United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces

June 2008
Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1231, Public Law 110-181)
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This report to Congress is submitted consistent with Section 1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181). It includes the United States plan for sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF). In accordance with subsection (a), it includes a description of the long-term plan for sustaining the ANSF, with the objective of ensuring that the ANSF will be able to conduct operations independently and effectively and maintain long-term security and stability in Afghanistan. The report includes a comprehensive strategy and budget, with defined objectives; mechanisms for tracking funding, equipment, training, and services provided to the ANSF; and any actions necessary to assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to achieve a number of specified goals and the results of such actions. This report is the first of the annual reports required through 2010 on the long-term plan for Afghanistan. Consistent with this Act, this report has been prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State. This assessment complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to the Congress; however, it is not intended as a single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its international partners, or Afghanistan.
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Executive Summary

Developing the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which includes both the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), is one of the United States’ top priorities in Afghanistan. The purpose of the ANSF development program is to grow the capacity and capability of the ANSF in line with internationally agreed benchmarks solidified in the 2006 Afghanistan Compact. The desired end state is a professional, capable, respected, multi-ethnic ANSF, with competent ministries and staffs and sustaining institutions, capable of directing, planning, commanding, controlling, training and supporting the ANSF.

Afghan National Army (ANA)

The capabilities of the Afghan National Army (ANA) are improving steadily. The ANA has taken the lead in more than 30 significant operations and has demonstrated increasing competence, effectiveness and professionalism. On February 5, 2008 the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) approved a proposal to expand the authorized end-strength of the ANA from 70,000 to 80,000 personnel. The current program calls for a light infantry force of 15 brigades, including artillery, armor, commando, combat support, combat service support, an air corps, and the requisite intermediate commands and sustaining institutions. The long-term ANA posture may also include a more robust ANA Air Corps capability and a larger force.

Afghan National Police (ANP)

The Afghan National Police (ANP) force is making steady progress, but its capabilities still lag behind those of the ANA. The current ANP force has not been sufficiently reformed or developed to a level at which it can adequately perform its security and policing mission. However, the Afghan and U.S. governments, and our international partners, recognize the shortcomings and are working to improve ANP capabilities. The target for the ANP is to build a reformed force of 82,000 personnel that is capable of operating countrywide. The Afghan Ministry of the Interior is instituting rank and salary reforms to ensure that qualified officers remain on the force and achieve the rank and salary that they deserve. The new Focused District Development (FDD) plan, which began being implemented in late 2007, shows promise. The FDD withdraws the locally-based Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) from selected districts, replacing them temporarily with highly trained and effective Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP). The AUP then receive two months of immersion training and equipping in a concentrated program of instruction. The goal of the FDD program is for the AUP to return to their home districts with increased professional capability and confidence to enforce the laws of their country.

The Way-Ahead

An independent, capable Afghan National Army (ANA) and Police (ANP) are critical to our counter-insurgency (COIN) efforts, and to establishing the security environment that will allow Afghanistan to become an economically prosperous, moderate democracy. It is crucial that the United States and our international partners dedicate the necessary resources and personnel to ensure that the mission to develop the ANSF is a success.
Section 1: United States Plans to Assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in Building the Afghanistan National Security Forces

1.1 Long-Term Strategy for Afghanistan National Security Forces Development

Building Afghanistan’s capacity to provide for its own security is a major priority of the U.S. effort in the country. Besides ongoing and concurrent efforts to defeat the Taliban-led insurgency and provide reconstruction and development to Afghanistan’s people, the United States and its international partners, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) are focused on fielding and sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The ANSF are comprised of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). These forces represent critical pillars for establishing security and stability in Afghanistan. The long-term goal is to build and develop ANSF that are nationally respected; professional; ethnically balanced; democratically accountable; organized, trained, and equipped to meet the security needs of the country; and increasingly funded from GIRoA revenue.

The plan for ANSF development is consistent with the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). The ANDS lays out the strategic priorities and mechanisms for achieving the government’s overall development vision. The plan for developing the ANSF is also consistent with the Afghanistan Compact, an agreement which defined a political partnership between the GIRoA and the international community. According to the compact, the international community commits to providing the budgetary, materiel, and training support necessary to develop national military forces, police services, and associated ministerial structures and the GIRoA commits to providing the human resources and political will. Although the United States (U.S.) is the primary provider of ANSF training and development, other international members are contributing to the effort. Sections 1 through 4 address U.S. efforts to build and sustain the ANSF, and Sections 5 and 6 describe international efforts to do so.

Despite achievements in Afghanistan, security threats and corruption remain major impediments to overall development. The security environment continues to be fluid, demanding continual reexamination and assessment of requirements. The 2001 Bonn Agreement established the goal of a 50,000-person ANA and a 62,000-person ANP. The Bonn II Agreement in December of 2002 expanded the ANA target end-strength to 70,000 personnel. Since the Bonn Agreements and the international declaration of the Afghanistan Compact in 2006, security conditions have evolved, with a resurgence of activity by insurgents and antigovernment elements. Consequently, in May 2007, the international community’s Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) approved an increase to 82,000 authorized ANP. Similarly, with the endorsement of the JCMB on February 5, 2008, the authorized ANA force structure increased to 80,000 personnel, with an additional 6,000 allotted for the trainee, transient, hospital, and student account.

The long-term ANSF posture potentially may include a more robust Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC) capability and a larger army. Additional analysis, study, and consideration must be given to the security environment, sustainability of the force, and available financial support for such efforts.
1.2 United States Plan for ANSF Development

Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) is the lead U.S. agency responsible for ANSF development. With policy guidance from Washington and the U.S. Ambassador, CSTC-A directs all U.S. efforts to organize, train, and equip Afghan security forces, and seeks to integrate the efforts of lead nations and other members of the international community into a comprehensive police plan. With GIRoA and international partners, CSTC-A plans, programs, and implements the development of enduring national military forces and police services with associated ministerial and sustaining institutions. This development covers the full spectrum of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, education, personnel, and facilities.

The CSTC-A Campaign Plan, which has been developed in close coordination with the GIRoA, follows three lines of operation: (1) build and develop ministerial institutional capability; (2) generate the fielded forces; and (3) develop the fielded forces. Specific objectives include:

- Ministries capable of effective inter-ministerial cooperation and formulating, promulgating, and implementing policies, plans and guidance throughout all levels of the ANA and ANP;
- Reduced corruption in the ministries and throughout the ANA and ANP;
- Increased credibility of the ministries, ANA, and ANP as effective and professional organizations;
- ANA and ANP manned, trained, and equipped to conduct the full spectrum of internal security and law enforcement missions as dictated by the local security situation, independent of significant external assistance;
- Common ideology and procedures across all elements of the ANA and ANP;
- Well-developed personnel management systems for the ANA and ANP;
- An enduring training base that can provide basic training, professional training and education, and literacy education at all levels;
- Efficient and mature acquisition, maintenance, and logistics systems capable of identifying, acquiring, and distributing required resources to the ANA and ANP and thus providing an effective, long-term sustainment capability without external assistance;
- Fully operational units capable of independent operations with minimal external assistance; and
- A joint command and control structure coordinated at the national level to integrating the ANA, ANP, and the National Directorate for Security (NDS) at the regional and provincial levels.

Progress along the three lines of operation is tracked using four Capability Milestones (CMs):

- CM4 describes a unit, agency, staff function, or installation that is formed but not yet capable of conducting primary operational missions. It may be capable of undertaking portions of its operational mission but only with significant assistance from, and reliance on, international community support.
- CM3 describes a unit, agency, staff function, or installation that is capable of partially conducting primary operational missions, but still requires assistance from, and is reliant on, international community support.
• CM2 describes a unit, agency, staff function, or installation that is capable of conducting primary operational missions with routine assistance from, or reliance on, international community support.

• CM1 describes a unit, agency, staff function, or installation that is capable of conducting primary operational missions. Depending on the situation, units may require specified assistance from the international partners.

The Campaign Plan’s three phases are conditions-based. They are not sequential and they may overlap. The focus of Phase I (Field/Generate the Afghan National Security Capability) is to generate and field effective national military forces and police services, their ministries, sustaining institutions, and intermediate commands. Substantial assistance will be required from the international community in all areas during this phase. The end state of Phase I will be achieved when the programmed forces have been fielded, received some collective training, and are participating in operations. The Ministry of Defense (MoD), Ministry of Interior (MoI), sustaining institutions, and intermediate commands will have been established.

During Phase II (Development of the Afghan National Security Capability) the ANA, ANP, and international forces will jointly plan, coordinate, and conduct operations. The ANSF, ministries, and institutions will continue to develop the capabilities necessary to achieve CM1. All elements of the fielded ANSF will undergo collective training and evaluation. For the ANA, each unit will go through a validation process conducted by international training teams with final certification being done by the ANA itself. For the ANP, validation and certification processes will be conducted in coordination with the MoI, U.S. Embassy, and various international organizations. The end state of Phase II will be achieved when most ANSF elements achieve CM1, i.e., ANSF organizations are between 85 and 100 percent manned, equipped, and trained and have the capacity to plan, program, conduct, and sustain operations with specified international support.

Phase III (Transition to Strategic Partnership and Afghan Security and Police Re-orientation) occurs when the GIRoA assumes full responsibility for its own security needs, with continued engagement with the international community. At this point, CSTC-A will transition to a more traditional security assistance organization. The end state is characterized by an ANSF configured to provide for the security needs of the country: the defense of national independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity against prospective enemies and internal threats.

1.3 Budget

CSTC-A receives funding through the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) to equip, train, and sustain the ANSF. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 ASFF request totaled approximately $2.7 billion, including $1,711 billion for the ANA, $980 million for the ANP, and $9.6 million for detainee operations. For the ANA, these funds will equip and sustain the 70,000-person, 14-brigade force in 2008; upgrade garrisons and support facilities; enhance ANA intelligence capabilities; and expand education and training, including the National Military Academy, counter-improvised explosive device (CIED) training, mobile training teams, branch qualification courses, and literacy and English language programs. For the ANP, these funds will increase CIED, communications, and intelligence training; purchase additional equipment, weapons, and ammunition to respond to insurgent threats; enhance ANP intelligence capabilities; set conditions for interoperability with the ANA to respond to events; enhance border surveillance; add basic health clinics in select provinces to improve casualty treatment; and
expand field medic and combat life support training. Because the operational and security realities in Afghanistan are constantly changing, it is not possible to make a reliable estimate of the long-term costs and budget requirements for developing the ANSF.

