1
00:00:01,090 --> 00:00:02,260
- [Martin] Secretary in response

2
00:00:02,260 --> 00:00:05,483
to Senator McCaskill's contracting concerns,

3
00:00:05,630 --> 00:00:07,530
you said that the best way to avoid these kinds

4
00:00:07,530 --> 00:00:11,510
of problems was quote, "having methodical review

5
00:00:11,510 --> 00:00:13,250
for every dollar going out."

6
00:00:13,250 --> 00:00:14,083
- Right

7
00:00:14,083 --> 00:00:14,916
- And I couldn't agree more.

8
00:00:15,000 --> 00:00:19,243
So I want to ask you about a particular RFP coming up.

9
00:00:19,320 --> 00:00:22,080
The Pentagon has announced that it intends to bring

10
00:00:22,470 --> 00:00:25,610
all of its computing services under one cloud

11
00:00:25,930 --> 00:00:28,910
in a ten billion dollar single award contract

12
00:00:29,210 --> 00:00:32,320
and the department issued an RFI last month

13
00:00:32,420 --> 00:00:34,560
which received over a thousand questions

14
00:00:34,560 --> 00:00:35,930
and comments from industry

15
00:00:35,930 --> 00:00:40,123
and leading technology experts who, for the most part,

16
00:00:40,360 --> 00:00:43,803
believe that the current proposal is deeply misguided.

17
00:00:44,143 --> 00:00:46,680
Yet, the department seems to be rushing ahead

18
00:00:46,700 --> 00:00:48,610
to issue an RFP in early May

19
00:00:48,610 --> 00:00:52,063
and intends to issue an award as early as September.

20
00:00:52,750 --> 00:00:55,450
What is the rush here and why is the Pentagon

21
00:00:55,450 --> 00:00:58,650
moving forward so quickly despite the concerns

22
00:00:58,650 --> 00:01:01,753
of both Congress and technology leaders?

23
00:01:03,410 --> 00:01:06,483
- Senator, the rush right now is

24
00:01:06,483 --> 00:01:09,770
that we have too many data banks

25
00:01:09,770 --> 00:01:11,330
that the frontline commanders

26
00:01:11,330 --> 00:01:14,643
cannot swiftly draw information from.

27
00:01:15,190 --> 00:01:17,810
So, what we have been looking at right now

28
00:01:17,810 --> 00:01:20,620
is how do we get faster access

29
00:01:21,130 --> 00:01:23,860
for the young folks on the front lines

30
00:01:23,860 --> 00:01:26,200
and displaying the information they need,

31
00:01:26,200 --> 00:01:27,920
not all the information in the world

32
00:01:27,920 --> 00:01:29,553
that clouds what they need.

33
00:01:30,095 --> 00:01:32,560
That is the driving impetus.

34
00:01:32,560 --> 00:01:34,670
It's the lethality.

35
00:01:34,670 --> 00:01:37,560
It is not a sole source and there's no preselect.

36
00:01:37,560 --> 00:01:39,360
- [Martin] But it is a single award?

37
00:01:39,940 --> 00:01:41,680
- It will be.
- You know there's

38
00:01:41,680 --> 00:01:42,876
A small carve out
- After two years for about,

39
00:01:42,876 --> 00:01:46,209
I wanna say it's
- There's a single award

40
00:01:46,490 --> 00:01:49,573
ten billion contract
- around 7%.

41
00:01:50,740 --> 00:01:53,560
- The first contract is a single award.

42
00:01:53,560 --> 00:01:55,120
It has, I think a two-year base

43
00:01:55,120 --> 00:01:56,210
and then some options

44
00:01:56,590 --> 00:01:58,250
- Current technology
- It's a big plum,

45
00:01:58,250 --> 00:02:00,380
that's why I think it it deserves some attention.

46
00:02:00,380 --> 00:02:02,340
I don't want to quibble with you about sole source

47
00:02:02,340 --> 00:02:05,930
but I think it deserves some oversight

48
00:02:05,930 --> 00:02:07,990
and we included language in the omni

49
00:02:08,870 --> 00:02:12,130
that requires you to submit

50
00:02:12,130 --> 00:02:15,210
a full justification for executing a single award,

51
00:02:15,210 --> 00:02:17,540
not sole source, single award contract

52
00:02:17,800 --> 00:02:20,103
instead of a multi-cloud approach.

53
00:02:20,300 --> 00:02:23,490
Are you gonna be able to submit

54
00:02:23,490 --> 00:02:25,930
that justification as required by law

55
00:02:25,930 --> 00:02:29,103
and will it happen before or after the RFP?

56
00:02:29,980 --> 00:02:34,980
- We always align ourselves with the law senator.

57
00:02:35,390 --> 00:02:37,963
When is it going to be brought in?

58
00:02:38,360 --> 00:02:40,020
- Both reports will actually be submitted

59
00:02:40,020 --> 00:02:41,600
at the time the first report is due,

60
00:02:41,600 --> 00:02:43,320
so there's normally a gap, we're gonna get them both in

61
00:02:43,320 --> 00:02:46,373
on May 7th, and that will be before the RFP.

62
00:02:46,380 --> 00:02:47,323
- Fantastic.

63
00:02:49,070 --> 00:02:51,628
To be perfectly clear, there are people speculating

64
00:02:51,628 --> 00:02:54,950
that this is tailor made for single vendor

65
00:02:54,950 --> 00:02:57,120
and I would just ask you to assure me

66
00:02:57,120 --> 00:02:59,053
that those concerns are not justified.

67
00:02:59,230 --> 00:03:02,920
- Sir, our goal is to get the best possible service

68
00:03:02,920 --> 00:03:03,860
for the frontline.

69
00:03:03,860 --> 00:03:08,240
I'm aware that some people in industry perhaps believe

70
00:03:08,240 --> 00:03:10,680
that this should be an equal opportunity thing

71
00:03:10,680 --> 00:03:13,023
where everybody gets a piece of the pie.

72
00:03:13,710 --> 00:03:16,670
We have got to go forward in a defensible way,

73
00:03:16,670 --> 00:03:19,260
where you can go to your constituent

74
00:03:19,260 --> 00:03:21,700
and say they did the right thing ethically

75
00:03:21,700 --> 00:03:23,918
as well as legally in order to carry out

76
00:03:23,918 --> 00:03:27,970
the best possible support for our frontline troops.

77
00:03:27,970 --> 00:03:29,347
If we can't do that--
- I want us to just get

78
00:03:29,347 --> 00:03:32,230
the best deal for the best product

79
00:03:32,230 --> 00:03:34,570
for the people who actually use it on the front lines.

80
00:03:34,570 --> 00:03:35,403
- [James] Yes.

81
00:03:36,720 --> 00:03:39,520
- I hate to go back to cyber deterrence

82
00:03:39,520 --> 00:03:41,270
but it's an endless topic.

83
00:03:41,270 --> 00:03:44,313
So, General Dunford, Secretary Mattis,

84
00:03:44,670 --> 00:03:46,660
we keep hearing from combatant commanders

85
00:03:46,660 --> 00:03:48,620
appearing before this committee

86
00:03:48,620 --> 00:03:50,413
that we need a cyber doctrine.

87
00:03:51,280 --> 00:03:54,830
We hear a common refrain that this requires

88
00:03:54,830 --> 00:03:56,170
a whole of government approach

89
00:03:56,170 --> 00:03:57,560
which we've heard so many times

90
00:03:57,560 --> 00:03:59,920
that now it's starting to sound more like

91
00:03:59,920 --> 00:04:01,433
it's someone else's job.

92
00:04:02,420 --> 00:04:06,090
Our adversaries don't see any significant consequences

93
00:04:06,090 --> 00:04:08,480
at this point for their cyber actions

94
00:04:08,950 --> 00:04:12,543
and we need to demonstrate an effective, credible deterrent.

95
00:04:12,960 --> 00:04:15,510
When are we gonna have that national cyber doctrine

96
00:04:15,562 --> 00:04:17,143
to address this issue?

97
00:04:19,460 --> 00:04:21,800
- I can tell you we're working on it, sir.

98
00:04:21,800 --> 00:04:23,784
Inside the Department of Defense

99
00:04:23,784 --> 00:04:26,660
we've got cyber orders out.

100
00:04:26,660 --> 00:04:31,660
We've got 130 of 133 cyber teams already manned.

101
00:04:32,040 --> 00:04:33,400
There's more training going on.

102
00:04:33,400 --> 00:04:34,920
We've got to get in place

103
00:04:35,150 --> 00:04:37,470
a persistent cyber training environment

104
00:04:37,470 --> 00:04:39,233
to bring to the top of their game.

105
00:04:39,560 --> 00:04:42,550
So we're organizing for the Defend the Nation effort,

106
00:04:42,550 --> 00:04:45,050
which I think is what you're referring to senator,

107
00:04:45,060 --> 00:04:46,800
you know we're in support

108
00:04:46,840 --> 00:04:51,113
of the obviously the Secretary of Homeland Security.

109
00:04:51,430 --> 00:04:55,280
That said, this is a very challenging effort

110
00:04:55,280 --> 00:04:57,970
and I believe that congressional guidance

111
00:04:57,970 --> 00:05:00,570
will be necessary as we weigh life

112
00:05:00,570 --> 00:05:03,090
and liberty right out of our Constitution

113
00:05:03,290 --> 00:05:06,280
and what role do you want the military to play

114
00:05:06,480 --> 00:05:09,910
inside the United States in a defense mode

115
00:05:09,950 --> 00:05:11,360
and I think this is something

116
00:05:11,360 --> 00:05:13,500
that you need to lead us on

117
00:05:13,750 --> 00:05:16,710
because this is not our normal operating location

118
00:05:16,710 --> 00:05:20,010
unless there's as you know a forest fire or insurrection.

119
00:05:20,010 --> 00:05:21,840
We don't do this stuff.

120
00:05:21,840 --> 00:05:24,013
We stay focused oversees.

121
00:05:24,290 --> 00:05:26,130
So I think the more clarity we get

122
00:05:26,130 --> 00:05:28,280
from the Congress the better

123
00:05:28,280 --> 00:05:29,560
and I think we have to work

124
00:05:29,560 --> 00:05:31,763
with the executive branch, all of us there,

125
00:05:31,990 --> 00:05:34,898
including the Secretary of Treasury for example

126
00:05:34,898 --> 00:05:37,863
and the Secretary of Energy.

127
00:05:38,211 --> 00:05:40,683
It's a very big issue right now.

128
00:05:40,800 --> 00:05:43,600
We're gonna have to break it down into bite-sized pieces

129
00:05:44,140 --> 00:05:45,767
and from the authorities that start here

130
00:05:45,767 --> 00:05:47,800
and the spirit of Congress to guide us,

131
00:05:47,800 --> 00:05:49,293
we can go forward on this.

132
00:05:49,490 --> 00:05:51,433
- [Martin] We need to get started then chairman.

133
00:05:51,433 --> 00:05:53,577
- [Jack] Thank you and Senator Perdue.

134
00:05:53,577 --> 00:05:55,170
- Thank you Mr. Chair

135
00:05:55,170 --> 00:05:58,240
and I'd like to echo the Secretary's opening comments

136
00:05:58,240 --> 00:05:59,840
about expressing our gratitude.

137
00:05:59,840 --> 00:06:02,410
to our folks in uniform around the world.

138
00:06:02,410 --> 00:06:04,653
The best of the best is out there on the wall.

139
00:06:04,653 --> 00:06:08,078
General Dunford, in your testimony

140
00:06:08,078 --> 00:06:11,790
you now are calling space a contested domain.

141
00:06:11,790 --> 00:06:13,637
In your words, "Potential adversaries

142
00:06:13,637 --> 00:06:15,097
"view our alliance on this domain

143
00:06:15,097 --> 00:06:16,897
"as a vulnerability they can exploit

144
00:06:17,067 --> 00:06:18,397
"and they're increasingly challenging

145
00:06:18,397 --> 00:06:20,977
"our competitive advantage in space."

146
00:06:20,980 --> 00:06:23,040
For the last, you know, few decades

147
00:06:23,040 --> 00:06:25,280
we've viewed space as a scientific endeavor

148
00:06:25,280 --> 00:06:26,827
where our potential adversaries

149
00:06:26,827 --> 00:06:28,670
in the last decade have been using it

150
00:06:28,670 --> 00:06:31,653
as a potential military domain, obviously.

151
00:06:31,920 --> 00:06:34,830
China in 2007 conducted an ASAT,

152
00:06:34,830 --> 00:06:37,270
anti-satellite missile test that was successful

153
00:06:37,270 --> 00:06:40,513
and threw thousands of pieces of debris into that orbit.

154
00:06:40,770 --> 00:06:44,320
'16 they put up a so-called space debris clearer

155
00:06:44,520 --> 00:06:48,080
that could clear that in supposed terms

156
00:06:48,080 --> 00:06:50,973
but also could potentially wreak havoc on our satellite.

157
00:06:51,890 --> 00:06:55,560
Even DNI Coats talks about any future conflict

158
00:06:55,560 --> 00:06:58,229
would occur with Russia and China would see this

159
00:06:58,229 --> 00:07:00,870
potentially it would be the first opening salvo

160
00:07:00,870 --> 00:07:02,880
would be an attempt to take out our

161
00:07:02,880 --> 00:07:05,023
satellite capabilities.

162
00:07:05,100 --> 00:07:07,200
We now see China with a snuggler

163
00:07:07,450 --> 00:07:10,150
satellite capability that's being talked about publicly.

164
00:07:10,150 --> 00:07:14,120
And a particular concern in quotes (stammers)

165
00:07:14,120 --> 00:07:16,533
I'm sorry, DNI Coats's words,

166
00:07:16,637 --> 00:07:18,353
"Of particular concern Russia and China

167
00:07:18,353 --> 00:07:20,730
" could continue to launch experimental"

168
00:07:20,730 --> 00:07:23,087
in parentheses, "satellites that conduct

169
00:07:23,087 --> 00:07:25,200
"sophisticated own orbit activities

170
00:07:25,557 --> 00:07:26,647
"with at least some of which

171
00:07:26,647 --> 00:07:29,717
"are intended to advance counter-space capabilities."

172
00:07:29,778 --> 00:07:33,810
And yet with our advanced battle management system

173
00:07:33,810 --> 00:07:36,870
is seems to me that over the last several months

174
00:07:36,870 --> 00:07:38,850
we've been briefed on the future direction,

175
00:07:38,850 --> 00:07:40,997
I'm talking about 10 years out

176
00:07:40,997 --> 00:07:44,770
and the future plan is that we have a strong dependence

177
00:07:44,770 --> 00:07:46,670
on our space capabilities.

178
00:07:46,670 --> 00:07:49,340
In the interim term, can you give us some comfort

179
00:07:49,340 --> 00:07:52,626
that the military is moving to protect

180
00:07:52,626 --> 00:07:56,150
any dependence we have on this space capability

181
00:07:56,210 --> 00:07:57,970
and then gives us a little of your thinking

182
00:07:57,970 --> 00:07:59,650
about moving more capability from

183
00:07:59,650 --> 00:08:02,863
the air, land, and sea domains to the space domain.

184
00:08:03,260 --> 00:08:05,410
- Senator I can and you raise a good issue.

185
00:08:05,410 --> 00:08:06,760
I think it's important to just go back

186
00:08:06,760 --> 00:08:08,710
and look at the assumption that we made

187
00:08:08,970 --> 00:08:10,430
when we stared to leverage space

188
00:08:10,430 --> 00:08:11,630
for our command and control,

189
00:08:11,630 --> 00:08:13,590
for our intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance,

190
00:08:13,590 --> 00:08:14,763
for our navigation,

191
00:08:14,840 --> 00:08:16,543
for the precision weapons we had,

192
00:08:16,720 --> 00:08:19,335
we made an assumption that space would be uncontested

193
00:08:19,335 --> 00:08:21,340
and many of the systems that we put

194
00:08:21,340 --> 00:08:22,800
into space were not resilient

195
00:08:22,840 --> 00:08:24,760
and so they weren't able to survive

196
00:08:24,760 --> 00:08:26,287
against the anti-satellite technology

197
00:08:26,287 --> 00:08:29,310
and other capabilities that the enemy now has

198
00:08:29,310 --> 00:08:32,083
to either jam or destroy our space capabilities.

199
00:08:32,400 --> 00:08:33,430
In the budget this year

200
00:08:33,430 --> 00:08:34,680
and really starting last year,

201
00:08:34,680 --> 00:08:36,446
we have started invest in broadly

202
00:08:36,446 --> 00:08:39,364
the category we call space resilience

203
00:08:39,364 --> 00:08:41,220
which is a variety of things.

204
00:08:41,220 --> 00:08:43,210
It's hardening some of the capabilities

205
00:08:43,210 --> 00:08:44,503
we have in space today,

206
00:08:44,600 --> 00:08:46,500
making sure that new capabilities have

207
00:08:46,500 --> 00:08:48,028
in the requirements documents,

208
00:08:48,028 --> 00:08:49,980
the right requirements to make sure

209
00:08:49,980 --> 00:08:51,310
they're resilient to the challenges

210
00:08:51,310 --> 00:08:52,573
we expect in the future.

211
00:08:52,740 --> 00:08:56,453
Then also ideas of more satellites,

212
00:08:56,680 --> 00:08:58,200
leveraging commercial satellites,

213
00:08:58,200 --> 00:09:00,160
and so forth and perhaps smaller satellites

214
00:09:00,160 --> 00:09:01,440
so that all of our capabilities

215
00:09:01,440 --> 00:09:03,763
aren't in one single satellite.

216
00:09:03,990 --> 00:09:05,440
With regard to characterization,

217
00:09:05,440 --> 00:09:07,205
debris and so forth and command and control,

218
00:09:07,205 --> 00:09:10,518
by no means am I suggesting where we need to be

219
00:09:10,518 --> 00:09:13,610
but frankly starting back a few years ago

220
00:09:13,610 --> 00:09:16,270
under General Hyten, who's now at Strategic Command,

221
00:09:16,270 --> 00:09:18,600
he was formally at Space Command

222
00:09:18,600 --> 00:09:20,090
in the United States Air force,

223
00:09:20,090 --> 00:09:21,720
we started an initiative to establish

224
00:09:21,720 --> 00:09:23,160
a more effective command and control.

225
00:09:23,160 --> 00:09:25,110
A key piece of that command and control

226
00:09:25,300 --> 00:09:27,850
in our Joint Space Operation Center, is the ability

227
00:09:27,850 --> 00:09:29,930
to characterize debris in space

228
00:09:29,930 --> 00:09:31,070
and to be able to make adjustments

229
00:09:31,070 --> 00:09:32,410
in our operating concepts

230
00:09:32,540 --> 00:09:35,069
to accommodate that debris in space.

231
00:09:35,069 --> 00:09:39,100
This is absolutely an area of focus in the department.

232
00:09:39,100 --> 00:09:41,740
I think the budget this year reflects that in '19.

233
00:09:41,740 --> 00:09:42,962
It reflects it in '18.

234
00:09:42,962 --> 00:09:44,957
For me from a war fighting perspective,

235
00:09:44,957 --> 00:09:46,800
we have to solve this problem.

236
00:09:46,800 --> 00:09:49,066
We have built a force that is dependent on space.

237
00:09:49,066 --> 00:09:52,094
Now on the other side, in our exercises

238
00:09:52,094 --> 00:09:54,320
we're also now increasingly making sure

239
00:09:54,320 --> 00:09:56,750
that we're able to operate in a space denied

240
00:09:56,750 --> 00:09:58,140
or degraded environment and to make sure

241
00:09:58,140 --> 00:10:00,230
that we can accommodate degradation

242
00:10:00,230 --> 00:10:03,130
to the capabilities that we have today that leverage space

243
00:10:03,180 --> 00:10:05,310
but all those things are very much on our mind, Senator.

244
00:10:05,310 --> 00:10:06,380
I appreciate you raising it

245
00:10:06,380 --> 00:10:08,932
'cause I think in the areas that we are concerned about,

246
00:10:08,932 --> 00:10:10,732
we say there's not a war in space,

247
00:10:10,732 --> 00:10:14,160
there's a war that involves the capabilities

248
00:10:14,160 --> 00:10:15,283
that we have in space.

