MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER
CHIEFS OF THE MILITARY SERVICES
DIRECTOR, COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM EVALUATION
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER
ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC
AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

SUBJECT: Final Recommendations of the Washington Navy Yard Shooting Internal and
Independent Reviews

Following the tragic shooting at the Washington Navy Yard on September 16, 2013, I
directed concurrent Internal and Independent Reviews to identify and recommend actions to
address any gaps or deficiencies in DoD programs, policies, and procedures regarding security at
DoD installations and the granting and renewing of security clearances for DoD and contractor
personnel. The reviews considered previous relevant studies in arriving at their conclusions.

After considering the findings and recommendations from the reviews, I approve the
following four key recommendations, as well as the way ahead described in the attachment. I
have also directed the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) to conduct further
analysis of three additional recommendations developed by the Independent Review (attached).

Four Key Recommendations:

1. Implement Continuous Evaluation. Implement continuous evaluation in coordination
   with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Office of Personnel
   Management, as appropriate, to provide automated records checks of personnel with
   access to DoD facilities or classified information.

2. Establish a DoD Insider Threat Management and Analysis Center (DITMAC).
   Establish a DITMAC with assigned cross-functional representatives to assess,
   recommend intervention or mitigation, and oversee case action on threats that insiders
   may pose to their colleagues and/or DoD missions and resources. With regard to the
protection of classified networks and information, the DITMAC would also fulfill certain requirements of the National Insider Threat Policy and Minimum Standards.

3. **Centralize Authority, Accountability and Programmatic Integration Under a Single Principal Staff Assistant (PSA).** Centralize authority, accountability and programmatic integration of continuous evaluation and establishment of the DITMAC under the USD(I) as the PSA with fiscal control over the Department’s personnel security resources.


Leaders at every level play a critical role in ensuring the security of our workforce. The Department will empower military and civilian leaders with the tools and discretion they need to take appropriate action consistent with law and policy to prevent and respond to potential insider threat problems, whatever their cause.

I hereby direct USD(I) to lead a task force to develop and coordinate an implementation plan, based on the above listed key recommendations, for my approval, and for all DoD components to support this task force. During the development of the implementation plan, the task force will consult with the DoD General Counsel, as well as civil liberties and privacy officials, to ensure legal and privacy issues are appropriately identified and addressed.

Attachments:
As stated
Way Ahead

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence will establish a task force comprised of representatives of the Secretaries of the Military Departments; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; DoD Inspector General; Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer; Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation; and Director, Administration and Management which will:

- Develop an implementation plan based on the four key recommendations. By June 23, 2014, the task force will develop major milestones, schedule for execution, allocation of responsibility, and resource requirements.

- Submit a budget issue paper for FY 2016 to establish a personnel security resources portfolio with the appropriate budget control and fiscal oversight necessary for the execution of the implementation plan.

- Initiate a series of pilot projects using the Automated Continuous Evaluation System to evaluate populations that are overdue for reinvestigation or those for whom the nature of their work might imply significant risk (e.g., privileged users and contractor employees working on site with their government customers).

- Report implementation progress to the Secretary of Defense.

- Work with the Offices of Legislative and Public Affairs, in coordination with Office of Management and Budget and the National Security Council, to develop a communications and outreach campaign to provide information to DoD personnel and gain support for these efforts.
Additional Recommendations of the Independent Review

1. **Strengthen Mental Health Care.** In addition to substantial revisions to the wording of question 21 on Standard Form 86, Questionnaire for National Security Positions, the Independent Review recommends more effective measures to screen recruits, separate the unfit, further destigmatize treatment, and ensure the quality of mental health care within the Department. The Department may also elect to contribute to, or recommend expansion of, the growing national dialogue regarding mental health and its impact on national security and the public interest.

2. **Reduce Reliance on OPM-Conducted Background Investigations.** The Independent Review strongly recommends that DoD determine how to regain responsibility for its own background investigations. The Department should conduct a comprehensive study of the cost, schedule, and performance of all types of personnel security investigations and reinvestigations for DoD employees and contractor personnel. Such a study should assess the program's efficiency, effectiveness, quality, and posture to support future Department needs. The resulting business case should become the basis for work with the Office of Management and Budget, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and other partners as needed, to ensure the Department's acquisition of investigations meets all risk management and resource management needs.

3. **Reduce Demand for Secret Security Clearances.** The Independent Review recommends reducing the number of personnel holding Secret security clearances by at least 10 percent and adopting a “just in time” system that aligns the Department more fully with “need to know” compliance. Of note, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued guidance on October 31, 2013, to achieve reductions in the number of all personnel with eligibility for access to classified information.