and provincial-level positions in the Afghan Government. Additionally, considerable progress was made in the provision of basic services and infrastructure: electricity consumption continues to increase, several new health facilities became operational, and new government-run vocational education centers are providing job training across the country.

However, the capacity of the Afghan Government has been limited by a number of issues, including the political dispute in the Lower House of the Afghan Parliament, the continued absence of an International Monetary Fund program, widespread corruption, and the lack of
political progress in enacting key reforms announced at the July 2010 Kabul Conference. Setbacks in governance and development continue to slow the reinforcement of security gains and threaten the legitimacy and long-term viability of the Afghan Government. The United States and the international community continue to work closely with their Afghan partners to address these challenges.

CONCLUSIONS
Security gains during the reporting period have provided a firm foundation for the transition of security responsibilities to the Afghan Government and the ANSF. The ongoing success of the civil-military COIN campaign has degraded the Taliban-led insurgency, limiting their operational capacity and undermining their popular support. The ANSF-ISAF partnership remains integral to security progress, as the Afghan Army and Police continue to translate training into operational effectiveness. Nevertheless, the insurgency remains resilient and, enabled by Pakistani safe havens, continues to contest ANSF and ISAF progress throughout the country, particularly in eastern Afghanistan. Although the security situation continues to improve, the Afghan Government must continue to make progress toward key governance and development initiatives in order for security gains to become sustainable. Finally, even as U.S. surge forces draw down over the next year and as the transition process continues, the mission and strategy remain unchanged, and the United States and its coalition partners remain committed to achieving long-term stability and security that will ensure Afghanistan never again becomes a safe haven for al Qaeda or its affiliates.
SECTION 1 – STRATEGY

1.1: U.S. MISSION

The goal of the United States is to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda, and to prevent its return to either Afghanistan or Pakistan. The specific objectives in Afghanistan are to deny safe haven to al Qaeda and to deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the Afghan Government. To support these objectives, U.S. and coalition forces will continue to degrade the Taliban insurgency in order to provide time and space to increase the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces and the Afghan Government so they can assume the lead for Afghanistan’s security by the end of 2014.

1.2: NATO STRATEGY, ISAF CAMPAIGN STRATEGY, AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

The NATO strategy remained unchanged during the reporting period. It is based on the NATO Comprehensive Strategic and Political-Military Plan and is implemented through the Supreme Allied Commander – Europe Operations Plan (OPLAN) 10302 (Revision 2), Joint Forces Command Brunssum OPLAN 30302, and ISAF OPLAN 38302. The mission in the current ISAF OPLAN states:

ISAF, in partnership with the Afghan Government and the international community, conducts comprehensive, population-centric counterinsurgency operations in order to: protect the Afghan people; neutralize insurgent networks; develop Afghan National Security Forces; and support the establishment of legitimate governance and sustainable socio-economic institutions.

The execution of ISAF OPLAN 38302 focuses on a “clear-hold-build” strategy, which is focused on key terrain districts and area of interest districts where the majority of the population lives, that will create the conditions necessary to complete a responsible transition to Afghan lead for security throughout the country by the end of 2014.

Diplomatic and reconciliation efforts continue to complement military efforts in Afghanistan. In his speech on June 22, 2011, President Obama emphasized that, “As we strengthen the Afghan Government and security forces, America will join initiatives that reconcile the Afghan people, including the Taliban. Our position on these talks is clear: they must be led by the Afghan Government, and those who want to be a part of peaceful Afghanistan must break from al Qaeda, abandon violence, and abide by the Afghan Constitution. But, in part because of our military effort, we have reason to believe that progress can be made.”

ISAF COMMAND AND CONTROL

During the reporting period, several senior leadership changes occurred within the ISAF command and control structure.

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5 ISAF OPLAN 38302, Revision 5, dated December 31, 2010
6 COMISAF-approved mission statement from the ISAF OPLAN 38302, Revision 5
On July 18, 2011, General John Allen assumed command of ISAF and U.S. Forces – Afghanistan (USFOR-A), replacing General David Petraeus, who had been in command since July 2010. At ISAF Joint Command (IJC), Lieutenant General Curtis Scaparrotti succeeded Lieutenant General David Rodriguez on July 11, 2011, as the commander responsible for overseeing day-to-day military operations throughout Afghanistan.

Also during the reporting period, Lieutenant General Keith Huber took command of Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF) 435, which is responsible for overseeing the transition of detention operations to Afghan lead. Further, COMISAF approved the creation of a Deputy Commanding General – Special Operations Forces (DCG-SOF), a post which will be filled by a one-star general/flag officer. DCG-SOF will coordinate and synchronize resources and operations between ISAF and Afghan SOF, as well as SOF from Operation Enduring Freedom.

In addition to leadership changes, another organization was added to the ISAF command and control structure. In an effort to improve the rule of law in Afghanistan, the NATO Defense Ministers endorsed the establishment of the NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission (NROLFSM). NROLFSM, which became operational on June 30, 2011, complements the rule of law support activities of the U.S.-led Rule of Law Field Force – Afghanistan. NROLFSM will focus on supporting Afghan and international civilians responsible for the development of the Afghan criminal justice system and improving the capability of the Afghan Government to deliver dispute resolution services to its citizens.

Figure 2: ISAF Command and Control Structure (as of September 30, 2011)
KEY NATO ENGAGEMENTS

Building on the commitments from the October 2010 NATO Defense Ministerial and the November 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon, Portugal, the NATO Defense Ministerial held in June 2011 further underscored the unwavering commitment of NATO Allies and partners to Afghanistan.

During the June Ministerial, NATO members and ISAF troop-contributing nations recognized Secretary Gates and General Petraeus for their leadership in Afghanistan during a key period of the campaign. Ministers also endorsed the NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission and tasked a revision to the Comprehensive Strategic and Political-Military Plan in order to better align both NATO’s current plans and future post-transition commitment to Afghanistan.

Additionally, during President Obama’s speech in June, he announced the location of the next NATO Summit, which will be held in Chicago in May 2012 and will focus on the next phase of transition in Afghanistan.

NATO TRAINING MISSION – AFGHANISTAN

NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A) is a multinational command that trains, mentors, and equips the ANSF with the goal of creating a professional and sustainable security force capable of providing security to the Afghan people. Through NTM-A, coalition partners provide institutional trainers to train the ANSF in basic military and police skills, logistics, and literacy.

NTM-A objectives include growing and improving the quality of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police, developing leadership capacity, promoting stewardship, and reducing attrition. During the reporting period, NTM-A continued to increase its focus on developing enabler, logistics, and procurement capabilities necessary to sustain the ANSF over the long-term.

NATO SENIOR CIVILIAN REPRESENTATIVE TO AFGHANISTAN

NATO’s Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) represents the political leadership of the NATO Alliance in Kabul. The NATO SCR acts as the civilian counterpart to Commander – ISAF (COMISAF), and coordinates regularly with COMISAF and his staff to promote unity of effort in NATO's military and political engagement in Afghanistan. British Ambassador Simon Gass was appointed to the post in February 2011, officially succeeding British Ambassador Mark Sedwill in April 2011.

The SCR and his staff are charged with promoting NATO’s political-military objectives in Afghanistan and representing NATO to Afghan Government officials and other principals of the international community and organizations engaged in Afghanistan, including the United Nations and European Union, the diplomatic community in Kabul, representatives of Afghan civil society, representatives of non-governmental organizations, representatives of neighboring countries, and other multilateral organizations.
The NATO SCR is also responsible for communicating and explaining NATO policy and key political messages to the local and international media, in close coordination with NATO Headquarters and ISAF. NATO’s Secretary General has also empowered the NATO SCR to serve as an advisor to the North Atlantic Council\(^7\) and NATO leadership. In this role, SCR provides guidance on: the general situation in the country; issues associated with the implementation of NATO's Afghanistan compact and development strategies linked to NATO's efforts; issues associated with the NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership; and unity of effort of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), particularly civilian efforts, with an emphasis on greater alignment of PRT activities to Afghan provincial and national priorities.

This advisory role also includes two specific tasks: 1) consulting with COMISAF on funding and validation of projects financed under the internationally-funded Post Operations Humanitarian Relief Fund; and 2) assisting with the implementation of the memorandum between Japan and NATO on enhanced cooperation between the humanitarian activities of PRTs and those of Japan. The NATO SCR is also responsible for any future initiatives similar to the above two arrangements.

The NATO SCR also plays a leading role in the transition process, which includes coordinating with ISAF on transition planning and implementation, with an emphasis on non-security related matters; co-representing NATO on the Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal\(^8\) Board with COMISAF; building and maintaining coalition cohesion and support for the overall NATO-ISAF effort in Afghanistan; engaging with senior Afghan officials to advance transition planning and implementation; informing and consulting with the diplomatic community regarding transition; facilitating national planning for the evolution of PRTs; and supporting Afghan and ISAF efforts to inform the Afghan people about transition through local and international media.

**CAVEATS**

National caveats are invoked by individual coalition partners to ensure their forces operate in Afghanistan in accordance with their national laws and policies. Regardless of national caveats, all ISAF coalition partners within Afghanistan operate according to the ISAF Rules of Engagement, which govern the use of force.

Although some Allies and partners have reduced these caveats, national caveats continue to constrain ISAF operations by limiting the types of missions a given country’s forces are authorized to undertake in Afghanistan. Senior U.S. leadership consistently emphasizes the need to reduce caveats to allow for the greatest operational effect.

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\(^7\) NATO’s principal decision-making body
\(^8\) “Transition”
The United States and 48 other countries currently have forces deployed to Afghanistan. As of September 30, 2011, the United States had approximately 97,795 military personnel in Afghanistan.9

Allied forces are deployed at all NATO headquarters, including IJC and NTM-A, and NATO Allies command three of the six regional commands: Regional Command – North (Germany), Regional Command – West (Italy), and Regional Command – Capital (Turkey). During the last six months, international force levels and pledged contributions declined to 46,400 personnel, down from approximately 47,000 as of March 2011.

Despite a minor decrease in total coalition forces, coalition membership continues to grow. In August 2011, El Salvador became the 49th contributing nation of ISAF and the 21st non-NATO member of the coalition. A contingent of approximately 25 Salvadoran personnel will perform training duties with NTM-A, joining liaison officers currently serving at ISAF Headquarters.

Following President Obama’s June 22 announcement of the redeployment of all 33,000 U.S. surge forces by September 2012, other key Allies and partners made similar announcements. During a visit to Afghanistan in July, French President Nicholas Sarkozy announced the withdrawal of 1,000 French personnel by the end of 2012. Additionally, UK Prime Minister David Cameron announced in May that the United Kingdom planned to withdraw 900 personnel by the end of 2012, reducing UK force levels to 9,000 personnel. Denmark also plans to withdraw approximately 120 personnel from the current level of approximately 500 personnel by the end of 2012, but will increase its development aid and begin to focus on training the ANSF. Other nations announcing drawdowns during the reporting period include Belgium, the Czech Republic, and Turkey: Belgium will remove 300 personnel from Kabul International Airport, the Czech Republic will redeploy its helicopter Task Force by the end of 2012, and 200-300 Turkish personnel will redeploy as part of the transition dividend from Regional Command – Capital by the end of 2012.

At the June NATO Defense Ministerial, Secretary Gates cautioned that any national drawdown decisions must be made in consultation with ISAF so as not to reverse the gains made to date. The Department of Defense and the Department of State continue to reinforce these points with Allies and partners, highlighting the commitment made at the Lisbon Summit to gradually transition security lead to the Afghans by 2014. Nevertheless, domestic political and financial concerns in coalition capitals, in addition to progress achieved by the surge, continue to play a role in these decisions.

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9 The number of U.S. Forces as of September 30, 2011 reflects the force management level number, utilizing the Secretary of Defense Business Rules for Managing Afghanistan Forces, which does not include the overlap of transitioning forces, short-duration temporary duty personnel, U.S. force assigned to Department of Defense combat support agencies, and other forces not operationally assigned and therefore unavailable to the commanding general. The current force level of 97,795 personnel reflects an estimate per current theatre calculations. The confirmed boots-on-the-ground (BOG) total for September 30, 2011 will be released in the monthly Congressional BOG report in early October, after validation and confirmation through the Combatant Commander, services, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
SECTION 2 – AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES GROWTH, DEVELOPMENT, AND OPERATIONS

The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) continued to make substantial progress during the reporting period, increasing in quantity, quality, and operational effectiveness.

During the reporting period, the Afghan Government approved an increase in ANSF end-strength figures from 305,600 personnel to 352,000 personnel (195,000 ANA and 157,000 ANP) by October 2012. This increase in forces will be critical to supporting the transition process and ensuring that the ANSF is well-positioned to assume responsibility for security throughout Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Final ANSF end-strength post-2014, however, remains to be determined. As of this reporting period, the ANA reached 170,781 soldiers and the ANP reached 136,122 policemen; both the ANA and ANP remain on track to achieve their respective growth goals for October 2012.

The Afghan Government continues to assume greater responsibility for force generation through the development of Afghan trainers. During this reporting period, both the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI) made significant progress in being able to train, and thereby generate, their own forces. The MoD, in partnership with NTM-A, trained and certified 587 ANA instructors to lead army training. Similarly, the MoI also worked with NTM-A to train and certify 126 ANP instructors to lead police training. Both security ministries are on track to achieve their respective trainer goals for December 2011, with final trainer end-strengths expected to be established and verified by December 2012.

As the ANSF continues to make progress towards its end-strength goals, U.S. and coalition forces continue to increase and expand efforts to improve the overall quality and sustainability of both the ANA and the ANP. During the reporting period, literacy training efforts continued to expand. As of September 2011, 89,267 ANSF personnel were in literacy training, a significant increase from approximately 60,000 in March 2011. Further, literacy training is now mandatory in every initial entry training course, with the goal to graduate each new soldier or policeman at the 1st grade level. In addition to literacy training, the 12th and final branch school opened, and all schools are now capable of developing the vocational skills that are needed to manage and sustain institutions, infrastructure, and systems. Training efforts, through a combination of officer and non-commissioned officer (NCO) training programs, are also expanding the leadership capacity in both the ANA and ANP. During this reporting period, the ANA produced more than 12,212 officers and NCOs, and the ANP added 6,987 officers and NCOs.

With the support of operational partnering, the ANSF continues to translate training and professionalization efforts into improved performance on the battlefield. As of the end of the reporting period, more than 92 percent of ANA units and 88 percent of ANP units were partnered with ISAF units. Further, the number of ANA and ANP units rated “Effective with Assistance” or better also increased during the reporting period. These improvements have enabled the ANSF to assume greater responsibility throughout Afghanistan, as indicated by the increase in ANSF-led operations over the last six months.
The continued growth and improvement of the ANSF is paralleled in the security ministries responsible for overseeing and managing the force. Both the MoD and MoI made notable progress during the reporting period, as evidenced by the nomination of two departments – one each from the Interior and Defense Ministries – to begin the Transition process to independent operations. Additionally, the Afghan security ministries also made significant progress in promoting stewardship throughout the ANSF. During this reporting period, the ANA and ANP initiated 100 percent inventories of vehicles, night vision devices, and weapons. The ministries were also simultaneously working with NTM-A to establish systems to assist with the long-term accounting and management of resources.

Even with this progress, the growth and development of the ANSF continue to face challenges, including attrition above target levels in the ANA and some elements of the ANP, leadership deficits, and capability limitations in the areas of staff planning, management, logistics, and procurement. The ANSF continues to require enabling support, including air (both transport and close air support), logistics, ISR, and medical, from coalition resources to perform at the level necessary to produce the security effects required for Transition. The influence of criminal patronage networks on the ANSF also continues to pose a threat to stability and the Transition process. Further, the drawdown of U.S. and international forces increases the risk of a shortfall of operational partnering resources, which could reduce the ANSF-ISAF operational partnership and may impede ANSF development.

2.1: ANSF WAY-AHEAD

Over the next year, NTM-A and Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) will continue to recruit, train, and equip soldiers and police to meet ANSF growth objectives by October 31, 2012. Training and fielding of all units with the required specialty skills to fully support the ANA and ANP is expected to be complete by December 2013.

In addition to training and fielding the ANA and ANP, NTM-A will remain focused on increasing quality by developing the ANSF’s internal capability to generate and sustain its forces over the long term. The five focus areas of this effort include: training Afghan trainers and instructors; accelerating leader development; building literacy and vocational skills; instilling an ethos of stewardship; and developing enduring institutions, systems, and enablers. These focus areas are aimed at creating an enduring and sustainable ANSF.

2.2: INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING AND ASSESSMENT

ASSESSMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

The leaders and staff of the Ministry of Defense continue to develop organizations and conduct training and leadership development in order to establish a professional ministry. The MoD, including the subordinate General Staff (GS), when fully established, should be able to conduct analysis, produce policies, and manage international defense relations independently in support of the Chief of the General Staff, the Minister of Defense, and the President of Afghanistan. The MoD and GS must also be able to conduct intra-ministerial coordination within the MoD and GS as well as inter-ministerial with other Afghan agencies coordination to plan, program, manage, and sustain the ANA.
NTM-A/CSTC-A’s ministerial development activities focus on advising, key leader engagements, combined and joint meetings and working groups, facilitated inter-ministerial coordination, advisor councils, functional boards, and the Ministerial Development Board. Coalition government civilians, alongside military and contract advisors, build enduring ministerial capability and capacity by supporting development of the core management and operational systems essential to operate a fully-functional MoD. Approximately 307 government civilians, military personnel, and contractors, primarily from the United States and Canada, participate in this training and development effort.

Advisors have begun shifting the focus of their efforts from individuals and offices to developing overall ministerial capacity in order to improve horizontal integration and strategic management and to support operations, personnel management, and national logistics above the Corps-level. Successful examples of this shift include the promulgation of a National Military Strategy; the development of a three-year program and budget; the assessment, planning and oversight of the first seven geographic areas to begin the Transition process; the initiation of a review of the solar year 1391 (beginning in March 2012) tashkil; and the establishment of the ANA Recruiting Command, which is entering a six-month test phase to confirm it is ready to Transition to operations with “coalition oversight only.”

NTM-A/CSTC-A uses a Capability Milestone (CM) Rating System to assess the professionalism and capacity of both the MoD and MoI. NTM-A/CSTC-A advisors, in many cases joined by their Afghan counterparts, assess individual offices and cross-functional activities on a quarterly basis. They evaluate these offices against specific end-state objectives, quarterly milestones, and skill-building requirements.

Figure 3: Capability Milestone Rating Definitions

| CM-4: The department or institution exists but cannot accomplish its mission. |
| CM-3: Cannot accomplish its mission without significant coalition assistance. |
| CM-2B: Can accomplish its mission but requires some coalition assistance. |
| CM-2A: Department or institution capable of executing functions with minimal coalition assistance; only critical ministerial or institutional functions are covered. |
| CM-1B: Department or institution capable of executing functions with coalition oversight only. |
| CM-1A: Department or institution capable of autonomous operations. |

10 “Manning document”
As of September 2011, the MoD is assessed as requiring some coalition assistance to accomplish its mission (a rating of CM-2B), a status it achieved in October 2010. Overall, NTM-A/CSTC-A anticipates the MoD moving to CM-1B by early 2013, with full Transition of most offices and functions to CM-1A by mid-2014.

Figure 4: Ministry of Defense Capability Milestone Ratings (as of July 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MoD Overall Rating: CM2B</th>
<th>Current CM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support to Operations</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMoD Intelligence Policy</td>
<td>2B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Command</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMoD Reserve Affairs</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMoD Disaster Response</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction &amp; Property Mngt Div</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD Health Affairs (New)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Management</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMoD Personnel</td>
<td>2B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMoD Education</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Integration</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilization (New)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Logistics</td>
<td>2B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMoD AT&amp;L</td>
<td>2B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition Agency</td>
<td>2A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horizontal Integration. &amp; Str. Mngt</td>
<td>2B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Defense</td>
<td>2A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Deputy Minister of Defense</td>
<td>2B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability &amp; Transparency</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMoD Strategy &amp; Policy</td>
<td>2A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD Legal</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD Public Affairs</td>
<td>2A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD Inspector General</td>
<td>2B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD Finance</td>
<td>2A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Communications</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GS Overall Rating: CM2B</th>
<th>Current CM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support to Operations</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS G2 Intelligence</td>
<td>2B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS G3 Operations</td>
<td>2B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS G5 Plans (New)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS G6 Communications</td>
<td>2B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comms Support Unit</td>
<td>2A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS G7 Force Struc, Trng &amp; Doctrine (New)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground Forces Command</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Air Force</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANASOC</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Management</td>
<td>2B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS G1 Personnel</td>
<td>2B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANAREC</td>
<td>2A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious &amp; Cultural Affairs</td>
<td>2B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Logistics</td>
<td>2B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Support Command (New)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS G4 Logistics</td>
<td>2B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Command</td>
<td>2B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hor. Int. &amp; Str. Mgmt</td>
<td>2B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of the General Staff</td>
<td>2B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice Chief of the General Staff</td>
<td>2A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS Legal</td>
<td>2B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS Inspector General</td>
<td>2B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS G8 Finance</td>
<td>2A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice Chief of GS (Air) (New)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant Major of ANA (New)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director of GS (New)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As of the last evaluation period, of the 44 total offices and cross-functional areas, 10 of the departments had achieved a CM-3 rating, 15 had achieved a CM-2B rating, and nine had achieved a CM-2A rating. One office, the Communications Support Unit, having been previously assessed as ‘test’ CM-1B, was reassessed as CM-2A by a more methodical assessment process. This unit did not regress in capability, but rather a more disciplined assessment was made of its current status. Medical Command (formerly Office of the Surgeon General), improved from CM-4 to CM-3, and three offices, First Deputy Minister, GSG2 Intelligence, and Chief of the General Staff, improved from CM-3 to CM-2B. Several departments that were recently established, including Civilization, GSG5, GSG7, and ANA Special Operations Command (ANASOC), have already achieved a CM-3 rating.
Synchronizing the Transition of the MoD to Afghan leadership with the Transition to Afghan security lead throughout Afghanistan remains essential. MoD planners, along with their colleagues from the MoI and National Directorate of Security, were heavily involved in the planning process for the first tranche of areas to begin the Transition process. MoD staff and GS officers have demonstrated robust capacity and substantial initiative during planning sessions with ISAF and IJC, and are already leading the assessment and planning effort for the second tranche.

**ASSESSMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR**

The Ministry of Interior is currently assessed at CM-3 (requires significant coalition assistance). During the reporting period, the MoI made significant progress by advancing three departments (General Directorate of Police Special Units Headquarters [GDPSU], Force Readiness, and the Afghan National Civil Order Police [ANCOP]) from CM-3 to CM-2B. Additionally, the Strategy department was authorized to advance from CM-2B to CM-2A in July.

Ratings for all MoI departments are summarized as follows: four at CM-4; 11 at CM-3; eight at CM-2B; and four at CM-2A. Ministerial development plans for Recruiting Command, Gender Affairs and Human Rights, Community Policing, and Counter IED are in development. Additionally, given the possibility of the Central Prison Directorate (CPD) being transferred from MoJ to MoI, initial planning is underway for a CPD ministry development plan to ensure the MoI is prepared to address this additional responsibility.

**Figure 5: Ministry of Interior Capability Milestone Ratings (as of September 2011)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Current CM</th>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Current CM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff/Special Staff</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>DM of Counter Narcotics</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Affairs</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>Counter Narcotics</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspector General</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>DM of Strategy and Policy</td>
<td>2A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Corruption</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>Strategic Planning</td>
<td>2A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Affairs/LEGAD</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Policy Development</td>
<td>2A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Force Management</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DM of Admin &amp; Support</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>DM of Security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Mgmt</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>Afghan Uniform Police</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Afghan Border Police</td>
<td>2B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance &amp; Budget</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>GDPSU</td>
<td>2B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities &amp; Installation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Anti-Crime</td>
<td>2B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surgeon Medical</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>ANCOP-(G)</td>
<td>2B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Info, Comms &amp; Tech</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Operations Planning</td>
<td>2A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Mgmt</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Force Readiness</td>
<td>2B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition &amp; Procurement</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>APPF</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Service</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The June 2011 Ministerial Development Board approved the Public Affairs department Transition plan and recommended it be forwarded to the Commander – NTM-A for final approval. Public Affairs is the first MoI department to be recommended for approval to Transition, and, upon approval, will be updated to a rating of CM-1B.
With sound and functional headquarters and human capacity growing in a number of departments, the increasingly capable MoI will be better able to manage and sustain the overall police force, including enabling capabilities from logistics to training. Although challenges remain in many areas, measured progress towards Transition and self-sufficiency will allow the Afghan Government to execute its responsibilities with decreasing assistance from ISAF.

Emphasis on developing the enabling systems for self-sufficiency will take on renewed vigor in 2012. The development of the logistics capabilities necessary to supply the ANP, from the construction of regional logistics centers and provincial supply points to the fielding of computerized systems such as the Logistics Readiness Tool, will support the ANP’s ability to sustain fielded forces. As the ANP nears its end-strength, training and human resources management will also take on greater importance as the ability to use resources efficiently, properly allocate human capital, and ensure qualitative measures of personnel are essential for long-term self-sufficiency.

Although progress is being observed and assessed in a number of areas across the MoI, challenges remain that must be addressed. Civil Service Reform, both in personnel management and pay, is a recurring deficiency, both in the MoI and the MoD. The September 3, 2011 Ministerial Development Board recommended that Public Affairs be held in the CM-1B testing phase until civilian pay reform is achieved. The MoI Civil Service Department remains behind schedule largely because it lacks a permanent director and empowerment to effect change, as well as adequate office space, logistical support, office equipment and internet connectivity needed to accomplish its basic functions. The Civil Service Department also requires support from the MoI senior leadership to implement the Afghan Government Public Administration Reform Law and to include conversion to the reformed pay scale. A strong partnership with provincial governors is required to improve hiring at the provincial level. The challenges surrounding civil service reform have already impeded Public Affairs’ advancement and could obstruct overall MoI capacity, progress, and sustainment.

2.3: INSTITUTIONAL ADVISOR PROGRAMS

INTERNATIONAL POLICE COORDINATION BOARD

The International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) remains the main forum by which the international community supports Afghan Police development and identifies shortfalls and potential areas of duplication in police development activity that may require international focus. Areas of emphasis during the reporting period have included ANP growth, Border Police development, ANP training, and transition. The development of assessment mechanisms to evaluate the development of the ANP as a civilian police force is also under consideration.

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION CELL

The MoI International Coordination Cell (MICC) was established in October 2010 to facilitate the MoI’s coordination of international assistance and program execution. The MICC was initially intended to operate inside the MoI under the direction of the chief of staff; however, the MICC no longer fulfills this function. Beginning in July 2011, the MICC has shifted roles to the delivery of two functions within the Plans Directorate of the Deputy Commander – Police. First, the original MICC delivers the Institutional & Police Policy Development and International
Advisors’ Council initiatives while sustaining the broader roles of managing MoI advisor, donor, and activity coordination. Second, the newly-added Plans section of the MICC is responsible for collaborating with partners to monitor the National Police Strategy and National Police Plan, serves as an important conduit for the Security Standing Committee process, and continues to build trusted partner relationships between the MoI and its international partners, including the IPCB.

**MINISTRY OF DEFENSE ADVISOR PROGRAM**

The Ministry of Defense Advisor (MoDA) Program, administered by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and established in 2010, provides experienced government civilians with unique skills to improve Afghan institutional-level competencies in strategic planning, policy analysis and development, installation management, budget, finance, logistics, personnel and education, legal systems, and accountability.

Fifty-six Department of Defense civilians from the MoDA Program have successfully integrated into NTM-A/CSTC-A – 26 as advisors to the MoD and GS, 24 as advisors to the MoI, and six as advisors to both ministries. In order to meet requirements established by COMISAF and NTM-A/CSTC-A, 30 additional MoDA personnel have been requested for 2011 with an anticipated deployment date of November 2011. This will significantly increase MoDA’s overall number as progress is made toward the eventual goal of 100 advisors by early 2012.

To date, advisors have made significant contributions to building the capacity of the MoD, while strengthening the partnership between the U.S. Government and the Afghan Government. One advisor has helped an Afghan general establish, man, and equip a new ANA logistics command, the Army Support Command. Another advisor’s actions led to the establishment of several personnel policies, including long-overdue guidelines for establishing a retirement system for ANA generals.

**AFGHANISTAN – PAKISTAN HANDS PROGRAM**

In order to generate and maintain mission continuity and focus in the counterinsurgency environment, USFOR-A leadership in 2009 identified the requirement for a cadre of military and civilian Afghanistan experts who speak local languages and have the training and skills to effectively engage with the Afghan Government and the Afghan people. In September 2009, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff established the Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands Program to provide this capability. As of September 2011, there are 27 military and civilian personnel in this program within NTM-A/CSTC-A, 10 of whom are advising key leaders in the MoD.

**2.4: INSTITUTIONAL TRAINER AND MENTOR STATUS**

The manning resources necessary to develop the ANSF are identified in the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR), NATO’s capabilities-based document used to identify the forces required to execute the campaign plan. Shortfalls in the institutional trainer requirements set forth in the CJSOR still exist and continue to impede the growth and development of the ANSF.
CJSOR v11.0 is the current document supporting trainer requirements. As of the end of the reporting period, the shortfall in institutional trainers is 485 trainers, a decrease of 255 from the March 2011 shortfall of 740, with 1,816 deployed trainers currently in-place against the total requirement of 2,778 trainers.

The United States currently sources 1,331 non-CJSOR trainer positions. In order to temporarily address the NATO CJSOR shortfall and fill the U.S.-sourced non-CJSOR requirements as quickly as possible, the United States has implemented a series of requests for information from other coalition partners, including unit-based sourcing solutions to address short-term training needs.

Figure 6: CJSOR Trainer Status (Version 11.0, as of September 30, 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>In-Place</th>
<th>Pledged</th>
<th>Shortfall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2,778</td>
<td>1,816</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>485</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7: NTM-A/CSTC-A CJSOR (Version 11.0) Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Percent Sourced</th>
<th>Trainers Short</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIR FORCE</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLICE</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDICAL</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOG</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMY</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTEL</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.5: ANSF LITERACY TRAINING

Given that illiteracy is still pervasive within the population and the ANSF, literacy is a vital force enabler and force multiplier. Literacy enables ANSF service members to learn required skills at vocational schools, enhances instruction on human rights and the rule of law, and enables long-term professionalization of the force.

NTM-A/CSTC-A has dramatically increased its literacy training for the Afghan Army and Police. As of September 25, 2011, NTM-A/CSTC-A employed 3,181 full-time Afghan literacy teachers, a five-fold increase from the 591 teachers employed in November 2009.

The substantial increase in trainers has resulted in parallel increase in the number of ANSF in literacy training, which has tripled since 2010. As of the end of the reporting period, approximately 89,297 ANSF personnel were in literacy training, compared to approximately 60,000 as of March 2010. Additionally, literacy training and tests are now mandatory in every initial entry training course, with the goal to graduate each new soldier or policeman at 1st grade level. Additional literacy training is provided in every professional development course, as well as in the fielded force.

Figure 7 summarizes the NTM-A/CSTC-A remaining 485 institutional trainer shortfall for Police, Medical, Logistics, Air Force, and Army.
In order to build on this foundation of basic literacy and to continue the professionalization of the ANSF, NTM-A/CSTC-A has begun development of more advanced levels of curriculum that will enhance the education level of the ANSF and support the more technical training requirements of the enabler force, including medical, logistics, fire, anti-crime, intelligence, and counternarcotics. Additionally, curricula have been developed for 4th through 6th grade levels, with more advanced curricula to be developed when the need and the capability arise. An improved coordination effort with IJC will also continue to expand the literacy training opportunities provided to the fielded units.

Figure 8: ANSF Literacy Progress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Passed Literacy Test</th>
<th>NOV 09- OCT 10</th>
<th>NOV 10-SEP 11</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Projected by JAN 12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Grade</td>
<td>16,591</td>
<td>58,962</td>
<td>75,553</td>
<td>102,903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Grade</td>
<td>8,783</td>
<td>20,016</td>
<td>28,799</td>
<td>37,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Grade</td>
<td>4,530</td>
<td>12,045</td>
<td>16,575</td>
<td>21,258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>29,904</td>
<td>91,023</td>
<td>120,927</td>
<td>161,291</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As of September 30, 2011, 89,297 personnel are currently in training

AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

All new recruits receive 64 hours of literacy training as part of the initial entry training program, which provides the fundamentals of literacy and numeracy to the 1st grade level. On average, this training has a pass rate of approximately 90 percent. However, it should be emphasized that Level 1 represents only a very elementary grasp of literacy, including numbers, letters, and some simple words.

Additionally, an eight-week literacy program has been developed for those progressing to the more demanding branch school courses. All branch schools will deliver literacy training by the end of 2011. Literacy training is also conducted during the seven-week collective training phase of units fielded at the consolidated fielding center, where all ANA kandaks and companies conduct collective training prior to deployment to the fielded force.

AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

While ANP and ANA recruits receive the same literacy training, the length of training is dependent on the follow-on assignment of the particular soldier/policeman. For example, in ANCOP recruits receive 1st grade training at the collection centers prior to the start of the formal training program. Once they begin training, ANCOP trainees will progress through 2nd and 3rd grade levels prior to graduation. This expectation for higher levels of literacy is reflective of the rank structure, where the ANCOP enlisted force is composed entirely of NCOs.
Those members of the fielded force recruited prior to the implementation of the mandatory literacy training program present the most challenging target for literacy training. To address this challenge, teachers are deployed to more than 1,000 district headquarters, precincts, and village stations at any one time to provide initial literacy training as well as advanced literacy training to the 2nd and 3rd grade equivalency.