1.4 Tracking U.S. Funding

ASFF funds are appropriated by the U.S. Congress to the U.S. Army. The Secretary of the Army distributes these funds to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). DSCA provides funding to Military Departments Life Cycle Management Commands (LCMCs) for purchases in the continental U.S. (CONUS) (e.g., major end items, weapons, ammunition, and communication needs), as well as to CSTC-A for items that can be procured through the local contracting office, or to fund services performed by the Department of State (DoS) or the United Nations.

CSTC-A’s annual program objectives for the force generation and development of the ANSF bridge the gap between the strategic aims of the CSTC-A Campaign Plan, subordinate development strategies, and budget execution. Baseline requirements are derived from the approved ANSF force structure. Any modifications to these requirements come from the GIRoA, in consultation with CSTC-A. Changes to requirements result either from a change to the security situation as reflected in updated strategic planning documents of the MoD or MoI, or from lessons learned through operational experience.

The ASFF is subdivided by Budget Activity Groups for the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police and Related Activities that include Detainee Operations. Budget activities are then further subdivided into sub-activity groups. Tracking of funds begins at the Budget Activity Group (BAG – e.g., ANA and ANP) and Sub-Budget Activity Group (SAG) – e.g., Equipment and Training) levels. BAG and SAG funding authorizations for each fiscal year are loaded into the Army’s Program Budget Accounting System (PBAS), as well as a database managed locally in Afghanistan. As Memoranda of Request (MORs) are submitted for CSTC-A requirements, funds availability is confirmed by reviewing current funds status.

For tracking of funds execution below the BAG- and SAG-levels, in addition to the MILDEP accounting systems, CONUS Life Cycle Management Command obligation reports are provided to the CSTC-A CJ8 and uploaded into a local database. For local procurement funds sent to CSTC-A via Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request (MIPR), CSTC-A tracks all purchase requests against available MIPR funding and reconciles amounts daily. As contracts and payments are made against purchase requests, the CSTC-A CJ8 posts the transactions in the local database. CSTC-A provides funds status on local procurement cases to USASAC who records the activity in the accounting system (SOMARDS) and the local Disbursing Office provides DFAS documentation of the disbursements made. The various MILDEP accounting systems report funds status monthly to the DSCA reporting systems (DIFS). The DIFS position is official program fund status. A funds control analyst reviews and audits funds status through the local database on a daily basis. Any discrepancies are worked with the appropriate offices and corrected.

The status of funds and financial decisions are managed using a Program Budget Activity Council (PBAC) process. The CSTC-A PBAC process reviews budget execution rates, un-financed requirement prioritization, and recommendations for command decision on program changes on a monthly basis.
1.5 Tracking Equipment

1.5.1 U.S. Procurement

The CSTC-A CJ4 tracks equipment from the identification of the requirement, to the refinement of the requirement; from procurement source through shipment delivery; and from issue to end user.

A new requirement for a weapon or vehicle system is initiated by a request to the CSTC-A directorate or subordinate task force that owns the BAG or SAG. The initiator of the requirement works with the BAG or SAG owner, CSTC-A CJ7, CSTC-A CJ4 Requirements Division, and Security Assistance Office representatives to develop and refine the requirement details to a level that can be correctly sourced. The generation of new requirements is a formal approval process that is documented in an order that details CSTC-A’s ANSF development programs.

Once approved as a new requirement by the CSTC-A CJ7 (or the Deputy Commanding General for Programs, depending on the dollar value), the CSTC-A CJ4 coordinates with the CSTC-A CJ8 to determine budget availability. The CSTC-A CJ4 allocates the requirement to a specific budget program, the CSTC-A CJ8 commits the funds for the requirement, and the CSTC-A CJ4 conducts a final verification.

The CSTC-A CJ4 then determines how to source the requirement—via local purchase or CONUS Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case. DSCA guidance requires weapons and vehicles to be purchased via CONUS FMS cases. Determinations for other items are accomplished in accordance with DSCA local procurement guidance and through liaison with DSCA.

For an FMS case, a MOR is fully staffed through CSTC-A prior to submission to DSCA. DSCA validates funding exists in the appropriate SAG and determines which service agent would best fulfill the requirement, and the services submit the requirement to their respective LCMCs. LCMCs work with the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) to develop and award contracts for equipment. Items procured through FMS cases that are designated by DSCA as requiring end use certification due to their sensitivity are certified by the end user through a program managed by the CSTC-A CJ4.

1.5.2 International Donations

CSTC-A works closely with the GIRoA at all levels to manage the manning, equipping, training, and provision of facilities for the ANSF. As requested in a December 2007 letter from Afghan Defense Minister Wardak to CSTC-A Commander General Cone, all equipment donations to the ANA are vetted through the office of the CSTC-A Deputy Commanding General for International Security Cooperation (DCG-ISC) to ensure that each donation fits an actual requirement for the ANA and will be logistically sustainable. A similar CSTC-A vetting process is in place for equipment donated for the ANP. Once vetted by CSTC-A, the donation offer is sent to the MoD or MoI for final approval. For Donations from NATO countries, the donor nation is notified of the initial acceptance of the offer through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Directorate of Army Training and Education Support (DATES), Joint Forces Command-Brunssum, and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).

Non-NATO countries can make donations in one of two ways, both considered bilateral donations. The first is similar to the process for NATO countries. A donor nation can approach the DCG-ISC with a potential donation. The vetting process would proceed at CSTC-A as
described above, though without the involvement of ISAF DATES. Final approval and acceptance of the offer falls to the MoI or the MoD. The second way that a non-NATO country can make a donation to the ANSF is by a direct offer to the sovereign GiRoA.

At this point, if necessary, an inspection in the donor country is conducted to verify the condition of the equipment. These inspections are required for all ammunition, weapons, and highly technical equipment. After the in-country inspection is completed, an arrangement for delivery of all accepted equipment is conducted. Regardless of the shipping method, the CSTC-A CJ4 transportation office is contacted with the arrival times of the donation in order to coordinate its delivery to a logistics depot in Kabul. A receipt (signed by a representative from either the MoD or MoI) is then sent to SHAPE to confirm the delivery and accountability of the donation.

Arrival information (e.g., specific quantities and types of equipment) is annotated in a donation database. Since 2002, 46 donor nations (both NATO and non-NATO) have contributed equipment worth $822 million. There are currently 18 pending donation offers from 14 nations with a total value of more than $194 million. Major items include Leopard-1 tanks, MI-17 and MI-35 helicopters, M2 machine guns, 81mm mortars, and millions of dollars in construction funding for such projects as the Kabul Military High School.

Future solicitations for donations will focus on equipment from both the ANA and ANP requirements lists. However, CSTC-A, on behalf of the GiRoA, is putting more effort into seeking donor funding for equipment already being purchased for the ANSF and for engineering projects. In the search for these resources, CSTC-A is working with the local contingent of 20 defense attachés and with all of the national military representatives at SHAPE. The Polish contingent within the DCG-ISC office focuses on coordinating with Eastern European nations to meet ANSF needs for Eastern-bloc equipment and in-theater training to support this equipment.

### 1.5.3 Shipment of Equipment

CONUS-sourced weapons and ammunition for both the ANA and ANP are shipped by Special Assignment Airlift Mission to Kabul International Airport (KAIA). Equipment is transferred from aircraft to ANA trucks by the U.S. element of the Combined Air Terminal Operations (CATO) activity at KAIA. The CSTC-A CJ4 representative attached to CATO and the ANA transportation element commander both sign a transportation management document that is subsequently signed by an ANA Depot 1 representative (the national depot for ANA weapons) or a “22 Bunkers” Ammunition Depot representative (national depots for ammunition and ANP weapons) upon delivery.

Large equipment, including vehicles, is shipped via sealift to the port of Karachi, Pakistan, where they are transferred onto commercial trucks by contracted carrier for movement to Afghanistan. Commercial vehicles depart Karachi, cross the Pakistan-Afghanistan border at Torkham Gate, and proceed to delivery points in Kabul. The CSTC-A CJ4 receives shipping reports through the Army Surface Deployment and Distribution Command. ANA vehicles are delivered to ANA Depot 2 where they are signed for by ANA personnel and prepared for issue. ANP vehicles are delivered to a contracted maintenance organization for preparation and hand-receipt to the MoI Technical Department.
1.5.4 Issue Process and Documentation

1.5.4.1 Afghan National Army

Units at initial fielding are "pushed" weapons and vehicles from the national depots in Kabul to the Forward Support Depot (FSD) in the unit area. The directive to issue the initial fielding sets is generated in a "push letter" signed by the CSTC-A CJ4 and transmitted to the U.S. mentors at the national depots. Staff at the depots generate an Afghan MoD Form 9 Issue or Turn-in Order, which is signed by the ANA unit transporting the equipment to the FSD. One copy is kept on file at the depot. The FSD supply officer signs the MoD 9 acknowledging receipt of the equipment and returns a copy to the issuing depot. The FSD issues the equipment to unit supply officers using the MoD Form 9 as well.

After the initial issue, units request equipment and supplies on MoD Form 14 Request for Issue or Turn-in. Units submit these requests through their chain of command, through the FSD and Forward Support Group, to the Logistics Support Operations Center at the MoD Logistics Command. Each supporting level in the supply chain will either fulfill the request, forward to higher headquarters if unable to fulfill, or deny the request if it is not within authorization.

1.5.4.2 Afghan National Police

The initial fielding process for the ANP is similar to the ANA process described above, except that equipment is “pushed” only in support of the scheduled fielding of Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) battalions and through the Focused District Development (FDD) program. Equipment is “pushed” to the Regional Training Centers (RTCs), which currently serve as the regional supply depots until the planned Regional Logistics Centers (RLCs) are constructed. RLCs will be the ANP equivalent of FSDs in the ANA. Documentation occurs through the use of the MoI Form 9.

After the initial issue, ANP units use the MoI Form 14 to request equipment. Other than support for the scheduled fielding of new units and the FDD program, all equipment is issued to the ANP by request only.

