WEBVTT

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- Good morning ladies, gentleman.

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My name is Sergeant Major Jason Wilson.

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I am currently the Senior
Army Enlisted Representative

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for the Close Combat Lethality Task Force.

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I've been a member of the Task Force

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for approximately two months now.

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I have served as an Army Infantry

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man for just over 23 years.

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Most recently, as the Brigade
Command Sergeant Major

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for the Second Brigade Combat Team,

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101st Airborne Division, Air Assault.

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The Secretary of Defense established the

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Closed Combat Lethality Task Force

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on 16 March 2018.

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The directive tasking memo from DOD

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stated that through
the CCLTF, the DOD will

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develop, evaluate, recommend,
and implement improvements to

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US Squad Infantry Combat
formations in order to

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achieve overmatch against pacing threats

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and strengthen our combat
lethality, survivability,

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resilience, and readiness
of our close combat squads.

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The focus of the Task
Force is on squad level

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infantry in the Army, US Marine Corps,

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and United States Army
Special Operations Command.

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We see ourselves doing
this through five methods.

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Number one: Accelerate promising service

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level close combat initiatives.

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Number two: Develop integrated
solutions to capability gaps.

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Number three: Federate
desperate R&D efforts

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into the departmental close
combat community of practice,

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and accelerate innovation
and implementation.

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Number four: Evaluate solutions

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across the DOTMLPF P spectrum.

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Number five: Prioritize
analysis in a manner

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minimizing delays in the fielding of

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the most promising
approaches and solutions.

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The Close Combat Lethality
Task Force was established

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within the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense

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for Personnel and Readiness,
and is currently staffed

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with personnel from across the department,

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joint staff, and the
services working in direct

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support of our Task Force Director.

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The Close Combat Lethality Task Force

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is charged with ensuring
US Squad Level Infantry

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and select special
operations combat formations

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achieve overmatch in close
combat against pacing threats.

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Close combat is an
environment characterized

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by extreme violence within line of sight

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of the enemy, where
historically, the vast majority

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of military combat casualties occur.

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Approximately 90%.

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The CCLTF is pursuing promising
leads in manpower policy,

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focusing on recruiting,
developing, and retaining

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the individuals with the
requisite cognitive capacity,

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skills, and trades to excel

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within a close combat environment.

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We are currently leveraging
multiple programs

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to identify those
attributes best suited for

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Infantry Soldiers, which
can assist early on

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in decision making and selecting the ideal

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candidates for our close combat soldiers.

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Training: live virtual,
constructive and synthetic

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capabilities, which will
revolutionize the way

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soldiers see, process, and
understand the battle space

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above and beyond what they have now.

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In addition to providing
soldiers an unparalleled

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advantage on the battle field,

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it also provides the
ability to incorporate

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the synthetic training environment,

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improving their ability
to conduct training

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and high fidelity, on
the ground rehearsals

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no matter where they are.

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Human performance initiatives:

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Physical, cognitive, and moral aspects.

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The CCLTF is currently seeking to identify

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best of breed science and
programs that improve screening,

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assessment, combat aggressiveness,

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situational understanding, and proper

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decision making under extreme stress.

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Equipping: Improving direct fire weapons,

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sensors, situational
awareness, communications,

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and lightweight protective
equipment in the near-term.

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As well as identifying new
war fighting capabilities

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for future investment or existing
programs for acceleration.

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We will continue to
support the exploration

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of emerging science and technology efforts

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as well as research activities that can

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sustain squad overmatch in the future.

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To note, the cost assessment
and program evaluation

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strategic portfolio review
resulted in a significant

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reprogramming action that
has drastically increased

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and will continue to increase lethality

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across our close combat formations.

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We as a task force work
off a three phase model.

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Phase one: Exploration, fact
finding, and problem framing

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to identify feasible solutions.

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It's an ongoing process.

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Phase two: Bringing the
most promising solutions

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to the Secretary of Defense
for guidance and decision.

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It started in April and will continue

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on for the foreseeable future.

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Phase three: Transitioning
the Secretary of Defense's

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guidance and decisions to the services

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and United States Army
Special Operations Command

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in order to deliver solutions
to close combat forces.

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Again, an ongoing process.

