Gender Integration Study

TRADOC Analysis Center
255 Sedgwick Avenue
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2345

Distribution limited by Commanding General, TRADOC. This determination was made on 24 January 2013. Other requests for this document will be referred to Headquarters, U.S. Army TRADOC, Attention: G3/5, 950 Jefferson Avenue, Fort Eustis, VA 23604.
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On 19 April 2013, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), issued strategic guidance for gender integration implementation planning. Designated Soldier2020, this initiative reflects the Army’s effort to address policies on women in combat and to evaluate all positions in the Army to determine their requirements – physical, mental, and emotional – regardless of gender. The goal of Soldier2020 is to enhance force readiness and capability by applying a scientific approach for evaluating and validating military occupation specialty (MOS)-specific standards. This will aid leadership in selecting the best-qualified Soldiers regardless of gender for each position. As part of Soldier2020, HQDA tasked TRAC to conduct the Gender Integration Study to identify the institutional and cultural factors associated with integrating women into previously closed MOSs and units and to recommend implementation strategies. Based on extensive research and data collection, this report identifies the factors expected to affect integration, presents the results of a risk assessment and mitigation effort, and provides near-, mid-, and long-term recommendations. This report recommends that the Army proceed with gender integration of all previously closed areas of concentration, MOSs, units, and positions. Analysis determined that the mitigated risk of the identified study factors to unit morale, cohesion, and readiness is moderate if the Army can appropriately address two high-risk factors: Soldier concerns about sexual harassment and sexual assault. Given these findings, the assignment of women to specific positions and occupational specialties does not conflict with the guiding principles outlined by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
Soldier 2020, S2020, gender integration, women in the Army
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Acknowledgments

These organizations and individuals significantly contributed to this analysis:

- TRADOC Analysis Center
- U.S. Army Armor School
- U.S. Army Cadet Command
- U.S. Army Civil Affairs & Psychological Operations Command (Airborne)
- U.S. Army Education Advisory Committee
- TRADOC G3/5
- U.S. Army Engineer School
- U.S. Army Field Artillery School
- U.S. Army Forces Command
- Army Knowledge Online
- Army National Guard
- HQDA G-1
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Executive Summary

As part of the Soldier2020 effort, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) tasked the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Analysis Center (TRAC) to conduct the Gender Integration Study (GIS). HQDA directed TRAC to identify the institutional and cultural factors associated with gender integration, and where possible, identify risk mitigation controls to enable the successful integration of women into previously closed combat arms military occupational specialties (MOSs)/units. This Report is the culmination of GIS and reflects two years of research and analysis to generate findings and recommendations.

Using multimethod research design, the TRAC study team identified institutional and cultural factors anticipated to affect gender integration. GIS identified these factors through four sources: 1) literature review of 200+ works; 2) eight surveys including Army women and combat arms Soldiers (over 60k participants); 3) 130 focus groups conducted across the Army; and 4) subject matter expert elicitation from numerous senior leaders and the Army Education Advisory Committee.

Upon identification of 17 study factors, the GIS team solicited feedback from the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy to assess each factor’s initial risk and residual risk with refined mitigation controls. This analysis leveraged nearly 400 senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) who assessed the risk of integration to unit morale, cohesion, and readiness as moderate if the Army can appropriately address Soldier concerns about sexual harassment and assault. Next, the GIS team conducted site visits with four brigade combat teams (BCTs) and interviewed 35 command teams to assess the feasibility and acceptability of proposed controls. These combined activities leveraged the experience of Army leaders to build the study’s recommendations based on unit-level risk. Additionally, the study conducted 35 separate engagements with senior Army leaders (general officer/SES-level) to collect additional guidance and feedback.

Based on study results, the Army should proceed with integrating women into previously closed combat arms MOS/units. To successfully integrate, the Army must address the following barriers: inconsistent enforcement of existing standards and perceptions of double standards; incidents of unprofessional behavior and indiscipline; fear of sexual harassment and assault; cultural stereotypes; and ignorance of current Army policy.

The Army has experience navigating historic integration initiatives. Like previous efforts, the success of gender integration will take time and requires a focus on standards, policy, and leader development. The Army can reduce integration barriers in four broad ways. First, Army leadership must effectively communicate the rationale and importance of integration to the force. Second, the Army must continue to develop, maintain, and enforce MOS-specific physical standards. Third, the Army must leverage on-going reviews to identify strategies to address the secondary effects of the Sexual Harassment / Assault Response and Prevention Program (SHARP) on future integration efforts. Fourth, the Army must resource a long-term leader development program focused on the Army Professional Ethic. In addition to these four actions, the Army should develop an enduring (and proactive) assessment plan to measure the effectiveness and progress of integration.
Chapter 1. Introduction and Overview

1.1. Background.

Effective 14 May 2012, the Secretary of the Army (SecArmy) rescinded the part of the 1994 Department of Defense (DOD) Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule (DGCAR) that permitted the Army to bar assignment of women to units and positions doctrinally required to physically collocate and remain with direct ground combat units. Furthermore, on 24 January 2013, the Secretary of Defense rescinded the entire DGCAR and directed DOD to begin removing gender-based barriers to service. These actions required the Army to plan for the expansion of opportunities for women by opening all remaining closed areas of concentration (AOCs), MOSs, units, and positions as expeditiously as possible, but no later than 1 January 2016.

The Army moved forward with four lines of effort (LOEs). LOE 1 focused on opening existing positions previously restricted to women based on the DCGAR. LOE 2 covered the development and validation of gender-neutral accession standards for closed MOSs and plans to open occupations by branch. LOE 3 tasked TRAC to conduct GIS. LOE 4 coordinated the Army’s efforts with the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), and other Services to develop a plan for integrating women in special operations and long-range reconnaissance.

On 19 April 2013, HQDA issued strategic guidance for integration implementation planning. Designated Soldier2020, this initiative reflects the Army’s effort to address policies on women in combat and to evaluate all positions in the Army to determine their requirements – physical, mental, and emotional – regardless of gender. The goal of Soldier2020 is to enhance force readiness and capability by applying a scientific approach for evaluating and validating MOS-specific standards. This will aid leadership in selecting the best-qualified Soldiers regardless of gender for each position.

1.2. Study Overview.

HQDA identified TRADOC as one of several commands supporting Soldier2020 and tasked TRADOC with leading two efforts.

First, TRADOC will develop, verify, and validate occupational physical requirements for all specialties with support from the U.S. Army Medical Command, the U.S. Army Research Institute for Environmental Medicine, and the Army Research Institute (ARI). In support of gender integration planning, TRADOC is currently conducting this occupational review for the specialties previously closed to women: Combat Engineer, Cannon Artillery, Armor, and Infantry.

Second, HQDA tasked TRAC to conduct a study (GIS) of the institutional and cultural factors associated with integrating women into previously closed MOSs and units. HQDA directed TRAC to report GIS findings by 31 March 2015.
This report contains final GIS findings and recommendations. It draws upon wide-ranging research activities that the TRAC study team conducted from early 2013 through 2015. These activities include a literature review of hundreds of academic articles, previous Army and other Service studies, foreign military reviews, and popular media publications.

TRAC also surveyed eight critical subpopulations in the Army and received more than 60,000 responses from men and women across the force, ranging from junior Soldiers to senior general officers. Additionally, TRAC interviewed hundreds of Soldiers in small focus groups at various TRADOC, Forces Command (FORSCOM), Army National Guard (ARNG), and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) locations. TRAC also solicited subject matter expertise from dozens of senior government, military, and academic sector experts, including routine engagements with the Army Education Advisory Committee (AEAC).

These combined activities supported TRAC’s identification of the factors expected to impact the integration of women in previously closed MOSs and units.

Given these results, TRAC conducted a risk assessment for each factor and developed a series of mitigation controls leveraging the professional military judgment of 373 senior NCOs at the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy (USASMA). Through three engagements at the academy, TRAC used composite risk analysis to assess the probability and severity that each factor posed to unit morale, cohesion, and readiness. Once this assessment was complete, TRAC interviewed command teams ranging from company to brigade level in four BCTs to weigh the feasibility and acceptability of the developed mitigation controls. Analyzing data from these study-related events, TRAC derived findings and recommendations.

1.3. Principal Finding and Recommendation.

This report recommends that the Army proceed with gender integration of all previously closed AOCs, MOSs, units, and positions. Analysis determined that the mitigated risk of the identified study factors to unit morale, cohesion, and readiness is moderate if the Army can appropriately address two high-risk factors: Soldier concerns about sexual harassment (SH) and sexual assault (SA). Given these findings, the assignment of women to specific positions and occupational specialties does not conflict with the guiding principles that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff outlined.

Given the principal finding and recommendation, this report provides a set of implementation recommendations. These recommendations provide the Army with analytically grounded solutions to mitigate the risk to morale, cohesion, and readiness identified in the course of this two-year study. In addition to supporting the successful integration of women in previously closed MOSs and units, these recommendations also address wider issues within the force and help posture the Army to win in a complex future world.
1.4. Report Organization.

This report includes four chapters. This chapter provides an introduction and overview of background, findings, and recommendations. The second chapter outlines the overall study approach and provides a detailed description of component methodologies within a phased scheme of analysis. The third chapter summarizes analysis findings. The fourth chapter presents recommendations for Commanding General (CG), TRADOC; the Army Chief of Staff (CSA); and SecArmy consideration.
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Chapter 2. Analytic Framework

This chapter provides an overview of how the TRAC analysis team conducted GIS. It contains the purpose of the study with brief background on what the analysis team did and the rationale for action. The chapter describes the study’s problem statement along with a decomposition of relevant issues. Furthermore, it provides the constraints, limitations and assumptions the TRAC team faced. Last, it lays out the phased study approach that the team used as a methodology for research activities, data collection, and analysis. A more detailed description of team activities, data, and analysis by study phase is contained in separate technical reports that TRAC maintains. These reports are available through coordination with TRADOC G3/5.

2.1 Problem Statement.

Given the rescission of the DGCAR, the Army must identify the institutional and cultural factors associated with gender integration, and where possible, identify risk mitigation controls to enable the successful integration of women into previously closed MOSs/units.

2.2 Study Purpose.

Inform the development of the Army’s gender integration strategy by:

- Identifying the factors associated with gender integration.
- Identifying mitigation controls to overcome institutional, cultural and implementation barriers (e.g., policies, programs, communications, and implementation guidance).
- Identifying MOSs/units, if any, that should not integrate at this time.
- Identifying requirement(s) needed to monitor the progress and effects of gender integration.

2.3 Study Objective.

Given relevant factors identified through research, develop recommendations that mitigate the risk that integration presents to individual and unit morale, cohesion, and readiness. To accomplish this, the TRAC study team decomposed the problem into three study issues.

2.4 Study Issues.

2.4.1 Study Issue 1. Considering the Total Force (Active Army, ARNG, USAR), what are the institutional and cultural factors expected to impact gender integration?

2.4.2 Study Issue 2. How risky is each factor and what potential controls can mitigate risk?

2.4.3 Study Issue 3. Given factor risk and potential mitigation controls, what near, mid, and long-term actions are required to successfully integrate women into previously closed MOSs/units?
2.5 Constraints, Limitations, and Assumptions.

2.5.1 Constraints. A constraint is a restriction imposed by the study sponsor that limits the study team’s options in conducting the study.

- The Secretary of Defense directed the Army to either integrate women into previously closed units and MOSs by January 2016 or request an exception to policy for MOSs/units to remain closed.

- This study will not consider Army Special Operations Forces (e.g., 75th Ranger Regiment, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, Special Forces, etc.).

- This study will focus on the integration of women into closed conventional Army AOCs/MOSs. This includes:
  - 11A (Infantry Officer).
  - 11B (Infantryman).
  - 11C (Indirect Fire Infantryman).
  - 12B (Combat Engineer).
  - 13B (Cannon Crewmember).
  - 13D (Field Artillery Automated Tactical Data System Specialist).
  - 13F (Fire Support Specialist).
  - 19B (Armor Officer).
  - 19D (Cavalry Scout).
  - 19K (M1 Armor Crewman).

- Additionally, GIS will focus on integrating female 12A (Engineer Officer) and 13A (Field Artillery Officer) officers into previously closed positions within their branch career-field.

- TRAC will submit findings and recommendations to CG, TRADOC by 31 March 2015.

2.5.2 Limitations. A limitation is an inability of the study team to fully meet the study objectives or fully investigate the study issues.

- The study will use preliminary results from ongoing integration-related activity. Conclusions drawn may not be representative of a fully integrated unit. This includes data from:
  - Soldier2020 LOE1 efforts as women begin to fill open MOSs positions in previously closed units.
Soldier2020 LOE2 efforts including the conduct of social science research of provisionally integrated combat arms units formed to facilitate the testing of MOS-specific physical standards.

Newly opened MOSs:
- 13M (Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS)/High Mobility Artillery Rocket System Crewmember).
- 13P (MLRS Operational Fire Direction Specialist).
- 13R (Field Artillery Firefinder Radar Operator).
- 91A (M1 Abrams Tank System Maintainer).
- 91M (Bradley Fighting Vehicle System Maintainer).
- 91P (Artillery Mechanic).

