United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces

April 2009
Report to Congress
In accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act 2008
(Section 1231, Public Law 110-181)
United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces

This report to Congress is submitted consistent with Section 1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181) (Section 1231). In accordance with subsection (a), the report includes a description of the long-term plan for sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), with the objective of ensuring that the ANSF will be able to conduct operations independently and effectively and maintain long-term security and stability in Afghanistan. The report includes a comprehensive strategy, with defined objectives; mechanisms for tracking funding, equipment, training, and services provided to the ANSF; and any actions necessary to assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to achieve a number of specified goals and the results of such actions. Consistent with Section 1231, this report has been prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State. This assessment complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to the Congress; however, it is not intended as a single source of information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its international partners, or Afghanistan.

NOTE: This is a historical document that covers the United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces from October 2008 to April 2009. Due to the delayed coordination of the report, essential data is included through June 2009. The subsequent iteration due April 28, 2010 will include data from April 28, 2009 to March 31, 2010.
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Section 1: United States Plan to Assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in Building the Afghanistan National Security Forces

1.1: Long-Term Strategy for Afghanistan National Security Forces Development

The Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) together constitute the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF). The United States and the international community, as part of their full-spectrum counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan, are currently working to build ANSF that are capable of independently providing for the internal and external security needs of Afghanistan. The long-term objective is to develop ANSF that are nationally respected; professional; ethnically balanced; democratically accountable; organized, trained, and equipped to meet the security needs of the country; and, increasingly, funded from Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) revenue. The existence of a professional, effective, and sustainable force, capable of conducting the full spectrum of internal security missions, will set the conditions for the eventual withdrawal of international forces. U.S. efforts to accomplish these goals focus on:

- Training, mentoring, and partnering with ANA and ANP personnel;
- Equipping the ANA and ANP units; and,
- Ministerial advisory and capacity building.

ANSF development efforts provide training, mentoring, and equipment to the ANA and the ANP so that those forces can fulfill their respective security and law enforcement roles and responsibilities. ANSF development efforts also ensure that the responsible government ministries and offices at all levels have the training, education, institutions, and supporting legislation to sustain and lead those forces. To build sustainable capacity and capability in the ANSF, the United States is focusing on three areas: ensuring disciplined execution of personnel management, logistics, and financial management systems; sustaining the institutional training base in the ANA and continuing to develop one for the ANP; and emphasizing the role of non-commissioned officers (NCOs). In 2009, U.S. efforts seek to continue developing the ANA, with increased focus on ANA and ANP capacity.

U.S. and international ANSF development efforts are consistent with the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and the Afghanistan Compact, the 2005 document that defines the political partnership between the GIRoA and the international community. The international community commits to providing the budgetary, materiel, and training support necessary to develop national military forces and police services and associated ministerial structures; while the GIRoA commits to providing the necessary human resources and political will. Although the United States is the primary provider of ANSF training and development personnel and material, international partners do provide support. In particular, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has directed all of its units to develop partnering relationships with the ANA. ISAF also provides Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) and Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (POMLTs) to develop the ANA and ANP, respectively. Additionally, NATO recently approved the establishment of the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) to bring greater international coherence and resources to ANSF development. On June 25, 2009, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) issued implementation guidance for NTM-A, which is to be operational by October 2009.

1 Sections 1 through 4 address U.S. efforts, while Sections 5 and 6 describe international efforts.
1.1.1: ANSF End-Strength

Despite achievements in Afghanistan in 2009, security threats remain an impediment to development. Corruption also continues to challenge development and will require continued emphasis on transparency in all programs and institutionalizing accountability and anti-corruption mechanisms. The security environment is fluid, demanding ongoing reexamination and reassessment of requirements. In April 2009, the international community’s Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) approved an increase in the ANP to 86,800 from the previously agreed end-strength of 82,000, primarily for Kabul security. The JCMB also approved an additional 10,000 ANP for vulnerable provinces prior to the August elections, for an authorized end-strength of 96,800. In September 2008, the JCMB approved an increase in the ANA to 134,000 soldiers, inclusive of a 12,000 trainee, transient, hospital, and student account, from the previously agreed end-strength of 80,000. The long-term ANSF posture will include a larger army and police force and a more robust Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAc) capability; however, continual analysis, study, and assessment must be made of the security environment, force capabilities, sustainability of the force, and available financial support. The long-term budget for ANSF development will be based on these considerations. A detailed assessment of ANSF end-strength is ongoing as part of the Commander, ISAF’s initial assessment, and is expected by August 2009.

1.2: U.S. Plan for ANSF Development

The Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A), under the command of U.S. Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A), is the lead U.S. command responsible for ANSF development. In conjunction with the GIRoA, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the international community, and with policy guidance from the U.S. Ambassador, CSTC-A plans, programs, and implements the generation and development of the ANSF and the related sustaining institutions in order to enable the GIRoA to achieve security and stability in Afghanistan. The CSTC-A Campaign Plan, developed in close coordination with the GIRoA and ISAF, is the principal U.S. plan for ANSF development. ANSF development covers the full spectrum of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities necessary for effective military and police forces.

1.2.1: CSTC-A Campaign Plan: Lines of Operations and Objectives

The CSTC-A Campaign Plan follows three concurrent lines of operation: (1) build and develop ministerial institutional capability; (2) generate the fielded forces; and (3) develop the fielded forces. Specific objectives include:

- Ministries capable of effective inter-ministerial cooperation as well as formulating, promulgating, and implementing policies, plans, and guidance throughout all levels of the ANA and ANP.
- Reduced corruption in the ministries and throughout the ANA and ANP so that the population of Afghanistan sees the Ministry of Defense (MoD)/ANA and the Ministry of Interior (MoI)/ANP as effective, efficient, and professional organizations.
- MoD and MoI senior leaders capable of engaging the international community on matters of security, development, and funding as they relate to their ministries.
• ANA and ANP manned, trained, and equipped to conduct the full spectrum of internal security and law enforcement missions as dictated by the local security situation, independent of significant external assistance.
• Common professional values and procedures across all elements of the ANA and ANP, including a shared ethos of serving the community and a shared sense of national identity.
• Well-developed personnel management systems for the ANA and ANP.
• An enduring training base that can provide basic training, professional training and education, and literacy education at all levels.
• Efficient and mature acquisition, maintenance, and logistics systems capable of identifying, acquiring, and distributing required resources to the ANA and ANP and thus providing an effective, long-term sustainment capability without external assistance.
• Combined support systems and processes for the ANA and ANP wherever possible to improve efficiency and affordability.
• Fully operational units capable of independent operations with minimal external assistance.
• A joint command and control structure, coordinated at the national level, to integrate the ANA, ANP, and the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS) at the regional and provincial levels.

Progress along the three lines of operation is tracked using a four-tier scale of Capability Milestones (CMs):

• CM4 describes an organization, unit, agency, staff function, or installation that is formed but not yet capable of conducting primary operational missions. It may be capable of undertaking portions of its operational mission but only with significant assistance from, and reliance on, international community support.
• CM3 describes an organization, unit, agency, staff function, or installation that is capable of partially conducting primary operational missions, but still requires assistance from, and is reliant on, international community support.
• CM2 describes an organization, unit, agency, staff function, or installation that is capable of conducting primary operational missions with routine assistance from, or reliance on, international community support.
• CM1 describes an organization, unit, agency, staff function, or installation that is capable of conducting primary operational missions. Depending on the situation, units may require specified assistance from the Coalition or international community.

1.2.2: Campaign Plan Phases

The CSTC-A Campaign Plan is executed in three phases. The three phases are concurrent; a given ANSF unit or supporting institution will be in the phase appropriate to the respective level of development of the unit or institution. As of June 2009, all three phases are ongoing.

Phase I – Generate/Field the Afghan National Security Capability

In Phase I of the Campaign Plan, CSTC-A aims to generate and field effective national military and police services, their ministries, sustaining institutions, and intermediate commands. Substantial assistance, including training personnel, equipment, funding, and logistical and
operational support, is required from the international community during this phase. Phase I is complete when the MoD, the MoI, the intermediate commands, and the ANSF sustaining institutions are established and sufficiently developed to execute the majority of their missions with international community support. Operational forces are generated, fielded, receiving collective training, and participating in operations with international community partners at all levels.

**Phase II – Development of the Afghan National Security Capability**

During Phase II of the Campaign Plan, CSTC-A works to develop Afghan national security capability. During this phase, all elements of the fielded ANSF will undergo collective training and evaluation to enable them to reach CM1. The ANA, ANP, and international forces will jointly plan, coordinate, and conduct operations. For the ANA, each unit is validated through a joint CSTC-A/ANA process. For the ANP, validation processes vary by the type of force. Phase II is complete when sufficient ANSF elements achieve CM1 and are capable of meeting Afghanistan’s internal security needs. Specifically, this requires ANSF organizations to be between 85 and 100 percent manned, equipped, and trained and have the capacity to plan, program, conduct, and sustain operations with specified international support.

**Phase III – Transition to Strategic Partnership and ANSF Re-orientation**

During Phase III of the Campaign Plan, the GIRoA assumes the lead responsibility for its own security needs with continued engagement with the international community. CSTC-A will transition from being intimately involved in day-to-day ANSF operations to a more traditional security assistance organization. Phase III will be complete when all ANSF are correctly configured and sufficiently resourced to meet the security needs of the country, including the defense of national independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity against prospective enemies with internal security and law enforcement bodies capable of sustaining themselves either unilaterally or with international community support. The first implementation of Phase III began in August 2008 with the transition of lead security responsibility in the Kabul area to the ANP.

1.3: **Budget**

CSTC-A receives funding through the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) to equip, train, and sustain the ANSF. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 ASFF request totaled $5.6 billion, including $4.0 billion for the ANA, $1.5 billion for the ANP, and $68.0 million for Related Activities including the training and operations of detainee operations and counterinsurgency activities.

The objective of the ANA current program is a 134,000 strong, infantry-based force structure by Dec 2011, assuming timely receipt of funding. The funding for the ANA force includes:

- Infantry, corps artillery, quick reaction, and commando battalions;
- Building institutional and organizational level experts in personnel, recruiting, training, logistics, maintenance, finance, acquisition, procurement, and other functions necessary to sustain a viable national military force;
- Upgrading garrisons and support facilities;
- Expanding the Afghan National Army Air Corps;
• Increasing battlefield mobility, airborne ISR, and light attack capability;
• Enhancing ANA intelligence capabilities; and
• Expanding education and training, including:
  - The National Military Academy of Afghanistan;
  - Counter-improvised explosive device (CIED) training;
  - Mobile training teams (MTTs);
  - Branch qualification courses; and
  - Literacy and English language programs.

ANP funding will:
• Increase counter-improvised explosive device (CIED), communications, medical, and intelligence training;
• Purchase additional equipment, weapons, and ammunition to respond to insurgent threats;
• Enhance ANP intelligence capabilities;
• Set conditions for interoperability with the ANA to improve joint response to events;
• Enhance border surveillance;
• Add basic health clinics in select provinces to improve casualty treatment; and
• Expand field medic and combat life support training.

1.4: Sustaining the ANSF

Since 2002, the United States and its partners have mentored, trained, and advised the trainers and leaders necessary to ensure that the ANA and ANP can maintain the knowledge base and the systems necessary to their effective operation. However, part of the strategic goal for the ANSF is for the ANA and ANP to be increasingly funded from GIRoA revenue.

Afghanistan is an extremely poor country. GIRoA domestic revenues equal approximately seven percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Comparable low-income countries have domestic revenues equal to approximately 14 percent of GDP. As part of the comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy, the United States and the international community are working with the GIRoA to develop the overall economy and increase government revenue. Despite these efforts and a steadily improving economy, the GIRoA will be unable to support financially the ANSF for the foreseeable future. Hence, the international community will have to provide financial support. At the time of writing this report, the members of the international community have not agreed to a specific plan for the long-term sustainment of the ANSF.

Some progress has been made in setting up mechanisms for sustaining the ANSF. In February 2009, the North Atlantic Council agreed to expand the NATO ANA Trust Fund including funds for sustainment costs. Prior to the expansion, the trust fund could only be used for ANA development. Several nations have expressed a willingness to contribute significantly to ANA sustainment. The United States will continue to work through diplomatic channels and international organizations to encourage its allies and partners to contribute to the long-term sustainment of the ANSF.

1.5: Tracking U.S. Funding

ASFF funds are appropriated by the U.S. Congress. The Secretary of the Army, in his role as the appropriation executive agent, distributes these funds to CSTC-A through the Defense
Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). DSCA authorizes the transfer of ASFF funds to the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) trust fund (i.e., for the purchase of major end items such as weapons, ammunition, and communication needs); transfers funds to other agencies (e.g., State Department for police training); and transfers funds to CSTC-A for local purchases. Fund status is tracked on the Defense Integrated Financial System—the official reporting system for FMS.

CSTC-A’s annual program objectives for the force generation and development of the ANSF bridge the gap between the strategic aims of the CSTC-A Campaign Plan, subordinate development strategies, and budget execution. Baseline requirements are derived from the approved ANSF force structure and any modifications to these requirements come from the GIRoA, in consultation with CSTC-A. Changes to requirements result from either a change to the security situation as reflected in updated strategic planning documents of the MoD or MoI, or from lessons learned through operational experience.