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Over the past few months,
we have focused our

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efforts on external
engagements to understand

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industry advances and
more fighter equipment

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and best practices in respects to

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training and doctrine in both US Forces

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and our NATO allied military partners.

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This has provided the task force the tools

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to assist in meeting the first tenet

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of our three phase model:

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Shaping the problem and
identifying the feasible solutions.

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Recently, we visited Israel,
where the team gained

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an appreciation and a
different perspective

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in the field on leader development,
equipment, and policies,

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which will potentially enhance our

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close combat lethality in the future.

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Three weeks ago, we spent a few days

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at 29 Palms, California observing

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the Squad X experimentation,
which showcased some

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distinct sensing
capabilities designed to be

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organic to the close combat formation.

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These capabilities are
directly linked to the

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find, fix, finish, exploit, and analyze,

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which are designed to
allow our close combat

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formations to dominate the
operational environment.

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Finally, we spent time
at Fort Benning, Georgia,

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visiting the Office of
the Chief of Infantry

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and the Maneuver Center of Excellence

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to better understand enhancements in the

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Infantry and Maneuver Tactics currently

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being used to train our force.

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While there, we took the
opportunity to sit down

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with leaders of the 75th Ranger Regiment

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and to gain and
appreciation for the models

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they use for selecting
their current soldiers.

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As it more closely
resembles the problem set

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that we as the Army face as well

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as the United States Marine Corps.

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The feedback we received will likely

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generate future discussion.

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These visits are indicative
of how we are operating

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and building out the
framework of this problem.

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Taking lethality and
survivability concepts from

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various units and looking to apply

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them to the conventional infantry forces.

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To do that, we must get out in the field

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and observe the latest
in lethality research

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and it's application on
today's modern battlefield.

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Lastly, we must ensure that
any implication is nested

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with the needs of the
Force and truly enhances

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squad lethality that is measurable

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and provides overmatch
against our adversaries.

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The Close Combat Lethality
Task Force will continue

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to analyze and provide
focused recommendations

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on Military department and
Military service efforts

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to achieve overmatch to
ensure infantry squads

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always have the advantage
in a fight through

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advanced training, manning, and equipping.

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Ensuring mission
accomplishment and victory

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on any battlefield at any time.

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Ladies and gentlemen, I hope this

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brief overview provided some insight on

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the Close Combat Lethality Task Force.

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At this time, is there any questions?

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Yes sir.

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- Hi, thank you.

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Damon Roth with the Washington Post.

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I wanted to drill down a
bit on the recommendation

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piece and, I guess, whatever
has been implemented so far

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following any recommendations
that have been made.

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Can you give an example
of the things that you've

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already recommended as a Task Force

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and what that has yielded?

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- Yes sir, some of the things that,

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you know, we have a task force.

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I won't speak on specifics right now

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because a lot of things that we have

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made recommendations on
are still in the works.

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Right now, we're looking at a lot of the

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synthetic training environment,

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and you can see a lot of the stuff.

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It's out there.

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You can do research on the internet and

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find a lot of the stuff that we are,

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that we're currently focusing on.

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But, a lot of our efforts
is with the synthetic

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training environment, which can allow

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our soldiers to fight the terrain,

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fight the enemy, and go into the..

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As the Secretary of Defense stated,

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fight the 25 bloodless battles
before their first contact

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wherever their located,
whether that's in their

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company operating facilities,
back on their installations,

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or their fully deployed down range.

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That's one of the big ones that we're

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focusing on right now sir.

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- Okay, alright, if I could follow up.

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I recall a General Mattis
being very interested

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in looking at the size of
small caliber ammunition,

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whether it was sufficient
556 versus going up

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to a 6.8 or something like that.

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Is that something that you
as a group have considered?

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- Yes sir, we have...

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We are looking at weapons,
different types of munitions,

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larger caliber, lighter weight munitions,

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but all that is still...

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I'm not able to talk about right now sir.

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- Matthew Cox from military.com.

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You had mentioned an effort to do recruit

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and develop and retain individuals that

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are suited for close combat operations.

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Could you talk about what
you've learned so far

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or what you're looking
at as far as screening

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process for young recruits coming in.

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I mean, how do you tell who's suited

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for close combat and who isn't?