249
00:10:16,200 --> 00:10:17,427
- Secretary I'm running out of time,

250
00:10:17,427 --> 00:10:20,470
but quickly, sorry, I'm about out of time

251
00:10:20,470 --> 00:10:22,710
but would you quickly just comment on

252
00:10:22,710 --> 00:10:25,080
the Israeli-Iran potential

253
00:10:26,310 --> 00:10:28,780
cataclysmic confrontation potential

254
00:10:28,780 --> 00:10:30,350
that is sitting there in Syria.

255
00:10:30,350 --> 00:10:32,950
With Iran, the Persian Empire,

256
00:10:32,950 --> 00:10:35,430
throughout history had a land bridge

257
00:10:35,430 --> 00:10:36,780
when they were at their height,

258
00:10:36,780 --> 00:10:37,900
all the way to the Mediterranean.

259
00:10:37,900 --> 00:10:40,230
Sure looks like everything Iran is doing right now

260
00:10:40,230 --> 00:10:42,100
is trying to reestablish that land bridge

261
00:10:42,100 --> 00:10:46,301
through Iraq and Syria and Lebanon into the Mediterranean,

262
00:10:46,301 --> 00:10:49,466
but right now we see a really dangerous crossfire

263
00:10:49,466 --> 00:10:51,910
between U.S. and Russia forces in the area

264
00:10:52,130 --> 00:10:54,463
and also now between Israel and Iran.

265
00:10:54,570 --> 00:10:56,010
You've talked publicly about this

266
00:10:56,010 --> 00:10:57,980
but give us some indication about

267
00:10:57,980 --> 00:11:00,563
the way you're thinking about this right now.

268
00:11:01,000 --> 00:11:02,299
- Senator very quickly,

269
00:11:02,299 --> 00:11:05,330
the Iran regime, the Tehran regime,

270
00:11:05,330 --> 00:11:08,500
not the Iranian people, are clearly

271
00:11:08,500 --> 00:11:12,963
in strength using their proxies in Syria.

272
00:11:13,700 --> 00:11:17,490
We have seen them trying to bring advanced weaponry

273
00:11:17,520 --> 00:11:19,580
in through Syria on it's way

274
00:11:19,580 --> 00:11:22,473
to the Lebanese-Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon.

275
00:11:23,110 --> 00:11:24,850
Israel is not going to wait

276
00:11:24,850 --> 00:11:27,361
until those missiles are in the air.

277
00:11:27,361 --> 00:11:29,493
Will it be cataclysmic?

278
00:11:29,900 --> 00:11:30,910
I hope not.

279
00:11:30,910 --> 00:11:33,380
I hope Iran pulls back.

280
00:11:33,380 --> 00:11:36,750
- Is there a nuclear threat in that potential confrontation?

281
00:11:36,750 --> 00:11:37,590
- A nuclear threat?

282
00:11:37,590 --> 00:11:38,423
- [David] Yes sir.

283
00:11:38,423 --> 00:11:39,518
- No sir, not at this time.

284
00:11:39,518 --> 00:11:40,550
- [David] Thank you.

285
00:11:40,550 --> 00:11:42,301
Thank you sir.
- Yes sir.

286
00:11:42,301 --> 00:11:44,564
- Thank you Mr. Chairman
- Thank you Mr. Perdue.

287
00:11:44,564 --> 00:11:45,814
Senator Warren.

288
00:11:45,850 --> 00:11:47,193
- Thank you Mr. Chairman.

289
00:11:47,470 --> 00:11:50,970
For over three years Saudi Arabia led coalition

290
00:11:50,970 --> 00:11:53,660
has been bombing Yemen to counter

291
00:11:53,670 --> 00:11:55,963
Iranian backed Houthi militia.

292
00:11:56,310 --> 00:11:59,763
The United States military has been providing intelligence,

293
00:12:00,000 --> 00:12:03,180
mid-air refueling and munitions to the Saudis,

294
00:12:03,180 --> 00:12:05,913
in other words we've been helping and helping a lot.

295
00:12:06,360 --> 00:12:09,380
Our refueling assistance to the Saudi led coalition

296
00:12:09,380 --> 00:12:10,213
is governed by something called

297
00:12:10,213 --> 00:12:14,090
the Acquisition and Cross- Servicing Agreement

298
00:12:14,090 --> 00:12:15,533
or ACSA I think.

299
00:12:15,787 --> 00:12:18,510
The United States has such an agreement

300
00:12:18,510 --> 00:12:22,253
with both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

301
00:12:22,277 --> 00:12:24,930
The Secretary of Defense is authorized

302
00:12:24,930 --> 00:12:28,680
to enter into these agreements with any non-NATO country

303
00:12:28,690 --> 00:12:31,494
and it must notify Congress 30 days

304
00:12:31,494 --> 00:12:34,113
before it signs such an agreement.

305
00:12:34,310 --> 00:12:37,478
Secretary Mattis, can you give me a ballpark number

306
00:12:37,478 --> 00:12:41,340
for how many acquisition and cross-servicing agreements

307
00:12:41,340 --> 00:12:43,300
that the United States has entered into

308
00:12:43,300 --> 00:12:44,623
with other countries?

309
00:12:45,790 --> 00:12:47,400
- I'll have to take it for the record

310
00:12:47,400 --> 00:12:49,100
and I think I can get back to you

311
00:12:49,100 --> 00:12:51,010
very quickly on that Senator Warren.

312
00:12:51,010 --> 00:12:53,850
This was, as you know, a decision

313
00:12:53,850 --> 00:12:55,580
by the previous administration

314
00:12:55,580 --> 00:12:58,083
that we inherited, reviewed, and endorsed.

315
00:12:58,640 --> 00:12:59,610
- What I'm trying to get at though

316
00:12:59,610 --> 00:13:00,650
is how many of these agreements,

317
00:13:00,650 --> 00:13:03,350
you don't even have a ballpark for what the number is?

318
00:13:04,180 --> 00:13:06,223
- [James] I do not Senator.

319
00:13:06,360 --> 00:13:10,930
- Okay, after an ACSA is signed ethe Defense Department

320
00:13:10,930 --> 00:13:13,149
is required to report to Congress.

321
00:13:13,149 --> 00:13:15,484
Let me ask, is the Defense Department

322
00:13:15,484 --> 00:13:18,330
required to report to Congress

323
00:13:18,330 --> 00:13:20,312
on a regular basis about the type

324
00:13:20,312 --> 00:13:23,463
of defense assistance that's provided?

325
00:13:23,690 --> 00:13:27,400
Or to report on any changes in the ACSA?

326
00:13:28,749 --> 00:13:30,830
- I'm gonna have to get back to you Senator.

327
00:13:30,830 --> 00:13:34,140
I know we have many times testified about this,

328
00:13:34,140 --> 00:13:36,840
as did people sitting in these chairs

329
00:13:36,840 --> 00:13:38,403
in the last administration.

330
00:13:38,907 --> 00:13:40,049
- [Elizabeth} Okay.

331
00:13:40,049 --> 00:13:43,373
- From President Obama's administration.

332
00:13:43,490 --> 00:13:45,740
You did characterize it correctly,

333
00:13:45,740 --> 00:13:47,953
what this one is about however.

334
00:13:47,990 --> 00:13:49,920
- And I think you'll find

335
00:13:49,920 --> 00:13:51,846
that there is no regular report required

336
00:13:51,846 --> 00:13:53,740
and last month I joined a letter

337
00:13:53,740 --> 00:13:56,410
with ranking member Reed and Senator Blumenthal

338
00:13:56,790 --> 00:13:59,330
to the Defense Department asking for details

339
00:13:59,330 --> 00:14:01,930
about the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements

340
00:14:02,060 --> 00:14:03,827
that we have with Saudi Arabia

341
00:14:03,827 --> 00:14:06,590
and the UAE, as they continue

342
00:14:06,590 --> 00:14:08,683
their bombing campaign in Yemen.

343
00:14:08,830 --> 00:14:11,520
Now the DOD responded with copies

344
00:14:11,520 --> 00:14:15,393
of the congressional notifications for these agreements.

345
00:14:15,560 --> 00:14:20,560
One was dated February 1988 and the other July 1992.

346
00:14:22,640 --> 00:14:25,690
Those are pretty old notifications given

347
00:14:25,690 --> 00:14:27,340
that we signed defense agreements

348
00:14:27,340 --> 00:14:32,070
with Saudi Arabia in 2016 and the UAE in 2006.

349
00:14:33,110 --> 00:14:35,720
Now, I'm concerned that these agreements

350
00:14:35,720 --> 00:14:37,777
have existed not just with Saudi Arabia

351
00:14:37,777 --> 00:14:41,480
and the UAE but with many other countries

352
00:14:41,480 --> 00:14:44,580
and with very little oversight from Congress.

353
00:14:44,580 --> 00:14:47,320
During the administration of both parties

354
00:14:47,630 --> 00:14:50,803
and I think that needs to change.

355
00:14:51,480 --> 00:14:52,330
There's another question I want

356
00:14:52,330 --> 00:14:54,320
to ask about Secretary Mattis,

357
00:14:54,320 --> 00:14:57,030
and that is the National Defense Strategy

358
00:14:57,030 --> 00:15:00,347
which says that quote, "Long-term strategic

359
00:15:00,347 --> 00:15:02,322
"competitions with China and Russia

360
00:15:02,322 --> 00:15:04,297
"are the principal priorities

361
00:15:04,297 --> 00:15:05,967
"for the Department of Defense."

362
00:15:06,090 --> 00:15:07,810
The strategy stresses the need

363
00:15:07,810 --> 00:15:09,690
to modernize existing equipment,

364
00:15:09,690 --> 00:15:11,122
to invest in advanced capabilities,

365
00:15:11,122 --> 00:15:14,050
and to enhance the readiness of joint-forces

366
00:15:14,050 --> 00:15:15,573
for a high-end fight.

367
00:15:15,870 --> 00:15:18,120
Many analysts have said that a conflict

368
00:15:18,120 --> 00:15:22,733
on the Korean Peninsula could bog us down for years,

369
00:15:22,960 --> 00:15:25,860
degrading our equipment and potentially resulting

370
00:15:25,860 --> 00:15:27,920
in thousands of casualties

371
00:15:28,150 --> 00:15:30,973
to our allies and to our own troops.

372
00:15:31,170 --> 00:15:33,980
So my question Secretary Mattis is,

373
00:15:33,980 --> 00:15:36,890
what would be the impact of a long-term conflict

374
00:15:36,890 --> 00:15:40,170
on the Korean Peninsula on our ability

375
00:15:40,170 --> 00:15:43,347
to prepare for a high-end conflict,'

376
00:15:43,420 --> 00:15:46,133
like those described in the defense strategy?

377
00:15:48,110 --> 00:15:51,190
- As you've seen Senator, where the full court press

378
00:15:51,190 --> 00:15:55,030
has been for the last year on a diplomatic initiative

379
00:15:55,050 --> 00:15:56,290
that is now bearing fruit.

380
00:15:56,290 --> 00:15:57,740
It's taken a long time

381
00:15:58,470 --> 00:16:00,683
and I think it can be fruitful.

382
00:16:00,850 --> 00:16:02,970
Obviously we're all hopeful

383
00:16:02,970 --> 00:16:05,163
but we're just going to see how it works.

384
00:16:05,211 --> 00:16:09,830
Every effort's bein' made that any resort

385
00:16:09,830 --> 00:16:12,340
to war is the last resort.

386
00:16:12,340 --> 00:16:14,930
- I appreciate that Secretary Mattis,

387
00:16:14,930 --> 00:16:17,690
but my question is if we get bogged down

388
00:16:17,690 --> 00:16:22,690
in a long-term ground conflict in Korea,

389
00:16:22,860 --> 00:16:25,842
what I'm asking about is what would be the impact

390
00:16:25,842 --> 00:16:29,520
on our ability to prepare for a high-end conflict

391
00:16:29,520 --> 00:16:32,220
like those that are described in the defense strategy?

392
00:16:32,360 --> 00:16:36,790
- War is such an unpredictable phenomenon, Senator,

393
00:16:36,790 --> 00:16:40,422
I wouldn't subscribe that we would get bogged down.

394
00:16:40,422 --> 00:16:43,530
In order words it might go a lot faster.

395
00:16:43,530 --> 00:16:45,110
Neither you nor I can tell

396
00:16:45,110 --> 00:16:47,913
if it's gonna beg two years or two months.

397
00:16:48,255 --> 00:16:49,917
- I'm gonna try a third time.

398
00:16:49,917 --> 00:16:53,475
If there is a long-term conflict

399
00:16:53,475 --> 00:16:57,750
on the Korean Peninsula what impact would that have

400
00:16:57,750 --> 00:17:01,053
on our ability to prepare for a high-end conflict,

401
00:17:01,240 --> 00:17:03,800
like the kind described in the defense strategy?

402
00:17:03,800 --> 00:17:06,023
- It would be distracting Senator.

403
00:17:06,390 --> 00:17:08,190
- [Elizabeth] More than distracting?

404
00:17:08,520 --> 00:17:10,810
- Well, if you look at what's happened

405
00:17:10,810 --> 00:17:13,630
over the regular fight over the last 15 years,

406
00:17:13,630 --> 00:17:15,430
you get a sense of what happens

407
00:17:15,430 --> 00:17:17,910
when you're distracted over that time

408
00:17:17,910 --> 00:17:20,570
from focusing on the primary threat

409
00:17:20,570 --> 00:17:22,155
but we are not going to do that.

410
00:17:22,155 --> 00:17:26,451
The Congress has reorganized the Department

411
00:17:26,451 --> 00:17:28,520
and we now have an undersecretary

412
00:17:28,520 --> 00:17:30,870
who focuses on nothing but research

413
00:17:30,870 --> 00:17:33,113
and engineering for the future.

414
00:17:33,430 --> 00:17:35,606
So he will continue what he's doing.

415
00:17:35,606 --> 00:17:37,960
The department will continue those efforts.

416
00:17:37,960 --> 00:17:40,110
Obviously this will be a distraction

417
00:17:40,116 --> 00:17:42,430
of enormous proportions.

418
00:17:42,430 --> 00:17:45,310
- You know, I will point out that last week

419
00:17:45,310 --> 00:17:48,533
I asked the nominee for Pacific Command,

420
00:17:48,533 --> 00:17:51,530
Admiral Philip Davidson, the same question

421
00:17:51,540 --> 00:17:52,910
and he put it differently.

422
00:17:52,910 --> 00:17:55,600
He said, any long-term conflict has significant

423
00:17:55,900 --> 00:17:58,900
financial costs and costs around the globe

424
00:17:58,930 --> 00:18:02,223
and people costs within the armed services.

425
00:18:02,390 --> 00:18:05,410
So I'm concerned about what would happen

426
00:18:05,410 --> 00:18:07,800
if we were in a position with both,

427
00:18:07,800 --> 00:18:09,110
but let me just say--
- So am I Senator.

428
00:18:09,110 --> 00:18:12,340
- Good, I am very glad to hear about your commitment

429
00:18:12,490 --> 00:18:15,770
to a diplomatic solution with North Korea

430
00:18:15,770 --> 00:18:17,330
and that we not get bogged down

431
00:18:17,330 --> 00:18:19,163
into a long-term conflict there.

432
00:18:19,190 --> 00:18:20,310
Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

433
00:18:20,310 --> 00:18:21,280
- [James] We've been committed

434
00:18:22,239 --> 00:18:23,463
the entire administration's time, ma'am.

435
00:18:23,696 --> 00:18:24,640
- Than you, Mr. Secretary.

436
00:18:24,640 --> 00:18:25,890
- [Martin] Senator Ernst.

437
00:18:26,310 --> 00:18:27,460
- Thank you, Mr. Chair.

438
00:18:28,058 --> 00:18:28,920
Gentlemen, thank you very much

439
00:18:29,373 --> 00:18:30,760
for your continued service to our country.

440
00:18:30,760 --> 00:18:31,921
Secretary Norquist, thank you

441
00:18:31,921 --> 00:18:35,150
and your team very much for sitting down

442
00:18:35,150 --> 00:18:36,650
with me not all that long ago

443
00:18:36,650 --> 00:18:39,773
to review the DoD audit and your progress there.

444
00:18:40,070 --> 00:18:43,130
I am very glad that you enjoy reading those audit reports

445
00:18:43,130 --> 00:18:45,000
so thank you for your work on that.

446
00:18:45,000 --> 00:18:46,060
- [David] And Senator I appreciate your interest

447
00:18:46,060 --> 00:18:47,770
in the subject, thank you.

448
00:18:47,943 --> 00:18:48,776
- Thank you very much.

449
00:18:48,820 --> 00:18:52,404
General Mattis, the Truman Carrier strike group ...

450
00:18:52,404 --> 00:18:53,487
Oh excuse me.

451
00:18:54,064 --> 00:18:55,614
The Truman Carrier strike group

452
00:18:55,640 --> 00:18:58,330
just recently departed from Norfolk

453
00:18:58,330 --> 00:19:00,068
and we wish them well.

454
00:19:00,068 --> 00:19:04,610
Recent reports suggest that they may remain

455
00:19:04,610 --> 00:19:08,210
in the European theater, which is breaking

456
00:19:08,210 --> 00:19:10,160
with tradition, rather then deploying

457
00:19:10,160 --> 00:19:11,830
to the Middle East as they have

458
00:19:12,440 --> 00:19:14,543
during deployments of the past.

459
00:19:14,650 --> 00:19:17,740
Can you speak about the need to make our military

460
00:19:17,740 --> 00:19:19,989
less operationally predictable

461
00:19:19,989 --> 00:19:23,290
and how we can posture our joint force

462
00:19:23,290 --> 00:19:25,630
to truly make our adversaries counter us

463
00:19:25,630 --> 00:19:28,273
in the multi-domain?

464
00:19:29,480 --> 00:19:30,540
- Yes, I can Senator.

465
00:19:30,540 --> 00:19:34,278
Naval forces by their very makeup, very composition,

466
00:19:34,278 --> 00:19:37,224
are naturally agile forces that can be deployed anywhere.

467
00:19:37,224 --> 00:19:41,024
In the past, we have focused

468
00:19:41,024 --> 00:19:46,024
on simply maintaining a forward presence.

469
00:19:46,297 --> 00:19:49,170
Now with the National Defense Strategy saying

470
00:19:49,170 --> 00:19:52,350
that we are going to focus on large power,

471
00:19:52,350 --> 00:19:54,286
great power, competition, it means

472
00:19:54,286 --> 00:19:56,693
that without breaking the families

473
00:19:56,693 --> 00:19:58,500
and without breaking the fleet

474
00:19:58,500 --> 00:20:00,200
or the field forces of the Army,

475
00:20:00,200 --> 00:20:02,730
the Air Force, whatever, we are going

476
00:20:02,730 --> 00:20:04,350
to make certain they are capable

477
00:20:04,350 --> 00:20:05,854
of deploying and fighting at a higher level of capability.

478
00:20:05,854 --> 00:20:10,240
What that means is, the Chairman,

479
00:20:10,240 --> 00:20:12,360
under his global integrator role,

480
00:20:12,360 --> 00:20:14,160
where I have given him the authority

481
00:20:14,230 --> 00:20:16,653
with my oversight, civilian oversight,

482
00:20:16,880 --> 00:20:20,210
to maneuver forces around in a manner

483
00:20:20,210 --> 00:20:23,550
that makes us strategically reliable as an ally

484
00:20:23,550 --> 00:20:27,178
to our allies but operationally unpredictable

485
00:20:27,178 --> 00:20:29,710
to our adversaries and this is part

486
00:20:29,710 --> 00:20:31,610
of making certain that we get out

487
00:20:31,610 --> 00:20:34,144
of acting with our navy like we're a shipping line

488
00:20:34,144 --> 00:20:36,433
and get back into acting like a navy.

489
00:20:36,510 --> 00:20:38,660
- And I greatly appreciate that, thank you.

490
00:20:38,686 --> 00:20:39,530
I think anything we can do

491
00:20:39,530 --> 00:20:41,990
to keep our adversaries off-kilter we need

492
00:20:41,990 --> 00:20:43,593
to do that, so thank you.

493
00:20:43,955 --> 00:20:47,340
As well, we've been talking a lot

494
00:20:47,340 --> 00:20:49,140
about the National Defense Strategy

495
00:20:49,370 --> 00:20:52,870
and General Mattis, it does reference expanding,

496
00:20:52,870 --> 00:20:55,516
in quote, "expanding the competitive space."