The ASFF is subdivided into Budget Activity Groups (BAGs) for the ANA, ANP, and Related Activities that include detainee operations and counterinsurgency operations. Each BAG is further subdivided into Sub-Activity Groups (SAGs) for categories such as equipment or training. Tracking of funds begins at the BAG and SAG levels. BAG and SAG funding authorizations for each fiscal year are loaded into a locally-managed database. As Memorandums of Request (MORs) are submitted for CSTC-A requirements, funds availability is confirmed by reviewing current funds status.

For tracking of spending below the BAG and SAG-levels, Life Cycle Management Command (LCMC) obligation reports are provided to the CSTC-A CJ8, the staff element responsible for financial matters, and uploaded into a local database. For local procurement funds sent to CSTC-A via Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request (MIPR), CSTC-A tracks all purchase requests against available MIPR funding and reconciles amounts daily. As contracts and payments are made against purchase requests, the CSTC-A CJ8 posts the transactions in the local database. A funds control analyst reviews and audits funds status through the local database on a daily basis. Any discrepancies are brought to the attention of the appropriate offices and addressed immediately.

The status of funds and financial decisions are managed using a Program Budget Activity Council (PBAC) process. The CSTC-A PBAC process occurs monthly and reviews budget execution rates, unfinanced requirement prioritization, and recommendations for command decision on program changes.

1.6: Tracking Equipment

1.6.1: U.S. Procurement

The CSTC-A CJ4, the staff element responsible for logistics, tracks equipment from identification and refinement of the requirement; from procurement source through shipment delivery; and from issue to end-user.

A new requirement for a weapon, communications, or vehicle system is initiated by either the ANA Plans and Requirements division or the ANP Plans and Requirements division (the BAG or SAG owners). Requirements are documented on the ANSF authorization document, the tashkieł. As the initiator of the requirements, the BAG or SAG owners work with CSTC-A CJ7 and the CSTC-A CJ4 Security Assistance Office (SAO) representatives to develop and refine the requirement details to a level and quantity that can be correctly programmed and resourced. Defining new requirements entails a formal approval process that is documented in
an order that details CSTC-A’s ANSF development programs and will be captured on the following year’s tashkiel.

Once approved as a new requirement by the CSTC-A CJ7, the staff element responsible for operation plans and force structure (or the Assistant Commanding General for Programs, depending on the dollar value), the CSTC-A CJ4 coordinates with the CSTC-A CJ8 to determine budget availability. The CSTC-A CJ4 then allocates the requirement to a specific budget program; the CSTC-A CJ8 commits the funds for the requirement; and checking once again, the CSTC-A CJ4 conducts a final verification of the requirements and fiscal resourcing available.

The CSTC-A CJ4 then determines how to source the requirement with an FMS case—via local purchase or procurement in the continental United States. Per DSCA guidance, weapons, ammunition, and most vehicles must be purchased via U.S. FMS cases. Determinations for local purchase items are accomplished in accordance with DSCA’s local procurement guidance and/or through liaison with DSCA.

For all FMS cases, the CSTC-A CJ4 SAO coordinates an MOR through the appropriate CSTC-A directorates prior to submission to DSCA. DSCA determines which Military Department agent would best fulfill the requirement, and the Military Departments then submit the requirement to their respective LCMCs. LCMCs work with the Defense Contract Management Agency to develop and award contracts for equipment. For specified technology, DSCA designates sensitive items procured through FMS cases as requiring end-use monitoring, a program that the CJ4 SAO manages.

**1.6.2: International Donations**

All monetary, infrastructure, equipment, and munitions donations to the GIRoA are evaluated through the office of the CSTC-A Assistant Commanding General for International Security Cooperation (ACG-ISC) to ensure that each donation fits an actual requirement for the ANA or ANP and will be logistically sustainable. Once approved, the donation offer is evaluated through the MoD or MoI for their approval and acceptance. For offers originating through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that are limited to the ANA, the donor nation is notified of Afghan acceptance through the Directorate of ANA Training and Equipment Support (DATES), ISAF, Joint Forces Command-Brunssum (JFC-B), and SHAPE. CSTC-A may elect to visit the donor nation and survey equipment or munitions offered to verify technical specifications and quality assurance. On-site surveys are anticipated for ammunition, weapons, and highly technical equipment. At CSTC-A’s discretion, and with concurrence of the donor, additional on-site technical work may be performed to assist the deliberative process. After CSTC-A and the GIRoA make the official decision to accept an offer, transportation arrangements are made. For offers originating through NATO, information concerning transportation arrangements flows to and from CSTC-A through DATES, ISAF, JFC-B, and SHAPE. The CSTC-A CJ4 transportation office is the key point of contact for all air and surface cargo transportation. Relying on military or commercial carrier input to established information systems, CJ4 tracks all lifts from embarkation to delivery. Delivery includes CJ4 receiving and accounting for all equipment, materials, and munitions at Depot 1 (the national depot for ANA weapons), “22 Bunkers” (the national depot for ammunition and ANP weapons), or another depot.

Monetary donations for the ANA may be made through the NATO ANA Trust Fund for infrastructure, munitions, equipment, and now, long-term sustainment. Such funds may be deposited with the NATO Trust Fund and subsequently used through NATO contracting or
transferred to the U.S. Treasury. Once on deposit with the Treasury, FMS/SAO organizations may use the donated funds to acquire infrastructure, equipment, or munitions as needed or as specified by the donor.

Some nations prefer to approach CSTC-A directly with an offer, as opposed to making their donations through NATO. The internal CSTC-A process described above, including all activities with the GIRoA, is performed in its entirety exclusive of the DATES, ISAF, JFC-B, and SHAPE communication: In sum, a bilateral offer is made and, with full CSTC-A and Afghan participation and approval, the offer becomes a bilateral donation. In instances of monetary donations, such funds are channeled through the United States and utilized by FMS/SAO.

Nations sometimes approach the GIRoA with bilateral offers. The ACG-ISC may be advised of donor intent at the time of offer or at any point along the way. Generally, the GIRoA and/or the donor nation advise ISC early in the process. For such offers, ISC makes every effort to provide the same assistance as described for the above bilateral example.

Arrival information (e.g., specific quantities and types of equipment) is annotated in a donation database. Since 2002, 47 donor nations (both NATO and non-NATO) have contributed equipment worth $838.8 million. Donations received in 2008 include .50 caliber machine guns, 81 millimeter mortars, winter clothing, and funds to construct a forward operating base.

Future solicitations will focus on equipment, infrastructure, and monetary donations for both the ANA and ANP. Monetary donations are especially critical due to the need for standardized equipment.

1.6.3: Shipment of Equipment

U.S.-sourced weapons, communications equipment, and ammunition for both the ANA and ANP are shipped by specially-assigned airlift to Kabul International Airport (KAIA). The U.S. element of the Combined Air Terminal Operations (CATO) activity at KAIA transfers equipment from aircraft to ANA trucks. The CSTC-A CJ4 representative attached to CATO and the ANA transportation element commander both sign a transportation management document which is subsequently signed by an ANA Depot 1 representative or a “22 Bunkers” Ammunition Depot representative upon delivery.

Large equipment, including vehicles, is shipped via sealift to the port of Karachi, Pakistan. The equipment is then delivered by contracted commercial carrier to Afghan depots. Commercial vehicles depart Karachi, cross the Pakistan-Afghanistan border at Torkham Gate or Chaman Gate, and proceed to delivery points in Kabul or the ANA vehicle depot in Kandahar. The Army Surface Deployment and Distribution Command provides CSTC-A CJ4 with shipping reports. Future transit agreements with the Central Asian States, Russia, and the Caucasus may allow shipments into Afghanistan from the north, rather than through Pakistan. (Fuel and other non-military items already come through the north.)

For FMS rolling stock, commercial carriers deliver ANA vehicles to ANA Depot 2 where they are signed for by ANA personnel, technically inspected, maintenance prepped, and staged for issue. Commercial carriers deliver ANP vehicles to a contracted maintenance organization for vehicle technical inspection and maintenance preparation prior to the MoI Technical Department taking custody.
1.6.4: Issue Process and Documentation

ANA

The CSTC-A CJ4 generates and transmits a “push letter” directing the issue of equipment to the U.S. mentors at the national depots. Units undergoing initial fielding at the Central Fielding Center (CFC) receive tashkīl-authorized equipment from the national depots in Kabul. Newly formed units receive their equipment from the Forward Support Depot (FSD) located in the unit’s corps area. The depots generate a MoD Form 9, Issue or Turn-in Order, which is signed by the ANA unit transporting the equipment to the CFC or from the FSDs. One copy is kept on file at the depot. The CFC or FSD supply officer signs the MoD 9 acknowledging receipt of the equipment and returns a copy to the issuing depot. The CFC or the FSD issues the equipment to unit supply officers using the MoD Form 9 as well.

Units request sustainment supplies via MoD Form 14, “Request for Issue or Turn-in.” Units submit these requests through their chain of command, through the FSD and the Forward Support Group to the Logistics Support Operations Center at the MoD Logistics Command. Each supporting level in the supply chain will either fill the request, forward to the next higher echelon if unable to fill, or deny the request if it is not authorized by the unit’s tashkīl.

The process lacks flexibility. If an allocation for a commodity is exceeded, the request is rejected. Additionally, in the past, if the item/quantity was not available in the FSD or depot, it would be cancelled. Within the past six months, CSTC-A has mentored a “due-out” process at the main supply depot (Depot 1), which allows items to go on backorder for up to 90 days. If the order is not fulfilled after the 90 day period, the supply echelon cancels the order.

The overall assessment of the MoD Form 14 request process is that it works when used properly. Although bureaucratic and inefficient by U.S. military standards, the Afghan process works within the Afghan system. MoD Logistics Decree 4.0, issued in 2008, reduced the number of required signatures and streamlined the process. The decree identifies key logistic responsibilities and support procedures and sets the conditions for an end-to-end logistics system for the ANA. However, communication up and down the supply chain during the MoD Form 14 fill process, from national-level issuing authorities to the end user, is problematic. The Logistics Embedded Training Team (ETT) is still working to improve coordination and interaction between FSDs and the national authorities. There are also significant challenges in providing feedback to the units making the request. A lack of automation makes this process difficult. In addition, the Afghan General Staff G4 plays a significant role in the process as it establishes sustainment allocation levels for the units. The G4 must ensure that the authorized allocations are in line with requirements. For example, when a unit receives new vehicles, the General Staff G4 must adjust fuel allocations thresholds for increased fuel requirements or the MoD Form 14s will be rejected because the request will have exceeded dated fuel allocations.

Accountability for issued equipment is a priority for the MoD and the ANA senior leadership. See Section 2.8, Oversight Management, for details on the equipment accountability systems.

ANP

The initial fielding process for the ANP is similar to the ANA process described above except that CSTC-A CJ4 “pushes” equipment only in support of the scheduled fielding of Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) battalions or through Focused District Development (FDD), Focused Border Development (FBD), and Afghan Public Protection
Program (AP3). CSTC-A CJ4 “pushes” equipment to the Regional Training Centers (RTCs), which currently serve as the regional supply depots until the planned Regional Logistics Centers (RLCs) are functional. RLCs will be the ANP equivalent of FSDs in the ANA. Documentation occurs through the use of the MoI Form 9 and other relevant property accountability forms.

After the initial issue, ANP units use the MoI Form 14 to request equipment and sustainment. Other than support for the scheduled fielding of new units and the FDD, FBD, and AP3 programs, all equipment is issued to the ANP by request only.

Some aspects of the MoI Form 14 Request process work, but overall it has yet to develop into an effective system. Until recently, logistics policies had not been updated in years and not all mid-level logistics depots—RLCs and Provincial Supply Points (PSPs)—are constructed. One of four RLCs and eight of 34 PSPs are completed with estimated construction dates through early 2010. The MoI currently has no Due In/Out process to track which orders have been filled. The 1388 tashkiel does not include funding for 1,006 civilian positions who work at the vital logistics nodes. Additionally, a lack of automation and communication at all levels hinders the process.

The release of the new logistics policies in January 2009 officially established the standards for the logistics system’s MoI Form 14 process. These policies delineate proper supply processes, form use, and accountability. The Logistics ETT is working to train the ANP on the new logistics policies. With the maturation of the MoI logistics system, CSTC-A anticipates that the MoI Form 14 request process will one day become an effective logistics process for the MoI.

1.7: Efforts to Build ANSF Leadership and Sustaining Institutions

CSTC-A and international mentors currently advise key leaders throughout the MoI and the MoD. In the MoD, these include the Minister of Defense, the Deputy First Minister, the Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy, the Deputy Minister for Personnel and Education, the Deputy Minister for Acquisition Technology and Logistics, the Deputy Minister for Reserve Affairs, and several other departments. In the ANA General Staff, these include the Chief of the General Staff, the Vice Chief of the General Staff, the Chief for Personnel, the Chief for Intelligence, the Chief for Operations, the Chief for Logistics, the Chief for Communications, and several other directorates. In the MoI, these include the Minister of Interior, the Deputy Minister for Security, the Deputy Minister for Administration and Support, the Deputy Minister for Counter-Narcotics, the Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy, and several other directorates and subordinate units.