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- Well sir, as I stated
earlier, I have been

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an Infantry man for over 23 years,

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and, you know, deployed
multiple times, you know,

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in support of, you know,
in support of, you know,

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forces and our Infantry soldiers,

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it is a tough job for anybody
to be able to, as you know,

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primary purpose to close
with and destroy the enemy.

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That is our purpose.

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So some of the things that, you know,

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that we're looking at
sir are the ability to

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not only come in, take
your ASVAB in high school,

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and join the Infantry.

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We are looking to get the
Infantry to where it is

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not a place where we
send soldiers that don't

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have the mental capacity to do other jobs.

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We want the Infantry to get away from...

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Not saying that everybody
in Infantry is bad,

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but we want to get away
from our close combat forces

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being the place where soldiers that don't

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meet the requisite criteria
to be an Intel Analyst

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or whatever gets sent to sir.

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We want to be able to get
those soldiers identified

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early to find out, do
you have the leadership

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potential to be in the Infantry?

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Do you have the mental
stability to be able

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to be in the Infantry and do they have the

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resilience and the mental
capacity to be able to

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handle some of the things that they may

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see in the Infantry, be
able to overcome that

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adversity and bounce back sir.

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- So, you mentioned going to Fort Benning,

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visiting with 75th Ranger Regiment.

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Are you looking at some of
their selection processes?

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- We definitely are sir.

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We were able to bring
some of the things that we

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talked to them, you know, back,

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briefed the director and some
of things that we discussed.

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Some of the things that they talked about

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are definitely in the future, sir,

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going to get pushed forward
for recommendations.

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- This is just a quick follow up.

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Are you referring to RASP and
ROPD and those (inaudible)?

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- No sir, no, sir we're looking at...

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It's one of the things
that the Marine Corps

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I know is looking at and
the Army is looking at.

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We're gonna make recommendations is...

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Basic training, the Army's
already took the initiative

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on basic training,
extending it from 14 weeks

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to 22 weeks and that
way soldiers could go to

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more ranges, they could get
more land navigation training,

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they could get more of the
training that their gonna need

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when they get to their
units, versus the units

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having to do all of that once

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that young soldier arrives sir.

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Yes sir.

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- [Female Reporter]
(inaudible) Inside the Navy.

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Are you seeing things
that the Marine Corps

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needs that are different than the Army?

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And if so, can you talk about
what some of those things are?

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- Right now, ma'am, what we are looking at

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is things that can be...

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We're looking at things that can be used

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for both Marine, Army,
and United States Army

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Special Operations Command
Close Combat Soldiers

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as a whole, ma'am, versus what's going to

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work for the Army, what's gonna work for

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the Marine Corps, ma'am.

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Yes sir.

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- Sydney Freebird, Breaking
Defense, Sergeant Major.

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Let me ask, I understand you can't

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speak to recommendations and process,

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but just from your
perspective as someone who has

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done this for 23 years and has seen a lot.

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As you're out there
looking at new concepts,

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new ways of choosing
people, new tech, new TTP's,

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what has struck going,

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"Gosh, we could have used
that back in OIF or OAF.

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"That is a really cool
thing that I personally

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"think that we get to actually
save lives out there."?

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- Sir, I would have to go back to the

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synthetic training environment.

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For us to be able to essentially use the

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live, virtual, constructive, and gaming to

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provide realistic
training for our soldiers.

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We just call it, you know,
battle-focused training.

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Train as you fight.

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We can get back to that
and we can actually,

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as I stated earlier, we can...

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There are systems that we're looking at

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that can allow the soldiers
to train as they will fight,

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train where they will
fight, and train against

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who they will fight while
back in the home state's

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training environment or forward, which

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I think will be a huge win sir.

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- Now, let me ask, you
and I are not millennials.

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We didn't' grow up with the devices

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in our hand and the games and so forth.

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Is there a generation gap or a culture gap

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between the folks like yourself,

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who weren't immersed
in this digital stuff,

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and the folks for whom, you know,

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"Sure I have three drones
up and I have devices,

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and I have a gaming..."

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Who might find the hard part being

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actually getting out in the mud?

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- I don't think, sir.