497
00:20:55,516 --> 00:20:57,661
Russia has been very, very successful

498
00:20:57,661 --> 00:21:00,418
in competing with the United States

499
00:21:00,418 --> 00:21:03,820
below the threshold of actual conflict

500
00:21:03,820 --> 00:21:05,783
in what we call the Gray Zone.

501
00:21:05,783 --> 00:21:08,250
They have been very aggressive

502
00:21:08,250 --> 00:21:10,140
through their military posturing,

503
00:21:10,140 --> 00:21:12,745
they've used political influence,

504
00:21:12,745 --> 00:21:15,412
they've done information operation campaigns,

505
00:21:15,412 --> 00:21:20,412
what does expanding the competitive space mean

506
00:21:21,230 --> 00:21:23,453
for competitions with Russia?

507
00:21:23,560 --> 00:21:24,950
- We're going to have to be able

508
00:21:24,950 --> 00:21:27,738
to compete across all the domains of warfare

509
00:21:27,738 --> 00:21:30,600
and we had two of them on this planet,

510
00:21:30,600 --> 00:21:33,370
land and sea, for the several thousand years.

511
00:21:33,370 --> 00:21:36,070
In the last hundred years, we added the air component

512
00:21:36,350 --> 00:21:37,920
and in the last ten years now,

513
00:21:37,920 --> 00:21:40,590
or five years, we're really focused in

514
00:21:40,590 --> 00:21:43,423
on the cyber domain and the outer space domain.

515
00:21:43,720 --> 00:21:45,290
We're going to have to be able to compete there

516
00:21:45,290 --> 00:21:46,640
but there's more than that.

517
00:21:46,730 --> 00:21:49,730
America is still a great beacon

518
00:21:49,730 --> 00:21:52,473
of hope to people who wanna run their own lives.

519
00:21:52,730 --> 00:21:55,673
We support sovereignty and territorial integrity.

520
00:21:55,910 --> 00:21:59,640
We don't believe nations should be requiring tribute

521
00:21:59,640 --> 00:22:01,670
from other nations using the statement

522
00:22:01,670 --> 00:22:03,283
of one belt, one road.

523
00:22:03,440 --> 00:22:06,310
We don't believe that Russia has a veto authority

524
00:22:06,310 --> 00:22:09,220
over the countries along its periphery

525
00:22:09,500 --> 00:22:12,230
or has any right to change international borders

526
00:22:12,230 --> 00:22:13,563
through the force of arms.

527
00:22:14,070 --> 00:22:15,000
So we're going to have to be able

528
00:22:15,000 --> 00:22:18,353
to compete across diplomatic, economic,

529
00:22:18,353 --> 00:22:22,370
information, energy lines

530
00:22:22,450 --> 00:22:26,050
and we're engaged in that on a routine basis

531
00:22:26,050 --> 00:22:27,600
in the sit room in the White House.

532
00:22:27,600 --> 00:22:29,863
We orchestrate and integrate this effort.

533
00:22:29,900 --> 00:22:31,430
- Very good, thank you very much.

534
00:22:31,430 --> 00:22:33,520
And thanks for the reference to dime as well.

535
00:22:33,520 --> 00:22:35,043
I think it's really important.

536
00:22:35,290 --> 00:22:40,290
and then the FY18 NDAA included a provision

537
00:22:40,640 --> 00:22:43,600
to provide assistance to our partner forces

538
00:22:44,090 --> 00:22:47,195
to support US Special Operations

539
00:22:47,195 --> 00:22:49,165
combating irregular warfare threats.

540
00:22:49,165 --> 00:22:52,503
Have you identified additional resources

541
00:22:52,503 --> 00:22:55,417
or new authorities that will help support

542
00:22:55,417 --> 00:22:58,600
those lines of effort, especially when we're trying

543
00:22:58,600 --> 00:23:00,743
to counter malign Russian influence?

544
00:23:03,370 --> 00:23:05,520
- I have not seen where we don't have

545
00:23:05,520 --> 00:23:07,330
the authorities we need, whether it be

546
00:23:07,330 --> 00:23:11,697
through the NATO support that you're aware of and you fund.

547
00:23:11,697 --> 00:23:15,360
We are expanding the Special Operation Forces,

548
00:23:15,360 --> 00:23:19,237
mostly niche capabilities, it's not a wholesale everything

549
00:23:19,237 --> 00:23:21,350
and the Special Forces being expanded

550
00:23:21,918 --> 00:23:25,960
but let me just ask the Chairman to weigh in on this

551
00:23:26,267 --> 00:23:29,750
- There is, Senator, in the European Defense Initiative

552
00:23:29,750 --> 00:23:31,300
a Special Operations component

553
00:23:31,300 --> 00:23:32,830
to training and exercises as well.

554
00:23:32,830 --> 00:23:35,270
If you're talkin' specific to the European Theater.

555
00:23:35,270 --> 00:23:37,393
- Yes, absolutely, thank you.

556
00:23:37,393 --> 00:23:39,770
Thank you, gentlemen, my time has expired.

557
00:23:39,770 --> 00:23:41,630
I appreciate your continued service.

558
00:23:41,630 --> 00:23:42,463
Thank you.

559
00:23:43,510 --> 00:23:45,020
- [Martin] Thank you, Senator Ernst.

560
00:23:45,020 --> 00:23:46,503
Senator Peters.

561
00:23:46,970 --> 00:23:47,870
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

562
00:23:47,870 --> 00:23:49,470
Gentlemen, once again, thank you

563
00:23:49,740 --> 00:23:51,350
for your testimony here today.

564
00:23:51,350 --> 00:23:54,960
Secretary Mattis, as you and I have spoken

565
00:23:54,960 --> 00:23:58,140
on many occasions about advanced technologies,

566
00:23:58,140 --> 00:23:59,740
particularly artificial intelligence

567
00:23:59,740 --> 00:24:01,860
and how those types of technologies

568
00:24:01,860 --> 00:24:04,740
will radically change warfare

569
00:24:04,740 --> 00:24:07,170
and how we fight wars in the future

570
00:24:07,170 --> 00:24:10,220
and we also know that our near peer adversaries

571
00:24:10,220 --> 00:24:13,893
are working very aggressively on acquiring these as well.

572
00:24:14,730 --> 00:24:16,840
That it is certainly critical for us

573
00:24:16,840 --> 00:24:20,970
to be working on it with a great deal of attention

574
00:24:20,970 --> 00:24:23,320
so my question to you though, Secretary Mattis,

575
00:24:23,938 --> 00:24:25,220
is that I know the department is working

576
00:24:25,670 --> 00:24:28,420
on establishing a joint Artificial Intelligence Center.

577
00:24:28,520 --> 00:24:30,970
Could you talk a little bit about that

578
00:24:31,050 --> 00:24:33,580
and give us some detail as to what you're thinking about?

579
00:24:33,580 --> 00:24:34,880
- I can, Senator Peters.

580
00:24:34,880 --> 00:24:38,190
Like you say, we've discussed these issues many times

581
00:24:38,190 --> 00:24:42,300
and this is probably one of the leading efforts we have

582
00:24:42,300 --> 00:24:45,110
but we also have these kind of efforts going on

583
00:24:45,110 --> 00:24:48,320
on big data, on computing, hyperscience.

584
00:24:48,320 --> 00:24:51,180
In this case that you're asking about here,

585
00:24:51,180 --> 00:24:54,260
what we're doing, we're finding a number

586
00:24:54,260 --> 00:24:57,740
of efforts in the department that are funded separately.

587
00:24:57,740 --> 00:24:59,760
Some of them are making some good progress.

588
00:24:59,760 --> 00:25:03,853
Some haven't achieved what I would call outputs yet.

589
00:25:03,950 --> 00:25:07,087
The Deputy Secretary, the Chief Management Officer,

590
00:25:07,087 --> 00:25:10,660
are pulling this together and we're going to try

591
00:25:10,660 --> 00:25:13,910
to get a synergy going so that all the money going

592
00:25:13,910 --> 00:25:17,240
in to this is purposeful, it's going for objectives,

593
00:25:17,240 --> 00:25:19,520
and we're not talkin' about three years from now,

594
00:25:19,520 --> 00:25:21,560
we're talkin' three months, six months,

595
00:25:21,560 --> 00:25:25,130
now what are we doing to get the processes under way

596
00:25:25,130 --> 00:25:27,993
to deliver capability in the near term.

597
00:25:28,440 --> 00:25:29,670
- Is there something this committee can do

598
00:25:29,670 --> 00:25:31,030
to help you in your efforts?

599
00:25:31,030 --> 00:25:32,270
- I need to come back to ya

600
00:25:32,270 --> 00:25:33,908
once we've got it organized, sir.

601
00:25:33,908 --> 00:25:37,360
Believe it or not it's taken me several months

602
00:25:37,713 --> 00:25:39,450
just in order to identify everything

603
00:25:39,450 --> 00:25:41,633
we've got going on in this regard.

604
00:25:41,790 --> 00:25:45,003
Once we have it aligned, I'll be back to you, I'm sure.

605
00:25:45,180 --> 00:25:46,070
Sayin' what we need.

606
00:25:46,070 --> 00:25:48,903
Right now, I think we need to get our act together.

607
00:25:49,413 --> 00:25:50,730
- I appreciate that, I'll look forward

608
00:25:50,730 --> 00:25:53,493
to workin' with you as you continue down that road.

609
00:25:53,790 --> 00:25:55,884
The other question that I have relates

610
00:25:55,884 --> 00:25:58,490
to the procurement process.

611
00:25:58,490 --> 00:26:00,780
Yesterday the Government Accountability Office

612
00:26:00,780 --> 00:26:03,480
released its 16 annual assessment

613
00:26:03,480 --> 00:26:06,160
of DoD weapons systems acquisitions

614
00:26:06,260 --> 00:26:09,750
which tracks the 1.6 trillion dollar portfolio

615
00:26:09,750 --> 00:26:11,846
over 86 weapons systems.

616
00:26:11,846 --> 00:26:14,803
The report emphasized a troubling trend

617
00:26:14,803 --> 00:26:17,130
that two many programs are proceeding

618
00:26:17,130 --> 00:26:19,630
without, as they call it, key knowledge essential

619
00:26:21,410 --> 00:26:22,403
to good acquisition outcomes.

620
00:26:22,959 --> 00:26:24,200
In fact, if i look at the summary here,

621
00:26:24,200 --> 00:26:26,583
basically the Comptroller General States

622
00:26:26,583 --> 00:26:29,037
" As we first observed in 2017,

623
00:26:29,037 --> 00:26:30,987
"production is the acquisition phase

624
00:26:30,987 --> 00:26:33,287
"most closely associated with cost growth."

625
00:26:33,330 --> 00:26:35,556
Where a lot of these project are now moving into.

626
00:26:35,556 --> 00:26:37,675
"Consequently, DoD's continued willingness

627
00:26:37,675 --> 00:26:41,704
"to accept knowledge gaps in these newer programs,

628
00:26:41,704 --> 00:26:45,007
"now over eight years after the implementation

629
00:26:45,007 --> 00:26:47,177
"of acquisition reforms, indicates

630
00:26:47,177 --> 00:26:49,287
"that reforms have not yet taken hold

631
00:26:49,287 --> 00:26:51,997
"to the extent that Congress intended."

632
00:26:52,150 --> 00:26:55,520
Secretary Mattis, could you respond to that finding?

633
00:26:55,520 --> 00:26:57,720
And anyone else on the panel would be appreciated.

634
00:26:57,720 --> 00:26:59,783
- I believe the finding is accurate.

635
00:27:00,340 --> 00:27:03,550
This is why a year ago when I came in I talked

636
00:27:03,550 --> 00:27:05,683
about reforming business practices.

637
00:27:06,510 --> 00:27:08,190
Today I come back with the same words

638
00:27:08,190 --> 00:27:10,113
and then I add accountability.

639
00:27:10,740 --> 00:27:12,050
We believe this is a problem.

640
00:27:12,050 --> 00:27:15,725
Now there are specific processes to get at this.

641
00:27:15,725 --> 00:27:18,320
One of them is make certain you keep people

642
00:27:18,729 --> 00:27:21,530
who are running programs in the program long enough

643
00:27:21,530 --> 00:27:23,850
that you really get a result from what they learn

644
00:27:23,850 --> 00:27:26,000
from the first year and they're not leavin'

645
00:27:26,732 --> 00:27:27,580
the second or third year.

646
00:27:27,580 --> 00:27:28,840
Second point is you have to get

647
00:27:28,840 --> 00:27:30,960
the requirements right up front, sir.

648
00:27:30,960 --> 00:27:33,980
Now in some of these, I would call it

649
00:27:34,947 --> 00:27:37,230
new technology areas, that can be a challenge

650
00:27:37,230 --> 00:27:39,530
and you understand that when we come back in

651
00:27:39,530 --> 00:27:41,410
and say, well, we found something

652
00:27:41,410 --> 00:27:43,933
through basic research that we didn't now before.

653
00:27:44,270 --> 00:27:46,380
But we have got to do better

654
00:27:46,380 --> 00:27:48,890
at getting the requirement right up front

655
00:27:48,890 --> 00:27:51,683
and then don't have requirement growth mid-way,

656
00:27:52,030 --> 00:27:57,030
specifically on this, we cannot bring technology in

657
00:27:57,125 --> 00:27:59,663
that is not at a mature level.

658
00:27:59,990 --> 00:28:02,570
If we do that before we prototype it

659
00:28:02,570 --> 00:28:04,690
and I realize that can create a time lag

660
00:28:04,690 --> 00:28:06,130
but that's where we've seen some

661
00:28:06,130 --> 00:28:07,513
of this growth come from.

662
00:28:07,730 --> 00:28:10,220
So as we define the problem it's people,

663
00:28:10,220 --> 00:28:13,600
it's processes, and then there's actual technical reasons

664
00:28:13,850 --> 00:28:15,100
that we've gotta correct,

665
00:28:15,100 --> 00:28:17,543
and that's leadership's responsibility,

666
00:28:17,810 --> 00:28:19,620
thus we've assigned accountability

667
00:28:19,620 --> 00:28:22,883
for each of these programs as a co-equal priority.

668
00:28:22,999 --> 00:28:24,499
- Great, thank you, Secretary.

669
00:28:24,930 --> 00:28:26,230
In my remaining time and it's low,

670
00:28:26,230 --> 00:28:28,450
I'd just like to ask a brief question about Yemen.

671
00:28:28,450 --> 00:28:30,539
All of you know that Yemen remains a humanitarian disaster.

672
00:28:30,539 --> 00:28:35,300
Disease, famine, unsafe drinking water,

673
00:28:35,300 --> 00:28:38,693
violence killing hundreds of Yemenis every day.

674
00:28:38,890 --> 00:28:41,190
I previously asked General Votel about this issue

675
00:28:41,190 --> 00:28:43,500
and he attributed some of the civilian casualties

676
00:28:43,500 --> 00:28:46,060
that we see associated with Saudi strikes as

677
00:28:46,371 --> 00:28:49,127
"related to the competence of the forces

678
00:28:49,127 --> 00:28:51,700
"that were operating" referring to the Saudis there.

679
00:28:51,700 --> 00:28:53,850
Secretary Mattis, General Dunford, briefly,

680
00:28:55,071 --> 00:28:56,283
could you comment on that?

681
00:28:56,575 --> 00:28:57,520
Has the competence of these forces operating

682
00:28:57,520 --> 00:29:00,723
in Yemen increased and what can we expect in the future?

683
00:29:01,612 --> 00:29:02,850
- Sir, I'll let the Chairman hit

684
00:29:02,850 --> 00:29:04,830
on a couple things we've actually done

685
00:29:04,830 --> 00:29:07,670
to reduce the number of innocents being hit.

686
00:29:07,670 --> 00:29:12,253
This is a tragedy, it is a catastrophe, humanitarian-wise.

687
00:29:12,550 --> 00:29:15,910
I will tell you that we now, as of about three weeks ago,

688
00:29:15,910 --> 00:29:18,923
we have for the first time, I believe,

689
00:29:19,053 --> 00:29:23,743
a United Nations envoy, a very experienced British diplomat,

690
00:29:24,882 --> 00:29:28,293
Michael Griffin who's in, I've met with him,

691
00:29:28,440 --> 00:29:29,760
State Department's met with him,

692
00:29:29,760 --> 00:29:31,780
we're gonna give him full support

693
00:29:31,780 --> 00:29:35,020
as we did his predecessor, but for the first time

694
00:29:35,020 --> 00:29:36,680
I think we have someone with the force

695
00:29:36,680 --> 00:29:38,930
of personality and the experience

696
00:29:38,930 --> 00:29:41,353
to help drive this to a close and end it.

697
00:29:41,510 --> 00:29:43,990
But there are some specific things we've done

698
00:29:43,990 --> 00:29:46,073
to address the innocent casualties.

699
00:29:46,859 --> 00:29:47,950
- Senator, I think mitigating the risk

700
00:29:48,212 --> 00:29:49,410
of civilian causalities with strikes

701
00:29:49,410 --> 00:29:51,680
is probably two issues, there's a cultural issue

702
00:29:51,680 --> 00:29:53,733
and then there's a technical issue.

703
00:29:53,870 --> 00:29:55,470
And I think we've had a positive impact

704
00:29:55,470 --> 00:29:56,870
with the Saudis in both regards

705
00:29:56,870 --> 00:29:59,653
by the advising and assisting we have been doing.

706
00:29:59,670 --> 00:30:04,416
We are co-located with them in their operations centers

707
00:30:04,416 --> 00:30:06,610
to help them develop the techniques

708
00:30:06,610 --> 00:30:08,240
and tactics that will allow them

709
00:30:08,240 --> 00:30:11,050
to conduct strikes while mitigating civilian casualties

710
00:30:11,060 --> 00:30:13,220
and I also think there's been a positive effect

711
00:30:13,220 --> 00:30:14,460
of the relationship that we built

712
00:30:14,460 --> 00:30:16,560
with the Saudis over time and the training

713
00:30:18,543 --> 00:30:19,720
to affect the changes in the culture

714
00:30:20,135 --> 00:30:21,130
that would have them take that into account

715
00:30:21,130 --> 00:30:22,459
when conducting military operations.

716
00:30:22,459 --> 00:30:24,683
So it's a long, plodding process.

717
00:30:24,683 --> 00:30:28,180
We, in many cases with the countries

718
00:30:28,180 --> 00:30:30,380
we're workin' on, addressin' those two issues,

719
00:30:30,380 --> 00:30:32,633
but I think it's payin' dividends over time.

720
00:30:33,090 --> 00:30:34,603
- Thank you, gentlemen.

721
00:30:35,049 --> 00:30:36,050
- [Jack] Thank you, Senator Peters.

722
00:30:36,050 --> 00:30:36,883
Senator Tillis.

723
00:30:38,430 --> 00:30:39,423
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

724
00:30:39,610 --> 00:30:40,530
Gentlemen, thank you for being here.

725
00:30:40,530 --> 00:30:43,450
I've got one quick question and it has to do

726
00:30:43,450 --> 00:30:45,290
with the budget.

727
00:30:45,290 --> 00:30:48,650
The President's budget calls for a 2.6% pay raise

728
00:30:48,650 --> 00:30:50,893
and other boosts to military spending.

729
00:30:50,930 --> 00:30:54,200
One concern that I have, if you see the trajectory

730
00:30:54,200 --> 00:30:59,200
for pay over time, we're gonna end up seeing some

731
00:30:59,860 --> 00:31:01,680
of that money to sustain that

732
00:31:02,719 --> 00:31:06,660
at the expense, probably somewhere, I think,

733
00:31:06,660 --> 00:31:08,963
in the 47 billion dollar range.

734
00:31:09,879 --> 00:31:13,640
So how are you going to be able to sustain,

735
00:31:13,640 --> 00:31:15,330
how are you going to continue to do

736
00:31:15,659 --> 00:31:17,610
what we should do which is continue to try

737
00:31:17,610 --> 00:31:19,200
and keep up with the cost of living

738
00:31:19,200 --> 00:31:21,640
and the competition y'all mentioned earlier

739
00:31:21,640 --> 00:31:25,210
in terms of retaining people with a growin' economy

740
00:31:25,610 --> 00:31:28,020
and then deal with the erosion of resources

741
00:31:28,020 --> 00:31:30,170
that would otherwise go to other priorities

742
00:31:30,446 --> 00:31:31,279
within the department?