2.6: AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY CAPACITY AND GROWTH

MANNING

The current Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB)-endorsed goal for growth of the ANA is 195,000 personnel by the end of October 2012. The last infantry kandak for 2011 fielded in May 2011; the final five infantry kandaks are expected to field in 2012, the last in October. Additionally, the surge of enabling and logistics forces is continuing as new units are fielded to provide essential support capabilities. As the force continues to grow, the MoD has demonstrated an increased force management capacity. The solar year 1390\textsuperscript{12} tashkil was prepared several months earlier than the previous year and distributed to ANA units in early April 2011. Additionally, the annual Command Plan Review (CPR), the process that facilitates adjustments to manning and equipping of units, is in progress, with Afghans fully in the lead. As of September 2011, ANA force levels reached 170,781 personnel, an increase of 11,418 personnel from the force level at the end of the previous reporting period in March 2011.

In order to maintain the accuracy of personnel figures, NTM-A/CSTC-A continues to review and revise the end-strength reporting process. During the reporting period, this constant review process highlighted a failure to report training attrition, which has resulted in a large discrepancy between actual and reported ANA end-strength numbers. After agreeing upon an accurate end-strength for September, NTM-A and ANA leadership implemented new policies and procedures to ensure training base attrition is accurately reported in the future. Strong leadership within the ANA Recruiting Command (ANAREC) and effective and mature processing within National Army Volunteer Centers, which induct recruits into the ANA, has enabled adjustments to current recruiting plans in order to prevent delays in achieving the objective end-strength levels. NTM-A/CSTC-A continues to work closely with and support the ANA in rectifying manning issues to ensure growth to the JCMB-endorsed ANA end-strength goal of 195,000 personnel by the end of October 2012.

Although recruiting and retention are continuing at a strong pace, if the high levels of attrition\textsuperscript{13} seen during this reporting period continue, there is a risk that the ANA will not be able to sustain the recruitment and training costs currently incurred to achieve the October 2012 growth goal. Historic trends show that attrition is seasonal, rising in the fall and winter and declining in the spring. The main causes of attrition in the ANA are poor leadership and accountability, separation from family, denial of leave or poor leave management, high operational tempo, and ineffective deterrence against soldiers going absent without leave (AWOL).

\textsuperscript{12} Solar Year 1390 began on March 22, 2011
\textsuperscript{13} Unanticipated losses, included Dropped from Rolls, Killed in Action, Deaths (non-combat), Captured and Permanently Disabled (Exempted). Soldiers and NCOs AWOL more than 45 days and officers AWOL more than 30 days are Dropped from Rolls, which composes the majority (over 90 percent) of attrition.
A number of ANA-led initiatives to address these issues are ongoing. NTM-A/CSTC-A has continued to work with ANA leadership to increase efforts to find and recall AWOL soldiers. Minister of Defense-created commissions have continued to meet with corps and intermediate-level commanders to address AWOL and attrition issues. In addition, NTM-A/CSTC-A and IJC are conducting an operational planning team effort with the initial focus on short-term solutions which can be initiated while continuing to develop mid- and long-term solutions in partnership with Afghan leaders. Nevertheless, President Karzai issued a decree in April 2011 renewing the policy of amnesty for AWOL officers, NCOs, and soldiers who return to their units voluntarily until March 2012. This extension has the potential to impede the ANA’s ability to decrease attrition.

Figure 9: ANA End-Strength (September 2010 – September 2011)

Improving the ethnic and tribal balance in the ANA, and specifically increasing recruitment of southern Pashtuns, has been a continuing focus of the ANA’s force generation and recruiting efforts. In September 2011, the ANA exceeded its goal for southern Pashtun recruiting; southern Pashtuns made up 10.9 percent of the recruiting cohort, above the stated goal of four percent and the largest monthly percentage to date. This increase can be attributed to adjustments in recruitment accounting methods as well as increased recruiting efforts in southern and southwestern Afghanistan as these areas have begun to stabilize. The implementation of ANAREC’s new method of accounting for southern Pashtuns by tribal affiliation vice recruiting location, and the subsequent increase in the southern Pashtun recruiting rate, implies that the actual number of southern Pashtuns already in the ANA may be higher than previously estimated.
**PROFESSIONALIZATION**

As the ANA and ANP continue to reach their growth targets, NTM-A/CSTC-A has increased its focus on force professionalization. A number of initiatives during the reporting period underscored this emphasis.

The ANSF Retirement Act, published as law in March 2011, was recently implemented and resulted in the retirement of 18 ANA general officers. This has had a positive effect, allowing for upward movement and advancement in the ANA officer ranks. Additionally, in June 2011, MoD implemented a new Leave and Pass Policy, which increased leave for officers and NCOs, provided three months of convalescent leave for pregnant soldiers, and allowed a one-time career leave period of 45 days for the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca. Also in June, the first ANA Company Commander’s Legal Course, which focuses on ANA’s military justice system and the law of armed conflict, graduated nine students.

In July 2011, the Minister of Defense approved and signed the ANA Core Values Statement, a one-page document that identifies six core values under “God, Country, and Duty.” Planning and initial steps to incorporate the six values (Integrity, Honor, Service, Respect, Courage, and Loyalty) into all ANA training curricula is ongoing. Finally, the Minister of Defense signed a newly-revised National Military Strategy (NMS) in June 2011. The NMS, based on the Afghan Government National Security Policy and National Threat Assessment, is the foundation for planning and programming in the MoD and GS.

Other force professionalization efforts during the reporting period include the first implementation of the Afghanistan Human Resources Information Management System (AHRIMS), which began on July 9, 2011 at select sites. AHRIMS provides commanders the ability to properly account for, assign, track, and locate trained personnel through the use of an automated *tashkil*. AHRIMS, through the use of additional skills identifiers, will also provide commanders the ability to locate ANA members immediately who have received additional training. The system will also eventually be linked to pay systems to facilitate the reconciliation of data and biometrics.

The Computerized Pay System (CPS) is the electronic structured pay process, scheduled to be implemented in the fall of 2011. Once implemented, CPS is designed to expedite the pay process, eliminate ghost accounts, streamline the signature process, and provide oversight to an increasingly complex pay system. CPS, using fingerprint biometrics to identify soldiers, will also provide ANA leaders and staff the automated ability to properly account for pay, track, and query payroll data. The system will eventually be web-based and accessible from anywhere within the MoD network. Future capabilities include compatibility with biometrics, banking, AHRIMS, and the Ministry of Finance.

**LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT**

A total of 2,820 officers were trained between April 1 and September 30, 2011, including 1,629 graduates from Officer Candidate School (OCS) and 1,191 graduates from the Mujahedeen Integration Course. Officers are also produced at the National Military Academy of Afghanistan (NMAA). NMAA has expanded its original capacity from the first course of 84 students that graduated in 2009 to the recently matriculated 2015 graduation class of 647 students.
The MoD has continued to improve and increase leadership development by focusing on increasing both the quality and capacity of officer and NCO training. The pool of potential NCOs has continued to increase with continued growth of the literacy training program. A total of 9,392 NCOs were generated between April 1 and September 30, 2011, including 6,358 from the Team Leader Courses (TLC) and 3,034 from initial entry 1 Uniform courses.

Figure 10: ANA Officer Strength Goal and Actual (November 2009 – November 2012)

Figure 11: ANA NCO Strength Goal and Actual (November 2009 – November 2012)
**TRAINING**

NTM-A/CSTC-A continues to focus on developing the Afghan institutions necessary to train and sustain the ANA. During the reporting period, the Afghan National Security University (ANSU) was established in order to bring the many ANA professional military education (PME) institutions, as well as other ANSF PME institutions, under the control of a single organization. This consolidation will be essential to training efforts, as it will provide coherent and effective military education and engender greater integration of education programs between the ANA and the ANP. The ANSU will be responsible for the development of future military and civilian leaders through its academic and military programs and, following the construction of a new facility west of Kabul, will encompass officer training and education establishments, a senior NCO education facility, the Counterinsurgency Training Center, the Foreign Language Institute (due to open in the Fall 2012), and two ANA branch schools.

One of the ANSU institutions, the Command and Staff College (CSC), is undergoing rapid change. The inauguration in August 2011 of new Canadian-sponsored facilities (classrooms, dormitories, and an extension of the dining facility) and the inclusion of a language laboratory will enable the CSC to further develop both the scope and content of its courses. The Strategic Command and Staff Course, the highest level of training available at CSC, has been strengthened by the participation of high-level external speakers, including ambassadors and leaders of well-respected international organizations. In addition, the Civilian Core Competency Course, a new course for MoD non-military personnel, will be coordinated and run at CSC beginning in October 2011. The number of students trained at CSC has increased during 2011 and is expected to reach approximately 650 by the end of 2011 – twice the number that were trained in 2010. On June 20, 2011 the CSC celebrated the enrollment of its 2,500th student since it was founded in 2002.

The senior NCO facility at ANSU currently runs several NCO courses and has demonstrated an increase in intra- and inter-ministerial integration during the past year. The Afghan Air Force (AAF) and ANP have placed personnel in these NCO courses, demonstrating increased mutual support within and among ANSF institutions.

In addition to NCO development, the ANA continues to create the institutions necessary to produce a capable officer corps, including the recent addition of an ANA Officers Academy (ANAOA) at the ANSU, based on the British “Sandhurst” model. The ANAOA will replace the current 20-week OCS course with a one-year course designed to improve the professionalism and leadership of junior officers in the ANA. The United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries will provide the majority of advisors. The first instructor course is scheduled to begin in spring 2013 and the first course is scheduled to begin in September 2013.

The existing NMAA four-year program has revamped the summer cadet field training program to focus on physical fitness, weapons training, unit-level training, and fundamental leadership. During 2011, third-year cadets had the opportunity to travel to Turkey for their collective training phase. Further, a “Train-the-Instructor” program has been adopted to give fourth-year cadets an opportunity to instruct and lead selected first- and second-year cadets. Although

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14 Professional Military Education (PME) encompasses individual military career development programs as well as courses undertaken for personal development.
advisor intensive, the new cadet field training program will, over a four-year period, develop well-educated, well-trained, and disciplined leaders.

In addition to the ANSF PME institutions, the ANA continues to develop its 12 branch schools, which are located around the country and are in the process of developing permanent facilities and locations. The 12 ANA branch schools provide a key element of professional training for the ANA, delivering individual training for officers, NCOs, and soldiers destined for newly-fielded kandaks of all types (Infantry, Artillery, Combat Support and Combat Service Support). Over the coming months, this training will increase to include individual training for officers, NCOs, and soldiers destined for the Corps Communications kandaks and the Mobile Strike Force kandaks.

The ANA has grown dramatically over the past two years and the majority of this force was fielded without receiving any professional training at the branch schools. In order to address this training deficit, the branch schools have put in place a Mobile Training Team (MTT) concept which is already making progress. To date, the Artillery and Infantry branch schools have deployed MTTs, composed of ANA instructors with coalition advisors, to the different corps to conduct training on behalf of their respective branch schools. For example, a Combat Service Support (CSS) MTT is currently training the 111th Capital Division, and additional CSS MTTs are scheduled to begin training the corps later in 2011. The MTT concept is proving successful in its initial implementation and plans are being made to expand the program to other branch schools.

On May 28, 2011, the ANA Military Police (MP) branch school, the twelfth and final ANA branch school to open since 2010, commenced training at its temporary site at Regional Military Training Center (RMTC) in Darulaman. In order to meet its primary role of fielding MP companies, the MP branch school is conducting a Company Commanders Course, a Basic Officer Training Course, a NCO Training Course, a Personal Security Detail Operational Course, and a Correction Operations Course, with a total course capacity of 140 students. Upon conclusion of its fielding and its relocation to the permanent facility at Mazar-e-Sharif, the MP branch school will adjust its training scope according to the MP requirements.

Key to the success of branch school training, as well as the ANA overall, is the Afghan instructor; as a result, NTM-A/CSTC-A is focusing on increasing both the quality and quantity of Afghan instructors. In general, the number of Afghan instructors assigned to ANA training centers has exceeded the December 2011 goal of filling 80 percent of authorized instructor positions (2,458 personnel). There are currently 2,769 Afghan instructors assigned to ANA training center billets, filling 90 percent of total authorized instructor billets. Instructor training courses are still in session at the RMTCs; the graduates from these courses will enable the ANA to fill all its instructor billets by the end of 2011. With regards to branch schools, the number of assigned Afghan instructors has increased to 647, which is 81 percent of total authorized instructor billets. With the exception of the recently-opened MP branch school, the majority of the instruction is now carried out by Afghan instructors with coalition advisors monitoring the classes, a significant improvement in the development of the branch schools and a key element to ensuring the long-term sustainability of the ANSF.
The ANA also operates the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) and seven RMTCs. The KMTC is viewed as the premiere military training center in the country, providing initial basic soldier and officer training, as well as specialty skills such as literacy training, driving courses, junior leadership courses, and instructor training. It has the capacity to train approximately 9,830 students concurrently.

RMTCs, located at Darulaman, Khost, Gardez, Kandahar, Shorabak, Herat, and Mazar-e-Sharif, provide locations for additional Team Leader Courses as well as Basic Warrior Training (BWT). Khost and Gardez currently train BWT kandaks of 600 soldiers each, while the remaining RMTCs train BWT kandaks of 1,400 soldiers each. Despite a significant and growing capacity, many of the RMTCs are faced with challenges not seen at the KMTC; RMTCs often have insufficient space available for training and marksmanship ranges are often located in insecure areas. The latter problem requires additional assets to clear routes to and secure ranges during the conduct of training activities.

**SPECIAL FORCES**

On April 7, 2011, the Chief of the General Staff activated ANA Special Operations Command (ANASOC) Headquarters, laying the foundation for the stand-up of ANASOC. Although awaiting approval of the ANASOC manning document, ANASOC Headquarters continues to develop its plan for manning, training, and equipping its forces while simultaneously achieving effects on the battlefield.

Once fully established, ANASOC will include the existing two brigades of Commandos and a brigade of Afghan Army Special Forces (ANASF). The Commandos are similar to U.S. Army Rangers, specializing in direct action. Alternatively, ANASF, partnered with U.S. Army Special Forces, specialize in foreign internal defense and COIN. Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) is developing high-quality Commandos, and the development of ANASF capabilities supports the COIN effort, particularly in Village Stability Operations.

The solar year 1390 tashkil added one division support company and two brigade support companies to the ANASOC structure, which gives the ANASOC Commander the ability to provide tactical-level logistical support to operational forces. The restructuring of the forward support company in each of the existing nine Commando battalions and one Special Forces battalion pushed support assets to the company-level, which better supports and sustains the operational units whose reach spans multiple provinces, mountain ranges, and isolated battle spaces throughout Afghanistan. Furthermore, the approved fielding plan also calls for the creation of a military intelligence capability within ANASOC, which will increase ANASOC’s capacity to generate its own intelligence-driven operations.

Currently, the ANASOC component-level headquarters is capable of conducting operational direction and control of fielded forces with assistance in intelligence support from IJC Regional Commands, CFSOCC-A, and CJSOTF-A. Since the beginning of the spring offensive in April 2011, ANASOC forces have conducted 142 Commando and 492 Special Forces operations. Despite significant progress, the ANASOC remains a nascent command and continues to face challenges. ANASOC still requires significant assistance from coalition partners for sustainment.
and maneuver, and intelligence and higher-level communications continue to require improvement.

Training efforts to expand the capacity and capability of the ANASF are ongoing. ANASOC’s School of Excellence is responsible for recruiting and training ANA Commandos (Commando Sustainment Course) and ANA Special Forces (Special Forces Qualification Course). From April 2011 to September 2011, the ANASOC, located at Camp Morehead, has produced a total of 1,186 new Commandos and 243 new Special Forces operators. ANASOC estimates that the fielding date for the last Commando unit is July 2013, and the last Special Forces unit is scheduled for fielding in December 2014.

**Female Officer Candidate School**

NTM-A continues to work with the ANA to increase female recruitment, as female security forces play a key role in enhancing the credibility and effectiveness of security forces. The development of female officers in the ANA through the female Officer Candidate School is a particular focus of these efforts.

Female OCS now offers two additional choices for branch school training for cadets to expand their options for future employment within the ANA. In addition to finance and logistics, cadets can now choose signals or human resources. All four courses incorporate a ten-week training program and are conducted in the female OCS Malalai Company compound at KMTC. In an important step towards the sustainment of a robust female presence in the ANA, twenty female students in the logistics and finance classes were instructed by two female 2nd Lieutenant ANA Platoon Commanders within Malalai Company in April and May 2011.

In the future, Malalai Company is expected to offer more occupation courses to the female cadets, such as medical assistant and driver training. Additionally, plans for female contact with male officer candidates during training are being considered. Coeducational courses may be an option to better prepare female officer candidates to work with their male counterparts upon graduation. These plans are currently at the early stages of discussion and have not been implemented.

**Equipping**

Building a sustainable combat capacity in the ANA depends on the acquisition and fielding of equipment that allows ANA soldiers to shoot, move, and communicate. NTM-A/CSTC-A’s capacity-building efforts, through the acquisition and fielding of equipment, continue to improve the capability of the ANA.

NTM-A/CSTC-A recently commenced a thorough review of ANA tashkil in order to ensure that the ANA is capable of providing the required security that will be both affordable and sustainable in the future. The initial review identified specific reductions in equipment and associated personnel with the Infantry, Logistics, and Artillery units; as a result of this review, plans for future equipment purchases for the ANA have been adjusted accordingly. Although detailed cost analysis is ongoing, these changes will result in significant savings compared to currently-programmed spending from 2012-2014. The tashkil review process is continuing in
order to identify further efficiencies and savings in other areas, including infrastructure builds and the Mobile Strike Force.

The dynamics of the Afghan COIN battle and terrain necessitate sustainable and reliable vehicles. As a result, vehicles issued to the ANA are to the same standards as those issued to U.S. forces. To date, 29,896 pieces of rolling stock in 64 variants have been issued to the ANA. Key High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) variants being acquired and issued to the ANA include the HMMWV with Troop Enclosure; the HMMWV Weapons Carrier; the HMMWV Cargo Truck; and the HMMWV ambulance. Additionally, the ANA has fielded other light and medium tactical vehicles. A high-visibility vehicle that will be fielded to the ANA beginning this fall is the Mobile Strike Force Vehicle (MSFV); there are 73 inbound MSFVs between now and March 2012.

Individual weapons are also to U.S. standard, while crew-served weapons are a combination of former Warsaw Pact weapons and U.S. standard weapons including the 9mm pistol, DShK, SPG-9, M4 and M16, M249, M240B, 50 caliber machine gun, various mortars, and the D-30 towed artillery systems.

There are ten different types of communications equipment currently being fielded to the ANA as well as night vision devices, which also fall into the “communicate” category. The night vision devices consist of ATN 2is, PVS-7s, and AVS-9s. Notably, NTM-A/CSTC-A is issuing the highest quality (1400 resolution) night vision devices to ANA Special Forces units. Reinforcement of accounting procedures for these highly sensitive items is ongoing.

As new units are fielded through the consolidated fielding center, the ANA is reaching an all-time high of equipment fielding rates. The majority of the units deploying out of the fielding center are leaving with more than 95 percent of their assigned equipment, a significant increase from the end of the previous reporting period in March 2011. Additionally, NTM-A/CSTC-A continues to backfill units that did not receive their full allocation when they initially were fielded according to priorities established by IJC.

**LOGISTICS CAPABILITY**

Due to a continued heavy reliance on coalition support, the development of the ANA’s logistics capacity and capability remains a major focus area for 2011. NTM-A/CSTC-A, in coordination with the MoD, continues to develop a logistics strategy that addresses structure, policy, training, acquisition/procurement, supply, maintenance, distribution, and logistics automation, with the ultimate goal of enabling the ANA to assume responsibility for national logistics and maintenance requirements.

As the ANA continues to develop its logistics capacity, it maintains an emphasis on stewardship and accountability. After completion of the DoD Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) vehicle audit in May 2011, the ANA started a 100 percent inventory of all weapons. Although the effort to account for 100 percent of the vehicles in the ANA is currently ongoing, these ANA-led operations demonstrate the ANA’s commitment to asset

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15 These include HF Base Stations and Vehicle Mounted RT7000s; HF Man Pack PRC 1099s; VHF Base Stations; Vehicle Mounted and Man Pack PRC1077s; VHF Handheld M1070/HH7700; Field Switch Boards and TA312 Tactical Telephones.
accountability and transparency. Beyond the vehicles and weapons, the ANA is preparing for another 100 percent inspection of communications equipment.

In June 2011, the first ANA-led logistics conference was held in Kabul for two days. It was a successful event, attended by more than 300 ANA logistics officers. It included direction from both the Chief and Vice Chief of the General Staff and discussion on how to improve the ANA logistics functions.

In an important sign of progress toward self-sufficiency, at the beginning of solar year 1390, the ANA transitioned from a completely contracted maintenance and repair parts system to one that is led by Afghans at the organizational level and supported by contractors at the general support level. Additionally, NTM-A/CSTC-A is helping the ANA fill the supply system with vehicle repair parts to help energize the maintenance process.

Although rapidly maturing at the national depot level, the ANA logistics system is still being developed at the regional level. The national ANA logistics function is made up of the Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Ministry, which comprises the ANA Logistics Command, GSG4, Logistics Policy, and Acquisition and Technology Departments respectively. The ANA Logistics Command is the centerpiece of logistics throughout Afghanistan and comprises the national depots, the Logistics Support Operations Center, and the Forward Support Group.

Training at the combat service support kandak-level has increased the ANA capability to conduct vehicle and equipment repairs, but is currently insufficient to address the backlog of deadline vehicles. The introduction of an automated maintenance tracking system has led to increased visibility of maintenance needs as well as the capability to measure operational readiness; however, this system requires additional emphasis and training to prepare the ANA to leverage the capability. The ANA has continued to increase the accuracy of requisitions for parts at the national depots and also has increased the overall volume of cargo shipped to regional forward supply depots. A backlog of almost 590 containers of repair parts in the transportation system has been eliminated, providing the ANA logistics systems many of the parts necessary to increase its overall operational readiness and combat effectiveness.

**AFGHAN AIR FORCE**

In June 2010, President Karzai re-designated the Afghan National Army Air Corps as the Afghan Air Force (AAF). Although the change in designation does not make the AAF independent from the ANA, it does affirm the Afghan Government’s intent to eventually return the Air Force to its former independent status.

The AAF’s long-term development strategy includes the creation of an air force that can support the needs of the ANSF and the Afghan Government by 2016. This force will be capable of Presidential airlift, air mobility, rotary and fixed-wing close air support, casualty evacuation, and aerial reconnaissance. The AAF also plans to be able to sustain its capacity through indigenous training institutions, including a complete education and training infrastructure. The air fleet will consist of a mix of Russian and Western airframes. Afghan airmen will operate in accordance with NATO procedures, and will be able to support the Afghan Government effectively by
employing all of the instruments of COIN airpower. This plan, however, is ambitious, and is indicative of the tension between Afghan Government aspirations, necessity, and affordability.

**BUILDING AFGHAN AIR FORCE CAPABILITY**

The NATO Air Training Command – Afghanistan (NATC-A) focuses on building Afghanistan’s airpower along four lines of operation: aircraft build, airmen build, infrastructure build, and operational capability.

The AAF infrastructure build has made significant progress during the reporting period. NATC-A delivered more than 22 new facilities totaling approximately $22M to the AAF to support the development of a self-sustaining force. To date, approximately $320M in AAF facility and infrastructure improvements have been completed out of a total requirement of $695M (46 percent).

The aircraft build has made modest progress. The AAF plans for a fleet of 145 aircraft once fully fielded in 2016; as of this report, the AAF had 59 of these aircraft, including 33 Mi-17 helicopters, nine Mi-35 attack helicopters, and 12 C-27 airlifters.

The AAF fleet and airpower reflects the Afghan Government’s COIN priorities. The C-27 is the AAF’s first modern, all-weather-capable aircraft. The Mi-17 is an effective rotary-wing airframe ideally suited to operations in Afghanistan due to its durable structure and lift capacity at high altitude. The Mi-35 provides an indigenous, albeit limited, close air support capability for the ANSF.

In conjunction with the AAF, NTM-A/CSTC-A has planned and funded a comprehensive aircraft acquisition and modernization plan. By 2016, the Mi-17 fleet will grow to 56. Discussions are underway to extend the service life of the Mi-35, which will allow this airframe to remain in the AAF inventory through 2016. Finally, the key acquisitions include:

- Replacement of the AAF’s Antonov An-32 by the C-27A aircraft, a turboprop, fixed-wing airlifter. Twelve C-27A’s are currently on-hand, and eight additional aircraft are expected to be delivered by 2012.
- Six initial flight training rotary wing aircraft, three of which have been delivered. The three remaining aircraft are expected to be delivered by the end of October 2011.
- Procurement of up to 32 “Cessna-like” fixed-wing aircraft for initial flight and basic fixed-wing screening, expected to be delivered by fiscal year 2013.
- Light Air Support aircraft (fixed wing, turbo prop, with close air support and ISR capacity); the last platform being procured is currently in source selection with an expected contract award date of December 2011.

In addition to the aircraft build, the AAF continues its airmen build line of operation, which focuses on the development of an experienced, professional AAF, including an instructor cadre that can provide pilot and technical training. The AAF continues to grow at a steady pace, ending the reporting period at 4,956 personnel, a growth of 715 personnel since the end of the previous reporting period in March 2011. The Afghans and NTM-A/CSTC-A also continue to research opportunities to bolster both the AAF NCO and officer corps in an effort to develop the
force in both quantity and quality as it grows to the proposed end strength of 8,040 personnel. One of the key growth areas will be the gradual replacement of out-of-country training by building an indigenous, Afghan-led training capacity, which is essential for the long-term sustainment of the AAF.

Factors limiting this growth include education levels, English language requirements, and pilot training. These factors also limit the AAF’s ability to produce personnel who are able to perform the technically-advanced specialties required for aircraft maintenance and airfield support. Attrition stands near 1.4 percent per month, which is an acceptable level to maintain necessary professional and technical skills.

**AAF Operational Capability**

As of September 2011, the AAF was rated as CM-4 (exists but cannot accomplish its mission). Nevertheless, there were notable signs of progress during the reporting period. Of particular note, the AAF has begun medical evacuation operations, providing patient transport from austere locations to regional medical centers. Although missions still require advisor oversight/support, this has been a key step towards building the foundation for a fully functional AAF medical evacuation capability. The operational capacity of each of the three wings of the AAF – Kabul, Kandahar, and Shindand – is detailed below.

Kabul Air Wing is assessed as CM-4, with the immaturity of the manning and training processes being the largest factors in this rating. Current Kabul aircraft include: 12 C-27s, 11 Mi-17s, and 11 Mi-35s. Equipment deliveries are ongoing, but the Wing is still waiting on additional deliveries of Mi-17 and light attack aircraft.

Kandahar Air Wing (KAW) is assessed as CM-4, with shortages in equipment, personnel, and facilities. KAW currently has seven of the planned 11 Mi-17s and is currently supporting two C-27’s on a rotational basis with the Kabul Air Wing, which is intended to assist in developing requirements in preparation for the permanent basing of the C-27. KAW has yet to receive the Light Lift Aircraft and the Light Air Support aircraft missions. Facility construction for the KAW will continue into late 2011.

Although Shindand Air Wing is assessed as CM-4, it has grown significantly over the past several months. In June, the base grew to more than three times its original size and became the second largest airfield in Afghanistan. Shindand is currently undergoing its Phase I infrastructure build, including a “Thunder Lab” for English Language Training and an NTM-A advisor compound. Construction on a second runway to handle strategic mobility and training aircraft will begin at the end of 2011.

**2.7: Afghan National Police Capacity and Growth**

**Manning**

As of September 2011, the ANP had reached an end-strength of 136,122 patrolmen, exceeding its October 2011 growth goal ahead of schedule. This force includes 21,704 officers, 34,414 non-commissioned officers, 73,853 patrolmen, and 6,151 initial entry trainees.
Despite indicating positive developments in ANP force generation, NTM-A recently determined that 3,940 officers and 6,733 patrolmen were filling NCO billets; large numbers of officers and patrolmen placed against vacant NCO positions overstates the development of the NCO ranks. Removing officers and patrolmen from NCO-designated positions would result in an actual officer strength at 102 percent, patrolmen strength at 113 percent, and NCO-assigned strength at 66.7 percent against authorized positions. NTM-A and IJC, along with ANP leadership, will focus on growing the NCO corps by 12,700 in order to close this gap.

Figure 12: ANP End-Strength (September 2010 – September 2011)

The ANP attrition reporting model (derived from the ANA model) accounts for killed in action, non-hostile death, disappeared/captured, disabled, and Dropped from Rolls (DFR). Patrolmen, NCOs, and officers are reported as AWOL after 24 hours, and are designated as DFR after 20 days of AWOL for officers and NCOs, and after 30 days of AWOL for patrolmen. Since adopting this attrition model, the ANP reported an average monthly attrition rate of 1.5 percent over the past six months.

Although overall attrition in the ANP has remained near target levels for the past year, high attrition continues to challenge the ANCOP in particular, which has experienced an annual attrition rate of 33.8 percent; although this has decreased significantly from 120 percent annual rate in November of 2009, it remains above the accepted rate for long-term sustainment of the force.
AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL CIVIL ORDER POLICE

The premiere police force in Afghanistan, ANCOP patrolmen operate in a primarily military capacity in response to significant events and deploy in support of large-scale military operations throughout the country. As of September 2011, the total strength for the ANCOP was 14,400 personnel, including policemen in training.

Despite current attrition levels, the ANCOP continues to meet growth objectives through sustained recruiting, command emphasis on reducing attrition, and predictable operational employment through the force generation cycle. Notably, the force has recently established a re-hire program which has resulted in the return of 142 personnel to the ANCOP since July. The Commander of the ANCOP is actively engaged on attrition and is initiating new processes to reduce attrition rates and ensure that leaders are held accountable for poor performance. These efforts continue to produce results, and ANCOP leadership and professional development initiatives are emerging as important examples for other Afghan-led efforts. In addition to these initiatives, multiple commander, functional staff, and senior NCO seminars have been held to improve policy and system process development at all levels. Individual officer and NCO development continues at all levels through attendance at command and staff courses, logistics and specialty training, and literacy training.

At any given time, there are 10 ANCOP battalions supporting coalition and MoI operations, primarily in southern and eastern Afghanistan. The ANCOP has received the highest density of coalition partnering during training and employment cycles, which has resulted in a highly-effective operational force. As a national police force rotating from outside areas, it has avoided the corruption that once seen in other police pillars. Although ANCOP units’ effectiveness initially suffered from runaway attrition that stemmed largely from extended deployments and high operations tempo, the adoption of a 12-week recovery and retraining period between deployments has improved this situation.

AFGHAN BORDER POLICE

As of September 2011, the Afghan Border Police (ABP) end strength was 20,852 personnel. The ABP remains on schedule to meet all growth objectives for officers and patrolmen, but remains short of NCOs, with only 3,800 of an assigned total of 5,600. This shortfall, as well as the shortfall of untrained patrolmen, remains the primary focus for training efforts. ABP attrition has consistently remained below 2.5 percent monthly over the last 8 months (February 2011 – September 2011).

Of particular note during the reporting period, ABP leadership took part in the first country-wide Border Coordination Conference, co-hosted by Ministry of Finance and ISAF Headquarters. The ABP Director of Operations presented an overview of force needs, which was greater than the 157,000 ANP force cap will likely allow. The ABP continue to work with NTM-A and international community partners to finalize detailed supporting justification for core ABP force requirements in preparation for the Command Plan Review in early August, the results of which are still being analyzed. Expectation management within competitive zero-sum growth across police pillars is a crucial part of this continued interaction.
**AFGHAN UNIFORM POLICE**

The Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) is the largest of the Afghan police pillars; as of September 2011, the AUP end strength was 79,432 personnel. The AUP is on schedule to meet all growth objectives for officers and patrolmen, and is capable of achieving 98 percent of its 2011 NCO objectives under current training fill rates.

Untrained patrolmen remain the biggest challenge for the AUP, and NTM-A/CSTC-A and the MoI continue to push the recruiting base in order to ensure all available training seats are used. As of September 2011, the AUP had a total of 11,919 untrained patrolmen and NCOs. AUP attrition remains the lowest of all police pillars at 1.3 percent, and has consistently remained below the monthly attrition objective of 1.4 percent for the last 11 months (November 2010 – September 2011).

**SPECIAL FORCES**

The MoI contains several special operations forces that work with ISAF Special Operations Forces (SOF) in support of the COIN strategy.

Provincial Response Companies are provincially-based special police units that specialize in civil order security and high-risk arrests. They are partnered with ISAF SOF and U.S. forces for training and operations. ISAF SOF also partners with other special police units, such as Commando Force 333, a special police commando unit originally developed by UK Special Forces for counternarcotics and interdiction, but now considered a multi-functional commando force capable of high-risk arrests. Additionally, Task Force 444 is a national task force developed by UK Special Forces to conduct operations in Helmand Province. The Crisis Response Unit, a national response unit based in Kabul, is partnered with ISAF SOF in high-risk arrest and hostage rescue missions primarily in the capital region.