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I don't think you can, no
matter how much of this

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training that you can do in the

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synthetic training
environment, you're not gonna

15:58.020 --> 16:01.070
replace a soldier being behind his weapon,

16:01.070 --> 16:03.400
a soldier that is, as you stated sir,

16:03.400 --> 16:05.723
is in the mud training.

16:06.200 --> 16:07.653
That is gonna happen.

16:08.340 --> 16:10.630
There is no doubt it
has to happen in order

16:10.970 --> 16:12.720
to effectively prepare our soldiers

16:12.840 --> 16:14.600
to conduct their missions down range.

16:14.600 --> 16:17.740
But, with the things that they can do

16:17.740 --> 16:20.570
before they go out and
conduct the training

16:20.690 --> 16:24.030
in a live situation, they can actually

16:24.030 --> 16:27.083
rehearse it through the virtual, sir.

16:29.200 --> 16:30.033
Yes sir.

16:30.120 --> 16:32.933
- Sergeant Major, Jeff
Sobel with Task and Purpose.

16:33.710 --> 16:36.210
Is the task force looking at the use,

16:36.210 --> 16:39.080
the increased use of shoot houses so that

16:39.080 --> 16:41.950
soldiers and marines can better learn

16:42.170 --> 16:45.110
to read body language
of potential adversaries

16:45.110 --> 16:46.740
to know if they're going for a weapon

16:46.740 --> 16:49.573
or if they're perhaps ready
to detonate a suicide vest?

16:50.180 --> 16:53.450
- Sir, we, that is not
something that we have

16:53.450 --> 16:55.960
specifically looked at right now.

16:55.960 --> 16:59.573
With what we have been doing in the past,

16:59.800 --> 17:02.863
we did see, when we traveled to Israel,

17:03.030 --> 17:05.230
we did follow the Israeli Defense Forces,

17:05.230 --> 17:06.500
and a little bit of their training and

17:06.500 --> 17:08.563
how they conduct shoot house operations,

17:08.680 --> 17:12.420
but as far as here in this environment,

17:12.420 --> 17:14.563
sir, we have not focused on that.

17:14.590 --> 17:16.750
- Okay, can you talk
about what you learned

17:16.750 --> 17:19.260
from the Israelis about how to effectively

17:19.260 --> 17:22.220
combine infantry and armor considering

17:22.220 --> 17:25.133
future adversaries will
likely be mechanized.

17:26.160 --> 17:27.503
- We don't (audio skips)...

17:27.720 --> 17:30.550
To fight lethal squads in the future sir.

17:30.550 --> 17:33.050
- Do you expect soldiers
to be rotating more through

17:33.050 --> 17:35.350
Fort Erwin and Fort
Polk and marines through

17:35.350 --> 17:38.753
29 Palms to get more reps before combat?

17:40.854 --> 17:43.560
- Again sir, that's not
something we focused on.

17:43.560 --> 17:47.610
I was a, as my bio states, I
was a Task Force Army Major

17:47.610 --> 17:50.480
at GRTC prior to going to Fort Campbell

17:50.480 --> 17:54.480
and I think the reps are going to have to

17:54.480 --> 17:57.210
happen at home station
and that's why we're

17:57.210 --> 17:59.430
looking at some of the things they can do

17:59.430 --> 18:01.340
for the home station training environment.

18:01.340 --> 18:06.080
Because, as we all know,
Fort Erwin, Fort Polk,

18:06.080 --> 18:11.080
29 Palms, they can only train
so many units in a year sir.

18:13.240 --> 18:14.590
There is only so much time.

18:14.882 --> 18:15.715
- [Jeff Sobel] There is no substitute

18:15.715 --> 18:17.501
to being able to blow something up.

18:17.501 --> 18:18.334
- There is sir.

18:18.334 --> 18:20.993
There is not and that's
what I stated earlier.

18:21.023 --> 18:24.250
You can't replace getting out and training

18:24.250 --> 18:26.500
and getting in the dirt, but units have

18:26.500 --> 18:28.410
the ability to do that at their

18:28.670 --> 18:31.373
home station, sir, without going to GRTC.

18:32.180 --> 18:33.013
Yes sir.

18:33.013 --> 18:33.846
- Thanks Sergeant Major.