743
00:31:31,746 --> 00:31:33,846
And Secretary Mattis, I'll start with you.

744
00:31:34,240 --> 00:31:36,930
- Senator Tillis, one difference

745
00:31:36,930 --> 00:31:38,450
about the way we look at people

746
00:31:38,450 --> 00:31:41,130
in the military, we look at them as an investment

747
00:31:41,130 --> 00:31:42,700
not as part of our overhead.

748
00:31:42,700 --> 00:31:45,270
We educate, we train 'em, we screen 'em,

749
00:31:45,270 --> 00:31:48,653
we screen 'em again and again and again.

750
00:31:48,842 --> 00:31:50,576
The idea is that we have best

751
00:31:50,576 --> 00:31:53,440
of breed goin' up and we're pretty good

752
00:31:53,440 --> 00:31:54,970
at promoting the right people

753
00:31:54,990 --> 00:31:57,943
and keeping an elite force.

754
00:31:58,150 --> 00:31:59,478
Part of this is making certain

755
00:31:59,478 --> 00:32:02,330
that the sacrifice of military life

756
00:32:02,330 --> 00:32:03,580
that can never be mitigated.

757
00:32:03,580 --> 00:32:04,413
- No question.

758
00:32:04,413 --> 00:32:05,873
But Mr. Secretary,
- This is one way to do it.

759
00:32:05,873 --> 00:32:07,050
how do you deal with the erosion?

760
00:32:07,050 --> 00:32:08,680
If you continue the trend line,

761
00:32:08,680 --> 00:32:10,490
how do you deal with the erosion based

762
00:32:10,490 --> 00:32:11,580
on other DoD priorities?

763
00:32:11,580 --> 00:32:14,380
- Well, I believe we have to look at this

764
00:32:14,380 --> 00:32:16,863
as America can afford survival, Senator.

765
00:32:17,080 --> 00:32:18,625
We're at 3.1% of GDP.

766
00:32:18,625 --> 00:32:22,920
If we can do better on our healthcare,

767
00:32:22,920 --> 00:32:25,203
in other words, reduce personnel costs

768
00:32:25,203 --> 00:32:28,510
outside the pay raise, if we can do better

769
00:32:28,510 --> 00:32:31,240
in our contracting so we're getting better return

770
00:32:31,240 --> 00:32:34,580
on the dollar, we're looking at finding those savings

771
00:32:34,580 --> 00:32:37,300
inside the department and making the argument

772
00:32:37,300 --> 00:32:38,850
to you that we get to keep them

773
00:32:39,000 --> 00:32:40,850
and apply 'em to the very direction

774
00:32:40,850 --> 00:32:42,810
that you're concerned with and rightly so.

775
00:32:42,810 --> 00:32:43,643
- [Thom] Thank you.

776
00:32:43,643 --> 00:32:45,273
General Dunford, did you have something?

777
00:32:45,780 --> 00:32:46,963
- Senator, I just say, I think as you know

778
00:32:46,963 --> 00:32:49,120
that the pay raise this year was benchmarked

779
00:32:49,120 --> 00:32:50,730
against a pretty consistent index

780
00:32:50,730 --> 00:32:52,740
that we've used over time with the ECI

781
00:32:52,740 --> 00:32:55,524
and while acknowledging the challenges we'll face

782
00:32:55,524 --> 00:32:58,885
in balancing compensation with the other pieces

783
00:32:58,885 --> 00:32:59,890
of the department, I do believe,

784
00:32:59,890 --> 00:33:00,885
and we had a discussion about earlier,

785
00:33:00,885 --> 00:33:02,730
I do believe that we're

786
00:33:02,730 --> 00:33:04,783
in a very competitive market right now

787
00:33:04,783 --> 00:33:07,236
for high quality people

788
00:33:07,236 --> 00:33:10,220
and I don't believe that we're payin' our people too much

789
00:33:10,220 --> 00:33:12,560
and so we do have to find efficiencies

790
00:33:12,560 --> 00:33:14,810
within the department in a wide range of ways

791
00:33:15,065 --> 00:33:16,990
to get the right balance but I would not argue

792
00:33:16,990 --> 00:33:19,480
at this point that the personnel account

793
00:33:19,523 --> 00:33:22,143
is an anchor on the department,

794
00:33:22,230 --> 00:33:24,230
getting the right people in is the cornerstone

795
00:33:24,230 --> 00:33:25,440
of us bein' successful.

796
00:33:25,440 --> 00:33:26,970
- Well, thank you all.

797
00:33:26,970 --> 00:33:29,670
In my capacity as the subcommittee chair

798
00:33:29,670 --> 00:33:31,030
on personnel I'm always lookin'

799
00:33:31,030 --> 00:33:34,110
for good ideas to give you more flexibility,

800
00:33:34,110 --> 00:33:36,660
find those efficiencies, and then plow them back in

801
00:33:36,869 --> 00:33:38,783
and makin' sure we're payin' our men and women.

802
00:33:39,500 --> 00:33:41,080
I may have another question about funding

803
00:33:41,080 --> 00:33:43,407
but I do have something that's a little bit--

804
00:33:43,430 --> 00:33:44,990
I tend not to get too specific,

805
00:33:44,990 --> 00:33:46,520
I focus on the business issues,

806
00:33:46,520 --> 00:33:48,670
but I wanna talk about Turkey for a minute.

807
00:33:48,820 --> 00:33:51,040
And I wanna talk about it on two fronts.

808
00:33:51,040 --> 00:33:55,360
One, they're below the NATO guidelines

809
00:33:55,360 --> 00:33:57,923
for as a percentage of DDP.

810
00:33:58,340 --> 00:34:01,380
Their participation, I think, is trending

811
00:34:01,380 --> 00:34:04,033
somewhere around 1.5%, the target's 2.

812
00:34:04,380 --> 00:34:06,950
And two, I'd also like to understand the complications

813
00:34:06,950 --> 00:34:08,960
that come from havin' a NATO partner

814
00:34:08,960 --> 00:34:11,370
possibly acquiring a missile defense system

815
00:34:11,370 --> 00:34:14,230
from Russia and the implications that that could have

816
00:34:14,230 --> 00:34:18,390
for our assets in Russia, our manufacturing facilities

817
00:34:18,390 --> 00:34:20,390
for the Joint Strike Fighter, et cetera.

818
00:34:22,745 --> 00:34:24,232
- As you know, Senator Tillis,

819
00:34:24,232 --> 00:34:26,550
Turkey is the only NATO ally

820
00:34:26,550 --> 00:34:29,570
with an ongoing insurgency inside its own country.

821
00:34:29,570 --> 00:34:32,890
We assist them as all of NATO does.

822
00:34:32,890 --> 00:34:37,890
We've got Spanish and Italian anti-missile batteries

823
00:34:37,910 --> 00:34:41,390
in Turkey to protect them against any Iranian threat

824
00:34:41,800 --> 00:34:46,060
but the complexity of the Syria fight

825
00:34:46,060 --> 00:34:50,570
has colored everything in that region, to include Turkey

826
00:34:50,570 --> 00:34:52,915
which has had an enormous refugee influx

827
00:34:52,915 --> 00:34:57,690
and they have gone through and attempted a haphazard coup

828
00:34:58,320 --> 00:35:00,507
that cost them innocent people killed.

829
00:35:00,507 --> 00:35:04,210
We are seriously concerned across NATO

830
00:35:04,210 --> 00:35:06,780
about the S-400, the Russian system.

831
00:35:06,780 --> 00:35:08,640
- Has there ever been another NATO ally

832
00:35:08,640 --> 00:35:10,240
that's done something like that?

833
00:35:10,430 --> 00:35:12,459
- Well, to a degree, as ya know,

834
00:35:12,459 --> 00:35:14,240
the Eastern European countries

835
00:35:14,240 --> 00:35:16,180
that were equipped with Russian equipment.

836
00:35:16,180 --> 00:35:17,220
- They had a legacy environment

837
00:35:17,220 --> 00:35:19,520
but I mean after you've gotten past that.

838
00:35:19,520 --> 00:35:20,800
To reach out
- I'm not aware

839
00:35:21,020 --> 00:35:22,320
to a would be adversary
- of any, sir.

840
00:35:22,320 --> 00:35:23,153
has that ever happened?

841
00:35:24,500 --> 00:35:25,831
- I'm not aware of any, Sen--

842
00:35:25,831 --> 00:35:26,664
- I know I can't do you alls' job,

843
00:35:26,664 --> 00:35:29,059
but aren't there other complexities just based

844
00:35:29,059 --> 00:35:31,260
on the inherit infrastructure that comes

845
00:35:31,260 --> 00:35:32,710
with that system with respect

846
00:35:34,797 --> 00:35:35,860
to our own intelligence, safety

847
00:35:36,167 --> 00:35:37,000
and security within there?

848
00:35:37,575 --> 00:35:38,630
Look, I agree, we need to protect Turkey,

849
00:35:38,630 --> 00:35:41,890
we need to help them make their homeland safe,

850
00:35:41,890 --> 00:35:43,580
but this seems like to be an outlier

851
00:35:43,580 --> 00:35:46,270
unlike any time that's happened since NATO was established.

852
00:35:46,270 --> 00:35:47,520
Is that an overstatement?

853
00:35:47,880 --> 00:35:49,940
- I don't believe so, Senator.

854
00:35:49,940 --> 00:35:53,083
I think that's accurate and it's causing a lotta concern.

855
00:35:53,205 --> 00:35:54,253
- [Thom] Thank you.

856
00:35:54,253 --> 00:35:55,086
- Yes, sir.

857
00:35:56,877 --> 00:35:58,146
- [Jack] Thank you, Senator Tillis.

858
00:35:58,146 --> 00:35:59,396
Senator Hirono.

859
00:36:00,810 --> 00:36:02,110
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

860
00:36:02,300 --> 00:36:04,030
I wanna thank all of you gentlemen

861
00:36:04,030 --> 00:36:05,360
for your service to our country

862
00:36:05,360 --> 00:36:08,240
and Secretary Mattis, thank you very much

863
00:36:08,240 --> 00:36:11,370
for your continuing commit to end the,

864
00:36:11,370 --> 00:36:13,130
what you refer to, as a cancer

865
00:36:13,130 --> 00:36:15,393
of sexual assault in the military.

866
00:36:15,484 --> 00:36:17,893
I wanted to further ask you, Secretary Mattis,

867
00:36:17,906 --> 00:36:21,310
the National Defense Strategy mentions expanding

868
00:36:21,310 --> 00:36:24,910
and strengthening alliances in the Indo-Pacific region

869
00:36:24,910 --> 00:36:27,843
and the ***

870
00:36:28,547 --> 00:36:30,700
Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies is just one

871
00:36:30,700 --> 00:36:33,330
of several assets in Hawaii that is tailor-made

872
00:36:34,636 --> 00:36:36,260
for this mission and your continued support

873
00:36:36,770 --> 00:36:37,693
is very much appreciated.

874
00:36:37,860 --> 00:36:39,500
I'd like to applaud you for your efforts

875
00:36:39,500 --> 00:36:41,500
in building partnerships and alliances

876
00:36:41,500 --> 00:36:44,070
and it's not lost on me that you have made several trips

877
00:36:44,070 --> 00:36:46,780
to the region and hosted several regional leaders

878
00:36:47,797 --> 00:36:49,540
in the Pentagon since the National Defense Strategy

879
00:36:49,540 --> 00:36:50,903
was released.

880
00:36:51,000 --> 00:36:52,910
So besides our traditional allies

881
00:36:52,910 --> 00:36:54,373
in that part of the world,

882
00:36:55,005 --> 00:36:55,838
where are the best possibilities

883
00:36:55,838 --> 00:36:57,858
for new partnerships in the region

884
00:36:57,858 --> 00:37:00,720
and what attributes do these countries share

885
00:37:00,720 --> 00:37:02,600
that make them strategically important

886
00:37:02,600 --> 00:37:03,850
to the the United States.

887
00:37:03,960 --> 00:37:06,310
I also wanna ask you about the importance

888
00:37:06,310 --> 00:37:10,500
of our compacts with Palao, the Confederated States

889
00:37:10,500 --> 00:37:12,653
of Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands.

890
00:37:14,590 --> 00:37:18,270
- Well, Senator, the Pacific is a priority theater

891
00:37:18,270 --> 00:37:21,000
as you and I have discussed since my first days

892
00:37:21,000 --> 00:37:22,993
in your office.

893
00:37:23,890 --> 00:37:26,485
There is an ongoing effort to build

894
00:37:26,485 --> 00:37:30,940
our military structure in the Pacific

895
00:37:30,970 --> 00:37:34,933
and much of this is by, with, and through our allies.

896
00:37:35,370 --> 00:37:38,440
I would say from Down Under in Australia

897
00:37:38,440 --> 00:37:41,140
all the way up through Japan and Korea

898
00:37:41,140 --> 00:37:43,173
you see this actively underway.

899
00:37:43,370 --> 00:37:46,010
We also have to be open to nations

900
00:37:46,010 --> 00:37:48,470
such as Indonesia, the fulcrum

901
00:37:48,470 --> 00:37:50,273
of the Indo-Pacific region,

902
00:37:51,210 --> 00:37:56,210
Vietnam, as it comes of age and adapts

903
00:37:56,320 --> 00:37:58,000
with many of their students here

904
00:37:58,000 --> 00:37:59,540
in our country bein' educated,

905
00:37:59,540 --> 00:38:02,660
we build new ties for the future

906
00:38:02,800 --> 00:38:05,270
but probably most importantly as we look overall

907
00:38:05,270 --> 00:38:07,083
at this region, I'd look at India,

908
00:38:07,220 --> 00:38:09,607
largest democracy on the planet

909
00:38:09,607 --> 00:38:12,420
and one where we probably have a once

910
00:38:13,294 --> 00:38:16,900
in a generation opportunity to find more common ground.

911
00:38:16,900 --> 00:38:18,960
I think it's there, we just have to find it.

912
00:38:18,960 --> 00:38:20,640
We don't have to search hard for it

913
00:38:20,640 --> 00:38:24,110
in the sense of creating it, we just have to get

914
00:38:24,825 --> 00:38:28,000
an understanding of each other's interests

915
00:38:28,250 --> 00:38:30,010
and I think there's a lotta common ground there.

916
00:38:30,010 --> 00:38:33,137
So the attributes you see are geographic,

917
00:38:33,137 --> 00:38:38,137
they're based on a potential military commonality

918
00:38:40,540 --> 00:38:43,590
in terms of threat, whether it be the, as you've seen

919
00:38:43,590 --> 00:38:47,330
in the Sulu Sea area, where ISIS has come in

920
00:38:47,330 --> 00:38:49,590
in strength and created a problem

921
00:38:49,590 --> 00:38:51,720
for Malaysia, Indonesia, but especially so

922
00:38:51,720 --> 00:38:52,833
for the Philippines.

923
00:38:53,130 --> 00:38:54,760
These are all issues that we have

924
00:38:54,760 --> 00:38:57,280
to work together if we wanna keep the Pacific

925
00:38:57,580 --> 00:39:02,580
a stable commerce zone for all countries to use.

926
00:39:03,010 --> 00:39:05,420
- What about the importance of our compacts

927
00:39:05,420 --> 00:39:08,203
with the islands nations that I mention,

928
00:39:08,320 --> 00:39:09,993
Palau, Micronesia, and Marshall?

929
00:39:11,788 --> 00:39:14,190
- I would just tell you, Senator,

930
00:39:14,190 --> 00:39:16,770
that we recruit from there, as you know,

931
00:39:16,770 --> 00:39:20,160
their young men and women serve in our Armed Forces

932
00:39:20,550 --> 00:39:22,760
and we have got probably, in terms

933
00:39:22,760 --> 00:39:26,460
of military relationships, an unusually high degree

934
00:39:26,460 --> 00:39:29,081
of trust between the United States

935
00:39:29,081 --> 00:39:31,393
and those nations.

936
00:39:31,532 --> 00:39:34,790
There's probably a lot more

937
00:39:34,790 --> 00:39:36,587
that we will be doing in the future

938
00:39:36,587 --> 00:39:39,930
along the lines of the direction we're going right now

939
00:39:40,330 --> 00:39:43,580
and I don't see any inhibition on their side

940
00:39:43,580 --> 00:39:47,483
or our side to an even better relationship partnership.

941
00:39:47,550 --> 00:39:49,830
- Some of these compacts will come do

942
00:39:49,830 --> 00:39:52,410
and I assume that we're going

943
00:39:52,410 --> 00:39:53,940
to be negotiating with them again

944
00:39:53,940 --> 00:39:55,510
and that these compacts are there

945
00:39:55,510 --> 00:39:57,430
for national security reasons?

946
00:39:57,430 --> 00:39:59,823
Is that correct?

947
00:40:00,560 --> 00:40:03,690
- They are there for that and I think there's also

948
00:40:03,720 --> 00:40:06,390
an affiliation that goes back many decades

949
00:40:06,530 --> 00:40:09,250
of friendship that we share with them.

950
00:40:09,327 --> 00:40:11,070
- And we have certain continuing responsibilities

951
00:40:11,070 --> 00:40:13,743
for our country's use of their lands.

952
00:40:14,450 --> 00:40:17,010
Secretary Mattis, while current events may lead

953
00:40:17,010 --> 00:40:19,100
to decreased tensions with North Korea,

954
00:40:19,100 --> 00:40:23,090
I applaud DoD's commitment to defending the homeland

955
00:40:23,090 --> 00:40:24,290
from ballistic missiles.

956
00:40:24,740 --> 00:40:26,660
The DoD budge request included funding

957
00:40:26,660 --> 00:40:28,520
for additional ground-based interceptors

958
00:40:28,520 --> 00:40:30,958
but also funding for new sensor capability

959
00:40:30,958 --> 00:40:34,113
such as the Homeland Defense Radar in Hawaii.

960
00:40:34,210 --> 00:40:36,500
How will these new sensors increase our ability

961
00:40:36,500 --> 00:40:40,203
to defend Hawaii and the continental United States?

962
00:40:40,360 --> 00:40:42,960
- Senator, those capabilities will allow us

963
00:40:44,130 --> 00:40:47,280
to detect launches from various angles,

964
00:40:47,280 --> 00:40:50,490
that means sooner, track them,

965
00:40:50,490 --> 00:40:52,620
and determine if they're a threat

966
00:40:52,620 --> 00:40:55,783
or not to he homeland and the homeland is,

967
00:40:55,855 --> 00:40:58,220
let me be very particular here,

968
00:40:58,220 --> 00:41:01,770
Guam, Hawaii, Alaska, and the United States.

969
00:41:01,770 --> 00:41:04,223
That means we have more engagement time.

970
00:41:05,109 --> 00:41:08,370
- I think that our ability to accurately detect missiles

971
00:41:08,370 --> 00:41:10,310
coming our way is very important

972
00:41:10,310 --> 00:41:13,420
as I'm sure you're aware the we had a false alarm

973
00:41:14,100 --> 00:41:15,653
in Hawaii recently.

974
00:41:15,900 --> 00:41:17,453
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

975
00:41:18,378 --> 00:41:19,782
- [Jack] Thank you, Senator Hirono.

976
00:41:19,782 --> 00:41:21,032
Senator Graham.

977
00:41:21,234 --> 00:41:22,067
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

978
00:41:22,067 --> 00:41:23,210
Thank you both for advocating

979
00:41:23,210 --> 00:41:24,910
for more funding for the military.

980
00:41:25,512 --> 00:41:26,550
Without you we could not have done it.

981
00:41:26,550 --> 00:41:27,593
So thank you both.

982
00:41:28,738 --> 00:41:31,250
Let's go to Afghanistan, than we're gonna work our way

983
00:41:31,250 --> 00:41:32,233
around to Syria.

984
00:41:32,580 --> 00:41:34,930
I talked to the Afghan ambassador yesterday.

985
00:41:34,930 --> 00:41:37,360
He said that the rule of engagement changing,

986
00:41:37,360 --> 00:41:40,550
targeting the Taliban as part of the enemy force,

987
00:41:40,550 --> 00:41:42,210
is really beginning to pay dividends.

988
00:41:42,210 --> 00:41:43,860
Do you see that, General Dunford?

989
00:41:44,870 --> 00:41:46,120
- [Joseph] I do, Senator.

990
00:41:46,180 --> 00:41:47,400
- [Lindsey] Secretary Mattis?

991
00:41:47,400 --> 00:41:48,233
- Yes, sir.