CSTC-A contracted trainers also provide staff training via Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) in the areas of logistics planning and property accountability, military decision-making processes, and other staff processes. A recent initiative has begun to expand this training to include students from district-level operations centers of the ANP.

ANSF sustaining institutions must be capable of independently assessing and developing their forces. CSTC-A works with the MoD and MoI to build training management and assessment procedures that can train the entire system, build honest and accurate assessments from the bottom up, and assist the leadership in identifying issues requiring action. In order to ensure common objectives and standardization, CSTC-A retains oversight of all training, including the formation of new training and schools. To summarize, key processes to build the ANSF into fully capable organizations include:
Developing common core and synchronized programs of instruction to ensure that training meets uniform standards, regardless of the source of the training cadre;

• Confirmation of the students’ ability to apply the processes, tactics, techniques, and procedures by mentor and assessment teams;

• Establishing contracts for new training facilities and programs to ensure a smooth transition of lead training responsibilities from CSTC-A to the ANSF; and

• Training and mentoring for effective institutional management and leadership processes and ensuring that effective processes are implemented in normal ANSF operations.

1.7.1: MoD

The MoD/ANA continues to maintain momentum for ministerial development, force generation, and force development. The ANA is meeting recruiting requirements to generate the force and has increased retention of soldiers in the last four months with implementation of a one-year contract option. The four critical issues for force generation remain: trained Afghan officers and NCOs; availability of equipment for initial issue; timely construction of facilities; and adequate mentor teams.

CSTC-A executes the ministerial development program that synchronizes the development of MoD organizations and intermediate and sustaining institutions with the development of management and operational systems. Vertical and horizontal integration of systems is achieved through mentor meetings, functional boards, and the Ministerial Development Board. CSTC-A functional staffs focus on building organizational capacity and capability, while contract civilians with prerequisite skills (working with military functional experts and staff) develop the core management and operational systems essential to enable the Ministry to plan, program, and manage the ANA. The specific core systems being developed within the MoD include:

- Executive Administration
- Intelligence
- Readiness Reporting
- Acquisition and Procurement
- Reserve Affairs
- Communications (Information Technology)
- Budget and Finance
- Inspector General
- Medical
- Personnel and Education
- Operational Planning
- Logistics
- Strategy and Policy
- Disaster Response and Relief
- Training
- Installation Management
- Legal
- Parliament, Social and Public Affairs

Additionally, senior military and civilian personnel serve as advisors/mentors to selected senior Afghan officials and officers within the MoD and General Staff to assist with senior level issues and serve as liaison officers between the officials and the CSTC-A Commander and principal staff on matters affecting the development of the security sector.

The MoD continues to improve and, as of May 2009, the CM rating for ministerial capability was 2.5. Based on current missions and the ministerial development plans, the Ministry is expected to largely reach CM1 by mid-2011. Strengths include strong leadership from the Minister and the Chief of the General Staff and an improving capability to formulate
and distribute policies, plans, and guidance. CSTC-A continues to encourage the senior leaders to work together and to focus on horizontal integration. Systems development in both logistics and personnel management are key focus areas for mentors.

1.7.2: MoI

The ministerial development program works to synchronize organizations within the MoI headquarters and build the core management systems essential to plan, program, and manage ANP institutions and forces. Vertical and horizontal integration of systems is achieved through mentor meetings, working groups, and the Ministerial Development Board. To ensure coordination and unity of effort in ANP development, the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB), which includes representatives of all nations and organizations involved in ANP development, serves as the international coordinating body between the operational-level ANP reform and development at the ministerial level. The Minister of Interior serves as a co-chair of this body. Once issues have been resolved via an international caucus, the IPCB provides agreed-upon coordination and direction for action.

Senior military and civilian personnel working within the MoI assist and advise selected senior Afghan officials and officers with actions and issues associated with reform initiatives, as well as serve as a conduit between MoI officials, the CSTC-A Commander and principal staff, and the European Union Police (EUPOL) Head of Mission. The Department of State (DoS) Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) provides contracted mentors who also assist with advising senior Afghan officials to facilitate reform efforts. CSTC-A functional staffs focus on building organizational capacity and capability, while contracted civilians with prerequisite skills (working with military functional experts and staff) assist the Afghan senior leaders and staff to develop and implement policies, systems, and procedures to establish modern management practices essential to facilitate MoI reform. The specific systems being developed within the MoI include:

- Ministerial Administration
- Criminal Intelligence
- Readiness Reporting
- Acquisition and Procurement
- Communications (Information Technology)
- Force Management
- Facilities Management
- Legal
- Public Communication
- Personnel Management
- Operational Planning
- Logistics Management
- Strategy and Policy
- Training and Education
- Budget and Finance
- Internal Affairs
- Medical

Additionally, senior CSTC-A military and civilian personnel, working alongside personnel from DoS INL, EUPOL, and other international partners, serve as advisors/mentors to selected senior Afghan officials and officers within the MoI. In addition to their advisory roles, CSTC-A personnel serve as liaison officers between MoI officials and the international community on matters affecting the development of the Ministry and the ANP.

Since November 2008, the MoI has created momentum towards ministerial reform and accountability, but lack of human capital continues to hamper efforts. The MoI is implementing measures at all levels, including establishing a merit based appointment system; dispatching
provincial teams to visit all 365 districts to inspect and establish personnel and equipment accountability; and supporting the establishment of the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF). The new tashkiel, implemented in March 2009, will improve functional alignment within the Ministry, provide transparency, reduce duplicity, and increase capability.

As of May 2009, the MoI is rated at CM3. The low CM rating is due principally to immature staff skills, but new capability requirements are a complicating factor that contribute to the low CM ratings.

**Afghan Public Protection Program**

The AP3 comprises security forces under MoI control that closely coordinates with ANA, ANP, and coalition forces. The AP3 is an Afghan-initiated and Afghan-led program that relies on increased community responsibility for security. The AP3 leverages the same community elder groups that the Independent Directorate of Local Governance has been working with through the Afghan Social Outreach Program. The AP3’s mission is to enhance security and stability, strengthen community development, and extend the legitimate governance of the GIRoA to designated districts in key provinces. The AP3 pilot began in Wardak province in Regional Command (RC) East in March 2009, with the initial trainees graduating in April. The second training cycle graduated in mid-May. The third cycle is currently in training. Wardak province was selected to facilitate mentoring and monitoring by U.S. forces. The potential for expanding AP3 is under assessment by the U.S. and Afghan leaders, based on the success and efforts in the Wardak pilot program.

**1.7.3: Support Capabilities**

**Logistics**

The ANSF must have the logistical support necessary to sustain their fielded forces independently. According to CSTC-A policy, no equipment is issued without verification of appropriate supply and accountability procedures.

The ANA possesses a mature and continually improving national logistics infrastructure. A series of national and forward support depots (FSDs) currently provide the bulk of the ANA’s needs. Brigade-level logistics structures and systems are adequate and continue to develop. However, there is a gap between brigade- and national-level logistics networks. This gap will be addressed by fielding five Corps Support Battalions (CSBs) to provide distribution “push” capacity from the FSDs to CSBs as well as “pull” capability from the national depots. This will be a significant capability enhancement for the long term. FY 2009 funds lay the groundwork for the transition of logistics, which are currently contracted, over to being an ANA core responsibility. As of May 2009, the ANA General Staff Logistics command was rated at CM3 and is expected to reach CM1 by the end of 2010. The MoD office of Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics was rated at CM3 and expected to reach CM1 in the beginning of 2010.

For the ANP, CSTC-A efforts to develop logistics capability are focused on establishing verification and accountability procedures. CSTC-A is addressing regional-, provincial-, and district-level gaps in ANP logistics that stem in part from incomplete or undeveloped logistics policies and procedures and a lack of logistics officer training. The MoI is working to close these gaps through regional-, provincial-, and district-level logistics officer training.
Medical Services

The Afghan medical services are improving after years of budget, education, and training neglect. Regional hospitals have been completed in all four regional commands. The National Military Hospital in Kabul serves as the flagship institution for the ANA. Other medical units include: ANA Surgeon General and staff; ANA Medical Command, which consists of the four regional hospitals; Medical Stocks Command; the Armed Forces Academy of Medical Sciences; and medical assets at corps level and below. Those assets include corps surgeons, garrison clinics, brigade surgeons and staff, battalion aid stations, medical companies, and medical platoons. ANP Medical Services include the Office of the Surgeon General and staff, Kabul National Primary Care Clinic, training center clinics, and medics assigned to the border and civil order police units.

The objective for the Medical Services is to develop a robust, sustainable ANSF healthcare system through education, training, mentoring, and material support. In the context of a growing ANA, the Afghan Medical Services must also grow in both number and quality of its healthcare providers. This will require collaboration and coordination with the Ministries of Defense, Interior, Higher Education, and Public Health. The medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) system is still in its infancy. There are currently no dedicated MEDEVAC aircraft in the ANA. CSTC-A is developing the training and infrastructure for a comprehensive Afghan MEDEVAC system. A helipad was recently completed on the grounds of the National Military Hospital. Emergency Operations Centers will be completed at each regional hospital, at the National Military Hospital, and at the Office of the ANA Surgeon General, and additional efforts are being made throughout the Medical Services System to improve Intensive Care Units. Fielding medical companies capable of providing emergency care and treatment within the CSBs will enhance ANA healthcare capacity at the corps level. Overall, as of May 2009, the ANA Medical Command’s rating was CM3, but was expected to reach CM2 during the third quarter of 2010 and CM1 by the second quarter of 2011.

Numerous medical education programs have progressed and continue to evolve. CSTC-A and the international community are working to expand physician, nurse, and allied health professions education and training programs. Plans are being made for academic affiliations between the Army Medical School and the Medical College of Georgia, Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, George Washington University, Harvard, Yale, and the University of Nebraska. The ultimate goal is to develop and sustain a “train the trainer” concept using ANA physicians, nurses, and other trained personnel to deliver education and training to their civilian Afghan counterparts.

Recruiting

Recruiting for the ANA and ANP is the responsibility of the MoD and MoI, respectively. Both the ANA and ANP have consistently met recruiting goals year after year, though new recruits have high rates of illiteracy and often test positive for drug use. Although separate and distinct, the ANA and ANP recruitment programs share resources when possible in order to remain efficient. Through its Recruiting Command, the ANA has significantly increased its ability to attract the 35,000 recruits that are required to meet the accelerated force requirements in FY 2009. This has been achieved through increasing the number of ANA recruiters and raising the maximum recruiting age from 28 to 35. ANP recruiting has been more difficult, particularly in the unstable districts of the South and East.
1.7.4: Command and Control

ANA

Efforts at the ANA National Military Command Center (NMCC) have concentrated on enhancing operational command and control through instituting standard operating procedures for corps headquarters’ reporting. In addition, training and mentoring of liaison officers (LNOs) has been an ongoing activity designed to foster an attitude of urgency and accuracy in obtaining information from field units. A weekly video teleconference with corps commanders continues. The NMCC also participated in the ANA Command Post Exercise in November 2008. The exercise improved internal battle drills and staff horizontal communications.

CSTC-A is working to establish an NMCC common operating picture (COP), using geotagged unit locations and graphic control measures that will allow the NMCC to share its COP with other command centers through e-mail. The COP will also include the ability to share intelligence at the appropriate levels. The National Police Command Center (NPCC) is being included in this effort in order to establish a national-level COP for all ANSF.

ANP

At the NPCC, efforts are focused on developing standard operating procedures for internal NPCC operations and Regional Command Center (RCC) and Provincial Command Center (PCC) reporting requirements. The NPCC assumed control of radio communication operations and has been involved in an aggressive program of establishing and maintaining regularly scheduled communication checks with each RCC. Command emphasis has been placed on the need to institute a single chain of command and control from district to province (i.e., PCC) to region (i.e., RCC), to the NPCC. Training and mentoring of LNOs has been an ongoing activity focused on coordinating all operational activities.

At the national level, efforts focus on enhancing situational awareness of both the ANA and ANP through the exchange of intelligence and operations information in weekly video teleconferences between the NMCC and NPCC. The two command centers exchange LNOs to ensure the timely and accurate exchange of operational information.

CSTC-A is establishing operations coordination centers (OCCs) at the regional and provincial levels (OCC-Rs and OCC-Ps, respectively). These centers provide a coordination facility for the ANA, ANP, NDS, and Coalition forces operating in the region or province. As of April 2009, OCC-Rs are operating in the five regions at Kabul (RC Capital), Paktya (RC East), Herat (RC West), Kandahar (RC South), and Balkh (RC North). OCC-Ps are also operating in a preliminary capacity in Helmand, Zabol, Khowst, Paktika, Ghazni, Paktya, Kandahar, Nangarhar, and Wardak. The OCC-P in Wardak was established earlier than planned to support the implementation of the Afghan Public Protection Program in that province. The Afghan objective is to have all OCC-Ps operational no later than July 2009 in preparation for the national elections in August.
Section 2: Afghan National Army

2.1: Programmed ANA End Strength

Provided adequate funding, ANA will field the programmed 134,000 personnel in October 2010. Continued training, mentoring, and development will be required beyond this timeframe. As stated previously, the long-term ANA posture may include a more robust ANAAC capability and a larger force. However, a final decision on these issues will depend upon the ongoing analysis and on consideration of the security environment and available financial support. The 134,000 force structure program includes a divisional headquarters for Kabul and five additional infantry brigades. The end result will be an expanded light infantry force of a total of 20 brigades aligned under five regional corps. The expanded structure includes additional infantry, artillery, armor, engineer, commando, combat support and combat service support units, an air corps, and the requisite intermediate commands and sustaining institutions.

