WEBVTT 00:00.640 --> 00:02.420 - Hello, everyone. 00:02.420 --> 00:03.680 My name's Missy Ryan. 00:03.680 --> 00:06.000 I cover military issues for the Washington Post. 00:06.000 --> 00:08.570 And it's my great honor to be here today 00:08.570 --> 00:11.099 with a distinguished group of panelists 00:11.099 --> 00:12.697 to continue our discussion about 00:12.697 --> 00:16.090 the strategic competition facing the United States. 00:16.090 --> 00:18.230 First, I'd like to introduce our panelists 00:18.230 --> 00:21.080 and then we're gonna have a brief moderated Q&A, 00:21.080 --> 00:24.340 followed by opening it up to what I'm sure are a lot 00:24.340 --> 00:26.670 of questions from you in the audience. 00:26.670 --> 00:29.250 First of all to my left, we have General Paul Selva, 00:29.250 --> 00:32.283 the vice chairman of the Joints Chief of Staff. 00:33.200 --> 00:36.590 Christine Warmuth, director and senior fellow 00:36.590 --> 00:39.410 of International Security and Defense Policy Center 00:39.410 --> 00:41.200 at the Rand Corporation, 00:41.200 --> 00:45.240 and the former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. 00:45.240 --> 00:48.940 Next we have Robert Weiss, former executive vice president 00:48.940 --> 00:51.620 and general manager of the Skunk Works, 00:51.620 --> 00:54.980 currently serving as executive vice president 00:54.980 --> 00:58.790 of Special Projects for Lockheed Martin Aeronautics. 00:58.790 --> 01:02.050 Finally, last but not least, we have Susanna Blume, 01:02.050 --> 01:06.130 senior fellow and acting director of the Defense Program 01:06.130 --> 01:08.223 at the Center for New American Security. 01:09.160 --> 01:11.470 So with that, we're gonna jump right in, 01:11.470 --> 01:13.440 following a very interesting 01:13.440 --> 01:15.763 and provocative presentation from Bob Work. 01:17.030 --> 01:19.700 And I'd like to start with you, General Selva. 01:19.700 --> 01:21.440 Do you agree with the assessment 01:21.440 --> 01:23.170 from the Chinese government that they 01:23.170 --> 01:26.150 will reach technological parody in 2020, 01:26.150 --> 01:29.990 and possibly technological superiority in 2030? 01:29.990 --> 01:32.010 How close to accurate is this? 01:32.010 --> 01:35.520 - Well, I think it's very clear that China's objective is 01:35.520 --> 01:38.420 to achieve parody in the early '20s 01:38.420 --> 01:40.473 and superiority in the early '30s. 01:41.750 --> 01:42.963 One of the presumptions in all of that is 01:42.963 --> 01:45.880 that we don't actually react to their ambition. 01:45.880 --> 01:48.700 And so, it's very clear from our National Defense Strategy 01:48.700 --> 01:50.760 and our National Military Strategy 01:50.760 --> 01:55.130 that we intend to react to what we see as an increase both 01:55.130 --> 01:58.920 in Russia and China's desire and ambition 01:58.920 --> 02:00.820 to achieve at least technical parody, 02:00.820 --> 02:03.090 if not technological superiority. 02:03.090 --> 02:04.190 And so we have to react. 02:04.190 --> 02:08.940 This offsets our multiplayer game. 02:08.940 --> 02:11.560 And if you accept that the Chinese are trying 02:11.560 --> 02:14.690 to offset our capability in the Western Pacific, 02:14.690 --> 02:15.780 and that the Russians are trying 02:15.780 --> 02:17.780 to offset our capability in Europe. 02:17.780 --> 02:19.474 It's incumbent upon us as strategists 02:19.474 --> 02:21.920 to react to that ambition. 02:21.920 --> 02:24.993 And so, inside the department today, 02:25.970 --> 02:29.100 we are working on how we might react to that capability. 02:29.100 --> 02:34.100 I am not one to discount a potential for a third offset, 02:34.780 --> 02:37.700 but my description of it is we have to assure our ability 02:37.700 --> 02:40.240 to project American power when 02:40.240 --> 02:43.440 and where it is in our national interest. 02:43.440 --> 02:46.330 And if we fail at projecting our power 02:46.330 --> 02:49.230 into situations where our interests are threatened, 02:49.230 --> 02:51.200 then we've failed the American people. 02:51.200 --> 02:54.060 It's not about trying to counter 02:54.060 --> 02:57.220 an anti-access area denial strategy. 02:57.220 --> 02:58.997 That's admitting defeat up front and saying, 02:58.997 --> 03:01.597 "We have to go back and fix something we broke." 03:03.700 --> 03:05.207 The alternative approach is to say, 03:05.207 --> 03:08.647 "Analyze what your opponent is trying to do to you. 03:08.647 --> 03:11.747 "Make this a competition, not a conflict. 03:11.747 --> 03:14.737 "And checkmate them, or prevent them from getting so much 03:14.737 --> 03:17.127 "of an advantage that they can prevent you 03:17.127 --> 03:19.270 "from doing the things that are in your national interest." 03:19.270 --> 03:22.400 And if you read carefully, in our national military 03:22.400 --> 03:23.830 and National Defense Strategies, 03:23.830 --> 03:26.910 as well as the National Security Strategy 03:26.910 --> 03:30.270 that underpins all of them, that's exactly 03:30.270 --> 03:32.240 the challenge we've given to the Department. 03:32.240 --> 03:34.670 So, in my job in the JROC in my work 03:34.670 --> 03:39.440 with the technology community and our industrial partners 03:39.440 --> 03:41.800 and commercial partners were delivering capability, 03:41.800 --> 03:43.540 that's my challenge to them. 03:43.540 --> 03:45.330 If we just sit back and don't react, 03:45.330 --> 03:47.400 we will lose our technological superiority 03:47.400 --> 03:49.063 in 2020, the Chinese are right. 03:49.930 --> 03:52.730 But we should be a player in this game, not an observer. 