992
00:41:49,016 --> 00:41:50,080
- [Lindsey] And the goal is to punish the Taliban

993
00:41:50,080 --> 00:41:51,610
to get 'em at the table and end this thing

994
00:41:51,610 --> 00:41:53,230
through negotiations, is that correct?

995
00:41:53,230 --> 00:41:54,680
- The goal is to make sure that they view

996
00:41:54,680 --> 00:41:56,790
that the only solution is a political solution

997
00:41:56,790 --> 00:41:58,200
that they can't win on the battlefield.

998
00:41:58,200 --> 00:41:59,350
- And we're makin' sure

999
00:41:59,368 --> 00:42:00,530
that they're not gonna win on the battlefield

1000
00:42:00,530 --> 00:42:02,207
and I wanna compliment you and President Trump

1001
00:42:02,207 --> 00:42:04,863
for changing those rules of engagement.

1002
00:42:05,120 --> 00:42:07,930
Do you believe that a residual forces is necessary

1003
00:42:07,930 --> 00:42:10,630
in Afghanistan for a while to come

1004
00:42:10,630 --> 00:42:13,180
and it should be conditions-based if we ever leave?

1005
00:42:13,827 --> 00:42:15,439
- I do believe that and that is consistent

1006
00:42:15,439 --> 00:42:17,360
with our strategy, Senator Graham.

1007
00:42:17,360 --> 00:42:19,167
- Secretary Mattis, is that so?

1008
00:42:19,167 --> 00:42:20,387
- [James] Yes, sir.

1009
00:42:20,387 --> 00:42:21,970
- To those senators that advocate leaving Afghanistan,

1010
00:42:21,970 --> 00:42:26,630
on September 10, 2001, we did not have one solider

1011
00:42:26,630 --> 00:42:29,653
in Afghanistan did we, Secretary Mattis?

1012
00:42:29,780 --> 00:42:31,154
- [James] That's correct, Senator.

1013
00:42:31,154 --> 00:42:32,420
- We didn't have an embassy, we didn't have a diplomat,

1014
00:42:32,420 --> 00:42:35,746
we didn't offer 'em a dime of aid, we got attacked anyway.

1015
00:42:35,746 --> 00:42:38,370
Do you agree with me, leaving them alone

1016
00:42:38,370 --> 00:42:40,520
doesn't mean they're gonna leave you alone?

1017
00:42:40,710 --> 00:42:43,633
- Problems in places like that don't stay there, sir.

1018
00:42:43,690 --> 00:42:46,087
- Okay, so we can't build a wall between us

1019
00:42:46,087 --> 00:42:47,790
and the threats coming from the Mideast

1020
00:42:47,790 --> 00:42:49,477
but we certainly can confront them

1021
00:42:49,477 --> 00:42:51,650
and I like your strategy in Afghanistan.

1022
00:42:51,650 --> 00:42:53,780
I think you got the right size force

1023
00:42:53,800 --> 00:42:55,130
with the right abilities.

1024
00:42:55,130 --> 00:42:57,330
Iraq, what did we learn

1025
00:42:57,330 --> 00:42:58,712
by leaving too soon, General Dunford?

1026
00:42:58,712 --> 00:43:01,102
We learned that the Iraqi forces weren't capable

1027
00:43:01,102 --> 00:43:04,777
of providing security inside the country

1028
00:43:04,777 --> 00:43:07,210
and that gave the enemy an opportunity to resurge.

1029
00:43:07,210 --> 00:43:09,092
That's where, really, ISIS had the space to grow.

1030
00:43:09,092 --> 00:43:11,903
- Couldn't agree with ya more.

1031
00:43:11,940 --> 00:43:15,480
General Mattis, working with our Iraqi partners

1032
00:43:15,480 --> 00:43:18,300
and coalition partners, we've done a pretty good job

1033
00:43:18,300 --> 00:43:20,904
of suppressing ISIS in Iraq, do you agree with that?

1034
00:43:20,904 --> 00:43:23,440
- I do, sir, although the fight goes one,

1035
00:43:23,440 --> 00:43:24,690
but yes, sir, absolutely.

1036
00:43:25,488 --> 00:43:26,841
- Would you support a residual force

1037
00:43:26,841 --> 00:43:28,292
based on conditions-based withdrawal

1038
00:43:28,292 --> 00:43:33,292
in Iraq if the Iraqis agreed with it?

1039
00:43:35,800 --> 00:43:39,960
- Absolutely, and that force, it will be augmented right now

1040
00:43:39,960 --> 00:43:42,610
by a NATO training element that is there

1041
00:43:42,610 --> 00:43:44,673
so it won't be just the Americans.

1042
00:43:44,740 --> 00:43:45,920
- I couldn't agree with ya more.

1043
00:43:45,920 --> 00:43:47,590
More people need to contribute money.

1044
00:43:47,590 --> 00:43:48,780
President Trump's right.

1045
00:43:48,780 --> 00:43:51,330
The Arabs need to pay more and other countries need

1046
00:43:52,140 --> 00:43:53,020
to contribute more but do you agree

1047
00:43:53,460 --> 00:43:54,856
with the following statement,

1048
00:43:54,856 --> 00:43:55,689
there is really no substitute

1049
00:43:56,286 --> 00:43:57,180
for the American military when it comes

1050
00:43:58,525 --> 00:43:59,621
to a holding force?

1051
00:43:59,621 --> 00:44:00,663
We have capabilities most people don't?

1052
00:44:01,360 --> 00:44:02,200
- That's correct, sir.

1053
00:44:02,200 --> 00:44:03,606
- Okay, now let's go to Syria.

1054
00:44:03,606 --> 00:44:04,608
The goal is, two, the total destruction of ISIS

1055
00:44:04,608 --> 00:44:09,608
and to combat the malign influence of Iran.

1056
00:44:12,860 --> 00:44:15,660
Is that the two goals that y'all have been articulating?

1057
00:44:16,390 --> 00:44:20,740
- Sir, our forces in Syria right now are there

1058
00:44:20,740 --> 00:44:24,330
to defeat ISIS, there is a political process underway

1059
00:44:24,330 --> 00:44:27,550
to end the civil was, but the chemical weapons

1060
00:44:27,550 --> 00:44:30,163
are a separate and distinct issue.

1061
00:44:30,280 --> 00:44:33,330
- So, here's my ... And we've know each other

1062
00:44:33,330 --> 00:44:34,163
for a long time.

1063
00:44:34,340 --> 00:44:36,113
I'm with you and I don't know,

1064
00:44:36,712 --> 00:44:39,000
is the president statement about withdrawing

1065
00:44:39,000 --> 00:44:41,570
from Syria, is that conditions-based withdrawal

1066
00:44:41,570 --> 00:44:43,150
or is he just gonna withdrawal

1067
00:44:43,150 --> 00:44:44,950
'cause he's tired of bein' in Syria?

1068
00:44:45,200 --> 00:44:46,580
- It is conditions-based.

1069
00:44:46,580 --> 00:44:48,700
As you know, neither the last administration

1070
00:44:48,700 --> 00:44:52,270
nor this administration sees itself occupying Syria.

1071
00:44:52,270 --> 00:44:54,270
What we have to do is keep our diplomats

1072
00:44:54,370 --> 00:44:56,860
in a position of authority so they can end this

1073
00:44:56,860 --> 00:44:58,330
through the Geneva Process.

1074
00:44:58,330 --> 00:45:00,110
- Right, but when it comes to ISIS,

1075
00:45:00,110 --> 00:45:02,810
the goal is to make sure they're ultimately destroyed,

1076
00:45:02,810 --> 00:45:03,723
is that correct?

1077
00:45:03,990 --> 00:45:06,728
- Destroyed, and also they cannot regenerate

1078
00:45:06,728 --> 00:45:10,710
so we have to create local forces

1079
00:45:10,940 --> 00:45:13,920
that can keep the pressure on any attempt

1080
00:45:13,920 --> 00:45:16,023
by ISIS to try to regenerate.

1081
00:45:16,023 --> 00:45:17,310
- Do you see those local forces being able

1082
00:45:17,310 --> 00:45:19,610
to accomplish that mission better

1083
00:45:19,610 --> 00:45:22,263
than the Iraqi Army when we left Iraq.

1084
00:45:22,790 --> 00:45:24,689
- Sir, we'll have to mature those forces.

1085
00:45:24,689 --> 00:45:27,570
We're engaged in it now, we have training goin' on

1086
00:45:27,570 --> 00:45:29,740
by a number of our international partners there

1087
00:45:29,740 --> 00:45:31,527
on the ground right now as well as our own forces.

1088
00:45:31,527 --> 00:45:33,023
- I only have a few minutes.

1089
00:45:33,170 --> 00:45:34,558
Would you fair to say that a holding force right now

1090
00:45:34,558 --> 00:45:38,880
without us would be a risky proposition

1091
00:45:38,880 --> 00:45:39,880
for a while to come?

1092
00:45:40,843 --> 00:45:45,127
- I'm confident that we would probably regret it.

1093
00:45:45,300 --> 00:45:46,133
- Okay.

1094
00:45:46,133 --> 00:45:49,360
Turkey, if we leave too soon, Turkey's gonna go

1095
00:45:49,360 --> 00:45:52,190
after the Kurds that helped us destroy ISIS.

1096
00:45:52,190 --> 00:45:53,320
Are you worried about that?

1097
00:45:53,320 --> 00:45:56,163
We gotta get that situation right before we leave.

1098
00:45:56,450 --> 00:45:58,930
- We are working with Turkey.

1099
00:45:58,930 --> 00:45:59,880
- Is that a concern

1100
00:46:00,093 --> 00:46:02,084
- of yours?
- to resolve this.

1101
00:46:02,084 --> 00:46:04,137
- I don't know if that's Turkey's intent

1102
00:46:04,137 --> 00:46:05,730
but we certainly

1103
00:46:05,730 --> 00:46:07,120
have to set the conditions
- But we know what they've

1104
00:46:07,256 --> 00:46:08,251
to prevent that.
- done in the past.

1105
00:46:08,251 --> 00:46:09,531
- Yeah, they've said they hate these guys more

1106
00:46:09,531 --> 00:46:10,583
than ISIS, they've actually attack 'em,

1107
00:46:10,583 --> 00:46:12,428
that to me needs to be a condition

1108
00:46:12,428 --> 00:46:14,986
'cause nobody else will help you in the future.

1109
00:46:14,986 --> 00:46:17,603
As to countering Iran.

1110
00:46:18,160 --> 00:46:21,603
The military strike, I though was not a big price.

1111
00:46:21,680 --> 00:46:24,490
I don't think this is gonna change the battlefield equation.

1112
00:46:24,490 --> 00:46:26,200
I don't see how ya go to Geneva

1113
00:46:26,200 --> 00:46:28,163
until the battlefield changes.

1114
00:46:28,230 --> 00:46:29,970
I don't see a change on the battlefield

1115
00:46:29,970 --> 00:46:33,203
until there's some credible force opposing a side.

1116
00:46:33,270 --> 00:46:34,973
I think we should be part of that.

1117
00:46:35,010 --> 00:46:37,820
If we're not, we're giving Damascus to the Iranians.

1118
00:46:37,820 --> 00:46:41,520
We depart here, I think you need

1119
00:46:41,520 --> 00:46:45,680
to have some kind of element on the ground in Syria

1120
00:46:45,910 --> 00:46:48,120
to combat Assad, it's in our interest

1121
00:46:48,120 --> 00:46:50,403
that we not give Iran to Damascus.

1122
00:46:50,410 --> 00:46:52,010
And the good news is there are millions

1123
00:46:52,010 --> 00:46:54,422
of Syrians who want Assad to go.

1124
00:46:54,422 --> 00:46:57,873
For another discussion for another time, thank you both.

1125
00:46:58,463 --> 00:47:01,673
- [Jack] Thank you, Senator Graham.

1126
00:47:01,673 --> 00:47:03,103
Senator King.

1127
00:47:03,900 --> 00:47:05,200
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1128
00:47:05,521 --> 00:47:10,343
Secretary Mattis, it occurs to me,

1129
00:47:10,400 --> 00:47:12,100
we have to make an important decision here

1130
00:47:12,100 --> 00:47:14,410
within the next hour which the confirmation

1131
00:47:14,410 --> 00:47:16,753
of Mike Pompeo to be Secretary of State.

1132
00:47:17,086 --> 00:47:19,380
It occurs to me, Secretary Mattis,

1133
00:47:19,380 --> 00:47:24,380
that you may be a good witness in this decision

1134
00:47:25,350 --> 00:47:26,490
in the sense that you have worked

1135
00:47:26,490 --> 00:47:28,960
with him directly and on the National Security Council.

1136
00:47:28,960 --> 00:47:30,730
I suspect you've been in the Situation Room,

1137
00:47:30,730 --> 00:47:32,313
in the Oval Office.

1138
00:47:32,720 --> 00:47:36,690
What is your view of his (stammers) I think two issues

1139
00:47:36,690 --> 00:47:40,540
that are of concern, judgment and willingness

1140
00:47:40,540 --> 00:47:44,720
to give the president his best advice based

1141
00:47:44,720 --> 00:47:46,970
upon his information and not necessarily

1142
00:47:46,970 --> 00:47:48,620
what the president wants to hear.

1143
00:47:50,267 --> 00:47:52,700
- Senator, you're right, I have worked with him

1144
00:47:52,700 --> 00:47:54,373
for over 14 months.

1145
00:47:54,810 --> 00:47:57,360
I have worked with him intimately during that time.

1146
00:47:57,690 --> 00:48:00,340
I would just tell you I've seen a rigorous intellect,

1147
00:48:00,420 --> 00:48:05,360
his judgment has been mature and objective

1148
00:48:05,680 --> 00:48:08,423
while still applying subjective elements,

1149
00:48:08,450 --> 00:48:12,083
it's not just a brittle approach to problem solving.

1150
00:48:14,147 --> 00:48:15,480
He's never shy about providing his input

1151
00:48:15,480 --> 00:48:18,100
to include when it was not the direction

1152
00:48:18,100 --> 00:48:20,790
the discussion was going and he had to stand

1153
00:48:20,790 --> 00:48:25,307
in opposition to the desires of some

1154
00:48:25,307 --> 00:48:27,113
of us in the Sit Room.

1155
00:48:27,810 --> 00:48:29,130
- Thank you, that's very helpful.

1156
00:48:29,130 --> 00:48:31,483
I appreciate your providing that.

1157
00:48:32,579 --> 00:48:34,730
General Dunford, you were asked

1158
00:48:34,730 --> 00:48:36,380
about what's going on in Yemen

1159
00:48:36,380 --> 00:48:39,640
and you were saying we're making progress

1160
00:48:41,563 --> 00:48:42,561
and it's a cultural change.

1161
00:48:42,561 --> 00:48:43,662
There was a report just this morning,

1162
00:48:43,662 --> 00:48:45,300
allegedly 3500 schools in Yemen

1163
00:48:45,300 --> 00:48:47,610
have been targeted by Saudi airstrikes.

1164
00:48:47,610 --> 00:48:50,060
I don't know if that's true, that's an allegation

1165
00:48:50,200 --> 00:48:52,940
but I just worry that we're complicit

1166
00:48:52,940 --> 00:48:54,810
in something that will turn out

1167
00:48:54,810 --> 00:48:58,055
in the hindsight of history to be a humanitarian tragedy

1168
00:48:58,055 --> 00:49:01,168
and I would appreciate it if for the record

1169
00:49:01,168 --> 00:49:05,510
you could supply us with what controls we have,

1170
00:49:05,510 --> 00:49:08,488
what limitations we have, what we're doing

1171
00:49:08,488 --> 00:49:11,833
to be sure that that's not the case.

1172
00:49:12,820 --> 00:49:14,860
- Senator, I will reply for the record

1173
00:49:14,860 --> 00:49:16,970
but what I would say here this morning

1174
00:49:16,970 --> 00:49:19,360
is we are not at all involved

1175
00:49:19,360 --> 00:49:21,180
in what we describe as the kill chain.

1176
00:49:21,180 --> 00:49:23,660
So we're not involved in what targets to strike.

1177
00:49:23,660 --> 00:49:25,250
- But my concern is that we can say that

1178
00:49:25,250 --> 00:49:29,520
but if we're doing intelligence

1179
00:49:29,520 --> 00:49:31,924
and refueling, we've got our hands on this thing.

1180
00:49:31,924 --> 00:49:34,229
We've got our fingerprints on it.

1181
00:49:34,229 --> 00:49:36,090
We can't then say, well, we don't know

1182
00:49:36,090 --> 00:49:37,860
what they're gonna do with that fuel

1183
00:49:37,860 --> 00:49:38,880
we put in their jets.

1184
00:49:38,880 --> 00:49:41,720
I don't think that's gonna be an acceptable answer

1185
00:49:41,720 --> 00:49:45,020
if we find out, well, I think we're finding out now,

1186
00:49:45,020 --> 00:49:48,050
that some pretty bad stuff is happening

1187
00:49:48,050 --> 00:49:49,533
with our engagement.

1188
00:49:49,720 --> 00:49:53,010
I really hope you'll give this some thought

1189
00:49:53,010 --> 00:49:55,453
and give us some solid ...

1190
00:49:55,815 --> 00:49:57,130
- Sir, I fully understand your concerns.

1191
00:49:57,130 --> 00:49:58,934
We'll outline that for you.;

1192
00:49:58,934 --> 00:49:59,934
- Thank you.

1193
00:50:00,090 --> 00:50:02,450
To get back to the budget which is the subject

1194
00:50:02,500 --> 00:50:03,572
of this hearing, just looking at the numbers,

1195
00:50:03,572 --> 00:50:04,564
I think it's very important that the public understand

1196
00:50:04,564 --> 00:50:09,564
that we're talking about the lowest percentage

1197
00:50:11,230 --> 00:50:13,160
of GDP for the defense budget

1198
00:50:13,250 --> 00:50:17,260
in something like 70 years, 3.1%.

1199
00:50:17,260 --> 00:50:19,803
I noticed in looking in the absolute numbers,

1200
00:50:20,170 --> 00:50:23,717
this year's proposal is actually below

1201
00:50:23,717 --> 00:50:27,673
the appropriation for 2010.

1202
00:50:28,620 --> 00:50:30,150
So here we are nine years later

1203
00:50:30,150 --> 00:50:33,710
and 2010 was 691, you're talking about 686,

1204
00:50:33,710 --> 00:50:35,670
so I just think it's important

1205
00:50:35,720 --> 00:50:38,170
to put those figures into context

1206
00:50:38,170 --> 00:50:40,746
and Mr. Norquist, a question to you.

1207
00:50:40,746 --> 00:50:42,370
It occurs to me that one of the things

1208
00:50:42,370 --> 00:50:44,140
that's happening in the defense budget is

1209
00:50:44,140 --> 00:50:45,673
that we're recapitalizing.

1210
00:50:45,772 --> 00:50:47,874
We're in a sense paying deferred maintenance

1211
00:50:47,874 --> 00:50:51,192
in terms of readiness, in terms of upgrading systems

1212
00:50:51,192 --> 00:50:53,740
like the Ohio Class submarine

1213
00:50:53,740 --> 00:50:57,467
that haven't been upgraded in 30 years, the B-21,

1214
00:50:57,467 --> 00:51:00,650
I would think in your position it would be helpful

1215
00:51:00,650 --> 00:51:03,260
to us who have to justify this budget

1216
00:51:03,260 --> 00:51:06,196
to our constituents, to break that down a bit,

1217
00:51:06,196 --> 00:51:09,470
to say, okay, what is it that's current operations

1218
00:51:09,470 --> 00:51:12,953
and what is it that's paying past due bills, in effect.

1219
00:51:13,050 --> 00:51:15,220
Do you agree that that's part of what's happening here?

1220
00:51:15,220 --> 00:51:16,934
- I do and just to put it in context,

1221
00:51:16,934 --> 00:51:21,373
if instead of sequestration back in 2011,

1222
00:51:21,540 --> 00:51:24,260
Congress had simply capped defense at inflation,

1223
00:51:24,260 --> 00:51:26,703
didn't allow for pay raises and everything else,

1224
00:51:26,950 --> 00:51:28,743
that's the number you'd be at now.