18:33.846 --> 18:35.480
Corey Dickstein with Stars and Stripes.

18:35.480 --> 18:38.970
I've seen in the past a
little bit of the synthetic

18:38.970 --> 18:42.380
training environment
stuff, but I'm not exactly

18:42.380 --> 18:44.970
certain I understand what all you guys

18:44.970 --> 18:45.803
are kinda looking at.

18:45.803 --> 18:47.710
Could you kind of describe what...

18:47.710 --> 18:51.983
Are we looking at squad level
things or platoon level?

18:52.220 --> 18:54.630
Can you give us some
examples of what this thing

18:54.670 --> 18:58.230
actually would like that
you guys are working on?

18:58.530 --> 19:00.071
- The things that we've looked at, sir,

19:00.071 --> 19:05.071
it's for individuals, but
it can tie in to the squad.

19:07.530 --> 19:10.623
It can tie in to the platoon,
it can tie in to a company.

19:10.810 --> 19:15.603
It can tie in to all the
way up to a BCT, sir.

19:16.760 --> 19:19.800
That's the one that we
are currently looking at,

19:19.800 --> 19:21.600
that we're assessing right now, sir.

19:23.930 --> 19:24.763
Yes sir.

19:24.880 --> 19:27.613
- I just wanted to follow
up what I asked earlier.

19:27.810 --> 19:31.293
So getting back to recruiting individuals.

19:31.530 --> 19:34.333
So, the Marine Corps, the
Army, and Army Special Ops,

19:34.461 --> 19:36.343
they're all trying to get the same,

19:36.580 --> 19:38.440
they're all recruiting from the same pool.

19:38.440 --> 19:40.140
They're all trying to, you know...

19:40.300 --> 19:44.550
So, each service is gonna,
or each part is gonna

19:44.650 --> 19:48.010
drill down and the pool
is gonna get smaller now

19:48.010 --> 19:50.400
because for individuals
for close combat...

19:51.160 --> 19:52.500
Are you all talking about that?

19:52.500 --> 19:54.250
What are some of the things that...

19:55.010 --> 19:56.390
How can you...

19:56.880 --> 19:58.863
Is there any way to make the pool bigger?

19:59.241 --> 20:01.315
How do you solve that problem?

20:01.315 --> 20:03.560
I mean, it doesn't seem like there

20:03.620 --> 20:04.770
is enough to go around.

20:06.500 --> 20:08.870
- That's one of the things
that we do discuss, sir.

20:08.870 --> 20:11.470
I don't think there is a way
of making the pool bigger.

20:11.470 --> 20:13.240
Especially when it comes to recruitment.

20:13.240 --> 20:17.193
As we start to recruit out of
high school and those things.

20:17.520 --> 20:22.263
That's why the retention part
is gonna play such a key role.

20:22.370 --> 20:24.633
It's when we get soldiers that,

20:25.062 --> 20:28.620
in the close combat forces,
we get those soldiers

20:28.620 --> 20:33.620
trained up, and I said
it as a first son of a

20:33.660 --> 20:35.730
Battalion Sergeant Major
or Brigade Sergeant Major,

20:35.730 --> 20:38.450
if we get those soldiers, we
get them in our formations,

20:38.450 --> 20:40.590
we get them trained up, we need to do

20:40.590 --> 20:43.240
everything we can do to
hang on to those soldiers

20:43.462 --> 20:47.260
to help train the new soldiers when

20:47.260 --> 20:49.140
they come in to our formations.

20:49.140 --> 20:50.730
And I think it's gonna be...

20:51.730 --> 20:52.790
Number one, its gonna be better

20:52.790 --> 20:54.420
and it's gonna cheaper in the long run

20:54.420 --> 20:56.010
because you've already invested the time

20:56.010 --> 20:58.943
and the money into these
soldiers and leaders.

20:59.380 --> 21:01.260
- Great, right now when you have...

21:02.420 --> 21:04.750
So right now, when you have an individual

21:04.750 --> 21:07.213
that's in an infantry
unit, light infantry unit,

21:07.549 --> 21:10.713
or they're a Sergeant and
they really excel at it,

21:10.840 --> 21:12.320
maybe more than others as far as

21:12.320 --> 21:15.793
the leadership, the land
navigation, everything like that.