03:53.690 --> 03:55.810 - Just to press it on that a little bit more, 03:55.810 --> 03:58.470 what specifically is the Department doing 03:58.470 --> 04:00.937 to maintain the strategic and technological edge, 04:00.937 --> 04:04.850 vis-a-vis China and Russia, and what is new, if anything, 04:04.850 --> 04:07.120 under the new defense National Defense Strategy? 04:07.120 --> 04:10.830 - So, a significant amount of research and development 04:10.830 --> 04:13.093 in long range precision strike capability. 04:14.170 --> 04:16.450 Significant amount of research and development 04:16.450 --> 04:19.300 in high speed, long range precision strike. 04:19.300 --> 04:22.930 And you heard Bob Work talk about several of those 04:22.930 --> 04:25.540 as things China has already achieved. 04:25.540 --> 04:26.810 They've achieved them in micro. 04:26.810 --> 04:29.250 They haven't mass deployed hypersonics 04:29.250 --> 04:31.860 or long range ballistic missiles. 04:31.860 --> 04:34.890 What they have done is proven the technologies. 04:34.890 --> 04:39.240 And so, they are able now to deploy those capabilities 04:39.240 --> 04:40.780 at a large scale. 04:40.780 --> 04:44.980 We are behind in the demonstration of many 04:44.980 --> 04:47.580 of those technologies, but we also can 04:47.580 --> 04:50.510 take asymmetric approaches and catch back up. 04:50.510 --> 04:53.650 We're way ahead in a lot of this sensor 04:53.650 --> 04:55.570 and sensor integration technologies, 04:55.570 --> 04:57.700 and we have to maintain that edge. 04:57.700 --> 04:59.137 So, I'm fond of saying, "With the Chinese, you have 04:59.137 --> 05:02.567 "to protect what you have, because if they can't learn 05:02.567 --> 05:04.607 "about it, they'll try to buy it. 05:04.607 --> 05:06.177 "If they can't learn about it or buy it, 05:06.177 --> 05:07.640 "they'll try to steal it." 05:07.640 --> 05:10.790 And we know they're active in all three domains, 05:10.790 --> 05:13.130 learning, buying, and stealing. 05:13.130 --> 05:14.180 And so, we have to be careful 05:14.180 --> 05:17.234 that we defend the technologies that are important to us 05:17.234 --> 05:20.440 in all three of those domains, or lines of effort, 05:20.440 --> 05:23.270 while we continue to develop additional capabilities 05:23.270 --> 05:25.490 that can be a asymmetric approach, 05:25.490 --> 05:27.420 both defensive and offensive to the things 05:27.420 --> 05:29.410 we know they're puttin' on the battlefield. 05:29.410 --> 05:33.210 - So, if that's the strategy, the major constraint 05:33.210 --> 05:37.360 would be the budget against that strategy. 05:37.360 --> 05:40.420 To what extent is the budget a constraint, 05:40.420 --> 05:43.050 and does the U.S. military have the resources 05:43.050 --> 05:47.120 that it needs currently to deal with this challenge 05:47.120 --> 05:49.470 in the near and immediate term? 05:49.470 --> 05:50.810 - So, given the size of our budget, 05:50.810 --> 05:52.260 if we don't have the money to do this 05:52.260 --> 05:53.860 then we're not paying attention. 05:55.220 --> 05:57.800 We have to put the money where it matters, 05:57.800 --> 06:00.900 and that means allocating money to research and development 06:00.900 --> 06:03.640 in the technologies that are important 06:03.640 --> 06:05.590 to achieve asymmetric approaches 06:05.590 --> 06:09.920 to both China and Russia's technology trends. 06:09.920 --> 06:11.760 And we have to do that. 06:11.760 --> 06:15.700 So, with an almost $700 billion budget, 06:15.700 --> 06:18.860 if we can't find the money to do this right, 06:18.860 --> 06:20.750 then we're not actually being strategists, 06:20.750 --> 06:25.610 we're tactically reacting to a competitor's activity. 06:25.610 --> 06:27.450 And I think we need to flip that argument. 06:27.450 --> 06:30.210 We actually do need to say, so while the use 06:30.210 --> 06:32.660 of the words, assured power projection, 06:32.660 --> 06:35.830 is really important versus counter-A2/AD. 06:35.830 --> 06:37.833 I'm not countering what they're doing. 06:39.850 --> 06:41.810 I'm gonna go around them. 06:41.810 --> 06:44.840 And that means we have to be able to see that battlespace 06:44.840 --> 06:47.480 and understand the patterns in that battlespace. 06:47.480 --> 06:49.750 We have to make sense of what we see, 06:49.750 --> 06:52.450 and we have to be able to react as quickly 06:52.450 --> 06:54.970 or faster than our opponent, 06:54.970 --> 06:57.180 or our competitor, in that battlespace. 06:57.180 --> 07:00.770 Otherwise, this could become a crisis and become a conflict. 07:00.770 --> 07:02.440 And that's what we need to be able to avoid. 07:02.440 --> 07:05.520 So, conventional deterrence is underpinned 07:05.520 --> 07:07.550 by those abilities, and those are the kinds 07:07.550 --> 07:10.210 of technology we have to invest in. 07:10.210 --> 07:12.670 Thankfully today, there's enough money 07:12.670 --> 07:14.950 to go around to get that work done. 07:14.950 --> 07:17.890 You will see in the next several budget cycles, 07:17.890 --> 07:20.900 continued prioritization into those kinds of technologies. 07:20.900 --> 07:22.740 - And you don't think it's too late to begin investing 07:22.740 --> 07:26.540 in some other capabilities, or to increase investment 07:26.540 --> 07:28.930 in some other capabilities that we need to be? 07:28.930 --> 07:30.230 - No, it's never. 07:30.230 --> 07:32.330 So, in a competition, it's never too late. 07:33.460 --> 07:36.680 If it becomes a conflict, the chance 07:36.680 --> 07:38.230 to invest in new capabilities 07:38.230 --> 07:41.020 and deploy them in that conflict is over. 07:41.020 --> 07:43.150 So, we need to be investing today 07:43.150 --> 07:45.410 in those asymmetric technologies in those things 07:45.410 --> 07:50.410 that impose cost on the strategy the competitor has taken, 07:51.450 --> 07:55.380 in order to avoid the potential for conflict. 