- When available, this study will use comparable data from other Services and allied countries to develop findings and recommendations.
- The timeframe of the study will prevent long-term study of unit changes in effectiveness that may occur concurrently with gender integration.

2.5.3 Assumptions. An assumption is a statement related to analysis that the study team considered as true in the absence of facts, often to accommodate a limitation.

- The organizations, units, and individuals who volunteer (or were selected) to participate in the study are representative of relevant populations within the Army.
- Per SecArmy guidance, the Army will take future action to ensure that all personnel (regardless of gender) are qualified in accordance with the required occupational knowledge, skills, attributes, and other characteristics (KSAOs). This includes MOS-specific physical standards.
- All future KSAO standards will be gender neutral.
- Complexities of integration may vary by unit; therefore, the Army may defer integration of specific MOSs and units to provide more time to understand the challenges and develop mitigation controls.
- Follow-on analysis is required to assess the long-term effects of integrating women into previously closed units and MOSs.
- The all-volunteer Army will be in place through 2020 and beyond.
- Women who enter formerly closed units and MOSs will be volunteers.
2.6 Study Methodology.

The TRAC study team planned, prepared, and executed GIS with a three-phase approach. The study relied on multimethod research design across all phases. Figure 1 shows the overall scheme of analysis.

![Scheme of Analysis](image)

**Figure 1. Scheme of Analysis.**

2.6.1 Phase 1 – Factor Identification.

Phase 1 focused on identifying the cultural and institutional factors associated with integrating women into previously closed MOSs/units. It also included discovery of a set of strategies that showed potential in mitigating anticipated risk in Phase 2 of the study.

In Phase 1, the study team used triangulation – a multimethod research technique that applies a combination of several research methodologies to study the same problem. Approaching a problem from a variety of methods enhances the accuracy of the results particularly when relying on qualitative analysis. It also provides for a level of depth and breadth to results that is difficult to achieve otherwise. Additionally, triangulation enables the merging of qualitative and quantitative data through the use of cross-source verification. Finally, the use of multiple data sources, methods, and observers provides confidence that no single method, bias, or theory dominates analytical findings.

The study team used four types of triangulation:

- Data triangulation. The study team collected data through a variety of sampling strategies of relevant populations from different parts of the Army.
• Investigator triangulation. The study team comprised a diverse group of operations research analysts, social scientists of different fields, and a mix of civilian and military members. Team members collected and interpreted data based on their knowledge, skills, and experience. After major data calls, collaborative group sessions provided the primary mechanism to form consensus where analysis coalesced into study findings.

• Theoretical triangulation. The study team examined data and tentative findings from a variety of perspectives to include sociology, psychology, economics, legal, and military lenses to gain an understanding of the cultural and institutional factors germane to integration.

• Methodological triangulation. The study team used four different methods for gathering data – literature review, surveys, focus groups, and elicitation of subject matter expertise. Triangulation provides high confidence that the veracity of findings and recommendations reflects the best practices of multimethod research design. The use of multimethod design allows the strengths of techniques to compensate for the weaknesses of other techniques, thus providing a more comprehensive understanding of the factors identified to affect gender integration. The methods used to identify factors and initial mitigation controls are literature review, surveys, focus groups, and subject matter expertise (SME) elicitation.

**Literature Review.**

The study team extensively reviewed literature related to gender integration. The team used many resources, including internet searches, to identify and access the literature referenced in the study bibliography. These resources included the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the Army Knowledge Online My Library page. The CARL and TRADOC librarians and TRADOC G3/5/7 also provided valuable assistance in gaining access to literature that was not accessible through alternate means. The U.S. Army Women’s Museum provided assistance with information on historic integration initiatives.

The types of literature searched included books; government policy papers and commission reports; Army pamphlets and regulations; medical, psychological, sociological, and management journal articles; studies by the militaries of the United States and other nations; and online or published stories told by military personnel. The search included the following topics:

• The history of gender integration in the U.S. Army.
• Service Academy integration.
• Navy and Marine Corps integration experience.
• Cultural, social, and gender diversity.
• Gender-related medical issues.
• The status and inquiry of gender integration in the militaries of Australia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Israel, Spain, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.
Service member perspectives and stories.

Position papers.

The study team reviewed more than 200 documents. Team members selected these documents primarily based on their ability to identify cultural/institutional factors, potential implementation strategies, working hypotheses, answers to study issues, consequences of not addressing issues, and the costs and benefits to individual and organizational performance.

Surveys.

The study team designed, deployed, collected, and analyzed the quantitative and qualitative results of eight surveys. These surveys aimed to provide an assessment of the issues, concerns, and opinions of important populations in the Army. Each survey contained closed and open-ended questions where the former included a set of pre-determined choices for participant selection, and the latter gave participants an opportunity to explain their perspectives. Guided by the literature review and incorporating elements and best practices of previous ARI research, the study team crafted survey questions to provide a high-level of comparability across multiple surveys. Additionally, this comparability will provide the baseline for future assessments of gender integration.

Once complete with survey development, the study team submitted each survey to the Army Human Research Protections Office (AHRPO) and ARI for their review and approval (ARI is the lead agency for survey efforts crossing Army Commands).

With these design activities and protocols, the study team built surveys to poll two important groups - combat arms Soldiers in closed AOCs/MOSs and Army women. Table 1 is an overview of the surveys.

Table 1. Survey Overview

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<tr>
<th>Survey Population (All Army Components)</th>
<th>Survey Dates</th>
<th>Target Population</th>
<th>Survey Participants</th>
<th>Response Rate</th>
<th>Written Comments</th>
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<td>Armor (E1-E6)</td>
<td>Nov/Dec 13</td>
<td>33,258</td>
<td>5,166</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>13,356</td>
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<td>Engineer (E1-E6)</td>
<td>Jun/Jul 13</td>
<td>26,634</td>
<td>3,036</td>
<td>11%</td>
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<td>Field Artillery (E1-E6)</td>
<td>Aug/Sep 13</td>
<td>42,266</td>
<td>5,066</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>14,058</td>
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<td>Infantry (E1-E6)</td>
<td>Oct/Nov 13</td>
<td>121,714</td>
<td>19,087</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>44,847</td>
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<tr>
<td>Women (E1-E6)</td>
<td>Jun/Jul 13</td>
<td>173,405</td>
<td>26,760</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>65,339</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female General Officers</td>
<td>Jul 13</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>177</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female ROTC Cadets</td>
<td>Jul/Aug 13</td>
<td>1,183</td>
<td>1,183</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female USMA Cadets</td>
<td>Nov/Dec 13</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>659</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>399,249</strong></td>
<td><strong>60,559</strong></td>
<td><strong>15%</strong></td>
<td><strong>147,196</strong></td>
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The study team designed a survey for Soldiers in each closed occupation – Infantry (11A, 11B, 11C), Armor (19A, 19D, 19K), Cannon Artillery (13B, D, F), and Combat Engineer (12B). These research instruments sought to capture views of integration; stereotypes of female Soldiers; concerns about impacts to morale, cohesion, readiness, and effectiveness; opinions of MOS-specific standards; and thoughts about a changing work environment.
While constructing these surveys, the study team leveraged each respective branch proponent office to ensure occupational questions addressed branch-specific issues. This coordination included a concerted leadership effort to maximize participation – proponent commandants sent invitation emails to all members of their branches. Furthermore, commanders addressed the necessity of survey participation with their unit members.

More than 32,000 participants completed the survey, and the overall response rate was between 11 percent and 16 percent of the combat arms community. Complementing the quantitative opinion-scale questions, participants provided more than 78,000 comments in open-ended questions. These survey results provided the study team with a substantial sample to draw conclusions about combat arms Soldiers’ concerns, ideas, and thoughts.

In addition to combat arms Soldier surveys, the study team designed a number of surveys for different sub-populations of Army women, including cadets (U.S. Military Academy (USMA) and Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC)), Soldiers, NCOs, officers, and general officers. These surveys aimed to determine women’s potential interest in combat arms specialties; the characteristics of those interested; deterrents to joining previously closed MOSs/units; keys to successful integration; and thoughts about the future effect of integration on women and the Army. More than 28,000 women responded to the surveys with approximately 65,000 comments made in open-ended questions. Combined with the combat arms survey results, the views of Army women provided the study team with a significant data source upon which to draw analytic conclusions.

After surveys closed, the study team analyzed results. Team members primarily used descriptive statistics to analyze closed-end questions. Additional analysis included examining the correlation of demographic data and participant responses with analysis of variance and factor analysis.

Although the study team postured to use inferential statistics, including multivariate regression analysis, to determine the existence of predictive relationships between variables, the overwhelming evidence from descriptive statistics provided sufficient evidence to draw defensible conclusions. When considering open-ended questions, the study team used qualitative analytic procedures, such as text mining, to identify response trends and sort comments into response categories. Response category frequency and cross-trend analysis enabled the study team to uncover underlying themes within open-ended responses.

Given the results of these techniques, the study team gained a holistic appreciation of the issues, concerns, potential mitigation controls, and obstacles to successful integration. Ultimately, survey analysis proved essential to identifying cultural and institutional factors, augmenting other data collection methods, and informing the conduct of focus groups and SME engagements.

**Focus Groups.**

Complementing the survey effort, the study team planned, prepared, executed, and assessed 130 focus group sessions during 11 site visits of institutional, training, and operational organizations. The study team aimed to capture Soldiers’ thoughts, ideas, and concerns about
integration. These focus groups contained junior enlisted Soldiers, NCOs, and company-grade/field-grade officers.

In planning for sessions, the team developed protocols to mirror practices used in the surveys; however, focus group sessions relied only on open-ended questions to guide discussion. As the team prepared for sessions, two senior TRAC analysts with extensive experience facilitating focus groups provided training to reinforce key concepts of ethics, facilitation, and record keeping. Additionally, all study team members completed the Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative (CITI) Social/Behavioral Research Course as part of mandatory certification to serve as facilitators in the conduct of research. The study team also conducted in-progress “best practices” training to refine facilitation and data collection skills.

All focus group sessions followed a predetermined format. Every focus group began with an administrative statement promising anonymity to ensure that participants felt comfortable expressing opinions without fear of repercussion or sanction. Facilitators also informed session members that their participation was voluntary and that they could excuse themselves at any time. Additionally, facilitators collected basic demographic information – gender, rank, MOS, years of experience, and age. Given the completion of administrative requirements, the facilitators used open-ended, predetermined questions to elicit conversation. The result was robust discussions on topics that were of greatest concern to session participants in an environment free of judgment.

In the course of focus group sessions, the study team worked to create an ethical and productive environment. Facilitators encouraged the sharing of frank and honest opinions, experiences, thoughts, and ideas while balancing the need to avoid any harm to participants. Many of the focus group sessions followed the same theme trajectory, with highly engaged discussions and overall curiosity about how the policy change would affect day-to-day life in garrison, the field, and on deployments. Soldiers were thoughtful and provided a high level of professional insight on the challenges and solutions of integration.

At the end of each site visit, the study team met with relevant organizational leadership when possible. The study team asked the same questions presented in focus group sessions, recorded key findings, and merged them with broader group findings. Whereas focus group sessions lasted two hours, discussions with organizational command teams tended to last one hour. The study team also provided a summary of preliminary findings to leadership teams. Table 2 contains a summary of the organizations that the study team visited.