2.2: Training Efforts

Force generation is the most significant training effort underway in the ANA. These efforts begin with individual training. The soldier training process begins with quality, needs-based recruiting followed by initial entry training (IET) at the Basic Warrior Training Course (BWT) at Kabul Military Training Center or at a remote BWT (RBWT) course in the corps’ areas. Both courses are conducted by Afghan trainers, with supervision by coalition mentors. ANA basics are taught to an objective standard uniformly applied throughout the force. The ANA generates new officers for the force through one of three programs: Officer Candidate School (OCS); the Militia Integration Course; and the National Military Academy of Afghanistan (NMAA). Each of these courses produces lieutenants for the force. All three methods are executed by the ANA with coalition mentorship. OCS is the largest source of ANA commissions, and the NMAA is the source of the most highly trained and educated officers.

In addition to generating the force, the ANA has significant force development programs in place. Although IET provides the basic skills for soldiers, the individual soldier’s foundation is strengthened through branch specific Advanced Combat Training (ACT). ACT courses are conducted for soldiers and sergeants in the following specialties: artillery, reconnaissance, mortar, maintenance, engineering, transportation, logistics, medical, and signal training. Additional specialty skills and other training efforts include: commando training, intelligence, computer training, literacy training, and CIED/explosive ordnance disposal training, and cooks. Implementation of the ANA career progression model requires branch specific training so that the ANA can continue its professional growth and modernization. Branch school development and implementation efforts are underway in CSTC-A, and CSTC-A continues to pursue assistance from the international community for the development and initial operation of ANA branch schools that currently include the Combat Arms, Combat Support, Combat Service Support, Intelligence, Aviation, and Medical Schools.

In addition to the IET described above, the ANA individual training is also conducted to develop and professionalize the enlisted force. NCO training is delivered by the ANA Bridmal Academy in Kabul and in the corps’ areas, and the course management and delivery are mentored by UK personnel. This training constitutes a critical element of the ANA Professional Military Education (PME) system and includes the following courses: the Team Leaders’ Course
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(TLC) for new Sergeants (E-5); the Squad Leaders’ Course (SLC) for Staff Sergeants (E-6); the Platoon Sergeants’ Course (PSC) for Sergeants First Class (E-7); and the Senior Sergeants’ Course for senior NCOs (E-8s and E-9s). Current efforts underway will deliver more training in the corps’ areas, including divestment of the TLC to the corps’ responsibility as well as increased delivery of the SLC and PSC by Bridmal Academy Regional Training Teams. These efforts will increase the production of NCOs in the ANA and increase the professionalization of the force. In addition to these current efforts, the ANA Bridmal Academy is preparing to execute two new courses for the ANA, with guidance from CSTC-A and the U.S. Sergeants Major Academy. The Sergeants’ Major Course and the First Sergeants’ Course are in the final stages of development, and the pilot courses will be executed at the Bridmal Academy in June 2009. Together, these courses represent the end-to-end PME system for the enlisted members of the ANA.

The ANA also conducts a significant amount of officer training as part of its PME to develop the force; all courses are mentored by coalition mentors. The current courses taught in the officer PME include: the Basic Officer Training Course (BOTC), which provides basic branch specialty training for new lieutenants; the Company Commanders’ Course, which prepares captains for company level command; the Staff Officers’ Course, which provides captains and majors with basic staff officer skills; the Command & General Staff Course (CGSC) for majors and lieutenant colonels, which is the first officer PME course; the Kandak (Battalion) Commanders’ Course, which prepares lieutenant colonels for Kandak-level command assignments; and the Strategic Command & Staff Course (SCSC), which is the culminating PME course taught to senior colonels and general officers. Current coalition and ANA efforts are expanding the officer PME system under the umbrella institution of the Command & Staff College (CSC). The CSC will house four PME courses, including the already operating CGSC and SCSC. The new courses under coalition mentorship include: the Junior Officers’ Staff Course for captains and the Higher Command and Staff Course for senior lieutenant colonels and colonels. Together, these courses constitute a robust end-to-end PME system for the officers in the ANA.

To provide increased unit cohesion and enhanced collective training, a new unit forms at the Consolidated Fielding Center (CFC), where its manpower comes together and is fully equipped and prepared. Unit members undergo 45 days of individual, collective, and validated training, including staff functions and roles and responsibilities of headquarters personnel, prior to deployment to the unit’s corps area and to combat operations. Combat and security operations continue to round out ANA development. Each ANA unit is accompanied by either a U.S. ETT or an ISAF OMLT. These teams provide comprehensive mentoring across the full spectrum of operations. Specifically, the teams provide the ANA unit leadership with advisory support on all unit functions and direct access to U.S. and NATO ISAF resources to enhance the ability of the ANA to operate effectively and independently. They also serve as role models and key liaisons between ANA and international forces. They coach unit staffs and commanders and assist them in development of their training programs, logistics and administrative systems, planning, and employment in operations. ETTs and OMLTs also facilitate the assessment of ANA units, helping the ANA identify strengths, shortfalls, and opportunities for improvement.

To accelerate the development of ANSF capabilities and maximize joint operational effects, ISAF directed its units to develop partnering relationships with their ANA counterparts. Defined as a peer-to-peer relationship, partnering builds the capability and confidence of the ANA and also reinforces the legitimacy of the force and of the GIRoA.

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Building a fully-trained, professional ANA is difficult in part due to low literacy levels, lack of education, and the lack of formal military training beyond the soldier and junior officer levels. Eventually, ANA branch specific training through branch schools will provide adequate military education. However, to ensure that the ANA has a core of soldiers and officers with a foundational military education, CSTC-A decided to develop the Afghan Defense University (ADU) ahead of branch schools. The ADU is subordinate to the Afghan National Army Training Command (ANATC) and provides the educational courses necessary to professionalize the ANA. The ADU is scheduled to achieve initial operating capability in March 2011 and full operating capability in 2013, and it will serve as the crown jewel of the ANA’s education system. The ADU will house the NMAA, the Bridmal Academy, the CSC and all of its courses, the Counterinsurgency Training Center-Afghanistan, and potentially a Foreign Language Institute.

Additional training efforts include MTTs to train new ANA units in collective skills and operations. The new ANA units include Route Clearance Companies, Corps Support Battalions, and Combat Service Support battalions. Furthermore, training efforts provide needed communications and intelligence training to key personnel. Where possible, training is conducted in a “train-the-trainer” mode to develop Afghan self-sufficiency. ANAAC training builds Afghan capability for missions ranging from MEDEVAC to battlefield mobility and presidential airlift. As discussed above, medical training is being expanded to improve the Allied Health Professional Institute.

**Assessment**

CSTC-A and the GIRoA deploy Validation Training Teams (VTTs) consisting of U.S. and Afghan personnel to each of the ANA corps to validate the corps’ units once the ETTs/OMLTs and local commanders believe that the unit is CM1. VTTs assist ETTs and OMLTs in establishing collective training strategies and evaluation standards to assess unit operational capability. As of May 2009, 47 units have been validated at CM1, including 29 battalions, nine brigade headquarters, two corps headquarters, and seven other units. Figure 1 illustrates the progression of CM ratings for all ANA combat and combat support/service units between April 2008 and May 2009.
The ANSF is demonstrating increased capacity and capability to lead deliberate operations. Future increases in ANSF capability and capacity will lead to further increases in ANSF-led deliberate operations. A sharp increase in the number of coalition-led operations beginning in the summer of 2008 resulted in a reduction in the overall percentage of ANSF-led operations, but the total number of ANSF-led operations continued to increase. Nonetheless, the ANSF was in the lead for more than 60 percent of 2008 operations. In 2009, from January through May, the ANSF led 56 percent of deliberate operations (see Figure 2).
CSTC-A and the MoD established a cyclical readiness system to manage individual soldier and unit readiness. This cycle is designed around a four-month rotation that allows units to manage missions, training, schools, and leave. The program is not universally implemented because of the operational tempo in the South and East. Where it has been implemented, it has helped to reduce the absent without leave (AWOL) rate to a manageable ten percent. Where operational tempo prevents its implementation, commanders are encouraged to allow up to ten percent of the force to take leave.

CSTC-A legal mentors are overseeing the development of a comprehensive legal officers’ training program (CLOTTP), which includes the development of a basic legal officers’ course (BLOC) that will be mandatory for all ANA legal officers. The goal of the BLOC is to develop a basic level of legal competency for all ANA legal officers, understanding that fewer than 20 percent of the current officers assigned to the ANA legal department are trained attorneys. The CLOTTP will eventually include specialized training courses for advanced legal training and all courses will be taught by members of the ANA’s legal department. The basic course materials were developed by legal development training team members from the United States and Canada, in conjunction with Afghan legal officers.

ANSF air capability continues to improve. Of note in 2008: the first large fixed-wing movement of ANCOP occurred in July and August, moving 230 policemen from Herat to Kabul; a new monthly cargo movement record was set in August with 100,495 kg moved; a new monthly personnel movement record occurred in October with 9,337 personnel moved; and the first Afghan-run presidential support mission occurred in October.

2.3: Equipment

The three infantry companies in each kandak, or battalion, were originally equipped with former Warsaw Pact rifles; light, medium and heavy machine guns; and rocket propelled grenade launchers. The weapons company in each kandak provides anti-armor capability with SPG-9 recoilless rifles and indirect fire with 82mm mortars. In the fall of 2008, the ANA began a transition to NATO standard weapons. CSTC-A is currently converting the ANA from the AK-47 to the M16 (or the Canadian version, the C7). Fielding of the NATO weapons is currently limited to the 201st, 203rd, and 205th Corps because the acceleration of the growth to 134,000 soldiers created a lag between FMS cases and fielding schedules. Limiting the initial transition to three corps allows the ANA to maintain integrity of weapon type in each corps until the FMS cases are resourced. Later this year, the ANA will begin converting to U.S.-model light and medium machine guns and 81mm mortars.

Each brigade has an artillery battery consisting of eight former Warsaw Pact 122mm D30 howitzers. As of March 2009, 95 D30 howitzers were on hand. All are scheduled to be refurbished and converted to the NATO standard 6400mm system under a program to be implemented in FY 2010. The 134,000-person ANA also includes five corps artillery battalions, bringing the total number of howitzers in the ANA to 283 when the force is fully fielded. The current program to field indirect fire capability to the ANA could be accelerated if additional howitzers were donated by the international community.

CSTC-A continues to assess possible programs and procurement options to upgrade ANA mechanized and armor capability. However, COIN capacity is the current focus of ANA development and procurement efforts; hence, armor is not the priority.

The ANA’s primary vehicle is the light tactical vehicle (LTV), a Ford Ranger truck. CSTC-A has procured more than 4,100 up-armored high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles
(HMMWVs) (M1151/M1152) and began fielding them in August 2008. The HMMWV fielding process will continue through December 2010.

The ANAAC currently consists of the following aircraft: seven medium cargo airplanes (six AN-32s and one AN-26) and 26 helicopters (17 MI-17s and nine MI-35s). The ANAAC will eventually include trainer, reconnaissance, and light attack fixed wing aircraft. By December 2009, the inventory will include an additional three MI-17s. Four of a total 18 C-27s will be delivered by December 2009.

Strategic command and control is accomplished through an ANA-controlled telecommunications network that connects the NMCC and corps headquarters. There has been no significant provision of communication equipment since the last report.

2.4: Readiness and Assessment Tools

The ANA readiness reporting system provides the metric-based analysis necessary to serve as a decision support tool to improve readiness. The ANA system, similar to the U.S. Army’s Unit Status Report, is well established and provides accurate, timely, and analytically useful information that enables the ANA to manage the force more effectively.

Contracted mentors developed the ANA readiness reporting system and are continually improving it; for example, by incorporating more sophisticated concepts into the system. The system assesses ANA units using CM ratings on a monthly basis, and as the system and the ANA mature, it will enable the analysis of a unit’s capability to perform mission essential tasks unique to that type of unit.

A quarterly Readiness Report Command Review Meeting (RRCRM) has been developed to provide the ANA senior leadership a forum to jointly review the current readiness report with the senior commanders and the General Staff. The focus of the RRCRM is to involve senior commanders and the General Staff in the development of corrective action plans to resolve unit shortfalls in personnel, training, equipment, and resources. It facilitates prioritization of scarce resources to increase combat readiness and facilitate key operational decisions on unit employment.

In order to brief unit status on manpower, equipment, munitions, and other operational readiness subjects effectively, the Afghan Combat Power Assessment briefing was redesigned to allow ANA leadership a more powerful reporting tool. This briefing is increasingly Afghan owned and run and is chaired by the General Staff G3 and other key staff. CSTC-A provided training and mentorship to the General Staff G3 and to the corps commanders to ensure that the briefing is used as an effective tool.