07:55.380 --> 07:56.920 And if we fail at doing that, 07:56.920 --> 07:58.830 if we invest in the wrong things, 07:58.830 --> 08:01.820 and they do achieve a military and technical advantage, 08:01.820 --> 08:04.670 then the potential for conflict goes up, not down. 08:04.670 --> 08:06.810 So, we have to be careful that we're actually investing 08:06.810 --> 08:07.890 in the right things. 08:07.890 --> 08:08.723 - Okay. 08:08.723 --> 08:10.820 Christine, can you give us your analysis 08:10.820 --> 08:13.160 of how the Trump administration is doing 08:13.160 --> 08:15.980 on addressing this, the Now Team's strategic 08:15.980 --> 08:19.020 and technological competition from China and Russia? 08:19.020 --> 08:22.270 What is it doing right and what is it not doing right? 08:22.270 --> 08:25.410 - Sure, I think the administration is doing 08:25.410 --> 08:27.023 at least two things right. 08:28.030 --> 08:31.470 The first one is, identifying both Russia 08:31.470 --> 08:34.130 and China as great power competitors. 08:34.130 --> 08:37.260 As they say, admitting you have a problem is the first step. 08:37.260 --> 08:40.050 And I think this administration has definitely done that 08:40.050 --> 08:41.740 in the National Security Strategies, 08:41.740 --> 08:43.533 in the National Defense Strategy. 08:44.710 --> 08:47.880 The key now, I think, is going to be making sure 08:47.880 --> 08:51.510 that our actions live up to that recognition. 08:51.510 --> 08:55.270 And it's showing that what we're doing actually consistently 08:55.270 --> 08:58.640 and sustained over time demonstrates an approach 08:58.640 --> 09:00.190 that treats Russia and China 09:00.190 --> 09:02.650 as the competitors that they are. 09:02.650 --> 09:04.377 The other thing I think the administration has done, 09:04.377 --> 09:07.210 and this picks up on what General Selva was just saying, 09:07.210 --> 09:09.220 is providing additional resources 09:09.220 --> 09:11.810 in particular to the Department of Defense 09:11.810 --> 09:13.700 to invest in the kinds of capabilities 09:13.700 --> 09:17.580 that we're going to need to counter both Russia and China. 09:17.580 --> 09:20.120 I do think it's worth noting that it's not 09:20.120 --> 09:22.148 all about the military competition. 09:22.148 --> 09:25.850 Our strategy should be looking at other dimensions 09:25.850 --> 09:29.312 of our power, our diplomatic tools, our economic tools, 09:29.312 --> 09:33.000 our international development tools. 09:33.000 --> 09:35.100 And in those areas, I think the administration 09:35.100 --> 09:37.690 isn't putting the resources that we need, 09:37.690 --> 09:39.340 but at least on the military side, 09:39.340 --> 09:41.270 I think that's a positive. 09:41.270 --> 09:43.078 I think what this administration is doing wrong 09:43.078 --> 09:47.916 from my perspective is not playing to our strength. 09:47.916 --> 09:51.077 And our biggest strength, I think, against both Russia 09:51.077 --> 09:55.750 and China is the incredible network of alliances 09:55.750 --> 09:59.100 and partnerships that we have around the world. 09:59.100 --> 10:02.130 And those partnerships and those alliances, 10:02.130 --> 10:06.483 things like NATO, bodies like the G7 are key 10:07.930 --> 10:10.750 to maintaining our leadership role in the world, 10:10.750 --> 10:14.670 and key to assuring our ability to continue 10:14.670 --> 10:18.020 to be a force for stability in Asia, for example, 10:18.020 --> 10:21.780 and continuing to present a strong incredible deterrent 10:21.780 --> 10:24.460 against Russia in Europe through NATO. 10:24.460 --> 10:28.890 And I think this administration is doing a lot 10:28.890 --> 10:31.350 of criticizing of our allies and partners. 10:31.350 --> 10:34.270 You see President Trump calling for Russia 10:34.270 --> 10:36.989 to rejoin and have the G7 become the G8 10:36.989 --> 10:39.230 just on the heels of Russia trying 10:39.230 --> 10:42.070 to kill citizens in the United Kingdom. 10:42.070 --> 10:44.880 You see President Trump criticizing Angela Merkel, 10:44.880 --> 10:46.950 one of our closest allies. 10:46.950 --> 10:50.610 And I think what Russia wants to do wherever it can 10:50.610 --> 10:54.520 is drive wedges into NATO, and I think China would like 10:54.520 --> 10:58.520 to also coerce our allies and friends in the region away 10:58.520 --> 11:00.730 from the United States and towards China. 11:00.730 --> 11:02.790 And unfortunately, I think some of the things 11:02.790 --> 11:06.170 that this administration is doing is actually doing some 11:06.170 --> 11:07.330 of that work for them. 11:07.330 --> 11:10.640 All of this criticism of the South Koreans, for example, 11:10.640 --> 11:13.600 about whether they're providing enough host nation support, 11:13.600 --> 11:15.953 what they're doing with us vis-a-vis trade. 11:16.790 --> 11:19.230 And frankly, surprising the South Koreans 11:19.230 --> 11:21.360 and the Japanese with things that we're doing 11:21.360 --> 11:24.720 to try to manage the North Korean problem. 11:24.720 --> 11:27.660 Those things, I think, create uncertainty and anxiety 11:27.660 --> 11:29.660 in the minds of our allies and partners. 11:29.660 --> 11:32.220 And so, that's one of the biggest concerns 11:32.220 --> 11:34.250 that I have about this administration right now, 11:34.250 --> 11:36.110 is I think it's eroding the strength 11:36.110 --> 11:39.020 of our alliances from the inside. 11:39.020 --> 11:42.400 - Can you just say a quick word about Russia? 