1225
00:51:29,020 --> 00:51:30,260
The difference is you woukdn;t have had

1226
00:51:30,260 --> 00:51:31,830
several hundred billion dollars

1227
00:51:32,654 --> 00:51:34,130
of lost buying capacity, you wouldn't

1228
00:51:34,130 --> 00:51:35,870
have been missing maintenance on equipment,

1229
00:51:35,870 --> 00:51:37,970
you wouldn't have been having older planes

1230
00:51:38,866 --> 00:51:39,699
that aren't getting replaced,

1231
00:51:40,243 --> 00:51:41,260
so you're not even in the same position,

1232
00:51:41,260 --> 00:51:43,510
so the fact that it took Congress

1233
00:51:43,510 --> 00:51:46,640
to raise the ceiling by 85 billion dollars

1234
00:51:46,880 --> 00:51:49,240
just to get back to where inflation alone

1235
00:51:49,240 --> 00:51:50,690
would have put the defense budget,

1236
00:51:50,690 --> 00:51:52,786
shows you how deep a hole the department has been in

1237
00:51:52,786 --> 00:51:55,120
during that period of sequestration

1238
00:51:55,120 --> 00:51:57,450
and the disruption to the military's readiness.

1239
00:51:57,450 --> 00:51:58,900
- I think it's very important

1240
00:51:59,372 --> 00:52:00,740
to make that point to the public

1241
00:52:01,516 --> 00:52:02,349
because sometimes people just look

1242
00:52:02,990 --> 00:52:04,030
at the number and say this is a huge number,

1243
00:52:04,030 --> 00:52:05,080
it's more than other countries,

1244
00:52:05,080 --> 00:52:06,656
actually, we're not the highest country

1245
00:52:06,656 --> 00:52:08,335
in the world in terms of percentage of GDP,

1246
00:52:08,335 --> 00:52:10,389
I think we're fourth or fifth and that's really

1247
00:52:10,389 --> 00:52:14,593
I think the appropriate way to look at it.

1248
00:52:14,701 --> 00:52:17,310
Final question, and this is a short one,

1249
00:52:17,310 --> 00:52:18,860
because I'm already outta time.

1250
00:52:18,860 --> 00:52:21,110
Secretary Mattis, I presume based

1251
00:52:21,110 --> 00:52:22,410
upon your prior testimony

1252
00:52:22,410 --> 00:52:23,860
that you think it's important

1253
00:52:24,220 --> 00:52:27,310
to maintain and rebuild our diplomatic capacity

1254
00:52:27,310 --> 00:52:28,950
at the State Department, that's a part

1255
00:52:28,950 --> 00:52:31,263
of our national security apparatus is it not?

1256
00:52:31,435 --> 00:52:35,583
- They are critical to our national security, Senator.

1257
00:52:35,890 --> 00:52:36,723
- [Angus] Thank you.

1258
00:52:36,723 --> 00:52:37,556
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1259
00:52:37,556 --> 00:52:38,480
- Thank you, Senator King.

1260
00:52:38,540 --> 00:52:39,533
Senator Scott.

1261
00:52:39,690 --> 00:52:40,540
- Thank you, sir.

1262
00:52:41,422 --> 00:52:42,310
Good morning to the panel, thank you for being here

1263
00:52:42,310 --> 00:52:45,053
and thank you all for your service to this country.

1264
00:52:45,275 --> 00:52:49,140
Secretary Mattis, General Dunford, Secretary Norquist,

1265
00:52:49,140 --> 00:52:50,670
I may be a little biased here

1266
00:52:50,670 --> 00:52:52,113
but I don't think that I am.

1267
00:52:52,230 --> 00:52:54,180
I think South Carolina is the epicenter

1268
00:52:54,590 --> 00:52:56,933
of training and readiness for our military.

1269
00:52:57,640 --> 00:53:00,930
Whether it's Fort Jackson, where we train more than half

1270
00:53:00,930 --> 00:53:04,110
of the enlisted soldiers or Paris Island,

1271
00:53:04,110 --> 00:53:06,640
Secretary Mattis, where you know we actually make

1272
00:53:07,010 --> 00:53:10,140
half of the Marines or the Navy Nuke School

1273
00:53:10,240 --> 00:53:11,880
where we prepare our sailors

1274
00:53:12,320 --> 00:53:15,255
or Char Air Force Base where we have the largest F-16 wing

1275
00:53:15,255 --> 00:53:16,255
in the Air Force or, if it's going to theater,

1276
00:53:16,255 --> 00:53:21,255
it's like going through AC 17 at Charleston Air Force Base

1277
00:53:22,820 --> 00:53:27,820
not to mention both SPAWAR and the Savannah River site

1278
00:53:28,060 --> 00:53:30,050
which is I think is a forward leaning,

1279
00:53:30,050 --> 00:53:32,653
forward looking part of our military.

1280
00:53:32,831 --> 00:53:36,770
So when the National Defense Strategy discusses a return

1281
00:53:36,770 --> 00:53:38,820
to great power competition with Russia

1282
00:53:38,820 --> 00:53:40,820
and China, I'm very interested

1283
00:53:40,820 --> 00:53:43,120
in seeing America leverage the ingenuity

1284
00:53:43,120 --> 00:53:45,560
and the imagination for our nation

1285
00:53:46,854 --> 00:53:47,750
to assure that there is never

1286
00:53:48,081 --> 00:53:51,603
a so-called level playing field for our adversaries.

1287
00:53:51,840 --> 00:53:54,800
To ensure American dominance in all areas

1288
00:53:54,800 --> 00:53:58,327
we must innovate faster and bring new capabilities

1289
00:53:58,327 --> 00:54:02,083
like hypersonic weapons, directed energy,

1290
00:54:02,350 --> 00:54:05,823
and advanced unmanned aircraft to the field sooner.

1291
00:54:06,930 --> 00:54:08,983
With additional funding for R&D,

1292
00:54:09,690 --> 00:54:11,290
how are we working to make sure

1293
00:54:11,290 --> 00:54:14,003
that we get those new technologies

1294
00:54:14,003 --> 00:54:16,540
in the hands of our war fighters

1295
00:54:17,120 --> 00:54:19,230
as soon as conceivably possible?

1296
00:54:19,230 --> 00:54:20,750
Secretary Mattis, please begin.

1297
00:54:20,750 --> 00:54:24,270
- Right, Senator, what we're doing right now is

1298
00:54:26,357 --> 00:54:29,196
because the Congress reorganized us,

1299
00:54:29,196 --> 00:54:30,745
you expressed your displeasure over years

1300
00:54:30,745 --> 00:54:33,770
with what we would call acquisition technology

1301
00:54:33,770 --> 00:54:36,040
and logistics, you broke it in half.

1302
00:54:36,040 --> 00:54:39,360
Ellen Lord now runs acquisition and sustainment.

1303
00:54:39,360 --> 00:54:42,094
That's the current fighters you see,

1304
00:54:42,094 --> 00:54:45,383
F-16s there, the current C-17s,

1305
00:54:47,023 --> 00:54:48,610
that sort of thing is being addressed by Ellen Lord.

1306
00:54:48,610 --> 00:54:51,590
But you also set up research and engineering

1307
00:54:51,684 --> 00:54:55,230
under Michael Griffin and our undersecretary confirmed him

1308
00:54:55,590 --> 00:54:58,660
and he has the responsibility for directed energy,

1309
00:54:58,660 --> 00:55:03,660
for hypersonics, for joint artificial intelligence efforts.

1310
00:55:04,510 --> 00:55:08,780
So we are organizing now for an expeditious,

1311
00:55:08,780 --> 00:55:12,533
output-oriented exploration, in research,

1312
00:55:12,660 --> 00:55:14,440
of these advanced technologies

1313
00:55:14,440 --> 00:55:16,340
that we know are going to play a role.

1314
00:55:16,570 --> 00:55:20,510
As we speed this forward, that's how we get them out

1315
00:55:20,510 --> 00:55:22,110
in the hands of the troops fast,

1316
00:55:23,062 --> 00:55:24,840
not by having more studies done

1317
00:55:24,840 --> 00:55:27,197
but by actually having something developed

1318
00:55:27,197 --> 00:55:30,610
and fly a hypersonic vehicle by X day

1319
00:55:30,610 --> 00:55:32,333
and now everybody works together.

1320
00:55:32,480 --> 00:55:35,084
We're also concentrating the department's efforts

1321
00:55:35,084 --> 00:55:38,490
that were somehwat diffuse, which is not uncommon

1322
00:55:38,490 --> 00:55:40,290
with new technology, but now we know

1323
00:55:40,982 --> 00:55:43,782
what we need to focus on so we're pulling those together

1324
00:55:45,234 --> 00:55:46,067
so the Army, the Navy, the Air Force,

1325
00:55:46,231 --> 00:55:48,030
are working together as service departments

1326
00:55:48,030 --> 00:55:51,943
in makin' this a synergistic effort.

1327
00:55:52,210 --> 00:55:53,910
- Thank you, it certainly is that.

1328
00:55:55,058 --> 00:55:56,430
Looking at the comments of Secretary Griffin

1329
00:55:56,430 --> 00:55:58,920
in the HASC hearing about our inability

1330
00:55:58,920 --> 00:56:02,440
to even see them coming there's an important need

1331
00:56:02,440 --> 00:56:03,990
for us to expedite that process

1332
00:56:04,616 --> 00:56:05,653
as quickly as conceivably possible.

1333
00:56:06,186 --> 00:56:09,030
Did you wanna add anything, General?

1334
00:56:09,030 --> 00:56:10,838
- The only think I'd say is one

1335
00:56:10,838 --> 00:56:11,671
of the other things, Senator, so we've talked a little bit

1336
00:56:11,842 --> 00:56:13,880
about science and technology research and development,

1337
00:56:13,880 --> 00:56:15,602
a really key piece, too, is our exercises

1338
00:56:15,602 --> 00:56:18,150
in experimentation and one of the key elements

1339
00:56:18,682 --> 00:56:20,600
of the Secretary's strategy is to make sure

1340
00:56:20,600 --> 00:56:23,133
that we regenerate our exercise program.

1341
00:56:23,230 --> 00:56:25,450
It has suffered, admittedly, as a result

1342
00:56:26,446 --> 00:56:27,930
of the operational tempo over the last decade

1343
00:56:28,795 --> 00:56:31,145
but as we look forward, better joint exercises,

1344
00:56:31,576 --> 00:56:34,026
a core element of which is joint experimentation,

1345
00:56:34,080 --> 00:56:35,720
will help move some of those capabilities

1346
00:56:35,720 --> 00:56:37,070
to the pipeline a bit faster

1347
00:56:37,070 --> 00:56:39,000
and so I think there really is three pieces,

1348
00:56:39,000 --> 00:56:40,450
two of which you spoke about,

1349
00:56:40,948 --> 00:56:42,520
but that third piece is really critical

1350
00:56:42,520 --> 00:56:44,060
in particularly going into this summer,

1351
00:56:44,060 --> 00:56:45,710
that's an area of particular interest

1352
00:56:45,710 --> 00:56:46,910
for the Secretary and I.

1353
00:56:47,210 --> 00:56:48,043
- Thank you.

1354
00:56:48,946 --> 00:56:49,870
I wanna continue on the subject

1355
00:56:50,069 --> 00:56:51,560
of keeping the perch that we have.

1356
00:56:51,560 --> 00:56:54,680
Secretary, you and several of your predecessors

1357
00:56:54,710 --> 00:56:56,330
have stated how important it is

1358
00:56:56,330 --> 00:56:58,650
for us to address our adversaries theft

1359
00:56:58,650 --> 00:57:01,360
or acquisition of intellectual property

1360
00:57:01,360 --> 00:57:03,653
and sensitive defense-related technology.

1361
00:57:04,250 --> 00:57:06,008
You have officially endorsed the Foreign Investment

1362
00:57:06,008 --> 00:57:09,413
Risk Review Modernization Act, FIRMA,

1363
00:57:09,900 --> 00:57:13,033
which Senator Cornyn and others on this committee,

1364
00:57:13,637 --> 00:57:16,087
including myself, introduced to modernize the way

1365
00:57:18,715 --> 00:57:19,673
we screen foreign investment for national security risks.

1366
00:57:20,599 --> 00:57:22,900
Do you see FIRMA, while not necessarily a silver bullet,

1367
00:57:22,900 --> 00:57:25,983
as one crucial step towards addressing the China threat?

1368
00:57:26,790 --> 00:57:30,430
- It's critical on China, on a number

1369
00:57:30,430 --> 00:57:33,063
of other threats that we face.

1370
00:57:33,228 --> 00:57:35,881
Cyber, for example, is not only from China.

1371
00:57:35,881 --> 00:57:39,010
But I would also point out that one

1372
00:57:39,010 --> 00:57:42,200
of the reasons Secretary Mnuchin orchestrated

1373
00:57:42,200 --> 00:57:44,380
the sanctions against China go

1374
00:57:44,927 --> 00:57:46,983
to the very heart of what you were just talkin' about,

1375
00:57:47,858 --> 00:57:48,691
the intellectual property theft.

1376
00:57:49,150 --> 00:57:53,343
- Would you support including FIRMA as a part of the NDAA?

1377
00:57:54,830 --> 00:57:57,890
- I would have no reservations whatsoever

1378
00:57:57,890 --> 00:57:58,790
about it, Senator.

1379
00:57:59,120 --> 00:58:02,679
It is a broader effort, however, much broader effort

1380
00:58:02,679 --> 00:58:05,610
than just Department of Defense

1381
00:58:05,610 --> 00:58:09,469
so I wouldn't want it to become a military priority effort

1382
00:58:09,469 --> 00:58:12,003
and not the same priority for others.

1383
00:58:12,040 --> 00:58:13,883
It's gotta be a whole of government.

1384
00:58:14,120 --> 00:58:16,963
For example, Treasury Department, Commerce,

1385
00:58:17,140 --> 00:58:20,433
Department of Energy, Homeland Security,

1386
00:58:20,660 --> 00:58:22,363
they all have a role in this.

1387
00:58:22,520 --> 00:58:24,020
- Yes, I'm on the Banking Committee

1388
00:58:24,020 --> 00:58:25,570
and we're working on it as well

1389
00:58:26,515 --> 00:58:27,715
on the non-defense side.

1390
00:58:28,230 --> 00:58:30,450
Do you believe as the National Defense Strategy

1391
00:58:30,450 --> 00:58:32,750
in your previous public comments suggest

1392
00:58:32,750 --> 00:58:34,650
that China poses the most significant

1393
00:58:34,650 --> 00:58:36,923
national security threat to the country still?

1394
00:58:37,400 --> 00:58:40,450
Senator, I think the one thing that this administration

1395
00:58:40,450 --> 00:58:42,980
would be graded on most critically ten

1396
00:58:42,980 --> 00:58:46,490
or fifteen years from now, historians will look back

1397
00:58:46,490 --> 00:58:49,810
and say did we develop a relationship

1398
00:58:49,810 --> 00:58:53,380
with China, a mature relationship,

1399
00:58:53,380 --> 00:58:56,570
a productive relationship, did we do everything we could

1400
00:58:56,570 --> 00:58:59,870
as we look at the long-range competition

1401
00:59:00,200 --> 00:59:04,240
to keep it out of war and into a more productive stance

1402
00:59:04,450 --> 00:59:06,370
and at the same time, some of the things

1403
00:59:06,370 --> 00:59:08,313
that you've initiated, like INERVA,

1404
00:59:10,006 --> 00:59:11,840
are absolutely critical that we take our own side

1405
00:59:12,286 --> 00:59:13,658
in this competition, so I think this is critical

1406
00:59:13,658 --> 00:59:17,177
as you look at it but there's nothing

1407
00:59:17,177 --> 00:59:21,390
that dictates this has to go to a force of arms between us.

1408
00:59:21,390 --> 00:59:23,400
If we do this right, along the lines

1409
00:59:23,890 --> 00:59:25,030
of some of the things you're doin' right now.

1410
00:59:25,030 --> 00:59:25,880
- Thank you, sir.

1411
00:59:26,870 --> 00:59:27,703
I'll just close, Mr. Chairman, with this comment.

1412
00:59:27,703 --> 00:59:29,334
That from my assessment, China's successful acquisition

1413
00:59:29,334 --> 00:59:32,635
of US technology is what helps them be

1414
00:59:32,635 --> 00:59:35,853
a near peer competitor.

1415
00:59:37,080 --> 00:59:38,190
- [Jack] Thank you, Senator Scott.

1416
00:59:38,190 --> 00:59:39,713
Senator Kane.

1417
00:59:41,140 --> 00:59:43,130
- Thank you, Mr. Chair and I appreciate

1418
00:59:44,366 --> 00:59:45,199
the witnesses testimony.

1419
00:59:45,690 --> 00:59:47,340
It's been an instructive morning.

1420
00:59:47,484 --> 00:59:51,100
I wanna do a Senator Kane broken record topic

1421
00:59:51,100 --> 00:59:54,020
and talk to you about Congressional authorization

1422
00:59:54,020 --> 00:59:55,623
for military force.

1423
00:59:56,047 --> 01:00:00,170
You each appeared before the Defense Subcommittee

1424
01:00:00,170 --> 01:00:03,693
of Senate Appropriations about a year ago, March 22, 2017.

1425
01:00:04,230 --> 01:00:06,387
Secretary Mattis, you stated that in quote

1426
01:00:06,387 --> 01:00:08,637
"I would take no issue with the Congress

1427
01:00:08,637 --> 01:00:10,187
"stepping forward with an AUMF.

1428
01:00:10,813 --> 01:00:11,730
"I think it would be a statement

1429
01:00:12,370 --> 01:00:13,967
"of the American peoples resolve if you did so.

1430
01:00:13,967 --> 01:00:14,987
"I've thought the same thing

1431
01:00:14,987 --> 01:00:17,037
"for the last several years, I might add,

1432
01:00:17,871 --> 01:00:18,704
"and have not understood why the Congress

1433
01:00:18,704 --> 01:00:21,077
"hasn't come forward with this at least to debate

1434
01:00:21,507 --> 01:00:23,577
"because I believe ISIS is a clear

1435
01:00:23,577 --> 01:00:25,320
"and present danger we face."

1436
01:00:25,320 --> 01:00:28,600
General Dunford, the same day, you stated quote

1437
01:00:28,797 --> 01:00:29,877
"I agree with the Secretary.

1438
01:00:29,877 --> 01:00:31,727
"I think not only would it be a sign

1439
01:00:31,727 --> 01:00:33,430
"of the American people's resolve

1440
01:00:34,521 --> 01:00:35,927
"but truly I think our men and women would benefit

1441
01:00:35,927 --> 01:00:37,577
"from an authorization of the use

1442
01:00:38,356 --> 01:00:40,070
"of military force that would let them know

1443
01:00:40,313 --> 01:00:41,146
"that the American people in the form

1444
01:00:41,146 --> 01:00:43,027
"of their Congress were fully supported

1445
01:00:43,027 --> 01:00:44,837
"of what they're doing out there every day

1446
01:00:44,837 --> 01:00:46,997
"as they put their lives in harm's way."

1447
01:00:47,220 --> 01:00:48,581
Are your feelings today generally consistent

1448
01:00:48,581 --> 01:00:51,990
with the testimony you gave in the Senate

1449
01:00:51,990 --> 01:00:53,240
a year ago on this topic?

1450
01:00:55,150 --> 01:00:57,220
- Generally, they are, Senator.

1451
01:00:57,220 --> 01:00:59,530
I will say that we believe right now

1452
01:00:59,530 --> 01:01:01,700
the operations we're conducting are legal

1453
01:01:01,700 --> 01:01:03,820
and we have a feedback loop to the Congress

1454
01:01:03,820 --> 01:01:05,820
to make certain we're not doing anything

1455
01:01:06,310 --> 01:01:08,163
where you're not kept informed.

1456
01:01:08,660 --> 01:01:11,910
We would need the right AUMF and you

1457
01:01:11,910 --> 01:01:14,940
and I have discussed it and that would be

1458
01:01:14,940 --> 01:01:16,373
the only caveat I would say.

1459
01:01:17,013 --> 01:01:18,950
We would not wanna end up restricting ourselves.

1460
01:01:18,950 --> 01:01:19,783
- [Tim] General Dunford?