1.6 Efforts to Build and Maintain ANSF-Sustaining Institutions

CSTC-A provides military officers to assist in the education and mentoring of Afghan military and civilian leadership on a daily basis. These officers assess and evaluate ANA and ANP progress and provide valuable advice that is designed to assist the ANSF to meet its development goals. They build confidence and experience in the leadership at the ground level, serving as an example for success. On a daily basis these officers help move the ANSF towards becoming a reliable, capable, and professional organization.

CSTC-A mentors currently advise leaders throughout the MoI and the MoD. CSTC-A provides advisors to key leaders including: the Ministers of the Interior and Defense, Deputy Minister of Defense, 1st Deputy Minister of Interior, Deputy Minister for Counter-Narcotics, Deputy Minister of Security, Deputy Minister for Administration and Logistics, Chief of the ANA General Staff (GS), Chief of the Criminal Investigative Division, Chief of Uniform Police, Chief of ANCOP, Chief of Counter-Terrorism, Chiefs of Training and Education, Intelligence, Finance, Internal Affairs, and many others.

CSTC-A-contracted trainers also provide staff training via Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) in the areas of logistics planning and property accountability, military decision-making
processes, and other staff processes. A recent initiative has begun to expand this training to include students from district-level operations centers of the ANP.

CSTC-A is committed to working in concert with the MoD and MoI to build training management and assessment procedures which train personnel to meet the demands of the entire system, build honest and accurate assessments from the bottom up, and assist the leadership in identifying issues requiring action. In order to develop common objectives and standardization, the oversight of training, including the formation of new training and schools, remains with CSTC-A. To summarize, a few of the processes that assist the ANSF in becoming strong and fully capable are:

- Development of common core and synchronized programs of instruction ensures the same standards are met regardless of the source of the training cadre.
- Mentor and assessment teams confirm the accomplishment of training standards and the students’ ability to apply the processes, tactics, techniques, and procedures.
- Contracts for new training facilities and programs ensure that transition is planned and phased to ensure a successful transition to the ANSF.
- Training on management and leadership practices, and assisting in their implementation within normal ANSF operations, provides common procedures throughout the command structure to identify and resolve issues.

1.6.1 The Ministry of Defense

CSTC-A executes a ministerial development program that synchronizes the development of MoD organizations and institutions with the development of management and operational systems. Vertical and horizontal integration of systems is achieved through mentor meetings, functional boards, and the Ministerial Development Board, a group of senior mentors and staff that reviews methods to improve the ANA. CSTC-A functional staffs focus on building organizational capacity and capability; and contractors with prerequisite skills (working with military functional experts and staff) develop the core management and operational systems essential to enable the ministry to plan, program, and manage the army. The specific core systems being developed within the MoD include:

**Personnel**
- Personnel Management
- Reserve Affairs
- Public Affairs

**Intelligence**
- Military Intelligence

**Operations**
- Strategic Defense Planning
- Operational Planning
- Force Management
- Training Management
- Doctrine Development
- Readiness Reporting
- Command, Control, Communications, and Computers

**Logistics**
- Logistics
- Acquisition

**Special Staff**
- Resource Management and Budgeting
- Inspector General
- Installation Management
- Military Justice and Legal
- Ministerial Administration
- Medical and Health Care

**Ministerial level Capability**
- Disaster Response and Relief
- Parliamentary Affairs
Additionally, senior military and civilian personnel serve as advisors to selected senior Afghan officials and officers within the MoD and General Staff (GS) to assist with senior-level issues and serve as liaison officers between the Afghan officials and the CSTC-A Commander and principal staff on matters affecting the development of the security sector.

1.6.2 Ministry of the Interior

As the lead U.S. agency for ANSF development, CSTC-A works with the Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), the European Union Police (EUPOL) Mission in Afghanistan, and others in the international community to develop and reform the MoI. Ministerial development is managed through a program that works to synchronize MoI headquarters agencies and the core management systems essential to reforming the ministry and enabling its organizations and personnel to plan, program, and manage ANP institutions and forces. Vertical and horizontal integration of systems is achieved through mentor meetings, working groups, and the Ministerial Development Board. The International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) serves as the international coordinating body between the operational-level entities and ANP reform efforts at the political level. The MoI serves as a co-chair for this body. Once issues have been resolved via an international caucus, the IPCB provides direction for action.

Senior military and civilian personnel from the U.S. and international community advise selected senior Afghan MoI officials and officers on actions and issues associated with reform initiatives. These senior advisors also serve as a conduit between MoI officials, the CSTC-A Commander and principle staff, and the EUPOL Head of Mission. INL provides contractors who also assist with advising senior Afghan officials to facilitate reform efforts. CSTC-A functional staff focus on building organizational capacity and capability. Contractors with the requisite skills, working with military functional experts and staff, assist the Afghan senior leaders and staff to develop and implement policies, systems, and modern management practices essential to effective reform of the MoI. The core systems being developed within the MoI include:

- Strategic Planning
- Operational Planning
- Operations and Force Readiness
- Internal Affairs
- Intelligence
- Logistic Management
- Faculties and Installation Management
- Ministerial Administration
- Personnel Management
- Legal Affairs
- Finance and Budget
- Force Management
- Training Management
- Programming
- Parliamentary/Public Affairs

1.6.3 Logistics, Intelligence, Medical Services, and Recruiting

The ability of Afghan security forces to operate independently will rely, in part, on adequate logistical support at all levels that allows the ANA and ANP to sustain their fielded forces. CSTC-A’s current policy is that equipment is not issued unless there is verification of appropriate supply and accountability procedures.

A mature and continually improving national logistics infrastructure exists and is already supporting the ANA. A series of national and forward support depots currently provide the bulk
of the ANA’s needs. Neither the United States nor the international community is involved in the distribution of supplies or equipment to ANA forces. Brigade-level logistics structures and systems are adequate and continue to develop. However, there is a gap in the linkage from the brigade level to the national level. This gap will require development of a corps-level logistics structure that will be addressed with the increase of 10,000 personnel beginning in 2009. Plans for 2009 lay the groundwork for making currently-contracted logistics an ANA core responsibility.

For the ANP, logistics development is currently focused on verification and accountability. CSTC-A is addressing regional, provincial, and district level gaps in ANP logistics that stem in part from still-developing MoI logistics policies and procedures and logistics officer training. The MoI is working to close these gaps through regional, provincial, and district level logistics officer training.

The Afghan intelligence community has three main components: the NDS, MoD, and MoI. Historically, information has rarely been shared; collaborative analysis and coordinated collection have been the exception rather than the norm. The establishment of clear roles and functions among the three major agencies has been hampered by distinct developmental paths, legacy Soviet paradigms, and disjointed U.S. Government and international support efforts. Although each agency is playing an increasingly effective role in the government’s counterinsurgency strategy, much work remains to build national intelligence structures that encourage intelligence sharing and can provide coherent, timely intelligence to Afghan national decision- and policymakers.

Medical services are developing, but are not yet adequate. Existing emergency medical services do not meet the needs of the ANA and ANP. Routine medical care is also rudimentary. However, the integration of ANA and ANP medical personnel into a collaborative health care system with the Ministry of Public Health will improve care, especially for combat casualties. Three new regional hospitals have opened, medical logistics proficiency and patient record keeping processes have improved, and immunizations have increased. Nevertheless, significant challenges remain before the ANA and ANP health care system can provide quality health care to those serving in the ANSF and their dependents.

Effective ANA and ANP recruitment programs are in place. Both the ANA and ANP have consistently met recruiting goals year after year. Although separate and distinct, the ANA and ANP recruitment programs share resources where possible in order to remain as effective and efficient as possible.

1.6.4 Command and Control

During the 12 months prior to March 2008, mentors have engaged in a variety of activities to develop ANSF communications capabilities among the national command and coordination centers, the regional coordination centers, and the provincial coordination centers. CSTC-A has focused on strengthening and refining the established command and control centers by improving the efficiency of operations at the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and National Police Command Center (NPCC) by standardizing reporting formats and procedures.

Efforts at the NMCC have been concentrated on enhancing operational command and control by developing standard operating procedures for Corps headquarters’ reporting of operational information to the NMCC. In addition, training and mentoring of liaison officers (LNOs) have been an ongoing activity designed to foster an attitude of urgency and accuracy in
obtaining information from field units. A weekly video teleconference with Corps commanders was implemented to establish strong personal links at the command level.

Current efforts are being made in the NMCC to establish a common operating picture (COP). A COP is established using GPS-established unit locations and graphic control measures that will then allow the NMCC to share its COP with other command centers through e-mail. The NPCC is included in this effort in order to establish a national level COP for all ANSF. This effort also includes an ability to share intelligence at appropriate levels.

At the NPCC, efforts have been concentrated on developing standard operating procedures for internal NPCC operations as well as Joint Regional Coordination Center (JRCC) and Joint Provincial Coordination Center (JPCC) reporting requirements. The NPCC assumed control of radio communication operations and has been involved in an aggressive program of establishing and maintaining regularly scheduled communication checks with each JRCC. Command emphasis has been placed on the need to consolidate Regional Commands (RCs) and JRCCs in order to institute a single chain of command and control from district to province (i.e., JPCC) to region (i.e., JRCC) to the NPCC. Training and mentoring of LNOs has been an ongoing activity focused on coordinating all operational activities.

At the national level, a weekly video teleconference between the NMCC and NPCC has focused on the exchange of intelligence and operations information in an effort to enhance situational awareness of both organizations. In addition, each command center provides LNOs to the other command center to ensure timely and accurate exchange of operational information.
Section 2: Afghan National Army

2.1 Programmed ANA End State

By the end of 2008, the GiRoA plans to field a total of 70,000 ANA personnel. An additional 10,000 personnel are expected to be fielded by the end of 2009. Continued training, mentoring, and development will be required beyond this timeframe. As stated above, the long-term ANA posture may include a more robust ANAAC capability and a larger army. The current program calls for a light infantry force of 15 brigades, including artillery, armor, commando, combat support, combat service support, an air corps, and the requisite intermediate commands and sustaining institutions.

2.2 Training Efforts

The soldier training process begins with quality, needs-based recruiting. New recruits receive initial entry training (IET) at the Basic Warrior Training Course (BWT), conducted by Afghan trainers with international supervision. ANA basics are taught to an objective standard uniformly applied throughout the force. The BWT provides the basics, but the individual soldier’s foundation is strengthened through branch-specific Advanced Combat Training. Although the necessity of fielding the force resulted in an initial focus on infantry and other combat-specific branches, training for the support specialties has also developed.