21:17.203 --> 21:19.700
A lot of times they just
move on to Special Ops.

21:19.700 --> 21:21.500
They don't stay in the conventional.

21:22.508 --> 21:25.030
Are you looking at any kind of bonuses

21:25.710 --> 21:30.710
or putting forward money
from Defense Department

21:31.270 --> 21:32.940
to the Army and Marine Corps, you know,

21:32.940 --> 21:35.003
more money for bonuses, things like that?

21:35.120 --> 21:38.730
- Yes sir, we have
talked about, you know...

21:38.800 --> 21:41.050
And it's, again, it's putting out feelers

21:41.050 --> 21:42.650
on things that we as a task force...

21:42.650 --> 21:46.820
Because, again, we're still
in kind of the shaping

21:46.820 --> 21:49.600
phase of everything,
but that is definitely

21:49.600 --> 21:50.690
something we're looking at, sir,

21:50.690 --> 21:54.563
and things that we ask each
other on a daily basis.

21:54.850 --> 21:58.530
How do we keep good
soldiers and good leaders

21:58.530 --> 22:02.263
in the conventional infantry forces?

22:02.800 --> 22:05.453
And I dealt with it, again, as well.

22:05.530 --> 22:07.780
You know, soldier if
you go to Ranger School,

22:08.480 --> 22:10.477
they would come back
and be immediately like,

22:10.477 --> 22:13.803
"As soon as I do my 12
months here, I'm going SL.

22:14.617 --> 22:17.427
"I wanna drop a RASP packet
and go to Ranger Battalion."

22:17.490 --> 22:21.673
So, then that's where the
leadership has to come in,

22:22.410 --> 22:24.240
from the squad level all the way up,

22:24.240 --> 22:27.700
is talking to these kids
trying to get them to

22:27.850 --> 22:30.970
stay on board to provide
that good leadership

22:31.307 --> 22:34.323
for our close combat
and our infantry forces.

22:36.090 --> 22:36.923
Yes ma'am.

22:36.970 --> 22:39.790
- Sergeant Major, just a follow
up on my question earlier.

22:39.790 --> 22:42.030
I know you said that
you're looking at lethality

22:42.030 --> 22:44.410
across the Army, Marine
Corps, and Special Ops,

22:44.410 --> 22:46.120
but can you talk a little bit more about

22:46.120 --> 22:48.829
how the coordination has
been with each service

22:48.829 --> 22:50.660
throughout this process and as you

22:50.890 --> 22:53.823
try to both do research
and execute on these,

22:54.210 --> 22:55.293
eventually on this?

22:57.150 --> 22:58.920
- You heard earlier
the things that I said.

22:58.920 --> 23:00.620
Kind of the outreach that we've done

23:00.620 --> 23:03.680
with going to Israel, going to 29 Palms,

23:03.680 --> 23:05.160
going to Fort Benning and things.

23:05.160 --> 23:07.173
Everything that we do in the task force,

23:07.640 --> 23:12.640
it is a joint task force and so,

23:12.740 --> 23:15.573
when we go somewhere, we don't just,

23:15.640 --> 23:18.980
we don't send the Marines,
just the Marines to 29 Palms.

23:18.980 --> 23:21.560
We send a Marine and an Army Contingent.

23:21.560 --> 23:23.000
Same thing when we went to Fort Benning.

23:23.000 --> 23:25.510
We took a Marine Contingent
and an Army Contingent,

23:25.510 --> 23:28.850
and that way you're getting
both sides while you're there.

23:28.850 --> 23:31.470
Because I think the Army can gain some,

23:31.470 --> 23:34.700
definitely gain some insight
from the Marine Corps

23:34.700 --> 23:36.550
and some of the things their looking at

23:36.550 --> 23:39.220
as well as the Marine Corps
pulling some of the things

23:39.220 --> 23:41.173
that the Army is looking at, ma'am.

23:42.580 --> 23:43.413
Yes sir.

23:43.760 --> 23:44.640
- Thanks Sergeant Major.

23:44.640 --> 23:46.463
Jim Garamone with DOD News.