11:42.400 --> 11:45.070 You mentioned the activities in the UK. 11:45.070 --> 11:47.820 But with Bob's presentation, we heard a lot 11:47.820 --> 11:50.160 about the challenge from China, 11:50.160 --> 11:53.080 what are the things you worry about most with Russia? 11:53.080 --> 11:54.070 - What I worry about the most 11:54.070 --> 11:57.100 with Russia is frankly the conventional imbalance 11:57.100 --> 11:59.093 that we have right now in Europe. 12:00.430 --> 12:03.340 Russia, like China, has invested tremendously 12:03.340 --> 12:06.500 in both its nuclear and conventional capabilities. 12:06.500 --> 12:10.550 And Rand, for example, has done a number of war games 12:10.550 --> 12:14.120 that show that if President Putin made the decision 12:14.120 --> 12:17.270 to try to go into the Baltics with the, 12:17.270 --> 12:19.130 while on the one hand the United States, 12:19.130 --> 12:21.310 I think it's important to note, we did not stand still. 12:21.310 --> 12:24.070 We haven't stood still nor has NATO 12:24.070 --> 12:26.890 in the wake of Russia going into Crimea and Ukraine. 12:26.890 --> 12:28.470 We've taken important steps through 12:28.470 --> 12:31.200 the European Reassurance Initiative. 12:31.200 --> 12:33.220 But even with those advancements, 12:33.220 --> 12:35.480 even with the things that we've done in the last couple 12:35.480 --> 12:39.020 of years, most of the war games we've run at Rand 12:39.020 --> 12:41.800 show that Russian troops would be outside 12:41.800 --> 12:45.630 of Thailand and Riga within 48 to 60 hours. 12:45.630 --> 12:48.190 And we would be in the position, 12:48.190 --> 12:50.000 NATO would be in the position of having 12:50.000 --> 12:53.090 to essentially retake the Baltics. 12:53.090 --> 12:54.610 And that concerns me a lot. 12:54.610 --> 12:57.130 I think the gold standard of deterrence 12:57.130 --> 13:00.560 is creating enough doubt in your adversary's mind 13:00.560 --> 13:03.240 as to whether he could achieve his objectives 13:03.240 --> 13:06.070 such that he doesn't take that step in the first place. 13:06.070 --> 13:08.460 And I think there's quite a bit of work that needs 13:08.460 --> 13:11.330 to be done to get us in a place conventionally 13:11.330 --> 13:14.040 in Europe where we've created enough of that doubt. 13:14.040 --> 13:16.073 That's what I worry about the most. 13:17.040 --> 13:20.077 Many Russians and Russian experts have said to me, 13:20.077 --> 13:21.687 "Putin doesn't wanna go into the Baltics. 13:21.687 --> 13:23.950 "He knows what the red line is." 13:23.950 --> 13:27.996 And I hope he does, but Putin to me is a risk taker. 13:27.996 --> 13:31.440 And we have not done a great job predicting the future 13:31.440 --> 13:34.230 when it comes to figuring out what bad guys are gonna do. 13:34.230 --> 13:38.670 So, I'd rather see us bulk up our forces there. 13:38.670 --> 13:41.650 - Okay, Susanna, a question for you before we move to Rob. 13:41.650 --> 13:43.510 Can you tell us in your opinion, 13:43.510 --> 13:45.760 is the budget properly shaped to deal 13:45.760 --> 13:48.050 with the threats that we're discussing here today? 13:48.050 --> 13:49.703 - I think not quite. 13:50.550 --> 13:52.500 And the story goes back at least 13:52.500 --> 13:55.710 to the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, 13:55.710 --> 13:57.900 which was a document that yes, was a reaction 13:57.900 --> 14:00.620 to a contraction in defense resources, 14:00.620 --> 14:04.220 but did state an intention to move towards a smaller, 14:04.220 --> 14:06.740 but more capable, joint force. 14:06.740 --> 14:09.130 So in essence, you would trade size 14:09.130 --> 14:11.790 or numbers for some of these advanced capabilities 14:11.790 --> 14:13.570 that we've been talking about. 14:13.570 --> 14:17.600 And that was a vision that was never quite realized. 14:17.600 --> 14:22.090 If we fast-forward to 2019, the current planning cycle 14:22.090 --> 14:25.150 that is just kind of coming to completion on the hill, 14:25.150 --> 14:28.140 I think it was a bit of a missed opportunity 14:28.140 --> 14:30.340 by the Trump administration. 14:30.340 --> 14:33.030 Particularly when you look at the opportunity 14:33.030 --> 14:35.110 to both create a new strategic direction 14:35.110 --> 14:36.700 through the new National Security Strategy, 14:36.700 --> 14:40.040 National Defense Strategy, and then a significant influx 14:40.040 --> 14:45.040 of dollars to implement that new strategic direction, 14:45.260 --> 14:48.170 you see a lot of investment in the right accounts, 14:48.170 --> 14:49.493 the research and development investments 14:49.493 --> 14:50.840 that General Selva mentioned, 14:50.840 --> 14:53.543 in addition to increased procurement. 14:54.450 --> 14:55.860 However, if you look kind of down 14:55.860 --> 14:58.090 to the next line item level, what you see 14:58.090 --> 15:03.090 is very significant investment in legacy capabilities, 15:03.150 --> 15:05.200 Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, 15:05.200 --> 15:07.073 Apache helicopters, F-18s. 15:08.240 --> 15:10.250 These are worthy and important investments, 15:10.250 --> 15:11.900 but they're not the kind of investments 15:11.900 --> 15:13.650 that are gonna maintain and extend 15:13.650 --> 15:17.113 our technological advantage against China and Russia. 15:18.240 --> 15:22.531 And so, not quite is the short answer to that question. 15:22.531 --> 15:23.383 - And what are the one or two things 15:23.383 --> 15:26.020 that we should be investing in that we're not? 15:26.020 --> 15:29.010 - I think that by and large, duty is investing 15:29.010 --> 15:30.780 in the right things. 