Immediately following a new unit’s fielding and arrival at its Corps and brigade area, it undergoes a 60-day period of individual and collective training before being put into the rotation for combat operations. Combat and security operations continue to round out ANA development. Each ANA combat unit is accompanied by either a U.S. Embedded Training Team (ETT) or a NATO-ISAF Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT). OMLTs and ETTS perform the same function: providing ANA units with comprehensive mentoring across the full spectrum of operations. Specifically, the teams provide the ANA unit leadership with advisory support on all unit functions as well as direct access to U.S. and NATO-ISAF resources and enablers that enhance the operational effectiveness of the Afghan units. They coach unit staffs and commanders and assist them in development of their training programs, logistics and administrative systems, and planning and employment in operations. ETTSs and OMLTs facilitate the assessment of ANA units, helping the ANA identify strengths, shortfalls, and opportunities for improvement. They also serve as role models and liaisons between ANA and international forces.

As more ANA units improve their capabilities and achieve operational independence it becomes increasingly important to track and record their progress. CSTC-A and the GiRoA have recently deployed Validation Training Teams (VTTs) consisting of U.S. and Afghan personnel to each of the ANA Corps to begin the validation process with the Corps’ most capable units. VTTs assist ETTSs and OMLTs in establishing collective training strategies and evaluation standards to assess unit operational capability. These teams have begun to validate the most capable units. March 2008 saw the 203rd Corps Headquarters and the 3rd Kandak, 2nd Brigade, 203rd Corps become the first ANA units validated as CM1.

In many instances, ANA combat units are assigned an ISAF partner unit during combat operations. In general, those ANA units with U.S. or NATO-ISAF partner units have shown a marked increase in their capability to provide security in their areas. However, it should be noted that some Afghan commanders have shown great initiative and improvement without the benefit of an international partner.
CSTC-A and the MoD have enacted a cyclical readiness system to manage individual soldier and unit readiness. This cycle is designed around a four-month rotation that allows units to manage missions, training, schools, and leave. The system recognizes past experience, poor banking infrastructure, and issues with overall unit manning levels and readiness. This program has helped to reduce the absent without leave (AWOL) rate to a manageable 10 percent.

2.3 Equipment

The three infantry companies in each kandak, or battalion, are equipped with former Warsaw Pact rifles, light and heavy machine guns, and rocket propelled grenade launchers. The weapons company in each kandak provides anti-armor capability with SPG-9 recoilless rifles and indirect fire with 82mm mortars. Plans are in place to effect a transition to NATO standard weapons. CSTC-A is currently converting the ANA from the AK-47 to the M16 (or the Canadian version, the C7). Later in 2008, the ANA will begin converting to U.S. model light and medium machine guns and 81mm mortars.

Each brigade has an artillery battery consisting of eight former Warsaw Pact D-30 howitzers. Currently, 82 of the 132 required are functional. CSTC-A has contracted to have the howitzers assessed for complete refurbishment and conversion to facilitate NATO standard interoperability.

One ANA brigade is designed to include a mechanized kandak and an armor kandak, but they are currently equipped with BMPs (amphibious infantry fighting vehicles) and T-62 main battle tanks in various states of functionality. Procurement and donation options are currently being studied to upgrade this capability.

The ANA’s primary vehicle is the light tactical vehicle (LTV), a Ford Ranger truck. CSTC-A has procured more than 4,100 up-armored high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) (M1151/M1152) which will be fielded beginning in the summer of 2008. These HMMWVs will displace many of the LTVs, particularly in the combat battalions, to provide a protected mobility capability.

The ANAAC currently consists of the following aircraft: seven medium cargo airplanes (five AN-32s and two AN-26s) and 17 helicopters (13 MI-17s and 4 MI-35s). The ANAAC will eventually include reconnaissance and light attack air-to-ground fixed wing aircraft. By December 2008, the inventory will include an additional 11 MI-17s, 6 MI-35s, and two AN-32s. Four, of a total of 20, C-27s are will be delivered in 2009.

Strategic command and control is accomplished through an ANA-controlled telecommunications network that connects the NMCC and Corps headquarters. The ANA communication network provides voice, video, and data communications capabilities. An offline commercial encryption capability provides secure data messaging. Secure voice capability will be provided by commercial TalkSECURE Digital Wireline terminals and wireless phones. U.S.-made Datron high frequency (HF) base station, vehicle-mounted, and man pack radios, with commercial encryption capacity, provide tactical and backup strategic command and control and extends HF communications to mobile forces. Thuraya satellite phones have been fielded to key ANA leadership to provide a tertiary means of strategic command and control. Tactical phones and field switches provide battlefield communication capability. Additionally, commercial cell phones provide backup tactical command and control in urban areas with cell phone coverage.
2.4 Readiness and Assessment Tools

The MoD readiness reporting system is maturing and provides a metrics-based analytical and decision-support tool to improve readiness. The ANA system, similar to the U.S. Army’s Unit Status Report, is well-established and providing accurate, timely, and useful information that enables the ANA to manage the force more effectively. The system assesses ANA units using CM ratings on a monthly basis. Contractors developed the ANA readiness reporting system regulations and are currently in the process of updating them. Future improvements to the system will enable analysis of ANA mission essential personnel and equipment unique to different types of units (e.g. pacing items).

In order to brief unit status on manpower, equipment, munitions, and other operational readiness subjects, the ANA Combat Power Assessment briefing was redesigned to allow ANA leadership a more powerful reporting tool. This briefing is an increasingly Afghan-owned and run briefing chaired by the ANA G3 and other key staff. To enable its effective use, training and mentorship was provided to the GS G3 and Corps commanders.

2.5 Building and Sustaining the Officer Corps

The ANA officer corps is working to improve its professionalism. Illiteracy rates remain high in Afghanistan, but members of the officer corps are required to have basic reading and writing abilities. Plans are being made to improve the educational level of the officer corps. Overall, officers are proficient at the tactical level though not yet fully mature in operational and strategic concepts. Nevertheless, the majority of the officers, and most importantly the very senior officers, believe in the concept of a national military and are starting to use the military decision-making process and provide information and decision briefs to their superiors. The chain of command works well when exercised, and there is strict adherence to direction from higher ranks.

Entry-level officer training occurs in three forms. Officers with previous experience in the former Afghan Army attend an eight-week Officer Training Course which provides professional ethics training. New officers attend the six-month Officer Candidate School or the four-year National Military Academy of Afghanistan.

Training provided by or coordinated with CSTC-A is conducted with the intent of building a self-sufficient, strong, and fully capable ANA. The cornerstone of the ANA end-to-end career and training program is the formation and incorporation of branch service schools and combined career progression courses. Advanced training conducted on both branch specific and general military and leadership subjects ensures that the professional non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and officers continue their professional development. A planned career path that includes professional, advanced schooling also allows for reinforcement of the values and goals of the GIRoA and develops an appreciation for and support of the national agenda. Although initially based on the U.S. Army branch and higher military education system, the ANA career schools must reflect Afghan organization and operation to ensure internalization and independence. In the interim, this training is provided through MTTs and on-the-job training provided by either ETTs or OMLTs.

2.6 Merit-Based Rank, Promotions, and Salary Reform

There is currently an increasingly effective soldier and NCO promotion process in place. The regulation and process refinement for senior NCO and officer promotion has been held in abeyance pending passage of the Military Service Law. However, in February 2008 a policy
referred to as “Pay by Rank” was decreed and implemented. The policy ensured that officers are paid according to their post-reform rank. The implementation of this policy will work toward ensuring salaries are based on merit and appropriate rank is worn.

2.7 Mechanisms for Incorporating Lessons Learned and Best Practices

The process for capturing ANA lessons learned has been resident at the ANA Training and Education Command. Both international and Afghan members of VTTs have the responsibility to capture lessons learned and appropriately process the information so that it eventually arrives in the ANA Training and Education Command Doctrine Cell. Once it has reached the Doctrine Cell it is incorporated into the relevant ANA guidance.

The build-up of additional mentors at the NMCC and NPCC and other staff agencies will result in more opportunities to mentor Afghans on proper operational and administrative functions. To date, minimal mentor manning has resulted in missed learning opportunities, as there was insufficient coverage to identify all areas in need of correction and/or mentoring.

2.8 Oversight Mechanisms

2.8.1 Personnel

2.8.1.1 Recruiting and Retention

2007 surpassed the previous four years in ANA recruitment of soldiers. The ANA has recruited 32,135 soldiers in the year leading up to March 20, 2008. Annual recruitment numbers for the past four years, beginning with the most recent, are: 21,287; 11,845; 15,790; and 9,671. The year-to-date re-enlistment average in the fielded ANA is 50 percent for soldiers and 56 percent for NCOs. Factors that preclude higher re-enlistment rates include the desire for larger salaries, better leadership, and to be stationed closer to family.

In the February 2008, the ANA had an 8.4 percent absentee rate. This rate is down from the 12 percent rate experience at the height of summer 2007. The three Corps most consistently in contact with insurgents and anti-government elements had the highest AWOL rates, but on average they experienced an average rate of less than 10 percent in 2007 and the beginning of 2008. This decrease in AWOL rates has contributed directly to an increase of 20,000 in ANA end strength since January 2007. This increase in end strength coupled with a deliberate effort to fully man combat units fully and overfill entry level soldier authorizations should further mitigate this issue. During the past year, AWOL rates in ANA combat forces have decreased three percent. With increasing emphasis on pay and incentives, better facilities and training, better leadership in the ANA, and more robustly manned units, we anticipate AWOL rates will continue to decrease through 2008.

2.8.1.2 Accountability

To improve personnel management, the ANA is currently implementing the Personnel Accounting and Strength Reporting (PASR) system at all levels of command. The objective is for all units to provide accurate information in a standardized format. The supporting policy and regulation have been distributed throughout the ANA, and training on the various processes is taking place by MTTs in the Corps’ respective areas. Once training is complete, a decree will be issued directing all units to use the new PASR system.