Upon completion of each site visit, the study team convened a collaboration session to compare facilitator notes and to form a qualitative assessment of the general themes captured. These sessions typically involved mapping out relationships between the observations of different facilitator notes. During this process, the study team explored the shared and divergent observations of each site visit through a variety of diversity lenses, such as sociological, psychological, legal, economic, and military perspectives.
### Table 2. Focus Group Overview

#### Institutional Site Visits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization/Unit</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Session Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC)    | Apr 13 | • G3 Requirements Branch  
|                                            |      | • Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate  
|                                            |      | • Officer Leader Development  
|                                            |      | • Officer Personnel Management Directorate  
|                                            |      | • Accessions, Evaluations, Selections, and Promotions                                 |
| U.S. Army Recruiting Command               | Apr 13 | • G2, G5  
|                                            |      | • 7/9 Marketing and Outreach                                                         |
| National Guard Bureau (NGB)                | Jul 13 | • G1, G3, G4, G5  
|                                            |      | • Office of the Chief Surgeon                                                        |
|                                            |      | • ARNG Employment Opportunity and Diversity                                          |
|                                            |      | • NGB Legislative Liaison                                                            |
|                                            |      | • NGB Public Affairs                                                                 |
| Office of the Chief, Army Reserve          | Jul 13 | • G1, G3, G5  
|                                            |      | • Army Reserve Communications                                                       |
|                                            |      | • Force Management                                                                   |
| U.S. Army Reserve Command                  | Jul 13 | • G3/5/7 Force Management                                                           |
|                                            |      | • Chaplain Office                                                                    |
|                                            |      | • Public Affairs Office                                                              |
|                                            |      | • Staff Judge Advocate Office                                                        |

#### Training Base Site Visits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization/Unit</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Session Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| U.S. Army Engineer School (USAES)          | Aug 13 | • Sapper Leader Course  
|                                            |      | • Engineer Captains Career Course (CCC)  
|                                            |      | • Engineer Basic Officer Leaders Course (BOLC)                                      |
|                                            |      | • Senior Leader Course (SLC)                                                        |
|                                            |      | • Advanced Leader Course (ALC)                                                      |
|                                            |      | • Warrior Leader Course (WLC)                                                       |
|                                            |      | • Basic Combat Training and Advanced Individual Training (AIT) Drill Sergeants       |
| U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAAS)  | Sep 13 | • Field Artillery CCC  
|                                            |      | • SLC / ALC / WLC                                                                    |
|                                            |      | • Basic Combat Training and AIT Drill Sergeants                                     |
| U.S. Army Infantry School (USAIS)          | Jan 14 | • Maneuver CCC  
|                                            |      | • Infantry BOLC                                                                     |
|                                            |      | • Officer Candidate School                                                           |
|                                            |      | • Basic Combat Training and AIT Drill Sergeants                                     |
|                                            |      | • NCO Academy                                                                       |
|                                            |      | • Airborne Ranger Training Brigade                                                   |
|                                            |      | • Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course                                     |
|                                            |      | • Sniper School                                                                      |
| U.S. Army Armor School                     | Feb 14 | • Armor BOLC                                                                         |
|                                            |      | • Basic Combat Training and AIT Drill Sergeants                                     |

#### Unit Site Visits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization/Unit</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Session Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Georgia ARNG, 48th Infantry BCT</td>
<td>Sep 13</td>
<td>• Command Teams (Company through Brigade Level)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Platoon Leaders, Platoon/Section Sergeants, Squad Leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd BCT, 1st Armored Division</td>
<td>Dec 13</td>
<td>• Command Teams (Company through Brigade Level)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Platoon Leaders, Platoon/Section Sergeants, Squad Leaders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This variety of perspectives put observations within the complex social construct of military culture. This allowed the study team to catalogue observations into different themes that supported the identification of cultural and institutional factors expected to affect integration. Additionally, the study team used cross-trend verification to identify potential strategies that Soldiers reported would mitigate the risk of integration to individual and unit morale, cohesion, and readiness. Last, the team compared these site visit findings with the literature review, survey results, and data from previous focus groups to triangulate on relevant factors. Ultimately, results of focus group sessions provided a mechanism to determine whether the issues discovered across all data collection methods were corresponding.

Subject Matter Expertise Solicitation

The TRAC study team elicited feedback from SMEs with academic, government, and military backgrounds. Specifically, the team presented interim updates to the AEAC for independent review. The AEAC has a mix of active duty and retired general officers and sergeants major. It also includes senior academics with experience across a broad set of disciplines. Many of these academics also have experience in senior executive-level positions within university administration. In these engagements, the study team conducted 1-2 day workshops on team research activities, interim findings, and the way ahead. The AEAC provided suggestions on future research activity, feedback on generated products, and overall commentary on the work. Table 3 identifies members of the AEAC.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Michael Wartell</td>
<td>Chancellor Emeritus, Indiana University-Purdue University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chair of AEAC</td>
<td>Fort Wayne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. David Segal</td>
<td>Professor, University of Maryland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Director, Center for Research on Military Organization (CRMO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Mady Segal</td>
<td>Professor Emerita, University of Maryland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Associate Director, CRMO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTG(R) Paul Funk</td>
<td>President and CEO, Mounted Warfare Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Former CG, III Corps and Fort Hood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG Marcia Anderson</td>
<td>U.S. Court, Clerk of Bankruptcy Court, Western District of Wisconsin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deputy Chief of the Army Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG(R) Maureen LeBoeuf</td>
<td>Executive Director, Feagin Scholars Program, Duke University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Former Head of the Department of Physical Education, USMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMA(R) Jack Tilley</td>
<td>Chairman and CEO of the American Freedom Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12th Sergeant Major of the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSM(R) Robert Dare</td>
<td>Previous FORSCOM Command Sergeant Major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Kayla Williams</td>
<td>Author: <em>Love My Rifle More Than You: Young and Female in the U.S. Army</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Plenty of Time When We Get Home: Love and Recovery in the Aftermath of War</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Former Army sergeant and Arabic linguist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to AEAC engagements, the study team also briefed and received feedback from senior civilian leaders and general officers in the course of the study. Table 4 displays these leadership engagements.
Table 4. Army Senior Leader Engagements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Engagements</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hon. Mr. McHugh</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Secretary of the Army (pending)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon. Ms. Wada</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of the Army, Manpower &amp; Reserve Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Odierno</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Army Chief of Staff (pending)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Perkins</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CG, TRADOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN (R) Cone</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>CG, TRADOC (Previous)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTG (R) Bromberg</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>HQDA DCS G-1 (Previous)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTG Brown</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CG, Combined Arms Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTG Cleveland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CG, USASOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTG Donahue</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>DCG, FORSCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTG Halverson</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>DCG, TRADOC (Previous)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CG, Installation Management Command (Current)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTG Mangum</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>DCG, TRADOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTG McConville</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>HQDA DCS G-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG Haas</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Director, Force Management and Development, USSOCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG Miller</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CG, US Army Maneuver Center of Excellence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG Ridge</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>DCG, Initial Military Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG Rossi</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CG, Fires Center of Excellence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG Seamands</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Director, Military Personnel Management, HQDA G1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG Spitler</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff, TRADOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG Young</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, US Army Reserve (Previous)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CG, 75th Training Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG Funkhouser</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Commandant, USAES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG Rainey</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Commandant, USAIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG Turner</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Commandant, USAFAS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.6.2 Phase 2 – Risk Assessment and Mitigation Strategy Development.  

Following the identification of cultural/institutional factors and potential mitigation controls, the study transitioned to Phase 2 – risk assessment and mitigation. Guided by Army technical publication (ATP) 5-19, Risk Management, the study team created a composite risk management model to assess and mitigate the hazard that Phase 1 factors presented to individual and unit morale, cohesion, and readiness. This approach leveraged the collective expertise of 373 senior NCOs at USASMA who identified factor risk, refined mitigation controls, and assessed the suitability of these controls. These male and female NCOs represented perspectives from open and closed MOSs/units across the Army. Figure 2 displays the risk methodology with example output.

The composite risk management model consisted of three sequential steps. First, the study team conducted a workshop where USASMA participants assessed the probability that a factor would cause a leader challenge within the first year in newly integrated combat arms units. Given that the leader challenge occurred, participants next assessed the severity that the factor would have on combat power, mission capability, or readiness. Combining the probability and severity assessment of each participant, the study team created a normalized histogram of the composite risk for each factor. The study team evaluated the overall initial risk for each factor at the median respondent’s composite risk assessment. The use of the median respondent was appropriate for analysis because the risk assessment results were ordinal data.
After completing the initial risk assessment, the study team executed the second step – develop mitigation controls. The team convened 9 student seminars consisting of 124 Master Sergeants (MSG) and Sergeants Major (SGMs) at USASMA to assist with refining the initial mitigation strategies identified during Phase 1. The study team decomposed these strategies into three control types – physical, education/awareness, and avoidance/elimination – by factor and presented these controls to seminar groups. Through structured facilitation, the study team elicited feedback to accept, reject, or refine the proposed controls. The seminar groups also recommended additional controls. Following this activity, seminar group members individually voted on the refined set of controls. The study team consolidated the voting results and prepared for the third step: risk assessment with mitigation controls in place.

Figure 2. Phase 2 Methodology.
Similar to the first step, the study team revisited risk assessment with the entire USASMA population. Through the use of a voting tool, study team members presented respondents with the initial collective risk assessment by factor from step 1 and the mitigation controls by factor from step 2. With this information, respondents assessed the probability and severity of each factor given the assumption that the Army successfully executed the refined list of controls. As in step 1, the study team reported the median participant’s characterization of risk as the overall assessed level of mitigated risk.

Given these results, the study team has confidence in Phase 2 activities. The composite risk assessment model captured the collective wisdom of approximately 8,300 years of professional experience. In addition to the ordinal risk assessment, senior NCOs provided a wealth of knowledge on the challenges that gender integration would present the Army and the solutions to successfully bring women into combat arms MOS/units. Ultimately, USASMA participants assessed the suitability of a set of collaboratively developed mitigation controls and provided the study team with a solid basis to move to Phase 3.

2.6.3 Phase 3 – Leadership Evaluation.

With the completion of the risk assessment and suitability analysis at USASMA, the study team transitioned to the final phase of analysis – an evaluation of the mitigation controls by unit leadership. Visiting four FORSCOM BCTs, the study team relied on 35 command teams ranging from company- to brigade-level to assess the feasibility and acceptability of the USASMA-refined set of risk mitigation controls. Additionally, the study team collected command team assessments of the impact integration would have on the morale, cohesion, and readiness of their respective units, assuming that the Army successfully executed mitigation controls. The units and locations visited were:

- 1st BCT, 1st Armored Division (1-1AD), Fort Bliss, TX.
- 4th BCT, 10th Mountain Division (4-10MTN), Fort Polk, LA.
- 3rd BCT, 82nd Airborne Division (3-82ABN), Fort Bragg, NC.
- 2nd BCT, 3rd Infantry Division (2-3ID), Fort Stewart, GA.

Figure 3 outlines Phase 3 activities for each of these unit site visits. First, the study team asked command teams to assess the feasibility for each mitigation control accounting for their current resource constraints. If participants responded that they could not execute the control, the study team asked what constrained the unit from a variety of perspectives – doctrine, operations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, or facilities (DOTMLPF).
Moving beyond the feasibility question, the study team asked command teams to assume that their resource requirements were met and followed with two questions regarding the acceptability of mitigation controls.

First, command teams assessed their Soldiers’ willingness to accept and adhere to the mitigation controls. If participants assessed that controls were unacceptable, then the study team asked whether the control conflicted with individual Soldier values, unit culture, and/or the Army values. This question provided the study team with insight into the potential cultural costs that the mitigation controls may present to units. The study team followed this question by asking command teams to weigh the resource and cultural costs of the mitigation controls against their perception of benefits that the controls provided their unit as integration begins. The study team used the responses to identify the ultimate impacts to morale, cohesion, and readiness as women enter closed MOSs/units.

2.7 Analytic Framework Conclusion.

The analytic framework outlined in this chapter provides an overview of a comprehensive multimethod study approach that took two years of research, data collection, and analysis to complete. Broad in scope and scale, these study activities provide a sound analytical basis for the study team to make relevant and credible findings and recommendations for senior Army leaders as they decide how to bring women into the Army’s combat formations.
Chapter 3. Analytic Findings

3.1. Introduction.

As outlined in Chapter 2, the study team planned, prepared, and executed a three-phase scheme of analysis using multimethod research design. With this approach, the team accomplished three tasks.

1) The team identified 17 factors expected to affect the integration of women into previously closed MOSs and units.

2) For each factor, the team conducted a risk assessment and mitigation development effort that provided initial risk and residual risk with mitigation controls.

3) For each factor, the team assessed the feasibility and acceptability of mitigation controls at the unit-level including the impacts to morale, cohesion, and readiness (MCR).

Given these results, the study team grouped factors using the output of the Phase 2 Risk Assessment by examining the median respondent’s initial risk characterization for the entire USASMA population and for important sub-populations (i.e., open-MOSs and closed-MOSs). The team classified factors into three groups as shown in Table 5:

- Major Factor. The USASMA median participant rated risk as extreme or high.

- Intermediate Factor. The USASMA median participant rated risk on the high end of the moderate risk scale.

- Minor Factor. The USASMA median participant rated risk on the low end of the moderate risk scale or rated risk as low.

Given the classification in Table 5, the remainder of this chapter is dedicated to detailing the impact of each factor on successful integration. Major factors receive a broad treatment to include a detailed justification, a comprehensive risk assessment with specific mitigation controls, and an assessment of impact to MCR. Not as risky as major factors, intermediate factors receive lesser detail with a risk and MCR assessment. The chapter briefly describes minor factors including an MCR assessment. Finally, the chapter ends with a section outlining five barriers to successful integration.
3.2. Major Factors

3.2.1. Physical Standards

Importance/Consequence: Maintaining operationally grounded physical standards for all Soldiers regardless of gender is the most important factor for the success of gender integration.

Context: The Army’s combat arms specialties require Soldiers to meet some of the most physically demanding tasks in the military. Many Soldiers believe that women are unable to meet these challenging physical demands. Literature review, focus groups, and surveys highlight concern that the Army will lower standards to accommodate women, thus leading to increased risk in combat and training environments. Soldiers have consistently linked the success of gender integration and the overall acceptance of women into previously closed MOSs as dependent upon the maintenance of physical standards.

Phase 1 – Factor Identification. Substantial evidence from literature review, surveys, and focus groups justify physical standards as a GIS factor.

Literature Review: Literature on physical standards includes findings from medical sources, personal narratives, and opinion pieces. Medical research published in refereed journals examine injury rates and gender-based physical capacity and capability and do not focus on
perceptions of gender-based physical capabilities or limitations. Opinion pieces tend to compare the average female Soldier to the average male Soldier and argue that it will take an “extraordinary [female] athlete” and not an average woman to successfully meet physical standards in combat MOSs.