15:30.780 --> 15:32.950 What I see lacking is a pervasive 15:32.950 --> 15:34.883 and consistent sense of urgency. 15:35.910 --> 15:39.580 I do wanna mention artificial intelligence in particular. 15:39.580 --> 15:44.250 I hear it is a very, very popular topic these days. 15:44.250 --> 15:47.060 But I think and most of the rest 15:47.060 --> 15:48.300 of the National Security community needs 15:48.300 --> 15:50.600 to get a bit smarter than the kind of, 15:50.600 --> 15:53.813 let's sprinkle some AI on it theory. 15:54.650 --> 15:57.830 But I do believe that artificial intelligence 15:57.830 --> 16:01.440 is gonna revolutionize not just military matters 16:01.440 --> 16:03.000 but the broader economy. 16:03.000 --> 16:04.700 And the sooner we can start to understand 16:04.700 --> 16:06.700 what that's gonna look like, the better. 16:08.030 --> 16:11.850 Space, and particularly offense and defense investments 16:11.850 --> 16:14.490 that prepare for war that extends into space, 16:14.490 --> 16:17.120 again, a lot of the popular conversation envisions 16:17.120 --> 16:20.040 the kind of like James Bond Moonraker, 16:20.040 --> 16:21.870 like in space infantry. 16:21.870 --> 16:23.830 That's not what we're talking about here. 16:23.830 --> 16:25.180 - [Missy] Spaceballs. 16:25.180 --> 16:26.540 - Right. 16:26.540 --> 16:29.500 But it is a very important area. 16:29.500 --> 16:32.660 Again, there's a lot of development happening 16:32.660 --> 16:34.550 in these spaces and that's good money. 16:34.550 --> 16:36.800 What I worry about is when we look a little bit 16:36.800 --> 16:39.990 into the future, it's gonna be very, very expensive 16:39.990 --> 16:41.820 to turn those developmental programs 16:41.820 --> 16:43.930 into full production programs. 16:43.930 --> 16:46.740 And I wonder about how the administration and Department 16:46.740 --> 16:49.500 are gonna make room in the budget to do that. 16:49.500 --> 16:52.940 - Okay, Rob, a related question for you, 16:52.940 --> 16:55.500 from an industry perspective, what are the areas 16:55.500 --> 16:58.740 of technology or what those specific programs 16:58.740 --> 17:02.330 that you think have the best chance of 17:02.330 --> 17:07.330 in the next 10, 15 years of maintaining that strategic edge? 17:07.330 --> 17:08.930 - Right, well Missy, I go back 17:08.930 --> 17:10.930 to the National Defense Strategy, 17:10.930 --> 17:14.610 and I presume most of the audience has read the document, 17:14.610 --> 17:17.050 if not, I highly encourage you to do so. 17:17.050 --> 17:20.940 I think it's an excellent strategy that's been outlined 17:20.940 --> 17:23.623 and prioritizes what's important to the country. 17:25.160 --> 17:27.070 A couple of takeaways that I have 17:27.070 --> 17:31.050 from considering our revisionist powers 17:31.050 --> 17:34.820 and the rogue states, as well, that we'll 17:34.820 --> 17:38.650 be receiving a lot of the technology from China 17:38.650 --> 17:43.370 and Russia, and we'll be faced with those threats. 17:43.370 --> 17:44.830 A couple of things about 'em. 17:44.830 --> 17:47.810 So, we're talking about operating environments 17:47.810 --> 17:49.600 and in environments that are contested 17:49.600 --> 17:51.380 and highly contested. 17:51.380 --> 17:54.360 We're also talking about basically an away game. 17:54.360 --> 17:57.500 So, our coalition partners, as Christine mentioned, 17:57.500 --> 17:59.180 are critically important. 17:59.180 --> 18:00.760 But also, in those away games, 18:00.760 --> 18:03.180 we're gonna be fundamentally outnumbered. 18:03.180 --> 18:06.150 So, we have to have the asymmetric capabilities 18:06.150 --> 18:08.220 that General Selva spoke to. 18:08.220 --> 18:10.780 And what that means to me is having 18:10.780 --> 18:13.780 10 to one effectiveness versus those threats, 18:13.780 --> 18:16.760 20 to one effectiveness versus those threats. 18:16.760 --> 18:19.940 And I think we can enumerate 18:19.940 --> 18:22.097 what some of those capabilities are, 18:23.720 --> 18:27.200 has been addressed up here as budget constraints. 18:27.200 --> 18:31.270 So, certainly we're in a healthy budget situation 18:31.270 --> 18:34.860 in '18 and what we look forward to in '19, 18:34.860 --> 18:37.550 but it's gonna be very important strategically 18:37.550 --> 18:39.200 what we decide we want to do 18:39.200 --> 18:41.910 and what we're gonna decide not to do. 18:41.910 --> 18:46.910 And when I look at that list, it's really those capabilities 18:47.290 --> 18:49.570 that will provide asymmetric capabilities. 18:49.570 --> 18:54.570 So, I would say stealth fighters, stealth bombers, 18:54.610 --> 18:58.210 advanced weapons, hypersonics being one of those, 18:58.210 --> 19:00.293 resilient space is important. 19:02.490 --> 19:05.380 I would go into these technology areas 19:05.380 --> 19:07.850 that need to be developed where they're remain 19:07.850 --> 19:11.390 in the R&D accounts right now, directing energy, 19:11.390 --> 19:13.093 AI as you pointed out. 19:14.080 --> 19:16.300 Those are areas, open system architectures, 19:16.300 --> 19:18.550 we could go on with some of those technologies, 19:18.550 --> 19:22.710 and determine where the real payoff is going to be 19:22.710 --> 19:24.300 in warfighting effectiveness. 19:24.300 --> 19:27.970 So, I think we've identified those areas 19:27.970 --> 19:30.940 what the payoff will come if we make 19:30.940 --> 19:33.540 the appropriate investments, but also again 19:33.540 --> 19:37.440 to make sure the budget is properly expended, 19:37.440 --> 19:39.500 what are we not going to do? 19:39.500 --> 19:41.070 - Well, we could continue this discussion 19:41.070 --> 19:44.436 for a while longer, but we have about 10 minutes 19:44.436 --> 19:46.910 for questions from the audience. 