The military justice system serves as a model for the civilian law enforcement and judicial system. CSTC-A’s ANA mentors have focused upon manning, equipping, and training the military attorneys and judges throughout the ANA. Each Corps has a staff judge advocate
office comprised of prosecutors, one or more defense attorneys, and military judges. There is also a Court of Military Appeals staffed with five military judges. There is currently one U.S. or NATO-ISAF force judge advocate at each Corps mentoring the Corps staff judge advocates. The ANA military justice system is operating effectively and hundreds of ANA soldiers have been court-martialed for misconduct.

CSTC-A also oversees the creation of justice centers at each of the five ANA Corps. The justice centers will serve as courthouses, office space for ANA attorneys, and short-term detention facilities. Additionally, CSTC-A mentors have been involved in the drafting, reviewing, and staffing of three cornerstone military justice laws: (1) the Military Courts Law, Military Crimes Code and Military Criminal Procedure Code (currently in force by Presidential decree); (2) the Prosecutor and Criminal Investigative Department Law (final draft recently forwarded to Minister of Defense); and (3) the Military Disciplinary Punishment Regulation (final draft recently forwarded to Minister of Defense). The passing and promulgating of these laws will enhance the ANA’s ability to enforce good order and discipline and ensure fairness in the military justice process.

The MoD Inspector General (IG) system is very well established. It is currently rated as capable with international support (CM2) with the expectation that it will be capable of independent operations (CM1) by the end of 2008 or early 2009. IG offices are at the MoD, GS, Corps, and brigade levels and more than 98 percent of assigned IG personnel are school-trained.

In addition, the MoD IG, the ANA GS IG, and the MoI Internal Affairs (IA) all have functional hotlines. Any soldier, policeman, or civilian can call these hotlines to report misconduct or request assistance.

2.8.2 Tracking of Equipment

There are two systems used to maintain oversight of ANA equipment, the Core Information Management System (Core-IMS), and the National Asset Visibility (NAV) System. Core-IMS is a commercial warehouse management system that has been used at the primary ANA national logistics depots since 2006. Core-IMS complies with ANA supply decree processes and is used to track and document equipment receipt, inventory, and issues resulting from ANA national-level depot operations. The NAV system has been used since 2001 and is a mechanism to track by-unit issue transactions for munitions, vehicles, and communications items. NAV entries are made using Core-IMS issue data from ANA national level depot operations and updated when battle damage documentation is received. Continued training and development of the systems are required to address current challenges with asset visibility and reporting.
Section 3: Afghan National Police

3.1 Programmed ANP End State

The Department of Defense assumed responsibility for the development of the ANP in April 2005. Efforts prior to this time were not comprehensive and lacked both resources and unity of effort within the international community. CSTC-A’s current efforts focus on key reforms within the MoI, greater unity of effort within the international community, and continued individual training and mentoring with the support of the INL.

The target for the ANP is to build and reform 82,000 personnel that are capable of operating countrywide. The ANP consists of Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), the Afghan Border Police (ABP), the Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), and additional specialized police including criminal investigation, counter-terrorism, and customs. The roles of the various police services span a wide spectrum of policing, law enforcement, and security functions:

- The AUP serve at the regional, provincial, and district levels, they focus on patrols, crime prevention, traffic, and general policing. They are meant to spread the rule of law throughout the country and provide a response capability for local security incidents.
- The ANCOP is a highly skilled, specialized police force, split into rural and urban units, trained and equipped to counter civil unrest and lawlessness. ANCOP units provide law enforcement and civil control, conduct operations in areas where government control may be weak, and support counterinsurgency operations. Eight of the planned 20 ANCOP battalions are currently operating. They are performing exceptionally well, both in their support of FDD, and in their primary role as the national quick reaction force in troubled areas. ANCOP battalions are formed as units and receive 16 weeks of institutional training followed by another eight weeks of Police Mentor Team (PMT)-supervised collective training. All reports on this new national police force indicate solid performance through its operations to dismantle illegal checkpoints, seize illegal weapons, and retake lost districts. ANCOP has successfully conducted counterinsurgency operations and secured the trust and confidence of the people.
- The ABP provides broad law enforcement capabilities at borders and entry points in order to deter illegal entry and other criminal activity.
- The CNPA is the lead agency charged with reducing narcotics production and distribution in Afghanistan.

Once assessments can be made on the effects of recently begun reform efforts, the ANP strength should be reassessed to determine if additional police forces are required. However, at this point in time, a lack of U.S. military trainers and mentors available for Police Mentor Teams precludes the acceleration or expansion of reform and mentoring efforts beyond the 25 percent of the ANP that is presently covered. Current PMT coverage is focused on the AUP who are closest to the population and are, therefore, the most immediate face of the Afghan government.

The auxiliary police are a temporary force of 9,000 officers, hired in 21 provinces, intended to augment the AUP. The auxiliary police will cease to exist by the end of 2008; those members that have served for at least one year, undergone five weeks of training, and receive a recommendation from their district chief will transition to the AUP. Those that do not meet these requirements will be released from service by September 30, 2008.
3.2 Training Efforts

3.2.1 Initial and Field Training

Currently, the ANP has fielded 92 percent of its forces, but it lags behind the ANA in capability. Police development has been hindered by a lack of reform, corruption, insufficient trainers and advisors, and a lack of unity of effort within the international community, among other things.

Unlike the ANA, police are not fielded as units. All policemen must be trained as individuals. The objective for ANP individual training is to require initial entry training (IET) for all accessions. However, current training capacity cannot meet demand, and many untrained policemen remain in the force. Efforts to expand the training capacity to meet demand should make it feasible to require IET for all police recruits in approximately three years. Currently, individual training is conducted at seven RTCs, a Central Training Center, and the Kabul Police Academy. Concurrently, CSTC-A and INL are developing a National Police Training Center (NPTC), which will achieve initial operating capability in 2008. This center will have an eventual training capacity of 2,000 policemen per year. Once the NPTC is complete (estimated for late 2010), it will be feasible to require all new policemen to attend IET prior to assumption of any duties. INL contracts to assist in individual police program training design, instructional implementation, and mentoring. More than 500 qualified civilian police advisors serve as training developers and instructors at the RTCs and Central Training Center, and as mentors at regional, provincial, and district locations. These civilian police mentors provide the civilian police expertise to augment the approximately 1,000 military mentors focused on police development.

The chart below is an overview of the police courses offered by the U.S. program. All ANP go through the basic course, with the exception of the auxiliary police. In addition to the core courses outlined below, advanced and specialized courses are provided for instructor development, field training, tactical training, medic training, and trainer training courses for investigative techniques, weapons proficiency, communications, and ethics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Courses</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic (AUP, ABP)</td>
<td>Entry</td>
<td>8 weeks</td>
<td>Basic policing skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firearms</td>
<td>Basic</td>
<td>5 days</td>
<td>Training and qualification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitional Integration Program</td>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>5 weeks</td>
<td>Democratic policing and human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Division</td>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>6 weeks</td>
<td>Investigative skills; forensics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANCOP</td>
<td>Advanced</td>
<td>16 weeks</td>
<td>Followed by 60 days of unit field training</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ANP training program, while recognizing that policemen do not operate in “units” as the ANA does, seeks to build cohesive, effective police organizations. The goal is to provide a mentor team to each police district, each provincial and regional headquarters, each ABP company and battalion, and each ANCOP company and battalion. However, the shortage of Police Mentor Teams affects CSTC-A’s ability to increase and improve ANP training and mentoring. Each PMT is composed of mostly military members that provide training support, maintenance, logistics, and administrative coaching; encourage professionalism; and serve as liaisons with international forces as required. Each team ideally includes two civilian police
mentors (provided by INL contract) that provide civilian police training expertise and advice. Due to the security situation, field-based police training is most often provided by military personnel with civilian or military police experience; RTC-based training is provided by civilian police trainers. Every PMT has a security force. There is no area of Afghanistan that permits independent mentorship by civilian police or very small PMTs. With 365 districts, 46 city police precincts, 34 provinces, five regions, 20 ANCOP battalions, 33 ABP battalions, and 135 ABP companies, CSTC-A is currently able to cover no more than one fourth of all ANP organizations and units with PMTs. Security is not only an issue for mentoring and training personnel. ANP officers perform hazardous duty. In many instances, the ANP experience significantly higher casualty rates when conducting counterinsurgency operations than do the ANA. The dedication and perseverance of individual police officers to fighting the insurgency and enforcing the laws of their country is commendable.

3.2.2 Focused District Development (FDD) Program

CSTC-A, in a coordinated effort with the GIRoA, the U.S. Embassy, NATO-ISAF and the international community, has recently implemented the Focused District Development (FDD) program to train, reconstitute, mentor and develop the AUP on a district by district basis. As the primary government interface with the Afghan people, an effective AUP is critical to the extension of the rule of law and to building trust in the institution of the police among the general populace. Accordingly, FDD concentrates resources on the district-level AUP. A reformed, more effective police force that can improve security in an area can facilitate the realization of other desired outcomes. It will take several years to reform the 45,000-person AUP and 18,000 ABP.

The first phase of FDD is an assessment of the district by a District Assessment and Reform Team, composed of a PMT, several representatives of the MoI and other Afghan government ministries, and, in some cases, other international partners (currently Canada and the United Kingdom). This assessment leads to selection and vetting of new leaders as required, recruiting to full authorization, and equipment inventories, as well as assessments of facilities, rule of law status, relationships with local leaders, and overall professional effectiveness. In the second phase, an ANCOP unit is deployed to the district to relieve the local AUP forces which then report to the RTCs to begin eight weeks of reconstitution (the third phase). The reconstitution period includes three different levels of training (i.e., new entrants, advanced, and officer leader and management training), biometric processing and identification card issue, pay records establishment, full equipping, leader reinforcement training, and continual ethics reinforcement. The AUP participating in the RTC training programs receive daily mentorship from PMTs. Upon completion of the TRC training phase, the PMT returns with the reformed police to continue collective training and mentoring in the district, ensuring the police put into practice the key individual and collective competencies as well as the ethical standards learned during training at the RTC. At the conclusion of this phase, which is proficiency-driven rather than time-driven, the district is validated as a reformed police force, using the same objective assessment checklist that was used in the preliminary assessment phase. The PMT then goes into an overwatch mode to ensure the district police retain the ethic and skills they have learned.

The first cycle, which began in seven districts in late 2007, is nearing completion with district ANP reinserted in their districts and undergoing intensive mentoring. As of April 2008, the second cycle of FDD was mid-course in five districts, with district ANP undergoing
reconstitution at the RTCs. The third cycle, being implemented in nine districts, was in the initial assessment phase. Three additional cycles of FDD are planned for 2008.