**TRAINING**

Between April 1, 2011 and September 30, 2011, ANP training capacity increased from 12,822 to nearly 14,500, and is expected to reach approximately 16,000 by the end of December 2011. NTM-A/CSTC-A continues to seek efficiencies while developing the necessary capacity to grow the size of the ANP and professionalize the force. Training is currently conducted at 32 formal training sites, but this total will eventually decrease to approximately 12 sites in 2014 as the permanent training base is established and temporary sites are closed. Across all police pillars and all courses, 18,016 students have graduated since the beginning of April 2011.

The establishment and transformation of the Training and Education Department from the MoI to the Afghan National Police Training General Command (ANPTGC) was scheduled to be complete by May 2010, but this was postponed as a result of delays in the selection of a commander, site location, and tashkil approval. Although a commander is now in place, an important part of achieving an initial operating capability is a reorganization of the solar year 1390 ANPTGC tashkil and the addition of 1,000 more positions.

ANPTGC requested an additional 1,000 positions under Command Plan Review for solar year 1391, and the Minister of Interior recently approved a total of 1,123 ANPTGC positions for the
solar years 1390 and 1391. *Tashkil* 1390 (approved for 859 positions) must be published as soon as possible by the MoI in order to start the development of ANPTGC Headquarters and the overall command. Over the next quarter, a comprehensive planning process will be undertaken jointly with ANPTGC Headquarters to assess how best to restructure the whole command in order to balance ANP training objectives while remaining within the *tashkil* resource constraints. The result will be a new series of 1391 *tashkil* for all ANPTGC Headquarters and training sites.

Overall, training efforts continue to support the development of a professional ANP. In this effort, the ANP Professional Development Board continues to standardize its plans of instruction across all three police pillars. As training increasingly focuses on professionalization, the levels of growth seen over the last year will begin to decline. Current projections have 20,000 graduating from training centers between September and the end of 2011.

**WOMEN’S POLICE INITIATIVES**

Women currently account for less than one percent of the total ANP force. As of September 2011, there were 1,204 female members of the ANP, 471 patrolwomen, 541 NCOs, and 192 officers. Women are likely to remain underrepresented in the ANP for the foreseeable future; the ANP failed to meet its recruiting goal in 2010, and only 131 women have been recruited to date in 2011. In the absence of a concerted effort to recruit, train, and assign females to policing positions within the ANP, efforts will continue to fall below expectations and will not achieve the goal of 5,000 women by the year 2014 as set forth in MoI Decree 55.16

The Gender and Human Rights Department of the MoI has taken initiative to address the issue of gender equality in the ANP by creating bi-weekly recruitment meetings at the MoI with representatives from several departments, including recruiting, training, personnel, and *tashkil* members, and to clarify ambiguities with respect to pre-requisites and necessary qualifications. The meetings aim to develop strategies for a targeted recruitment campaign where gender concerns will be addressed. Problems with funding for the recruitment campaign have been resolved and the program is expected to progress as planned.

The training of untrained policewomen is ongoing, and the National Police Academy and the Women Police Corps Training Centre in Jalalabad have graduated a total of 38 women in the basic patrolman course. Additionally, the National Police Academy conducted two basic patrolman courses for untrained police women during this period.

**EQUIPPING**

Building a capable and sustainable ANP depends on acquiring the equipment necessary to support the three basic police functions: shoot, move, and communicate. Accordingly, significant equipment uplift for the ANP began during the reporting period, which is expected to increase the ANP’s on-hand equipment to approximately 80 percent by the spring of 2012. Despite progress, however, the ANP remains underequipped as a result of fielding challenges. Due to these shortages, the MoI has developed fielding priorities based on operational requirements. To address the delay in processing supply/equipment requests, the MoI Material

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16 MoI Decree 55, signed in September 2010, aimed to increase the number of women serving in the ANP to 5,000 over the next five years, establishing an annual goal of 1,000 additional women per year until 2014.
Management Center established a Customer Care Center in April 2011. This single point-of-entry clearing house for supply/equipment requests has been a success, significantly reducing response times.

Notable equipping developments during the reporting period include the fielding of high frequency, very-high frequency, ultra-high frequency and wired communications equipment in order to improve command and control. To date, more than 45,000 handheld, mobile, and base station radios and networking equipment have been delivered in support of the ANP. Computer networks have been fielded to all six operational regional headquarters, as well as to 26 of 34 provincial headquarters. The thickening of networks to the district-level will continue under a network expansion contract that began in the summer of 2010, and the Regional Support Team initiative, which includes the forward deployment of six communications specialists to each region to support an increased pace of network development.

Night vision devices and other higher end equipment continued to be issued to the ANP Special Forces, the addition of which will dramatically increase the capability of ANP Special Forces to conduct high-risk counterterrorism and counternarcotics missions. Sensitive items such as night vision devices require monthly inventory; the Department of Defense Inspector General verified Afghan adherence to this policy during a July 2011 audit. The ANP also has a monthly inventory requirement for a variety of explosive ordnance device/counter-IED and personnel protective equipment items.

**LOGISTICS CAPABILITIES**

As a result of a deliberate decision to place the initial focus of force generation on producing patrolmen, the development of enablers, in particular logistics capabilities, has been delayed; thus, the ANP logistics system is still being developed and is not expected to be fully self-sufficient until late 2014. However, as force growth remains on schedule to meet end-strength goals, NTM-A/CSTC-A began to shift its efforts to logistics development in 2011, which will continue to be a key focus in 2012.

The ANP’s logistics system remains particularly limited, both in facility development and in assigned and trained logistics personnel. The biggest challenge in developing logistics support to the ANP is the hiring and training of civilian personnel, as civilians make up 50 percent of the logistics workforce. Civilian hiring will continue to be a challenge until the MoI institutes civil service reforms.

Also during the reporting period, the MoI Transportation Battalion was expanded to a transportation brigade. The new capability will allow the MoI to reduce its reliance on commercially-contracted vehicles and rely on its own capacity to sustain the ANP force, which has the additional benefit of reducing transportation costs.

As it builds its logistics capability, the ANP continues to emphasize accountability. All property acquired by the MoI and ANP from any source, whether paid for or donated, must be accounted for in accordance with Afghan policy and procedures. All materiel is recorded in stock records and property books, assigned to individuals or organizations by hand receipts. In accordance with MoI Department of Logistics policy, the ANP conducts monthly 100 percent serial number
inventories for all weapon types, and the Logistics Department of the MoI reconciles the on-hand weapons serial numbers of each unit with their receipt records and the property book.

The ANP’s emphasis on accountability has been reflected in several successful audits during the reporting period. SIGAR conducted an audit to evaluate ANP vehicle accountability, which audited documentation and physical inventories for equipment issued between October 2007 and December 2010. The results of the audit demonstrated the ANP to be effective stewards of its resources, as SIGAR found the ANP were 100 percent for “Proof of Issue” and 96.8 percent for “Proof of Location.”

2.8: FIELDED FORCE PARTNERING, OPERATIONS, AND ASSESSMENT

ANA AND ANP PARTNERING

Following the initial recruitment and training of Afghan soldiers and police by NTM-A/CSTC-A, the operational development of the ANSF is the responsibility of IJC. Partnering and mentoring teams from IJC provide a critical bridge from the individual and collective training received during basic training and various specialty schools to the practical necessities of operating in a combat environment, where partnering and mentoring teams coach, teach, mentor, and support operational planning and employment of the ANA or ANP unit to which they are partnered.

The current partnering definitions detail four types of relationships between partnered ISAF and ANSF units: Embedded Partnering, Partnering, Mentoring, and Uncovered.

Figure 13: ANSF-ISAF Partnering Definitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partnering Relationship</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Embedded Partnering</td>
<td>Combined Team units in which a trust-based, assigned relationship exists where both share the same battle space and live together on the same installation. The Partner Units share the same goal of building capacity and capability of the ANSF Unit to achieve Operational Effectiveness of Effective w/ Assistance or better whilst working together to defeat the insurgency. The IJC Partner Unit shares comprehensive operations guidance, strategy, information, intelligence, and IJC tactical directives with its ANSF counterpart. Partnership includes an active mentoring role and the primary readiness oversight responsibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnering</td>
<td>Combined Team units in which a trust-based, assigned relationship exists where both share the same battle space but do not live together on the same installation. The Partner Units share the same goal of building capacity and capability of the ANSF Unit to achieve Operational Effectiveness of Effective w/ Assistance or better whilst working together to defeat the insurgency. The IJC Partner Unit shares comprehensive operations guidance, strategy, information, intelligence, and IJC tactical directives with its ANSF counterpart. Partnership includes an active mentoring role and the primary readiness oversight responsibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mentoring</td>
<td>Combined Team units in which an assigned relationship exists where both share the same goal of building capacity and capability of the ANSF Unit to achieve Operational Effectiveness of Effective w/ Assistance or better. The IJC Partner Unit shares no comprehensive operations guidance, strategy, information, intelligence and IJC tactical directives with its ANSF counterpart. Partnership is primarily an active mentoring role.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncovered</td>
<td>Coalition unit not present / assigned. ANSF Unit is uncovered.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Successful Transition of the lead for security responsibilities to the ANSF is heavily dependent on a healthy, sustained partnering and advising relationship. These security assistance relationships create the conditions by which ANA and ANP forces can develop and become effective in defeating the insurgency, providing security for the local population, and fostering legitimacy for the Afghan Government. These relationships provide the ANSF with the ability to operate in a complex, counterinsurgency environment while also providing operational space and timing to man, equip, and absorb critical training. As the ANSF continues to grow and the U.S. and coalition forces begin to draw down, the gap between the requirements for partnering and available resources will grow. This gap threatens to undermine force development and may pose a risk to the Transition process. As a result, IJC is currently reviewing all partnering relationships to align with projected force levels and ensure resources are used to the greatest effect in the areas where they are most needed.

As of September 30, 2011, there are seven critical shortfalls for the ANA and 88 shortfalls in the ANP in focus districts (31 AUP, 22 ANCOP, and 35 ABP). These shortfalls do not account for U.S. forces departing theater without backfills due to the ongoing surge recovery, and shortfalls are expected to increase as U.S. and coalition forces continue to draw down. The figure below depicts the partnering status of fielded ANA kandaks and headquarters.

**Figure 14: ANA Partnering Status**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Command</th>
<th>Embedded Kandaks</th>
<th>Embedded HQ</th>
<th>Partnered Kandaks</th>
<th>Partnered HQ</th>
<th>Mentored Kandaks</th>
<th>Mentored HQ</th>
<th>Uncovered Kandaks</th>
<th>Uncovered HQ</th>
<th>Total Partnered Kandaks</th>
<th>Total Partnered HQ</th>
<th>Total Reported Kandaks</th>
<th>Total Reported HQ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RC Capital</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC East</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC West</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC North</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC Southwest</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC South</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commando</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>38</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
<td><strong>69</strong></td>
<td><strong>17</strong></td>
<td><strong>38</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
<td><strong>145</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
<td><strong>160</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grand Totals: 175 | 190

Source: IJC CUOPS Security Partnering CUAT CYCLE 10
As of Date: 06 August 2011

NOTE: Partnering numbers differ from the Effectiveness numbers due to shortages in partners/mentors.

In the ANP, the partnering shortfall is currently 88 partnering teams in key terrain districts and area of interest districts (AUP-31, ANCOP-22, and ABP-35). There is an additional shortfall of 129 POMLTs in low-priority locations. The table below depicts the partnering status of priority ANP units.
ANSF OPERATIONS AND ASSESSMENT PROCESS

Assessing performance in contingency operations is one of the most important methods of evaluating the progression of the ANSF. A partnered contingency operation is a discreet event in which ISAF and ANSF units work together in the planning and execution of a combined joint tactical operation. The number and type of these operations, and whether they are Afghan-led, are monitored in ISAF’s campaign assessment framework. Both partnering and operational partnering efforts are aimed at improving the overall operational effectiveness of ANSF units, while at the same time protecting the population and accomplishing overall campaign objectives. ANSF-led operations, where the ANSF plans and conducts an operation unilaterally, are the goal of partnering relationships. When the ANSF is capable of not only planning, preparing, and executing missions, but are also able to incorporate other ANSF elements for a joint operation and coordinate their activities, the unit is performing exceptionally well.

There are four types of operations: 1) ANA Partnered (ANA conducted the operation jointly with ISAF forces); 2) ANP Partnered (AUP, ABP or ANCOP conducted the operation jointly with ISAF forces); 3) Joint ANSF Partnered (ANA and ANP conducted the operation jointly with ISAF forces); and 4) ANSF Led (ANSF conducted the mission with support from ISAF forces). There are three levels of contingency operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level 0</th>
<th>Day-time deliberate pre-planned forced entry required (progressive “soft-knock” and “hard-knock”)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political consequences offer minimum potential of prejudicial IO, media, or political impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 1</td>
<td>Operations involving entry into houses or compounds at night to include deliberate pre-planned forced entry required (progressive “soft-knock” and &quot;hard-knock&quot;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May have minor to moderate unfavorable regional media impact, detrimental IO and/or undesirable political consequences, manageable at the regional level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2</td>
<td>Pre-planned kinetic operations within 10km of border with Pakistan or Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SOF conducting deliberate operations with company size force or greater within 1km of border with Pakistan, or 10km of border with Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arrest, apprehension, or detainment of any current or prominent former Afghan Government appointed official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Potential for collateral damage, unfavorable media impact, severely detrimental IO, and/or undesirable political consequences at the national level</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Over the past six months, there has been a general increase in the number of partnered operations as well as an increase in the number of ANSF-led operations.\(^\text{17}\)

**Figure 16: Partnered and ANSF-led Operations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Level 1 Operations with ANSF</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Level 2 Operations with ANSF</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 1 and 2 Partnered Operations Combined</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Level 1 ANSF and ISAF</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Level 2 ANSF and ISAF</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 1 and 2 ANSF and ISAF Operations</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total ANSF Led Level 1 Operations</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ANSF Led Level 2 Operations</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ANSF Led Level 1 and 2 Operations</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Level 1 ANSF Led</td>
<td>16.55%</td>
<td>9.64%</td>
<td>18.92%</td>
<td>26.67%</td>
<td>33.67%</td>
<td>38.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Level 2 ANSF Led</td>
<td>20.00%</td>
<td>18.18%</td>
<td>28.57%</td>
<td>37.50%</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>14.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total % of ANSF Led</td>
<td>17.36%</td>
<td>11.11%</td>
<td>18.75%</td>
<td>27.71%</td>
<td>33.65%</td>
<td>36.48%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The majority of partnered operations occur in Regional Commands South, Southwest, and East; however, ANSF-led operations typically occur in Regional Commands South, East, and North. These types of trends, used in conjunction with the operational readiness data, provide a comprehensive understanding of the ability of the ANSF to operate unilaterally. For example, Regional Commands with a high number of Level 1 or Level 2 partnered operations and few ANSF-led operations are likely relying more heavily on coalition forces for assistance.

The Commander’s Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT) and Rating Definition Levels (RDLs) are used to assess ANSF operational effectiveness. The report covers quantitative data (Personnel, Equipment and Training) as well as qualitative assessments in Communications, Equipping, Intelligence, Logistics, Leadership, Maintenance, Operations, Personnel, Partnering, and Training and Education. The report concludes with an overall assessment of operational effectiveness. Each assessment area uses the RDL scale and is supported with comments from the coalition partner assigned to the ANSF unit.

The assessment process has been modified to include a thorough evaluation of operational performance. These details will allow IJC to consider the volume of long-term coalition assistance required throughout theater. As units move towards independence, the use of coalition enablers must be continually reviewed, revised, and planned. This expanded portion of the CUAT will assist in that process. As the assessment process has been refined, the reliability of the data has concurrently improved.

Long-term reforms to the operational assessment process include a separation of ANA and ANP reports. Currently, the CUAT report template is standardized regardless of the ANSF element. In early 2012, the ANP CUAT report, with the support of the IPCB, will target ANP specific operations and will begin collecting data on community policing and rule of law capabilities.

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\(^{17}\) August data decreases due to Ramadan and should not be considered an indicator of change.
Prior to the spring campaign, IJC reviewed the definition of an Independent unit and concluded that the definition was too restrictive and would be difficult for any ANSF element to attain. As a result, IJC rewrote the definition of an Independent unit to reflect the reality that most ANSF force enablers will likely require long-term coalition assistance. Within each of the ratings below, there are detailed explanations and parameters to guide the partner or advisor in properly assigning an RDL. In addition, the Independent rating was renamed Independent with Advisors in order to emphasize that an assistance relationship must be maintained by coalition forces. The ratings in the next CUAT cycle will incorporate the new names for the RDLs.

**Figure 17: ANSF Rating Definition Levels Summary**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>This unit is able to plan and execute its missions and maintain command and control of subordinate elements, calling on and controlling a QRF and MEDEVAC assets when required. When necessary the unit can call for and integrate joint effects from coalition forces and is capable of exploiting intelligence and operating within a wider intelligence system. Unit personnel and equipment levels are greater than or equal to 75 percent of the authorized strength (Present for Duty) and are sufficient for the unit to undertake its assigned tasks. The unit can operate, account for, and maintain its equipment and meet its basic logistic needs with no assistance from coalition forces. The unit is able to coordinate its operations with other ANSF units and headquarters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective w/Advisors</td>
<td>Effective planning, synchronizing, directing, and reporting of operations and status. Coordinating and communicating with higher, lower, adjacent, and combined/joint units. Maintains effective readiness reports. Leaders, staff, and unit adhere to the ANSF Code of Conduct, and are loyal to the Afghan Government. All unit enablers are present and effective in this unit, and are providing most of the support to the ANSF unit. Coalition forces provide only limited, occasional guidance to the staff. Coalition forces may provide enablers that are missing from higher or lower ANSF levels. Coalition forces augment support only on occasion. Equipment and personnel levels are greater than or equal to 75 percent. OCC P and R are always integrated, and links are usually effective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective w/Assistance</td>
<td>Requires routine mentoring for planning, synchronizing, directing, and reporting of operations and status; coordinating and communicating with higher, lower, adjacent, and combined/joint units; and maintaining effective readiness reports. Leaders, staff, and most of the unit adhere to the ANSF Code of Conduct, and are loyal to the Afghan Government. Most unit enablers are present and effective. Those enablers present are providing most of the support to the ANSF unit. Coalition forces may provide enablers that are missing from this level, and augment enabler support at this level. Equipment and personnel levels are greater than or equal to 65 percent. OCC P and R are usually integrated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing</td>
<td>Requires partner unit presence and assistance for planning, synchronizing, directing, and reporting of operations and status; coordinating and communicating with higher, lower, adjacent, and combined/joint units; and maintaining effective readiness reports. Leaders and most of the staff usually adhere to the ANSF Code of Conduct, and are loyal to the Afghan Government. Some unit enablers are present and effective at this level of unit. Those present provide some of the support to the ANSF unit. Coalition forces provide the missing enablers and most of the support at this level. Equipment and personnel levels are less than or equal to 65 percent. OCC P and R are usually integrated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Established</td>
<td>This unit is at the beginning of organization. It is barely capable of planning, synchronizing, directing, or reporting operations and status, even with the presence and assistance of a partner unit. It is barely able to coordinate and communicate with higher, lower, adjacent, and combined/joint units. It has barely effective or missing personnel, logistics, training, or readiness reports. Leadership and staff may not adhere to the ANSF Code of Conduct, or may not be loyal to the Afghan Government. Most of this unit’s enablers are not present or are barely effective. Those enablers present provide little or no support to the ANSF unit. Coalition forces provide for the missing enablers and most of the support at this level. Equipment and personnel levels are less than or equal to 50 percent. OCC P and R are sometimes integrated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Assessed</td>
<td>Insufficient data available for complete assessment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ANA Operations and Assessment**

The overall operational effectiveness of the ANA continues to improve. In August 2011, the total number of reporting ANA units in the field increased to 204, and the number of units achieving an operational effectiveness rating of “Effective with Assistance” or higher was sustained at 147; alternatively, 37 units (18 percent) of fielded ANA units are in the lowest assessment categories, “Developing” or “Established,” due to an inability to perform their mission or the immaturity of a newly-fielded unit. Even the ANA’s highest-rated kandak, 2nd kandak, 2nd Brigade, 205th Corps, which achieved the rating of “Independent,” remains dependent on ISAF for combat support and combat enablers. In locations without a large ISAF footprint, the ANA has exhibited little improvement and there is little reporting on their operational strengths and weaknesses. These units are typically located in the west and far northeast regions.
It is unusual for ANA units to operate completely independently; nevertheless, there are several instances of ANA units operating with limited ISAF support. For example, on August 18, two explosions involving two Afghan civilian vehicles occurred in Obeh District, Herat Province. In response, the 207th ANA Corps dispatched an Mi-17 helicopter to assess the situation and medical evacuation to transport the wounded to the 207th Corps military hospital. The mission demonstrated the ANSF’s growing capability and was performed with limited ISAF supervision.

Finally, the ANA is gradually developing the capability to conduct its own assessments, and the MoD’s ANSF Combined Assessment Team is currently at initial operating capability. Each RC has an assessment team that is mentored by the Regional VTT. Additionally, the MoD has

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18 The trends of improvement within the ANA war fighting kandaks. This only includes the infantry, CS, CSS, GSU and SOF kandaks. As noted, the increase in “Not Assessed” units in August from 13 to 16 is in direct response to the surge recovery.
mobile teams that are sent out to assess units at the discretion of the MoD leadership. This plan, supported by the MoD, is expected to expand the MoD’s capability and transition all ANA external unit assessments to the MoD.

**ANP OPERATIONS AND ASSESSMENT**

The ANP has demonstrated improvement in its ability to conduct limited, independent policing operations and to coordinate operations with other ANSF elements. These improvements are largely attributable to a number of exogenous factors, including low insurgent threat levels in the given operating environment and ISAF enablers. ISAF mentor reporting shows that the majority of ANP units still rely heavily on coalition assistance, especially in contested areas.

As with the ANA, the operational performance of ANP units is also suffering from U.S. and coalition force reductions. Each of the three ANP pillars saw an increase in the number of units that were not assessed due to recently-fielded units that are not reporting or not partnered due to lack of available coalition forces. Within the ABP, 11 of the 12 units were not assessed due to long standing partnering shortages. Additionally, four ANCOP kandaks located throughout theater were not assessed. Finally, within the AUP in key terrain districts, 17 of the 22 units not assessed were in RC-C.

Public opinion of the ANP continues to improve, specifically in Kabul, where the ANSF assumed security lead in July. The effective response of the ANP to the June complex attack on the Intercontinental Hotel, the August attack on the British Consul, and the September attack on ISAF Headquarters, the U.S. Embassy, and Afghan Government buildings in central Kabul served to further promote this perception. In each attack, the ANSF responded quickly and efficiently, demonstrating their growing capacity and ability to assume security lead in the Transitioning areas.

As of August 2011, 26 ANP units were rated as Independent by the coalition forces. Of these, 22 are AUP, one is ABP, and three are ANCOP. However, they remain classified as “Effective with Advisors” pending validation of their Independent rating.

**Figure 20: ANP Operational Effectiveness Ratings**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating Definition Level (RDL)*</th>
<th>AUP</th>
<th>ABP</th>
<th>ANCOP</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective with Advisors</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective with Assistance</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Established</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Assessed</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td>159</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes AUP field units (no HQs) in Key Terrain Districts, all ANCOP and all ABP.

Source: IJC CTAG Security Partnering CUAT CYCLE 10
As of Date: 10 August 2011
The overall focus within the ANP is the transition to a community policing role. This is a challenge within many districts because the role of the ANP, until recently, has been aligned with that of the ANA. Changing the role of the ANP to a community police force that interacts with the population and is a source of dispute resolution and law enforcement will be challenging, particularly in contested areas. Civilian police mentors from the international community are currently partnering and mentoring the ANP to focus on rule of law as opposed to COIN operations and are the key element in this change.

The partnership between IJC and IPCB will increase the ability to assess civil policing effectiveness. This long-term project seeks to gather police specific data through the CUAT. The IPCB will assist in data reporting by having the Law Enforcement Professionals report in the CUAT, and IJC will assist IPCB by sharing current and historical data. The police experts at the IPCB have also assisted IJC through working together to draft targeted questions within the CUAT that will provide a focused reporting of ANP units. These questions focus on law enforcement operations such as receiving and recording complaints, making arrests, seizing and securing seized property, referring cases to the informal (tribal) and formal (courts) justice system, and community contacts not associated with reported complaints (e.g., school visits).

Currently, the MoI Force Readiness Report is the Afghan system for reporting ANP data. Unfortunately, at this time, the report only focuses on the statistics for personnel and equipment: shoot, move and communicate. There are no ratings associated with the data and no commander’s assessment or narrative comments to describe issues and challenges. The positive aspect of the report is that the MoI collects, aggregates, and builds its own reporting products with minimal coalition oversight.

2.9: BUDGET

**AFGHANISTAN SECURITY FORCES FUND**

The Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) provides funding to grow, train, equip, and sustain the ANSF. In February 2011, President Obama asked Congress to provide an additional $12.8B in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 budget, up from $9.2B in FY 2010 and $11.6B in FY 2011, to continue to grow, equip, and sustain the ANSF.

All NTM-A investment decisions related to equipment and infrastructure must meet the “CAS” criteria: 1) Capable – equipment and infrastructure is sufficient to accomplish ANSF mission requirements; 2) Affordable – equipment and infrastructure is the best value for the cost and not too expensive for the ANSF to operate and maintain; 3) Sustainable – equipment and infrastructure is best suited to operate in the environment of Afghanistan.

ASFF funds are first allocated for the ANA, ANP, and related activities. Within each of these categories, funding is then further divided into infrastructure, equipment, training, and sustainment. As the ANSF grow, NTM-A/CSTC-A will focus its attention on both investment accounts (infrastructure and equipment) and operation accounts (training and sustainment).

As part of the transparency effort associated with these funds, the Government Accountability Office, Department of Defense Inspector General, and the Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction currently have more than 28 audits ongoing. Although important to ensuring transparency and promoting accountability, the associated requirements to support and enable these audits are degrading the ability of NTM-A/CSTC-A to complete its mission.

**INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FUNDING FOR THE ANSF**

The international community also provides funding for the ANSF. In December 2006, NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC) established a trust fund to support the ANA by covering the transportation and installation of donated equipment. In March 2008, the scope of the fund was expanded to include the purchase of required equipment and infrastructure growth and sustainment.

In early 2009, the NAC agreed to further expand the NATO ANA Trust Fund beyond the limitations of ANA development to include funding for sustainment costs. Following the declaration of the NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership in November 2010, an addendum to the ANA Trust Fund was incorporated in support of ANSF Literacy and English Language Training and a Professional Military Education Program. Work is ongoing to include the ANP in the ANA Trust Fund.

Funding for police salaries as well as other police development programs is supported by the United Nations Development Program, which oversees the Law and Order Trust Fund of Afghanistan (LOTFA). From 2002-2010, the international community donated approximately $1.74B to LOTFA, $620M of which was contributed by the United States. The United States continues to work through diplomatic channels and international organizations to encourage allies and partners to help sustain the ANSF, including a challenge that former Secretary Gates first made at the March 2011 NATO Defense Ministerial that ISAF nations commit to contribute €1B annually to the NATO ANA Trust Fund. Nonetheless, the United States will likely continue to provide the preponderance of funding for the ANSF for the foreseeable future.

**Figure 21: Calendar Year 2011 Trust Fund Activity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>€ M</th>
<th>$ M</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NATO ANA Trust Fund Balances</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CY11 Starting Balance</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donations Received CY11</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Project Transfers CY11</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remaining Funds Balance</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NATO ANA Sustainment Fund Balances</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CY11 Starting Balance</td>
<td>14.09</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donations Received CY11</td>
<td>109.77</td>
<td>149.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Project Transfers CY11</td>
<td>93.65</td>
<td>127.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remaining Funds Balance</td>
<td>30.20</td>
<td>41.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NATO ANA Literacy, Education, Professional Military Education Fund Balances</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CY11 Starting Balance</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donations Received CY11</td>
<td>7.34</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Project Transfers CY11</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remaining Funds Balance</td>
<td>7.34</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**DIRECT CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND MINISTRY OF DEFENSE**

In accordance with the goal established at the July 2010 Kabul Conference to expand direct funding to Afghan Ministries in order to build the capacity of the Afghan Government, the Department of Defense approved operating guidelines for providing ASFF funds directly to the security ministries through the Ministry of Finance. The main purposes of direct contributions are to improve MoD and MoI internal budget development and execution processes, strengthen their acquisition planning and procurement capabilities, and improve their capacity to allocate resources across various competing requirements.

In 2011, NTM-A/CSTC-A has allocated direct contributions to expand the capacity of the ministries to procure items in their operations and acquisition accounts. Execution of direct contributions is closely monitored through liaison personnel embedded inside Afghan ministries. NTM-A/CSTC-A cooperates with its Afghan partners to oversee Afghan financial systems, procurement systems, and the requirements process. Improving these key ministerial processes will minimize risks to Transition and develop self-sufficient Afghan security ministries in the long term.

**INTERNATIONAL DONATIONS**

NTM-A/CSTC-A evaluates all infrastructure, equipment, and weapon donations to the Afghan Government to ensure that each satisfies the “CAS” principles: Capable, Affordable, and Sustainable. The MoD or MoI subsequently evaluates, approves, and accepts each donation. NTM-A/CSTC-A also evaluates equipment or munitions offered by a donor nation to verify technical specifications and quality, and works with the Afghan Government to coordinate shipping, receipt, and accountability for all equipment, materials, and munitions.

Since 2002, nearly 50 nations, NATO, and six international funding agencies have contributed over $2.9B in assistance to the Afghan Government, including several notable donations during the reporting period. In May, Croatia and Slovenia concluded an offer to donate 15,000 and 6,880 AK-47 assault rifles, respectively, to the ANP; delivery is expected in October 2011. Additionally, in June, both Australia and the Republic of Korea made monetary donations to the NATO Trust Fund. Australia contributed $40M to support the relocation project for the ANA’s 205th Corps, and the Republic of Korea contributed $30M for the purchase of medical and communications equipment.

Future solicitations will focus on equipment, infrastructure, and monetary donations, as well as literacy training, for the ANSF. The current priorities for these solicitations include personal protective equipment and ammonium nitrate test kits, which will expand the ANSF’s capability to detect explosives made from ammonium nitrate-based fertilizer. Monetary donations are especially important due to the need for contracted institutional training centers, medical facilities, and standardized equipment. Additionally, the development of literate forces has been identified as a critical enabler to building a professional ANSF. The initial success of the NTM-A literacy program will be targeted for long-term sustainment through a dedicated fund with targeted donations.
2.10: INFRASTRUCTURE

Over the past year, NTM-A/CSTC-A has significantly improved its facilities planning capability. For example, in November 2009, there were only 33 engineers assigned to NTM-A/CSTC-A; as of the end of this reporting period, this capacity had increased to more than 100 engineers. Additionally, processes are in place to ensure that disciplined planning principles are met for every funded project; for each installation, NTM-A/CSTC-A has a master plan that describes the intended purpose of each facility and its intended location, and ensures that all facility designs meet ANSF Austere Guidelines, which allows for cost controls in infrastructure projects and ensures facilities are sustainable by Afghan facility engineers after they are Transitioned.

During the reporting period, NTM-A/CSTC-A continued to execute the infrastructure program to support ANA and ANP fielding with an emphasis on building a sustainable facilities maintenance program. In support of this effort, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Air Force Center for Engineering and Environment, and USCENTCOM Contracting Command awarded program management contracts. Working with these execution agents, NTM-A/CSTC-A has initiated several programs to improve construction execution, including quarterly conferences that are conducted with each Regional Command engineer and local ANA and ANP leaders to discuss specific issues in the battle space. Additionally, monthly facilities shuras are held with the MoD and MoI to discuss national-level concerns and issues.

FACILITIES MAINTENANCE

NTM-A/CSTC-A made significant gains with regard to Afghan facility maintenance during the reporting period. The Infrastructure Training Advisory Group (ITAG) is a key embedded training team charged with providing training, advising, and synchronization of Operations and Maintenance (O&M) efforts at ANSF sites in order to ensure future ANSF-led facility sustainment. The initial 22-person ITAG group grew to nearly 50 personnel by the end of September 2011; ITAG teams are currently operating at 16 ANA sites and will expand to include ANP sites in the near future. ITAG will continue to integrate three important components: contracted maintenance, training of Afghan facilities engineers to build the long-term capacity of the Afghans to care for their own facilities, and the development of the garrison management structure that will be responsible on a day-to-day basis.

Besides encouraging growth over the last six months, ITAG has been able to arrive at partial solutions to systemic problems and challenges including manning, training, equipping, and budgeting. Through the force integration process, ITAG was able to increase authorizations for the ANA facility personnel tashkil and improve upon its corresponding equipment set, which will provide the ANA a more effective workforce to maintain its facilities. ITAG recognizes the continuing need for delegating the more technical services such as power plant, waste water treatment, and well operations to contractors; however, a more robust, in-house capability will reduce the need for expensive O&M services.

With respect to training, NTM-A/CSTC-A is finalizing plans for a second semester of trade-specific coursework for approximately 120 students at the MoD’s Construction and Property Management Department. The vocation school, located in Kabul, trains students from both the

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19 “Council”
MoD and the MoI. Complementing this centralized training approach is the increase in contractor and ITAG-led on-job training, the focus of which is more active learning, tailored to specific garrisons. ITAG and Ministerial Development are also working with the ministries on developing training opportunities at local trade schools. This third training option is an Afghan solution and produces more graduates at a cost cheaper than U.S.-contracted instruction.