19:46.910 --> 19:49.013 So, if people could raise their hands. 19:52.004 --> 19:54.040 So, please identify yourself 19:54.040 --> 19:56.350 and just your name and your affiliation. 19:56.350 --> 19:58.800 I'm not sure if there are microphones floating around. 19:58.800 --> 20:01.173 So there, how about here in the front? 20:04.350 --> 20:05.774 There's a mic right-- 20:05.774 --> 20:07.030 - There is a mic. - Yeah. 20:07.030 --> 20:09.500 - I'm pretty loud on my own as you know 20:09.500 --> 20:11.050 from working with me years ago. 20:12.110 --> 20:13.800 Sydney Freedberg, Breaking Defense. 20:13.800 --> 20:17.083 To pull a thread from Bob Work's presentation, 20:18.310 --> 20:21.360 the nervous system that holds 20:21.360 --> 20:23.870 all these wonderful technologies together 20:23.870 --> 20:26.190 is the quote, unquote, battle network. 20:26.190 --> 20:29.360 It's radio primarily because you can't use land lines 20:29.360 --> 20:34.360 at sea or in the air, and usually not on the battlefield. 20:34.470 --> 20:37.580 And I notice we have a lot of time on cyber, 20:37.580 --> 20:39.730 but precious little talking about electronic warfare. 20:39.730 --> 20:42.990 We hear DSB says we need more billions a year 20:42.990 --> 20:45.750 on that a few years ago, Kaminski Study. 20:45.750 --> 20:48.820 We had an EW study that was going around for a while, 20:48.820 --> 20:52.400 but basically since we retired the Raven, 20:52.400 --> 20:55.920 the Air Force has had a penetrating jammer, 20:55.920 --> 21:00.040 the Navy's sort of the only ones, and Army and Marine Corps. 21:00.040 --> 21:02.380 But Army certainly don't have very much. 21:02.380 --> 21:05.090 Here's a question for General Selva before all you chime in. 21:05.090 --> 21:07.800 Is this an on goal here that we've sort 21:07.800 --> 21:10.760 of unilaterally disarmed electronic warfare, 21:10.760 --> 21:13.663 and to a large extent, haven't gotten it back? 21:14.500 --> 21:15.333 - So, a couple of things. 21:15.333 --> 21:18.450 One, I think we assumed wrongly that encryption 21:18.450 --> 21:23.450 and our domination over the precision timing signals 21:24.550 --> 21:26.030 would allow us to invade the enemy 21:26.030 --> 21:27.810 in the electromagnetic spectrum. 21:27.810 --> 21:29.110 I think that was a bad assumption. 21:29.110 --> 21:31.315 It's not that we disarmed, it's that we took a path 21:31.315 --> 21:33.450 that they have now figured out. 21:33.450 --> 21:34.610 The Chinese and the Russians took 21:34.610 --> 21:36.020 an alternative path, which was 21:36.020 --> 21:40.640 to deploy digitally managed radio frequency manipulation, 21:40.640 --> 21:43.740 which changed the game in electronic warfare. 21:43.740 --> 21:48.740 So, we have done an intense study on where we are relative 21:48.980 --> 21:52.000 to the Chinese and the Russians over the next 10 years 21:52.000 --> 21:53.687 in electromagnetic warfare. 21:53.687 --> 21:57.260 And we actually call it the entire spectrum. 21:57.260 --> 21:58.850 And we've got some work to do. 21:58.850 --> 22:00.290 We've got work to do not only 22:00.290 --> 22:03.420 in the potential to use penetrating jammers 22:03.420 --> 22:07.280 and electromagnetic counter measures against an enemy, 22:07.280 --> 22:09.050 we have to figure out alternative pathways 22:09.050 --> 22:12.170 for communications and for command and control. 22:12.170 --> 22:14.430 And so, it doesn't have to be an RF game. 22:14.430 --> 22:17.740 It's an RF game, a radio frequency game. 22:17.740 --> 22:21.258 It's an RF game because we chose to make it so. 22:21.258 --> 22:23.850 And we're gonna have to do some targeted investments 22:23.850 --> 22:26.780 in expanding the capacity of the networks that we use 22:26.780 --> 22:29.310 for command and control and for battle management. 22:29.310 --> 22:32.050 And if we fail to do that, we're gonna lock ourselves 22:32.050 --> 22:34.310 into this forced counterforce game 22:34.310 --> 22:37.880 inside the electromagnetic spectrum for the balance 22:37.880 --> 22:39.720 of the next couple of decades. 22:39.720 --> 22:40.983 We're a step behind. 22:41.820 --> 22:43.820 It's not hard to catch up, 22:43.820 --> 22:44.960 but as soon as you catch up, 22:44.960 --> 22:47.780 the fast followers will actually leap over the top of you. 22:47.780 --> 22:49.420 And that's the dynamic that's set up 22:49.420 --> 22:52.950 by having digital radio frequency management capabilities. 22:52.950 --> 22:55.410 So, we have to adapt to that and adapt quickly. 22:55.410 --> 22:58.370 So, the work has been done to characterize the problem. 22:58.370 --> 23:02.570 And the problem is we're locked in this point, 23:02.570 --> 23:06.840 counterpoint fight with two potential competitors 23:06.840 --> 23:08.770 who've taken alternative paths. 23:08.770 --> 23:11.470 So, we have to unlock a different way to do that work. 23:12.350 --> 23:14.390 - Okay, I think there was a gentleman 23:14.390 --> 23:17.593 with white shirt, blue tie right there, yeah. 23:19.260 --> 23:20.620 - Thank you. 23:20.620 --> 23:22.760 Jonathan Ward, Atlas Organization. 23:22.760 --> 23:25.140 We work on Chinese global strategy. 23:25.140 --> 23:26.990 So, I've a question just following 23:26.990 --> 23:29.680 on Secretary Work's presentation. 23:29.680 --> 23:32.700 And insofar as that's the state that were in 23:32.700 --> 23:34.810 with the improvements in Chinese military, 23:34.810 --> 23:38.110 the aspiration for technological superiority, 23:38.110 --> 23:40.130 I completely agree with all of that. 23:40.130 --> 23:41.750 But the United States has really 23:41.750 --> 23:44.360 had a bifurcated policy towards China 23:44.360 --> 23:46.000 for the last 20 years, which is sort 23:46.000 --> 23:49.010 of business engaged, what's sort of build 23:49.010 --> 23:51.960 a healthy economic relationship in defense, 23:51.960 --> 23:54.200 you know, make sure we don't have a problem. 