23:49.720 --> 23:51.960
The services still have men trained

23:52.120 --> 23:55.140
and equipped for mission,
and just sort of to

23:55.970 --> 23:59.393
build on the young lady's
question over there,

23:59.814 --> 24:02.170
what sort of reception are you getting

24:02.170 --> 24:04.830
from the leadership of the services

24:06.156 --> 24:10.070
in putting forth these recommendations?

24:10.070 --> 24:13.890
And how confident are you
that they may be accepted

24:14.140 --> 24:17.473
and transitioned into it, and just,

24:17.870 --> 24:22.280
since Vietnam, infantry men
have been complaining about

24:22.460 --> 24:26.763
the small caliber weapon, the 5.56.

24:27.140 --> 24:30.850
If you made the recommendation
to go to a larger caliber,

24:30.850 --> 24:32.763
do you think it would be accepted?

24:36.688 --> 24:39.803
- I can't say that it wouldn't, sir.

24:41.080 --> 24:43.870
But I know that as we start to...

24:43.970 --> 24:47.950
As we're looking at weapon
systems, we're looking at...

24:47.950 --> 24:52.200
Things have changed since
I was a young soldier.

24:52.200 --> 24:55.343
I mean, yeah, you still
carry and I carried an M16A2.

24:56.430 --> 24:57.810
- [Jim Garamone] The M16
hasn't really changed.

24:57.810 --> 25:01.360
- Right, right, I mean you went from M16A2

25:01.360 --> 25:02.610
to and M4 to, you know...

25:05.040 --> 25:08.220
So, I think they are definitely,

25:08.220 --> 25:12.680
we are definitely looking at
different things for the future

25:12.680 --> 25:14.860
and I know that there's some...

25:15.990 --> 25:19.250
Again, as I said earlier, you can research

25:19.250 --> 25:22.920
and see what the services
are looking at right now.

25:22.920 --> 25:24.860
But, kind of some of what we're looking at

25:24.860 --> 25:29.860
for the short term is, how
do we adjust what we have

25:33.630 --> 25:37.693
right now until something
else comes along, sir.

25:39.860 --> 25:41.230
- [Timekeeper] We just
got time for one more.

25:41.230 --> 25:42.913
So, we'll go with Sydney.

25:43.160 --> 25:46.260
- Yeah, on STE, you mentioned it

25:46.260 --> 25:49.160
could go up to BCT level training.

25:49.160 --> 25:50.610
Are you actually talking about a massively

25:50.610 --> 25:52.270
multi-player kind of thing
where there are thousands

25:52.270 --> 25:55.460
of real people online directing at once,

25:55.460 --> 25:58.300
or do somebody have a
real squad of people is

25:58.300 --> 25:59.760
plugged into their VR goggles,

25:59.760 --> 26:01.563
but everybody else is simulated?

26:02.800 --> 26:03.633
- No sir.

26:05.349 --> 26:09.350
With the simulated
training, it is able to do

26:09.590 --> 26:12.763
multi-echelon and multi-domain.

26:13.470 --> 26:15.653
Put you into those situations.

26:15.790 --> 26:18.502
And again, it can...

26:18.502 --> 26:21.080
A squad can put it on,
actually an individual

26:21.080 --> 26:24.283
can put it on and immerse
hisself into that environment.

26:24.390 --> 26:27.800
Or a squad can put it on
and be able to actually

26:27.841 --> 26:31.270
conduct training on the same terrain

26:31.270 --> 26:34.270
that they are about to
go out into the field

26:34.690 --> 26:37.173
or to deploy and conduct a training on.

26:37.820 --> 26:39.720
So units will be able to conduct

26:40.226 --> 26:44.900
rehearsals like live
rehearsals before they step off

26:44.900 --> 26:47.564
and do it on the same terrain

26:47.564 --> 26:49.423
that they're gonna be fighting on.

26:49.950 --> 26:51.830
- How many people are we talking about

26:51.830 --> 26:53.733
plugged in at once interacting?

26:54.611 --> 26:56.300
- I don't know the exact number, sir,

26:56.300 --> 26:58.393
on how much that the system can,

26:58.540 --> 27:01.140
how much the system can hold.
- Kay.