2.5: Building and Sustaining the Officer Corps

The officer corps is required to have basic reading and writing abilities and it is an objective of CSTC-A to improve the overall education level of the ANA officers. Officers are proficient at the tactical level; however, the majority has not fully mastered operational and strategic concepts. Most officers, including the very senior officers, use the military decision-making process and provide information and decision briefs to their superiors. The chain of command continues to work well when exercised, and there is strict adherence to direction from higher ranks.

Entry-level officer training occurs in three forms. Officers with previous experience in the former Afghan army attend an eight-week Officer Training Course, which provides professional ethics training. New officers attend the six-month OCS or the four-year NMAA. In
January 2009, 84 cadets became the first NMAA graduates. To keep pace with the continued growth of the ANA and overcome a shortage of lieutenants, OCS was expanded from three companies to five companies, and plans are in place to create a sixth company.

Training provided by or coordinated with CSTC-A is conducted with the intent of building a self-sufficient, strong, and fully capable ANA. The keystone of the ANA end-to-end career and training program is the formation and incorporation of branch service schools and combined career progression courses. Advanced training conducted on both branch specific and general military and leadership subjects ensures that the professional NCOs and officers continue their professional development. A planned career path that includes professional, advanced schooling also allows for reinforcement of the values and goals of the GIRoA and develops an appreciation for and support of the national agenda. Although based on the U.S. Army branch and higher military education system, the ANA career schools must reflect Afghan organization and operation to ensure internalization and independence. The BOTC was developed at the Kabul Military Training Center as a bridge to the branch schools. The BOTC is modeled after the enlisted Advance Combat Training and is a six-week course following OCS. The BOTC offers branch specific training in mortar/reconnaissance, field artillery, engineering, transportation, signal, and logistics to new lieutenants. In addition, training is provided through MTTs and on-the-job training is provided by either ETTs or OMLTs.

2.6: Merit-Based Rank, Promotions, and Salary Reform

An effective soldier and NCO promotion process is in place. In February 2008 a policy referred to as “Pay by Rank” was decreed and implemented. The Pay by Rank policy ensured that ANA officers are paid according to their position within a reformed rank and pay structure. The policy ensures salaries are based on merit and that appropriate rank is worn.

2.7: Mechanisms for Incorporating Lessons Learned and Best Practices

The lessons learned and doctrine cells are organizationally aligned within the ANATC; but the collection and analysis process within the ANA is underdeveloped. Collection requires more resources and a cultural shift towards a willingness to seek and share information within the ANA. Analysis is hampered by a lack of experienced personnel devoted to analyze and identify trends and incorporate them into doctrine development.

The lessons learned process will continue to mature with sustained mentoring and increased cooperation from coalition forces. Improving links with ETTs, OMLTs, VTTs, and ISAF will enhance ANATC’s capabilities. The MoD recently improved its support of the ANATC Doctrine Directorate with more personnel, but more resources are still required.

2.8: Oversight Mechanisms

2.8.1: Personnel

Recruiting and Retention

The recruitment of more than 36,000 ANA soldiers between March 2008 and March 2009 surpassed the totals of the previous five years. Annual recruitment numbers for the previous five years, beginning with the most recent, are: 31,805; 21,287; 11,845; 15,790; and 9,671.

The re-enlistment average for fielded ANA is 57 percent for soldiers and 63 percent for NCOs. This rate is an increase of seven percent for both soldiers and NCOs from last year. To
encourage re-enlistment, the ANA implemented an incentive pay package and a $20/month pay increase, introduced the option for soldiers to sign one-year contracts instead of three-year contracts, and established a mobile team of Re-Contracting Master Trainers.

In the month of May 2009, the ANA had a seven percent absent without leave (AWOL) rate. The annual rate is eight percent. With the exception of the 203rd Corps, AWOL rates are highest in units with a high operational tempo. Other factors contributing to high AWOL rates include the difficulty soldiers face trying to return from leave and poor leadership.

**Accountability**

Improving personnel management is an objective for ANA development. The ANA is implementing the Personnel Accounting and Strength Reporting system at all levels of command. The objective is for all units to provide accurate information in a standardized format. Once all units and personnel are fully trained on the use of the system, a decree will be issued requiring its use.

CSTC-A’s ANA mentors have focused on manning, equipping, and training the military attorneys and judges throughout the ANA. Each corps has a staff judge advocate office comprising prosecutors, one or more defense attorneys, and military judges. There is also a Court of Military Appeals staffed with five military judges. There is currently one U.S. or NATO ISAF judge advocate at each corps mentoring the corps staff judge advocates.

CSTC-A also oversees the construction of justice centers at each of the five ANA corps and CSTC-A mentors are also involved with the revision of proposed laws relating to military matters.

The MoD Inspector General (IG) system will achieve CM1 in 2009. IG offices are at the MoD, General Staff, corps and brigade levels. Over 98 percent of assigned IG personnel are school trained. In addition, the MoD IG, the ANA General Staff IG and the MoI Internal Affairs all have functional hotlines. Any soldier, policeman, or civilian can call these hotlines to report misconduct or request assistance.

**2.8.2: Equipment**

Accountability of equipment remains a high priority for both CSTC-A and the ANA/ANP leadership in order to maintain positive control, safeguard equipment and ammunition, and incorporate transparency into logistics systems. The 2008 U.S. Government Accountability Office audit identified several areas where improvements could be made in weapons accountability.

CSTC-A now has several programs to reemphasize its role in accountability of equipment. For night vision devices, CSTC-A established a formal Enhanced End User Monitoring Program that ensures compliance with accountability procedures for this sensitive equipment. In February 2009, CSTC-A published “Weapons and Ammunition Standard Operating Procedures,” which assigns missions, roles, and responsibilities for training teams and mentors involved in weapons and ammunition accountability at Afghan national depots.

Senior MoD and MoI leaders also established programs to maintain weapons accountability. Both ministries require monthly “100 percent” serial number inventories of all weapons. It is important to note that this requirement is a significant change from the old culture of annual inventories by quantity rather than serial number.
In order to reinforce this inventory system and align mentor efforts with these policies, CSTC-A requires a monthly mentor verification/validation program. Mentors provide the inventory results of their Afghan counterparts to CSTC-A as part of normal readiness reporting.

There are two systems used to maintain oversight of ANA equipment, the Core Information Management System (Core-IMS) and the National Asset Visibility (NAV) System. Core-IMS is a commercial warehouse management system that complies with ANA supply decree processes and is used to track and document equipment receipt, inventory, and issues resulting from ANA national-level depot operations. The NAV system has been used since 2001 and is a mechanism to track equipment transactions by unit. NAV entries are made using Core-IMS issue data from ANA national-level depot operations and updated when battle damage documentation is received.

2.8.3: Logistics

The ANA is fielding the Logistics Readiness Assessment Tool (LRAT) in order to provide the ANA leadership with asset visibility and assert positive control of supply chain management. As of March 2009, personnel from all five corps are trained on the LRAT.
Section 3: Afghan National Police

CSTC-A directs, with policy guidance from the U.S. Ambassador, all U.S. efforts to organize, train, and equip Afghan police forces, and seeks to integrate the efforts of lead nations and other members of the international community into a comprehensive police plan. As such, CSTC-A works with INL, EUPOL, and others in the international community to develop and reform the MoI.

3.1: Programmed ANP End Strength

The ANP consists of Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), the Afghan Border Police (ABP), Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), and additional specialized police including criminal investigation, counter-terrorism, and customs. The roles of the various police services span a wide spectrum of policing, law enforcement, and security functions. The priority for the ANP remains to build and reform a 96,800-personnel force that is capable of operating countrywide. This includes the recent JCMB decision to increase immediately the number of Kabul police by 4,800 and to add 10,000 partially trained police for key and vulnerable provinces prior to the election in August 2009. The MoI is currently recruiting these police with the objective to have them in place by the national elections in August. These 10,000 personnel will complete the full training regimen after the election period. The increase in U.S. military trainers as a result of President Obama’s strategic review will assist the accelerated training for election security.

As of May 2009, the ANP reported it had fielded 94 percent of its authorized force, but it continues to lag behind the ANA in capability. Generally, police development has been hindered by insufficient trainers and mentors, a lack of reform, widespread corruption, illiteracy and drug addiction, a high attrition rate, and lack of unity of effort within the international community.

The FDD program, which trains district-level police, is an effective training and reform program. However, the shortage of police mentors has limited its implementation to date to 56 of 365 districts. For FDD Cycle 7, which began training in late March 2009, four Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (POMLTs) from the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands, are participating in the training and will deploy to districts with their assigned police. This contribution of mentors is a significant step in garnering additional international support for police reform. The MoI seeks to complete sufficient reform to meet international conditions for police growth and has begun identifying gaps between the forces available and the levels required to conduct “hold” missions for the counterinsurgency mission and the law and order mission in order to establish local rule of law. The MoI works with the JCMB to identify Afghan and international solutions to provide the additional police necessary to close such gaps.
3.2: Training Efforts

3.2.1: Initial and Field Training

With the exception of specialized units such as the ANCOP, ANP are not fielded as units but rather hired as individuals to join existing police organizations. Ideally, police are trained on individual tasks before they begin duties in a district. One of the fundamental objectives for ANP individual training is to require IET for all recruits; however, because police reform began with police units already in existence and current training capacity cannot meet demand, many untrained policemen remain in the force. The FDD program trains these policemen as part of district training. Efforts to increase the training capacity to meet demand and completion of other police reform programs should make it feasible to require IET for all police recruits in approximately three years. Currently, individual training is conducted at seven RTCs, a Central Training Center, a national ANCOP Training Center, and the Kabul Police Academy. CSTC-A is also developing a National Police Training Center (NPTC), which will achieve initial operating capability early next year. This center will have an initial capacity of 1,000 and a fully operational capacity of 3,000 policemen.

INL has contracted more than 500 qualified civilian police advisors to serve as training developers and instructors at the RTCs and Central Training Center, and as mentors at regional, provincial, and district locations. These civilian police mentors augment the approximately 1,000 military personnel mentors assigned to police development. To date all military mentors assigned to the ANP are seconded from the Army training mission. Sourcing PMTs remains the single greatest challenge for progress in police development.

The chart below is an overview of the police courses offered by the U.S. program. All ANP go through the basic course. In addition to the core courses outlined below, advanced and specialized courses are provided for instructor development, field training, tactical training, medic training, and “train the trainer” courses for investigative techniques, weapons proficiency, communications, and ethics.

Table 1 – ANP Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Courses</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic (AUP)</td>
<td>Entry</td>
<td>8 weeks</td>
<td>Basic policing skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABP</td>
<td>Entry</td>
<td>8 weeks</td>
<td>Survivability and interdiction skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Police</td>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>14 weeks</td>
<td>Basic policing and advanced skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Investigative Division</td>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>6 weeks</td>
<td>Investigative skills; forensics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CN Training</td>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>8 weeks</td>
<td>CN specialized training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANCOP</td>
<td>Advanced</td>
<td>16 weeks</td>
<td>Quick Reaction Force, high-level training</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The auxiliary police program—a temporary force of 9,000 hired in 21 provinces to augment the AUP—terminated on October 1, 2008; those members who served for at least one year, attended five weeks of transition training, and received a recommendation from their district chief transitioned to the AUP. Those who did not meet these requirements or chose not to attend the transition training were released from service on September 30, 2008.

CSTC-A’s objective is to provide a mentor team to each police district, each provincial and regional headquarters, each ABP company and battalion, and each ANCOP company and battalion. However, the shortage of PMTs limits CSTC-A’s ability to increase and improve ANP
training and mentoring nationwide. CSTC-A is currently able to cover no more than one-fourth of all ANP organizations and units with PMTs.

3.2.2: Focused District Development Program

CSTC-A implemented the FDD program to assess, train, reconstitute, mentor, and develop the AUP on a district-by-district basis. The district represents the level of policing closest to the population in Afghanistan and is the level at which reform can have its greatest effect. This reform effort of the 45,000-personnel AUP and the 18,000-personnel ABP is expected to take at least three years. FDD concentrates resources on district-level AUP, recognizing that police reform must be integrated with governance and economic development efforts in order to achieve lasting reform in a district. To date, 56 districts are well underway toward reform through FDD. Districts enter the program in cycles. In May 2009 there were seven FDD cycles underway. Figure 3 shows the capability level of districts currently undergoing FDD, distinguished by cycle.

**Figure 3**– FDD districts as of May 2009

Cycle Seven consists of eight provincial police companies and four districts that will be mentored by international POMLTs from Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK. The decision to include provincial-level police companies in the FDD program was made because CSTC-A did not have additional PMTs to mentor new districts and provincial police already have assigned mentors.