**Surveys.** Nearly 3 out of 4 participants in the Survey of Army Women indicated that applying the same physical standards to males and females is very important to the successful integration of women into the combat arms. 1 in 4 female general officers and 1 in 10 Army women surveyed also offered written comments about the importance of maintaining standards. The ability to meet the rigorous physical requirements associated with combat arms occupations was also identified as a deterrent to Army women considering a transfer into one of these occupations. A majority of the Army women surveyed indicated the physical requirements for occupations were somewhat (31%) or very (45%) likely to deter women already serving in the Army from transferring.

Over half (59%) of the combat arms Soldiers surveyed believe leaders will have difficulty maintaining high standards of MOS-related physical performance following the integration of female Soldiers. The importance of maintaining standards was a consistent theme in the written comments provided by combat arms Soldiers with many participants indicating doubts about female Soldier physical capabilities. This was further demonstrated in the survey where 74% indicated they do not believe female Soldiers have the strength and stamina to be effective in their specialty and 65% doubted female Soldiers could handle the physical demands of their position. Only 35% indicated confidence that women would be admitted to their specialties if they have the requisite skill and abilities, and 84% believe that public pressure would force the Army to change standards so women can succeed in their combat specialty.

**Focus Groups.** Soldiers in focus groups identified physical standards as one of the most important factors. Three themes repeatedly arose in focus group discussions:

1) **The perceived inability of women to meet required physical demands.** In discussion, many Soldiers repeatedly expressed belief that women cannot perform the tough physical demands required of combat arms specialties. Citing combat experience, Soldiers shared that women in Female Engagement Teams/Cultural Support Teams were unable to keep up on dismounted patrols, which resulted in slow movement that de-synchronized operations and hindered mission accomplishment. Additionally, many male Soldiers cite that the differing standards of the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) is an implicit acknowledgement by the Army that women are weaker than men. Furthermore, they believe the scale difference is unfair and puts men at a disadvantage to women when considered for promotion and career progression.

2) **The perception that physical standards will change to accommodate women.** Most Soldiers stated that adherence to and maintenance of physical standards is a “make or break” issue for them. While acknowledged that some female Soldiers are capable of accomplishing the physical demands required in combat arms specialties, many male and female Soldiers voiced concern that the Army would lower standards to achieve a pre-determined population of women. If this condition occurs, Soldiers reported that it would decrease MCR while
simultaneously hampering the successful integration of qualified women into previously all-male units. Additionally, Soldiers discussed the importance of being in top physical shape to garner respect from fellow Soldiers and obtain key positions in units. Examples of unwritten local or unit physical standards that exceeded Army standards were prevalent and typically required to excel. There is concern that these standards would also change.

3) Concern that women will suffer higher and longer rates of medical injury. Although GIS is not a medical study, many male and female Soldiers shared concern that women would be disproportionately injured during training and on deployment.

**Phase 2 - Risk Assessment and Mitigation.**

The initial assessment by the entire USASMA population ranked physical standards as a high risk factor. Applying the below mitigation controls resulted in an overall assessment of moderate risk where probability remained constant ("likely") while severity decreased ("critical" → "marginal").

**Mitigation Controls:**

1) Develop MOS-specific physical standards for awarding an MOS.

2) Access only those Soldiers who meet MOS-specific physical standards.

3) Require periodic evaluation of Soldier ability to meet MOS-specific physical standards with a Pass/Fail format.

4) Refine MOS-specific physical standards in a transparent manner that is grounded in operational requirements. This includes a socialization period with the force to allow for feedback and ample time for instruction to train to meet MOS-specific physical standards.

5) Reclassify or take administrative action against Soldiers who fail to meet specified physical standards of their MOS. Administrative action includes possible separation from the Army.

The above mitigation controls lowered risk across all populations; however, the NCOs in closed combat arms MOSs still maintained a high median risk assessment. The difference between these two views demonstrates the significance that combat arms NCOs place on physical demands and their skepticism that the female Soldiers transferring into the combat arms can meet physical standards.
Phase 3 - Unit Leadership Evaluation. FORSCOM command teams rated the five controls as both feasible and acceptable.

Potential Impacts to Morale, Cohesion, and Readiness. Command teams have significant concern regarding impacts to MCR if physical standards decrease. Even if the Army successfully executes the above mitigation controls, 45% of command teams expect a decrease in morale and cohesion, and 39% of these teams expect a decrease in readiness. With perceptions of disparities in standards already existing (e.g., APFT scoring), impacts to morale may worsen. Command teams consistently stated that the ability of women to perform physically in a unit with their male peers is critical in reducing negative perceptions and stereotypes.

Conclusion. Analysis results indicate that perceptions of physical standards will play a crucial role in the success of gender integration. Ensuring that standards are clear, operationally-grounded, and enforced is essential for qualified women to attain respect in newly opened combat arms career fields. Failing to do so only amplifies existing stereotypes, perceptions, and biases and decreases MCR.

3.2.2. Pregnancy.

Importance/Consequence: Pregnancy and pregnancy-related issues may negatively affect integration due to perceived impacts to readiness and negative stereotypes about pregnant Soldiers.

Context: Many Soldiers are concerned with the ability to accomplish their unit’s mission when future female teammates are unavailable due to pregnancy. Preliminary research indicates several concerns related to pregnancy:

- Impact to units when pregnancy occurs immediately before or on deployment.
- Impact on crew certifications due to pregnancy losses.
- Impact to readiness of units that are on alert status.
- Stereotypes related to pregnant Soldiers.

Phase 1 – Factor Identification. Substantial evidence from literature review and focus groups and moderate evidence from surveys justify pregnancy as a GIS factor.

Literature Review: The literature review drew on a variety of sources to investigate pregnancy. Sources included existing Army regulations covering counseling, medical profiles, physical fitness training, recovery time, and separation from service due to pregnancy. Extensive sources from the medical community examine the impact of military service on pregnant women, especially the toll a physically demanding job has on pregnant women’s health. Multiple Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) reports examine perceptions of medical care for pregnant women, as well as, the stigma that pregnant military women face. Comment sections in journal articles highlight the challenges pregnant women face with acceptance from male peers.
**Surveys:** Survey results show that 68% of combat arms Soldiers hold the stereotype that some female Soldiers have or would use pregnancy to avoid deploying.

**Focus Groups:** Pregnancy was a frequent topic of discussion within focus groups and interviews of leaders. Several themes repeatedly arose in focus group discussions. First, Soldiers are concerned with the ability to accomplish their unit’s mission when future female teammates are unavailable due to pregnancy; furthermore, Soldiers indicate that negative impacts to unit readiness are amplified if a senior officer/NCO becomes pregnant. Additionally, Soldiers and leaders repeatedly voiced concern with readiness impacts particularly when pregnancy occurs immediately before or on deployment. Second, Soldiers have numerous pregnancy-related biases. Many male Soldiers believe that women use pregnancy as a planned way to avoid deployment and report that pregnant female colleagues are disloyal to their unit, selfish, and not committed to the profession.

**Phase 2 - Risk Assessment and Mitigation**

The initial assessment by the entire USASMA population ranked pregnancy as a high risk factor. Applying the below mitigation controls resulted in an overall assessment of moderate risk where probability increased (“occasional” → “likely”) while severity decreased (“critical” → “marginal”).

**Mitigation Controls:**

1) Educate currently closed units/MOSs about Army pregnancy policy.

2) Follow Army Regulation (AR) 600-9 (Army Weight Control Program), paragraphs 3-11, 3-14 and 3-15 including the provision that female Soldiers who are postpartum plus 180 days must meet Army weight control standards or be enrolled in the Army Body Composition Program.

3)Authorize unit commanders to backfill pregnant Soldiers who have certified as a crewmember prior to deployment to avoid negative readiness impacts.

The above mitigation controls lowered risk across all populations; however, the NCOs in closed combat arms MOSs still maintained a high median risk assessment. These NCOs have limited experience working with Soldiers who become pregnant. By their own admission, they did not have the level of experience that NCOs in open MOSs have with this factor. Consequently, they report difficulty losing a Soldier through an act that they see as voluntary, thus contributing to the widely held belief that female Soldiers “get” pregnant to avoid deployments. As a result, many of these NCOs view pregnancy as a betrayal to the unit, especially if the Soldier is a leader or a member of a certified team or crew.
Phase 3 - Unit Leadership Evaluation.

Overall, command teams rated the controls as both feasible and acceptable. However, the third control drew skepticism. From participant discussions following the assessment, command teams did not believe that the Army could establish a backfill program to offset the loss of pregnant Soldiers due to fiscal pressures, personnel drawdowns, and a number of other practical constraints.

Potential Impacts to Morale, Cohesion, and Readiness. Command teams shared how pregnancy influences MCR. Even if the Army successfully executes the above mitigation controls, 49% of command teams expect a decrease in morale, while 53% expect cohesion to decrease. Additionally, 65% of these teams expect a decrease in readiness. Command teams provided examples of female Soldiers who had to re-deploy due to pregnancy and how this negatively affected morale. In addition to reporting readiness implications, command teams also expressed apprehension that losing a female Soldier immediately before a deployment would interfere with the unit’s ability to work as a cohesive group on certain tasks that require a high level of teamwork and communication.

Conclusion. Study research indicates that pregnancy is a major factor. Although the Army defines pregnancy as a natural medical condition, there are cultural ramifications and biases associated with it. Even though open units have effectively managed pregnancy impacts for the last 13+ years of war, pregnancy is perceived as a major readiness issue to closed units.

3.2.3. Sexual Harassment

Importance/Consequence: Research indicates that Soldier concerns about SH will make gender integration difficult. The study team identified evidence that provides substantial support for this conclusion to include the lack of experience of combat arms Soldiers working around women, fear of women that they will suffer harassment, and fear of men that they will fall victim to unfounded accusations.

Context: After extensive review and aggressive action by the Army to appropriately address SH, an unintentional, second-order effect of apprehension has become pervasive within the force. First, many male Soldiers are worried that currently accepted comments and behavior within closed units/MOSs will result in accusations of harassment. Furthermore, these Soldiers are concerned that some harassment charges are unfounded and are the result of female Soldiers retaliating against male Soldiers. From the female Soldier perspective, many women expressed reluctance to join previously closed MOSs out of fear of harassment. Both populations report that Sexual Harassment /Assault Response and Prevention Program (SHARP) training contributes to this apprehension and mistrust between men and women. Finally, male and female Soldiers believe that incidents of SH will increase after women arrive in previously closed units. The duration of this potential increase in harassment is unknown.

Phase 1 – Factor Identification. Substantial evidence from literature review, surveys, and focus groups justify SH as a study factor.
Literature Review. Literature on SH includes current statutes and regulations along with studies exploring the issue within the military and other career fields. A number of studies concentrate on harassment in academia, the technology sector, and the government. Other studies focus on the extent of the problem within the military and the effects of over and under-reaction to this problem. Also included were personal narratives and blog sites discussing popular sentiments about SH in the military and society as a whole.

Surveys. A majority of the female Soldiers and cadets surveyed believe that concerns about SH are likely to deter women from considering a career in one of the previously closed combat arms occupations. Additionally, a majority of Army women (89%) and female cadets (72% USMA and 76% ROTC) expect integration to result in increased occurrences of SH. Many women echoed their concerns about increasing incidents of SH in their written comments, and 38% identified SH/SA-related issues as a reason why they personally would not be interested in a career in one of the newly opened occupations. Despite these concerns, only 61% of the participants in the Survey of Army Women believe additional Equal Opportunity/SHARP training is necessary to set the conditions for gender integration.

Combat arms Soldiers also expressed concerns about SH. A majority (83%) expect an increase in incidents following integration. SH was also one of the most common themes that emerged in written comments.

Focus Groups. In discussions with Soldiers, it was common to hear them simultaneously address both SH and SA, which is not surprising since the Army covers both issues through SHARP training. Several themes repeatedly arose in focus group discussions:

1) SHARP training has created an environment that will make integration difficult.
Many Soldiers report that SHARP training has created an environment where men and women avoid interaction. Soldiers express trepidation with interaction because they are confused where attraction and flirting become harassment; furthermore, SHARP training exacerbates this fear by reinforcing Soldiers’ fears of “false” accusations. Many Soldiers also report that their chains of command have warned them to avoid all but necessary contact with the opposite gender as a means of avoiding accusations of harassment. Combining this leader guidance with a lack of experience working with female Soldiers has resulted in many combat arms Soldiers questioning how integration will proceed in the current environment.

2) Soldiers are concerned that currently accepted language and humor will lead to SH charges.
Soldiers characterized the current culture of all-male units as being similar to a boys club, fraternity house, or athletic locker room. Soldiers recognize that what is currently acceptable behavior/language in all-male units will probably not be acceptable in mixed-gender units.
Phase 2 - Risk Assessment and Mitigation.

The initial assessment by the entire USASMA population ranked SH as a high risk factor. Applying the below mitigation controls still resulted in an overall assessment of high risk where probability and severity remained unchanged (“Occasional”; “Critical”)

Mitigation Controls:

1) Require sustained leader involvement with command emphasis on a unit-level program:
   - Educate Soldiers at platoon-level and below with interactive training sessions.
   - Emphasize appropriate TTPs (tactics, techniques, and procedures) and training for conducting official Army investigations.
   - Integrate DA civilian, contractor, and host nation populations into training.

2) Use SHARP/Victim Advocates to sensitize Soldiers on the seriousness of SH reports.