Current challenges facing the FDD program include shortages of PMTs, shortages of trained ANCOP units (currently a growing program), limited space availability at the RTCs (which will be alleviated by construction of the NPTC), lack of provincial governor support (due to the perceived loss of power as the AUP become loyal to the nation, as well their loss as a source of revenue for the governor from illegal checkpoints and graft). We anticipate that over the course of 2008, these challenges will lessen with the training of additional ANCOP units, the construction of the NPTC, and the ability of FDD-reformed districts to strengthen ties with district governance and populations.

The FDD initiative is focused nation-wide and is linked and complementary to ongoing ISAF operations. It is aimed at focusing limited resources to maximize the overall development of the AUP, ultimately creating communities able to sustain stability in the long term. The initial popular perception of the FDD program is favorable, and the national government views the FDD as a catalyst for similar programs that might benefit other governmental branches.

3.3 Equipment

The ANP is equipped with light weapons, including AK-47s and 9mm pistols. Most police elements also have light machine guns. The Afghan Border Police (ABP) will be provided heavy machine guns later in 2008, in recognition of the higher level of operations they encounter on the borders. ANCOP units also will be provided heavy machine guns. There is no intent to provide the ANP with NATO weapons. Former Warsaw Pact weapons are provided through donations or through U.S. funded purchase. Specialty organizations, such as the CNPA and counter-terrorism police, receive unique equipment consistent with their mission.

The ANP is provided Ford Rangers as LTVs and International Harvesters as Medium Tactical Vehicles (MTVs). The ANCOP is currently fielded with LTVs and MTVs, but these will be replaced with armored HMMWVs or a similar vehicle in 2008.

Police are equipped with a variety of communications equipment. They currently face an interoperability challenge because of the wide variety of communications equipment provided by the previous lead nation for the ANP. The U.S. Government has procured a common set of NATO-interoperable communication equipment to field the ANP completely, and will complete fielding during the coming year.

3.4 Readiness and Assessment Tools

The MoI Readiness Reporting System (RRS) is being re-worked to produce timely and accurate readiness system reports, provide actionable readiness data, and provide an executive level brief. The revised RRS should enable the MoI and ANP to conduct analysis of readiness data that will recognize shortfalls and allow MoI and ANP leadership to make corrective actions. Without the full complement of PMTs, however, a comprehensive assessment of the ANP will not be possible.

3.5 Building and Sustaining the Officer Corps

Overall, most MoI senior leaders are currently assessed as capable of performing their functions and duties with limited assistance (CM2), although others are less capable and require more assistance (CM3). The capacity of lower-level leaders and their loyalty to national police organizations are questionable. The lack of full implementation of approved organizational authorization documents and incomplete rank reform hinder progress toward leader
professionalism. Assessment and reform are being addressed at the district level through the FDD program.

Professional training and development at the national level is a new concept within the various ANP organizations. However, this situation is changing because of MoI involvement in the management of the FDD program, the continuation of the Kabul Police Academy, and a common eight-week leader and management course that all new officers must attend. Each training program provides objective and standardized training to ensure a greater degree of professionalism within the police forces. Additionally, an in-service training program is being implemented in each district and will eventually expand to all of the police forces to sustain training proficiency. Selected officers in each district and unit attend an instructor development course in subjects such as ethics and professional behavior, medical, communications, investigative techniques, and weapons. These officers then become the sustainment trainers in their districts and units. We expect that this program will be fully implemented in 2008.

We are also seeing improvements in the establishment of a professional NCO corps in the ANP. This development is critical to the success of the police, as only officers and NCOs have arrest authority, largely due low rates of literacy among patrolmen. Approximately 1,300 police NCOs will graduate from the Kabul Police Academy in 2008. Recently, more than 200 academy graduates were assigned to the districts outside Kabul that are going through FDD. We expect this to continue in 2008. Additionally, an advanced course targeted to NCOs was added to the curriculum for police training. Simultaneously, we are implementing literacy programs in the MoI to increase the literacy level of all policemen.

3.6 Merit-based Rank, Promotions, and Salary Reform

The MoI has taken substantial steps toward establishing fair and equitable compensation and recognition across the ANP. It began with rank reform, which sought to evaluate and stratify ANP personnel to ensure that each member was provided the opportunity to be objectively compared to their counterparts. Rank reform looked at the top 18,000 officers within a top-heavy structure and, through an international vetting process, reduced the officer corps by more than 9,000 officers. In addition to rank reform, pay reform provided for a more adequate pay scale, and pay parity provided the police with pay equal to that of the ANA. Other initiatives, including the development of comprehensive promotion and recognition programs, are underway, and written guidance regarding these initiatives is under review by the MoI for implementation.

3.7 Mechanisms for Incorporating Lessons Learned and Best Practices

The build-up of additional mentors at the NPCC and other staff agencies will result in more opportunities to mentor Afghans on proper operational and administrative functions. To date, shortfalls in mentor manning has resulted in missed opportunities to identify all actions needing correction or mentoring.

Lessons learned from the FDD process are captured via After Action Reviews (AARs). Training and mentor teams complete AARs and route them back through FDD program implementers, to be used to continually update the training programs as required. This process ensures lessons learned are efficiently applied to future FDD cycles and instruction blocks. This feedback is shared through the mentor chain and with the MoI and ANP leadership to improve the Afghan police beyond those areas that can be touched by FDD.
3.8 Oversight Mechanisms

3.8.1 Personnel

3.8.1.1 Recruiting and Retention
From March 24, 2007 through March 2, 2008, the nationwide recruiting number for all police programs was 17,474 (4,795 ABP, 1,414 ANCOP, and 11,265 AUP and specialty police).

3.8.1.2 Accountability
In general, accountability for the ANP has been a significant challenge. The Identification Card Program is a major step towards addressing the problem. This program maintains photographic and biometric records of all registered police. The end state of the program is an identification card that will incorporate equipment issue, pay, promotion, and tracking from accession to attrition using an accurate record management system. Current efforts include use of the identification card barcode system to pay ANP personnel. Identification cards will allow tracking of all ANP officers as well as their pay, providing accurate strength numbers and ensuring that officers receive their full pay.

CSTC-A has proposed a draft ANP strength accountability regulation that incorporates all 11 of the current ANP strength tracking documents as well as adding a Unit Manning Roster (UMR) to track policemen by their position of work, including the data collected during the initial the initial recruitment and vetting process. The database will then be linked to the ANP Identification Card database and a finance database. The UMR should eliminate the possibility of “ghost” employees since every position will either be vacant or have a name attached to it. These reforms will facilitate personnel complaints because it will show exactly where the complainant is located, and it will be easier to find his or her chain of command and records and resolve the issue. In addition, all ANP personnel have the ability to call the hotline mentioned above to request assistance, and the MoI IA is working to add a block of instruction on this subject to the FDD program.

CSTC-A mentors are working with the MoI Legal Advisor to provide disciplinary instruction for the ANP. This instruction will be executed and implemented under the Minister of the Interior’s signature and will provide for the administrative discipline of police personnel through the reduction in rank, pay forfeitures, and transfers. However, developing the capacity to implement the program will be challenging.

Despite having 11 police prosecutors assigned to MoI headquarters, police corruption and misconduct remain a challenge. Effective administrative internal controls within the ANP are hampered in part due to the law itself and a lack of capacity and will to execute that law. Firing a patrolman requires a criminal conviction or a Presidential decree. CSTC-A is currently working with the MoI on redrafting the personnel regulation that governs MoI employees, specifically, the ANP. These efforts are aimed at empowering lower-level officials to make removal decisions while providing sufficient administrative due process to the employee subject to termination. Regional IA units have been included in the 2008 Tashkil (authorization document) in five of the six police regions (Kabul is not included due to the presence of the national headquarters).

The Minister of Interior has commissioned a legislative drafting committee to revise the “Inherent” (or police personnel) Law, by consolidating three outdated laws that apply to the AUP. The drafting committee includes representatives from CSTC-A and the international community. Although the new law may not be passed for some time, the goal is to ensure that it
provides for the administrative separation of corrupt or inept police officers. This change likely will require either an advisory opinion from the Supreme Court or a Presidential delegation of authority (the Afghan Constitution grants only the President the authority to fire police).

Additionally, CSTC-A ANP legal mentors have focused on using the police court and the police prosecutor to bring criminal cases against police officers for misconduct that amounts to a crime. Again, these efforts have not yet shown results. A policy on drug use is under development. Though the drug use policy is not yet implemented police officers known to use drugs are removed from the force. In 2007 during the FDD cycle, 29 policemen (out of 650) were identified as drug users, immediately removed from the program, and released from the police force.

3.8.2 Equipment

A Stock Record Account (SRA) is used to maintain oversight of ANP equipment. The ANP SRA has been used at the MoI Interim Logistics Facility (ILF) since 2006 to track and document equipment receipt, inventory, and issues. The SRA from the ILF provides the details of all munitions, vehicles, clothing and individual equipment items. The MoI Technical Department maintains a manual property book to track equipment damaged in combat.
Section 4: U.S. Government Efforts

4.1 ANSF Development Efforts

The DoS and U.S. Embassy play a major role in mentoring, shaping, and developing the ability of Afghan leadership to direct and prioritize the use of security forces countrywide. Representatives of the U.S. Embassy assist in advising the security sector ministers and provide assistance in coordinating with the international community and participating in security sector development planning forums. The U.S. Government provides International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding to send Afghan military officers to U.S. military schools for professional development and leadership training. IMET is also provided for English language training. Further efforts include:

- The U.S. Ambassador provides policy guidance for all U.S. actors in Afghanistan, with particular emphasis on the development of the ANP. INL provides trainers and mentors to assist CSTC-A in executing the police program. INL’s specific mandate is to assist in the development of the police through training in accordance with direction from CSTC-A.
- The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), in conjunction with INL and the U.S. Embassy’s Counter-Narcotics Task Force, is the lead U.S. agency for counternarcotics planning and operations.
- The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Afghan Engineering District supports CSTC-A’s efforts in planning and programming infrastructure development for the ANSF, as well as supporting (as needed) USAID’s infrastructure development efforts in Afghanistan.
- The United States works with the IPCB in order to coordinate its efforts and train Afghan police more efficiently and professionally.