At the time of writing this report, CSTC-A is working with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and ISAF to determine the districts for FDD Cycle Eight. The selection process will focus on districts that are also identified as action districts for governance reform and development so that FDD becomes part of a larger comprehensive district development program. FDD Cycle Eight will include additional provinces and districts where other countries are offering POMLTs due to the continuing shortage of U.S. PMTs.
3.2.3: Focused Border Development

Focused Border Development (FBD) is a program designed to enhance the effectiveness of ABP companies in central and eastern zones of the Combined Joint Task Force-101 (CJTF-101) area of operations. CSTC-A, the Department of Defense (DoD) CN, and CJTF-101 have partnered to accelerate the fielding of ABP companies in these areas. FBD will man, train, and equip 52 companies, and 32 companies are enrolled in FBD as of April 2009. As it became evident that FBD would significantly increase the survivability of border police companies, CSTC-A began to look for ways to expand to other regions. When additional class space became available at the Spin Boldak training facility in December 2008 and January 2009, 40 ABP from RC South were inserted into the ABP training program. The program will now expand to six companies in RC South and eight companies in RC North, with coordination continuing with ISAF to establish partner units where U.S. forces are not present. ABP companies are fielded with unit equipment (e.g., vehicles, weapons, and communication assets) as they complete their training cycle.

3.2.4: Afghan National Civil Order Police

Fourteen of the 17 planned ANCOP battalions are currently fielded and are performing exceptionally well, both in their support of FDD, and in their primary role as the national quick reaction force in troubled areas. ANCOP are formed as units and receive 16 weeks of institutional training followed by another eight weeks of PMT-supervised collective training. All reports indicate solid performance in ANCOP operations to dismantle illegal checkpoints, seize illegal weapons, and retake insurgent-controlled districts. The ANCOP has successfully conducted counterinsurgency operations and secured the trust and confidence of the people. ANCOP are also being employed as the relief force in districts that are part of FDD. The ANCOP assume responsibility for law and order in the district while the assigned AUP are attending eight weeks of training at the RTC. One challenge for the ANCOP has been a high level of attrition due to a high operations tempo resulting from election preparation and the Focused District Development program.

3.2.5: Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan

The CNPA is the lead counter-narcotics law enforcement agency for the GIRoA. DoD is coordinating efforts with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Department of Justice, and DoS to develop CNPA into a credible force through an interagency approved five-year expansion plan, first implemented in 2006.

DoD provides training, infrastructure and equipment support, including funding the construction of Forward Operating Bases to enable DEA and CNPA to conduct joint counter-narcotics operations and expand the rule of law.

DoD provided eight MI-17 helicopters for the CNPA aviation squadron, short and medium endurance unmanned aerial surveillance systems for intelligence gathering and force protection, and a wire intercept program to allow for legal wire taps for law enforcement investigations. DoD also trains and equips the National Interdiction Unit, Technical Investigation Unit, and the Sensitive Investigation Unit.

3.3: Equipment

The ANP is equipped with light weapons, including AK-47s and 9mm pistols. Most police elements also have light machine guns. The ABP will be provided heavy machine guns in
2009 due to the higher level of operations they encounter on the border. ANCOP units will also be provided heavy machine guns. Former Warsaw Pact weapons are provided through donations or through U.S.-funded purchase. The pre-existing reliance on former Warsaw Pact weapons throughout the ANP makes this approach much more cost effective than attempting to re-equip the entire force with NATO weapons. Specialty organizations, such as CNPA and counter-terrorism police, receive special equipment consistent with their respective missions.

The ANP is provided Ford Rangers as LTVs and International Harvesters as Medium Tactical Vehicles (MTVs). The ANCOP is currently fielded with LTVs and MTVs, but these will be replaced with armored HMMWVs in late fall 2009. Ambulances are also being fielded starting this year to ANCOP and ABP elements.

Police communications equipment is limited and hampered by interoperability issues. In 2009, the United States will supply the entire ANP with NATO-interoperable communications equipment.

3.4: Readiness and Assessment Tools

The MoI Readiness Reporting System (RRS) is managed to produce timely and accurate Readiness System Reports, provide actionable readiness data, and provide an executive level brief. The revised RRS should enable MoI/ANP to conduct analysis of readiness data that will recognize shortfalls and CM ratings. This analysis will allow MoI/ANP leadership to take corrective actions. Figure 4 below demonstrates ANP unit capability levels between October 2008 and May 2009.

Figure 4-ANP CM Levels, October 2008-May 2009
3.5: Building and Sustaining the Officer Corps

Overall, the majority of MoI senior leaders are currently assessed as capable of performing assigned functions and duties with limited assistance (CM2), although some are less capable and require more assistance (CM3). The capacity of lower-level leaders and their loyalty to national police organizations are questionable. The lack of full implementation of approved organizational authorization documents and incomplete rank reform hinder progress toward leader professionalism. Assessment and reform are being addressed at the district level through the FDD program.

Professional training and development at the national level are new concepts within the various ANP organizations; however, it is becoming more familiar through the involvement of the MoI in the management of the FDD program, the continuation of the Kabul Police Academy, and a common eight-week leader and management course that all new officers must attend. Each program provides objective and standardized training to ensure a greater degree of professionalism within the police forces. Additionally, an in-service training program is being implemented in each district and will eventually expand to all of the police forces to sustain training proficiency. Selected officers in each district and unit attend an instructor development course in subjects such as ethics and professional behavior, medical, communications, investigative techniques, and weapons. These officers then become the sustainment trainers in their districts and units. This program is scheduled to be fully implemented over the next year.

There is also progress in establishing a professional NCO corps in the ANP. This professionalization of the NCO corps is critical to the success of the police, as only officers and NCOs have arrest authority. Approximately 1,300 police NCOs graduated from the Kabul Police Academy in 2008, and more than 200 graduates were assigned outside of Kabul to districts undergoing FDD. Additionally, an advanced course was added to the curriculum for police training, targeted to NCOs. Simultaneously, literacy programs are in place to increase the literacy level of all policemen.

3.6: Merit-based Rank, Promotions, and Salary Reform

The MoI has taken great steps toward establishing fair and equitable compensation and recognition across the ANP. It began with rank reform, which sought to evaluate and stratify ANP personnel to ensure that each member was provided the opportunity to be objectively compared with his counterparts. The rank reform process evaluated the top 18,000 officers within the ANP’s top-heavy structure. As a result of the rank reform, the ANP officer corps was reduced by 9,022 officers. Pay reform provided for a more adequate pay scale, while pay parity provides the police with pay equal to that of the ANA. Additionally, other initiatives, including the development of comprehensive promotion and recognition programs, are underway; written guidance regarding implementation of these initiatives is under review by the MoI for implementation.

3.7: Mechanisms for Incorporating Lessons Learned and Best Practices

The build-up of additional mentors at the NPCC and other staff agencies will result in more opportunities to mentor Afghans on proper operational and administrative functions. To date, shortfalls in mentor manning have resulted in missed opportunities to identify all actions needing correction or mentoring.

Lessons learned from the FDD process are captured via After Action Reviews (AARs); training and mentor teams complete AARs and route them back through FDD program.
implementers, to be used to update the training programs continually, as required. This process ensures lessons learned are efficiently applied to future FDD cycles and instruction blocks. This feedback is also shared through the mentor chain and with the MoI and ANP leadership to improve the Afghan police beyond those areas that can be affected by FDD.

3.8: Oversight Mechanisms

3.8.1: Personnel

In 2009 the MoI will transition from locally-based recruiting to a national recruiting system. Between March 2008 and March 2009, the nationwide recruiting numbers for all police programs were 17,191 (2,737 ABP, 3,562 ANCOP, and 9,468 AUP and specialty police).

All ANP recruits undergo the same screening process. The recruits are screened by the MoI Medical, Intelligence, and Criminal Investigative Departments. Recruits must have either a national identification card (tashkira) or two letters of recommendation from community elders.

In addition to initial evaluation, the FDD program introduces further screening to the ANP development process. Upon arrival at an RTC for FDD training, all AUP officers are screened for a second time by a regional police recruiter. They also undergo health screening, biometrics data collection, enrollment in the electronic payroll system, issue of identification cards, enrollment in electronic funds transfer where available, and drug testing.

Recruits that test positive for drugs are immediately removed from training sites and sent back to their districts. The commander must then follow a specific process for those ANP who have tested positive. The Afghan who tested positive is not allowed to participate in ANP special programs. If the member fails a single test he faces disciplinary action or removal from duties. With the first offense the ANP member is placed on one year probation and acknowledges and signs a declaration and oath allowing periodic testing. A second positive drug screening will result in separation. In addition, he must be evaluated for dependency via a qualified program. A member that is determined to be a chronic user is medically disqualified from the ANP.

Illiteracy among recruits remains a challenge, and CSTC-A has funded voluntary literacy courses, which have been well attended by recruits. During the course of the eight weeks of FDD training, U.S. civilian police mentors monitor all trainees and identify those that need to be removed. Police officers that fail to graduate from the FDD course are removed from the force.

Accountability

Establishing accountability for the ANP has been a significant challenge. To help address this issue, the U.S. Government is issuing identification cards to all ANP. This program maintains photographic and biometric records of all registered police. The goal of the program is a national identification card that will incorporate equipment issue, pay, promotion, and tracking from accession to attrition using an accurate record management system for the ANP. Current efforts include use of the identification card barcode system to pay ANP. As of April 2009, 52,892 ANP officers had received their identification cards.

Electronic funds transfer will help ensure that ANP officers are paid their full salaries. The United States is working to extend electronic funds transfer to all officers. It is currently available in 19 provinces and is being dispersed throughout the districts as local technology and infrastructure allow. One of the challenges of implementing electronic funds transfer for pay is the availability of banks. In an effort to expand the program beyond the range of the local
banking system, the MoI is running a pilot program in Wardak Province that uses cellular telephones for personal banking. Roshan Telephone Company has signed on for this initial pilot.

Minister of Interior Atmar commissioned 34 provincial assessment teams to assess personnel and equipment accountability in each province. The intent of the teams is also to establish personnel accountability in provinces where it has not been established using the Unit Manning Roster. As of February 2009, these teams visited 341 districts. The 24 remaining districts were not visited due to weather or security concerns. They will be visited as soon as practical. We expect the teams to provide their results to the Minister within the next 60-90 days. The Minister also initiated a plan to establish a senior leader screening system soon after his arrival at the Ministry in order to hire qualified staff for the Ministry and remove unqualified leaders from the organization. Final work is being done on the plan with implementation expected in the near future.

CSTC-A mentors are working with the MoI Legal Advisor to provide disciplinary instruction for the ANP. This instruction will be executed and implemented under the Minister of Interior’s signature and will provide for the administrative discipline of police personnel through reduction in rank, pay forfeitures, and transfers. However, developing the capacity to implement the program will be challenging.

In 2008, a drafting committee including representatives from CSTC-A and the international community revised the law applying to ANP personnel, the “Inherent” Law. Although the revised Inherent Law has still not been passed, the goal is to ensure that it provides mechanisms to dismiss corrupt or inept police officers. Passing this law will likely require either an advisory opinion from the Supreme Court or a presidential delegation of authority, as the Afghan Constitution grants only the President the authority to fire police.

**Equipment**

President Karzai approved the reorganization of the MoI in December 2008. In January 2009, the Interior Minister approved major new logistics reforms. Several efforts are now underway to build a NATO standard logistics system for the ANP. At the national level, the Material Management Center (MMC) is being established to oversee the distribution of all the supplies, equipment, weapons, and vehicles issued to ANP units nationwide. The MMC will provide the capability to manage logistics materiel effectively and efficiently. The MMC will include 94 Afghan logisticians and is now operational with an initial cadre of staff. It will provide the central hub for all logistics materiel and maintenance management activities. MMC personnel complete all required documentation and gain the approval of the Minister prior to the requested items being provided. Weapons systems replacement is managed at the national level through the MMC. Organizations will maintain accountability at all times and will prepare and provide inventory and consumption data through their chains of command to the MMC and other MoI staff activities for reporting and reconciliation. If an item is not in stock in either the Provincial Supply Point or the Regional Logistics Center, the MMC will check for lateral transfers and will fill from stock or initiate the order of the item from commercial sources.

CSTC-A is working with the MoI Logistics Department to train Afghan police logisticians on the new reforms. Beginning in February 2009, MTTs started to spend approximately one week at each district AUP unit that has completed FDD. The MTTs will train PMTs and ANP logistics officers on the new reforms and then assist them in compiling property books that will include the serial numbers of sensitive items. The MTTs will also identify excess equipment for redistribution to districts that will be going through future cycles of FDD. The
reorganization, logistics reforms, new MMC, and local-level training together provide a foundation for enhanced ANP logistics capacity that will eventually provide responsive logistics support to police units at the local level.

In March 2009, the Minister of Interior decreed that all weapons in the MoI will be inventoried by serial number monthly. This decree is part of the larger effort to maintain accountability of weapon systems throughout Afghanistan. See Section 2.8 for more details on this effort.
Section 4: U.S. Interagency Efforts to Build ANSF Capacity

4.1: U.S. Interagency Roles and Responsibilities

The DoS and U.S. Embassy play major roles in mentoring, shaping, and developing the ability of Afghan leadership to prioritize and direct the use of security forces countrywide. Representatives of the U.S. Embassy assist in advising the security sector ministers and provide assistance in coordinating with the international community and participating in security sector development planning forums. Several embassy offices, including the Ambassador, INL, the DEA, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Afghan Engineering District (AED) provide assistance in various forms. Specific roles and activities include:

- The U.S. Ambassador provides policy guidance for all U.S. actors in Afghanistan, including those involved with development of the ANSF;
- INL provides policy guidance, training curriculum, trainers, mentors, and training facilities to assist CSTC-A in developing the ANP. INL is the lead U.S. agency for counter-narcotics policy implementation and planning;
- DEA, supported by INL, is the lead U.S. agency for interdiction operations and CNPA training;
- USAID representatives participate in planning sessions in support of FDD; and,
- AED supports CSTC-A’s efforts in planning and programming infrastructure development for the ANSF, as well as supporting (as needed) USAID’s infrastructure development efforts in Afghanistan.

