1 00:00:00,970 --> 00:00:03,710 - Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for coming. 2 00:00:03,710 --> 00:00:06,760 Appreciate your attendance after a pretty long day, 3 00:00:06,760 --> 00:00:09,830 I know, this is going to be your last briefing of the day. 4 00:00:09,830 --> 00:00:11,150 Welcome, I'm Mark Wright, 5 00:00:11,150 --> 00:00:12,930 Public Affairs Officer for the Missile Defense Agency. 6 00:00:12,930 --> 00:00:16,150 Let me introduce you to your speakers for today. 7 00:00:16,150 --> 00:00:19,180 On your right is Miss Michelle Atkinson. 8 00:00:19,180 --> 00:00:20,860 She is the Director for Operations, 9 00:00:20,860 --> 00:00:22,320 the Acting Director for Operations 10 00:00:22,320 --> 00:00:23,820 for the Missile Defense Agency. 11 00:00:23,820 --> 00:00:26,310 And to her right is Rear Admiral Jon Hill, 12 00:00:26,310 --> 00:00:28,580 the Deputy Director of the Missile Defense Agency. 13 00:00:28,580 --> 00:00:32,010 They'll give an opening statement and then go through some 14 00:00:32,010 --> 00:00:33,890 slides for you and give you some additional information. 15 00:00:33,890 --> 00:00:35,330 I know you already should have picked up 16 00:00:35,330 --> 00:00:38,160 a packet of information from OSD/PA. 17 00:00:38,160 --> 00:00:40,830 Make sure you get one if you haven't yet. 18 00:00:40,830 --> 00:00:42,330 Right after that's done, 19 00:00:42,330 --> 00:00:44,660 they'll go through the budget slides for you 20 00:00:44,660 --> 00:00:46,270 and then we'll have time for some questions. 21 00:00:46,270 --> 00:00:48,205 I ask that when time for questions, 22 00:00:48,205 --> 00:00:51,660 the admiral doesn't know you, neither does Miss Atkinson, 23 00:00:51,660 --> 00:00:54,620 so please identify yourself and where you're from 24 00:00:54,620 --> 00:00:57,010 and then we'll answer your question as best as possible. 25 00:00:57,010 --> 00:00:59,380 We should have about 20 minutes for each 26 00:00:59,380 --> 00:01:01,563 if everything works out all right. 27 00:01:01,563 --> 00:01:02,448 Admiral? 28 00:01:02,448 --> 00:01:05,030 - Okay, thank you Mark, and good afternoon. 29 00:01:05,030 --> 00:01:07,823 As Mark mentioned, we are well aware that this is your last 30 00:01:07,823 --> 00:01:11,740 brief of the day and so we'll try to keep you excited here. 31 00:01:11,740 --> 00:01:13,990 It's great to have an opportunity to talk to you about 32 00:01:13,990 --> 00:01:16,550 the importance of the president's budget request. 33 00:01:16,550 --> 00:01:20,650 And as you know, MDA has an incredibly important mission. 34 00:01:20,650 --> 00:01:22,430 We develop and deploy missile defenses 35 00:01:22,430 --> 00:01:24,530 to protect the homeland as well as to protect 36 00:01:24,530 --> 00:01:26,300 our deployed forces and allies all over 37 00:01:26,300 --> 00:01:28,470 the world from the threat of missile attack. 38 00:01:28,470 --> 00:01:30,900 I'm incredibly proud of that mission. 39 00:01:30,900 --> 00:01:33,470 It is a noble mission and I'm incredibly proud 40 00:01:33,470 --> 00:01:36,780 of the men and women of MDA that make this possible. 41 00:01:36,780 --> 00:01:38,730 So at this point, without any further ado, 42 00:01:38,730 --> 00:01:40,820 I'd like to turn it over to Miss Michelle Atkinson, 43 00:01:40,820 --> 00:01:42,930 who is our Director for Operations. 44 00:01:42,930 --> 00:01:44,370 So she can run you through the particulars 45 00:01:44,370 --> 00:01:46,510 of our budget request for FY20. 46 00:01:46,510 --> 00:01:49,440 And then we'll be happy to take your questions. 47 00:01:49,440 --> 00:01:50,810 - Thank you, Admiral. 48 00:01:50,810 --> 00:01:52,270 Good afternoon. 49 00:01:52,270 --> 00:01:54,131 I appreciate the opportunity to brief you today on 50 00:01:54,131 --> 00:01:58,358 the Missile Defense Agency fiscal year '20 budget request. 51 00:01:58,358 --> 00:02:00,470 Our budget request is consistent with 52 00:02:00,470 --> 00:02:01,744 the president's commitment to expand 53 00:02:01,744 --> 00:02:04,750 and improve our missile defense capability, 54 00:02:04,750 --> 00:02:07,270 while at the same time recognizing that we must 55 00:02:07,270 --> 00:02:09,570 be able to address tomorrow's threats, 56 00:02:09,570 --> 00:02:12,080 which continue to expand and advance. 57 00:02:12,080 --> 00:02:12,913 Next chart. 