MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Investigation into the Fatal Shooting Incident at the Washington Navy Yard on September 16, 2013

On September 16, 2013, a terrible tragedy occurred at Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) headquarters on the Washington Navy Yard (Navy Yard). Aaron Alexis, a contractor employee assigned to work at the NAVSEA headquarters building, shot and killed twelve members of our Navy family and wounded four others.

In accordance with the Manual of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy (JAGMAN), I directed Admiral John M. Richardson to conduct a comprehensive investigation into the circumstances surrounding the Navy Yard shooting, to include a review of applicable policy, programs, and execution. This JAGMAN Investigation follows and expands upon the “Rapid Reviews” I ordered shortly after the incident. Those reviews were intended to immediately identify and begin to remedy potential vulnerabilities in the Department of the Navy (DON) Personnel Security Program and Departmental force protection policies and procedures. The Rapid Reviews and the October 11, 2013 joint Navy and Marine Corps “Quick Looks” informed Admiral Richardson’s investigative efforts.

Admiral Richardson organized his report along five lines: (1) the personal history of Alexis; (2) the personnel security program designed to vet and continuously evaluate personnel for suitability for access to classified material; (3) the force protection plan designed to prevent unauthorized access to secure facilities; (4) the incident response and emergency management programs; and, (5) the response after the incident. The report discussed each of these lines in a separate chapter, followed by a summary of Admiral Richardson’s conclusions and recommendations. Specific details of the shooting were not covered as they are being addressed by the criminal investigation conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service.

For the DON, I accept the findings and recommendations of the JAGMAN Investigation and have directed immediate action to address the matters raised in Chapter 7. The emphasis shall be on eliminating or mitigating identified vulnerabilities with Personnel Security Program, force protection, and physical security procedures. The Under Secretary of the Navy, or in the absence of the Under Secretary of the Navy, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Energy, Installations and Environment) (ASN (EI&E)), is hereby directed to oversee completion of all corrective actions and reconcile them with the approved recommendations contained in the Rapid Reviews and the Base, Station, and Installation Physical Security Assessments.

Safeguarding our people remains critical to our national security. Although the JAGMAN Investigation found that none of the deficiencies pertaining to Navy activities directly
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contributed to the shooting incident, it is important that we assess responsibility for implementation of Department of Defense (DoD) and Navy policies and procedures designed to safeguard our people and protect our mission capabilities. Accordingly, by copy of this memorandum, I forward the JAGMAN Investigation to the Chief of Naval Operations for review and appropriate accountability action to the extent that he deems such action warranted.

Similarly, by copy of this memorandum, I forward the JAGMAN Investigation to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development & Acquisition) (ASN (RD&A)) to take appropriate action with respect to the Program Executive Office for Enterprise Information Systems and the Naval Enterprise Networks Program Manager, Warfare. ASN (RD&A) shall ensure that the appropriate offices within the DON are informed of those findings of the JAGMAN Investigation related to HPES and The Experts, Inc., so that those offices may review and take action, if any, that they deem to be appropriate.

With respect to DoD and DON policies and procedures regarding personnel security, force protection, and physical security, the JAGMAN Investigation found there needs to be a more concerted effort to execute them and oversee the execution. Accordingly, I have directed the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to take specific actions which are described in TAB A.

The memorandum at TAB A identifies the responsible officials for each of the other JAGMAN Investigation’s recommendations and assigns completion dates. The Under Secretary of the Navy, or in the absence of the Under Secretary of the Navy, ASN (EI&E), shall keep me apprised of the DON’s progress on a monthly basis, unless subsequently modified.

The JAGMAN Investigation also confirmed that the post-incident response was comprehensive and compassionate. From the moment the incident response began, the Navy Family sprang into action and created a fabric of support for the survivors and the family and colleagues of the victims. The support included immediate provision of chaplain and clinical social worker services, as well as my designations allowing shooting victims and their surviving families to receive medical care and legal assistance. We will ensure all those affected by this tragedy continue to receive the support they need. To this end, I have appointed the ASN (EI&E) to lead a newly established Washington Navy Yard Recovery Task Force, a comprehensive, Navy-wide effort to restore the Department of the Navy commands and all personnel affected by the tragedy to full mission capability.

Finally, I recommend that the JAGMAN Investigation recommendations with respect to DoD be provided to the DoD Internal and Independent Reviews of the Washington Navy Yard Shooting for their consideration.