The primary U.S. interagency mechanism to define U.S. Government objectives and coordinate U.S. efforts to develop the ANSF is the Deputies Committee. The DC ultimately answers to the National Security Council and the President of the United States and meets weekly to discuss all aspects of Afghanistan and Pakistan security policy issues. CSTC-A coordinates daily with U.S. Government agencies through USFOR-A. USFOR-A staff coordinates with the interagency country team at the U.S. Embassy, ensuring that ANSF policies and planning are consistent with policies of other U.S. Government agencies. USFOR-A is also the main conduit to pass and coordinate information through the chain of command to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and other relevant offices.

On a more informal level, CSTC-A assists in hosting and briefing interagency personnel visiting Afghanistan. CSTC-A officials also make periodic visits to Washington, DC in order to discuss key issues with interagency officials.

4.2: Interagency Coordination with International Partners

The international and interagency entities that are relevant to Afghan security sector development include JCMB, the Policy Advisory Group (PAG), and the Security Operations Group (SOG). These major forums are important mechanisms for DoS and CSTC-A cooperation to engage international partners.

The JCMB was constituted at the 2006 London Conference to drive delivery of the Afghanistan Compact, which has been finalized as the ANDS. The JCMB is the main forum for coordination of long-term strategic objectives in Afghanistan, joint policy formulation, problem solving, and ensuring mutual responsibility between GIRoA and the international community. Thus the JCMB is involved with defining the objectives and coordinating the efforts of the
international community with respect to development of the ANSF. The JCMB also represents donor nations and donor nation equities in the achievement of long-range, coordinated development goals. The United States plays a less prominent role in the JCMB than it does in the PAG. The 28 JCMB members include ministerial-level representatives from the GIRoA and the international community who oversee the implementation of the ANDS. CSTC-A and the interagency are critical parts of all JCMB meetings and working groups and assist in preparing policy discussions and papers that are related to the ANSF. The JCMB meets quarterly.

The PAG provides GIRoA an integrated planning mechanism for joint ISAF-ANSF long-term strategic security initiatives across counterinsurgency lines of operation to ensure a consistent approach towards security, economic development, and social challenges. It oversees and discusses issues raised by Afghan interagency working groups corresponding to four pillars: security operations, counter-narcotics, intelligence fusion, and strategic communications. The PAG process and mission are documented under the ANDS, which states the PAG “will provide overall direction to key Afghan and international actors to ensure that the interdependence of security, governance, and development objectives guide operations and programs in order to achieve the conditions for basic service delivery, development programs, and private sector-led growth, especially in conflict affected areas.” The PAG was originally created to address insurgency and counterinsurgency issues pertaining to four southern provinces (Nimruz, Helmand, Kandahar, and Zabol). It is composed of GIRoA ministers, international agencies (e.g., UNAMA, EU, NATO), and Ambassadors from key nations involved in the counterinsurgency efforts such as the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands, and others. It is chaired by the Afghan National Security Advisor. The U.S. Ambassador, CSTC-A Commander, and the ISAF Commander all attend PAG sessions. The PAG meets on an “as required” basis.

The SOG is the sub-PAG interagency working group in the security operations pillar. It raises relevant issues to the PAG for consideration, ensures the implementation of security-related decisions made by the PAG, and facilitates coordination with the other three pillar groups. As such, ANSF brief their requirements to the SOG. It is composed of representatives at the one- to three-star general officer rank from the MoD, the MoI, and NDS; ISAF; CSTC-A; and U.S. Embassy representatives. The SOG meets weekly.

4.3: Efforts to Ensure Progress in Other Aspects of the Afghan Security Sector

4.3.1: Rule of Law

The Special Committee on the Rule of Law (SCROL), established in 2006 and chaired by the U.S. Embassy Rule of Law (ROL) Coordinator, meets on a weekly basis. The SCROL provides an internal mechanism to organize, coordinate, and deconflict ROL programs and policy issues among elements of the embassy, to elevate unresolved issues for decision by the Ambassador, and to present a consistent face to the justice sector ministries. The members of the SCROL include representatives from CSTC-A, ISAF, and CJTF-101, in addition to officials from the following U.S. Embassy directorates and agencies: Political Section, Political-Military Section, Public Affairs Section, Economic Section, Provincial Reconstruction Team, Afghan Reconstruction Group, INL, USAID, DEA, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Department of the Treasury. Others attend when necessary.

Despite the efforts by the interagency, additional efforts in the development of Rule of Law are necessary to compliment and allow for capacity building in the ANP. In order for the
ANP training to succeed, significant improvements in the capacity of the rule of law institutions such as the courts, justice system, and correction system need to occur. Without a strong rule of law base, even the best trained police will not be sustainable in the long term. Although the lead for rule of law development is the interagency, it is essential that DoD and the international community work with the interagency, specifically to provide personnel and resources to facilitate the necessary improvements.

4.3.2: Counter-Narcotics

Counter-narcotics (CN) policy and implementation is the purview of the GIRoA. DoD, INL, USAID, DEA, and CSTC-A support GIRoA CN efforts through a CN strategy, in coordination with ISAF. The CN strategy focuses on countering the link between narcotics, corruption and the insurgency by shifting away from eradication towards increased interdiction and agriculture efforts.

CSTC-A serves in a coordinating role with the U.S. agencies listed above; coordinates with CN specialists at ISAF, CJTF-101, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, and the UK Embassy; provides a representative to the CN sub-PAG meetings hosted by the Afghan Ministry of Counter-Narcotics; and provides a mentor to the Deputy Minister of Counter-Narcotics within the MoI. The Ministry of Counter-Narcotics is also advised by representatives of the UK in its role as the lead ISAF nation for CN efforts.

Through the staff agencies, CSTC-A trains, equips, and supports members of the ANP and ANA that are involved either directly or indirectly in CN efforts. DoD (CN) funds training at the CNPA Academy. CSTC-A assisted the MoD in its efforts to develop the Counter-Narcotics Infantry Kandak (CNIK). This unit gained initial combat experience in the South from May to October 2008 prior to reconstituting in Kabul over the winter. Consisting of approximately 900 soldiers, the CNIK had the specified mission to provide security for the MoI’s Poppy Eradication Forces (PEF). The CNIK and PEF conducted poppy eradication operations in RC South from January to April 2009. The security provided by the CNIK enabled the PEF to eradicate 2,644 hectares of poppy during the 2009 season, compared to 1,174 hectares during 2008. CNIK and PEF operations encountered resistance from insurgents and suffered at least one casualty during the reporting period. CNIK performance has been marred by intermittent refusals to conduct operations in regions with poor security.

In October 2008 at the NATO Defense Ministerial in Budapest, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) decided to increase ISAF flexibility in assisting ANSF in CN operations. In December 2008, the Secretary of Defense approved changes to DoD rules of engagement and policy that allow U.S. military commanders to target illicit drug facilities and facilitators providing support to the insurgency.

4.3.3: Demobilizing, Disarming, and Reintegrating Militia Fighters

From December 2006 until April 2007, CSTC-A maintained oversight of the GIRoA Takim-e-Sohl (PTS) reconciliation program. In May 2005, PTS was established as an independent commission by presidential decree. The Office of the National Security Council provides oversight for the commission. During the period from December 2006 until April 2007, PTS processed 5,000 Afghans through its reconciliation program. CSTC-A no longer has a role in the PTS program.
Section 5: ISAF ANSF Development Efforts

5.1: Training and Mentoring

In addition to coordinating international donations, CSTC-A facilitates international training efforts by educating the international community on requirements and encouraging them to provide manpower to aid development of the MoI, MoD, and their subordinate elements. As of May 2009, there are a total of 55 OMLTs fielded. The eventual NATO requirement is 103 teams for the fully fielded 134,000 soldier ANA force. Some OMLTs have operational caveats that prevent them from deploying with ANA units out of their home area of operations, a situation that minimizes their effectiveness.

To date, the critical mission of developing the ANP has been significantly under-resourced, and NATO support to that mission has been minimal, though the UK, Canada, Germany and the Netherlands are now conducting police mentoring duties. NATO attitudes toward police mentoring appear to be shifting, however. At the April 2009 NATO Summit, heads of state and governments agreed in principle to establishing the NTM-A to support the development of a capable and self-sustaining ANSF, comprised of senior-level mentoring for the ANA and an expanded role in developing professional ANP.

Additionally, shifts in policy along with the sourcing of additional U.S. forces will significantly enhance the ability to develop the ANP. In accordance with orders from the Commander USFOR-A/ISAF, U.S. maneuver forces that deploy to Afghanistan in support of ISAF will have the additional mission of providing police mentors in districts where they are operating. The request for forces (RFF 920) that outlines this program projects that these U.S. maneuver forces will be able to provide 1,278 police mentors for the PMT mission. AUP districts will continue to undergo reform through the FDD program. Unit PMTs will participate in the district assessment, police training, and mentorship following the training to ensure that the teams are fully integrated into the FDD process.

International training donation offers are screened through CSTC-A for acceptance and then forwarded to the MoD for its approval. Upon acceptance, and depending upon the type of training assistance provided (e.g., in-country MTTs or out-of-country training), coordination occurs among CSTC-A, MoD, and ISAF or directly with the nation involved in the case of a bilateral agreement. For out-of-country training events, the MoD officially requests CSTC-A assistance with transportation funding if required. The MoD coordinates most transportation details (i.e., passports, screening trainees, and arranging for commercial transportation). The ANA also supports forces preparing for the ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom missions by providing officers and NCOs to predeployment training events. NATO has expressed intent to fund the travel for ISAF mission preparation in 2009.

5.2: Partnering

ISAF fully embraced the requirement to partner coalition forces with ANA units to accelerate the development of ANSF capabilities and maximize joint operational effects toward achievement of counterinsurgency objectives. Partnership is a peer-to-peer, habitual relationship between coalition and ANA units that pervades all aspects of operations, from planning to preparation, execution, and post-operation feedback. Partnered operations help build ANSF

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2 ISAF and some troop contributing nations support ANP development but NATO has not designated the police mentor mission as a key military task. EUPOL remains the lead for European contributions to police reform.
capacity and reinforce the legitimacy of the coalition mission while also extending the authority of the GIRoA.

5.3: Donations

The CSTC-A ACG-ISC coordinates closely with the ISAF DATES in order to coordinate effectively both NATO and non-NATO donations to the ANA. CSTC-A also works closely with the MoI and the IPCB Secretariat to coordinate international donations for the ANP. The ACG-ISC advertises the training and equipment needs of the ANA and ANP and then manages the details of integrating donated requirements into the force. Donations are coordinated through CSTC-A to validate the need, suitability, and sustainability of each donation.

5.4: Sustaining Institutions

ISAF recently began to integrate the Afghan General Staff into its planning and coordination processes. The effort was initiated and continues to be facilitated by CSTC-A to serve two purposes: (1) develop the General Staff’s operational planning and coordination ability and (2) integrate the General Staff into ISAF planning for future operations. RC East also interfaces with the General Staff to integrate it into planning for its area of operation.

Interaction and coordination through regular meetings occurs between ISAF headquarters staff and MoD and ANA General Staff officers in order to advise them on the conduct and planning of security operations. As detailed above, the ANA lead a significant amount of ANA/ISAF operations.

5.5: Efforts to Ensure Progress in Other Pillars of the Afghan Security Sector

5.5.1: Counter-Narcotics

In October 2008 in Budapest, the NAC agreed to expand ISAF flexibility in targeting narcotics producers and traffickers, with the ANSF in the lead. However, individual unit authority to conduct expanded CN operations is still subject to national caveats. The Secretary of Defense updated U.S. forces’ CN authorities to ensure that U.S. operations were well coordinated with those of NATO.

5.5.2: Demobilizing, Disarming, and Reintegrating Militia Fighters

ISAF supports the disbandment of illegally armed groups (IAGs) as it contributes to the GIRoA’s goal of establishing a secure environment through disarmament and setting the conditions for the extension of good governance and the rule of law. ISAF participates in the disbandment of IAGs in its areas of operations using capabilities and means within its mandate, authorized rules of engagement, and subject to any national caveats.
Section 6: Other International Partner Efforts

6.1: Training and Mentoring

As discussed above, the UK, Canada, Italy, France, Germany and the Netherlands are conducting police mentoring in Afghanistan on a bilateral basis, independently of the NATO-led ISAF. Mongolia and Romania both provide MTTs for ANA training on a bilateral basis.

Several countries support institutional training and mentoring efforts in Afghanistan, including the Command & General Staff Course (France), the Junior Officer’s Staff Course (Canada), the Drivers-Mechanics School (Germany), and the Kabul Military High School (Turkey). France offered to sponsor the Higher Command and Staff Course (with German assistance), and Germany offered to sponsor the Engineer Branch School and the Combat Service Support School.