1461
01:01:19,783 --> 01:01:22,250
- Senator, I feel the same way

1462
01:01:22,250 --> 01:01:23,550
and I think what the Secretary said

1463
01:01:23,550 --> 01:01:25,490
is what I would've said first is

1464
01:01:25,490 --> 01:01:27,700
without bein' concerned about changes

1465
01:01:27,700 --> 01:01:30,170
is just makin' sure that we have the inherent flexibility

1466
01:01:30,170 --> 01:01:32,250
that we have today to be able to prosecute an enemy

1467
01:01:32,250 --> 01:01:35,683
that doesn't respect boundaries in time.

1468
01:01:35,930 --> 01:01:39,160
- Secretary Mattis, you then, after the March hearing

1469
01:01:39,160 --> 01:01:41,973
that I described, sent a letter to the Senate,

1470
01:01:42,070 --> 01:01:44,140
I think actually to the Senate Majority Leader

1471
01:01:44,140 --> 01:01:47,110
in September of 2017, and then together

1472
01:01:47,110 --> 01:01:48,690
with Secretary Tillerson, appeared before

1473
01:01:48,690 --> 01:01:50,590
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

1474
01:01:51,523 --> 01:01:52,780
at the end of October, 2017

1475
01:01:52,780 --> 01:01:54,750
and in that letter and hearing you talked

1476
01:01:54,750 --> 01:01:57,130
about some of the sort of limitations

1477
01:01:57,130 --> 01:01:58,560
or concerns that you might have,

1478
01:01:58,560 --> 01:02:00,490
that the idea of an authorization,

1479
01:02:00,490 --> 01:02:03,020
the idea of Congressional expression of resolved

1480
01:02:03,020 --> 01:02:06,418
would be a good thing, but that on the operational side

1481
01:02:06,418 --> 01:02:09,011
you would have concerns and you shared

1482
01:02:09,011 --> 01:02:12,057
in that letter and in that testimony some

1483
01:02:12,057 --> 01:02:14,000
of the concerns that you have.

1484
01:02:14,000 --> 01:02:15,120
I don't need to go through those

1485
01:02:15,120 --> 01:02:19,368
but you remember those, is that still generally your point,

1486
01:02:19,368 --> 01:02:21,780
that if we could do a Congressional authorization, great,

1487
01:02:21,780 --> 01:02:23,756
but take into account some of the reservations

1488
01:02:23,756 --> 01:02:25,940
or concerns you expressed?

1489
01:02:25,940 --> 01:02:28,953
- Yes, sir, I'm aligned with those comments.

1490
01:02:29,160 --> 01:02:30,810
- I have worked on this matter

1491
01:02:30,810 --> 01:02:33,481
and I've proceeded upon an additional assumption

1492
01:02:33,481 --> 01:02:35,480
that I think is important for Congress

1493
01:02:35,480 --> 01:02:37,540
that if we were to do an authorization

1494
01:02:38,665 --> 01:02:40,430
it would be very important that the authorization be done

1495
01:02:40,430 --> 01:02:41,920
in a way that was bipartisan

1496
01:02:42,110 --> 01:02:44,007
so that we wouldn't be sending a sign

1497
01:02:44,020 --> 01:02:46,070
either to the American public

1498
01:02:46,070 --> 01:02:48,554
or especially to our troops that support

1499
01:02:48,554 --> 01:02:50,497
for military action against non-state terrorist groups,

1500
01:02:50,497 --> 01:02:53,334
for example, is something that just one party supports

1501
01:02:53,334 --> 01:02:57,000
and not the other because then that would raise a question

1502
01:02:57,000 --> 01:02:59,457
of, okay, good or bad election might then lead

1503
01:02:59,457 --> 01:03:04,457
to a lack or resolution which would make people wonder

1504
01:03:04,870 --> 01:03:07,140
whether they were being supported out on the battlefield.

1505
01:03:07,140 --> 01:03:08,959
Do you share that thought that if we can do a resolution

1506
01:03:08,959 --> 01:03:12,172
it shouldn't only be one that protects operations

1507
01:03:12,172 --> 01:03:14,864
but also expresses a bipartisan resolve of Congress?

1508
01:03:14,864 --> 01:03:17,074
- I think it's critical that our adversaries

1509
01:03:17,074 --> 01:03:20,956
and our allies see a unified America

1510
01:03:20,956 --> 01:03:23,005
when we make the grave decision

1511
01:03:23,005 --> 01:03:25,773
to put our troops in harm's way, sir.

1512
01:03:26,162 --> 01:03:28,560
- Just as I close, Senator Corcoran

1513
01:03:28,560 --> 01:03:30,640
and I have introduced an authorization

1514
01:03:32,019 --> 01:03:32,852
that is being taken up

1515
01:03:32,852 --> 01:03:35,093
by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee soon.

1516
01:03:35,196 --> 01:03:36,760
We've attempted to incorporate

1517
01:03:36,760 --> 01:03:40,119
into that authorization, Secretary Mattis,

1518
01:03:40,119 --> 01:03:43,560
some of the concerns you expressed in the letter

1519
01:03:43,750 --> 01:03:45,497
of September 2017

1520
01:03:45,497 --> 01:03:48,300
and the subsequent Congressional testimony.

1521
01:03:48,300 --> 01:03:51,560
It is bipartisan and thus involves compromises

1522
01:03:51,560 --> 01:03:54,310
but since the chair of that committee has indicated

1523
01:03:54,310 --> 01:03:56,480
a desire to take it up and put it

1524
01:03:56,480 --> 01:03:58,180
through a markup in the committee,

1525
01:03:58,776 --> 01:03:59,609
I look forward to working together

1526
01:04:00,277 --> 01:04:01,110
with you and other administration officials

1527
01:04:01,110 --> 01:04:02,430
so that we can hopefully get this right

1528
01:04:02,430 --> 01:04:03,983
and express that bipartisan resolve

1529
01:04:03,983 --> 01:04:04,947
that I think our troops deserve.

1530
01:04:04,947 --> 01:04:06,097
- [James] Thank you.

1531
01:04:06,983 --> 01:04:09,446
- [Jack] Thank you, Senator Kaine.

1532
01:04:09,446 --> 01:04:10,745
Senator ...

1533
01:04:10,745 --> 01:04:13,828
(man speaks off mic)

1534
01:04:14,062 --> 01:04:15,114
Yeah, but he was here first.

1535
01:04:15,114 --> 01:04:16,099
(men speaking off mic)

1536
01:04:16,099 --> 01:04:17,516
Senator Donnelly.

1537
01:04:22,450 --> 01:04:23,970
I'll remind those remaining

1538
01:04:23,970 --> 01:04:27,923
that while our timer has malfunctioned we'll remind you.

1539
01:04:28,267 --> 01:04:30,517
(laughter)

1540
01:04:30,710 --> 01:04:32,360
- Is there a reason you said that

1541
01:04:32,390 --> 01:04:34,601
right before I spoke, Mr. Chairman?

1542
01:04:34,601 --> 01:04:36,851
(laughter)

1543
01:04:37,190 --> 01:04:39,024
Thank you very much to the witnesses.

1544
01:04:39,024 --> 01:04:41,939
I wanna thank all of you for your implementation

1545
01:04:41,939 --> 01:04:46,939
of the Sexton Act requirements regarding military suicide.

1546
01:04:47,700 --> 01:04:50,632
I know how hard you've worked on this.

1547
01:04:50,632 --> 01:04:52,738
I know the efforts that have been put in

1548
01:04:52,738 --> 01:04:57,059
and how you have worked hard to reduce that.

1549
01:04:57,059 --> 01:05:02,059
As you look ahead, what are the top priorities now, for you?

1550
01:05:02,520 --> 01:05:06,920
When you look at this and you try to determine

1551
01:05:06,920 --> 01:05:09,543
what else can we do to move the ball here?

1552
01:05:10,188 --> 01:05:13,260
What do you think are some of the things

1553
01:05:13,500 --> 01:05:16,423
that we can still accomplish?

1554
01:05:17,000 --> 01:05:20,160
- Senator Donnelly, we actually had a brief conversation

1555
01:05:20,160 --> 01:05:22,840
about that with the House Appropriations Committee yesterday

1556
01:05:22,840 --> 01:05:25,193
and I think one of the more promising things

1557
01:05:25,193 --> 01:05:28,750
that we've seen is this kind of interdisciplinary model

1558
01:05:29,170 --> 01:05:32,193
of mental healthcare, so that's had a big impact.

1559
01:05:32,410 --> 01:05:34,433
But we do have significant shortages

1560
01:05:34,433 --> 01:05:36,630
of the right experts in the right places

1561
01:05:36,650 --> 01:05:38,844
and it's hard to sometimes attract the right amount.

1562
01:05:38,844 --> 01:05:41,167
We have a small population of uniformed experts

1563
01:05:41,167 --> 01:05:44,158
and then we rely on some contract support.

1564
01:05:44,158 --> 01:05:46,538
And there's certain places where our forces are

1565
01:05:46,538 --> 01:05:49,010
and you've certainly seen the same scourge

1566
01:05:49,010 --> 01:05:51,910
with veterans where getting the right care

1567
01:05:51,910 --> 01:05:54,782
to the right people is a difficult thing.

1568
01:05:54,782 --> 01:05:57,610
So leveraging things like telemedicine,

1569
01:05:57,610 --> 01:06:00,366
finding ways to delivery that multidisciplinary model

1570
01:06:00,366 --> 01:06:03,241
even in locations that are geographically difficult

1571
01:06:03,241 --> 01:06:06,910
to attract the right people, I think is the key thing.

1572
01:06:06,910 --> 01:06:08,620
But in my own personal experience

1573
01:06:08,620 --> 01:06:11,260
and I spend a little less time on it now

1574
01:06:11,260 --> 01:06:12,690
than I have in previous assignments

1575
01:06:12,690 --> 01:06:14,670
just 'cause the nature of my assignment,

1576
01:06:14,670 --> 01:06:17,340
the single biggest change in my judgment

1577
01:06:17,340 --> 01:06:20,090
has been the change in the culture

1578
01:06:20,090 --> 01:06:23,590
of the medical profession to that multidisciplinary approach

1579
01:06:24,130 --> 01:06:26,870
and then combined with the full visibility

1580
01:06:26,870 --> 01:06:28,690
of what's goin' on with an individual

1581
01:06:28,690 --> 01:06:31,590
in the leadership realm or with the chaplain and so forth.

1582
01:06:32,193 --> 01:06:34,550
So what I used to tell people is if I knew as much

1583
01:06:34,550 --> 01:06:35,910
about people when they were alive

1584
01:06:35,910 --> 01:06:38,173
as I found out about 'em after they die,

1585
01:06:38,420 --> 01:06:41,340
we would've been able to do something to help fix this

1586
01:06:41,530 --> 01:06:43,950
so I think that multidisciplinary approach

1587
01:06:43,950 --> 01:06:45,990
is probably the biggest thing in terms

1588
01:06:45,990 --> 01:06:48,000
of an investment and then making sure

1589
01:06:48,000 --> 01:06:49,590
that we actually do know as much

1590
01:06:49,590 --> 01:06:52,050
about our men and women when they're alive

1591
01:06:52,050 --> 01:06:54,480
as we sometimes find out after they die

1592
01:06:54,480 --> 01:06:56,750
is probably the biggest thing we can then emphasize.

1593
01:06:56,750 --> 01:06:59,940
Piece of it is resources, but a piece of it

1594
01:06:59,940 --> 01:07:01,700
is continuing to have the kind of decisive,

1595
01:07:01,700 --> 01:07:04,070
engaged leadership that we've seen be successful.

1596
01:07:04,070 --> 01:07:04,903
- Thank you.

1597
01:07:05,410 --> 01:07:07,330
Another thing that you've been working

1598
01:07:07,330 --> 01:07:09,083
with me and with all of us on,

1599
01:07:09,226 --> 01:07:13,090
in Syria, is to try and find the young men

1600
01:07:13,090 --> 01:07:17,283
and women who ISIS killed while they were there.

1601
01:07:17,980 --> 01:07:19,660
We appreciate all your hard work

1602
01:07:19,660 --> 01:07:22,520
and I just wanna say one more time

1603
01:07:24,145 --> 01:07:24,978
if we could continue to keep looking

1604
01:07:25,602 --> 01:07:26,908
and continue to make that effort

1605
01:07:26,908 --> 01:07:30,180
it would mean the world to those families

1606
01:07:30,180 --> 01:07:32,220
who have young people who are still over there.

1607
01:07:32,220 --> 01:07:34,300
- Please assure them, Senator,

1608
01:07:34,300 --> 01:07:36,393
that we are doing exactly that.

1609
01:07:36,730 --> 01:07:38,881
We track this, we get reports frequently

1610
01:07:38,881 --> 01:07:43,250
about leads, there is no stone left unturned

1611
01:07:43,250 --> 01:07:45,483
as we try to resolve this.

1612
01:07:45,730 --> 01:07:47,330
- And as we're lookin' at Syria,

1613
01:07:47,504 --> 01:07:52,280
you hear things from here, from over there,

1614
01:07:52,280 --> 01:07:56,640
from wherever, when we talk about leaving as soon

1615
01:07:56,640 --> 01:08:01,640
as we have wrapped up ISIS, I have great fears

1616
01:08:02,104 --> 01:08:05,540
of seeing history repeat itself in some ways

1617
01:08:05,540 --> 01:08:09,320
that we simply head out and the second we do

1618
01:08:09,320 --> 01:08:10,763
ISIS comes back in.

1619
01:08:11,301 --> 01:08:16,013
I know that the Department of Defense, General Dunford,

1620
01:08:16,013 --> 01:08:19,380
you've all said, look, we're just not walking away

1621
01:08:19,380 --> 01:08:22,317
but I wanna make sure that we have a plan in place

1622
01:08:22,317 --> 01:08:24,750
to protect those people in those regions

1623
01:08:24,838 --> 01:08:28,153
that we've stood with, who we've given our word to,

1624
01:08:28,218 --> 01:08:31,290
and who have relied on us as partners

1625
01:08:31,440 --> 01:08:33,740
and have stuck their necks out for us as well.

1626
01:08:35,660 --> 01:08:37,400
- Senator, what we're doing right now

1627
01:08:37,400 --> 01:08:39,840
is we're helping the local places

1628
01:08:39,840 --> 01:08:43,330
that we've liberated put together their own leadership,

1629
01:08:43,330 --> 01:08:47,433
civilian leadership, civilian counsels we call them.

1630
01:08:47,610 --> 01:08:50,350
We're training their police chief, the deputy chief,

1631
01:08:50,350 --> 01:08:53,040
and a handful of others so when they bring people in

1632
01:08:53,040 --> 01:08:55,009
they've got some professional folks there

1633
01:08:55,009 --> 01:08:57,589
so if ISIS tries to come back at them

1634
01:08:57,589 --> 01:08:58,993
they're taken care of.

1635
01:08:58,993 --> 01:09:01,390
Then we're workin' the political process

1636
01:09:01,690 --> 01:09:03,790
to make sure they're not left to drift

1637
01:09:04,180 --> 01:09:06,140
in terms of not havin' a seat at the table

1638
01:09:06,140 --> 01:09:08,447
for their future, their longer term future.

1639
01:09:08,447 --> 01:09:11,170
That's a diplomatically led effort

1640
01:09:11,267 --> 01:09:14,193
but it's one that State Department, Brett McGuirk,

1641
01:09:14,310 --> 01:09:18,513
former Secretary Tillerson, Acting Secretary Sullivan,

1642
01:09:18,804 --> 01:09:22,260
will have been working on, so there'll be no loss

1643
01:09:23,644 --> 01:09:24,477
of momentum as we go forward.

1644
01:09:24,477 --> 01:09:27,290
- Yeah, I worry about them looking up one day,

1645
01:09:27,290 --> 01:09:31,150
the local forces, and seeing the trucks coming back in.

1646
01:09:31,150 --> 01:09:34,660
With ISIS and as they say, we don't wanna buy

1647
01:09:34,660 --> 01:09:36,443
the same real estate twice.

1648
01:09:37,249 --> 01:09:40,180
I also wanna ask, what does success

1649
01:09:40,180 --> 01:09:42,230
in Afghanistan look like a year from now?

1650
01:09:44,550 --> 01:09:46,760
- Sir, it's probably going to take more

1651
01:09:46,760 --> 01:09:48,810
than a year is the first point I would make.

1652
01:09:48,810 --> 01:09:50,950
- If you're a year out, where do you wanna be

1653
01:09:50,950 --> 01:09:52,900
and then what does success look like?

1654
01:09:52,900 --> 01:09:55,120
- A more capable Afghan force

1655
01:09:55,120 --> 01:09:57,643
between their military and their police.

1656
01:09:58,630 --> 01:10:01,373
The violence level going down.

1657
01:10:02,280 --> 01:10:05,770
As you know, the Taliban have been unable

1658
01:10:05,778 --> 01:10:08,130
to take over anymore district

1659
01:10:08,130 --> 01:10:10,570
or provincial centers since last August

1660
01:10:10,570 --> 01:10:12,690
and as a result, they've turned

1661
01:10:12,690 --> 01:10:14,390
to high-visibility bombings

1662
01:10:14,390 --> 01:10:17,200
for the very outcome they've achieved

1663
01:10:17,200 --> 01:10:20,113
which is getting a lotta news, that sort of thing.

1664
01:10:20,520 --> 01:10:21,990
I think , too, that we're going

1665
01:10:21,990 --> 01:10:24,960
to see fewer casualties, we dominate the area,

1666
01:10:24,960 --> 01:10:27,720
in other words we've got NATO air support for them

1667
01:10:27,720 --> 01:10:29,280
on the ground now with people

1668
01:10:30,281 --> 01:10:32,043
from NATO countries calling the support.

1669
01:10:32,502 --> 01:10:33,811
We've sent over reinforcements.

1670
01:10:33,811 --> 01:10:36,890
And lastly, you'll see elections ongoing.

1671
01:10:36,890 --> 01:10:38,740
You'll notice that one of the targets

1672
01:10:39,146 --> 01:10:42,333
of the Taliban is the election campaign.

1673
01:10:42,870 --> 01:10:44,770
We're going to sustain this effort

1674
01:10:44,850 --> 01:10:47,783
under President Ghani, get the elections in,

1675
01:10:47,950 --> 01:10:49,400
and it'll be a reminder to everybody

1676
01:10:49,400 --> 01:10:51,180
in the country that the Taliban know

1677
01:10:51,180 --> 01:10:53,080
they can't win through ballots,

1678
01:10:53,080 --> 01:10:54,580
that's why they turn to bombs.

1679
01:10:54,730 --> 01:10:57,183
That does not endear them to the population.

1680
01:10:57,895 --> 01:10:59,036
- Thank you all.

1681
01:10:59,036 --> 01:11:00,126
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1682
01:11:00,126 --> 01:11:00,959
- Thank you, Senator Donnelly.

1683
01:11:00,959 --> 01:11:01,792
Senator Cruz.

1684
01:11:03,780 --> 01:11:06,750
And Senator Cruz our timer is not functioning properly.

1685
01:11:06,750 --> 01:11:08,367
We'll let you know what time it is.

1686
01:11:08,367 --> 01:11:09,883
- Ill try to take no more than 40 minutes.

1687
01:11:09,883 --> 01:11:11,614
(laughter)

1688
01:11:11,614 --> 01:11:13,830
Gentlemen, good morning, welcome.

1689
01:11:13,830 --> 01:11:15,570
Thank you for your service.

1690
01:11:15,570 --> 01:11:19,130
Let's start with the topic that is much

1691
01:11:19,130 --> 01:11:20,558
in the news which is Iran.

1692
01:11:20,558 --> 01:11:22,596
Mr. Secretary, in your judgment,

1693
01:11:22,596 --> 01:11:26,680
what would be the national security implications

1694
01:11:26,680 --> 01:11:28,550
for the United States if Iran were

1695
01:11:28,550 --> 01:11:30,133
to acquire nuclear weapons?

1696
01:11:31,710 --> 01:11:34,190
- I think the implications for the United States

1697
01:11:34,190 --> 01:11:37,032
and for every nation in the region

1698
01:11:37,032 --> 01:11:40,335
it would be an increased level of danger

1699
01:11:40,335 --> 01:11:44,453
at a level we have never experienced from this regime.

1700
01:11:45,870 --> 01:11:49,223
- General Dunford, anything to add on that same question?

1701
01:11:50,144 --> 01:11:52,810
- No, I think the Secretary captured that, Senator.