Also during the reporting period, ITAG added another key task to team with Ministerial Development and interface with the MoD and MoI. Increased interaction with the ministries will help ITAG solve the challenges they face at the garrison level. The transfer of facilities from the national O&M contract to Afghan facility engineers is an area that requires close coordination with ITAG and Ministerial Development. As a test case, ITAG enabled the transition of 17 of 133 buildings at Camp Hero on July 1, 2011. The transfer of this initial set was a major milestone and is the example to follow at every site, especially those with an ITAG presence. Continued support of the ministries will be important for future facility transition progress.

**Facility Management Ministerial Development**

NTM-A/CSTC-A supports a monthly facilities *shura* with the ANA Construction and Property Management Department (CPMD) and the Vice Chief of the General Staff. The facilities *shura* provides a forum to communicate and coordinate facility development and sustainment topics nation-wide to the Army General Staff, to present ANA infrastructure and basing issues that need high-level strategic guidance or decisions, and to inform ANA General Staff of the effects of both coalition and ANA initiatives. Major areas of discussion in the last six months include local installation commander interference with construction contractors, stewardship of resources (particularly water), encroachment of residents onto military property, and finalizing locations of ANA garrisons. In the last two months, CPMD has slowly moved into a lead role in developing the briefing, with coalition engineers in a technical/data support role.

Additionally, the MoI Facility Department’s Organization and Functions Manual is nearly complete. The manual will delineate responsibilities, functions, and relationships for each level of authority within the department. Several new facility management policy and regulation proposals are in draft form and should be completed as the department matures and becomes capable of training and implementation. The initial policies to be implemented will address acceptance and transfer of real property, real property management, reporting, inspections, planning, programming, and budgeting.

NTM-A/CSTC-A is developing a “hub-and-spoke” maintenance model in order to integrate Facilities Management structure vertically through the headquarters, regional, and provincial levels. This design is based on an analysis of the functions required to manage projected end-state facilities throughout the country, and is expected to keep required facility engineer manning to a reasonable level and allow maintenance teams to operate out of the provincial supply points without police pillar interference.

NTM-A/CSTC-A also supports a monthly facilities *shura* with the MoI Facilities Department. The facilities *shura* started in July 2011 and gives the opportunity to communicate and coordinate facility development and sustainment topics nation-wide.
ANA INFRASTRUCTURE

NTM-A/CSTC-A continued construction to field the current Afghan Government-approved end-strength of 195,000 personnel and greatly expanded the total amount of infrastructure under construction. At the end of the reporting period, NTM-A/CSTC-A has 121 projects valued at $2.3B under construction for the ANA. During the reporting period, 60 projects worth $1B were awarded and 16 projects worth $256M were completed. Another 163 projects for $3.2B are actively being planned. Also during the period, construction contracts for the following branch schools were awarded: Engineering, Human Resources and Finance, Signal, Military Police, Intelligence, and Religious and Cultural Affairs.

Final plans for the ANA enabler unit (Signal, Engineering, Military Intelligence, and Mobile Strike Force *kandaks*) facilities were completed with several entering construction in preparation for the fielding of these units in FY 2012. These *kandaks* make up the majority of the personnel increases within the current plan to reach 195,000 soldiers.

Capitalizing on standardized arch-span designs and government-furnished material, the first contract was awarded with both initiatives at the 3/203rd Brigade in Ghazni Province. Construction is expected to be faster while increased commonality across standardized facilities is expected to reduce life cycle costs for the ANA by simplifying maintenance.

Significant steps were made in finalizing permanent infrastructure plans for the 3rd Brigade of the 207th Corps and the 2nd Brigade of the 203rd Corps, two of the last four brigades without firm infrastructure plans (the other two being the 1st Brigade of the 209th Corps and the 4th Brigade of the 203rd Corps). In western Afghanistan, a permanent site was identified at Chesma-e-Dozakh for 3/207 Headquarters and at Moqur for the 3/3/207. In eastern Afghanistan, coalition partners and NTM-A concurred upon an overall plan for permanent infrastructure in all of RC-E, identified Khas Kunar for the permanent site of the 2nd Brigade of the 201st Corps, and began planning courses of action to accommodate a possible 4th Brigade in the 201st Corps.
**ANP INFRASTRUCTURE**

NTM-A/CSTC-A continued the programming and execution of the ANP infrastructure program. NTM-A/CSTC-A is currently constructing over 200 projects worth more than $1.1B to support all police pillars. From April 2011 to September 2011, 39 projects worth $221M were estimated to be awarded and 41 projects worth $111M were completed. Another 300 projects for $2.1B are actively being planned. More than 100 projects are expected to be completed in the next year, greatly increasing the ability of the ANP to provide security and stability to the country.

NTM-A/CSTC-A is planning an additional 266 projects to support the ANP; locations and requirements for these projects are currently being determined in a collaborative process with NTM-A/CSTC-A, MoI, and IJC. The resulting construction will provide facilities for the current approved end-strength of 157,000 police personnel and provide a key cornerstone in the transition to the Afghan Government.

NTM-A/CSTC-A supported the expansion of ANP training by awarding contracts for two of the three Regional Police Training Centers (RPTCs). By adapting the ANA’s Regional Military Training Center design, NTM-A/CSTC-A reduced design time by six months, allowing training goals to be met ahead of schedule. NTM-A/CSTC-A continues to support construction efforts at numerous smaller ANP Regional Training Centers throughout Afghanistan. Completion of the National Police Training Center (NPTC) in Wardak Province is currently anticipated in December 2011. When complete, NPTC will have the capacity to train 3,000 students simultaneously. The National Logistics Center in Wardak will complete construction in the winter 2011, and several Regional Logistics Centers have been completed, with the remainder either under construction or in design.

2.11: PROCUREMENT

**LOCAL ACQUISITION – AFGHAN FIRST**

In 2010, NTM-A formed the Security Assistance Office – Afghanistan (SAO-A), which includes a Local Acquisition and Contract Management Oversight Division. The Local Acquisitions Branch is responsible for buying locally-procured defense articles and services for the ANSF, including uniforms, boots, organizational clothing and individual equipment (with the exception of Kevlar and armor plates), tents, temporary buildings, generators, force protection materials, office supplies, cleaning supplies, kitchen supplies, and furniture.

Prior to 2010, although NTM-A/CSTC-A bought all of these items from Afghan companies, none of them, except uniforms, were made in Afghanistan. Currently, NTM-A/CSTC-A funds contracts with three companies making boots, five companies making uniforms, and three female-owned companies making 23 items of organizational clothing and individual equipment. NTM-A/CSTC-A contracts with four Afghan companies making Connex container-based temporary buildings, two Afghan companies making tents, and two Afghan companies making furniture in the Kabul area. An estimated 5,000 Afghans, including women, are directly employed through these contracts.

In addition to providing jobs, the Afghan First Program reduces procurement costs. Not only do the Afghan firms produce high-quality products at lower cost (savings of about 50 percent for the
boots alone), but local acquisition significantly reduces transportation costs and contributes to stabilization and economic development objectives. The Afghan First program also has the potential to reduce corruption by implementing COMISAF COIN contracting guidance through regular visits to the factories; getting to know the owners, workforce, suppliers, and business processes; understanding cost structures and fair pricing; and vetting through non-governmental organizations.

NTM-A established the Contract Management Oversight Branch within the SAO-A to eliminate several problems highlighted by two Department of Defense Inspector General reports. The first report, released in February 2010, indicated that the Department of State Police Mentor Contract lacked “hands-on oversight” and recommended that the Department of Defense take ownership of the contract to ensure effective management and oversight was in place. The second report, released in May 2010, referenced findings of concern for contingency contracting in Afghanistan, and found that ineffective contractor oversight was a systemic issue that needed to be corrected.

JOINT VENTURES

December 2010 marked another significant event in the Afghan First program: the signing of the first international joint venture facilitated to support ANSF requirements. An Afghan firm and Austrian firm signed a $5M joint venture agreement to produce and certify transformers and other electrical equipment. This was followed in March 2011 by a second joint venture for fire-rated doors and windows involving two Afghan firms and an Indian company. Similar to the transformer joint venture, the Afghan firm will have to meet UL standards, have women in skilled positions, and require the foreign firm to make both a monetary and intellectual property investment.

In support of this effort, NTM-A/CSTC-A leveraged funding from the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations in May 2011 to conduct electrical and manufacturing training at Simorg Homa. This investment will enable a test lab to be established with a goal of producing transformers meeting UL standards with more than 50 percent of its parts locally procured in Afghanistan.

PROCUREMENT MINISTERIAL ADVISING

The SAO-A also includes a Security Cooperation Division with Ministerial Procurement Advising teams that assist the MoD Acquisition Agency and MoI Procurement Department to procure goods and services. Both ministries made significant progress this reporting period in several key procurement areas, and both ministries now make use of internet solicitations, which dramatically increase competition, transparency, and efficiency. The MoD now uses the internet for 100 percent of its Acquisition Agency Headquarters advertisements.

Additionally, the MoD and MoI both began monitoring disbursements on contracts for products and services, and commitments and obligations. This is an essential step in viewing acquisition as a “system-of-systems” consisting of integrated requirements, contracting, and budgeting processes.

20 UL is a global independent safety science company.
Given the MoD still retains an estimated $26.6M in residual Foreign Military Financing funds, the SCD also provides advice and training on how to use the Foreign Military Sales process to procure defense article and services. NTM-A anticipates that the MoD will submit Letters of Request and requirements documents to expend these remaining funds by the end of 2011.

**END-USE MONITORING**

Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act requires the Department of Defense to perform End-Use Monitoring of U.S. defense articles and defense services. Section 1228 of Public Law 110-181 and Section 1225 of Public Law 111-84 further require the establishment of plans and procedures to: 1) register the serial numbers of all small arms; 2) establish an end-use monitoring program of all lethal defense articles; and 3) to maintain a detailed record of the origin, shipping, and distribution of all defense articles provided to the Afghan Government.

This year, Defense Security Cooperation Agency conducted a Golden Sentry Compliance Assessment Visit to assess CSTC-A and the Afghan Government’s compliance with Section 1225 of the NDAA, as well as the terms and conditions for the transfer of night vision devices. CSTC-A and the Afghan Government passed the CAV and received the highest rating possible.
SECTION 3 – TRANSITION

3.1: THE TRANSITION PROCESS

In January 2010, participants at the London Conference pledged to develop a plan for phased Transition to Afghan security lead. NATO and ISAF Foreign Ministers endorsed the Joint Framework for Inteqal at Tallinn in April 2010, and President Obama and President Karzai committed to the process in a May 2010 joint statement. At the Kabul Conference in July 2010, the international community expressed its support for President Karzai’s objective that the ANSF should lead and conduct all military operations in all provinces by the end of 2014. At the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, NATO and ISAF member nations reaffirmed that Transition would be complete country-wide by the end of 2014.

According to the 2010 Inteqal Framework, the Joint Afghanistan-NATO Inteqal Board (JANIB) is responsible for approving Transition implementation plans and recommending areas to enter and exit the Transition process. The JANIB is chaired by Dr. Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, the Chairman of the Transition Coordination Committee, co-chaired by COMISAF and the NATO SCR, and includes key Afghan, NATO, and ISAF stakeholders, as well as the United Nations Special Representative.

Following the June 29-30 Afghan Transition Conference, the Transition Coordination Committee and Afghan ministries renewed their efforts to develop cohesive and relevant implementation plans to move forward with the Transition process. Transition implementation plans are developed jointly between the Afghan Government, NATO, and ISAF and approved by the JANIB. The implementation plans define command and control relationships and security development plans during Transition implementation. They also specify governance and development activity that will support security Transition, and include a strategic communication plan describing how Transition will be communicated to populations living in transitioning areas. On July 16, 2011, the JANIB approved the Transition implementation plans for the first tranche of provinces and municipalities announced by President Karzai in March 2011.

ELIGIBILITY AND IMPLEMENTATION

Based upon the 2010 Inteqal Framework, four conditions are evaluated when considering an area’s eligibility to begin the Transition process. First, the security environment must be at a level that allows the population to pursue routine daily activities. Second, the ANSF must be capable of shouldering additional security tasks with less assistance from ISAF. Third, local governance must be sufficiently developed so that security will not be undermined as ISAF assistance is reduced. Finally, ISAF must be postured properly to thin-out as ANSF capabilities increase and threat levels stabilize or diminish.

Once an area enters the Transition implementation process, NATO and ISAF support continues through four stages, ranging from support to strategic overwatch. The security of the Afghan people and the stability of the government will be used to judge the readiness of the province to move to each successive stage of Transition implementation. Although a province can enter Transition implementation as soon as any part of its area is eligible, the province will not exit Transition until all its areas meet the required criteria.
EVOLUTION OF PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) led by coalition partners have made a significant contribution to Afghanistan's peace and stability. However, the beginning of the Transition process and the Afghan Government's assumption of its full responsibilities country-wide requires the evolution and ultimate dissolution of these entities. In June 2011, PRT-contributing nations reaffirmed that as a part of the Transition process, and in recognition of Afghan concerns regarding parallel structures, PRTs would evolve and phase out based on a set of six guidelines, which include:

1. Evolve, reinvest, and phase out. By the end of their province’s transition period, PRTs will methodically hand-off their functions and phase out. Each PRT's evolution plan will depend on Afghan priorities, the unique circumstances in its province, and the PRT's capabilities and structure.
2. Incentivize Transition. PRTs should support governance and development efforts that promote transition's sustainability.
3. Set the conditions to make Transition irreversible. PRTs should focus on supporting and building capacity.
4. Shift to technical assistance, build capacity, and improve national and sub-national linkages.
5. Network and reach back. PRT nations should exchange information and share expertise amongst one another to meet needs in Afghanistan.

In August 2011, with the concurrence of the PRT-contributing nations, the NATO SCR established a new coordination process wherein nations could share information and best practices with one another and with NATO and ISAF as they develop their evolution plans. As of September, this NATO SCR-facilitated process has yielded draft plans for several PRTs and demonstrated that many PRTs have already significantly evolved in accordance with the agreed guidelines. All PRT-contributing nations are working to provide a short annex to JANIB-approved provincial Transition implementation plans detailing how the PRT will support transition and phase out. Early drafting of plans for all PRTs ensures that the eventual nationwide evolution of all PRTs is in support of the Transition process.

3.2: TRANSITION PROGRESS

On March 22, 2011 President Karzai announced his decision on the first areas to begin Transition in July 2011. The seven areas that began the Transition process during the reporting period include the provinces of Kabul (excluding Sarobi District), Panjsher, and Bamiyan; the municipal districts of Mazar-e-Sharif (Balkh Province), Lashkar Gah (Helmand Province), and Herat (Herat Province); and the Mehtar Lam Municipality, not including the rest of the capital district (Laghman Province). In all, the areas include approximately 25 percent of Afghanistan’s population and reflect a geographic and ethnic balance. Discussions are currently ongoing to designate the areas that are expected to begin transition in the next tranche.

SECURITY

Insurgents are aware of ISAF's intent to Transition responsibility for security to the ANSF by the end of 2014; however, implementation of the Transition process has not generated a coordinated
or unified nationwide action from the insurgency, as it lacks the cohesion necessary to coordinate
attacks across Afghanistan. Although isolated attacks are likely throughout the Transition
process, the ANSF has demonstrated sufficient capacity to respond effectively to such attacks in
Transitioning areas and limit their strategic impact.

Since the beginning of the Transition process in July, there have been sporadic, isolated
insurgent attempts to disrupt security in the newly transitioned areas, including high-profile
attacks in Kabul. The August 19 attack on the British Consul and the September 13 attack on
ISAF Headquarters, the U.S. Embassy, and Afghan Government buildings in central Kabul
demonstrate insurgent determination to target the capital region. Nevertheless, these attacks
were operational failures, and the ANSF responded quickly and efficiently, demonstrating their
growing capacity and ability to assume security lead in the Transitioning areas. The ANSF in
Kabul are capable of conducting and planning operations with limited coalition support, although
the insurgency – particularly the Haqqani Network – continues to target Kabul with high-profile
attacks, enabled by safe havens in Pakistan.

Beyond Kabul, the ANSF is also currently assuming security lead in the Transitioning provinces
of Bamiyan and Panjshir. Although there is no permanent Afghan National Army presence in
Bamiyan Province, the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) are improving and currently lead security
operations throughout the province. The security situation in Panjshir Province is also improving
due to a combination of low insurgent threat, the continued improvement of the AUP, and local
security initiatives.

The ANP has shown similar progress in the Transitioning city of Herat. The coordinated ANP
and ANSF Commando response to the May 30 attack on the Italian PRT in Herat City
demonstrated the ability of the city’s ANSF to react efficiently to a surprise attack and provide
adequate force protection, ultimately preventing a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device
from penetrating the PRT compound.

**GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT**

Beyond security concerns, governance and development capacity remain the most challenging
aspects of Transition. The first tranche of provinces and municipalities to Transition has been
slow to develop the necessary service delivery and governance structures to underpin security
gains, yet arguably these are the most difficult capacities to develop and grow. Efforts by the
Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and PRTs are focusing on the
development and expansion of Afghan capacity in governance, rule of law, and service delivery,
as well as linkages between national and sub-national governance structures. The development
of these sectors will reinforce long-term stability and ensure that Transition is irreversible, as
well as encourage the Afghan people to rely on the Afghan Government, rather than Taliban
shadow governments, for necessary services.
SECTION 4 – SECURITY

4.1: THE INSURGENCY

Safe havens in Pakistan remain the insurgency’s greatest enabler and have taken on increased significance as ANSF-ISAF operations continue to clear key insurgent safe havens in Afghanistan. Safe havens in Pakistan, which directly support insurgent operations in Afghanistan, have grown more virulent during the reporting period, and represent the most significant risk to ISAF’s campaign.

The majority of insurgent fighters and commanders operate in or near their home districts, and low-level insurgent fighters are often well-integrated into the local population. Out-of-area fighters comprise a relatively small portion of the insurgency; typically a source of technical expertise, these fighters tend to be more ideological in nature and less tolerant of local norms.

Taliban senior leaders remain capable of providing strategic guidance to the broader insurgency and channeling resources to support their operational priorities. Pakistan-based senior leaders exercise varying degrees of command and control over the generally decentralized and local Afghan insurgency. Within Afghanistan, leadership structures vary by province. In general, the insurgency is led by a shadow governor and a military commander at the provincial level, who oversee district-level shadow governors and lower-level military commanders.

Due to the success of ISAF and ANSF operations, particularly in the key provinces of Helmand and Kandahar, the insurgency continues to adapt its tactics, techniques, and procedures. To preserve resources and avoid direct confrontation, insurgents have increased their use of IEDs, which remain one of the most potent and efficient weapons. High-profile attacks have also increased, and insurgents have begun to increase terrorist-type attacks on “soft targets,” particularly in Kabul. The attacks on the Intercontinental Hotel in June, the British Consul in August, and the U.S. Embassy and ISAF Headquarters in September demonstrate the insurgency’s determination to attack the national capital in order to achieve strategic effects as they seek to undermine ISAF, the ANSF, and the Afghan Government.

Despite the death of al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in May, the Taliban’s relationship to al Qaeda continues. Although the personal relationship between Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar and bin Laden represented one of the most important and influential links between the two groups, al Qaeda leadership continues to view the Taliban and the conflict in Afghanistan as integral to the organization’s continued relevance and viability. Al Qaeda’s global agenda, however, does come into conflict with the Taliban’s domestic and regional goals. As a result, the Taliban has publicly sought to distance itself from al Qaeda; following bin Laden’s death, Taliban leaders emphasized the indigenous nature of the insurgency and stated the insurgency would not be weakened. Al Qaeda’s most significant enabler in Afghanistan remains the Pakistan-based Haqqani Network, which will likely leverage this relationship as they continue to seek relevance in Afghanistan.
4.2: State of the Insurgency

ANSF-ISAF operations, building on the success of the winter 2010 campaign, have seized the momentum from the Taliban-led insurgency and made important gains in a number of areas, particularly in Regional Commands South and Southwest. Operations continue to disrupt and deny insurgent safe havens in Afghanistan, limit freedom of movement, remove insurgent leaders and fighters from the battlefield, interdict logistics, and effectively separate the insurgents from the local population in many areas. However, the disparate elements of the insurgency in Regional Command – East remain resilient and continue to contest ANSF-ISAF presence and operations. Although ISAF and the ANSF retain the momentum in a number of key areas, the insurgency remains adaptive with a significant regenerative capacity, and will continue to evolve, restructure, and reprioritize operations to achieve its objectives.

The Taliban’s spring campaign, Operation al Badr, began on May 1, 2011. The campaign focused on regaining lost safe havens in Helmand and Kandahar; reasserting dominance in Khost, Paktika, and Paktia Provinces; conducting high-profile attacks in Kabul; and expanding the insurgency into Regional Commands West and North.

Figure 23: Enemy Focus Areas (Spring-Summer 2011)

However, Operation al Badr was largely unsuccessful and resulted in limited Taliban offensive action that remained within seasonal norms. Due to unprecedented pressure on the insurgency and the resulting degraded capability, insurgent attempts to meet their stated intent for the al
Badr summer fighting campaign faced significant challenges, particularly in the south and southwest.

The combination of their unsuccessful spring campaign and the ongoing success of ANSF-ISAF operations has led to significant discontent within the Taliban-led insurgency. Friction between Pakistan-based senior Taliban leaders and Afghan-based commanders remains and is occasionally highlighted by a disparity between senior Taliban leaders’ guidance and the Afghan-based commanders’ willingness or ability to successfully implement the guidance. However, the disconnect between Pakistan-based leadership and Afghan-based commanders must not be overstated; Afghan-based insurgents have historically operated with a degree of autonomy, which allows them to tailor guidance to their local conditions.

For the remainder of 2011, the Taliban-led insurgency’s main effort will focus on regaining control of safe havens and population centers in Helmand and Kandahar. Southern Afghanistan remains vital to the insurgency; the Quetta Shura, the Taliban’s Pakistan-based leadership council, continues to be dominated by Kandahari leaders, and the nexus between narcotics-related financial interests and the insurgency further compound the importance of the region. Beyond southern Afghanistan, Kabul remains a persistent strategic target for high-profile attacks and assassination attempts.

The Haqqani Network’s main effort will be to re-exert dominance in Khost, Paktika, and Paktia Provinces, while continuing efforts to expand the influence of their network both geographically and across the spectrum of insurgent and terrorist organizations. It will also continue to target Kabul with high-profile attacks in an effort to maintain its influence on the reconciliation process. Insurgent leaders will also continue their attempts to expand the insurgency to Regional Commands West and North; however, these regions will remain supporting efforts to the main focus areas of southern, southwestern, and eastern Afghanistan.

**4.3: ISAF CONCEPT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS – SPRING 2011**

ISAF’s spring and summer-fall operations focused on consolidating and expanding the gains made against the insurgency in the winter campaign of 2010-2011. In particular, ANSF-ISAF efforts expanded security in the south through Kandahar and Helmand Provinces, as well as in the east from Kabul into surrounding districts and provinces, including Wardak and Logar Provinces. Further, operations reinforced and expanded security in Kunduz and Baghlan Provinces in the north and Faryab and Baghdis Provinces in the west. Complementing conventional military operations throughout the country, U.S. and ISAF Special Operations Forces maintained a high operational tempo and continued their strategy of counterterrorism network targeting to help expand existing security zones.
ISAF’s operations during the reporting period were executed within the existing key terrain and area of interest strategic framework. To ensure that limited resources were applied to areas that would realize the greatest advantage and to better prioritize coalition operations, 94 key terrain districts (KTD) and 44 area of interest districts (AOI) were identified in agreement with the Afghan Government. Key terrain is defined as areas the control of which provides a marked advantage to either the Afghan Government or the insurgency. AOI districts, though of secondary importance to KTDs, are areas in which ISAF and the ANSF operate in order to positively shape KTDs to meet operational objectives.

4.4: ANSF-ISAF OPERATIONS

**REGIONAL COMMAND – EAST**

Enemy-initiated attacks in Regional Command – East (RC-E) rose significantly during June and July of 2011, but decreased in August and September. However, enemy-initiated attacks remain well above levels from the previous reporting period, as insurgents increased their efforts to penetrate the Kabul security perimeter, to assassinate Afghan officials and leaders, and to acquire safe havens in the region. Violence in RC-E remains 16 percent higher for the summer fighting season compared to 2010, with the most notable changes in the provinces of Ghazni (11 percent increase in violence), Logar (76 percent increase), and Wardak (19 percent increase) due to ongoing clearance operations. The rise in violence and the insurgency’s ability to carry out operations in the east is directly attributable to safe havens in Pakistan.
ANSF-ISAF operations in RC-E focused on extending the security zone around Kabul Province by neutralizing insurgent support bases in key districts within Logar and eastern Wardak Provinces. Within these provinces, active insurgent cells from both the Taliban and the Haqqani Network continued attacks of intimidation against the local populace in order to limit and disrupt cooperation with ISAF and the Afghan Government. In response, the ANSF and ISAF conducted multiple offensive operations in these two provinces, denying the insurgents staging areas from which to conduct attacks and interdicting the flow of lethal aid along insurgent supply routes. High operations tempo from the ANSF and ISAF led to a sharp increase in the amount of enemy-initiated attacks; notably, however, most of these attacks were through indirect fire and IEDs as the insurgents avoided direct fire contact. This adjustment in tactics suggests a deterioration of insurgent capability.

Also during this reporting period, the abilities of the ANSF matured significantly. Operation DIAMOND HEAD, an ANSF-planned and -led operation designed to provide humanitarian aid to the remote districts of Parun and Wama in Nuristan Province, demonstrated ANSF abilities to secure a main supply route in the Pech Valley.

RC-E continues to face security concerns regarding insurgent infiltration across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Pakistani military operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas continue to drive insurgents into the border provinces of Khost, Paktia, and Patika. In response, the ANSF and ISAF continue to conduct operations within these provinces in order to degrade insurgent freedom of movement and prevent the insurgents from reaching potential safe havens in Logar and Wardak Provinces.

Lastly, in July 2011, Bamiyan and Panjshir Provinces, as well as the municipality of Mehtar Lam in Laghman Province, were the first areas in RC-E to begin the transition of security responsibility to the ANSF.

**REGIONAL COMMAND – SOUTH**

The security situation in Regional Command – South (RC-S) improved during the reporting period, as ANSF-ISAF operations continued to solidify the gains from Operation HAMKARI. Partnered operations within Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Zabul Provinces have reduced insurgent capability and deteriorated insurgent support lines throughout the area. This has created the space necessary to increase the reach and effectiveness of the Afghan Government and enabled increased overt popular support from the local populace. This popular support is beginning to manifest in several ways, most notably by increased participation in the *shura* process and the spread of Afghan Local Police programs across the region.

ISAF, together with its ANSF partners, conducted two major operations during the reporting period in order to maintain the initiative against the insurgency. Operation MOUNTAIN JAGUAR and Operation MOUNTAIN LEOPARD, conducted in the spring and summer of 2011 respectively, included more than 80 air assault missions. These operations resulted in the clearance of 47 compounds of interest, and the uncovering of 53 separate weapons caches, and led to the destruction of more than 3,100 kg of home-made explosives, 1,050 kg of ammonium nitrate, and three IED labs. These interdictions, coupled with the removal of more than 500 identified insurgent leaders and facilitators and the detention of more than 3,600 low-level
fighters, have significantly reduced the insurgency’s operational capacity and vertical and lateral command and control capabilities in RC-S.

Leveraging the improvements in security, RC-S has seen improvement in Afghan governance capacity at the district and provincial level within key terrain districts. Direct coalition mentoring and assistance is enabling the Afghan Government to improve capacity in the areas of health, rule of law, education, and agriculture, but continued international community support is required to ensure sustained advancement throughout the broader region. Economic growth is still hindered by the uncertainty of the security situation, but is more significantly stalled due to limited private investment. In general, however, freedom of movement for the population continues to improve, and infrastructure development efforts are expanding the transportation network. The main development effort remains strengthening the agriculture value chain through projects and activities that facilitate better farm-to-market linkages, coupled with investment in processing facilities, which will increase agriculture commerce.

Although the insurgency remains resilient in RC-S, its capacity has been degraded and it is increasingly rejected in communities throughout the region. The expansion of effective governance, enabled by security improvements, is resulting in measured progress in the process to Transition security responsibilities to Afghan lead.

**REGIONAL COMMAND – SOUTHWEST**

ANSF-ISAF operations throughout the spring and summer have improved the overall security level within Regional Command – Southwest (RC-SW). Enemy-initiated attacks in RC-SW during the last three months of the reporting period were 27 percent lower than during the same period last year. In particular, Afghans residing in the population centers of the six key districts of the Central Helmand River Valley are experiencing greater freedom of movement as the Taliban’s influence over these districts continues to wane. Operations in RC-SW aim to expand security gains into the outskirts of these key districts, where most of the insurgents have relocated, and decrease insurgent infiltration from Pakistan.

Security gains throughout Helmand Province have enabled operations in RC-SW to concentrate on expanding key governance and development initiatives, as well as identifying opportunities to transfer security responsibilities to the ANSF. In July 2011, the municipality of Lashkar Gah, Helmand Province, became the first municipality in RC-SW to begin the transition of security responsibility to the ANSF. The populace’s faith in the ability of the ANSF to provide security continues to increase, as indicated by the continued rise in tips from the local populace on potential weapons cache locations. Continued cache finds, such as the 4,150 pounds of home-made explosives seized in Lashkar Gah during the reporting period, may improve local opinions of the ANSF.

**REGIONAL COMMAND – WEST**

Insurgent activity has steadily declined throughout RC-W, and remains concentrated in Herat Province, western Badghis Province, and central and eastern Farah Province. Year-to-date enemy-initiated attacks have decreased approximately 20 percent compared to the same period in 2010.
Operations in RC-W predominantly included joint ANSF-ISAF patrols along Highway 1 through Farah, Herat, and Badghis Provinces, and the Highway 8 corridor from Herat City to the key northern border crossing point into Turkmenistan at Towraghondi. These patrols reinforced and expanded on the security gains achieved during the winter operations of 2010-2011. ANSF-ISAF efforts have increased freedom of movement along Highway 1 and along the routes connecting the Iran-Afghanistan border crossing point of Islam Qalah to Towraghondi, improving commerce and civilian freedom of movement.

To supplement conventional military operations in RC-W, ISAF relied heavily on an aggressive communications campaign with Afghan Government leaders through frequent meetings with local village elders and the Afghan people. Additionally, increased cooperation and communication helped prevent erosion of the public’s confidence in the ANSF’s abilities to provide security despite insurgent intimidation attempts. Confidence in both the ANSF and coalition forces, as well as frustration with the insurgency, facilitated successful Village Stability Operations throughout RC-W. Furthermore, local citizens’ desires to take responsibility for their own security led to the development of Afghan Local Police programs in the villages of Darreh-Ye Bum, Chasma, and Panerak in Badghis Province.

Four COIN operations in the districts of Pashtun Zarghun, Nizam-e-Shahid, and Obeh of Herat Province set the conditions to begin the transition of security responsibility to the ANSF in the municipality of Herat in July. Notably, the ANSF led all planning efforts for the transition ceremony, providing 400 soldiers from the 207th ANA Corps for the security effort.

**REGIONAL COMMAND – NORTH**

The security situation in Regional Command – North (RC-N) improved significantly during the reporting period, as year-to-date enemy-initiated attacks were 31 percent lower than during the same period in 2010.

During the first half of the reporting period, the main operational effort in RC-N focused on maintaining Afghan Government control over key terrain in Kunduz and Baghlan Provinces, and promoting freedom of movement along Highway 1 and Highway 6 leading to the Sher Khan border crossing point with Tajikistan. These operations resulted in increased security in these provinces and enabled the ANSF and ISAF to re-focus operational efforts west to Faryab Province. Of significance, the ANSF led 74 percent of combined ANSF-ISAF joint operations in RC-N during July and August, further demonstrating the ANSF’s increased professionalism and operational capacity.

In July 2011, the ANSF and ISAF began Operation NAZDECK DOST in Faryab Province, a one-year operation to neutralize insurgent attempts to hinder construction and development along Highway 1. This operation will secure and upgrade Highway 1 from Maimanah to Ghormach District in Badghis Province. Complementary operations in RC-W will lead to a secure traffic corridor from the municipality of Herat, Herat Province, to the municipality of Mazar-e-Sharif, Balkh Province. This secure traffic corridor will be key to promoting commerce and economic activity in the region.
Improved security within Mazar-e-Sharif, which pushed the insurgency into isolated, outlying districts, has also enabled Mazar-e-Sharif to be the first municipality in RC-N to begin the transition of security responsibility to the ANSF.

**REGIONAL COMMAND – CAPITAL**

ISAF and the ANSF have established layered defenses that yielded an improved level of security in Regional Command – Capital (RC-C) during the reporting period. Joint ANSF-ISAF patrols successfully interdicted insurgent infiltration routes into Kabul and eliminated traditional insurgent support bases in Sarobi District. Additionally, the ANSF and ISAF expanded the security zone around Kabul by increasing pressure on insurgents in Wardak, Logar, Nangarhar, and Paktia Provinces. Nevertheless, Kabul remains under the persistent threat of high-profile attacks and assassination efforts targeting Afghan Government officials. Insurgents, enabled by safe havens in Pakistan, remain focused on penetrating the security zone around Kabul City.