27:02.790 --> 27:05.593
- (inaudible) Inside the Army, (inaudible)

27:06.877 --> 27:09.210
(inaudible)

27:13.852 --> 27:15.980
- (clears throat) Excuse
me, Maximilian Kwiatkowski

27:15.980 --> 27:17.443
with Inside the Army.

27:18.520 --> 27:20.340
I understand you're working with a lot of

27:20.340 --> 27:22.720
the different groups, but I was curious

27:22.720 --> 27:24.403
specifically on the Army side,

27:24.540 --> 27:26.140
there's these cross-functional teams

27:26.140 --> 27:28.240
focusing on different modernization areas.

27:28.440 --> 27:30.260
How closely are you working with them

27:30.260 --> 27:31.390
to see what kind of technologies

27:31.390 --> 27:34.183
you can leverage for close combat?

27:34.200 --> 27:35.250
- Very close sir.

27:35.250 --> 27:37.740
We actually as part of
the Fort Benning visit,

27:37.740 --> 27:38.920
I didn't mention it in here, but

27:38.920 --> 27:40.620
as part of the Fort Benning visit,

27:40.680 --> 27:44.970
we were actually tied in
with the CFT for lethality

27:45.230 --> 27:47.080
for the entire time
that we were down there,

27:47.080 --> 27:49.330
so they were, they went
to all the briefings

27:49.330 --> 27:53.740
that we went to, the 75th
Ranger Reg at the MCOE,

27:53.740 --> 27:54.970
everything, so...

27:54.970 --> 27:57.860
And while we are here in DC and they're

27:57.860 --> 28:01.740
down at Fort Benning, we
stay very close connected

28:02.000 --> 28:05.130
with all the CFT's from
across the Army, sir.

28:05.130 --> 28:07.730
So, that way we can make
sure that we're all focused

28:07.750 --> 28:10.130
on the same thing and we're not focused

28:10.130 --> 28:11.240
on one thing and then they're

28:11.240 --> 28:14.183
focused on something
totally different, sir.

28:14.580 --> 28:16.540
- Are you working with any specific one

28:16.540 --> 28:20.170
more closely than another like lethality

28:20.170 --> 28:21.603
or maybe synthetic training environment?

28:21.603 --> 28:25.120
Sir, right now, sir, we're working

28:25.400 --> 28:27.723
with the CFT for lethality, sir.

28:29.600 --> 28:30.433
Yes sir.

28:30.650 --> 28:33.170
- (inaudible) Missed your main objective

28:33.170 --> 28:34.160
you mentioned that we've been talking

28:34.160 --> 28:35.840
a lot of questions about
the personnel issues

28:35.840 --> 28:38.840
with potential readiness for
recruiting and also the STE's.

28:38.840 --> 28:40.910
Do you have some timelines on those?

28:40.910 --> 28:42.230
It sounds like there's
fact finding going on,

28:42.230 --> 28:43.980
but when does this go to Sec Def's desk?

28:43.980 --> 28:44.813
When will it be a decision?

28:44.813 --> 28:46.983
And when could the
forces see these changes?

28:47.630 --> 28:51.380
- Sir, I don't know what the timeline is.

28:51.380 --> 28:54.230
I can tell you there's
forward momentum on it.

28:54.230 --> 28:56.080
I don't know when it will be ready to

28:56.670 --> 29:01.670
go to the Sec Def, but in the
very foreseeable future, sir.

29:02.700 --> 29:04.743
- A year, six months?

29:04.870 --> 29:05.850
- I'm not gonna...

29:05.970 --> 29:08.817
Like I said, I personally
don't know the timeline

29:08.817 --> 29:12.136
associated with it, but like it said,

29:12.136 --> 29:14.257
there is forward momentum with

29:14.257 --> 29:18.113
some of the recommendations,
sir, as they're going forward.

29:24.520 --> 29:27.310
- Alright, well we appreciate
Sergeant Major Jason Wilson

29:27.310 --> 29:29.460
coming on board to give
us an update this morning

29:29.460 --> 29:32.653
and we appreciate the Press
Corps for attending as well.

29:32.840 --> 29:34.430
This concludes today's briefing.

29:34.430 --> 29:35.263
Thank you.

29:35.310 --> 29:36.703
- [Press Corps] Thanks a lot.