The U.S Government, the GIRoA, and international entities coordinate their security sector development activities through the Policy Action Group, the Security Operations Group, and the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board. DoS and CSTC-A also coordinate their efforts through these forums.

The Policy Action Group (PAG) is a committee composed of GIRoA ministers, international agencies (e.g., United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), EU, NATO, and ambassadors from key donor nations such as the United Kingdom (UK), Canada, and the Netherlands), and others. The PAG was created to address issues pertaining to four southern provinces (Nimroz, Helmand, Kandahar, and Zabol). Over time the PAG has become a forum for discussing overarching national issues (e.g., regulation of private security companies and reconciliation). The PAG is scheduled to meet twice monthly and is chaired by the Afghan National Security Advisor. The U.S. Ambassador, CSTC-A Commander, and the ISAF Commander all attend these sessions. The PAG is chartered to develop joint long-term strategic security initiatives with the international forces and the ANSF to ensure that a long-term, consistent approach is adopted towards security, economic development, and social challenges. All of these efforts are designed to accelerate the development, equipping, Manning, and modernization of the ANSF. Issues to be addressed by the PAG are discussed in Afghan interagency working groups corresponding to six pillars: security operations, counternarcotics, reconstruction and development, intelligence fusion, sub-governance, and strategic communications.
The Security Operations Group (SOG) is composed of representatives at the one- to three-star general officer rank from MoD, MoI, and NDS; international partners; ISAF; and U.S. Embassy representatives. The SOG meets weekly, but a SOG Working Group meets each day to produce an overall security assessment that is passed to Afghan ministries and ISAF. The SOG provides coordinated guidance and direction for security operations, facilitating coordination between security operations and other efforts supporting the pillar groups mentioned above. It is perceived to be the lynchpin of the pillar construct. The SOG ensures the implementation of security-related decisions made by the PAG. The ANSF are fully represented at the SOG and brief their requirements to the forum.

The JCMB was established by the GIRoA and the international community for overall strategic coordination of the ANDS. The 28 JCMB members include ministerial-level representatives from the GIRoA and the international community who oversee the delivery of the ANDS. CSTC-A and other U.S. Government participants are critical parts of all JCMB meetings and working groups. They assist in preparing policy discussions and papers that are related to the ANSF. The JCMB meets quarterly.

The primary U.S. Government policy-making mechanisms to provide guidance to sustain and build national military forces and police services capacity are the Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group, the Afghanistan Steering Group, and the Deputies Committee. CSTC-A participates in the preparation and coordination of topics that are directly or indirectly related to the ANSF via these interagency working groups. The groups meet weekly to discuss all aspects of Afghanistan security policy issues (e.g., ANSF development, counternarcotics planning, reconciliation, border issues, and election security).

Additionally, CSTC-A coordinates daily with members of the interagency through the Deputy Commander for Political-Military Affairs (DCG-PMA) and his primary staff who work and live at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. The DCG-PMA staff coordinates with the country team at the U.S. Embassy and ensures that ANSF policies and planning are consistent with policies of other U.S. Government agencies. DCG-PMA is also the main conduit to pass and coordinate information through the chain of command to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and other relevant members of the U.S. Government entities.

CSTC-A assists in hosting and briefing U.S. Government representatives visiting Afghanistan. CSTC-A officials also make periodic visits to Washington in order to discuss key issues with U.S. Government officials.

4.2 Efforts to Ensure Progress in Other Pillars of the Afghan Security Sector

4.2.1 Rule of Law

The U.S. Government is developing its own strategy to support the GIRoA in establishing the rule of law in Afghanistan that is coordinated through the U.S. Embassy and incorporates U.S. military efforts. Priority areas of the U.S. strategy include: accelerating institutional reform; building provincial infrastructure and capacities; bolstering counternarcotics and anti-corruption prosecutions; investing in the corrections system; improving linkages between police and prosecutors; and focusing on public awareness and legal aid to improve public confidence in and access to the justice system. These efforts support the overall U.S. Government push to project governance to the provincial and district levels, which in turn will build nationwide confidence in the central Government’s ability to provide security and services. U.S. Government agencies currently pursuing justice sector and rule of law efforts include: DoD, Department of Justice (DoJ), DoS, and USAID.
The Special Committee on the Rule of Law (SCROL), established in 2006 and chaired by the U.S. Embassy Rule of Law (ROL) Coordinator, meets on a weekly basis. The SCROL provides a mechanism to organize, coordinate, and deconflict ROL programs and policy issues among elements of the Embassy; to highlight unresolved issues for decision by the ambassador; and to present a consistent face to the justice sector ministries.

4.2.2 Counternarcotics

CN operations are severely constrained by the capacity of the Afghan law enforcement and judicial systems. As a result, DoD, DoS, DoJ, DEA, USAID and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are working to build the infrastructure necessary for the GIRoA to conduct legitimate law enforcement operations against narcotics traffickers.

The U.S. counternarcotics strategy focuses on helping the GIRoA disrupt Afghanistan’s opium-based economy and strengthen the central government’s control over the country. DoD, INL, USAID, Department of Justice (DoJ), and DEA collectively promote the “Five Pillar” Afghan National Drug Control Strategy. The five pillars include:

- **Public Information**: Designed as a year-round, nationwide program focused on helping the GIRoA achieve sustainable reductions in poppy cultivation and production through public information, engagement, and education, the most recent campaign has increased its emphasis on person to person community outreach initiatives through local *Shuras* that engage trusted local opinion leaders.

- **Alternative Development**: Designed to help the GIRoA establish economic alternatives to the cultivation of poppy for the Afghan people, this includes short-term cash-for-work projects and comprehensive agricultural and business development projects.

- **Elimination/Eradication**: Designed to help the GIRoA deter and reduce the cultivation of opium poppy through incentives while also building a credible forced eradication capability, this program includes support for Governor-Led Eradication and the centrally-led Poppy Eradication Force.

- **Interdiction**: Interdiction efforts focus on decreasing narcotics trafficking and processing in Afghanistan by helping the GIRoA to build its capacity to disrupt and dismantle the most significant drug trafficking organizations. Groups such as the CNPA, the Afghanistan Special Narcotics Force, and the National Interdiction Unit of the CNPA are being equipped to arrest and prosecute the command and control elements of narcotics trafficking organizations.

- **Law Enforcement/Justice Reform**: Both police and justice sector efforts help the GIRoA increase overall rule of law, specifically in the area of narcotics-related law enforcement. U.S. advisors mentor the Afghan Criminal Justice Task Force’s pursuit of narcotics and public corruption cases through the Central Narcotics Tribunal in Kabul. Building the overall justice system has a direct effect on expanding the rule of law and thus on enhancing counternarcotics law enforcement efforts.

CSTC-A serves in a coordinating role with the U.S. agencies listed above. CSTC-A also coordinates with counternarcotics specialists at ISAF, CJTF-101, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, and the U.K Embassy. Finally, CSTC-A provides a representative to the Counter-Narcotics Sub-PAG meetings hosted by the Afghan Ministry of Counter-Narcotics.

Through the various staff agencies, CSTC-A trains, equips, and supports members of the ANP and ANA that are involved either directly or indirectly in the counternarcotics effort.
CSTC-A funds training at the Counter-Narcotics Police Academy and is assisting the MoD in its efforts create a new unit, the Counternarcotics Infantry Kandak, intended to provide security for MoI eradication operations. Additionally, CSTC-A provides a mentor to the Deputy Minister of Counternarcotics within the MoI.

Current joint DoD-DEA programs have resulted in the construction of the National Interdiction Unit (NIU) training compound, the installation of equipment for the Sensitive Investigative Unit and the Technical Investigations Unit and provided advanced training for the CNPA. Funding for these programs was supplied by DoD. DEA conducted background checks on applicants and trained those suitable for duty in these elite units. With DoS, DoD provided funding for the Afghan Joint Aviation Facility and the CN Justice Center, while providing helicopter flight training to MoI personnel for the creation of an organic lift capability for Afghan CN organizations. DoD is developing an Unmanned Aerial System program to provide dedicated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance support to CN forces. This program will provide situational awareness and force protection for DEA Foreign Advisory Support Teams (FASTs) and the NIU when conducting operations. DEA deployed FASTs are supported by DoD and provide guidance, mentoring and bilateral assistance to the GIRoA and CNPA to identify and disrupt clandestine drug operations. While U.S. military personnel do not directly participate in law enforcement operations, U.S. forces do provide medical evacuation and in-extremis support, pilot training, helicopter lift support for administrative purposes, and intelligence for law enforcement CN missions.

DoD and DEA are working with the MoI to strengthen the capacity of the CNPA. In FY08, DoD is providing more than $95 million to foster CNPA development. Some major DoD-funded initiatives are: Afghan helicopter crew member training, Mi-17 helicopter operations and maintenance, aviation facilities, NIU sustainment training, DEA mentoring and training program, expansion of the CNPA headquarters compound, and construction of two regional law enforcement centers. DoD has long-term plans to further support the capacity building of GIRoA law enforcement CN forces.

DoD also plays an integral role in building the operational capacity of the Afghan Border Police (ABP) and Afghan Customs Department (ACD). The ABP and ACD require extensive support if they are to effectively control Afghanistan’s 5,000 plus kilometer border. To help the GIRoA meet this challenge, DoD funded a DoS program, the Border Management Initiative (BMI). The purpose of BMI is to improve security and promote stability in the border regions, and to increase interdiction capacity. In FY08, DoD will provide over $14 million to build the capacity of the ABP and ACD. At the request of DoS, DoD funded the development of the U.S. Embassy Border Management Task Force (BMTF). The BMTF provides oversight and management of U.S. border initiatives and assists the GIRoA with border issues. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) looks to the BMTF as the focal point for border management issues on behalf of the international community. Under the BMTF, U.S. mentors are provided to the ABP and ACD for border crossing points at Islam Qalah and Towrkham. DoD-funded construction of several border crossing points in Afghanistan and the region to include Sher Khan Bander, Towragundhi, and Islam Qalah. A communications system was also purchased for the ABP to support key command and control functions. Non-intrusive detection capability (x-ray and gamma scanners) has been provided to support inspections at major border crossing points and airports.