The greatest risks in Kabul remain insurgent targeting of key officials and facilities. The ability of the ANSF to detect, deter, and disrupt those attacks, however, continues to improve. As a result of these improvements, the ANSF assumed security responsibility for fourteen of Kabul’s fifteen Districts in July (the exception being Sarobi District). The improvements in the ANSF have become readily apparent throughout the transition period. Despite an increase in enemy-initiated attacks consistent with seasonal norms, the insurgency’s ability to conduct complex, high-profile attacks was limited. When insurgents attempted high-profile attacks, notably the June attack at the Intercontinental Hotel, the August attack at the British Consul, and the September attack on the U.S. Embassy and ISAF Headquarters, the ANSF responded quickly and effectively, eliminating the insurgent threat while minimizing loss of life and damage to infrastructure.

**4.5: AFGHANISTAN – PAKISTAN COOPERATION**

After steady improvement in Afghanistan-Pakistan cooperation in recent reporting periods, events during this reporting period have put the relationship under significant strain, most notably the May 2 U.S. raid in Pakistan which led to the death of Osama bin Laden.

Despite persistent attempts to improve relations by focusing on mutual security interests, the relationship deteriorated further in late July following several incidents of indirect fire from the Pakistani military, particularly in Kunar and Nangarhar Provinces. ANSF and ISAF forces reported a sharp increase in enemy-initiated cross-border attacks21 in Paktika, Khost, and Paktia Provinces; from January through July 2011, enemy-initiated cross-border attacks increased more than five-fold compared to the same period in 2010. The border situation began to improve towards the end of the summer, and cross-border attacks subsided throughout August and early September, but had begun to increase throughout September. As of the end of the reporting period, ISAF had initiated a review of the ISAF-Pakistan communications framework in an effort to reduce cross-border incidents by improving ISAF-Pakistan response when incidents do occur.

Despite the apparent progress in limiting the effects of cross-border attacks, high-profile attacks executed in Afghanistan near the end of the reporting period were directly attributable to

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21 Defined as any attack in which insurgents initiate contact from the Pakistan side of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
insurgents within Pakistan. A series of attacks, including the September 13 complex attack on the U.S. Embassy, ISAF Headquarters, and Afghan Government buildings; the suicide attack on September 10 against Afghan Chief of Police Sayed Abad in Wardak Province; and the August 13 attack on the British Consul were carried out by the Haqqani Network and directly enabled by Pakistani safe haven and support. Addressing insurgents emanating from Pakistan is critical to the success of ISAF’s campaign and Afghanistan’s future; ISAF will continue to assist Pakistan in denying the Taliban and Haqqani Network safe haven from which they can plan and conduct attacks against ISAF, the ANSF, and the Afghan Government.

4.6: LOCAL SECURITY PROGRAMS

Local security programs, including Village Stability Operations and the Afghan Local Police program, continue to be successful in protecting rural and remote populations, preventing their exploitation by the insurgency, and expanding the influence of the Afghan Government. These programs integrate bottom-up village and district defense systems and serve as a complement to top-down, national-level ANSF development.

VILLAGE STABILITY OPERATIONS

The Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) began conducting Village Stability Operations (VSO) in February 2010. VSO is a bottom-up COIN initiative that establishes security areas around rural villages to promote local governance and development. VSO uses Afghan and ISAF Special Operations Forces embedded in the community full-time to help improve security, governance, and development in more remote areas of Afghanistan where the ANSF and ISAF have a limited presence.

Each VSO consists of a 12-man team that embeds in a village and regularly engages local Afghans, enabling a level of situational awareness and trust otherwise unattainable. VSO teams are supported by a Village Stability Platform (VSP), which includes a range of enablers and supporting elements. Along with medical, air, civil affairs, and military information teams, VSPs also include units focused on linking the district and provincial levels of governance and development to the national government. Further, Provincial Augmentation Teams and District Augmentation Teams, in partnership with Provincial Reconstruction Teams, help VSPs to build local governance and improve development.

In districts with VSO, Afghan satisfaction with access to essential services has uniformly increased over the last three months. Further, analysis of attack levels before and after a VSP is established indicates, after a brief increase in insurgent attacks, a steady improvement in security conditions throughout the community. The VSO initiative has resulted in such noticeable improvements in security, governance, and development that Taliban senior leaders have identified the VSO initiative as a significant threat to their objectives.

Significant success has prompted the program to expand. The VSO initiative began with five VSPs covering 1,000 square kilometers; as of this report, CJSOTF-A has 6,000 personnel in 103 locations throughout Afghanistan, covering approximately 23,500 square kilometers. To support this growth, the VSO initiative now supplements Special Forces with conventional forces. Currently, the 1st/505th Parachute Infantry Regiment are augmenting
Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) presence to enable the expansion of VSO sites across the country.

**AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE**

Established in August 2010 by President Karzai, the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program is part of the VSO initiative. ALP is a village-focused MoI initiative that complements ISAF’s COIN strategy by training local Afghans in rural areas to defend their communities against threats from insurgents and other illegally-armed groups. The ALP program is a complementary component to the VSO program; although not all VSO sites have ALP units, all ALP units are a part of an existing VSO site.

Figure 25: Afghan Local Police Sites (as of September 30, 2011)

In the latter phases of a VSO, village elders may, through a *shura*, elect to establish an ALP unit. These prospective ALP sites are validated by the MoI, which conducts an evaluation and officially approves the district for ALP development. A district is considered officially validated when the Afghan Government officials meet with the local officials to formally agree that the given district demonstrates both a need and a desire for an ALP unit. The MoI has approved 100 districts for ALP units as of September 2011; of those, 48 districts have been validated by their district *shura* and collectively represent a force of about 8,100 ALP. In conjunction with counsel from U.S. Special Operation Forces and IJC, the Afghan Government has authorized an ALP end-strength of 30,000 patrolmen.

The MoI requires ALP candidates to be 18-45 years of age. They must be nominated by local community *shuras*, vetted by the MoI, and biometrically-enrolled in the ALP program. Weapons must be registered in order for the ALP unit to receive the MoI funding provided for authorized program positions. ALP members sign one-year service contracts, work part-time, and are paid approximately 60 percent of the basic salary for an ANP patrolman. Upon termination of their
respective contracts or of the ALP unit, qualified members are eligible for integration into the ANSF.

U.S. Special Operations Forces currently conduct a three-week ALP training program that introduces basic security and policing skills. It includes instruction on the Afghan constitution and penal code, ethics, rule of law, human rights, and appropriate use of force, patrolling, establishing checkpoints, marksmanship, tactical maneuver, IED detection, driving, search and detention, medical classes, and drug interdiction. The training is conducted either in the unit’s village by coalition forces and Afghan forces, or, in some cases, at regional police training centers. The MoI, with support and funding from the coalition, equip ALP members using the Afghan Security Forces Fund. ALP units receive uniforms, small arms (AK-47 or variant) and ammunition, as well as other equipment, such as vehicles and radios, to enable an effective defense of their communities. CFSOCC-A cost estimates indicate that the cost to train, equip, and sustain one ALP patrolman is one-quarter of the per-person cost for an ANP patrolman and one-sixth of the per-person cost of an ANA soldier.

As a purely defensive force, ALP units are not equipped for offensive operations nor are they permitted to grow beyond the size in their tashkil, which amounts to approximately 30 patrolmen per village and 300 per district. ALP patrolmen have detention but not arrest authority, and conduct investigations under the direct supervision of the Deputy District Chief of Police. Despite these limitations, ALP units have proven effective in disrupting insurgent activities by denying them safe havens and limiting their freedom of movement; the improved security enables development and governance projects for the community.

Each ALP unit coordinates its operations extensively with the ANSF, coalition forces, local shuras, and Afghan Government officials, which helps build and strengthen the link between local governance and the central government. The units are also overseen by the village shura that originally sponsored them, as well as U.S. Special Operation Forces. This extensive oversight by both Afghan and coalition members helps to ensure ALP operations are effective and conducted in accordance with Afghan law.

The ALP program continues to increase in strength and effectiveness, and the ALP have proven to be a significant threat to the insurgency in key areas throughout Afghanistan. In response to this, insurgents have engaged in intimidation campaigns and targeted assassinations against ALP members and their families. These attacks have largely failed to intimidate ALP forces and local communities, which continue to defend their villages effectively against insurgent attacks.

Despite its significant success, the ALP program faces a number of challenges. The program is heavily dependent on Special Operations Forces for training, mentorship, and oversight. The approved expansion to 30,000 ALP patrolmen will likely strain the capacity of the coalition Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan, and may require additional conventional forces in order to adequately support projected ALP growth.

Further, the proliferation of independent, non-sanctioned militias outside the VSO framework threatens to undermine the legitimacy and progress of the ALP program. Although limited in number, these unauthorized groups exacerbate the concern that the ALP program risks
empowering local strongmen who will either use the ALP program to incorporate their own militias into the government structure, or will brand their militias under the ALP title to further their own illegal interests. Illegally-armed militias in Kunduz Province, for example, posing as ALP patrolmen, have been collecting illegal taxes and have engaged in a number of armed conflicts with other local groups, degrading local security conditions and fostering negative perceptions of the ALP program. Also during the reporting period, a Human Rights Watch report accused some ALP units of abusive practices. ISAF has undertaken to investigate these allegations. The ALP is also challenged by ethnic tensions; although shuras are largely effective in ensuring fair tribal and ethnic representation in ALP units, some units actively resist recruiting certain ethnicities, which can create significant ethnic tension in rural villages.

4.7: PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES

Private Security Companies (PSCs) in Afghanistan are responsible for securing ISAF sites and convoys, diplomatic and non-governmental organization personnel, and development projects. ISAF and diplomatic missions, along with their development partners, employ approximately 34,000 contracted security guards from PSCs. Currently, approximately 93 percent of all PSC guards are Afghans, more than half of which are employed by ISAF.

By 2010, however, many PSCs were operating outside of Afghan law and customs as well as U.S. Government requirements, and PSC performance was often marked by poor discipline and safety. As a result, President Karzai issued Presidential Decree 62 in August 2010 directing many PSCs to be disbanded by December 2010 and replaced by the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF)22. Although the decree included exceptions for Embassies and diplomatic personnel, it soon became clear that the APPF could not adequately replace PSCs in such a short time period.

In order to allow time for the APPF to develop, the Afghan Government, together with the international community and ISAF, developed a 12-month bridging strategy for the further implementation of Decree 62. The strategy is divided into categories to address the three distinct types of PSC operations: diplomatic, development, and ISAF. Diplomatic entities are exempt from Presidential Decrees and associated regulations applicable to PSCs. In contrast, at the conclusion of the bridging period, development entities and ISAF are expected to contract for their security services through the APPF.

The 12-month bridging period began on March 22, 2011, and terminates on March 20, 2012. At the end of this period, as determined by its capacity and capability, the APPF will increasingly assume responsibilities, in priority order, for the security of ISAF and ANSF construction sites and for ISAF bases. In the event the APPF does not possess the capacity or capability to assume this responsibility, there is a conditions-based extension in the bridging strategy to allow PSCs to continue to provide services for an additional 12 months. The bridging strategy also called for disbanding seven PSCs due to close ties with Afghan officials. During June and July 2011, ISAF replaced all contracts held by these seven PSCs, which included 34 contracts and nearly 4,000 guards.

22 The APPF is currently on tashkil; however, as directed by President Karzai, the APPF is to eventually become a state-owned, fee-for-service enterprise under the Ministry of Interior.
Of the 46 remaining PSCs, 43 PSCs have renewed licenses and have been certified as compliant, while the remaining three continue to work with the MoI to become relicensed. All remaining PSCs, however, barring the extension of the current bridging strategy, will be disbanded by March 2012, with the exception of those PSCs providing security services to diplomatic activities, which will continue to operate indefinitely.

**AFGHAN PUBLIC PROTECTION FORCE DEVELOPMENT**

ISAF and the U.S. Embassy are assisting the MoI to develop the management and command and control necessary for the APPF to meet the needs of the coalition and the international community. The APPF currently has a guard force of approximately 6,400, and is expected to integrate approximately 14,000 guards who are expected to transition from existing PSCs to the APPF, while also generating additional forces of no fewer than 11,000 guards. In total, approximately 25,000 guards will be required by 2012 in order to support ISAF and implementing partner security requirements.

To support this growth, the APPF Training Center (ATC) was established in Bagrami District, Kabul Province. To date, the APPF has three approved Programs of Instruction (POIs): Basic Static Guard, convoy operations, and Personal Security Detail (PSD); however, the APPF does not possess the capability to train the convoy and PSD POIs.

The ATC’s current maximum training capacity is 200 guards per three-week course, despite a stated goal of 500 guards per course. The training center program is only capable of conducting one course at a time and is hindered by resourcing issues, infrastructure shortfalls, and health challenges. In an effort to increase the training capacity, the first APPF “Train the Trainer” course was completed in July, graduating 42 Afghan National Police trainers. To date, these Afghan trainers have taught three Static Guard courses, which have graduated 615 guards. All graduates from these courses, however, are from existing contracted security units and have not added any new capacity to be applied to ISAF or implementing partner requirements.

As directed by the bridging strategy, the MoI, ISAF, and representatives of the U.S. Embassy recently completed a six-month assessment of the effectiveness of the bridging strategy and the capacity of the APPF. Specifically, the assessment reviewed whether the APPF will be able to assume effective management and provision of security to ISAF and ANSF construction sites and ISAF bases at the end of the bridging period. Subsequent assessments will follow approximately every three months thereafter.

Key observations from the initial assessment indicated that the APPF was unable: 1) to execute and maintain the business operations necessary to remain a viable and solvent business; 2) to man (recruit, vet, train), pay, equip, deploy, and sustain guard forces to meet contract requirements; 3) to negotiate and establish legal and enforceable contracts with customers for security services; 4) to command and control security operations across Afghanistan; 5) to meet the requirements of the bridging strategy. Additionally, the APPF has not created an operational State-Owned Entity to support business operations essential to manage and execute contracted security services.
Also identified in the September 2011 six-month assessment, inadequate and unresponsive administrative and logistics support from the MoI have adversely affected the sustainment of the ATC. Examples of this include a lack of authorized or requested equipment, medical supplies, fuel, and ammunition, as well as a lack of maintenance and/or repair of existing infrastructure, such as generators and sewage.

In sum, the APPF is not on track to assume the responsibilities for security services performed by PSCs, which, barring the extension of the current bridging strategy, are projected to be disbanded on March 20, 2012. Combined planning efforts are ongoing to resolve the identified issues in a timeframe that is consistent with President Karzai’s original directive.

4.8: Population Security

Since April 2011, overall Afghan perceptions of security worsened slightly. At the end of the previous reporting period in March 2011, approximately 87 percent of Afghans polled described security as either "fair" or "good." As of September 2011, this percentage decreased slightly to 85 percent. Although this is not a statistically significant difference due to sampling error of the survey, fewer Afghans responded "good" and more Afghans responded "fair" to the survey question about security. Additionally, the percentage of Afghans who described their security environment as "bad" increased slightly from 11 percent in March 2011 to 15 percent in September 2011. This is likely due to the increase in combat operations due to the summer fighting season as well as the Afghan population's perception of decreased freedom of movement due to insurgent-emplaced IEDs, the number one cause of civilian casualties in Afghanistan.

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23 Afghan National Quarterly Assessment Research (ANQAR), Wave 13, September 2011
4.9: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

Previous trends in civilian casualties continued during this reporting period, with civilians primarily being killed and wounded by insurgent-emplaced IEDs. From January to September 2011, the insurgency caused 80 percent of civilian casualties. Of the year-to-date civilian casualties caused by insurgents, more than 70 percent were caused by IEDs. ISAF-caused civilian casualties from January to September 2011 remain unchanged from the same period in 2010, despite a significant increase in ISAF operations.

Figure 26: Monthly Civilians Wounded or Killed by ISAF or Insurgents (October 2009 – September 2011)²⁴

²⁴ The figures reported on this chart reflect incidents of conflict-related civilian casualties (deaths and wounded) that have been confirmed through investigation to have been caused by either ISAF or insurgents. The data reported here is consistent with ISAF policy, which directs that all credible allegations of civilian casualties be reviewed.
4.10: VIOLENCE AND SECURITY INCIDENTS

In Afghanistan, violence and security incidents tend to increase with the spring and summer months and decrease during the fall and winter months. Thus, comparing data season-to-season, as opposed to across continuous periods of time, offers the most accurate basis for sound assessments of violence trends.

TOTAL SECURITY INCIDENTS

Figure 27: Monthly Security Incidents (October 2009 – September 2011)

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25 All data contained in section 4.10 reflects data from the Afghanistan Mission Network CIDNE as of September 30, 2011

26 Security incidents include direct fire, indirect fire, surface-to-air fire, and IED events. IED events include IED explosions, IEDs found and cleared, mine explosions, and mines found and cleared.
While violence in Afghanistan remains high, 16 of the last 20 weeks in this reporting period witnessed a decrease in nation-wide enemy-initiated attacks when compared to the same period in 2010. Through the end of September, enemy-initiated attacks in Afghanistan were five percent lower than the same period in 2010. Much of the decrease in attacks is due to significantly less direct fire attacks compared to last year, down 40 percent from the same time period last year.

Figure 28: Monthly Enemy-Initiated Attacks (October 2009 – September 2011)

Enemy-initiated attacks comprise enemy action (enemy-initiated direct fire, indirect fire, surface-to-air fire) and explosive hazard events, including executed attacks only (IED/mine explosions); potential or attempted attacks (i.e., IEDs/mines found and cleared, prematurely detonated IEDs, and IEDs turned in) are not included.

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27 Enemy-initiated attacks comprise enemy action (enemy-initiated direct fire, indirect fire, surface-to-air fire) and explosive hazard events, including executed attacks only (IED/mine explosions); potential or attempted attacks (i.e., IEDs/mines found and cleared, prematurely detonated IEDs, and IEDs turned in) are not included.
SECURITY INCIDENTS BY REGIONAL COMMAND

As a result of ANSF-ISAF operations, violence in RC-SW continues to decrease, particularly in central Helmand Province, which was the first area to receive surge forces last year. In the districts of Marjeh, Nad ‘Ali, and Garm Ser, violence during the summer fighting season dropped by approximately 70 percent in comparison to the same period last year.

Violence in RC-SW during the last three months of the reporting period was 27 percent lower than last year at this time, and continues to drop. Violence levels in RC-S appear to be following a similar pattern to RC-SW, likely reflecting the later flow of surge troops into the region. These trends, however, remain nascent.

Violence in RC-E remains 16 percent higher for the summer fighting season compared to 2010, with the most notable changes in the provinces of Ghazni (11 percent increase in violence), Logar (76 percent increase), and Wardak (19 percent increase) due to ongoing clearance operations. The availability of safe havens in Pakistan has enabled this increase in violence, and violence levels are expected to remain high throughout the remainder of 2011. More than 68 percent of nationwide indirect fire attacks are reported in RC-E.

Figure 29: Security Incidents by Regional Command (April 2011 – September 2011)
**IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE ACTIVITY**

The insurgency increased their use of IEDs during the reporting period, as IEDs are an efficient and effective weapon to target ANSF-ISAF operations and to avoid decisive engagement in order to preserve rank-and-file fighters. Year-to-date IED figures for 2011 indicate that IED activity has increased by 22 percent compared to 2010.

Despite the increase in IED activity, however, IED strikes increased only five percent during the period of January – September when compared to the same period in the previous year. The smaller increase in IED strikes relative to IED activity is attributable to a much greater increase in IEDs found and cleared without explosion; 55 percent of planted IEDs were found and cleared during this year’s fighting season, up 10 percent from last year. This improvement is a result of the increase in assistance from the local Afghan population. Tips reported by Afghan civilians have increased nearly three-fold since last year, especially in regions where security gains have been reinforced with effective governance and stabilizing development efforts. The overall improvement of the ANSF, particularly in counter-IED capabilities, has also contributed to the increase in the IED found-and-cleared rate.

**Figure 30: Monthly IED and Mine Explosions**
**Complex and Coordinated Attacks**

The high-operational tempo has kept the insurgency off-balance during the fighting season, evidenced by the sharp decrease in complex and coordinated attacks this year compared to 2010. The number of complex and coordinated attacks for the last three months of this reporting period was nearly half of that observed in 2010; complex and coordinated attacks in the summer fighting season of 2011 were only four percent higher than those reported during the same period in 2009. In addition to the ongoing ANSF-ISAF conventional operations, persistent, precise Special Operations Forces strikes have removed a number of mid-level insurgent leaders, which has severely degraded the insurgency’s capacity and capability to launch deliberately planned complex and coordinated attacks.

**Figure 31: Monthly Complex and Coordinated Attacks (October 2009 – September 2011)**

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28 A complex and coordinated attack is an attack which is conducted by multiple hostile elements employing at least two distinct classes of weapon systems from multiple locations, which indicates a higher level of planning.
**CACHES FOUND**

After a significant increase in weapons cache discoveries from October 2010 to March 2011, finds decreased during the reporting period. This is likely due to a combination of the cyclical nature of cache creation, reduction in insurgent supplies, last fall’s expansion of ANSF-ISAF operations into previously-held insurgent areas increasing find rates, and insurgents adjusting their tactics by reducing cache sizes and moving into unpatrolled areas. Regardless, the high rate of cache finds will continue to impair insurgents’ ability to initiate violence.

Figure 32: Caches Found (October 2009 – September 2011)
SECTION 5 – GOVERNANCE

5.1: ASSESSMENT OF GOVERNANCE

During the reporting period, the Afghan Government made only limited progress in building the human and institutional capacity necessary for sustainable government. The most notable developments were efforts to build the human capacity necessary to extend governance throughout the country; merit-based appointments of senior civil servants continued, and a civil service recruiting campaign, focused on less-secure provinces, maintained momentum. However, the extension of effective governance in Afghanistan continues to face significant challenges, including: difficulty linking sub-national governance structures to the central government, the continued lack of an International Monetary Fund (IMF) program, minimal progress on Kabul Conference commitments, widespread corruption, and delays in the legislative process resulting from the September 2010 Wolesi Jirga\textsuperscript{29} elections.

Since the outbreak of the Kabul Bank crisis in August 2010, corruption, transparency, and accountability issues have been at the forefront of efforts to resolve the crisis and strengthen Afghanistan’s banking sector. The international community’s engagement on those issues has taken place largely in the context of Afghanistan’s request for a program with the IMF. As of the end of this reporting period, the Afghan Government had yet to reach an agreement on an IMF program, although in late September, the IMF and the Afghan Government appeared to reach a preliminary understanding about the way forward. Representatives of the Afghan Government and the IMF said that they had made substantial progress on a number of actions intended to safeguard financial and economic stability, which, when completed, would serve as the basis for a new program. A new IMF program, and the resulting structural reform agenda, would reassure international donors, creditors, and potential private investors that the country is pursuing sound financial policies.

In addition to an IMF program, the implementation of the Kabul Conference commitments remains necessary to the development of effective governance in Afghanistan. These commitments, which promised 21 changes to Afghan law or policy, were scheduled to be completed by January 2011 and July 2011. However, as of this reporting period, all but two of the 21 commitments are past due. The majority of the laws have stagnated in the drafting phase – particularly within the line ministry and the Ministry of Justice. However, in a sign of progress, the Afghan Government and international community representatives reaffirmed their commitment to the Kabul Conference commitments – after a 10-month period of inactivity – by convening a series of standing committee meetings in July. These meetings were necessary to restart the reform process, which had stalled due to donor frustrations with the Kabul Bank crisis and the disputes regarding the IMF country program. Nevertheless, limited Afghan Government technical capacity has posed a significant challenge to fulfilling these commitments, and delays implementing these commitments are likely to continue.

\textsuperscript{29} Lower House of the Afghan Parliament
5.2: ASSESSMENT OF SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNANCE

An important indicator of the Afghan Government’s progress towards self-sufficiency is the ability of officials at the provincial, district, and municipal levels to plan for and administer basic governance. Overall, governance in Afghanistan remains highly centralized with limited authorities delegated to sub-national structures. Nevertheless, progress has been made on improving the information flow and delegation of responsibilities between Kabul and the provinces. Building the provincial governance capacity, as well as linking sub-national governance structures to the central government, continues to be a focus to enable the Afghan Government to respond to, identify, and meet the needs of the Afghan people.

At the provincial level, all 34 provinces now have a functioning provincial governor’s office complex. There has also been progress in filling the \textit{tashkil} of provincial structures. However, the capacity of provincial governors’ offices and provincial line departments remains fairly low and largely dependent on contractors. This is due in part to difficulties of recruiting qualified individuals and a lack of resources for a basic operating budget for maintenance and repairs.

Another challenge facing the continued development of sub-national governance capacity is the difficulty of linking provincial planning exercises into the national budgeting cycle. Provincial governors and provincial line departments all have limited roles in the process due to the highly-centralized system of governance in which they have limited service delivery and budget execution authority. This centralized system adversely affects the provincial governor’s ability to lead provincial line departments, since their reporting chain is through the central ministries.

In order to improve budget execution at the sub-national level, the Ministry of Finance and five pilot Afghan Ministries are conducting the National Provincial Budgeting Pilot Program. This program is expected to build provincial capacity to identify local needs and inform the national budget accordingly, as well as improve communication between the different levels of government.

INDEPENDENT DIRECTORATE OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE

The Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) was established in 2007 in order to coordinate and support the development of sub-national governance in Afghanistan.

Guiding the sub-national governance development is the Sub-National Governance Policy, developed by the IDLG and approved by the Cabinet in March 2010, which provides a coherent framework that allows the IDLG the ability to coordinate planning across disparate capacity-building and development initiatives. In addition to the Sub-National Governance Policy, the IDLG has also drafted the Local Governance National Priority Program (NPP), which focuses on four strategic points to further promote sub-national governance development: 1) creating a national framework for local governance to support implementation of the sub-national governance policy; 2) building the capacity of Provincial and District Governors’ offices, coordinated with the Civil Service Commission; 3) building the capacity of municipalities; and 4) supporting elected Councils.
Current U.S. Government-supported programs that fall within the Sub-National Governance policy and the NPP include the District Delivery Program (DDP), the Performance-based Governor’s Fund (PBGF), the Regional Afghan Municipality Program for Urban Population (RAMP UP), and the Afghan Social Outreach Program (ASOP).

Province-focused DDPs have been launched in 12 districts, supported by funds transferred from USAID to the Afghan Government, and plans are currently pending to deploy DDPs to 33 additional districts across Afghanistan. Through the USAID-funded PBGF, interim financial assistance is provided to provincial governors to enable them to meet operational and community outreach requirements. The RAMP UP programs, also funded by USAID, focus on capacity building, revenue generation, and service delivery for municipalities across Afghanistan. Strengthening the links between district and provincial leadership and providing a forum to enhance relationships with the local population are important elements of district-level programming.

Funding for sub-national governance initiatives remains a concern. Current U.S. Government funding is projected to be cut by 60 percent. Discussions with IDLG leadership are ongoing in order to create sustainable programs that focus on priority areas and maximize limited funding.

5.3: CIVIL SERVICE REFORM

The Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC) continues to make measured progress in building the human capital necessary for improving governance throughout Afghanistan.

With USAID support, the IARCSC initiated an ambitious program to recruit civil servants in provinces where security conditions make hiring and retaining government officials difficult. The Job Fair Program, started in December 2010 and headed by the Provincial Affairs Directorate, has been critical to recruiting efforts. In May and June, job fairs were held in Ghazni and Paktika Provinces, where a total of 400 civil service employees were hired by various ministries, and more than 150 qualified Kandaharis participated in a job fair held at the Provincial Governor’s palace in June. The Job Fair Program was recently extended until the end of 2014. The current aim is to complete job fairs in all 14 vulnerable provinces and to conduct a second round of fairs within the next twelve months.

In addition to recruiting efforts, the IARCSC is also executing the merit-based appointments program for deputy provincial governors and district governors, although recently efforts have stalled. Merit-based appointments are key to improving governance capacity and addressing the allegations of corruption, which continue to undermine the Afghan Government’s legitimacy. In May, IARCSC assessed deputy provincial governor candidates for 14 provinces, and nominations are pending approval by President Karzai. If approved, more than three-quarters of all 34 provinces would have a deputy provincial governor selected through a merit-based process. Presidential approval is still pending.

Supplementing the recruiting of qualified civil servants is the follow-on training effort. The National Training Directorate (NTD), a key component of the Afghan Civil Service Institute, provides training for civil servants in the 50 ministries and governmental bodies to improve
governance capability, accountability, and effectiveness. The NTD covers five core civil service functions: strategy and policy development, financial management, human resources management, procurement, and project management.

Despite effective programs and signs of progress, several challenges persist that limit recruiting and retention of qualified civil servants. Standardized pay scales are low in comparison to the technical assistant salaries offered by donors, and heightened threats and targeting of government officials also hamper recruiting efforts. Public administration reforms and capacity-building programs are essential for the development of sufficient human and institutional capacity to deliver governance and basic services to the Afghan people.

5.4: RULE OF LAW

The United States and coalition partners conduct a broad range of programs that promote rule of law in Afghanistan, including: justice sector capacity-building activities of the Department of State and the Department of Justice, economic and civil development work of USAID, and the field support to civilian rule of law teams as well as the training of judges, prosecutors, police, and corrections officials by the Department of Defense. Overall, progress continues to be mixed in rule of law development efforts in Afghanistan. The main challenges include a lack of access to the formal justice system, enforcement of the human rights protections guaranteed by the Afghan constitution, corruption, and the limited ability of the Afghan Government to sustain new programs and facilities.

In order to further promote rule of law efforts and stem the influence of the Taliban on the justice system, NATO Defense Ministers endorsed the establishment of the NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission (NROLFSM) at the June Defense Ministerial. NROLFSM, which became operational on June 30, 2011, complements the rule of law support activities of the U.S.-led Rule of Law Field Force – Afghanistan. NROLFSM focuses on supporting Afghan and international civilians responsible for the development of the Afghan criminal justice system and improving the capability of the Afghan Government to deliver dispute resolution services to its citizens.

Despite notable progress, rule of law efforts suffered a setback in April, when 488 detainees escaped from the Sarposa prison in Kandahar Province. Although a number of escapees were captured when they returned to their local farms, many fled to Pakistan. Immediately following the escape, Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF) 435 deployed 24 corrections experts to stabilize operations at Sarposa by instituting standards for regular searches, head-counts, key control, visitation, and prisoner escort. Additionally, the Sarposa Warden and fourteen Afghan guards allegedly involved in abetting the escape have been detained and are awaiting trial.

As a part of CJIATF 435’s stabilization efforts following the escape, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Rapid Reaction Tunnel Detection Team began conducting an assessment across all Afghan provincial prisons, ISAF detention sites, forward operating bases, and combat outposts in May. As a result of the assessment, USFOR-A and ISAF requested funds to equip 11 detention facilities with permanent passive-detection systems as well as five mobile-detection kits to periodically assess 12 other Afghan facilities.
Following the escape at Sarposa, the Afghan Government accelerated the effort to transfer responsibility for the Central Prisons Directorate (CPD) from the Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of the Interior, officially proposed by a Presidential Decree issued in May. The main implications of the shift include a review of the current legislative framework, the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the two Ministries, staffing and resourcing, and a reorganization of the MoI to accommodate the CPD. The MoI and MoJ have established two commissions to examine these issues. As of the end of the reporting period, the transfer of the CPD is still pending. The international community will remain closely involved in the process through UNDP/LOTFA, NTM-A, British, Canadian, and U.S. participation in both commissions.

**The Justice Sector**

Overall, there continues to be little progress in the development of Afghanistan’s justice sector. Plans to expand the justice sector to underserved areas, particularly in the Pashtun regions of Afghanistan, are ongoing, but have yet to yield results, and the fraud allegations of the 2010 Parliamentary elections stopped progress on necessary legal reforms for several months. Furthermore, the capacity of the justice sector continues to be limited by a lack of infrastructure and the inability to offer salaries sufficient enough to attract and retain trained legal personnel.

Despite these challenges, the Afghan Government made modest progress in addressing justice sector shortfalls during the reporting period. In May 2011, 140 new judges graduated from the Supreme Court Judicial Stage training, a two-year judicial training program designed to help prepare new law graduates for careers as judges. An additional 57 applicants are pending acceptance as judges without formal Stage training. Despite some progress in developing the human capital necessary to support the justice system, the Supreme Court must take steps to assign judges to priority vacancies throughout the country.

Notwithstanding some recent positive rule of law initiatives, such as the IDLG-led Rule of Law Working Group, access to the formal justice system remains poor throughout most of the country. Although the Afghan Government, supported by ISAF and the U.S. Embassy, has made substantial progress in establishing five provincial justice centers, these locations remain underdeveloped and serve only a small portion of Afghanistan. Outside of the provincial justice centers, most provinces have a formal justice presence in the provincial capital, although many remain under resourced. Access to the formal justice system at the district level remains uneven, with at least one quarter of all districts missing a judge, a prosecutor, or both.

In an effort to more effectively identify the challenges facing the formal justice sector, the Afghan Government recently drafted the Governance National Priority Plan 5. As of this report, however, it is not clear that sufficient resources currently exist to fully implement the expansion described by the plan, despite substantial international assistance. Without necessary resourcing, the Afghan people will likely continue to have extremely limited access to the formal justice system for the foreseeable future.

Nevertheless, most disputes in Afghanistan continue to be resolved outside of the formal justice system through traditional means. Councils of village elders, *jirgas*[^30], and *shuras* remain the

[^30]: “Assembly”
foundation of dispute resolution in Afghanistan. USAID leads efforts to improve the informal justice system through its Rule of Law Stabilization Program, an initiative that helps councils to improve their functionality within their traditional role in Afghan society. USAID assistance has supported the creation of a system to transmit council decisions in writing to the district level, enabling information sharing and promoting an improved understanding of Afghan law. Traditional dispute resolution will likely remain the primary means of mediating conflict for the foreseeable future.