3) Conduct leader inspections of unit physical environments to ensure that posted material is appropriate.

4) Assign women together at the company-level in previously closed units to avoid isolation.

The above mitigation controls slightly lowered risk across all populations; however, male NCOs in both open and closed MOSs still maintained a high median risk assessment. Further analysis found that fears of false accusations contributed to this high-risk assessment. Conversely, female NCOs assessed that these controls would reduce the risk of SH to moderate.

Phase 3 - Unit Leadership Evaluation.

Command teams across four BCTs assessed the above controls as feasible and acceptable.

Potential Impacts to Morale, Cohesion, and Readiness. Command teams expect SH to negatively impact MCR. Even if the Army successfully executes the above mitigation controls, 47% of command teams expect a decrease in morale. Additionally, 45% anticipate a decrease in cohesion. After integration, command teams report unit leaders will face a number of issues with negative implications. First, fears of SH are a deterrent to attracting qualified women to combat arms career fields. Second, if left unchanged, SHARP training may lead male Soldiers to avoid female colleagues out of fear of harassment complaints. If widespread, this avoidance could isolate women in newly integrated units. Third, assigning
women together to avoid isolation may result in furthering negative stereotypes that women require special treatment and protection. Fourth, command teams recognize that Soldiers are concerned that cohesion will drop because previously accepted humor/language used to build tight bonds will no longer be acceptable in a mixed-gender environment. Finally, command teams expressed concern that readiness will diminish if prevention and response to SH consume their time rather than planning and training for wartime missions.

**Conclusion.** Sexual harassment is a societal problem that the Army has sought to address through SHARP training. Senior leaders have expressed a zero tolerance policy for harassment, but combating the problem during gender integration may result in more reported cases of harassment. A lack of experience working in mixed gender environments may cause initial challenges. Both men and women view the phenomenon differently. Female Soldiers are concerned about working in male-dominated units where they may be harassed, while male Soldiers are concerned about false accusations. Additional investigation is required to identify strategies to address the effects of the SHARP program on future integration.

### 3.2.4. Sexual Assault

**Importance/Consequence:** Analysis indicates that Soldier concerns about SA will make gender integration difficult.

**Context:** As discussed in the SH section, Soldiers communicated that the heightened environment created by SHARP training has made many male Soldiers fearful of interacting with female Soldiers. Associated with this fear is an understanding that combat arms Soldiers must make physical contact during the high stress of combat and training. Under these conditions, Soldiers must physically move or inspect one another. With heightened SHARP awareness, Soldiers are concerned that this required physical contact may lead to sexual assault allegations. Furthermore, some Soldiers are concerned that accusers may maliciously use assault allegations as a means of retaliation against male peers and members of the chain of command. Finally, concern over the threat of assault has resulted in leaders viewing women as “risks” in need of “over-watch.” Taking actions to protect women from SH/SA has reinforcing negative stereotypes that female Soldiers are not capable of defending themselves and in need of “men’s protection.”

**Phase 1 – Factor Identification.** Substantial evidence from literature review, surveys, and focus groups justify SA as a study factor.

**Literature Review.** Literature on sexual assault includes current statutes and regulations, studies exploring the issue within the military and on college campuses, select studies from government sponsors, personal narratives, and specialists on prevention. The study team placed emphasis on literature focused on combating sexual assault in the Army.

**Surveys.** Most female Soldiers and cadets believe sexual assault concerns will deter women from considering combat arms occupations. A majority expect incidents to increase following integration. In written comments, 38% of female Soldiers indicated potential SA issues as a reason why they were not interested in combat arms. Almost a quarter (24%) of female general officers voiced concerns over SH/SA, violence, and safety of women.
Though not directly asked, over 10% of infantry and armor Soldiers also provided comments related to SH/SA concerns.

**Focus Groups.** Several themes repeatedly arose in focus group discussions:

1) **Soldiers are hypersensitive due to SHARP training.** Soldiers raised this concern for both SH and SA. See SH section for more detail.

2) **Soldiers may avoid job-related physical contact out of fear of false accusations.** Soldiers gave examples of avoiding routine procedures like pre-jump inspections out of fear that a female Soldier will complain about inappropriate touching. Others indicated a concern that physical contact needed for their job (e.g., checking a Soldier for wounds, physically moving a Soldier to the correct position, making corrections to uniforms, etc.) might lead to allegations.

3) **Some unit leaders believe that women need additional “protection.”** Leaders expressed the cross-pressure between allowing women to succeed on their own merit without special treatment, while simultaneously feeling the need to provide “over watch” to protect female Soldiers from assault. Responding to this dilemma, a number of leaders simply separated men and women while in garrison and the field to avoid SA. Soldiers identified that this type of action is at odds with integration and creates separation in a unit that interferes with accomplishing a mission and overall cohesion.

**Phase 2 - Risk Assessment and Mitigation**

The initial assessment by the entire USASMA population ranked SA as a high risk factor. Applying the below mitigation controls still resulted in an overall assessment of high risk where probability and severity remained unchanged (“Occasional”; “Critical”)

![Risk (Before and After Mitigation)](image)

**Mitigation Controls:**

1) Require sustained leader involvement with command emphasis on a unit-level program:
   
   - Educate Soldiers at platoon-level and below with interactive training sessions.
   - Emphasize appropriate TTPs and training for conducting official Army investigations.
   - Integrate DA civilian, contractor, and host nation populations into training.

2) Use SHARP/Victim Advocates to sensitize Soldiers on the seriousness of SA reports.
3) Plan and resource physical security controls in barracks, offices, and common areas to prevent incidents.

4) Formulate Army-wide TTPs that will mitigate Soldier fears of SA and false allegations (e.g., specific TTPs for mixed gender casualty evaluation).

The above mitigation controls slightly lowered risk across all populations; however, male NCOs in both open and closed MOSs still maintained a high median risk assessment. Similar to the SH risk assessment, further analysis found that fears of false accusations contributed to this high-risk assessment. Also like the SH risk assessment, female NCOs assessed that these controls would reduce the risk of SA to moderate.

**Phase 3 - Unit Leadership Evaluation.**

Command teams across four BCTs assessed the above controls as feasible and acceptable.

**Potential Impacts to Morale, Cohesion, and Readiness.** Approximately a third of command teams anticipate a decrease in MCR from SA incidents occurring after integration. Command teams have anxiety regarding the significant impacts to MCR during integration if SA cases increase. A common theme among command teams and many male Soldiers is that morale will decrease because the Army treats accused Soldiers as guilty until proven innocent with regard to SA charges. Command teams also indicated male Soldiers resent that SHARP training predominantly profiles male Soldiers as perpetrators and female Soldiers as victims. Finally, command teams expressed concern that readiness may diminish if their time is expended on prevention and response to SA rather than training and operations.

**Conclusion.** SA is a societal problem that the Army has sought to address through SHARP training, but the approach to training and prevention has caused unintended consequences; including increasing distrust between male and female Soldiers. The heightened focus on combatting SA, while simultaneously integrating previously closed MOSs, will present challenges.

3.3. Intermediate Factors

The factors described in this section present moderate risk to successful integration. Instead of a full exposition like the major factors, this section presents a brief definition of each intermediate factor, its risk assessment and mitigation, and its potential impacts to MCR.

**3.3.1 Combat Arms Unit Culture**

Research indicates that combat arms units are characterized by a culture that emphasizes hyper-masculine traits such as dominance, aggressiveness, hiding fear, pursuit of physically demanding/potentially dangerous activities, and competitiveness. Part of unit culture relates to ways in which many male Soldiers communicate with one another using crude language and behavior. Additionally, it includes how they respond to stress, and express emotion. Many male and female Soldiers report that this existing culture is incompatible with a mixed-gender working environment.
Phase 2 - Risk Assessment and Mitigation

The initial assessment by the entire USASMA population ranked unit culture as a moderate risk factor. Applying the below mitigation controls resulted in an overall assessment of moderate risk where probability and severity remained constant (“Likely”; “Marginal”)

Mitigation Controls:

1) Establish, communicate, and enforce boundaries of what is and is not acceptable language and behavior. Leaders must vocalize it and make swift corrections when Soldiers cross boundaries. Additionally, leaders must continually engage Soldiers with on-the-spot corrections to avoid over-reaction.

2) Plan and resource a long-term leader development initiative that focuses attention on team building skills that build morale and cohesion without unprofessional behavior and language.

Phase 3 - Unit Leadership Evaluation.

Command teams across four BCTs assessed the above controls as feasible and acceptable.

Potential Impacts to Morale, Cohesion, and Readiness. Overall, analysis indicates a high level of concern that the current combat arms unit culture is incompatible with gender integration. In fact, 41% of command teams expect morale to decrease following integration and 39% anticipate cohesion will also decline. As a result, leaders must prepare for the internal friction caused by change – certain elements of the culture at the small-unit level must change for successful integration. Many of these elements include behaviors that are viewed by unit members as invaluable to building cohesion and combat effectiveness, yet these behaviors are potentially at odds with the Army Values. Command teams and male Soldiers report anxiety that removing these cultural elements will dampen the aggressiveness and discipline within combat arms units and the sense of fraternity among members. Acknowledging that crude language and joking may not create a “professional” working environment, they believe this humor, language, and behavior are coping mechanisms for very stressful situations. Integrating Soldiers who do not conform to these cultural norms may decrease MCR. Changing the combat arms culture will take persistent leader attention with a focus on reinforcing the Army’s professional ethic.

Conclusion. The Army faces the challenge of changing combat arms unit culture. A balance is required to retain high morale while removing the culture’s less desirable aspects. This will take time and require patience.
3.3.2 Field Environment

Soldiers indicated concern that austere field environments characterized by a lack of hygiene facilities and privacy will complicate integration. Specific concerns include mixed-gender sleeping arrangements in tightly confined spaces, privacy expectations in remote field environments, and hygiene/field sanitation during long-term dismounted operations. Additionally, discussions in focus groups revealed widespread ignorance of standards on hygiene, and the belief that men and women have different official field sanitation standards. Specifically, Soldiers report the myth that women require a shower every 72 hours. This widely held belief tended to elicit strong reactions that women expect favorable treatment over their male counterparts. Overall, Soldiers with little previous experience serving with women were concerned that female Soldiers could not cope with the harsh living conditions of extended, dismounted operations.

Phase 2 - Risk Assessment and Mitigation

The initial assessment by the entire USASMA population ranked field environment as a moderate risk factor. Applying the below mitigation controls resulted in an overall assessment of moderate risk where probability and severity remained constant (“ Likely”; “Marginal”). However, NCOs in closed MOSs rated the mitigated risk as high. During discussion, these NCOs expressed unease with the practicality of affording privacy to female Soldiers given very austere field conditions. They also were concerned with the possibility of SH charges against male Soldiers who inadvertently observed female Soldiers in compromising situations (i.e. changing uniforms, urinating, defecating).

Mitigation Controls:

1) Disseminate regulations, policies, and TTPs on personal hygiene, sleeping arrangements, occupying confined spaces, and field sanitation.

2) Leverage best practices from currently integrated units.

3) Seek new materiel solutions for the differing field conditions of dismounted and mechanized operations (e.g., portable shower screens for use in differing settings to afford minimal levels of privacy during hygiene).

4) Communicate that field conditions, specifically in dismounted operations, will not significantly change and that expectations of privacy are limited.
Phase 3 - Unit Leadership Evaluation.

Command teams across four BCTs assessed the above controls as feasible and acceptable.

Potential Impacts to Morale, Cohesion, and Readiness. A third of command teams anticipate a decrease in MCR when considering field environment issues. Many open units follow the “72 hour” shower rule even though it is not in doctrine, regulations, or policy. Command teams are aware that male Soldiers report resentment of female Soldiers who return to garrison areas for showers – something men are not usually permitted to do. Similarly, making special accommodations for women to sleep separately or have privacy those men are not afforded has negative MCR implications. While this provides male and female Soldiers greater comfort to sleep in gender-segregated areas, information exchange diminishes and MCR declines when Soldiers are at different locations. Forming cohesive teams in this split environment is challenging.

Conclusion. Operations in austere conditions present concerns with respect to sleeping accommodations, privacy, and hygiene. Tactical situations will dictate levels of privacy and hygiene allowed – some Soldiers’ personal sensibilities may be offended. Increasing information about current regulations and best practices can go a long way to minimizing potential risks.

3.3.3. Fraternization

There is confusion within the force as to what constitutes fraternization. Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) defines fraternization as an inappropriate relationship between a commissioned or warrant officer and an enlisted service member. Furthermore, AR 600-20, Army Command Policy, expands upon UCMJ by allowing unit commanders to prohibit any relationship (including interaction between an NCO and junior enlisted Soldier) if it negatively affects the good order and discipline within a unit. As a result, many broad and divergent interpretations of what constitutes fraternization exist; consequently, Soldiers report that leaders are not uniformly enforcing a consistent force-wide fraternization policy. Additionally, many Soldiers reported observing fraternization in both deployed and garrison environments in currently open units. Finally, NCOs repeatedly stated that increased supervision of the barracks (to include more authority to conduct inspections and oversight of room assignments) is critical to enabling them to spot and stop fraternization before it becomes serious.