58 00:02:14,560 --> 00:02:17,520 In FY20, MDA will continue to strengthen 59 00:02:17,520 --> 00:02:19,844 and expand the deployment of defenses for our nation, 60 00:02:19,844 --> 00:02:23,342 deployed forces, allies, and international partners 61 00:02:23,342 --> 00:02:26,620 against increasingly capable missile threats. 62 00:02:26,620 --> 00:02:28,640 The missile defense program will support our war fighters 63 00:02:28,640 --> 00:02:31,908 and the needs of the combatant commanders by developing, 64 00:02:31,908 --> 00:02:36,171 integrating, testing, and deploying interceptors, sensors, 65 00:02:36,171 --> 00:02:39,850 and improvements to the ballistic missile defense system. 66 00:02:39,850 --> 00:02:40,683 Next chart. 67 00:02:42,880 --> 00:02:45,790 MDA's priorities for missile defense are nested within 68 00:02:45,790 --> 00:02:49,150 the National Defense Strategy priorities and are as follows. 69 00:02:49,150 --> 00:02:51,304 First, we must continue to focus on increasing 70 00:02:51,304 --> 00:02:54,790 system reliability to build war fighter confidence. 71 00:02:54,790 --> 00:02:57,910 We need to increase engagement capability and capacity 72 00:02:57,910 --> 00:03:01,894 and also rapidly address the advancing missile threats. 73 00:03:01,894 --> 00:03:04,330 Our budget request maintains operational 74 00:03:04,330 --> 00:03:05,916 missile defense capabilities for existing 75 00:03:05,916 --> 00:03:08,730 homeland and regional defense forces, 76 00:03:08,730 --> 00:03:10,866 continues to increase interceptor inventory, 77 00:03:10,866 --> 00:03:14,390 and will use existing technologies to improve sensors, 78 00:03:14,390 --> 00:03:16,730 battle management, fire control, 79 00:03:16,730 --> 00:03:18,057 and kill vehicle capabilities 80 00:03:18,057 --> 00:03:20,640 to address the evolving threats. 81 00:03:20,640 --> 00:03:21,473 Next chart. 82 00:03:24,020 --> 00:03:26,310 The current BMDS can defeat the current 83 00:03:26,310 --> 00:03:28,445 ballistic missile capabilities of our adversaries 84 00:03:28,445 --> 00:03:31,310 but we require additional capacity and advanced 85 00:03:31,310 --> 00:03:35,430 capabilities in order to stay ahead of the evolving threat. 86 00:03:35,430 --> 00:03:37,610 The projected missile threat is complex and volatile, 87 00:03:37,610 --> 00:03:40,070 and it includes evolving ballistic 88 00:03:40,070 --> 00:03:41,990 and hypersonic missile threats. 89 00:03:41,990 --> 00:03:44,650 It is critical that we continue to develop innovative 90 00:03:44,650 --> 00:03:47,800 and breakthrough technologies to outpace rogue state 91 00:03:47,800 --> 00:03:51,210 offensive missile capabilities against the US homeland. 92 00:03:51,210 --> 00:03:53,244 This evolving threat demands a globally present 93 00:03:53,244 --> 00:03:55,760 and persistent sensor network to be able 94 00:03:55,760 --> 00:03:58,530 to track it from birth to death. 95 00:03:58,530 --> 00:03:59,363 Next chart. 96 00:04:00,740 --> 00:04:03,720 The recently completed Missile Defense Review recognizes 97 00:04:03,720 --> 00:04:06,505 the evolving missile threats that we face and underscores 98 00:04:06,505 --> 00:04:08,970 that missile defense must remain a high-priority 99 00:04:08,970 --> 00:04:11,940 investment in our National Defense Strategy. 100 00:04:11,940 --> 00:04:14,130 Indeed, the missile defense mission 101 00:04:14,130 --> 00:04:17,730 is expanding to include non-ballistic threats. 102 00:04:17,730 --> 00:04:20,450 Aligned with the current National and Defense Strategies, 103 00:04:20,450 --> 00:04:23,269 the MDR strengthens our posture as we continue to make 104 00:04:23,269 --> 00:04:26,500 progress in the development and fielding of a BMDS to defend 105 00:04:26,500 --> 00:04:31,070 our homeland, our deployed forces, our allies, and partners. 106 00:04:31,070 --> 00:04:33,840 The MDR supports the critical need to pursue new concepts 107 00:04:33,840 --> 00:04:36,720 and technologies to address tomorrow's threat. 108 00:04:36,720 --> 00:04:39,256 The MDR also emphasizes our continued pursuit 109 00:04:39,256 --> 00:04:42,670 of cooperative relationships with allies and partners, 110 00:04:42,670 --> 00:04:44,000 to field interoperable 111 00:04:44,000 --> 00:04:47,050 and effective regional missile defenses. 112 00:04:47,050 --> 00:04:47,963 Next chart. 