DETENTION OPERATIONS

CJIATF 435 is responsible for U.S. Government detention operations in Afghanistan. U.S. detention operations are authorized under the Law of Armed Conflict, which is distinct from the Afghan criminal justice system. However, the transition of U.S. detention operations to Afghan authority includes the transfer of U.S. detainees to the Afghan criminal justice system and requires additional judicial sector capacity building. Thus, Afghan rule of law efforts and U.S. detention operations, while distinct, are related and mutually supporting.

All detainees currently held by U.S. forces at the Detention Facility in Parwan (DFIP), the sole U.S. detention facility in Afghanistan, receive periodic administrative reviews of their status, threat, and potential for rehabilitation and reintegration, in accordance with the procedures initiated in July 2009. During the reporting period, the Detainee Review Board (DRB) completed 2,203 cases, including 506 in September, the highest of any month since the first DRB was established in September 2009. Thus far in 2011, the DRB has completed 3,224 cases and will reach an estimated 4,600 review boards by the end of the calendar year, with over 550 cases anticipated in October 2011. Meanwhile, the volume of cases has increased without a concomitant increase in manpower, thus straining the system.

In addition to the growing capacity of the DRB, the DFIP continues to add to the capabilities of its Reintegration Directorate, with the opening of a new vocational training facility that provides classes in basic carpentry, welding, steel works, masonry, electrical and plumbing. These classes provide necessary training to detainees to enable their reintegration into Afghan society.

CJIATF 435 has begun the process of transitioning detention operations at the DFIP to the Afghan Government. This process began in January 2011, when CJIATF 435 transitioned responsibility of a detainee housing unit to the Ministry of Defense, which is now guarded by an Afghan guard force with the support of personnel from CJIATF 435. The speed of this transition process is dependent on a number of factors, including operational conditions, Afghan judicial capacity, and the point at which the Afghan Government is fully trained, equipped, and able to detain insurgents securely and to perform its detention, prosecution, and incarceration responsibilities in accordance with its international obligations and Afghan law.

An integral part of the transition effort is to help build Afghanistan’s legal capacity for prosecuting, under Afghan law, individuals currently held by the United States at the DFIP. Adjacent to the DFIP is the Justice Center in Parwan (JCIP), an Afghan-run facility consisting of courtrooms and ministerial office buildings. Judicial capacity at the JCIP is now beginning to keep pace with the number of detainee cases that have been identified as suitable for Afghan prosecution. Compared to the previous reporting period, judicial capacity at the JCIP has
improved significantly; for the entire reporting period, the Afghan Government has conducted 181 primary court trials (adult and juvenile) and 77 appellate court trials at the JCIP with Afghan judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel. Since the first trial in June 2010, the JCIP has completed a total of 271 primary court trials (adult and juvenile) and 104 appellate court trials.

Although the number of detainees identified for prosecution declined during the reporting period, the number of detainees increased substantially. The number of detainees found suitable for transfer from the DFIP to Afghan custody for prosecution, however, is limited by the quality of evidence obtained by ISAF at the point of capture, and whether the expected sentence at the JCIP would sufficiently mitigate the risk posed by the detainee. As evidence collection improves across the battle space, more cases will be referred to Afghanistan for prosecution. The collection of biometrics is one area has contributed significantly to the prosecution being able to present admissible evidence leading to successful convictions.

Also during the reporting period, there were several reports of abusive practices in the Afghan detention system. ISAF has undertaken to investigate these allegations, and the investigation is ongoing.

5.5: AFGHAN PARLIAMENT

The months following the September 2010 elections for the Wolesi Jirga of the Afghan Parliament saw multiple allegations of electoral fraud, which prompted a flood of formal and informal election complaints.

According to Afghan electoral law, final election results are declared by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), while the fraud investigations are under the jurisdiction of the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC). The IEC announced the final results in December 2010, once the ECC had concluded its investigations. However, the Attorney General’s Office continued to investigate more than 300 claims of fraud, and the Supreme Court, at the direction of President Karzai and without basis in the Afghan legal framework, later convened a Special Elections Court to further investigate the fraud allegations.

Following a number of weeks of uncertainty and continuing investigations, President Karzai, under pressure from Parliament, civil society, and the international community, inaugurated the Wolesi Jirga in January 2011. However, in February 2011, the Special Court undertook a completely new count of the votes in all 34 provinces; the Court’s count was performed by Provincial line ministry staff absent procedural guidance and devoid of any domestic or international observation.

On June 23, 2011, the Special Court announced the results of its six-month investigation into electoral fraud during the September 2010 elections. The Court found evidence of fraud in 33 of 34 provinces, and according to the Court’s recount results, 62 parliamentarians (who represent 26 provinces and nearly one quarter of the Wolesi Jirga) were fraudulently elected. Despite the fraud allegations, the Parliament opened its second session on July 23, 2011.

In an effort to resolve the impasse, President Karzai issued a decree in August dissolving the Special Election Court and reaffirming the IEC as the final arbiter regarding election jurisdiction
in Afghanistan. Following this decree, the IEC ruled that nine members of parliament from the Wolesi Jirga were to be removed as opposed to the 62 ordered by the Special Elections Court; in early September, eight of the nine new members were sworn in.

These results have prompted a significant protest from a number of Parliamentarians. As a result, Parliament has been unable to resume work on a variety of important legislative issues, including the recapitalization of Kabul Bank and outstanding Kabul Conference commitments.

5.6: COUNTER-CORRUPTION AND TRANSPARENCY

Corruption and organized crime present a significant threat to the success of the ISAF mission and the security and stability of the Afghan state. Corruption undermines the effectiveness, cohesion, and legitimacy of the Afghan Government; it alienates elements of the population and generates popular discontent from which insurgent groups draw strength; it deters investment, encourages the diversion of international assistance, and impedes licit economic growth; it enables criminal networks to influence important state institutions and functions; and it facilitates the narcotics trade and other transnational threats emerging from Afghanistan. Counter-corruption efforts are essential to strengthening Afghan institutions and to consolidating gains in the wake of improved security, and will grow in importance as the process of transition continues.

The United States has implemented a number of initiatives to support the Afghan Government in its efforts to reduce corruption and organized crime, while working to ensure that U.S. contracting resources and development assistance are not subject to fraud and corruption. These initiatives include sustained engagement, capacity-building, and technical assistance in key Afghan ministries; expansion of interagency efforts to mature organized crime and corruption estimates in key sectors as a basis for action; creation of joint, Presidentially-sponsored forums to promote inter-ministerial coordination and develop concrete counter-corruption recommendations; and the development of investigative leads and other forms of support for vetted Afghan law enforcement, investigative, and oversight bodies. The United States has also expanded its vendor-vetting and contract actions, suspending or debarring contracting companies engaged in corruption and criminality. Additionally, ISAF and its interagency partners are increasingly examining the transnational dimensions of corruption and organized crime in Afghanistan and identifying ways to combat it.

Despite continued U.S. and coalition support, the Afghan Government continues to lack the resolve to address many corruption issues. A number of anti-corruption commitments have not been addressed nearly a year after the Kabul Conference and Afghans’ perceptions of corruption in the government and its negative effects on their daily lives remain high.31

**COMBINED JOINT INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE - SHAFAFIYAT**

In coordination with the international community and in support of the Afghan government, Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF) – *Shafafiyat*32 fosters a common understanding of the corruption problem, plans and implements ISAF anti-corruption efforts, and

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31 Afghan National Quarterly Assessment Research (ANQAR), Wave 13, September 2011.

32 “Transparency”
integrates ISAF anti-corruption activities with those of key partners to support President Karzai’s goal of an “active and honest administration” in Afghanistan. ISAF works with Afghan partners to reduce corruption such that it no longer presents a significant threat to the viability of the Afghan state, and to institutionalize reforms to promote continued counter-corruption progress.

Since August 2010, CJIATF-Shafafiyat has been responsible for integrating the efforts of three existing task forces engaged in counter-corruption and counter-organized crime activities: Task Force 2010, Task Force Spotlight, and CJIATF-Nexus. Task Force-2010 and Task Force Spotlight have been integral in providing increased coordination and oversight of U.S. and ISAF contracting processes and in ensuring that international resources do not inadvertently strengthen criminal networks or insurgent groups. CJIATF-Nexus analyzes the intersection of corruption, the narcotics trade, and the insurgency as a basis for Afghan and coalition law enforcement and military efforts. CJIATF-Nexus, in coordination with other ISAF and interagency elements, has contributed to the integration of law enforcement and military operations in support of enduring counternarcotics efforts.

**COUNTER-CORRUPTION EFFORTS**

ISAF’s working relationship with Afghan officials on the corruption problem has matured significantly over the reporting period. Senior Afghan leaders have acknowledged the threat corruption poses to the state and are increasingly willing to participate in joint counter-corruption planning efforts with ISAF and the international community. In partnership with ISAF, Afghan leaders have established a variety of high-level forums in which ISAF and other international organizations can share information, gain insights, and develop common, concrete solutions with Afghan officials. Chief among these is the Transparency and Accountability Working Group, which is hosted jointly by CJIATF-Shafafiyat and Afghanistan’s Office of the National Security Council. Representatives from U.S. Government agencies, international organizations, and Afghan ministries attend the monthly working group, which generates detailed recommendations for reducing corruption within key sectors of the Afghan government. The working group provides its recommendations to President Karzai and the Afghan National Security Council for their consideration and action.

CJIATF-Shafafiyat also participates with United Nations Assistance Mission – Afghanistan (UNAMA), key embassies, and others within ISAF in a bi-monthly working group designed to promote cohesion on matters of corruption and identify opportunities for collaboration. At this International Community Transparency and Accountability Working Group, CJIATF-Shafafiyat shares insights, estimates, and assessments with donor nation missions and others within the international community in order to encourage coordinated action.

ISAF has expanded and institutionalized its partnerships with agencies and organizations in the United Kingdom, the United States, and other NATO partners to create reach-back networks and resolve gaps in information and intelligence regarding the corruption problem. In coordination with these interagency and international partners, ISAF is broadening its understanding of the transnational dimension of corruption and organized crime in Afghanistan, while identifying the tools and capabilities available to address those elements of the problem that extend beyond Afghanistan’s borders.


**THE BANKING SECTOR**

On September 26, 2011, following the conclusion of the IMF and World Bank annual meeting in Washington, the IMF issued a press release indicating that an agreement had been reached between the IMF and the Afghan Government. The release stated that the Afghan Government committed to full compliance with IMF “prior actions” for the resolution of the Kabul Bank crisis in order to meet the necessary conditions for a new IMF country program. These actions include recapitalization of the Afghan Central Bank, criminal prosecutions of those responsible for the Kabul Bank crisis, asset recovery, and an audit of another major Afghan bank.

The Afghan Government has taken over the management of Kabul Bank, extinguished the rights of its shareholders, taken measures to recover some of the stolen assets, and segregated bad assets by splitting the bank into a “good” bank and a “bad” bank. The “good” portion of Kabul Bank will be offered for sale and, in the absence of a credible buyer, the bank will be liquidated. As a result of discussions with the IMF, a supplementary budget request will be submitted to Parliament to recapitalize the Afghan Central Bank, which had to extend lender of last resort financing to Kabul Bank. Additionally, at the urging of the IMF, the Afghan Government is committed to announce a strategy to enforce Afghan law in relation to any financial crimes committed at Kabul Bank.

Separately, the United States announced at the plenary session of the World Bank Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund Steering Committee in mid-September its decision to disburse $100M to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) Investment Window to support the National Solidarity Program administered by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development. This marked an important milestone enabling continuation without interruption of this important community development program linking the government to the Afghan people, which is essential to supporting coalition stabilization and transition goals. However, as of the end of the reporting period, the ARTF Recurrent Cost Window (used to support about 23 percent of the Afghan Government operating budget) is closed and will remain so until a new IMF agreement is in place.

**5.7: RECONCILIATION AND REINTEGRATION**

Reconciliation and reintegation are critical components to a long-term political solution in Afghanistan.

The Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP), established by President Karzai in 2010, continues to complement security gains by removing insurgents from the battlefield. The number of reintegrees brought off the battlefield has increased substantially this year. Progress in key strategic areas, however, has been limited by a lack of institutional capacity, and results have yet to become strategically significant. By the end of this reporting period, the APRP had formally reintegrated a total of 2,497 insurgents country-wide, up from 699 at the end of March 2011.

Although most reintegation has occurred in the north and west, formal reintegation is advancing in eastern Afghanistan and just beginning to emerge in the strategically-significant southern provinces – critical areas where the insurgency is most intransigent. In order to
promote further reintegration in the south, the Afghan Government and ISAF are conducting a focused operation which combines military pressure with outreach initiatives to push insurgents into the reintegration program. To help accelerate reintegration in the south and southwest, the APRP Joint Secretariat held a Regional Reintegration Conference in Kandahar September 12 that brought together more than 300 officials and stake-holders to develop action plans for advancing reintegration in their provinces and districts. In addition to those who formally enter the APRP, reporting indicates that many insurgents, particularly in the south, have informally reintegrated by quietly opting to end their opposition and return to their communities.

The APRP Joint Secretariat’s effort to build capacity to manage reintegration at the provincial level continues with the establishment of Provincial Peace Councils in all 34 provinces and the organization of Provincial Joint Secretariat Teams (PJSTs) in 25 provinces (up from six PJSTs in May 2011). PJST training was conducted in July, and most PJSTs have access to operational budgets, although capacity to execute these funds in some areas remains limited. In August, the first Afghan Government-executed community recovery projects were launched in Badghis Province, and the first APRP small grants proposals were submitted in September. With most provincial structures in place, provinces will see an increasing ability to conduct reintegration operations without close management from Kabul. However, provincial reintegration structures are still new, and capacity, while growing, remains low. International support will remain crucial in the near term for filling program gaps and building capacity.

In a parallel and complementary track, the United States, the international community, and the Government of Afghanistan continue to explore options to bring a lasting diplomatic solution to the conflict.

During the reporting period, the High Peace Council (HPC), the Afghan body responsible for overseeing negotiations with the Taliban, continued its domestic outreach through conferences and events throughout the country with high-profile events in several provinces. The HPC led a May reintegration planning conference with high-level donor representation, and a June reintegration meeting for the International Contact Group on Afghanistan. The HPC has also expanded its regional contacts in order to build international support and cooperation for reconciliation. HPC representatives have traveled to India and conducted several meetings with Pakistan. HPC outreach efforts will be critical to the success of focused reintegration operations in southern Afghanistan.

The reconciliation effort experienced a setback with the September 20 assassination of Burhanuddin Rabbani, the Chairman of the High Peace Council. The killing sent a message from certain extremist elements of the Taliban that they were not interested in peace. However, President Karzai and the Afghan leadership have restated their commitment to persevere in the pursuit of peace and national unity, and to look for areas to advance reconciliation where opportunities emerge. Insurgents, who initially claimed credit for the killing, later recanted, likely because they had not predicted such a robust Afghan and international reaction.

In a tangible sign of support by the international community for Afghan reconciliation efforts, the UN Security Council enacted significant changes to the international sanctions against al Qaeda and the Taliban. The previous sanctions, enacted under Resolution 1267 in 1999, were an
effort to pressure the Taliban government into turning over Osama bin Laden, and also formed the “al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee” to oversee the implementation of Resolution 1267.

In June 2011, the Security Council adopted Resolutions 1988 and 1989, effectively separating al Qaeda and Taliban members into two separate lists. The resolutions also created separate committees to oversee each list, which will allow the Security Council to respond to the unique nature of each group.

Under Resolution 1988, the committee overseeing the Taliban will consider candidates for removal from the sanctions list every six months. In order to be delisted, individuals must renounce violence, sever links to international terrorist organizations, and respect the Afghan Constitution. Delisting requests are thoroughly vetted and must include a recommendation from the HPC. Fourteen of the 22 names submitted by the Afghan Government to the UN Taliban Sanctions Committee for delisting had been approved, including four members of the HPC.

In addition to the new process for delisting individuals, Resolution 1989 is designed to provide a more-effective appeals mechanism for individuals who are listed. The Resolution strengthens the committee’s ombudsperson, whose office now has the power to submit delisting recommendations of its own. The committee must decide on these removal requests within sixty days and cannot reject them without a unanimous vote; otherwise, requests will be referred to the Security Council.

Since Resolution 1267 was enacted in 1999, the sanctions have proven to be an important tool for limiting al Qaeda and the Taliban’s ability to raise funds and recruit new members. By refocusing efforts on the threat posed by al Qaeda, ensuring the accuracy of the lists, and taking steps to foster negotiations, Resolutions 1988 and 1989 have improved the effectiveness of the sanctions while also promoting the reconciliation process.
SECTION 6 – RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

6.1: OVERVIEW

The limited capacity of the Afghan Government continues to impede reconstruction and development efforts in Afghanistan. The availability of essential services remains mixed, and the government has yet to develop a comprehensive economic growth strategy or plan for private sector-led economic development. Technical assistance and capacity-building efforts from the international community will remain important in the medium- to long-term in order to enable the Afghan Government to carry out core state functions for the provision of the public welfare and to build a market economy to support sustainable economic growth and job creation.

6.2: UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is a political mission established at the request of the Afghan Government to assist in laying the foundations for sustainable peace and development. The mission is responsible for a wide range of support activities including political affairs, relief, recovery and reconstruction, and human rights. UNAMA coordinates closely with several UN agencies, funds, and programs in order to provide a wide range of humanitarian support to the Afghan people, as well as policy and program support to various Afghan Government ministries on development matters.33

UNAMA operates under UN Security Council Resolution 1974 (2011), which provides UNAMA and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan, Staffan de Mistura, with a mandate to support the Afghan Government in its efforts to improve security, governance and economic development, and regional cooperation, as well as to support the full implementation of mutual commitments made on these issues at the London Conference of January 2010 and the Kabul Conference of July 2010. In support of this mission, UNAMA currently operates 18 regional and provincial field offices, with liaison offices in Islamabad and Tehran.

UNAMA’s mandate expires in March 2012. Currently, discussions regarding an extension of the mandate are ongoing, while UNAMA remains conscious of a growing desire on the part of the senior Afghan leadership to scale back the scope of the mission, as the Afghan Government continues to assume greater responsibility for Afghanistan.

6.3: PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

Provincial Reconstruction Teams across Afghanistan continue to promote the authority and legitimacy of the Afghan government at local, district, and provincial levels; integrate and coordinate the combined multinational civil-military efforts; increase stability and security for the citizens of Afghanistan; develop local, provincial, and national infrastructure; and promote national unity by diminishing the influence of warlords and insurgents.

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33 Agencies include the Asian Development Bank, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Development Program, UN Food and Agriculture Organization, UN Office on Drugs and Crime, UN World Food Program, UN World Health Organization, and the World Bank, among others.
In general, PRTs throughout the regional commands confront similar strategic challenges: a lack of financial capital; difficulty funding maintenance of infrastructure projects; long-term sustainability of projects; shortfalls in Afghan human capacity; lack of Afghan expertise in engineering, budget planning, and proposal writing; and a challenging security situation.

Figure 33: Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Lead Nations

PRTs are also important elements to ensuring the success of the transition process, and every province in the first tranche of transition, with the exception of Kabul, contains a PRT. This presence is especially important given that governance capacity remains the most challenging aspect of transition, even in areas where security gains have allowed for increased ANSF capacity.

6.4: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

**Economic Outlook and Budget Review**

Overall, short-term economic growth trends remain positive, largely due to a consumption-driven economy dominated by services and construction demands associated with large scale international donor and military spending. The medium- and long-term economic outlook, however, indicates a recession will likely occur in the wake of the drawdown of international forces and declining international donor support leading up to and following 2014.
Current World Bank figures indicate that the Afghan Government’s operational and development budget funding is externally driven by donor assistance and military spending. Nevertheless, domestic revenue collection has continued to improve over the last year. From March 2010 to March 2011 (equivalent to the Afghan solar year 1389), Afghan Government revenue collection amounted to $1.66B, constituting 11.3 percent of Afghanistan’s gross domestic product. This represents an increase of 26.4 percent, or $350M, from March 2009, and exceeded the projected target of $1.47B. The major drivers of revenue growth include improved tax and customs administration and the introduction of an ad-valorem tax on imports. These increases improved the fiscal sustainability indicator, defined as the percentage of operating budget expenditures covered by domestic revenue, to 73 percent, an increase from 60 percent seen in March 2008 – March 2009.

While revenue generation has progressed since 2009, revenues continue to be outpaced by operating expenditures. This shortfall is likely to be exacerbated as the Afghan Government assumes more responsibility for the recurrent implications of the external budget (funds spent by donors outside of the Afghan budgeting process).

Financial management, particularly budget execution, also remains a major challenge for the Afghan Government. From March 2010 to March 2011, the Afghan Government executed just 39 percent of the on-budget development funds – $894M out of a total budget of $2.3B. However, during the first quarter of solar year 1390 (March 21, 2011 – June 20, 2011), the Afghan Government executed the development budget at an efficient pace. Total Afghan Government expenditure during the period was $117M, an increase of 92 percent over the same quarter in the previous year.

The ability to improve budget execution and the delivery of basic services is fundamental to promoting the viability and legitimacy of the Afghan Government. Accordingly, donors and international financial institutions such as the World Bank have sought to improve the capacity of financial management through technical assistance, training, and mentoring. These programs are currently underway at the provincial level to improve financial management and the link between national and provincial structures, and are expected to enable progress in sub-national provincial budgeting and improve basic service delivery to the local population in five key Afghan Government entities: Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Public Health, Ministry of Reconstruction and Rural Development, and the Independent Directorate for Local Governance.

**Trade and Exports**

In a notable development during the reporting period, the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA), which allows Afghan trucks to export cargo to Pakistani ports as well as the Indian border, went into effect. The agreement was originally signed in October 2010, but could not be enforced amid concerns that goods would be smuggled back into Pakistan.

The APTTA was officially inaugurated on June 12, 2011. Full implementation of the agreement will provide a boost to the economies of both countries by reducing the costs and delays in transport between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and will help both countries expand their reach to
world markets and make Afghan exports more competitive. The agreement is also expected to reduce cross-border smuggling and increase government revenues from legitimate trade. However, full implementation of the agreement remains a work in progress due to unresolved issues relating to the bonding insurance for cargoes and trucks. The resulting delay has reduced customs revenue collections and increased the prices of imported goods in Afghanistan.

In addition to potential for trade growth in Pakistan, India’s decision during the reporting period to reduce tariffs and to allow the duty-free import of certain goods from Afghanistan is expected to increase trade between the two countries.

Also during the period, the Afghan National Standards Authority opened with the intent of increasing quality control for Afghan goods; the Ministry of Commerce and Industry opened a shop to help exporters with procedures and to promote licit trade; and support for small and medium enterprises continues in areas such as marble, food processing, carpets, textiles, and construction.

**Task Force for Business and Stability Operations**

The Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) continues to be a key organization for fostering economic growth in Afghanistan. TFBSO was formed by the U.S. Department of Defense in 2006 to leverage U.S. and international economic power as a strategic tool for promoting economic stabilization in Iraq. In January 2010, TFBSO established operations in Afghanistan to identify and create economic opportunities in direct support of the civil-military COIN strategy.

TFBSO’s mission has been to reduce violence, enhance stability, and restore economic normalcy in areas where insecurity has resulted in economic hardship. TFBSO employs a range of programs that encourage investment by U.S. and international businesses; assist industrial development; and enhance banking and financial system development, agricultural revitalization, and the development of Afghanistan’s natural resources. TFBSO activities complement other U.S. Government economic and development activities in Afghanistan and help set the conditions for business, trade, and long-term economic development to expand as the security environment improves.

TFBSO supports a variety of economic development efforts throughout Afghanistan. Several of these initiatives are highlighted below:

- The Afghan First Program connects Afghan companies with U.S. Government clients in Afghanistan, improves procurement management and accounting systems, and ensures emergent Afghan contractors meet required, internationally-accepted business standards.
- Through the Agricultural Development Program, TFBSO works with the Norman Borlaug Institute of International Agriculture and other partners to help revitalize the Afghan agriculture sector by improving farmer outputs, filling gaps in the agribusiness processing chain, and driving demand for agriculture sector jobs.
- The Energy Program allows TFBSO to partner with the Afghan government, the Afghan private sector, and the U.S. interagency to provide the Afghan population access to
affordable electricity and fuel and accelerate the development of the hydrocarbon sector in Afghanistan to increase domestic oil and gas production.

• With the Indigenous Industries Program, TFBSO aims to help revitalize traditional Afghan industries — such as carpet weaving, dried fruit processing and cashmere production — in order to reintroduce historically Afghan products and services to the international market.

• Under its Natural Resources Program, TFBSO works with USAID, the U.S. Geological Service, and private-sector geologists to help Afghanistan to grow its economy through the development of its mining and energy industries in a socially, environmentally, and fiscally responsible way.

**AGRICULTURE**

More than 80 percent of Afghanistan’s economy is agriculturally-based, making the agricultural sector a significant area of U.S. and international assistance and a priority for stabilization efforts. There has been slow but steady progress in agricultural and rural development in Afghanistan during the reporting period, although much of the activity is largely dependent on donor assistance.

The U.S. Agricultural Assistance Strategy for Afghanistan has dual goals: increase the capacity of Afghanistan’s Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL) to deliver services; and increase agricultural sector jobs and incomes through enhancing agricultural productivity, regenerating agribusiness, rehabilitating watersheds, and improving irrigation infrastructure. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) is taking numerous steps to assist MAIL in becoming a more efficient organization that is able to address the nation’s agriculture needs.

To achieve this, USDA continues to implement a program to help MAIL strengthen its administrative and financial functions, including grants management, internal audits, procurement, and accounting. This multi-year program specifically focuses on establishing a Grants Management and Contract Services unit at MAIL, a necessary step to enable MAIL to directly receive and manage program funding from USDA, USAID, and other donor organizations. This project has installed an automated, integrated, and comprehensive Financial Management and Information System, which replaces manual ledgers and individual spreadsheets, automating more than 10,000 transactions each month.

To support capacity building at the provincial and district level, USDA experts in the field trained more than 460 MAIL provincial and district Directors of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock, as well as their staffs and extension agents, covering at least 79 districts throughout Afghanistan. The development of leadership capacity at the sub-national level continues to improve the Afghan Government’s broader agricultural sector.

In addition to building institutional capacity, support for Afghanistan’s food security remains essential to U.S. development and stabilization efforts. To this end, USAID supports a number of development initiatives, including on-farm support, increasing the availability of credit to farmers and agribusiness, and seed distribution programs. Specifically, the Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased Production in Agriculture program in southern Afghanistan has provided improved seed and farm inputs, resulting in the distribution of more than 1.16 million vouchers.
worth $164M. Further, USAID’s National Seed Distribution Program recently completed its distribution phase throughout 31 provinces, which supplied 13,000 metric tons of certified wheat seed and 39,000 tons of fertilizer to nearly 260,000 farmers.

Wheat is a key staple in Afghanistan, accounting for more than half of the caloric intake of the population and grown on roughly 70 percent of cultivated land area. Given the dependency of wheat production on weather conditions, food security remains a serious problem in Afghanistan. After a poor wet season (October 2010 – March 2011), USDA estimated in July that the 2011 Afghan wheat production declined by 33 percent from the previous year to 2.5 million metric tons, particularly in northern Afghanistan, where it is estimated to have declined 70 percent in wheat production compared to 2010. The drought created a food crisis in 14 provinces with predominantly rain-fed agriculture, mainly in the northern and northwestern portions of Afghanistan. However, the Afghan Government has not requested food assistance as of this report.

In cooperation with donors and international food aid agencies, MAIL has enacted a plan to mitigate the impact of the drought, but the situation remains critical. A wheat deficit of 1.8 million tons will need to be filled by wheat from neighboring wheat-producing countries or provided by international donors in order to prevent significant food shortages this year (July 2011 – June 2012).

Further, MAIL announced a three-month emergency response project to address severe food shortages and drought in provinces in north and northeast Afghanistan. This project consists of three main distribution efforts: 1) food aid to 200,000 families (approximately 1.3 million people); 2) 20 metric tons of animal feed to livestock owners; and 3) 10,000 metric tons of high-quality wheat seed to drought-affected areas. Additionally, the World Food Program has stated that 42,000 metric tons of food commodities are available if necessary.

Fortunately, favorable growing conditions in neighboring countries are anticipated to provide robust supply that will satisfy Afghan consumption needs; commercial imported wheat and flour should be plentiful in the markets this fall and compensate for domestic production shortfalls. Due to an expected ample food supply from neighboring countries, the main household-level food security challenge identified this season is loss of income; thus, most necessary assistance is predicted to be cash-for-work or vouchers as opposed to commodities.

However, as expected, some remote areas isolated during the winter months will need assistance in the form of pre-positioned food aid commodities. USAID’s Famine Early Warning Systems Network advises that approximately 240,000 to 390,000 poorer households in affected districts across 14 provinces could need assistance as a result of a combination of factors affecting food and livestock prices, labor wages, and purchasing power. The poorest households, whose livelihoods are solely dependent on rain-fed production or on livestock in northern Afghanistan, could need assistance to meet food requirements beginning as early as August and continuing through to the next harvest season.

Despite positive developments in supporting Afghanistan’s agriculture sector, the absence of an IMF program and the funds that have been withheld from the ARTF by donors as a result, has
disrupted some ARTF-funded agriculture and rural development programs. Absent an IMF program, these programs will be obliged to downscale or completely cease activity, which would severely hamper further progress in an agricultural sector that is the foundation of the Afghan economy.

**MINING**

The cultivation of Afghanistan’s mineral resources has the potential to generate significant economic growth and government revenues in the medium- to long-term, with a U.S. Geological Survey estimate of up to more than $900B of untapped mineral resources.

In June 2011, the Ministry of Mines (MoM) released an internal report titled the “Expected Contribution of the Mining Sector to Afghanistan’s Economy,” in which it projects $1.4B in direct fiscal revenue to the Afghan Government by 2016, growing to $2.2B by 2020. Although these are only estimations, they indicate the economic potential in Afghanistan’s natural resources. Near-term revenues are expected to be limited; nevertheless, the Afghan Government continues to develop the mineral sector with the long-term goal of leveraging mineral wealth as a platform for infrastructure development and gross domestic product growth.

In September, the MoM received seven bids for the Hajigak iron ore site in Bamiyan Province. As of the end of the reporting period, a MoM Bid Evaluation Team is reviewing these bids and will make a recommendation to the Inter-Ministerial Committee and Parliament in October. The contract is expected to be awarded in November, and the development of the site is scheduled to begin in 2012. Production of iron ore could begin by the end of 2015.

To manage and promote the responsible development of these significant natural resources, the Afghan Government is conducting an aggressive campaign to restructure the MoM and improve its overall capacity. Accordingly, the MoM has recently completed its organizational five-year plan, with reforms guided by international best practices on mining sector reforms, to transform the Ministry and help facilitate the monetization of Afghanistan’s deposits. The plan is heavily invested in the review and drafting of changes to the Mineral and Hydrocarbons Laws in order to clarify roles and responsibilities, simplify licensing procedures, streamline revenue collection systems, and guarantee the rights for companies who conduct mineral exploration. To support Afghan Government reform efforts, the World Bank approved a $52 million project in May 2011 to strengthen MoM capacity to manage rapid and large-scale foreign direct investment in the mining sector.

To complement reforms underway at the MoM, the Afghan Government continues to establish the legal, policy, and regulatory frameworks required to promote private sector-led economic growth and foreign direct investment in the Afghan economy. These frameworks must be paralleled by initiatives to attract foreign investment and improve technical capacity, while also improving supporting infrastructure, such as railways, to allow for the efficient movement of heavy ores and processing chemicals to and from mines and refining locations.

**HEALTH**

The Afghan population’s access to healthcare centers has steadily improved since 2009 as security and international funding support have increased. USAID, along with the World Bank
and the UK Department for International Development, continues to support the growth and development of Afghanistan’s health sector, increasing access to basic health services and primary care facilities, improving the quality of both public and private health services, and building the capacity of the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) at the national and sub-national levels.

Figure 34: District Assessment of Basic Health Centers

In April and May alone, 33 health centers opened across the country, bringing the nationwide total to more than 1,800. These new facilities, which include four Comprehensive Health Centers, one Basic Health Center, and 17 Sub-Health Centers, are staffed to provide care for up to 389,000 Afghans. Fifteen additional health facilities opened in July and August, including 2 district hospitals and 5 sub-health centers, which are staffed to provide care to more than 300,000 Afghans. Further, the number of health centers in key terrain districts and area of interest districts that meet or exceed MoPH standards increased from 45 in 2009 to 91 in 2011. Facilities that were assessed as below standards decreased from 41 to two during the same period.

Improvements in facilities have led to improvements in accessibility. In 2002, only nine percent of the population had access to basic health services within the MoPH benchmark of two hours walking distance; 85 percent of Afghans now reside within one hour of a health facility. The MoPH continues its efforts to expand the availability of health services toward the new goal of 90 percent national coverage by 2013.

Despite the increase in the availability of healthcare, Afghanistan still lacks the human capital to meet the health needs of the Afghan population. The World Health Organization recommends one doctor for every 600 people; Afghanistan currently has one doctor per 5,000 people. However, there is increased access to quality education for all levels of care – doctors, nurses, community health nurses, midwives, and nursing aides. Additionally, the MoPH is socializing the development of a medical council, which would work to establish a system of licensure and accreditation for health providers and hospitals.