1702
01:11:52,810 --> 01:11:55,140
I mean, given the behavior of Iran

1703
01:11:55,140 --> 01:11:56,470
and how difficult it is to deal

1704
01:11:56,470 --> 01:11:58,620
with all the other challenges they present,

1705
01:11:58,650 --> 01:12:00,540
certainly the possession of a nuclear weapon

1706
01:12:00,540 --> 01:12:01,840
would be of great concern.

1707
01:12:02,126 --> 01:12:05,140
- Let's shift to another topic.

1708
01:12:05,140 --> 01:12:06,573
Let's shift to space.

1709
01:12:06,970 --> 01:12:10,567
General Dunford, you've acknowledged that, quote

1710
01:12:10,567 --> 01:12:12,307
"Unlike previous eras when space

1711
01:12:12,307 --> 01:12:14,980
"was considered a benign and unchallenged environment

1712
01:12:15,377 --> 01:12:17,547
"space is now contested domain."

1713
01:12:18,320 --> 01:12:20,660
And based on that shared assessment,

1714
01:12:20,660 --> 01:12:23,030
I introduced language in last year's NDAA

1715
01:12:23,950 --> 01:12:26,400
which my colleagues on this committee supported,

1716
01:12:26,400 --> 01:12:29,350
that officially labeled space as a combat domain

1717
01:12:29,920 --> 01:12:31,820
and called for a policy to develop

1718
01:12:31,820 --> 01:12:33,590
and field an integrated system

1719
01:12:33,590 --> 01:12:36,513
of assets to protect our space-based capabilities.

1720
01:12:36,700 --> 01:12:38,840
To deter/deny attacks in space

1721
01:12:39,410 --> 01:12:41,890
and to defend the US homeland, our allies,

1722
01:12:41,890 --> 01:12:43,113
and deployed forces.

1723
01:12:43,900 --> 01:12:45,660
In your judgment, what is the United States

1724
01:12:45,660 --> 01:12:49,110
greatest military comparative advantage in space,

1725
01:12:49,110 --> 01:12:51,253
relative to Russia and China?

1726
01:12:52,230 --> 01:12:53,897
- Senator, I think there's really a few,

1727
01:12:53,897 --> 01:12:55,720
if you don't mind me listin' 'em.

1728
01:12:55,720 --> 01:12:57,770
I mean one is obviously we leverage space

1729
01:12:57,770 --> 01:12:59,570
for our command and control systems.

1730
01:12:59,670 --> 01:13:01,060
We leverage it for navigation

1731
01:13:01,060 --> 01:13:02,760
and that also includes our ability

1732
01:13:03,364 --> 01:13:05,083
to deliver precision munitions.

1733
01:13:05,130 --> 01:13:06,850
And the other area that we leverage it for

1734
01:13:06,850 --> 01:13:09,300
is intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance,

1735
01:13:09,712 --> 01:13:11,810
so for example, when North Korea was doin' testing,

1736
01:13:11,810 --> 01:13:13,410
just to put a finer point on it,

1737
01:13:13,440 --> 01:13:14,939
the first indicators we had that there

1738
01:13:14,939 --> 01:13:18,360
was a missile test came from our space-based assets,

1739
01:13:18,360 --> 01:13:22,840
so we really do leverage space

1740
01:13:22,840 --> 01:13:25,440
for some of the core capabilities of the department.

1741
01:13:25,940 --> 01:13:28,610
- And what are our greatest vulnerabilities in space

1742
01:13:28,610 --> 01:13:30,741
and what are we doing and should we be doing

1743
01:13:30,741 --> 01:13:32,483
to mitigate those vulnerabilities.

1744
01:13:32,520 --> 01:13:34,623
- Well what we see with China, Russia,

1745
01:13:35,299 --> 01:13:36,500
and to some degree some other countries,

1746
01:13:36,500 --> 01:13:38,980
they develop the ability to jam our systems,

1747
01:13:38,980 --> 01:13:42,070
they develop the ability to laser-blind our systems

1748
01:13:42,070 --> 01:13:43,570
are some of the biggest challenges.

1749
01:13:43,570 --> 01:13:46,040
And then one that was referred to earlier

1750
01:13:46,040 --> 01:13:48,527
is we get a lotta space junk out there

1751
01:13:48,527 --> 01:13:50,230
that puts at risk our targets

1752
01:13:50,230 --> 01:13:52,650
and as that increases that becomes a greater threat as well.

1753
01:13:52,650 --> 01:13:55,863
So those would be the three that I would highlight.

1754
01:13:56,610 --> 01:13:58,500
- Let me shift to a related topic

1755
01:13:58,500 --> 01:14:00,133
which is missile defense.

1756
01:14:01,000 --> 01:14:03,130
In the last decade, near peer competitors

1757
01:14:03,130 --> 01:14:05,260
like Russia and China have been able

1758
01:14:05,260 --> 01:14:08,359
to rapidly test and field technologies

1759
01:14:08,359 --> 01:14:11,253
that have given them the edge in hypersonic flight.

1760
01:14:12,060 --> 01:14:14,384
These hypersonic weapons systems can be launched

1761
01:14:14,384 --> 01:14:16,840
and flown in methods traditionally associated

1762
01:14:16,840 --> 01:14:18,040
with ballistic missiles.

1763
01:14:18,810 --> 01:14:20,770
The combination of speed, trajectory,

1764
01:14:20,770 --> 01:14:22,420
and maneuverability make these systems

1765
01:14:22,420 --> 01:14:25,040
increasingly challenging for our missile defense systems

1766
01:14:25,040 --> 01:14:27,540
to defend against them and ultimately defeat them.

1767
01:14:28,740 --> 01:14:30,940
How do you view the dual necessity

1768
01:14:30,962 --> 01:14:34,107
of number one developing new missile defense capabilities

1769
01:14:34,107 --> 01:14:36,630
to intercept hypersonics earlier in flight

1770
01:14:36,630 --> 01:14:39,730
and number two furthering the development

1771
01:14:39,800 --> 01:14:41,253
of our own hypersonics?

1772
01:14:43,520 --> 01:14:47,690
- Sir, the reorganization of Acquisition Technology

1773
01:14:47,690 --> 01:14:51,070
and Logistics now has someone focused on these areas.

1774
01:14:51,070 --> 01:14:54,763
Mike Griffin with a NASA/Lincoln Labs background.

1775
01:14:55,899 --> 01:14:58,510
Hypersonics is the number one priority

1776
01:14:58,650 --> 01:15:01,690
both having them for ourselves

1777
01:15:03,423 --> 01:15:04,724
(clears throat)

1778
01:15:04,724 --> 01:15:05,709
'scuse me, it's been a long morning,

1779
01:15:05,709 --> 01:15:07,013
but also the defense against 'em.

1780
01:15:07,190 --> 01:15:08,659
We could go into a classified briefing for you, sir,

1781
01:15:08,659 --> 01:15:10,845
about where we're going with it

1782
01:15:10,845 --> 01:15:12,780
but I would just register

1783
01:15:12,780 --> 01:15:14,350
that it's our number one priority

1784
01:15:14,350 --> 01:15:15,993
in the developing technology.

1785
01:15:16,120 --> 01:15:18,492
- Wow, and obviously please let this committee know

1786
01:15:18,492 --> 01:15:20,437
what else we need to be doing to assist in that.

1787
01:15:20,437 --> 01:15:25,437
Let me finally focus on, the administration

1788
01:15:27,190 --> 01:15:29,280
has taken very positive steps

1789
01:15:29,280 --> 01:15:32,293
to strengthen missile defense in the Korean peninsula.

1790
01:15:32,980 --> 01:15:35,823
Particularly with the deployment of THAAD batteries.

1791
01:15:36,562 --> 01:15:39,760
Even so, the capabilities calibrated

1792
01:15:39,760 --> 01:15:42,100
for ballistic missiles and it is ill-equipped

1793
01:15:42,100 --> 01:15:43,810
to defend against conventional threats

1794
01:15:43,810 --> 01:15:45,823
like rockets, artillery, mortars,

1795
01:15:46,350 --> 01:15:50,970
of which North Korea has stockpiled a staggering level

1796
01:15:51,310 --> 01:15:53,120
both to hold Seoul hostage and also

1797
01:15:53,120 --> 01:15:54,820
to target capabilities like THAAD.

1798
01:15:56,190 --> 01:15:57,985
In your judgment, what steps should we take

1799
01:15:57,985 --> 01:16:00,050
to further protect South Korea

1800
01:16:00,050 --> 01:16:03,493
against North Korean rockets, artillery, or mortars?

1801
01:16:03,919 --> 01:16:06,343
- Senator, I'll start with that.

1802
01:16:06,980 --> 01:16:09,937
Only so much can be done with defensive capabilities

1803
01:16:09,937 --> 01:16:13,460
and a key element of dealing with the challenges presented

1804
01:16:13,460 --> 01:16:16,047
by North Korea is our offensive strike capability as well.

1805
01:16:16,047 --> 01:16:18,730
And one of the things that we really

1806
01:16:18,730 --> 01:16:21,100
have started workin' on over the last 15 months,

1807
01:16:21,100 --> 01:16:23,270
truth be told, we diverted a lot

1808
01:16:23,270 --> 01:16:25,610
of our intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance assets

1809
01:16:25,610 --> 01:16:27,980
away from the peninsula for a long period of time,

1810
01:16:27,980 --> 01:16:29,490
and so if you ask me right now

1811
01:16:29,490 --> 01:16:32,020
what's the best way to get after that problem

1812
01:16:32,020 --> 01:16:33,459
is increase our intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance,

1813
01:16:33,459 --> 01:16:37,063
we call that find the threat,

1814
01:16:37,370 --> 01:16:39,750
and then be in a position to conduct strikes

1815
01:16:39,750 --> 01:16:40,700
against the threat.

1816
01:16:41,601 --> 01:16:44,600
And our plans, without speaking with specificity today,

1817
01:16:44,600 --> 01:16:48,040
are very much focused on more concerted strikes

1818
01:16:48,040 --> 01:16:50,520
against that artillery rockets

1819
01:16:50,520 --> 01:16:51,950
and denying them that capability.

1820
01:16:51,950 --> 01:16:54,490
So it's really a combination, in my view,

1821
01:16:54,490 --> 01:16:57,340
of there is a baseline of defensive capabilites

1822
01:16:57,340 --> 01:16:59,580
that we need to have in the greater Seoul area

1823
01:17:00,193 --> 01:17:02,193
in particular, but also enhancing better

1824
01:17:03,640 --> 01:17:04,473
the ability to conduct offensive strikes

1825
01:17:05,228 --> 01:17:06,061
against those systems.

1826
01:17:06,061 --> 01:17:07,540
- Terrific, thank you, gentlemen.

1827
01:17:07,540 --> 01:17:08,740
- [Jack] Thank you, Senator Cruz.

1828
01:17:08,740 --> 01:17:09,573
Senator Nelson.

1829
01:17:09,573 --> 01:17:11,173
- Mr. Chairman, I'll be quick.

1830
01:17:11,319 --> 01:17:14,270
When we talk about challenges in space

1831
01:17:14,270 --> 01:17:17,533
we gotta talk about challenges in cyber.

1832
01:17:18,360 --> 01:17:22,593
And I'd like to take if from a different standpoint.

1833
01:17:26,215 --> 01:17:28,540
Not only the cyber threat to the country

1834
01:17:28,540 --> 01:17:33,540
but to what degree is the Department of Defense,

1835
01:17:38,133 --> 01:17:42,580
our cyber command, going to be involved

1836
01:17:44,160 --> 01:17:49,160
in cyber-enabled information operations

1837
01:17:51,180 --> 01:17:56,180
like the Russians did to us in the 2016 election?

1838
01:17:58,440 --> 01:18:01,290
Is that something you wanna talk to in a different forum?

1839
01:18:02,070 --> 01:18:04,370
- It would be best in a different forum, sir.

1840
01:18:04,370 --> 01:18:05,203
- Okay.

1841
01:18:07,120 --> 01:18:07,953
Niger.

1842
01:18:09,670 --> 01:18:13,763
One of those service members was from Florida.

1843
01:18:15,950 --> 01:18:19,310
They're just about to produce the report

1844
01:18:20,130 --> 01:18:24,450
and, in fact, the families as we speak

1845
01:18:24,840 --> 01:18:27,630
have been informed, is there anything

1846
01:18:29,021 --> 01:18:31,643
that you can tell us, Mr. Secretary, about the report?

1847
01:18:33,663 --> 01:18:34,800
- Sir, we have a 200-page summary.

1848
01:18:34,800 --> 01:18:36,670
I know that sounds like a long summary

1849
01:18:36,670 --> 01:18:41,140
but it was very involved investigation

1850
01:18:41,140 --> 01:18:43,103
spanning three continents.

1851
01:18:44,020 --> 01:18:47,563
The last family will be notified on Monday.

1852
01:18:47,960 --> 01:18:50,380
Already in your classified vaults

1853
01:18:50,380 --> 01:18:53,513
the SASC has available the 200-page.

1854
01:18:53,640 --> 01:18:57,243
I can also get the 6,300 pages up.

1855
01:18:57,450 --> 01:18:59,133
Many of those pages I've read.

1856
01:18:59,359 --> 01:19:02,403
But I think right now we have found

1857
01:19:02,403 --> 01:19:05,190
what we believe to be the crux

1858
01:19:05,190 --> 01:19:08,513
of the problems, not problem but problems,

1859
01:19:08,590 --> 01:19:10,563
that contributed to this.

1860
01:19:10,850 --> 01:19:13,880
It was not a delegation of authority problem.

1861
01:19:13,880 --> 01:19:17,690
So we know immediately how to address

1862
01:19:17,690 --> 01:19:21,151
and we are doing that right now, addressing those problems.

1863
01:19:21,151 --> 01:19:26,151
- Finally, and I will, I will go

1864
01:19:27,397 --> 01:19:31,033
and I will read that report.

1865
01:19:32,592 --> 01:19:37,592
Quickly, you've touched a lot today

1866
01:19:38,360 --> 01:19:41,350
on Syria but the truth is that Iran

1867
01:19:41,350 --> 01:19:45,633
now has a lang bridge all the way to Beirut.

1868
01:19:46,250 --> 01:19:51,250
Through Iraq, through Syria, on in to Lebanon.

1869
01:19:52,880 --> 01:19:55,270
Is there any additional thing

1870
01:19:55,270 --> 01:19:57,080
that you wanna share, Mr. Secretary,

1871
01:19:57,080 --> 01:20:00,230
about how we're gonna protect our interests

1872
01:20:00,290 --> 01:20:05,290
in Syria given that that is a new significant threat?

1873
01:20:07,160 --> 01:20:09,763
- Well, the broader strategy, sir,

1874
01:20:10,407 --> 01:20:11,810
has got to take this into account

1875
01:20:11,810 --> 01:20:16,810
and if Iran does not change its behavior

1876
01:20:17,400 --> 01:20:19,390
and I have no reason to think that they will

1877
01:20:19,390 --> 01:20:22,230
under the current regime, the Iranian people

1878
01:20:22,230 --> 01:20:25,043
are held hostage by this regime leadership,

1879
01:20:25,350 --> 01:20:28,360
so long as they continue to fund the level

1880
01:20:28,360 --> 01:20:32,370
of proxy warfare, whether it be in Yemen

1881
01:20:32,400 --> 01:20:36,520
or the explosives they sent into Saudi Arabia

1882
01:20:36,880 --> 01:20:39,740
or into Bahrain, and then you're pointing out,

1883
01:20:39,740 --> 01:20:44,550
the crescent as they try to resupply their proxy

1884
01:20:44,550 --> 01:20:48,140
in Lebanon and Syria through a land bridge.

1885
01:20:48,140 --> 01:20:52,320
I would just suggest that Iraq has not yet succumb

1886
01:20:52,320 --> 01:20:54,920
to the idea that they need to be a rump state

1887
01:20:55,190 --> 01:20:58,060
of the Iranian regime and I believe

1888
01:20:58,060 --> 01:21:00,870
that we are well advised to continue

1889
01:21:00,870 --> 01:21:03,370
to support the Iraqi Security Forces

1890
01:21:03,720 --> 01:21:06,030
and the legitimate government in Baghdad

1891
01:21:06,270 --> 01:21:10,823
as one of the ways to avoid this becoming a reality.

1892
01:21:11,098 --> 01:21:13,550
I would also say that the Geneva process

1893
01:21:13,550 --> 01:21:18,520
in resolving the Syria civil war

1894
01:21:18,520 --> 01:21:21,710
would set the conditions for more interruption

1895
01:21:21,710 --> 01:21:25,150
of that and then, of course, Lebanese Hezbollah

1896
01:21:25,150 --> 01:21:26,820
has gotta be look at as a separate

1897
01:21:26,820 --> 01:21:30,193
and distinct problem inside Lebanon.

1898
01:21:30,393 --> 01:21:32,200
- Thank you, Mr. Secretary .

1899
01:21:32,200 --> 01:21:34,130
- [Jack] Thank you, Senator Nelson.

1900
01:21:34,130 --> 01:21:36,343
The majority and the minority have agreed

1901
01:21:36,343 --> 01:21:38,790
in that there are votes taking place right now

1902
01:21:39,539 --> 01:21:41,560
that the conclusion of the remarks and questions

1903
01:21:41,560 --> 01:21:44,223
by Senator Blumenthal, we will be adjourned.

1904
01:21:44,869 --> 01:21:46,116
(gavel banging)

1905
01:21:46,116 --> 01:21:47,961
- [Man] Senator Blumenthal is recognized.

1906
01:21:47,961 --> 01:21:49,122
- [Jim] Senator Blumenthal is recognized.

1907
01:21:49,122 --> 01:21:50,790
- Am I recognized?

1908
01:21:50,790 --> 01:21:51,623
- Yes, you are.

1909
01:21:52,312 --> 01:21:53,312
- Thank you.

1910
01:21:53,548 --> 01:21:54,381
- I will be brief because we do have votes

1911
01:21:54,381 --> 01:21:56,316
and I wanna first and foremost apologize

1912
01:21:56,316 --> 01:22:01,316
for being absent for a large part of the hearing.

1913
01:22:02,560 --> 01:22:05,900
A lot has been going on in the judiciary committee

1914
01:22:05,900 --> 01:22:10,090
and other committees and I will ask one brief question

1915
01:22:10,090 --> 01:22:13,363
and then perhaps supplement the record with others.

1916
01:22:13,970 --> 01:22:18,519
Have you seen any change in North Korea's cyber activities

1917
01:22:18,519 --> 01:22:23,519
since the diplomatic discussions concerning a meeting

1918
01:22:24,623 --> 01:22:27,913
between Kim and President Trump?

1919
01:22:29,150 --> 01:22:31,754
- We have not seen a change.

1920
01:22:31,754 --> 01:22:34,760
Now I didn't specifically go in and look at this

1921
01:22:34,827 --> 01:22:39,827
in the last week or two but I get the reports,

1922
01:22:40,410 --> 01:22:44,795
routinely, frankly, so I cannot give ya

1923
01:22:44,795 --> 01:22:47,290
a good answer on that, straight answer on it, sir.

1924
01:22:47,290 --> 01:22:49,810
But I can get back to ya, sir, and tell ya what I find.

1925
01:22:49,810 --> 01:22:54,690
- Because I have the impression over the years

1926
01:22:54,690 --> 01:22:56,700
that I've been on the Armed Services Committee

1927
01:22:57,131 --> 01:22:59,330
that they're cyber activities have mounted

1928
01:22:59,330 --> 01:23:01,580
over the years, obviously they've attacked us

1929
01:23:01,633 --> 01:23:03,083
on a number of occasions.

1930
01:23:03,390 --> 01:23:05,760
So I'd be very interested in your response.

1931
01:23:05,760 --> 01:23:07,760
As I said, I have other questions

1932
01:23:07,760 --> 01:23:10,020
that I would like to put to you

1933
01:23:10,105 --> 01:23:12,600
in light of the vote and in lfihgt

1934
01:23:12,600 --> 01:23:17,320
of your very long and valuable attendance here

1935
01:23:17,320 --> 01:23:20,110
and your forthright answers I'm gonna spare you

1936
01:23:20,210 --> 01:23:21,989
any more time but thank you for your service

1937
01:23:21,989 --> 01:23:25,560
and thank you for all you do for the country.

1938
01:23:25,560 --> 01:23:26,393
Thank you.

1939
01:23:26,393 --> 01:23:27,473
- [James] Thanks, Senator.

1940
01:23:27,562 --> 01:23:29,895
(murmuring)