Several nations assist with individual training. France assists with officer and commando training; the UK assists with NCO and officer training; New Zealand assists with individual soldier training; Australia contributes to counterinsurgency training; and Romania assists with advanced combat training. France and the UK also assist CSTC-A in the headquarters mentoring of the ANATC.

EUPOL

CSTC-A brings organizational energy and resources to police reform. As a partner in this effort, EUPOL brings law and order expertise and international political capital. In 2009, reinvigorated relations between CSTC-A and EUPOL, combined with renewed emphasis on coordinating efforts, enabled the MoI to make determined progress towards the Minister of Interior’s six priorities: acceleration of FDD and other police reform programs; anti-corruption; police intelligence; increased tashkiers; securing key cities and highways; and secure elections.

In the framework of its comprehensive approach towards Afghanistan, the EU is conducting an EUPOL mission in Afghanistan. Launched in June 2007, it contributes to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements under Afghan ownership and in accordance with international standards. EUPOL is part of the overall EU commitment to Afghanistan, with political guidance provided by the EU Special Representative and a reconstruction effort managed notably through the European Commission delegation in Kabul. EUPOL brings together individual national efforts under an EU hat, taking due account of the relevant European Community activities. Furthermore, the mission has non-EU staff from Canada, Croatia, New Zealand, and Norway.

EUPOL mentors, advises, and trains at the MoI and other central Afghan administrations, regions, and provinces. The mission’s personnel strength is currently 216 international staff and has committed to a staff of 400. The headquarters is located in Kabul, and field offices are present in 16 of the 34 provinces. EUPOL has a budget of EUR $64 million for the period until November 2009.

The EUPOL goal is for Afghanistan to achieve sufficient local capacity to maintain a civil police service that is both transparent and accountable, operates within a sound legal framework in accordance with international standards and the rule of law, and is trusted by Afghan citizens and responsive to the needs of society. In this regard, five strategic priorities guide EUPOL’s operations:

- Supporting the GIRoA in police reform and strengthening the MoI through provision of strategic advice;
Strengthening the ANP, including Criminal Investigation, ABP, AUP, national training strategy, and anti-corruption strategy;

Enhancing cohesion and coordination among international actors in the area of policing;

Achieving linkages to the wider rule of law through advising on police-related criminal justice elements, law enforcement monitoring, and training; and,

Working on cross-cutting priorities of security, human rights, and gender.

For the year 2009, EUPOL’s top priorities are to bolster its operations in the regions and focus on ABP and rule of law. EUPOL’s current operations include:

- Kabul and Herat City Police Projects (including the integration of Kabul checkpoints into a “Ring of Steel”);
- Organized crime task forces in the provinces (i.e., focus groups of Afghan investigating police and prosecutors dedicated to combat organized crime structures and serious felonies);
- Policing plan and intelligence-led policing, with particular investment in developing ANP capacity and capability in tackling homicide, terrorism, and drugs;
- Surveillance, specialist crime scene, and counter-terrorism investigations;
- Continuing support to the EUPOL-initiated Anti-Corruption Unit at the Attorney General’s Office;
- Large scale “train-the-trainer” programs to improve Afghan-owned ANP training capacity and develop curricula in basic police skills, human rights, rule of law, and ethics and values; and,
- Development and delivery of an election specific training program for the ANP, as a joint project with the UNDP, covering both a short-term action plan for the next elections, and a long-term project to develop a program for elections until the end of 2010.

There are several new developments within the field of international police reform and cooperation. These include City Police Projects in Kabul and Herat, which are making steady progress, and the integration of intelligence-led policing into ANP structures. In January 2009, the IPCB was restructured with input from both CSTC-A and EUPOL; staffs from both organizations are now assigned to the newly formed Senior Police Group (SPG) of the IPCB, with the chair rotating between CSTC-A and EUPOL. CSTC-A brings the organizational energy and resources for police reform, and EUPOL brings the law and order expertise as well as international political capital. These efforts are resulting in closer synchronization and coordination of police reform and are producing results.

6.2: Funding

CSTC-A works closely with DSCA to facilitate the transfer of funds from donor nations to support the ANSF. ACG-ISC and the IPCB encourage our international partners to donate funding for equipment, training, and engineering projects to support ANSF development or to trust funds set up by SHAPE to cover transportation from donor countries to Afghanistan.

The Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan was established in May 2002 and is managed by United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Reimbursement funds are dispersed to the MoI through the Ministry of Finance in support of ANP salaries and rations.
6.3: Further ANSF Development Efforts

As part of the CSTC-A headquarters, the ACG-ISC primarily concentrates on international donations (both lethal and non-lethal), international training, international military relations, and mentorship of the MoD’s International Military Affairs Department.

Many of our international partners participate in the same coordinating forums discussed above (e.g., PAG, SOG, and JCMB). Still, many groups and programs exist to promote reform and ANSF sustainment independent of the U.S. interagency process and ISAF. These include:

- Aided by a standing secretariat, the IPCB is the principal means for both Afghan and international community coordination with regard to the ANP. The primary international institutions represented at the IPCB include the European Commission, EUPOL, and UNAMA. CSTC-A and the U.S. Embassy are IPCB members and thus assist in ANP reform by developing a common approach to policing that reflects the challenges of the security environment, the need to protect communities, and the requirement to strengthen policing skills. CSTC-A has a full time staff member on the IPCB Secretariat.

- CSTC-A supports the Office of the National Security Council development in producing effective strategic analysis and plans. This support is accomplished through education via several institutions such as the George C. Marshall European Center for Strategic Studies (GCMS), Garmisch, Germany; Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA), Washington, DC; Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA; and the National Defense University (NDU), Washington, DC. The NATO headquarters two-day conference on Strategic Planning and MoD/General Staff integration in conjunction with the Naval Post Graduate School is an example of the support provided. CGMC courses include the Senior Executive Seminar; Program on Advanced Security Studies; Program on Terrorism/Security Studies; and the Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Course. NESA offers the Senior Executive Seminar and the Seminar on Counter-Terrorism. NDU courses include Civilian-Military Response to Terrorism and the Masters Program in Counter-Terrorism. Other opportunities include the UK-taught MoD/ANA Leadership Management Training Project in Kabul and the Afghanistan-Pakistan Workshop in Washington, DC.
## List of Acronyms

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>After Action Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABP</td>
<td>Afghan Border Police</td>
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<td>ACG-ISC</td>
<td>Assistant Commanding General for International Security Cooperation</td>
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<td>ACT</td>
<td>Advanced Combat Training</td>
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<td>ADU</td>
<td>Afghan Defense University</td>
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<td>AED</td>
<td>U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Afghan Engineering District</td>
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<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
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<td>ANAAC</td>
<td>Afghan National Army Air Corps</td>
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<td>ANATC</td>
<td>Afghan National Army Training Command</td>
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<td>ANCOP</td>
<td>Afghan National Civil Order Police</td>
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<td>ANDS</td>
<td>Afghanistan National Development Strategy</td>
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<td>ANSF</td>
<td>Afghanistan National Security Forces</td>
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<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
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<td>AP3</td>
<td>Afghan Public Protection Program</td>
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<td>APPF</td>
<td>Afghan Public Protection Fund</td>
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<td>ASFF</td>
<td>Afghan Security Forces Fund</td>
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<td>AUP</td>
<td>Afghan Uniform Police</td>
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<td>AWOL</td>
<td>absent without leave</td>
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<td>BAG</td>
<td>Budget Activity Group</td>
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<td>BLOC</td>
<td>Basic Legal Officers’ Course</td>
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<td>BOTC</td>
<td>Basic Officer Training Course</td>
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<td>BWT</td>
<td>Basic Warrior Training</td>
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<td>CATO</td>
<td>Combined Air Terminal Operations</td>
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<td>CFC</td>
<td>Central Fielding Center</td>
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<td>CGSC</td>
<td>Command &amp; General Staff Course</td>
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<td>C-IED</td>
<td>Counter-Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<td>CJTF-101</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force-101</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLOTP</td>
<td>Comprehensive Legal Officers’ Training Program</td>
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<td>CM</td>
<td>Capability Milestone</td>
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<td>CN</td>
<td>counter-narcotics</td>
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<td>CNIK</td>
<td>Counter-Narcotics Infantry <em>Kandak</em> (battalion)</td>
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<td>CNPA</td>
<td>Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan</td>
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<td>COIN</td>
<td>counterinsurgency</td>
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<td>COP</td>
<td>common operating picture</td>
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<td>Core-IMS</td>
<td>Core Information Management System</td>
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<td>CSB</td>
<td>Corps Support Battalion</td>
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<td>CSC</td>
<td>Command &amp; Staff College</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSTC-A</td>
<td>Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan</td>
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<td>DATES</td>
<td>Directorate of ANA Training and Education Support (ISAF)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEA</td>
<td>Drug Enforcement Administration</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DoS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<td>DSCA</td>
<td>Defense Security Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>ETT</td>
<td>Embedded Training Team</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUPOL</td>
<td>European Union Police</td>
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<td>FBD</td>
<td>Focused Border Development</td>
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<td>FDD</td>
<td>Focused District Development</td>
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<td>FMS</td>
<td>Foreign Military Sales</td>
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<td>FSD</td>
<td>Forward Support Depot</td>
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<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
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<td>GCMC</td>
<td>George C. Marshall European Center for Strategic Studies</td>
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<td>GIRoA</td>
<td>Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>HMMWV</td>
<td>high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle</td>
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<td>IAG</td>
<td>illegally armed group</td>
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<td>IET</td>
<td>initial entry training</td>
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<td>IG</td>
<td>Inspector General</td>
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<td>INL</td>
<td>Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (U.S. DoS)</td>
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<td>IPCB</td>
<td>International Police Coordination Board</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>JCMB</td>
<td>Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board</td>
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<td>JFC-B</td>
<td>Joint Forces Command-Brunssum</td>
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<td>JPCC</td>
<td>Joint Provincial Coordination Center</td>
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<td>JRCC</td>
<td>Joint Regional Coordination Center</td>
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<td>KAIA</td>
<td>Kabul International Airport</td>
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<td>LCMC</td>
<td>Life Cycle Management Command</td>
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<td>LNO</td>
<td>liaison officer</td>
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<td>LRAT</td>
<td>Logistics Readiness Assessment Tool</td>
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<td>LTV</td>
<td>light tactical vehicle</td>
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<td>MEDEVAC</td>
<td>medical evacuation</td>
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<td>MIPR</td>
<td>Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request</td>
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<td>MMC</td>
<td>Material Management Center</td>
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<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
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<td>MoI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
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<td>MOR</td>
<td>Memorandum of Request</td>
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<td>MTT</td>
<td>Mobile Training Team</td>
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<td>MTV</td>
<td>medium tactical vehicle</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NAV</td>
<td>National Asset Visibility</td>
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<td>NCO</td>
<td>non-commissioned officer</td>
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<td>NESA</td>
<td>Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies</td>
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<td>NDS</td>
<td>National Directorate of Security</td>
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<td>NDU</td>
<td>National Defense University (Washington, DC)</td>
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<td>NMAA</td>
<td>National Military Academy of Afghanistan</td>
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<td>NMCC</td>
<td>Afghan National Military Command Center</td>
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<td>NPCC</td>
<td>National Police Command Center</td>
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<td>NPTC</td>
<td>National Police Training Center</td>
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<td>NTM-A</td>
<td>NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan</td>
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<td>OCC</td>
<td>operations coordination centers</td>
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<td>OCC-P</td>
<td>provincial operations coordination centers</td>
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<td>OCC-R</td>
<td>regional operations coordination center</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCS</td>
<td>Officer Candidate School</td>
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<td>OMLT</td>
<td>Operational Mentor and Liaison Team</td>
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<td>PAG</td>
<td>Policy Advisory Group</td>
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<td>PASR</td>
<td>Personnel Accounting and Strength Reporting</td>
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<td>PBAC</td>
<td>Program Budget Activity Council</td>
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<td>PCC</td>
<td>Provincial Command Center</td>
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<td>PEF</td>
<td>Poppy Eradication Forces</td>
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<td>PME</td>
<td>Professional Military Education</td>
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<td>PMT</td>
<td>Police Mentor Team</td>
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<td>POMLT</td>
<td>Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Team</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Platoon Sergeants’ Course</td>
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<td>PSP</td>
<td>Provincial Supply Point</td>
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<td>PTS</td>
<td>Takim-e-Solh reconciliation program</td>
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<td>RBWT</td>
<td>Regional Basic Warrior Training</td>
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<td>RC</td>
<td>Regional Command</td>
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<td>RCC</td>
<td>Regional Command Center</td>
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<td>RFF</td>
<td>Request for Forces</td>
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<td>RLC</td>
<td>Regional Logistics Center</td>
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<td>ROL</td>
<td>rule of law</td>
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<td>RRCRM</td>
<td>Readiness Report Command Review Meeting</td>
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<td>RRS</td>
<td>Readiness Reporting System</td>
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<td>RTC</td>
<td>Regional Training Center</td>
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<td>SAG</td>
<td>Sub-Activity Group</td>
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<td>SAO</td>
<td>Security Assistance Office</td>
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<td>SCROL</td>
<td>Special Committee on the Rule of Law</td>
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<td>SCSC</td>
<td>Strategic Command &amp; Staff Course</td>
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