With integration, Soldiers are concerned that there will be an increase in fraternization, particularly inappropriate relationships between Soldiers within the same chain of command. In surveys, 71% of combat arms Soldiers believe that fraternization is unavoidable when units are integrated and 90% expect fraternization to occur more frequently following integration. They believe that resolving these cases will consume command time and adversely affect MCR.
Phase 2 - Risk Assessment and Mitigation

The initial assessment by the entire USASMA population ranked fraternization as a moderate risk factor. Applying the below mitigation controls resulted in an overall assessment of moderate risk where probability and severity remained constant (“Likely”; “Marginal”). However, NCOs in closed MOSs rated the mitigated risk as high.

Mitigation Controls:

1) Educate and enforce Army fraternization policy (AR 600-20 paragraphs 4-14b, 4-14c and 4-15) equally and uniformly.

2) Plan and resource physical security controls in barracks, offices, and common areas. In mixed-gender barracks, the chain of command must stay aware of potential fraternization conditions (e.g., mixing NCOs and Soldiers on the same floor or in the same area).

3) Increase NCO oversight of barracks facilities to set conditions for unit leadership to observe and stop questionable relationships before the potential development of fraternization.

Phase 3 - Unit Leadership Evaluation.

Command teams across four BCTs assessed the above controls as feasible and acceptable.

Potential Impacts to Morale, Cohesion, and Readiness. Less than a third of command teams expect fraternization to negatively affect MCR in newly integrated units. From the perspective of junior Soldiers, both men and women report that unit leaders are not currently enforcing fraternization standards uniformly, thus negatively affecting morale and cohesion. Respondents attribute fraternization problems to a sense of apathy on the part of busy command teams and a lack of education of what constitutes an inappropriate relationship. Soldiers expect the incidence of fraternization and/or the appearance of fraternization will most likely increase as women integrate into previously-closed MOSs/units. When current policy is enforced uniformly across the force, Soldiers and leaders believe that fraternization issues are less likely to cause concern or impact MCR.

Conclusion. Fraternization problems partially stem from an uneven application of Army Command Policy and a lack of leader willingness to pursue potential violations. Furthermore, mixed gender units potentially require greater leader attention to enforce UCMJ and AR 600-
These problems reinforce broader, negative views that male Soldiers hold towards integration.

### 3.3.4 Consensual Sex

Most combat arms Soldiers do not have experience working with women in a professional environment. Research indicates that Soldiers are concerned that integration will increase sexual tension and consensual sex. Soldiers describe problems with attraction, jealousy, breakups, and ensuing “drama”. They express apprehension that integration will cause a loss of mission focus. Repeated themes included concern over the negative effects of male Soldiers doing the work of female Soldiers as a means of currying favor (e.g., getting a date, etc.), sexual relationships among single Soldiers at the small-unit level, and adulterous relationships among Soldiers where one or both parties are married.

**Phase 2 - Risk Assessment and Mitigation**

The initial assessment by the entire USASMA population ranked consensual sex as a moderate risk factor. Applying the below mitigation controls resulted in an overall assessment of high risk where probability decreased ("Likely" → "Occasional"), but severity increased ("Marginal" → "Critical"). When questioned about this unexpected result, senior NCOs stated that they believe that consensual sex will occur regardless of the controls implemented by the Army. Unit-level discussion sessions and education efforts by leaders will only draw attention to the issue.

**Mitigation Controls:**

1) Educate the force on the current fraternization policy. Education should emphasize how policy does not prohibit consensual sex amongst peers even though these relationships can adversely affect professional reputation, morale, and cohesion.

2) Plan and resource physical security controls in barracks, offices, and common areas to discourage sex in military facilities. These controls will also provide monitoring to mitigate the risk of non-consensual sex.

**Phase 3 - Unit Leadership Evaluation.**

Since USASMA participants did not assess the above mitigation controls as sufficient, the study team did not ask FORSCOM command team to rate feasibility and acceptability.

**Potential Impacts to Morale, Cohesion, and Readiness.** When considering consensual sex, 41% of command teams expect cohesion to decrease follow integration, while a third
anticipate that morale will also decline. Additionally, Soldiers provided insights on what they characterize as “drama” associated with consensual sex and attraction in mixed gender groups. For example, male Soldiers described a decline in MCR when a small number of women arrived at combat outposts because men jockeyed for female attention. These actions caused infighting among the men resulting in a loss of discipline. This lack of combat focus, combined with competition for female attention, may cause negative future impacts to MCR.

**Conclusion.** Leaders are concerned about impacts to MCR as personal relationships change unit dynamics and social environment. Most leaders report that an Army-wide policy is not required to address consensual sex because open units have managed this factor without significant decrease in MCR. As integration begins, small-unit leaders must prepare to address the issues arising from consensual relationships.

3.3.5. Stereotypes about Women

Many male and female Soldiers have a wide range of stereotypical views about women. Analysis indicates that some Soldiers believe that women possess emotional and personality traits that may inhibit unit effectiveness. Study results show that women are perceived to be emotionally weaker, less mentally resilient, and more “hormonal” than men. Some Soldiers believe that women have a lower breaking point and may not be able to handle stressful training and combat situations. Additionally, there is a perception among many Soldiers that women expect/receive special treatment. Female Soldiers who integrate will confront these negative views and biases.

**Phase 2 - Risk Assessment and Mitigation.**

The initial assessment by the entire USASMA population ranked stereotypes as a moderate risk factor. Applying the below mitigation controls resulted in an overall assessment of moderate risk where probability and severity remained constant (“Likely”; “Marginal”). NCOs in closed MOSs dropped their median risk assessment to moderate. Academic research points to a potential explanation. Studies indicate that close training contact between men and women can result in debunking stereotypes. The study team captured evidence of this condition at Fort Stewart, Georgia. Men and women working together in the provisionally integrating physical testing unit (part of Soldier2020 LOE2) reported that their gender-based stereotypes lessened over time.

**Mitigation Controls:**

1) Assign men and women together to heighten awareness in order to mitigate the effect of some of these stereotypes.
2) Educate commanders in closed units/MOSs on specific Army policies related to women. They must educate their unit leaders and Soldiers on these policies prior to the arrival of female Soldiers.

Phase 3 - Unit Leadership Evaluation.

Command teams across four BCTs assessed the above controls as feasible and acceptable.

Potential Impacts to Morale, Cohesion, and Readiness. Less than a third of command teams expect MCR to decrease after integration due to stereotypes about women. Both male and female Soldiers indicate that impacts from gender integration are partially dependent upon women’s ability to successfully perform in newly-opened MOSs. There will be a high burden placed on the shoulders of the initial group of women who integrate, since their success or failure will set conditions for future Soldier perceptions. Their performance will either reinforce or dispel negative stereotypes.

Conclusion. Analysis results indicate that successful integration will require the Army to confront broad cultural stereotypes about women that exist in America as a whole. While this is no easy task, creating an environment where soldiers work together in a professional environment characterized by high standards is the best way to break pre-conceived notions associated with gender.

3.3.6. Differences in Leadership Style

Combat arms Soldiers report concern about what they perceive as “weaknesses” in female leadership styles. Stereotypes about a so-called “feminine” leadership style include the following descriptions: collaborative, consensus-building, caring, indecisive, etc. Combat arms Soldiers consider these traits as incompatible with the leadership style that may be more familiar to their community: aggressive, decisive, and direct. Soldiers who have never worked with female Soldiers in the past have concerns about “feminine leadership style” and working for a female supervisor.

Phase 2 - Risk Assessment and Mitigation.

The initial assessment by the entire USASMA population ranked leadership style differences as a moderate risk factor. Applying the below mitigation control resulted in an overall assessment of moderate risk where probability increased (“Unlikely” → “Occasional”), but severity decreased (“Catastrophic” → “Marginal”). NCOs in closed MOSs dropped their median risk assessment from high to moderate. Like the previous stereotypes factor, academic research has found that close training contact between men and women can reduce stereotypes including those related to leadership styles.
Mitigation Control:

1) Continue to open combat-oriented leadership schools (e.g., Sapper Leader Course, Ranger School, etc.) to expose women to the type of leadership that is familiar to Soldiers in closed units and expose men to different women in order to demonstrate that leadership style is unique to an individual.

Phase 3 - Unit Leadership Evaluation.

Command teams across four BCTs assessed the above control as feasible and acceptable.

Potential Impacts to Morale, Cohesion, and Readiness. Less than a third of unit command teams expect a decrease in morale while less than a quarter anticipate a decline in cohesion and readiness due to “feminine” leadership styles. Command teams stated that leadership style is not as important as job competency to garner respect and maintain MCR. When confronted with negative views of female leadership styles from Soldiers in their units, many command teams stated speculation informed their Soldiers’ opinions due to lack of experience working with women. Historic evidence shows that as women gain leadership experience in previously male dominated fields acceptance slowly occurs and stereotypes decline.

Conclusion. The study identified that leadership style differences are not a major obstacle to integration, but rather a potential challenge. A portion of the force will continue to hold stereotypes about leadership differences and display reluctance to working with female leaders. Although graduation from respected courses (e.g., Ranger/Sapper) may provide some credibility for female leaders, respect for different leadership styles will take time. In conclusion, the demonstration of effective leadership and job competency by women assigned to combat arms units will decrease negative stereotypes over time.

3.3.7. Men as Protectors (Paternalism).

Study findings indicate that male Soldiers may have a heightened sense of urgency to protect female Soldiers, especially in a combat environment. Many Soldiers have traditional views on the “chivalrous duty” of men to watch over women. These male Soldiers view female Soldiers as “women” first, and “Soldiers” second. This attitude is primarily the result of male Soldier upbringing prior to their entrance in the Army. As a result, these Soldiers may exhibit paternalistic behaviors that could negatively affect integration.
Phase 2 - Risk Assessment and Mitigation.

The initial assessment by the entire USASMA population ranked paternalism as a moderate risk factor. Applying the below mitigation controls resulted in an overall assessment of moderate risk where probability and severity remained constant (“Likely”; “Marginal”).

Mitigation Controls.

1) Train men and women together (starting in Basic Combat Training) to focus Soldier attention on mission accomplishment and discipline.

2) Access only those Soldiers who meet MOS-specific physical standards. This will mitigate some learned paternalistic behaviors that weak Soldiers require protection.

3) Ensure that leaders assign duties and responsibilities consistently and equally to Soldiers to avoid the negative effects of paternalism.

Phase 3 - Unit Leadership Evaluation.

Command teams across four BCTs assessed the above controls as feasible and acceptable.

Potential Impacts to Morale, Cohesion, and Readiness. Less than one fifth of command teams expected MCR decreases due to paternalism. Contrary to command team assessments, many male Soldiers indicate a serious concern that having women in combat will detract men from their unit mission, citing the paternalistic instinct to protect female Soldiers. These Soldiers believe that paternalistic behavior is both an innate and learned behavior and are concerned that the death or injury of their female colleagues will cause more morale and cohesion problems than a similar result for a male peer.

Conclusion. As qualified women arrive in previously closed units and demonstrate their competency as members of a cohesive team, paternalistic viewpoints and behaviors should subside. Previous Army integration efforts find this occurrence. Additionally, proper training and time should substantially reduce this factor.

3.3.8. Reclassification.

Reclassification is a short-term mechanism to assign female leaders to previously closed units. Although it provides immediate role models, reclassification presents a number of challenges. First, transferring Soldiers (both men and women) are experientially disadvantaged by not having the tactical and technical competence required to advance in rank and responsibility. Second, newly transferring leaders’ lack of experience may lead to
negative performance that could reinforce negative stereotypes about women. There is
general concern from male and female Soldiers that allowing reclassification above the rank
of E5 or O2 may hamper integration. Finally, reclassification into an over-strength MOS puts
newly transferred women at promotion and retention risk.

**Phase 2 - Risk Assessment and Mitigation.**

The initial assessment by the entire USASMA population ranked reclassification as a moderate risk
factor. Applying the below mitigation controls resulted in an overall assessment of moderate risk where
probability increased (Occasional → Likely) and severity remained constant (“Marginal” → “Marginal”).
NCOs in closed combat arms MOSs initially assessed the risk as moderate, but raised their final risk assessment to
high. The study team did not discover a significant reason for this higher assessment.

**Mitigation Controls:**

1) Counsel potential reclassification candidates to ensure they understand MOS
requirements, both physical and technical/tactical.

2) Access only those Soldiers who meet MOS-specific physical standards.

3) Allow only volunteers to reclassify into previously closed MOSs.

4) Restrict reclassification into over-strength MOSs.

5) Assign branch proponents the responsibility to determine the highest rank (enlisted and
officer) allowed for reclassification into each respective MOS to ensure that applicants
meet branch-specific knowledge, skill, and ability requirements.

**Phase 3 - Unit Leadership Evaluation.**

Command teams across four BCTs assessed the above controls as feasible and acceptable.

**Potential Impacts to Morale, Cohesion, and Readiness.** One fifth of command teams
anticipate that reclassification will cause a decrease in unit MCR. Commanders were
concerned that the reclassification of women into over-strength combat arms MOSs to build
a role model cadre will have negative effects on MCR if experienced male Soldiers believe
that they are being forced from the Army to make room to women. The Army must
transparently demonstrate that women reclassifying into previously closed MOSs are fully
qualified across all physical, technical, and tactical dimensions. The experiential hurdle faced
by all Soldiers reclassifying will only intensify for women entering the combat arms
considering the stereotypes they will face. This condition may deter qualified women from transferring.