23:54.200 --> 23:55.680 That's come apart. 23:55.680 --> 24:00.040 Now, the increases in China's military budgets, 24:00.040 --> 24:02.650 their advances in their technology, et cetera, 24:02.650 --> 24:04.080 these are all essentially coming 24:04.080 --> 24:05.940 from that policy of engagement 24:05.940 --> 24:07.780 on the business side, I think, 24:07.780 --> 24:09.740 not just by the United States, but globally. 24:09.740 --> 24:11.710 So, I'm wondering what at this point 24:11.710 --> 24:14.080 can American business administrate broadly 24:14.080 --> 24:16.900 in terms of defense in aerospace and technology 24:16.900 --> 24:20.840 to a range of other sectors do to play a role 24:20.840 --> 24:23.993 towards bringing American advantage 24:23.993 --> 24:26.350 in this strategic competition rather than sort 24:26.350 --> 24:27.980 of engaging, engaging, engaging 24:27.980 --> 24:30.130 as our problems grow bigger on the security side. 24:30.130 --> 24:31.720 Thank you. 24:31.720 --> 24:33.640 - Why don't you take that, Rob? 24:33.640 --> 24:37.410 - Well, I can speak to, as General Selva pointed out, 24:37.410 --> 24:39.200 we have been making these investments 24:39.200 --> 24:40.950 in technology for a long time now. 24:40.950 --> 24:45.080 I think the signal that's informed industry 24:45.080 --> 24:47.180 has been sent several years ago. 24:47.180 --> 24:50.683 So, we're not behind to the earlier question you received. 24:51.840 --> 24:54.500 So, we've made a lot of advancements, as I said, 24:54.500 --> 24:56.580 in the areas of artificial intelligence, 24:56.580 --> 25:00.880 open system architecture, secured communications, 25:00.880 --> 25:04.010 resilient space, air space integration, 25:04.010 --> 25:06.493 multidomain command and control. 25:07.380 --> 25:08.950 The investments have been made. 25:08.950 --> 25:12.030 And I think what's important on those investments, 25:12.030 --> 25:15.000 it's always how do you get over the valley of death 25:15.000 --> 25:17.230 to create programs of record. 25:17.230 --> 25:18.960 We have demonstrated a lot of this. 25:18.960 --> 25:20.670 Experimentation is important. 25:20.670 --> 25:25.670 Prototyping is important to inform where we're heading 25:25.890 --> 25:28.960 to reduce the risk, so when these technologies 25:28.960 --> 25:30.640 that become programs of record, 25:30.640 --> 25:34.010 they have a very good chance of executing, 25:34.010 --> 25:36.090 and executing quickly to your point. 25:36.090 --> 25:39.100 So, I personally am optimistic that we have 25:39.100 --> 25:40.980 what we need to move forward. 25:40.980 --> 25:44.570 And again, I think it will come back to the commitment 25:44.570 --> 25:48.280 from the nation to continue strong budgets 25:48.280 --> 25:53.280 until we can basically recapitalize what arguably has 25:53.440 --> 25:56.620 been a deferred readiness, and procurement, 25:56.620 --> 25:59.417 and modernization for a couple of decades, 25:59.417 --> 26:02.110 as Bob Work stated earlier. 26:02.110 --> 26:03.880 - I think we maybe have time to just 26:03.880 --> 26:06.360 take two questions together, two final questions. 26:06.360 --> 26:08.983 And then if you can try to keep them brief. 26:10.050 --> 26:13.513 Let's see, the woman in the row back there, yeah. 26:14.740 --> 26:15.830 With her hand up. 26:15.830 --> 26:17.610 Wanna just stand up? 26:17.610 --> 26:19.970 And then the gentleman there with the blue shirt. 26:19.970 --> 26:21.800 If you guys could both just ask a quick question 26:21.800 --> 26:23.540 and then we'll take them together. 26:23.540 --> 26:27.440 - Thank you, I am Julie Renwick, of Vietnamese Americans. 26:27.440 --> 26:30.310 When you talk about geo-politic 26:31.310 --> 26:34.100 in our strategy competitions, mentioning of the air, 26:34.100 --> 26:37.490 how does our allies, especially Southeast Asia, 26:37.490 --> 26:42.490 Vietnam, for example, affecting our strategy? 26:42.640 --> 26:43.473 Thank you. 26:49.560 --> 26:50.753 - Go ahead, sir. 26:51.620 --> 26:56.050 - John Radner, retired intelligence officer, Navy. 26:56.050 --> 27:01.020 My concern is a fundamental socio-political aspects 27:01.020 --> 27:05.440 as leverage in the kinds of confrontations 27:05.440 --> 27:06.273 we're talking about. 27:06.273 --> 27:09.020 We have seen how the Russians have been very adept 27:09.020 --> 27:13.800 at using our diversity as a weapon against us 27:13.800 --> 27:17.290 in the last election particularly, but not only then. 27:17.290 --> 27:22.290 The Chinese had a serious vulnerability, in my opinion, 27:22.850 --> 27:27.850 in that they're very dependent on good, centralized control. 27:28.830 --> 27:31.810 Is there any thought being given 27:31.810 --> 27:34.210 in the command control sector, 27:34.210 --> 27:37.439 realizing that's only one-syllable sectors 27:37.439 --> 27:41.510 to trying to exploit that inherent vulnerability 27:41.510 --> 27:44.508 that they can't run away from? 27:44.508 --> 27:46.690 - Okay, maybe just two quick answers. 27:46.690 --> 27:48.920 Christine, you wanna take the first question? 27:48.920 --> 27:52.640 - Sure, in terms of allies and partners in Southeast Asia, 27:52.640 --> 27:56.353 that is a key part of, I think, what we should be doing. 27:57.247 --> 28:01.250 We want to stay in Asia, continue to be a stabilizing force, 28:01.250 --> 28:04.170 and we wanna reassure our allies and friends there 28:04.170 --> 28:05.520 that we're not going anywhere. 