The Ministry has also emphasized increasing the numbers of female health care providers, as well as the number of babies delivered by a skilled attendant, by focusing attention on midwifery
schools and female enrollment in other health professions programs across the country. According to MoPH, the country currently has approximately 2,000 midwives, and requires an additional 4,000 to ensure Afghan women have access to pre- and post-natal care. In support of this, Afghanistan’s first midwifery institute is currently under construction in Kandahar Province.

**EDUCATION**

Access to basic education in Afghanistan has seen a dramatic increase since 2001. Education figures for the current school year, which officially began in late March 2011, were released in July by the Ministry of Education (MoE). General education enrollment increased 8.4 percent in the last year with a total enrollment of approximately eight million students. Female enrollment increased by more than 200,000 students, and females currently represent approximately 37 percent of the total student population. Further, USAID continues its community-based education programs, which have provided education for more than 42,000 children. However, more than 4.5 million children are still denied access to education due to: poor security conditions, particularly in the south and east; lack of teachers, particularly female teachers at the secondary school level; and low salaries that inhibit the recruitment of teachers to keep pace with an increasing population. While the MoE is pursuing a policy of “Education for All,” building and sustaining the capacity necessary to reach this goal remains a significant challenge.

In order to accommodate the increasing student population, the number of teachers, as well as the number of schools, also increased in 2011. With the support of USAID training efforts, the total number of teachers increased by 4.7 percent from 162,418 to 170,014, up from only 20,000 at the beginning of 2002. The total number of schools rose by 843 to a total of 13,066. Funds from the Commander’s Emergency Response Program have significantly supported this development by funding the construction and rehabilitation of more than 1,000 schools in the last five years, including 364 since 2010.

In the face of a dramatic increase in the school-aged population, the MoE will continue to be challenged to keep pace in terms of facilities, teachers, and relevant curriculum. The MoE is aiming to improve its capacity through strategic planning, the institution of teacher registration, and improvements to syllabi and materials. Notably, more than 50,000 teachers in 11 provinces are participating in in-service training. Major donors, including USAID, are working with the MoE to provide provincial teacher training colleges and pre-service university facilities and courses across the country in order to keep pace with the growing population of students. However, despite significant growth, the teacher population continues to lag behind increasing student enrollments.

The MoE reports that, as of the beginning of the school year in March 2011, 539 schools remain closed due to security, maintenance, and administrative issues. Teachers also leave as a result of the poppy harvest, staff salary issues, and natural disasters, ultimately depriving an estimated 115,000 children of access to education, predominantly in highly-contested areas in the southern portion of the country. Additionally, re-opened schools may be operating at significantly reduced capacity, and parents may still be reluctant to send their children due to concessions made to insurgents, limited access for girls, or altered curriculum. However, the recent softening
in Taliban attitudes towards education and a decrease in attacks on schools presents an opportunity to address some education access issues that may be related to security.

**LAND REFORM**

Similar to other areas of governance, land management in Afghanistan remains a centralized process susceptible to corruption. However, progress has been made during the last six months in the area of land management and reform.

In order to reduce the Afghan justice system’s burden of land dispute cases and resolve land cases more quickly, the Land Dispute Resolution Directorate was created in the Afghanistan Land Authority (ALA). The main tasks of this directorate include information gathering, analysis of land disputes, and arbitration, as well as referral of cases to the Afghan court system. To date, 741 cases have been analyzed and 263 cases have been resolved.

ALA has steadily increased its capacity to deal with land issues in Afghanistan, holding two land conferences in Kabul in the past six months: one in May with the ministries, the other in September with provincial land committees. Also during the reporting period, USAID began the Land Reform in Afghanistan Project (LARA), a three-year project designed to build the land management institution and improve land tenure security.

In addition to land reform and management, land owned by the Afghan Government is being used as a tool to encourage domestic and foreign investment, as well as a method to prevent the usurpation of Government land by local powerbrokers. Recently, the Afghan Government streamlined the leasing process, reducing the process from over 40 steps to fewer than 10, which has resulted in a reduction in overall processing time from 22 months to two months. To date, 95,850 jiribs[^34] of land have been leased, and another 200 applicants have requested to lease an additional 40,000 jiribs.

Amendments to the existing Afghan land management law, last amended in 2008, are currently underway and focus on equity and enforceability. Articles related to formalization of informal ownership are also a key focus; specifically, one new component of the law focuses on compensation and/or resettlements of individuals who have had their property taken for development projects. In addition, standard regulations and procedures regarding key issues such as lease, land transfer, and exchange are also under revision.

**6.5: INFRASTRUCTURE**

Development efforts continue to improve Afghan infrastructure, including roads, rail, power, borders, civil aviation, and information and communications technology in key resource corridors. However, the Afghan Government is only now beginning to take the necessary steps to develop regulatory authorities and operations and maintenance (O&M) mechanisms necessary for the long-term sustainability of this infrastructure, which is integral to laying the foundation for sustainable economic development and growth.

[^34]: Roughly equivalent to an acre
ROADS

Donor, ISAF, and Afghan Government coordination for the planning and implementation of road development projects continues to be excellent, and the road network in Afghanistan continues to expand.

During the reporting period, the Asian Development Bank awarded the oversight contract for the remaining unpaved 233 km portion of the Ring Road. Although the contract is still under negotiation, it is expected to be signed in October, with construction slated to begin in January 2012.

With the nearing completion of the Ring Road, there is a growing vision of Afghanistan as a regional transportation hub. Accordingly, the Afghan Government committed to developing an East-West Corridor of 655 km paved road connecting Herat to Kabul to promote regional trade and economic integration in central and south Asia. However, a number of obstacles still remain, including a lack of funding commitments for the central corridor, security, and concerns about weak Afghan Government financial management and O&M capacity.

Efforts are also underway to assist the Ministry of Public Works (MoPW) in establishing a road authority that would be responsible for policy, regulation, and providing O&M for more than 34,800 km of roads that have been rehabilitated or constructed, including 6,000 km of national and regional highways. Currently, the MoPW has insufficient capacity to execute O&M programs. It is anticipated that donors will play a key role, once a road authority has been established, in providing technical assistance, training, and mentoring for a cadre of engineers to assume O&M program administration and technical work. The road authority would likely be an independent agency capable of generating revenue through tolls and fuel taxes to support its activities. However, there has been very little progress to date in establishing the road authority.

RAIL

Afghanistan’s emerging rail system has the potential to enable further economic opportunities, particularly with regards to the mining sector.

Following the completion of the Asian Development Bank-funded 75 km rail line from Hairatan to Mazar-e-Sharif in March 2011, an O&M contract with the Uzbek Railway Company was signed in July preparing the rail for use. However, due to several unresolved issues, railway operations are not expected to start until the end of 2011.

The Asian Development Bank has also provided funding to the MoPW for a port management contract at Naibabad Railhead near Mazar-e-Sharif. This rail link will stimulate trade and commerce with Uzbekistan and other Central Asian neighbors. Iran is involved in the construction of a rail line to Herat, and there is also initial French interest in developing a railway linking Kandahar to Pakistan.

Future progress in developing Afghanistan’s rail system is hampered by the lack of a rail authority in Afghanistan. However, a new ministerial working group was formed during the reporting period to outline the way forward for private sector-led development of the rail system. ISAF is planning to support this effort by providing a five-person rail advisory team, arriving in
October 2011, to provide technical assistance to the MoM to determine the mandate, structure, and location for the establishment of a rail authority that will provide a regulatory and oversight framework for national rail system development.

**BORDER CONTROL**

Afghanistan’s 5,529 km border serves as both a strategic challenge as well as an important source of revenue. Afghanistan continues to focus on securing the borders and developing the necessary infrastructure and human capital to maximize customs revenue; however, overall progress remains mixed.

A significant step forward in streamlining border management operations was reached in June when the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Finance signed a Memorandum of Understanding which initiated the implementation of the World Bank-proposed Border Management Model.

In July, the Afghan Government began a pilot project to operationalize the Border Management Model at the Hairatan border crossing point in Balkh Province. While the implementation of the model is proceeding slowly, it has already improved border procedures at the border crossing point, increasing cooperation between various Afghan agencies as well as promoting efficiencies in border security, improving narcotic/contraband interdiction, increasing revenue, and facilitating international trade. The main challenge for the pilot project is the absence of government support for customs authorities to protect against actions by local powerbrokers.

The border management model pilot project is scheduled for a 90-day assessment in October; pending the results of the assessment, the model will then be implemented at three additional border crossing points and adopted as the national border management model.

DoD funding also supports U.S. Embassy Kabul’s Border Management Task Force (BMTF), which currently has 54 advisors in Afghanistan working at various points of entry, inland customs depots, and Afghan ministries. During this reporting period, the Department of Defense signed a memorandum of understanding with the Department of Homeland Security for an additional 26 border management advisors in support of Afghanistan’s Border Management Initiative using Department of Homeland Security funds.

The BMTF continues to support capacity-building efforts of the Afghan National Customs Academy and the Afghan Advanced Border Management Academy, as well as other specialized training and equipment relating to interdiction, identification, and testing of illegal narcotics, IEDs, precursors, and other contraband. The BMTF has also worked with the leadership of the Afghan Border Police, Afghan Customs Police, and the Afghan Customs Department to develop a model and implementation plan for the creation of specialized mobile enforcement teams, which will serve to expose inspection gaps as well as smuggling and corruption efforts in order to improve border management and security.

Despite these signs of progress, significant challenges continue to hamper further improvements to border security. The development of a risk management process is a key component of border reform, but implementation is behind schedule; progress in the risk management pilot project at
the Torkham Gate border crossing point remains limited, and the project continues to be challenged by the influence of criminal patronage networks. Further, several border crossing points, including Weesh Chaman and the Kandahar inland customs depot, still lack the automated system for customs data, a gap which continues to hinder the effective border management and control of the trade corridor between these two points.

Additionally, the use of truck and cargo scanners can significantly improve security; however, power availability and other limitations have made placement difficult. The areas between border crossing points and ANSF outposts, known as green borders, are also extremely difficult to observe and control and create opportunities for lost revenue to smuggling as well as the import of illicit or dangerous goods.

**ENERGY**

Power generation, transmission, and distribution represent a primary focus of donor assistance in Afghanistan. As of the end of the reporting period, the power capacity in Afghanistan remains insufficient to meet increasing demand. Seventy-five percent of electricity is currently being imported, only 30 percent of Afghans are connected to the national power grid, less than 20 percent of the Afghan population has access to electric power, and per capita consumption is among the lowest in the world. Current estimates indicate a 42 percent shortfall in coverage of demand.

A number of ongoing initiatives are working to improve the population’s access to electricity and support the development of the energy sector.

USAID has continued efforts to expand the electrical grid to encompass communities in eastern and southern Afghanistan, improve energy security, and ensure sustainability. Over the last three years, these efforts have resulted in 170 megawatts in additional generating capacity, the doubling of national utility revenues nationwide, and a decrease in the utility subsidy to the Afghan Government. During the reporting period, USAID authorized a private security firm to provide security at Kajaki Dam, enabling work to begin on a critical piece of power infrastructure that is expected to meet the majority of energy needs for the South East Power System. Further, USAID supported the development of the National Load Control Center, the nerve center of the growing electricity grid, which was inaugurated in August.

Additionally, the gas industry showed promise during the reporting period. The planned upgrade of the Sheberghan Gas Field project and the pipeline system connecting Sheberghan to the major population center of Mazar-e-Sharif has the potential to yield the first major private investment in the Afghan gas industry, fully 25 percent of an estimated $300M for a 200 megawatt gas-fired thermal power plant.

**CIVIL AVIATION**

Civil aviation remains under-developed in Afghanistan, and Afghan flag-carrying airlines are still unable to meet International Civil Aviation Organization standards. However, limited progress is being made on a number of civil aviation development initiatives.
Airport rehabilitation, funded by international donors and ISAF, is underway in Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif. When renovated and fully operational, these international airports will substantially increase the prospects for regional and international trade and commerce and will promote economic growth.

In order to support the expected growth of the civil aviation sector, the Afghan Cabinet approved the creation of a Civil Aviation Authority; however, the organization has yet to be officially established under the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation. Other progress includes budgetary approval to fund air standards and safety ($5.2M), flight security ($7.5M), airport inspection and certification ($1M), air traffic control oversight ($750M), and air transport systems operations ($40.8M).

Further, the Multilateration Aerial Surveillance System, which will allow for greater situational awareness of civilian traffic transiting the airspace over Afghanistan, made significant progress during the reporting period towards becoming operational. This system will allow for a greater number of aircraft to transit Afghan airspace, with a corresponding increase in the revenue gained from over-flight fees.

**INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY**

The most significant event related to Information and Communication Technology (ICT) infrastructure development during the reporting period was the approval of the World Bank ICT Sector Development Project. In late May, the World Bank formally announced a multi-component $50M ICT program grant to expand communications connectivity, increase the use of mobile applications in strategic sectors of the Afghan Government, and incubate and support the development of the local information technology industry in Afghanistan. The project builds on earlier World Bank efforts to catalyze a second wave of development of the ICT sector in Afghanistan.

Additionally, the National Fiber Ring and central spurs have been fully funded to increase internet access and bandwidth across Afghanistan. However, security conditions continue to delay the project, particularly the Southeast fiber route from Ghazni to Kandahar Province, a strategically-important link between Kabul and Kandahar. Also during the reporting period, the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MCIT) has announced that wholesale internet prices will be reduced, thus continuing a trend that began in 2009. Since that time, internet rates have decreased by ten-fold, improving internet access for the Afghan population.

In addition to improvements in internet access, the number of GSM subscribers continues to increase; since July 2010, the number of GSM subscribers increased by two million people and continues to grow. To support this growth, the MCIT has launched an international competitive tender to expand and improve Afghanistan’s network. The submission deadline for bids is October 1, 2011, and the contract is expected to be awarded in early November.

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35 Global System for Mobile Communications
6.6: WOMEN’S ISSUES

The condition of Afghan women continues to be one of the worst in the world. In general, traditional gender biases, lack of security, weakness of government institutions, and women’s subordinate positions in Afghan society continue to impede women’s exercise of rights and freedoms. Women in Afghanistan still face widespread threats, including baad, forced marriages, child marriages, honor killings, and self-immolation at alarmingly high rates.36 Women still do not have equal access to justice mechanisms or feel comfortable reporting offenses to Afghan authorities, nor are the laws protecting women’s rights regularly upheld by Afghan courts.

The condition of women in prisons is of particular concern. An estimated 50 percent of imprisoned women are there on charges of adultery, which is broadly defined in the Afghan context as an absence from home for over 48 hours. Women’s security is often threatened inside the prison, and the overall living conditions are inadequate. Additionally, many mothers are forced to bring their children to prison with them.

GENDER DIRECTORATE DEVELOPMENT

An Afghan Government study of 33 ministries and governmental institutions indicates an overall positive trend in the institutionalization of gender directorates, gender units, or gender focal points in the executive branch. However, although 26 gender directorates have been created and integrated into the tashkil for 2011, many directorates have yet to begin recruiting personnel, and six of the ministries and government institutions have not established gender directorates in their tashkil for the current year.

Even where established in the tashkil, most gender directorates are either under-staffed, lack sufficient facilities, or require further capacity building. Due to their place in the government structure, they are also often marginalized and lack the legitimacy and the respect necessary to be effective advocates for Afghan women.

WOMEN’S SHELTERS

NGO-operated women’s shelters remain the only genuine safe haven for female victims in Afghanistan. However, in January 2011, Afghan Cabinet Decree 41 declared it to be the responsibility of Afghan Government to run and fund the shelters, and administrative responsibilities were delegated to the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, which increased the risk that women will be sent home due to family or community pressure. Since this decree, however, the Afghan Government has backtracked from its controversial draft regulation after Afghan women’s groups banded together and successfully lobbied against these changes. A revised version was drafted in May 2011 that reflected input from shelter NGOs and civil society organizations, with the most controversial provisions regarding access requirements and government intervention removed from the regulation. In early September, the final regulation passed the Council of Ministers.

36 Traditional means of settling disputes in Afghanistan, where a daughter is given to the family members of the victim of the crime.
**Gender and Counterinsurgency Strategy**

Gender also has a significant, yet often overlooked, impact on COIN operations. In order to defeat the insurgency and build support for the Government, COIN requires a critical mass of support, which cannot be reached without support from women.

To this end, ISAF has Female Engagement Teams (FETs) in all of the regional commands with the exception of RC-C. FETs conduct female engagement at the tactical level, where the goal is to build Afghan trust and confidence in the Government. FETs facilitate a better understanding of the operational environment and constitute an important tool in ISAF COIN operations, specifically conducting district female shuras and jirgas with a focus on expansion of female roles and responsibilities in the ANSF ranks.

During the reporting period, the Commander of RC-N hosted the first Regional Female Security shura, and all PRTs and task forces were tasked to nominate female key leaders in their respective areas of operation to be invited. Overall, 89 female key leaders from all nine provinces in RC-N participated. The shura included seminars, group discussions, and a press conference. A second shura was held in September, this time with a focus on governance. Approximately 100 Afghan women, including female Members of Parliament and District Directors of Women’s Affairs, joined representatives from RC-N, NTM-A, IJC, and ISAF Headquarters to discuss the female population’s perceptions of security and what roles they can and should play in the governance process.

In addition to ISAF female engagement efforts, NTM-A is working with the ANSF to increase female recruitment and training. Female security forces can play a key role in creating credible and respected security forces. The Afghan Government has established target numbers for female members of the ANSF, but recruitment, equipment, uniforms, and facilities remain significant challenges to achieving these goals.

**Reintegration and Reconciliation**

Afghan Women’s organizations remain concerned about the reintegration process, fearing that former insurgents with a history of human rights and women’s rights violations will be reinstated in society without punishment, or will assume positions of power and influence, particularly in the ANSF.

An important objective of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 is to ensure the participation of women in the peace process, including the APRP as well as transition. The APRP was designed to incorporate all Afghans, including women, in the peace process. The APRP leadership and its Gender Advisor continue to work with Afghan civil society to incorporate women’s perspective into the reintegration and reconciliation processes. On August 14, the leaders from the HPC, Parliament, Ministry of Women’s Affairs, APRP Joint Secretariat, and development line ministries met with civil society representatives to finalize APRP gender mainstreaming strategy and work plan. The APRP leadership charged the women members of the HPC and the APRP Gender Advisor to continue building Afghan women’s awareness of the APRP and generate confidence in the peace process. The gender framework emphasizes: 1) deploying the female representatives of the HPC to support the female representatives on the Provincial Peace Councils; 2) increasing the number of women participating in the APRP; 3) building women’s
capacity to engage in the peace process and monitor participation; 4) increasing awareness of the peace process among all Afghans; and 5) outreach to women leaders in the region.
SECTION 7 – COUNTERNARCOTICS

7.1: STRATEGY AND PRIORITIES

The Afghan Government is the lead for all counternarcotics (CN) operations, regularly partnering with U.S. and international partners to target illicit narcotics traffickers and facilities. The Department of Defense coordinates with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and other U.S. Government agencies with CN responsibilities to support the Afghan Government and the U.S. Government’s overall CN strategy for Afghanistan. The main goal of this strategy is to counter the link between narcotics and the insurgency by significantly reducing the support the insurgency receives from the illicit narcotics industry. The Defense Department’s role in support of this goal includes building the capacity of the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), improving border security, promoting information sharing, and fostering regional and international cooperation.

The Department of Defense prioritizes efforts against the narcotics-insurgent-corruption nexus as a subset of ISAF’s COIN strategy. Regional Commands South and Southwest are the priority for military and law enforcement CN efforts, as these regions contain the majority of Afghan poppy cultivation and, as a result, are a primary source of revenue for the Taliban-led insurgency.

In an effort to continue to refine the CN strategy in Afghanistan, U.S. Government representatives conducted a review of the Defense Department’s support for the U.S. CN strategy in May 2011. Representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, USCENTCOM, and the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) evaluated the current level of Department support to law enforcement, CN, and rule of law activities in Afghanistan, as well as coalition, military, and law enforcement integration in support of the COIN strategy. Following their review, the team’s recommendations included: addressing the lack of resolve by the Afghan Government to address the illicit drugs problem; developing effective mentoring and advising capacity within the MoI to improve the integration of CN activities across other Afghan ministries; defining the U.S. Government’s expectation for all U.S. agencies involved in developing Afghanistan’s CN capacity up to and following the 2014 transition; and resolving CN police sustainment issues. These recommendations will contribute to the larger, U.S. Government-wide Afghan CN assessment and strategy update, to take place in October 2011.

7.2: COUNTERNARCOTICS OPERATIONS

Increased ISAF presence and expanded operations in southern Afghanistan, enabled by the surge in forces during 2010, have helped to decrease poppy cultivation in southern Afghanistan, an area of the country where CN progress was previously unattainable. Areas with ISAF and ANSF presence have seen a steady decline in cultivation, most notably in Helmand, Afghanistan’s largest poppy-growing province, where cultivation has declined for three consecutive years. This reporting period saw an eight percent decrease in seized opium, a 451 percent increase in seized morphine, a 18 percent decrease in seized heroin, a 60 percent decrease in seized hashish, a 366 percent increase in seized solid pre-cursor chemicals, a 781 percent increase in seized liquid pre-cursor chemicals, and a 47 percent increase (a total of 125 individuals) in the total number of suspects arrested.
The Afghan Government and its U.S. and coalition partners conducted several major CN operations throughout the reporting period, most notably Operation *Kahfa Kardan*[^37][^72x511], a 30-day sustained CN surge targeting narcotics networks operating within Regional Commands South and Southwest. Between May 15 and June 15, 2011, ISAF, in partnership with DEA and Afghan CN forces, conducted 94 missions aimed at disrupting the narcotics-insurgent-corruption nexus. Operation *Kahfa Kardan* resulted in 41 enemies killed, 57 detainees, 25 suspects arrested for drugs charges, and 17 insurgents incarcerated for an average sentence of 16 years. Additionally, 12,766 kg of opium, 15,909 kg of hashish, 2,888 kg of marijuana, and 25,566 kg of precursor chemicals were destroyed, and $49,790 equivalent currency was seized. Due to the success of Operation *Kahfa Kardan*, this operation will be used as an enduring framework to support future CN activities. However, the surge of CN operations involved in *Kahfa Kardan* must be sustained and expanded in order to permanently disrupt the resilient and adaptive narcotics networks in southern Afghanistan.

In addition to Operation *Kahfa Kardan*, DEA directly assisted the Afghan Government in conducting several CN law enforcement operations during the reporting period. This cooperation was highlighted by a joint operation between the DEA, the Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU), and the Afghan Border Police (ABP) near the border of Afghanistan and Iran in May 2011. This operation resulted in the arrest of a provincial police officer and the seizure of 510 kg of opium and 112 kg of heroin, and further improved operational coordination across different CN stakeholders.

[^37]“To Strangle”
DEA, the Afghan National Interdiction Unit (NIU), and ISAF maintained the high CN operations tempo throughout the reporting period, conducting three major CN operations in Helmand Province in late September 2011 which resulted in the destruction of several drug processing labs.

On September 17, DEA, NIU, and ISAF conducted an operation which resulted in the destruction of one laboratory and the seizure of 2,782 kg of morphine base, 16,254 liters of morphine solution, 4 kg of heroin, 1,045 kg sodium carbonate, 1,227 kg of ammonium chloride, and various processing equipment. The NIU also arrested nine individuals.

The second operation, executed on September 26, resulted in the destruction of three additional laboratories and the seizure of 5,935 kg of morphine base, 10,810 liters of morphine solution, 100 kg of heroin, 3,280 kg of sodium carbonate, 25 gallons of acetic anhydride, 2,850 kg of ammonium chloride, as well as related processing equipment. This seizure is one of the largest ever made by combined forces in Afghanistan.

Later, on September 28, DEA, NIU, and ISAF executed a narcotics disruption operation in order to search for and seize narcotics at a suspected heroin production laboratory. The search warrant resulted in the seizure of 5,391 liters of morphine solution, 2,760 kg of sodium carbonate, 2,160 kg of ammonium chloride, and three heroin presses.

**7.3: INTERAGENCY COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORTS**

The Department of Defense, in close coordination with the DEA and the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, supports a number of CN task forces and working groups in Afghanistan. These groups are designed to develop Afghan Government capacity and harmonize Afghan efforts with international law enforcement agencies in the conduct of CN operations and in support of ISAF’s overall COIN strategy.

CJIATF-Nexus, an ISAF organization with representatives from the international law enforcement community, supports interdiction operations to counter the narcotics-corruption-insurgent nexus. It specifically targets network functions (i.e. safe havens, movement, communications, and finance) rather than individual narcotraffickers in order to disrupt network resiliency. CJIATF-Nexus improved and expanded its narcotics targeting support during the reporting period, providing essential support for law enforcement investigations and military operations by analyzing key trafficking networks and by improving visibility on powerbroker corruption in Regional Commands South, Southwest, West, and East.

In conjunction with CJIATF-Nexus, the Interagency Operations and Coordination Center (IOCC) provides intelligence and operational support to law enforcement CN operations in Afghanistan. The IOCC, led by DEA and the United Kingdom’s Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), complements CJIATF-Nexus efforts to develop an understanding of the narcotics trade that supports the insurgency and corruption. The IOCC also partners with ISAF and CJIATF-Shafafiyat to enable law enforcement to conduct operations in insecure, predominantly military environments, and to bring together the necessary resources to counter the narcotics-corruption-insurgent nexus.
In May 2011, ISAF, in coordination with the U.S. Embassy Kabul, UK Embassy Kabul, and other CN stakeholders, created a Strategic Effects Process (comprising the Strategic Effects Board, Strategic Effects Council, and Operational Development Working Group (ODWG)) to address the synchronization and prioritization process for the CN and organized crime campaign in support of the counterinsurgency strategy. The process is composed of three levels of review to prioritize, de-conflict, and apportion resources as required. The IOCC chairs the ODWG and develops the pan-Afghanistan CN operational picture to guide targeting priorities that address strategic CN goals and objectives.

**7.4: COUNTERNARCOTICS POLICE OF AFGHANISTAN**

In partnership with Afghan CN forces, international contributors, coalition military forces, and other U.S. Government agencies with CN responsibilities, the Department of Defense is developing a strategy to combat the narcotics trade effectively during and after the Transition 2014. The ability of the Afghan law enforcement and CN forces to prosecute traffickers is an integral part of this strategy.

The CNPA is the component of the ANP responsible for CN operations throughout Afghanistan. The CNPA Headquarters is located in Kabul, and the CNPA has officers stationed at all provinces and four forward operating bases located throughout Afghanistan. Building the capacity of the CNPA and other units is key to ensuring irreversible gains and establishing a capable Afghan institution that can counter the narcotics and corruption threat. Including its specialized units, the current CNPA tashkil has 2,570 authorized positions, divided among the CNPA headquarters elements, specialized units, and the 34 CNPA provincial units.

The Counternarcotics Training Academy (CNTA), also located in Kabul, continues to provide the basic investigative course of instruction for all CNPA officers. All potential CNPA officers, following graduation from Basic Police Academy run by NTM-A, must attend the five-week CN training course prior to being certified as a CN officer. The course is designed to give a trainee the fundamental training required to effectively investigate and prosecute a narcotics crime. The curriculum includes informant handling, identification of clandestine drug production laboratories, proper report writing, and tactical shooting techniques. Since its establishment in 2007, the CNTA has trained a total of 2,088 CNPA officers; during the reporting period alone, the CNTA trained 220 officers. In addition to progress in training, efforts to grow and maintain the CNPA continue to yield progress; notably, more predictable pay and above-average working and living conditions have greatly diminished the CNPA’s recruitment and attrition challenges over the last year.

Training milestones for the CNPA during the reporting period include a first-ever medics course and an NIU graduation at Quantico, VA. In April 2011, forty-three students from across the CNPA graduated from the first-ever, DoD-funded Counternarcotics Police Medics course. This course is an important milestone in the development of the CNPA as an institution and for the eventual transition of police responsibilities to the Afghan Government in 2014.

Further, the CNTA continues to develop an Afghan training capacity through the “Train-the-Trainer” program. The 12-week program is designed to build the capacity of an Afghan-owned,
independent training center. Complementing the Government’s development strategy, this initiative is considered integral to Afghanistan’s long-term strategy and capability to address narcotics trafficking and organized crime. The CNTA began its second “Train-the-Trainer” program in May 2011 with a total of ten cadre trainers, which recently completed the first phase of the three-phase course.

In addition to the CNTA, the Department of Defense, in partnership with the Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, is funding the CNPA Development Unit (CDU). Established to coordinate and oversee the development of CNPA, the CDU is working towards the goal of transitioning CN responsibility to the Government of Afghanistan. In support of this goal, the CDU mentors CNPA personnel to manage a two-tier management and decision-making structure, separating and defining executive and operational planning and management responsibilities. This ongoing effort provides a framework for structured and accountable organizational planning and improved management.

In order to further support the CNPA, the Afghan Government established a Tactical Operations Center (TOC). The TOC continues to conduct training, develop procedures to fulfill mission requirements, and produce materials to support CN operations. One of the TOC’s most valuable products is the Daily Report, which not only includes CNPA statistical data but also threat information, coalition force military activity and seizures, weather, personnel strength data, and highlights of important CN events.

In addition to the CNPA, the ABP also plays an important role in the counternarcotics effort. The Department of Defense, in partnership with the U.S. interagency and ISAF, is supporting a number of programs designed to improve the capability of ABP to secure the borders and to improve facilities at the border crossing points to stem the flow of narcotics, precursor chemicals, and other contraband. The Department of Defense provides funding for training, weapons, ammunition, and communication equipment for the ABP. Additionally, by the end of 2011, there will be more than 200 graduates from the Advanced Afghan Border Management Academy, which is the only academic institute in Afghanistan that provides a platform for interagency dialogue and information sharing on border management.

**SPECIALIZED UNITS**

The DEA, with the Department of Defense and Department of State contractor support, continues to support, train, and equip three specialized units within the CNPA: the NIU, the SIU, and the Technical Investigative Unit (TIU).

With Defense Department and international community support, the CNPA’s specialized units continue to improve. Established to investigate high-value narcotics traffickers and complement traditional CNPA units, specialized unit personnel are carefully vetted and operate with the mentorship of the international law enforcement community. In particular, the NIU and the SIU are specialized units mentored by DEA, and the Intelligence Investigations Unit (IIU) is mentored by SOCA. These specialized units work with conventional CNPA units to support and conduct CN investigations throughout Afghanistan.

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38 Refer to Section 2.7 for more details on the Afghan Border Police.
The 470-member NIU – established by the DEA as a specialized, tactical element of the CNPA – is capable of conducting interdiction operations and seizures and serving arrest and search warrants in a high-threat environment. In May 2011, DEA began training an additional 48 members of the NIU in Quantico, Virginia. These members graduated in July 2011 and are currently being integrated into the NIU. The NIU continues to assume greater responsibility for CN operations in Afghanistan. For example, on July 24, 2011, the NIU seized 31 kilograms of heroin in Kabul based on judicial intercepts conducted by the TIU. This operation was Afghan-led and demonstrates the NIU’s increasing capability to plan and execute its own operations.

The Afghan NIU works with the SIU, a 77-person, specially-vetted and -trained Afghan law enforcement unit. The SIU carries out complex CN investigations using intelligence developed by the TIU, which is composed of nine, specially-vetted officers and up to 200 contracted linguists and translators who perform court-authorized judicial wire intercepts.

In order to provide basic, advanced, and sustainment training to the NIU and SIU, DEA has established a regional training team. Between April 1 and August 31, 2011, the regional training team conducted 126 seminars for approximately 2,864 Afghans. Training seminars include firearms instruction, basic and advanced drug investigation techniques, and map reading techniques.

In addition to the NIU, SIU, and TIU, the CNPA’s Air Interdiction Unit (AIU) plays a strategic role by enabling elite Afghan CN law enforcement personnel and their DEA partners to conduct missions in areas that would otherwise be inaccessible. The United Kingdom contributes one training team member and supplements aircrew salaries. The Department of Defense trains Afghan pilots and crew members to fly and maintain Mi-17 helicopters to international standards, and has also assigned an embedded training team to train and mentor the unit’s key leadership and personnel in order to maintain proper readiness levels to provide adequate tactical support to law enforcement missions.

Since April 1, 2011, the AIU aircraft have flown in support of 21 CN interdiction missions for the DEA and the Afghan Special Narcotics Forces. These missions have resulted in the seizure or destruction of narcotics, precursor chemicals, weapons, and ammunition, as well as the detainment of several individuals.

During this reporting period, the U.S. Army-led mentor team integrated Afghan crewmembers into the more complex and higher risk AIU CN missions. On August 10, 2011, three Afghan crewmembers were integrated with U.S. crewmembers on an interdiction mission that resulted in the destruction of one drug laboratory and one ton of illegal drugs. The mentoring team will progressively integrate more qualified Afghan crewmembers into future CN operations as more Afghan pilots and crewmembers demonstrate proficiency.

**7.5: Afghan Threat Finance Cell**

The Afghan Threat Finance Cell (ATFC) is a U.S. National Security Council-mandated organization that identifies and disrupts the sources of insurgent and terrorist funding in Afghanistan. The DEA leads the cell with deputies from the Defense and Treasury Departments.
The force structure of the cell consists of personnel from the Department of Defense’s services and combat support agencies, Treasury Department analysts, Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) representatives, and law enforcement agents (DEA, Department of Homeland Security, Internal Revenue Service, and coalition partners). Personnel from the UK’s SOCA are also assigned to work with the ATFC.