**Conclusion.** Due to the aforementioned implications, the Army should limit the use of reclassification to support integration.

### 3.4. Minor Factors.

The factors outlined in this section present lower risk than major or intermediate factors. As a result, each minor factor receives a limited summary.

#### 3.4.1. Spousal Concerns

Research indicates that some Soldiers are concerned with spousal reaction to working with female Soldiers. Related topics include infidelity and changing dynamics within family readiness groups. Other concerns relate to how male and female Soldiers will develop emotional bonds with one another that may interfere with marital relationships.

**Potential Impacts to Morale, Cohesion, Readiness.** Less than one fifth of command teams anticipate that spousal concerns will negatively affect MCR. In addition to command team assessments, Soldiers in focus groups speculated that while on deployment in newly integrated units that spouses back home would receive rumors of infidelity via social media. Soldiers were concerned that these rumors would decrease morale and cohesion.

**Conclusion.** Army Families are part of unit life and are critical to supporting Soldiers. Addressing their concerns will positively contribute to integration’s overall success. Leaders should continue to use current Army programs to help strengthen unit families and reduce impacts to individual MCR.

#### 3.4.2. Tokenism

Tokenism is the appearance of making symbolic gestures towards diversity to insulate an organization from accusations of discrimination. Academic literature finds that token employees typically represent less than 15% of the workforce, are subjected to greater scrutiny from leadership and colleagues, and suffer stereotype identity that lessens their worth as individuals (i.e., where of all the negative stereotypes of women are applied to each individual woman). Survey and focus group analysis suggests that women in the combat arms will meet a variety of these criteria and are at risk of the negative effects of tokenism.

Analysis of survey results and data from other countries with integrated combat arms branches show that propensity of women to serve in these specialties is lower than 15%. Preliminary forecasts suggests women will comprise of 2-4% of combat arms branches after integration. In focus groups, women expressed that as a current minority in the Army they feel “too visible, or are scrutinized too closely and are held to a higher standard.” They report that living under the spotlight makes them feel like their every move is scrutinized by male Soldiers constantly looking for perceived unequal or differential treatment. As a result, these women report that their female colleagues entering the combat arms will have to handle much higher levels of unfair critique. Further exacerbating this problem, male combat arms
Soldiers repeatedly expressed concern that “token” female Soldiers, who are unqualified for combat arms specialties but allowed to enter, will put units and Soldiers at risk. In surveys, 80% of combat arms Soldiers believe that the Army will cave to political pressure and lower occupational standards to accommodate women’s success.

**Potential Impacts to Morale, Cohesion, Readiness.** Although company and battalion-level command teams expressed little concern with tokenism, brigade command teams stated that it was a long-term MCR concern for them. They expressed that no Soldier wants to be viewed as a token and that most female Soldiers resented any special considerations that were different from what male Soldiers received. These commanders expressed that the same occupational standards must apply to everyone. Failure to do this will have the unintended consequence of casting the shadow of tokenism over female Soldier accomplishments. Furthermore, pressures of tokenism may act as a deterrent for qualified women to branch/transfer into the combat arms and has the potential to decrease the morale of women, and overall cohesion within the units.

**Conclusion.** Leader awareness of tokenism and actions taken to avoid its negative effects, primarily through education, are necessary for successful integration. Although tokenism is not a major issue for the force, senior commanders raised concern that very small numbers of women will qualify to branch/transfer into combat arms. As a result, some form of tokenism is almost inevitable. Selecting the right approach for implementation will mitigate the long-term risk of tokenism. Education, shared hardship, and baseline training will be key factors in ensuring that all Soldiers can perform assigned tasks and are not isolated or singled out.

### 3.4.3. Role Models

Historic analyses of previous Army integration initiatives cite the lack of role models as a challenge to success. Senior leaders within the Army are concerned female Soldiers will need female NCOs and officers within units as integration commences. The intent is not to create a shadow chain of command but to provide a conduit to resolve transitional issues. Many male leaders within closed units reported a lack of knowledge of regulations or approaches to taking care of female-specific issues and expressed a desire to leverage female roles models to help in their education. Soldiers expressed a desire to learn from role models on what "right" looks like with respect to male-female Soldier interaction.

**Potential Impacts to Morale, Cohesion, Readiness.** Less than one fifth of command teams expressed concern that the lack of role models will decrease MCR. Commanders reflected that role models present both an opportunity and a challenge for the Army. As stated above, good role models regardless of gender assist individual Soldiers and raise unit MCR. The challenge for the Army is finding female NCOs and officers to transfer into combat units. As previously outlined in the reclassification factor, there are numerous individual and unit-related MCR pitfalls to using reclassification to build a cadre of female role models in potentially over-strength combat specialties. The Army must judiciously consider these countervailing pressures when considering role models as a factor to successful integration.

**Conclusion.** Role models provide an important example for Soldiers to emulate. When role models act as mentors, they further assist and guide Soldiers for the betterment of the Army.
Unit leaders should strive at a minimum to serve as role models while actively pursuing mentorship opportunities with junior Soldiers. Growing role models from within while trusting in the professionalism of existing male leaders is necessary for successful integration.

3.4.4. Physical Proximity

Research indicates that many male Soldiers have concerns that particular jobs will require direct physical contact with female Soldiers. For example, some vehicle and weapons crews are concerned with incidental contact while operating their equipment. Similarly, accomplishing a specific task may require female and male Soldiers to physically touch at times (e.g., blood sweeps, physically moving Soldiers in combat or training, etc.) or while occupying tactical positions or listening posts/observation posts.

**Potential Impacts to Morale, Cohesion, Readiness.** Less than one fifth of command teams expect MCR to decline due to physical proximity. Command teams fear that inadvertent actions associated with required close contact or confined spaces may be misconstrued as sexual in nature. The Army must appropriately address issues when Soldiers clearly cross the line but also recognize that contact may occur that one Soldier believes was unwantedly sexual in nature while the other Soldier views it as unintentional. In these situations, whether intentional or unintentional, the ensuing investigation lowers MCR for the unit and all Soldiers involved.

**Conclusion.** Soldiers expressed concern over physical proximity in the conduct of their MOS mission. Trust between Soldiers and with their leaders is critical. Leaders must acknowledge this concern and set conditions of professional conduct in close quarters in order to properly train and execute combat operations.

3.4.5. Professional Standards of Conduct.

Some leaders expressed limited knowledge of female-specific standards and are fearful of enforcing those standards because of the potential for sexual harassment accusations. Furthermore, male and female Soldiers report having observed unequal enforcement of standards based on gender, beginning in Basic Combat Training and AIT, and extending to current units with regard to corrections on uniforms, interpersonal conduct, and professionalism. Lastly, some Soldiers believe that women use their gender to avoid equal enforcement of standards.

**Potential Impacts to Morale, Cohesion, Readiness.** Approximately 10% of command teams anticipate a decline in MCR due to poor enforcement of standards of conduct. Command teams report that as integration occurs, combat arms leaders must educate themselves on gender-specific regulations and policies. Standardized education products should originate in the training base with leaders receiving re-fresher instruction during professional schooling. Emphasis on uniform enforcement of standards is critical to the success of integration. It will mitigate MCR impacts.

**Conclusion.** Leader emphasis on appropriate conduct and the professional military ethic will mitigate the risk of falling standards and loss of discipline.
3.5. Analytic Findings.

Combining elements of the identified study factors, five wide-ranging barriers to successful integration exist. While some military professionals may question the occurrence of these barriers based on their anecdotal experience, it does not lessen the veracity of their existence. While none of the barriers is individually widespread enough across the force to make integration unsuccessful, their reported prevalence in numerous study-related venues warranted inclusion in this Report. Furthermore, their combined effect, if not appropriately addressed, could potentially make integration much more difficult for individual Soldiers, units, and the Army as a whole. Acknowledging these barriers is the first step to overcoming them. Figure 4 provides the underlying logic - it traces the lineage of factors to barriers to recommendations.

The five barriers to successful integration are:

**Barrier 1. Inconsistent Enforcement of Existing Standards and Perceptions of Double-Standards.**

**Contributing Factors:** Physical Standards, Combat Arms Unit Culture, Field Environment, Stereotypes About Women, Fraternization, Professional Standards of Conduct.

The development and maintenance of standards of performance, conduct, and uniformity are the basis of the Army’s historic performance as the professional force that serves the Nation by winning its wars and securing its peace. Well-defined, operationally ground standards provide the Army with its primary mechanism to prepare individuals and units to prevent, shape, and win in a complex world. The absence or weak enforcement of individual and collective standards within any military organization corrodes morale, cohesion, and readiness. As a result, the Army’s professional culture traditionally abhors these conditions and strives to maintain high standards as the primary means of ensuring success across the broad range of military operations.

Respondents routinely reported that the absence or weak enforcement of standards would complicate integration. Most Soldiers who responded in GIS surveys and focus groups stated that standards were critical to the success of integration, yet many reported experiencing a waning emphasis on the standards-based culture on which the Army prides itself. Many
senior NCOs and officers also identified this atrophy as a problem and attributed it to the limited time available to focus on the Army Professional Ethic due to the pressures of multiple deployments since 2001. Prevalent observations of a declining standards-based culture require immediate action to prevent it from becoming a systemic issue.

The study also found problematic views within the force regarding perceptions of gender-based standards. Many male combat arms Soldiers expressed a lack of knowledge of female Soldier-specific standards, apprehension in applying unfamiliar standards because of concerns of potential harassment complaints, and concern that leaders will not enforce standards uniformly. Additionally, they reported that differing standards, such as the gender-normed APFT scale, are unfair and put them at a disadvantage when considered for promotion. Perceptions of double-standards and the perceived inability of women to meet occupationally based physical standards has reinforced negative stereotypes that women are “lesser Soldiers.” In fact, 4 out of 5 combat arms Soldiers believe that unit effectiveness will decrease in the future because standards will change to accommodate women’s success. As the Army moves forward with integration, it must address perceptions of the differing application and enforcement of standards based on gender.

**Barrier 2. Incidents of Unprofessional Behavior and Indiscipline.**

**Contributing Factors:** Sexual Harassment, Combat Arms Unit Culture, Consensual Sex, Sexual Assault, Fraternization, Role Models, Professional Standards of Conduct.

As members of the Army profession, Soldiers aspire to live up to the principles in the Warrior Ethos: “I will always place the mission first;” “I will never accept defeat;” “I will never quit;” and “I will never leave a fallen comrade.” The Warrior Ethos originates from the culture of the Army’s combat arms branches. This culture is shared across the Army as the principal system of learned behavior for building cohesive teams by focusing on activities that raise esprit de corps, heighten pride in unit heritage, and build trust among Soldiers and between Soldiers and their leaders. However, this study has uncovered some negative aspects of the combat arms culture, where small-unit leaders in pockets across the Army have embraced unprofessional behavior, such as rites of passage, harassment, excessive cursing, hazing, and hypermasculine sexuality as ways of building cohesion. These informal actions usually occur outside the sight of senior unit leaders and are thought of as an indispensable means of creating effective teams. Contrary to the Army Values, these incidents threaten the standards of professionalism expected by the American people, harm the Soldiers who are victims of the behavior, and ultimately reduce unit morale, cohesion, and readiness.

Given these reported incidents and the history of previous integration efforts, women will potentially face these negative behaviors as they enter previously closed MOSs/units. In fact, 4 out of 5 Army women report that an expected negative reception from their male peers is a deterrent when considering a potential transfer into combat arms specialties. Additionally, both male and female Soldiers express concern over the potential disruptions from unprofessional behavior provoked by newly introduced sexual attraction, consensual sex, and inappropriate social relationships in previously all-male units. Furthermore, many respondents are apprehensive that broadly shared relationship issues on social media will intensify indiscipline and unprofessional behavior. To successfully integrate, the Army must
focus attention on the Professional Ethic and Warrior Ethos, reinforce the positive aspects of the combat arms culture, and aggressively root out unprofessional behavior and traditions.

**Barrier 3. Fear of Sexual Harassment and Sexual Assault.**

**Contributing Factors:** Sexual Harassment, Combat Arms Unit Culture, Consensual Sex, Sexual Assault, Fraternization, Spousal Concerns, Professional Standards of Conduct.

The Army has identified SH and SA as significant threats to the morale, cohesion, and readiness of the force. While the Army has taken aggressive action to appropriately address these issues with some success, the study has found that this institutional response, known as SHARP, has created an unintended consequence of fear and apprehension in the force that is not conducive to future integration. SHARP training has resulted in two divergent views on SH/SA that will make integration more difficult in the future.

The first view (shared mostly by female respondents) reflects the observation that SH/SA are widespread problems in the Army. These respondents report that accused perpetrators of SH/SA typically have tremendous power over their victims and are routinely exonerated of charges. Furthermore, respondents report that SHARP training makes them potentially mistrustful of their male peers. As evidence of this view, almost 4 out of 5 female Soldiers report that SH/SA is a deterrent when considering a potential transfer into previously all-male combat arms specialties.