28:05.520 --> 28:07.940 And so, I think we wanna continue 28:07.940 --> 28:10.840 to reach out to all of the Asian countries 28:10.840 --> 28:13.390 and be building up our relationships with them, 28:13.390 --> 28:15.470 finding ways to cooperate, and particularly 28:15.470 --> 28:18.840 on the military side, continuing to form relationships. 28:18.840 --> 28:21.310 We, the United States has done quite a bit 28:21.310 --> 28:24.470 with Vietnam recently, with Singapore, 28:24.470 --> 28:28.000 and that's incredibly important because not only 28:28.000 --> 28:29.550 are we helping, I think, build up some 28:29.550 --> 28:30.960 of their military capabilities, 28:30.960 --> 28:35.020 but they're also giving us more places 28:35.020 --> 28:38.460 from which we could operate potentially if we needed to. 28:38.460 --> 28:41.780 So that, I think, is a key part of what we need 28:41.780 --> 28:44.310 to be doing and it's a key part of our strategy. 28:44.310 --> 28:48.880 But we have to be doing that consistently over time 28:48.880 --> 28:51.900 and showing countries in the region that they can count 28:51.900 --> 28:53.980 on us and that we are going to be there for them, 28:53.980 --> 28:56.090 and that they understand what the United States 28:56.090 --> 28:57.470 is trying to do. 28:57.470 --> 28:59.120 And that is where I think we have some work 28:59.120 --> 29:04.120 to do because in my assessment we sort of swing back 29:04.140 --> 29:06.520 and forth and send a lot of conflicting signals. 29:06.520 --> 29:08.780 I think we need to be more consistent 29:08.780 --> 29:10.730 with our allies and partners. 29:10.730 --> 29:12.740 - Okay, and on the last question of how to build 29:12.740 --> 29:17.290 in responses to cultural and sociological phenomena. 29:17.290 --> 29:18.339 General, do you wanna take that? 29:18.339 --> 29:20.460 - So, I think incredibly important in terms 29:20.460 --> 29:21.820 of the way he formulated the question, 29:21.820 --> 29:24.910 but also in the value of the human relationships 29:24.910 --> 29:27.440 that underlie those command and control networks. 29:27.440 --> 29:28.810 So, it's not enough to understand 29:28.810 --> 29:30.510 how the Russians do the calculus 29:30.510 --> 29:32.810 and whether or not they'll engage in the fight, 29:32.810 --> 29:35.210 or how the Chinese try to use their whole 29:35.210 --> 29:37.300 of government approach to influence people 29:37.300 --> 29:38.980 to their way of thinking. 29:38.980 --> 29:42.400 It's what's actually going on General Gerasimov's head? 29:42.400 --> 29:44.810 What's going on in General Feng's head? 29:44.810 --> 29:48.960 And part of that building that human touch 29:48.960 --> 29:51.070 is about Mil to Mil contact. 29:51.070 --> 29:54.097 So, it's not an accident that General Gerasimov 29:54.097 --> 29:57.490 and General Dunford actually communicated about 29:57.490 --> 30:00.310 what our two nations are trying to achieve in Syria. 30:00.310 --> 30:03.300 As cloudy and murky as those objectives might be viewed 30:03.300 --> 30:06.170 from the outside looking in, the forces on the ground need 30:06.170 --> 30:07.960 to have relative assurance that they're 30:07.960 --> 30:10.560 not actually gonna actually gonna bang into each other. 30:10.560 --> 30:13.130 So, the notion of deconfliction at a strategic 30:13.130 --> 30:16.190 and operational level inside the boundaries of Syria 30:16.190 --> 30:19.160 in a fight where we're there on a set of authorities 30:19.160 --> 30:22.650 to defend Iraq and to defeat ISIS, 30:22.650 --> 30:24.670 and the Russians are there on a set of authorities 30:24.670 --> 30:27.280 and the invitation of the Russia government 30:27.280 --> 30:28.690 to shore up the government. 30:28.690 --> 30:32.450 We actually have to understand what the red lines are 30:32.450 --> 30:35.360 in terms of how our forces will maneuver in that space. 30:35.360 --> 30:38.270 That is accomplished by human contact. 30:38.270 --> 30:40.530 It's General Dunford, General Gerasimov, 30:40.530 --> 30:41.950 talking to each other. 30:41.950 --> 30:45.690 It's the three star down in LUD on the phone 30:45.690 --> 30:49.410 with his counterpart in Latakiyah, Syria, 30:51.620 --> 30:54.440 making sure that those deconfliction range works. 30:54.440 --> 30:56.840 The next layer which I think is what you're addressing is, 30:56.840 --> 30:58.290 how do they bolt all that together 30:58.290 --> 30:59.790 to make their national decisions, 30:59.790 --> 31:01.290 and the extent to which we can exploit 31:01.290 --> 31:03.720 our intelligence enterprise to figure that out. 31:03.720 --> 31:06.180 We can actually get inside of that enterprise. 31:06.180 --> 31:07.790 And I'll stop there 'cause that 31:07.790 --> 31:10.580 would cause conflict, not competition. 31:10.580 --> 31:12.700 We have to be ready to flip that switch. 31:12.700 --> 31:15.800 If we haven't created those accesses and that understanding, 31:15.800 --> 31:18.090 we won't be ready if the day ever comes. 31:18.090 --> 31:20.010 And that's part of our deterrence strategy is 31:20.010 --> 31:20.963 to get inside it. 31:22.140 --> 31:24.000 - All right, well, I wanna thank the panel 31:24.000 --> 31:27.240 for an important, insightful discussion here today. 31:27.240 --> 31:28.640 Our next speakers are going 31:28.640 --> 31:31.050 to be discussing China's power play. 31:31.050 --> 31:33.613 So, please join me in thanking our panelists. 31:34.471 --> 31:36.888 (applauding) 31:39.050 --> 31:43.160 Also, in now in welcoming to the stage CNAS's Dan Kliman, 31:43.160 --> 31:45.113 Eli Ratner, and Elizabeth Rosenberg.