The ATFC works through both Afghan law enforcement and coalition forces to identify and disrupt insurgent and terrorist financial activities. For law enforcement support, the ATFC works closely with vetted personnel from the DEA-mentored NIU and SIU, the Afghan Public Prosecutors’ Office, and vetted judges towards developing an independent financial investigative capability. These investigations and operations are focused on prosecuting individuals, either in the United States or Afghanistan, who provide financial support to insurgents and are affiliated with Afghanistan's illicit narcotics industry. Additionally, the ATFC identifies financial networks of insurgents that are linked to narcotics, corruption, and other illicit activities. During this reporting period, the ATFC continued to identify and disrupt sources of insurgent funding, as well as assist the Afghan Government in identifying corruption in its financial sector.

To support military activities in Afghanistan, the ATFC supports ISAF regional commands, task forces, and Special Operations Forces. The intent of these operations is to inject counter-threat finance lines of effort into military planning cycles and operations to disrupt insurgent funding.

The ATFC works closely with the U.S. Treasury Department’s OFAC and has several OFAC sanctions investigators assigned to the ATFC. These sanctions investigators collaborate with the ATFC’s law enforcement component, along with the DEA, U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Department of Homeland Security special agents, to develop information to identify and target narcotics traffickers who support the insurgency.

In February 2011, nine individuals and seven businesses associated with the New Ansari Money Exchange were designated by the U.S. Department of Treasury under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (1999) for money laundering activities. The vast majority of the intelligence that supported these designations, including links between New Ansari Money Exchange and the insurgency, came as a result of the teamwork between the ATFC and OFAC. As a result of the OFAC designation, New Ansari Money Exchange shut down its operations throughout Afghanistan and several related business in Dubai, United Arab Emirates.

7.6: INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION

During this reporting period, the U.S. and UK Joint Narcotics Analysis Center (JNAC) continued to perform strategic-level analysis and provide operational reach-back support for organizations in Afghanistan and improved collaboration across a wide spectrum of counternarcotics partnerships. CJATF-Nexus will continue to work with international law enforcement elements and ISAF to continue interdiction efforts against trafficking organizations. JNAC remains an effective model of interagency and international collaboration and partnership with an important international stakeholder.

ISAF, in coordination with the U.S. Embassy Kabul, UK Embassy Kabul, and other counternarcotics stakeholders, created a strategic effects process to address the synchronization
and prioritization process for the counternarcotics and organized crime campaign. The process is composed of three levels of review to prioritize, de-conflict, and apportion resources as required. Representatives from Washington, London, and Kabul met in London in June 2011 to synchronize efforts and discuss future plans. Representatives agreed to continue ongoing programs and to collaborate on future efforts. The next bilateral meeting will take place in Washington, D.C. in fall 2011.

Since President Obama and President Medvedev formed the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission in July 2009, the United States and Russia have significantly increased bilateral CN cooperation in Afghanistan. Established as part of the commission, the Counternarcotics Working Group, co-chaired by ONDCP Director Gil Kerlikowske and Russian Federal Drug Control Service Director Viktor Ivanov, has greatly improved law enforcement information sharing and collaboration between the U.S. and Russia on Afghanistan drug issues. The working group has agreed to continue its efforts through 2011 by continuing to cooperate on law enforcement investigations and countering the drug trade’s illicit financial flows emanating from Afghanistan.

At the regional level, the Northern Route Working Group (NRWG) is a multilateral initiative designed to increase general drug law enforcement cooperation, and specifically target transnational drug trafficking organizations responsible for the flow of illicit narcotics through the region. The NRWG, comprised of DEA representatives serving in Dunshabe, Kabul, and Moscow DEA Country Offices, as well as members of the CNPA SIU, the Russian Federal Drug Control Service, and the Kyrgyzstan Drug Control Service, allows the DEA to continue to effectively engage their Central Asian counterparts on CN investigations. The next NRWG meeting is anticipated in fall 2011.

The Department of Defense also continues to support regional and international partnerships centered on countering the Afghan opiate trade. For example, the Paris Pact, a United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) partnership of more than 50 member states and organizations, focuses on decreasing the availability, demand, and trafficking of Afghan opiates. As part of the Paris Pact, the UNODC sponsors the Triangular Initiative, which aims to strengthen regional cooperation in law enforcement and promote partnerships on border security and regional collaboration among Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran to combat the Afghan opiate smuggling. Triangular Initiative operations during the reporting period entailed synchronized patrols along the Iranian border, although at times forces mistakenly arrived at the wrong border posts despite pre-coordination, and intelligence sharing was largely non-existent. Separate cross-border incidents in 2009 between Iranian and Pakistani forces also contributed to greater mistrust. Moreover, the Triangular Initiative has yet to compel Afghanistan and Pakistan to coordinate security efforts along the Baluchistan border, a major trafficking and processing corridor.
SECTION 8 – REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT

8.1: PAKISTAN

As a result of its shared border with Afghanistan, its status as a nuclear power, and its role as a partner in the shared fight against al Qaeda and violent extremism, Pakistan remains a state of central importance in South Asia.

The United States continues to seek an effective partnership with Pakistan that is constructive and mutually beneficial, and that advances both U.S. and Pakistani interests. Although tensions persist from the May 2 U.S. raid that resulted in the death of al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, both the United States and Pakistan are committed to building and maintaining a constructive relationship that will help lead to a stable and secure Afghanistan. Nevertheless, Pakistan’s selective counterinsurgency operations, passive acceptance – and in some cases, provision – of insurgent safe havens, and unwillingness to interdict materiel such as IED components, continue to undermine security in Afghanistan and threaten ISAF’s campaign.

Efforts to reinvigorate cooperation with Pakistan in the wake of the bin Laden operation, highlighted by numerous visits by senior U.S. civilian and military officials, the Tripartite Commission with Afghanistan at the end of June, and the capture of senior al Qaeda leader Yunis al-Mauritani, demonstrate modest progress. Nevertheless, the United States is taking a frank approach to its relationship with Pakistan and the progress that must be made to repair the relationship and restore cooperation.

Overall, Pakistan continues to seek a government in Afghanistan friendly to Pakistan with limited Indian influence, and a political settlement that enables pro-Pakistani Pashtun power brokers to participate in provincial and national government. Despite these broad goals, Pakistan’s plan for Afghanistan continues to evolve, and some senior Pakistani officials may question whether their preferred outcome in Afghanistan is possible. Therefore, Pakistan continues to tolerate and abet the insurgency in Afghanistan, particularly the Haqqani Network. Enabled by safe havens inside Pakistan, the insurgency remains resilient with a notable operational capacity, as reflected in isolated high-profile attacks in Kabul and sustained violence levels in eastern Afghanistan.

Recent meetings between senior Pakistani and Afghan officials continue to seek common ground for cooperation in an advance of an ultimate U.S. drawdown in Afghanistan. However, mistrust, long-standing tensions, and divergent strategic interests will continue to make genuine cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan difficult. Moreover, assassinations and attacks emanating from the safe havens in Pakistan, particularly those that shelter the Haqqani Network and other Taliban affiliates, continue to threaten the emergence of a durable and stable political solution in Afghanistan.

Pakistan has long judged that the United States would withdraw from Afghanistan before achieving political stability, leaving Pakistan with either an unstable Afghanistan or an Indian “proxy” on its borders. Nor does Islamabad see a sustained U.S. presence in Afghanistan as a preferable alternative over the long term. As a result, Pakistan seeks to play a dominant role in
the peace and reconciliation process. However, early trends suggest that Pakistan is not prepared to deliver on the expectations established in bilateral and multilateral discussions on reconciliation. Pakistan does not want to undermine its influence in a post-U.S. withdrawal scenario by advancing negotiations on terms that are not assured to protect Pakistan’s interests. Despite these challenges, recognizing Pakistan’s legitimate interests in the future of Afghanistan and determining a viable route to encourage Pakistani cooperation in an Afghan-led reconciliation process remain essential elements of reaching a long-term political solution in Afghanistan.

8.2: INDIA

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Kabul in May 2011, his first since 2005, underscored India’s enduring commitment to diplomatic and development efforts in Afghanistan. During his visit, PM Singh announced an increase in economic support to Afghanistan to a joint session of the Afghan Parliament. PM Singh’s pledge of an additional $500M in aid, to be spent mainly on development projects, raised India’s overall assistance pledge to a total of $2B. In October 2011, PM Singh and President Karzai signed a strategic partnership declaration, which covers governance, economics, commerce, education, public administration, and security/law enforcement cooperation.

Indian assistance continues to focus on major infrastructure projects, such as electricity generation and transmission and road construction. India’s contributions to energy infrastructure development are particularly noteworthy; India is largely responsible for bringing more consistent electricity to Kabul, and Indian funding continues to support the construction of the Salma hydroelectric dam in Herat Province. Construction at Salma, however, is currently behind schedule, with a tentative completion date of late 2012.

India also supports a variety of smaller-scale projects and initiatives, like the Indian Medical Missions in Afghanistan’s major cities that serve tens of thousands of Afghans yearly. India also focuses its assistance on building Afghan human capital through scholarship programs at Indian Universities (more than 1,000 scholarships per year), agricultural training programs, and other vocational training activities. Public opinion surveys continue to show that Afghans view India’s involvement in their country favorably.

In addition to reconstruction projects, India has expressed an interest to help strengthen the capabilities of the ANSF. During his June 2011 visit to New Delhi, Afghan Defense Minister Wardak and Indian Defense Minister A.K. Antony discussed expanding cooperation to train ANSF personnel. To date, India’s security assistance has been limited; India currently provides scholarships for Afghan National Security Force personnel to study in India, and the Indian Government is also exploring options to train female Afghan police in India.

8.3: CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

The Central Asian States are host to the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), which provides multiple ground and air transportation routes into and out of Afghanistan for commercial carriers and U.S. military aircraft. The air and ground lines of communication (LOC) that constitute the

39 Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan
NDN provide operational flexibility and increased total capacity that reduce reliance and stress on any single route into and out of Afghanistan. Officials from some Central Asian countries have supported U.S. efforts to diversify the LOCs, which include new over-flight permissions and expanded ground transit agreements, including “reverse” transit and transits of wheeled armored vehicles.

Beyond the NDN, the Central Asian States are important contributors to a number of other activities in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan completed a 75 km railway line from Hairatan to Mazar-e-Sharif in November 2010; however, due to several unresolved issues, railway operations are not expected to start until the end of this year. As Afghan infrastructure continues to develop, expanded road, rail, and air networks such as this will facilitate additional commercial activity between Afghanistan and its northern neighbors.

Kyrgyzstan hosts the Manas Transit Center, an important transit point for coalition forces on their way to and from Afghanistan. As a result of an international agreement signed by the United States and the Government of Kyrgyzstan, on September 26, 2011, the United States signed a new fuel contract with the Kyrgyz Republic’s designated entity, Gazpromneft-Aero Kyrgyzstan (GPNAK). Under this contract, GPNAK will provide a mutually-agreed percentage of the Manas Transit Center’s fuel requirements.

Central Asian States’ concerns regarding Afghanistan include both the spread of violent extremism in the region and the threats stemming from narcotics trafficking and other criminal activities. According to the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, the Central Asian States are a significant conduit for Afghan-produced narcotics, with Tajikistan being the primary route from Afghanistan to markets in Russia. Border security will remain a top concern for the Central Asian States, which are closely attuned to the implications for their own countries stemming from events in Afghanistan and developments in narcotics trafficking.

8.4: IRAN

Iran’s attempts to influence events in Afghanistan include overt support for the Afghan Government; economic and cultural outreach to the Afghan population, particularly to minority populations; and covert support for various insurgent and various political opposition groups, including the provision of weapons and training. Iran seeks a withdrawal of foreign military forces and aims to play a dominant, long-term role in Afghanistan and the broader region.

At the highest political levels, Iran seeks to maintain positive relations with the Afghan Government. Various pro-Iranian Afghan officials continue to welcome and seek further Iranian support despite allegations about Tehran’s covert support to insurgents. In addition to maintaining a diplomatic presence in Afghanistan, Tehran often uses high-level visits and key leadership engagements to publicly criticize the presence of the international community in Afghanistan and to call for the withdrawal of ISAF.

In June, the defense ministers of Iran and Afghanistan issued a joint statement expressing intent to increase cooperation to counter common threats and to fight against organized crime and narcotics trafficking. This visit – the first by an Iranian defense minister since 1979 – garnered considerable attention from the Afghan security ministries before and during the visit. There are
already some basic counternarcotics cooperation links between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran including the UN Office of Drug Control-brokered Triangular Initiative, which includes nascent Joint Planning Cell in Tehran, border liaison offices, and joint counternarcotics operations, although progress has been limited.

Since 2001, Iran has pledged more than $1B in aid to Afghanistan and given more than $500M. Iran’s reconstruction and development efforts continue, largely concentrated in western Afghanistan. Iran’s aim is to increase its influence with the local population in order to create an Iran-friendly environment. Iran also wants to expand its sphere of influence beyond border regions into other parts of Afghanistan, particularly Kabul. Iran currently maintains consulates in Herat, Jalalabad, Kabul, Kandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif, and is considering opening additional consulates in Bamiyan and Nimroz Province.

Iran also continues to provide lethal assistance, including weapons and training, to elements of the Taliban and other insurgent groups. Tehran’s relationship with the Taliban, though not ideologically based, is consistent with Iran’s short to mid-term goal of undermining coalition efforts and an international military presence in Afghanistan. Coalition and Afghan forces have interdicted several shipments of Iranian weapons since 2007.

Beyond economic and security issues, the status of Afghan refugees in Iran continues to be a contentious issue between Iran and Afghanistan. Approximately three million Afghan refugees currently reside in Iran, only one-third of which are registered with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. In order to limit the impact of unregistered refugees on the economy and infrastructure, Iran has focused much of its forced repatriation on unregistered refugees. Current deportation rates range from 17,000 to 25,000 people per month. With little progress being made between the two countries on the status of the refugees and the rate of repatriation, the Afghan Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation has begun planning for the full repatriation of undocumented Afghans living in Iran at a rate of 50,000 per month.

8.5: CHINA

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) seeks a stable Afghanistan to mitigate the need for a long-term U.S. presence on China's western border. It continues to seek improved relations with, and stability and security for, Afghanistan, devoting diplomatic efforts to develop an economic relationship focused more on future raw material access and extraction.

To promote stability in Afghanistan while it sustains its own economic development, Beijing pursues natural resource exploitation, infrastructure development, and trade based on an outbound model already practiced in Africa and Latin America: gain political influence, provide an alternative development model that places higher value on domestic stability than political liberty, and adhere to an official policy of noninterference in the host country's internal matters. Beijing's interest in Afghanistan and its untapped mineral wealth is likely to grow, particularly if the security situation continues to improve. However, for the foreseeable future, China will continue to rely on coalition forces to provide security to support Chinese projects, as Beijing has no plans to commit security personnel to Afghanistan.
Since 2002, China has committed over $180M in aid to the Government of Afghanistan, and in 2009, China announced it would provide an additional $75M over the next five years. Further, PRC companies will likely continue to invest in Afghanistan, most notably in the development of Afghanistan’s mines and infrastructure. For instance, China is currently involved in bidding for the rights to develop iron ore deposits at Hajigak in Bamiyan Province. However, progress remains slow and security concerns persist, stalling existing projects such as Aynak copper mine while impeding other investments. In order to further develop the trade relationship, Afghan and PRC delegations continue to cooperate under the umbrella of the Afghanistan-China Joint Economic Commission. Beijing’s extension of this invitation underscores its goal of returning stability to Afghanistan by boosting Kabul’s export market and access to international trade.

Since the establishment of Afghan-PRC relations, China has sought to promote friendly relations, providing token official assistance and economic aid to Afghanistan. Both countries exchange regular political visits and seek cooperative bilateral efforts on counterterrorism and counternarcotics issues; specifically, PRC counterterrorism efforts that focus on the Uighur Islamic extremist groups with ties to Afghanistan. Beijing has also voiced its support for Afghan Government-Taliban reconciliation efforts, but limits its involvement to prevent possible repercussions from Uighur extremists. China and Afghanistan have entered into various bilateral agreements in the past, although most are symbolic in nature. Beijing continues to support regional diplomacy, most notably by including President Karzai in annual Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summits and forming an SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group. Although Afghanistan is neither a member nor observer of the SCO, it retains status as a guest attendee. China sees the SCO as an important platform for the promotion of stability and reconstruction in Afghanistan.

China is concerned about the security situation in Afghanistan, including issues such as external support to Uighur separatists, the safety of PRC workers in the country, and narcotics trafficking into western China. Although China maintains a strict policy of non-involvement with ISAF security operations, it has provided ANSF personnel a variety of non-lethal, China-based training to bolster Afghanistan’s security and stability since 2006. Training for the ANP conducted at People’s Armed Police municipal training facilities has covered core policing skills, crowd and riot control, criminal investigations, and internal security duties. China has also offered basic, advanced, and senior military courses for ANSF officers at PRC People’s Liberation Army military training colleges and universities.

8.6: RUSSIA

President Dmitry Medvedev recognizes that Afghanistan remains a “common cause” between Russia and NATO-ISAF partners. For Russia, minimizing the threat an unstable Afghanistan poses to Central Asia and the Northern Caucasus is linked to the success of ISAF’s mission, with the prospect that a stable and secure Afghanistan will stem the spread of extremism and the flow of narcotics into Central Asia and Russia.

Based on a commitment made at the November 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon, Russia continues to expand the types of cargo shipped by rail via the NDN and also permits the reverse transit of goods back through the NDN. Currently, 55 percent of DoD sustainment cargo goes through the NDN, and more than 76 percent of supplies transiting the NDN flows across Russia.
Since April 2010, more than 30,000 U.S. containers have been delivered to Afghanistan via the NDN. The United States continues to explore expanding surface transit cooperation agreements with Russia and other countries in the region.

Since the U.S.-Russia-Afghanistan Air Transit Agreement entered into effect in July 2009, more than 1,400 flights have transited Russian airspace, ferrying approximately 221,000 U.S. personnel to and from Afghanistan. The Air Transit Agreement allows for up to 4,500 military flights and unlimited commercial flights to transit Russian airspace en route to Afghanistan each year, and significantly reduces aircraft transit times and fuel usage.

Also of note, with Russia’s assistance, the U.S. Air Force Air Mobility Command completed two historic firsts in U.S. efforts to resupply forces in Afghanistan. In early June, a USAF C-5 cargo aircraft flew from the United States over the Arctic Circle, then south through Russian and Kazakh airspace to Afghanistan. Later in the same month, a USAF KC-135 aerial refueling aircraft flew the same route from Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington, to the Manas Transit Center, Kyrgyzstan. It was the first time U.S. Air Force aircraft have ever flown this Arctic route.

In May, the U.S. Army and the Russian Federation’s military export agency concluded a $375M agreement for the acquisition of 21 new Mi-17V5 military transport helicopters for the Afghan Air Force, along with a comprehensive initial support package that includes spare parts, ground support equipment, and engineering support. The first nine aircraft will be delivered by the end of 2011 and the remaining aircraft will be delivered over a two-year period. The new aircraft will augment the existing fleet of 52 Mi-17s already in operation with the Afghan Air Force and the Afghan Ministry of Interior. The establishment of a NATO-Russia Council Afghan Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund will assist in maintaining Afghanistan’s growing fleet of helicopters by funding spare parts, tools, and training for the Afghan Air Force. To date, Russia has pledged $3.5M towards the trust fund and is planning to provide intermediate level maintenance training to 10 Afghan Air Force maintainers beginning in September 2011 at a helicopter maintenance training facility in Russia.

The NATO-Russia Council will also expand its Central Asian counternarcotics program, which trains counternarcotics personnel from Central Asia, Afghanistan, and now Pakistan, in Russia, Turkey, and via mobile training teams.

In addition to security assistance and counternarcotics cooperation, Russia continues to support economic development in Afghanistan. Following up on President Karzai’s first official state visit to Russia in January 2011, Russian and Afghan officials met this summer and pledged to further boost economic ties between the two countries. During the latest round of talks, Russia pledged to build one million square meters of affordable housing in Kabul, and also agreed to provide Kabul with 500,000 tons of petroleum products a year beyond what it currently provides.
8.7: Gulf Cooperation Council States

The members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) continue to provide support to Operation Enduring Freedom, and have worked to provide financial support in the interest of a stable Afghanistan.

GCC states provide the United States key basing facilities and access in support of the mission. Many of the GCC countries provide important air bases and over-flight and transit rights for operations in Afghanistan and logistical support of these operations. Qatar continues to host USCENTCOM’s forward headquarters, as well as the Combined Air Operations Center. Bahrain hosts U.S. Naval Forces Central Command Headquarters. Other GCC countries host key air and naval facilities and provide staging capability for combat, ISR, and logistics operations in support of U.S. and coalition operations in Afghanistan.

GCC nations have also been partners in efforts to block terrorist financing, including the seizure of assets associated with al Qaeda’s financial network. GCC nations have also supported humanitarian operations in Afghanistan; these contributions include the establishment of refugee camps in Pakistan, financial assistance, and other humanitarian aid for Afghan refugees.

GCC countries are likely to continue their support for Afghanistan after U.S. and coalition combat operations end, as a stable Afghanistan free of extremist influence is in the best interest of the Gulf region’s security and stability. Additionally, Gulf countries and their ongoing large-scale construction projects provide a robust opportunity for the migrant labor force; Afghan participation in this labor force has been robust and could continue to be a major source of remittances, further contributing to the economic development of Afghanistan.

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40 GCC members include the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait.
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<tr>
<td>AAF</td>
<td>Afghan Air Force</td>
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<td>ABP</td>
<td>Afghan Border Police</td>
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<td>AHRIMS</td>
<td>Afghan Human Resources Information Management System</td>
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<td>AIU</td>
<td>Air Interdiction Unit</td>
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<td>ALA</td>
<td>Afghan Land Authority</td>
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<td>ALP</td>
<td>Afghan Local Police</td>
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<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
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<td>Afghan National Development Strategy</td>
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<td>Area of Interest District</td>
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<td>APPF</td>
<td>Afghan Public Protection Force</td>
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<td>APRP</td>
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<td>BMTF</td>
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<td>BOG</td>
<td>Boots-on-the-Ground</td>
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<td>BWT</td>
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<td>CJIATF</td>
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<td>Central Prisons Directorate</td>
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<td>HMMWV</td>
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<td>IARCS</td>
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<td>ICT</td>
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<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<td>Northern Distribution Network</td>
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<td>NROLFSM</td>
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<td>National Training Directorate</td>
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<td>Operations and Maintenance</td>
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<td>Operational Development Working Group</td>
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<td>Office of Foreign Asset Control</td>
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<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operations Plan</td>
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<td>Operational Mentor and Liaison Team</td>
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<td>ONDCP</td>
<td>Office of National Drug Control Policy</td>
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<td>PBGF</td>
<td>Performance-Based Governor’s Fund</td>
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<td>PME</td>
<td>Professional Military Education</td>
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<td>POI</td>
<td>Program of Instruction</td>
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<td>POMLT</td>
<td>Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team</td>
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<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<td>Regional Police Training Center</td>
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<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>SAO-A</td>
<td>Security Assistance Office – Afghanistan</td>
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<td>SCO</td>
<td>Shanghai Cooperation Organization</td>
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<td>SCR</td>
<td>NATO Senior Civilian Representative</td>
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<td>SIGAR</td>
<td>Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction</td>
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<td>SIU</td>
<td>Sensitive Investigation Unit</td>
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<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
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<td>SOCA</td>
<td>Serious Organised Crime Agency (UK)</td>
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<td>TFBSO</td>
<td>Task Force for Business and Stability Operations</td>
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<td>TIU</td>
<td>Technical Investigation Unit</td>
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<td>TLC</td>
<td>Team Leaders Course</td>
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<td>TOC</td>
<td>Tactical Operations Center</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>United Nations Assistance Mission – Afghanistan</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>United States Central Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USDA</td>
<td>United States Department of Agriculture</td>
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<td>USFOR-A</td>
<td>United States Forces – Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<td>VSO</td>
<td>Village Stability Operations</td>
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<td>VSP</td>
<td>Village Stability Program</td>
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ANNEX C – CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION

FY2008 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT SECTION 1230 – REPORT ON PROGRESS TOWARD SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN

(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter through the end of fiscal year 2010, the President, acting through the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan.

(b) COORDINATION.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the head of any other department or agency of the Government of the United States involved with activities relating to security and stability in Afghanistan.

(c) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED: STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF UNITED STATES ACTIVITIES RELATING TO SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN.—The report required under subsection (a) shall include a description of a comprehensive strategy of the United States for security and stability in Afghanistan. The description of such strategy shall consist of a general overview and a separate detailed section for each of the following:

(1) NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE.—A description of the following:

(A) Efforts of the United States to work with countries participating in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan (hereafter in this section referred to as “NATO ISAF countries”).

(B) Any actions by the United States to achieve the following goals relating to strengthening the NATO ISAF, and the results of such actions:

(i) Encourage NATO ISAF countries to fulfill commitments to the NATO ISAF mission in Afghanistan, and ensure adequate contributions to efforts to build the capacity of the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF), counter-narcotics efforts, and reconstruction and development activities in Afghanistan.

(ii) Remove national caveats on the use of forces deployed as part of the NATO ISAF.

(iii) Reduce the number of civilian casualties resulting from military operations of NATO ISAF countries and mitigate the impact of such casualties on the Afghan people.
(2) AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES.—A description of the following:

(A) A comprehensive and effective long-term strategy and budget, with defined objectives, for activities relating to strengthening the resources, capabilities, and effectiveness of the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) and the Afghanistan National Police (ANP) of the ANSF, with the goal of ensuring that a strong and fully-capable ANSF is able to independently and effectively conduct operations and maintain security and stability in Afghanistan.

(B) Any actions by the United States to achieve the following goals relating to building the capacity of the ANSF, and the results of such actions:

   (i) Improve coordination with all relevant departments and agencies of the Government of the United States, as well as NATO ISAF countries and other international partners.

   (ii) Improve ANSF recruitment and retention, including through improved vetting and salaries for the ANSF.

   (iii) Increase and improve ANSF training and mentoring.

   (iv) Strengthen the partnership between the Government of the United States and the Government of Afghanistan.

(3) PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS AND OTHER RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES.—A description of the following:

(A) A comprehensive and effective long-term strategy and budget, with defined objectives, for reconstruction and development in Afghanistan, including a long-term strategy with a mission and objectives for each United States-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan.

(B) Any actions by the United States to achieve the following goals with respect to reconstruction and development in Afghanistan, and the results of such actions:

   (i) Improve coordination with all relevant departments and agencies of the Government of the United States, as well as NATO ISAF countries and other international partners.

   (ii) Clarify the chain of command, and operations plans for United States-led PRTs that are appropriate to meet the needs of the relevant local communities.
(iii) Promote coordination among PRTs.

(iv) Ensure that each PRT is adequately staffed, particularly with civilian specialists, and that such staff receive appropriate training.

(v) Expand the ability of the Afghan people to assume greater responsibility for their own reconstruction and development projects.

(vi) Strengthen the partnership between the Government of the United States and the Government of Afghanistan.

(vii) Ensure proper reconstruction and development oversight activities, including implementation, where appropriate, of recommendations of any United States inspectors general, including the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction appointed pursuant to section 1229.

(4) COUNTER-NARCOTICS ACTIVITIES.—A description of the following:

(A) A comprehensive and effective long-term strategy and budget, with defined objectives, for the activities of the Department of Defense relating to counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan, including—

(i) roles and missions of the Department of Defense within the overall counter-narcotics strategy for Afghanistan of the Government of the United States, including a statement of priorities;

(ii) a detailed, comprehensive, and effective strategy with defined one-year, three-year, and five-year objectives and a description of the accompanying allocation of resources of the Department of Defense to accomplish such objectives;

(iii) in furtherance of the strategy described in clause (i), actions that the Department of Defense is taking and has planned to take to—

(I) improve coordination within the Department of Defense and with all relevant departments and agencies of the Government of the United States;

(II) strengthen significantly the Afghanistan National Counter-narcotics Police;

(III) build the capacity of local and provincial governments of Afghanistan and the national Government of Afghanistan to assume greater responsibility for counter-narcotics-related activities, including interdiction; and
(IV) improve counter-narcotics-related intelligence capabilities and tactical use of such capabilities by the Department of Defense and other appropriate departments and agencies of the Government of the United States; and

(iv) the impact, if any, including the disadvantages and advantages, if any, on the primary counter-terrorism mission of the United States military of providing enhanced logistical support to departments and agencies of the Government of the United States and counter-narcotics partners of the United States in their interdiction efforts, including apprehending or eliminating major drug traffickers in Afghanistan.

(B) The counter-narcotics roles and missions assumed by the local and provincial governments of Afghanistan and the national Government of Afghanistan, appropriate departments and agencies of the Government of the United States (other than the Department of Defense), the NATO ISAF, and the governments of other countries.

(C) The plan and efforts to coordinate the counternarcotics strategy and activities of the Department of Defense with the counter-narcotics strategy and activities of the Government of Afghanistan, the NATO-led interdiction and security forces, other appropriate countries, and other counter-narcotics partners of the United States, and the results of such efforts.

(D) The progress made by the governments, organizations, and entities specified in subparagraph (B) in executing designated roles and missions, and in coordinating and implementing counternarcotics plans and activities, and based on the results of this progress whether, and to what extent, roles and missions for the Department of Defense should be altered in the future, or should remain unaltered.

(5) PUBLIC CORRUPTION AND RULE OF LAW.—A description of any actions, and the results of such actions, to help the Government of Afghanistan fight public corruption and strengthen governance and the rule of law at the local, provincial, and national levels.

(6) REGIONAL CONSIDERATIONS.—A description of any actions and the results of such actions to increase cooperation with countries geographically located around Afghanistan’s border, with a particular focus on improving security and stability in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas.

(d) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED: PERFORMANCE INDICATORS AND MEASURES OF PROGRESS TOWARD SUSTAINABLE LONG TERM SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN.—

(1) IN GENERAL.— The report required under subsection (a) shall set forth a comprehensive set of performance indicators and measures of progress toward
sustainable long-term security and stability in Afghanistan, as specified in paragraph (2),
and shall include performance standards and progress goals, together with a notional
timetable for achieving such goals.

(2) PERFORMANCE INDICATORS AND MEASURES OF PROGRESS
SPECIFIED.— The performance indicators and measures of progress specified in this
paragraph shall include, at a minimum, the following:

(A) With respect to the NATO ISAF, an assessment of unfulfilled NATO ISAF
mission requirements and contributions from individual NATO ISAF countries,
including levels of troops and equipment, the effect of contributions on
operations, and unfulfilled commitments.

(B) An assessment of military operations of the NATO ISAF, including of NATO
ISAF countries, and an assessment of separate military operations by United
States forces. Such assessments shall include—

(i) indicators of a stable security environment in Afghanistan, such as
number of engagements per day, and trends relating to the numbers and
types of hostile encounters; and

(ii) the effects of national caveats that limit operations, geographic
location of operations, and estimated number of civilian casualties.

(C) For the Afghanistan National Army (ANA), and separately for the
Afghanistan National Police (ANP), of the Afghanistan National Security Forces
(ANSF) an assessment of the following:

(i) Recruitment and retention numbers, rates of absenteeism, vetting
procedures, and salary scale.

(ii) Numbers trained, numbers receiving mentoring, the type of training
and mentoring, and number of trainers, mentors, and advisers needed to
support the ANA and ANP and associated ministries.

(iii) Type of equipment used.

(iv) Operational readiness status of ANSF units, including the type,
number, size, and organizational structure of ANA and ANP units that are—

(I) capable of conducting operations independently;

(II) capable of conducting operations with the support of the
United States, NATO ISAF forces, or other coalition forces; or

(III) not ready to conduct operations.
(v) Effectiveness of ANA and ANP officers and the ANA and ANP chain of command.

(vi) Extent to which insurgents have infiltrated the ANA and ANP.

(vii) Estimated number and capability level of the ANA and ANP needed to perform duties now undertaken by NATO ISAF countries, separate United States forces and other coalition forces, including defending the borders of Afghanistan and providing adequate levels of law and order throughout Afghanistan.

(D) An assessment of the estimated strength of the insurgency in Afghanistan and the extent to which it is composed of non-Afghan fighters and utilizing weapons or weapons-related materials from countries other than Afghanistan.

(E) A description of all terrorist and insurgent groups operating in Afghanistan, including the number, size, equipment strength, military effectiveness, sources of support, legal status, and any efforts to disarm or reintegrate each such group.

(F) An assessment of security and stability, including terrorist and insurgent activity, in Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas and in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

(G) An assessment of United States military requirements, including planned force rotations, for the twelve-month period following the date of the report required under subsection (a).

(H) For reconstruction and development, an assessment of the following:

(i) The location, funding (including the sources of funding), staffing requirements, current staffing levels, and activities of each United States-led Provincial Reconstruction Team.

(ii) Key indicators of economic activity that should be considered the most important for determining the prospects of stability in Afghanistan, including—

(I) the indicators set forth in the Afghanistan Compact, which consist of roads, education, health, agriculture, and electricity; and

(II) unemployment and poverty levels.

(I) For counter-narcotics efforts, an assessment of the activities of the Department of Defense in Afghanistan, as described in subsection (c)(4), and the effectiveness of such activities.
(J) Key measures of political stability relating to both central and local Afghan governance.

(K) For public corruption and rule of law, an assessment of anti-corruption and law enforcement activities at the local, provincial, and national levels and the effectiveness of such activities.

(e) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex, if necessary.

(f) CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFINGS.—The Secretary of Defense shall supplement the report required under subsection (a) with regular briefings to the appropriate congressional committees on the subject matter of the report.

(g) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means—

(1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.