The fatal shooting on September 16, 2013, was a tragedy. Twelve wives, husbands, fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, children, colleagues, and friends were taken from us suddenly, violently, cruelly. We remember them as heroes who were loved by their families and friends, took pride in their important work for the Navy and the Marine Corps, and contributed to the
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provision of our national security. We will always mourn their loss, and we will continue to be there for the loved ones they left behind.

On September 16, 2013, we also witnessed and were inspired by extraordinary heroism. Law enforcement officers and other first responders ran into danger to stop the shooter. Colleagues, friends and strangers assisted each other escape from danger, some at the risk of their own lives. In the eyes of the world, that is what heroes do. In our eyes, that is what the Navy and the Marine Corps – uniformed and civilian – do. The immediate response by members of the Naval Security Force, Naval District Washington Fire and Emergency Services, and Naval Criminal Investigative Service personnel were in keeping with the highest traditions of the Naval service and deserve recognition.

In addition, the Unified Command, led by the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department, responded quickly and effectively, and most certainly saved lives. The Federal Bureau of Investigation provided outstanding support on the day of the incident and throughout the investigation process. We are grateful for their responses and assistance and those from so many other Washington, D.C. emergency management agencies.

Through all of the directed actions, we seek to improve our ability to protect our people, and reduce the likelihood that events like this will happen again.

Ray Mabus

Attachment:
As stated

cc:
Chief of Naval Operations
Commandant of the Marine Corps
Under Secretary of the Navy
General Counsel of the Department of Defense
Admiral John M. Richardson
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition)
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Energy, Installations and Environment)
General Counsel of the Department of the Navy
Department of the Navy Assistant for Administration
Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy (Plans, Policy, Oversight and Integration)
Judge Advocate General of the Navy
Auditor General of the Navy
Department of the Navy Chief of Legislative Affairs
Department of the Navy Chief of Information
MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
UNDER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (RESEARCH,
DEVELOPMENT & ACQUISITION)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (MANPOWER AND
RESERVE AFFAIRS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (ENERGY,
INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT)
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR PLANS,
POLICY, OVERSIGHT AND INTEGRATION
AUDITOR GENERAL OF THE NAVY

SUBJECT: Assignment of Responsibilities Based on Recommendations in the Investigation into the Fatal Shooting Incident at the Washington Navy Yard on September 16, 2013 (Admiral Richardson Report of Investigation, dated November 8, 2013)

I have accepted the findings and recommendations contained in the subject investigation. The Under Secretary of the Navy (Under Secretary), or in the absence of the Under Secretary, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Energy, Installations and Environment) (ASN (EI&E)), is directed to oversee the Department of the Navy’s (DON) actions to implement the investigation’s recommendations and shall report directly to me. This includes actions taken to deter insider threats and improve implementation of force protection, physical security, incident response and emergency management policies as detailed in the Report of Investigation.

Below, I have assigned Offices with Primary Responsibility for execution of each recommendation. Regular reporting is required to ensure all actions are completed and that the effects endure. The Under Secretary, or in the absence of the Under Secretary, ASN (EI&E), will keep me apprised of the DON progress on these tasks on a monthly basis, unless subsequently modified. Accordingly, Offices with Primary Responsibility shall report completion and results of assessments and short term actions to the Under Secretary, or in the absence of the Under Secretary, ASN (EI&E), with the first report due no later than December 16, 2013. For longer term programs, a Plan of Action and Milestones (“POAM”) shall be in place no later than December 16, 2013, with progress reports required monthly, unless subsequently modified.

By copy of this memorandum, the addressees are tasked with the following.

1. The Under Secretary, or in the absence of the Under Secretary, ASN (EI&E), shall:

   a. Compile a list of tasks and responsible offices and submit to me not later than November 30, 2013. The list shall include the actions assigned herein, as well as the actions
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assigned in response to other investigations related to the September 16th incident– to include the Rapid Reviews conducted by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) (ASN (M&RA)) and by the General Counsel of the Navy, and the October 11, 2013 joint Navy and Marine Corps “Quick Looks,” as well as the Base, Station, and Installation Physical Security Assessments directed by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Where actions overlap, coordinate with the Offices of Primary Responsibility to reconcile them. Ensure dates for completion are assigned for each action, accelerating completion dates for the personnel security program consistent with the recommendations of Chapter 7 of the JAGMAN Investigation.

b. If you determine that additional tasking is necessary, forward those recommendations to me.

c. No later than November 22, 2013, prepare a communications plan reinforcing the following with leadership within the DON and with those in the Department responsible for contract oversight:

   (1) Responsibility to comply with existing personnel security program requirements as set forth in SECNAV M-5510.30, Department of the Navy personnel security program, and the National Industry Security Program Operating Manual, including prompt and accurate reporting of adverse information and removing access to secure assets when warranted.