A second view of SH/SA (shared primarily by male respondents) reveals apprehension that the victim-centric SHARP approach has empowered accusers to falsely use allegations to detrimentally impact the accused for a variety of malicious purposes. This group of respondents perceives that even when charges are proved false, the accused is never fully cleared and the false accuser is rarely punished. Focus groups reported that the heightened emphasis on SHARP has made male Soldiers fearful of interacting with their female colleagues, hence making future integration more difficult. Furthermore, some male Soldiers indicated concern that the physical proximity demanded in combat arms specialties puts them at heightened risk for SA allegations.

Finally, Army leaders now face institutional SHARP policies that have created potentially perverse career incentives to either cover-up allegations or to separate men and women as much as practical to avoid incidents of SH/SA. This separation is harmful to future integration where men and women are expected to work together. It also reinforces negative stereotypes that women are in need of “protection,” thus contributing to the belief that they are “lesser Soldiers.” Given these study results, the Army must adjust the SHARP program to ensure the success of integration. In particular, research indicates that failed consensual relationships and fraternization are common pre-curators to SH/SA incidents; therefore, SHARP education should increase focus on the Army Professional Ethic with discussion of appropriate work-based relationships.

**Contributing Factors:** Pregnancy, Physical Standards, Combat Arms Unit Culture, Field Environment, Stereotypes About Women, Fraternization, Differences in Leadership Style, Men as Protectors.

A variety of gender-based stereotypes present challenges to the integration of women into previously closed MOSs/units. Some of these stereotypes come from broader American society and include views that women are emotionally weaker, less mentally resilient, and more emotional than men. As such, many male Soldiers hold traditional views on the “chivalrous duty” of men to watch over women. Many male Soldiers believe this paternalistic instinct to protect women is both genetic and culturally reinforced. As a result, these Soldiers indicate concern that having women in combat will detract them from their mission, citing their instinct to protect women. For these men and broader American society, Soldiering is seen as “men’s work” that requires an organizational environment which emphasizes dominance, aggressiveness, and overcoming fear.

In addition to external stereotypes, the Army has many internal stereotypes about women. Male Soldiers report that women have lower breaking points than men and may not be able to handle stressful training and combat situations. Additionally, many Soldiers perceive that women expect and receive special treatment; therefore, women are seen as “getting over” when it comes to meeting standards of performance and discipline. In particular, 7 out of 10 male Soldiers believe that women use pregnancy to avoid deploying. Moreover, there are expectations that women will bring “feminine” leadership styles that emphasize collaboration, consensus-building, caring, and indecisiveness into a combat arms culture that prizes leaders who are aggressive, decisive, and direct. Finally, there is a prevalent belief that these stereotypes are true and that Army and national leadership are exaggerating the benefits of integration and are in denial of the costs. As a result, many male Soldiers believe that unqualified women will enter combat arms specialties only to serve as tokens of an ill-conceived policy decision. To successfully integrate, the Army must confront these broad cultural stereotypes about men and women, while simultaneously communicating the rationale and importance of integration.

Barrier 5. Ignorance of Army Policy.

**Contributing Factors:** Pregnancy, Physical Standards, Field Environment, Fraternization, Reclassification, Physical Proximity.

Ignorance of Army policy is the final barrier to successful integration. While the Army strives to hold all Soldiers to the same standards regardless of gender, some policy differences exist between men and women. Many male Soldiers report that they are ignorant of these differences, particularly female uniform policy and Army requirements pertaining to pregnancy. Additionally, many Soldiers believe the Army has official differing policy for women in austere field environments and report numerous beliefs about hygiene requirements for women that are wrong. This problem is particularly acute in units that conduct long-duration, dismounted operations. A concerted education effort to address this
ignorance and to debunk common myths is required to successfully integrate women into previous closed units.

### 3.6. Analytical Synopsis

This study incorporated the latest social science research via a multimethod research design to identify and mitigate the risk of 17 institutional and cultural factors expected to affect the integration of women into previously closed MOSs/units. The synthesis of these factors into the five barriers to integration provides the groundwork to develop approaches to address identified concerns. The next chapter of the report details strategies to address the barriers in the near, mid, and long-term.
Chapter 4. Summary and Conclusion

4.1. Principal Finding and Recommendation.

This Report recommends that the Army proceed with gender integration of all previously closed AOCs, MOSs, units, and positions. Analysis determined that the mitigated risk of the identified study factors to unit morale, cohesion, and readiness is moderate if the Army can appropriately address two high-risk factors – Soldier concerns about SH and SA. Given these findings, the assignment of women to specific positions and occupational specialties does not conflict with the guiding principles outlined by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

4.2. Summary of Results.

As the Army moves forward with integration, this Report is intended to help leaders gain a deeper understanding of the factors related to integration and take the necessary steps toward ensuring that the best-qualified Soldiers, regardless of gender, are selected for each position within the Army. To accomplish this goal, the Army must take three significant steps.

First, leaders must communicate the rationale and importance of how integration makes the force more ready and effective.

Second, the Army must continue to develop, maintain, and enforce MOS-specific physical standards to ensure that all Soldiers meet the operational requirements of their position. Research supports the conclusion that physically capable women in the combat arms will reduce many of the stereotypes held by their male peers.

Finally, the Army must focus attention and expend resources over time on strengthening the Army Professional Ethic. Increased professionalism in the force will hamper the rise of negative aspects associated with mixed gender working environments. These negative aspects include SH/SA, fraternization, the spectacle of failed consensual relationships, and spousal concerns of infidelity.

In general, the Army has experience navigating historic integration initiatives. Like previous efforts, the success of gender integration will take time and require a focus on standards, policy, and leader development.

The following recommendations set conditions for successful integration. Each recommendation is followed in brackets by the primary barrier it addresses.

4.2.1 Recommendations in the Near-Term (Pre-Integration - 2015).

- **Focus on the Professional Ethic.** To increase professionalism across the force, the Army requires a concerted force-wide initiative led by senior leaders focused on the Professional Ethic. This initiative should broadly incorporate products from the Center for the Army Profession and Ethic into leader development down to the small-unit level and across the training base. [Barrier 2]
- **Continue Standards-Based Messaging.** To effectively communicate the importance of integration to the force, Army leaders at the midgrade level must understand the rationale and benefits of the Soldier2020 effort. Senior Army leaders must continue standards-based messaging to all audiences. [Barrier 1]

- **Develop and Maintain MOS-specific Physical Standards for Accessions.** In addition to ongoing LOE2 work related to combat specialties, the Army should continue to develop and maintain MOS-specific physical standards for all occupations. [Barrier 1]

- **Address SHARP Program Issues.** Modify training and education to mitigate the current climate SHARP has created. This climate has led to secondary effects of fear and mistrust among Soldiers that will make integration more difficult. A focus on the Professional Ethic and appropriate relationships will partially mitigate these issues. [Barrier 3]

- **Develop an Enduring Assessment Effort.** As part of forecasting potential pitfalls to successful integration, the Army must proactively develop an assessment plan to measure progress and effectiveness. To accomplish this goal, the Army must resource the maintenance and analysis of results over time by establishing clear responsibilities at the HQDA-level under one of the principal staff elements. Army leadership should charge this staff element with periodically reviewing and reporting on integration impacts to morale, cohesion, and readiness. Results from this assessment will enable the Army to address potential stakeholder concerns with the progress and public outcomes of integration. [All Barriers]

- **Plan to Integrate Female Leaders First.** To set conditions for the arrival of new female enlisted Soldiers, female lieutenants in combat arms branches should be the first women assigned at the company level to newly integrated units. Female NCOs in currently open MOSs (e.g., supply sergeants – 92Y) could arrive concurrently with the lieutenants. This study recommends very limited reclassification of female NCOs into previously closed specialties – particularly MOSs that are over-strength. [Barrier 2]

- **Plan to Integrate All Training.** The Army should plan to integrate all training to successfully prepare military schools for the future inclusion of female Soldiers. [Barrier 4]

- **Create a Primer for Policy Education.** The Army should develop and distribute a primer on female-specific policy and regulations to help educate newly integrated units. [Barrier 5]

**4.2.2 Recommendations in the Mid-Term (Integration Begins – 2016-2020).**

- **Focus on the Warrior Ethos.** Building on the Professional Ethic focus, Army leadership should emphasize the Warrior Ethos as the theme for building integrated teams with strong task cohesion – the ability to accomplish a collective task using the team’s common knowledge, skills, and abilities. [Barrier 2]
• **Resource a Long-Term Leader Development Program.** To weed out unprofessional behavior at the small-unit level, the Army should focus training of first-line leaders on how to successfully build task cohesion. These leaders will serve as role models of professionalism. [Barrier 2]

• **Assign Two or More Women to Integrating Units at the Company Level.** Two female enlisted Soldiers assigned together at the company-level where female lieutenants and NCOs are already in place would be sufficient to address many concerns Army women voiced. New female Soldiers do not require a female supervisor, and do not have to be assigned together in the same platoon. Additionally, when assigning women, the Army should place them in BCTs beginning a major training cycle to ensure unit attention is focused on individual and collective task training. [Barrier 3]

• **Limit Integrating Unit Exposure to Excessive Attention.** To avoid negative aspects of the “spotlight” effect, leaders must meter unit exposure to external attention (e.g., media, senior leader visits, etc.). The Army must allow integrating units to focus on team building without publically singling out newly integrated women as “special.” [Barrier 4]

• **Explore Options for MOS-specific Continuation of Service Testing.** As an extension of LOE2, the Army should explore whether continuation testing after accessions of MOS-specific physical standards is advantageous to individual and unit readiness and effectiveness. [Barrier 1]

• **Develop Materiel Solutions.** The Army must develop materiel solutions to meet the unique physical needs of women in newly integrated MOSs. [Barrier 1]

4.2.3. **Recommendations in the Long-Term (Integration Steady-State – 2020 and beyond).**

• **Focus on the Army’s Heritage.** As pressures of constant deployment cycles lessen, the Army should focus on unit pride and heritage activities. This focus aims to build high social cohesion – the closeness of group members based on emotional bonds of respect and admiration. High social cohesion combined with high task cohesion encourages the development of resiliency within units. [Barrier 2]

• **Refine MOS Standards.** Refine MOS-specific physical standards in a transparent manner that is grounded in operational requirements. This includes a socialization period with the force to allow for feedback and ample time for instruction to train to meet standards. [Barrier 1]

• **Display Strategic Patience with the Force.** The Army will encounter negative publicity for isolated incidents related to newly integrated units. Leadership must show strategic patience with the force and rely on the long-term assessment plan for results to provide cogent answers to critics of integration. [All Barriers]
4.3. Conclusion.

The above recommendations, if successfully executed, provide the Army with analytically grounded solutions to mitigate the risk to morale, cohesion, and readiness identified over the course of this two-year study. In addition to supporting the successful integration of women in previously closed MOSs/units, these recommendations also address wider issues within the force.

Finally, this study is not a traditional Army operations research analysis – it connects elements of sociology, psychology, economics, and law via the use of multimethod research design to merge quantitative and qualitative data. The combination of operations research and social science provides a powerful synergy. This coupling potentially points to the future of Army analysis where social science perspectives will complement traditional methods. As outlined in the recent Army Operating Concept, the first-order capabilities to succeed are not materiel solutions as in the past, but rather optimization of Soldier performance in the future. Examinations of the human dimension similar to this study will provide the necessary analysis for senior leaders to posture the Army to win in a complex world.
Glossary

AD  Armored Division
ABN  Airborne
AEAC  Army Education Advisory Committee
AIT  advanced individual training
ALC  Advanced Leader Course
AOC  area of concentration
APFT  Army Physical Fitness Test
AR  Army Regulation
ARI  Army Research Institute
ARNG  Army National Guard
ATP  Army technical publication

BCT  brigade combat team
BG  Brigadier General
BOLC  Basic Officer Leaders Course

CARL  Combined Arms Research Library
CCC  Captains Career Course
CG  commanding general
CMD  command
COL  Colonel
CPT  Captain
CSA  Chief of Staff of the Army
CSM  Command Sergeant Major

DA  Department of the Army
DACOWITS  Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services
DCS  deputy chief of staff
DGCAR  Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule
DOD  Department of Defense
DOTMLPF  doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities

FORSCOM  Forces Command
FRG  family readiness group

GEN  General
GIS  gender integration study

HQDA  Headquarters, Department of the Army
HRC  U.S. Army Human Resources Command

ID  Infantry Division
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KSAO</td>
<td>knowledge, skills, attributes, and other characteristics</td>
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<td>LOE</td>
<td>line of effort</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
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<td>LTG</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
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<td>MAJ</td>
<td>Major</td>
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<td>MCR</td>
<td>morale, cohesion, and readiness</td>
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<td>MG</td>
<td>Major General</td>
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<td>MLRS</td>
<td>Multiple Launch Rocket System</td>
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<td>MOS</td>
<td>military occupational specialty</td>
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<td>Master Sergeant</td>
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<td>Reserve Officer Training Corps</td>
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<td>Secretary of the Army</td>
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<td>Sergeant Major</td>
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<td>Senior Leader Course</td>
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<td>U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center</td>
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<td>TTP</td>
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<td>UCMJ</td>
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