The DoS works within the five pillar plan to coordinate public information campaigns and poppy eradication. DoS and DoJ work together to increase the capacity and competence of
the Afghan judicial system, train prosecutors, and build the infrastructure necessary to indict, arrest, try, convict, and incarcerate drug traffickers. DEA is in the process of developing a three-to-five-year expansion plan for DEA operations in Afghanistan. USAID provides devolvement opportunities for the Afghan people, and is building roads, installing irrigation, constructing cold storage facilities, and introducing improved farming techniques to the Afghan people with the goal of providing viable alternatives to opium cultivation.

### 4.2.3 Demobilizing, Disarming, and Reintegrating Militia Fighters

In May 2005, Takim-e-Solh (PTS) was established as an independent commission by presidential decree. PTS is reconciliation program for the former insurgent fighters. The Office of the Afghan National Security Council (ONSC) provides oversight for the commission. At the outset, ONSC assigned a full-time PTS program manager and the former Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan assigned a full-time contractor to the program, in addition to providing CJ2 and CJ5 directorate support. Since its inception, PTS has reconciled 5,000 Afghans. Since December 2006, CSTC-A has maintained oversight of PTS. CSTC-A’s role in PTS is under transition, and management options are being explored.

The program receives donor funding from USAID, the U.K., and the Netherlands. The United States contributes $1.3 million to the program, and the U.K. and the Netherlands contribute $390,000 collectively. The United States pays for PTS employee salaries and overhead operating expenses, including rent and administrative expenses for the main office in Kabul and 10 of 11 field offices. U.S. funding has been constant since the outset of the PTS reconciliation program. On 1 April 2007, USAID assumed the primary funding role.
Section 5: NATO-ISAF Efforts

5.1 ANSF Development Efforts

5.1.1 Donation and Funding Coordination

The CSTC-A DCG-ISC coordinates closely with the ISAF DATES in order to effectively coordinate both NATO and non-NATO donations to the ANA. CSTC-A also works closely with the MoI and the IPCB Secretariat to coordinate international donations for the ANP. The ISC advertises the training and equipment needs of the ANA and ANP and then manages the details of integrating donated requirements into the force. Donations are coordinated through CSTC-A to validate the necessity, suitability, and sustainability of each donation.

5.1.2 Mentoring and Training

NATO ISAF supports ANA training and mentoring in three main areas: generating and deploying OMLT teams; filling CSTC-A training billets; and providing functional area mentoring, mobile niche training, schools, and courses. DCG-ISC coordinates the validation and fielding of OMLTs through cooperation with ISAF DATES. Currently, there are a total of 32 validated OMLTs. This number is insufficient to meet current needs. Furthermore, some OMLTs come into the country with national caveats that prevent them from deploying with ANA units out of their home area of operations, thus hindering operational flexibility. The shortage of OMLTs delays ANA development and has a further adverse effect on police mentoring. At present, the police mentor mission is significantly under-resourced. ISAF does not directly support ANP development with resources. However, the more NATO OMLTs in the field, the more U.S. military assets can be applied to the police mentor mission. Functional area and niche training efforts include officer and commando training provided by France and NCO and officer training provided by the U.K.

5.1.3 Operations

ISAF’s operational approach to counterinsurgency is to build Afghan capacity while degrading destabilizing influences. Accordingly, the ISAF Partnership Program continues to enhance the capabilities of the ANSF to plan, gather intelligence, conduct independent operations sustainable at the battalion level, and to integrate enablers in order to enhance security. At the tactical level, ISAF has begun to integrate ANA forces into planning and conducting operations in various degrees depending on the capabilities of the ANA and the respective Regional Commander’s intent and objectives. Additionally, key leader engagements, medical operations, humanitarian aid missions, and combined presence patrols provide a venue for ANSF forces to interact and discuss needs and local improvements with, and create trust among the local populace, Afghan leadership, ANSF, and ISAF. As trust increases, support for the GIRoA, ANA, and ANP evolves proportionately. An example of improved trust and confidence among Afghan civilians is their reporting of enemy activity, including improvised explosive device emplacements, suspicious activity, and potential future attacks.

RC-East is the most advanced regional command in regards to coordination of ISAF Operations with the ANA. ISAF forces in RC-East have benefited from having the most capable ANA units currently fielded, the 201st and 203rd Corps, deployed in their area of operation. The integration of the ANA into RC East efforts has contributed to increasing the ANA ability to successfully plan, coordinate, and execute combined operations. RC-East also complements the PMT effort at the district level. International forces are employed in coordination with CSTC-A
to maximize mentorship opportunities for police forces throughout the country, providing some level of mentorship coverage where the PMTs are unable to do so. RC East forces have also created programs that enhance police training at the RTCs.

5.1.4 Sustaining Institutions

ISAF efforts to reform and establish ANSF-sustaining institutions are somewhat limited at this time but are beginning to increase, with work focused on the MoD and ANA GS. ISAF does not have a mandate to support police operations or ANP development.

ISAF recently began to integrate the GS into its planning and coordination processes. The effort was initiated and continues to be facilitated by CSTC-A and serves two purposes: (1) develop the operational planning and coordination ability of the ANA and (2) integrate the GS into ISAF planning for future operations. RC East works to integrate the ANA GS into planning for the RC East area of operation through regular interfaces. ISAF headquarters staff advises MoD and ANA GS officers on the conduct and planning of security operations in regular meetings. These meetings include:

- A monthly War Council meeting with the ISAF Commander, CSTC-A Commander, ANA Chief, GS, and other key leaders;
- A weekly Operations Review with the ISAF Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and the ANA GS G3;
- A weekly Short-Term Planning Coordination Meeting among ISAF CJ35, CSTC-A CJ5, and ANA GS G3 key staff members; and
- A weekly Long-Term Planning Coordination Meeting among ISAF CJ5 and ANA GS G3 key staff members.

5.2 Efforts to Ensure Progress in other Pillars of the Afghan Security Sector

5.2.1 Counternarcotics (CN)

ISAF does not have a direct CN mission; however, ISAF assistance to CN activities is a key supporting task. ISAF is providing CN support consistent with its operations plan. The U.K. and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) have assisted the GIRoA in producing its National Drug Control Strategy. CSTC-A coordinates with counternarcotics specialists at the U.S. Embassy, ISAF, CJTF-101, the UNODC, and the U.K. Embassy.

5.2.2 Demobilizing, Disarming, and Reintegrating Militia Fighters

ISAF supports the disbandment of illegal armed groups (IAGs), contributing to the GIRoA’s goal of establishing a secure environment through disarmament. In its areas of operations, ISAF units participate in the disbandment of IAGs within their means, capabilities, and mandates; authorized rules of engagement; and applicable national caveats. This support amounts to active participation in policy development at both national and provincial government levels; planning support and coordination; information gathering; information operations; situation monitoring; influencing IAG commanders; and, in extremis, logistic and medical support.
Section 6: Other International Partner Efforts

6.1 Funding and Donation Coordination

CSTC-A works closely with DSCA to ensure that funds from donor nations are spent in the most efficient and productive manner possible. DCG-ISC and the IPCB encourage the Coalition partners to donate funding for equipment, training, engineering projects, or to trust funds set up by SHAPE to cover equipment transportation costs from donor countries to Afghanistan. As part of the CSTC-A headquarters, the DCG-ISC concentrates on international donations (both lethal and non-lethal), international training, international military relations, and mentorship of the MoD’s International Military Affairs Department. A detailed description of the funds coordination process can be found in section 1.5.2 of this report.

6.2 ANSF Development Efforts

CSTC-A encourages and facilitates international training efforts by educating the international community on requirements and encouraging the provision of key leader and staff mentors, International Police Mentor Teams (IPMTs), and MTTs to assist in the development of both the MoD and MoI and their subordinate organizations. DCG-ISC coordinates the validation and fielding of IPMTs through cooperation with ISAF DATES.

Currently, the U.K., Canada, and the Netherlands are providing IPMTs in Afghanistan. There are several bilateral MTTs in Afghanistan, including one from Mongolia and two from Romania. Additionally, several countries are supporting the establishment of institutions such as the Command and General Staff College (France), the Drivers-Mechanics School (Germany), and the Kabul Military High School (Turkey).

Many of our international partners participate in the same coordinating forums discussed above (e.g., PAG, SOG, and JCMB). Still, many groups and programs exist to promote reform and ANSF sustainment independent of the U.S. Government process and NATO-ISAF.

The Interagency Coordination Team (IACT) is the coordinating mechanism between the PAG pillar working groups and the PAG itself. The IACT is chaired by a member of the ONSC. IACT members attend the Pillar working group meetings and serve as the liaison for the PAG. Members of CSTC-A, UNAMA, and GIRoA attend the IACT sessions.

Aided by a standing secretariat, the IPCB is the principal means for both Afghan and international community coordination with regard to the ANP. The primary international institutions represented at the IPCB include the European Commission, EUPOL, and UNAMA. CSTC-A and the U.S. Embassy are IPCB members and assist in ANP reform by developing a common approach to policing that reflects the challenges of the security environment, the need to protect communities, and the requirement to strengthen policing skills. CSTC-A has a full time staff member on the IPCB Secretariat.

The Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) was established in May 2002 and is managed by the United Nations Development Program. LOTFA finances are disbursed to the MoI through the Ministry of Finance in support of ANP salaries and rations.

CSTC-A supports Training Program Development at the Office of the National Security Council (ONSC) through educational programs. The programs are provided by several institutions, including:

- The George C. Marshall European Center for Strategic Studies (GCMC) in Garmisch, Germany;
- The Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA) in Washington, D.C;
• The Naval Post Graduate School in Monterrey, California; and
• The National Defense University (NDU), Washington, D.C.

GCMC courses include the Senior Executive Seminar; Program on Advanced Security Studies; Program on Terrorism/Security Studies; and the Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Course. NESA offers the Senior Executive Seminar and the Seminar on Counter-Terrorism and the Afghanistan-Pakistan Workshop in Washington, D.C. NDU courses include Civilian-Military Response to Terrorism and the Masters Program in Counter-Terrorism. Other educational opportunities include the UK-taught MoD/ANA Leadership Management Training Project in Kabul.
**List of Acronyms**

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>After Action Review</td>
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<td>ABP</td>
<td>Afghan Border Police</td>
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<td>ANSF</td>
<td>Afghanistan National Security Forces</td>
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<td>AWOL</td>
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