   (2) Responsibility to oversee compliance with existing physical security, law enforcement, and antiterrorism program requirements.

2. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps shall:

a. Order unit level self-assessments of compliance with the requirements of SECNAV M-5510.30, including security manager training, reporting of adverse information, performance evaluations, and follow up of Department of Defense Central Adjudication Facility (DoDCAF) letters of concern.

b. Conduct a self-assessment of installation compliance with higher headquarters directives related to force protection and emergency management. This assessment shall include field assessment of actual compliance at the installation, as well as review of program administration, and should include:

   • Adequacy of program oversight.
   • Adequacy of training and drill programs.
   • Adequacy of resources.
   • Implementation of deadly force policy.
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Deficiencies shall be assessed for mitigation, as well as to inform appropriate longer-term action.

c. Identify, prioritize, and execute the most cost effective, high-impact actions that could mitigate known force protection and emergency management capability gaps. This may include effective use of random antiterrorism measures to deter, detect and disrupt potential attacks; revitalized training and drills; and the establishment and subsequent exercising of mutual aid agreements to enhance incident response.

d. Conduct a review of Department of the Navy requirements for force protection and emergency management as compared to the available resources and assessed threats. This review shall also address how the operational commander and the resource provider reach agreement on the priority for resource distribution as balanced against the resultant risk.

3. The Chief of Naval Operations shall take such actions necessary to remedy or otherwise address the discrepancies or deficiencies identified in the category B and C findings of the JAGMAN Investigation, to include appropriate accountability actions to the extent that he deems such actions warranted.

4. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development & Acquisition) (ASN (RD&A)) shall promulgate guidance for Program Executive Officers, Program Managers, and Contracting Officers regarding oversight and administration of the security aspects of Department of the Navy contracts. Second, ASN (RD&A) should take appropriate action with respect to the inaction of the Program Executive Office for Enterprise Information Systems and the Naval Enterprise Networks Program Manager, Warfare to implement corrective actions in response to the May 26, 2011 Naval Audit Service Audit Report entitled “Controls Over Navy Marine Corps Intranet Contractors and Subcontractors Accessing Department of the Navy Information.” Finally, ASN (RD&A) shall ensure that the appropriate offices within the DON are informed of those findings of the JAGMAN investigation related to HP Enterprise Services, LLC and The Experts, Inc. so that those offices may review and take action, if any, that they deem to be appropriate.

5. ASN (M&RA) shall:

   a. Ensure all adverse information developed during investigations, deliberations, and formal adjudications, beginning with the recruitment process, is thoroughly documented, properly retained, and readily accessible to authorized personnel in order to provide a complete and detailed record to support future suitability and eligibility determinations.

   b. Address identified policy gaps related to post incident response in the areas of personnel casualty matters, family support programs, and the fleet and family support center program by taking actions consistent with your authority to do so. Forward recommended resolutions to me for actions outside of your cognizance.
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6. The Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy for Plans, Policy, Oversight & Integration, in coordination with ASN (M&RA) shall develop targeted training material on the principles of the personnel security program and force protection. The training materials, supplemented by a case study based on the Washington Navy Yard shooting incident, must reinforce the importance of compliance and consequences of non-compliance and should be incorporated into leadership schools and civilian continuing training programs. Existing training materials created by other DoD Entities related to insider threats, for example, lessons learned from the Fort Hood incident, may be incorporated as well.

7. The Auditor General of the Navy shall present terms of reference for an audit of contractor compliance with personnel security program requirements.

Ray Mabus

cc:
Admiral John M. Richardson
General Counsel of Department of the Navy
Department of the Navy Assistant for Administration
Judge Advocate General of the Navy
Department of the Navy Chief of Legislative Affairs
Department of the Navy Chief of Information