113 00:04:50,615 --> 00:04:54,580 MDA's FY20 budget request is a total of $9.4 billion 114 00:04:54,580 --> 00:04:56,139 to continue the development of a reliable, 115 00:04:56,139 --> 00:04:59,110 increasingly capable and state-of-the-art missile 116 00:04:59,110 --> 00:05:01,223 defense for our nation, deployed forces, 117 00:05:01,223 --> 00:05:04,110 allies, and international partners. 118 00:05:04,110 --> 00:05:06,650 Our priority in this budget remains the delivery of greater 119 00:05:06,650 --> 00:05:09,930 missile defense capability and capacity to our war fighters, 120 00:05:09,930 --> 00:05:11,085 and includes investments in advanced 121 00:05:11,085 --> 00:05:14,650 technology development and future capabilities. 122 00:05:14,650 --> 00:05:15,483 Next chart. 123 00:05:17,340 --> 00:05:20,180 MDA remains committed to delivering, expanding, 124 00:05:20,180 --> 00:05:22,856 and sustaining our nation's homeland missile defenses, 125 00:05:22,856 --> 00:05:26,000 and we request $1.8 billion in FY20 for 126 00:05:26,000 --> 00:05:29,163 the Ground-based Midcourse Defense, or GMD, program. 127 00:05:30,000 --> 00:05:33,030 In FY20, we will continue to have 40 ground-based 128 00:05:33,030 --> 00:05:35,890 interceptors deployed at Fort Greely, Alaska, 129 00:05:35,890 --> 00:05:38,908 and four at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. 130 00:05:38,908 --> 00:05:41,000 We will strengthen and expand homeland 131 00:05:41,000 --> 00:05:43,160 missile defenses by continuing the construction 132 00:05:43,160 --> 00:05:45,070 of a new missile field at Fort Greely, 133 00:05:45,070 --> 00:05:47,100 and work to deploy 20 additional 134 00:05:47,100 --> 00:05:48,320 interceptors at Fort Greely, 135 00:05:48,320 --> 00:05:53,033 which will increase the total deployed GBIs from 44 to 64. 136 00:05:54,140 --> 00:05:55,970 This budget also continues development 137 00:05:55,970 --> 00:05:58,603 of the Redesigned Kill Vehicle, or RKV. 138 00:05:59,690 --> 00:06:02,020 We are committed to using a rigorous engineering 139 00:06:02,020 --> 00:06:04,300 and test approach that provides a system to 140 00:06:04,300 --> 00:06:07,970 the war fighter that is both reliable and effective. 141 00:06:07,970 --> 00:06:11,360 A two year delay to the RKV program was necessary 142 00:06:11,360 --> 00:06:13,430 in order to complete design modifications 143 00:06:13,430 --> 00:06:15,277 and perform the testing to demonstrate 144 00:06:15,277 --> 00:06:18,743 that the RKV system will meet its requirements. 145 00:06:19,670 --> 00:06:22,880 Also in FY20, we will conduct a GMD flight 146 00:06:22,880 --> 00:06:25,493 test using a GBI launched from Vandenberg. 147 00:06:27,080 --> 00:06:29,996 For the Long Range Discrimination Radar, or LRDR, 148 00:06:29,996 --> 00:06:34,660 we are requesting $136 million in FY20. 149 00:06:34,660 --> 00:06:37,512 This radar, which will be available in 2020, 150 00:06:37,512 --> 00:06:39,671 is a critical midcourse sensor that will 151 00:06:39,671 --> 00:06:42,474 improve BMDS target discrimination capability 152 00:06:42,474 --> 00:06:45,663 and support a more efficient use of our GBIs. 153 00:06:47,400 --> 00:06:49,368 We are requesting $128 million 154 00:06:49,368 --> 00:06:51,609 for the Sea-Based X-Band Radar, 155 00:06:51,609 --> 00:06:54,200 which provides precision midcourse tracking 156 00:06:54,200 --> 00:06:56,950 and discrimination to protect the homeland. 157 00:06:56,950 --> 00:06:59,260 As of now, SBX has been at sea 158 00:06:59,260 --> 00:07:02,730 for more than 500 days without a port visit. 159 00:07:02,730 --> 00:07:06,290 The FY20 program continues to provide extended SBX sea time 160 00:07:06,290 --> 00:07:09,493 to maintain its important contribution to homeland defense. 161 00:07:10,527 --> 00:07:12,780 Our budget also requests $20 million 162 00:07:12,780 --> 00:07:14,270 for the Cobra Dane radar, 163 00:07:14,270 --> 00:07:15,880 to continue radar refurbishment 164 00:07:15,880 --> 00:07:17,382 and life extension in partnership 165 00:07:17,382 --> 00:07:18,983 with the US Air Force. 166 00:07:19,920 --> 00:07:22,040 Our PB20 request also includes funding 167 00:07:22,040 --> 00:07:23,690 for two additional radars, 168 00:07:23,690 --> 00:07:25,681 which will help provide persistent discrimination, 169 00:07:25,681 --> 00:07:29,138 precision tracking, and hit assessment to support defense 170 00:07:29,138 --> 00:07:32,840 of the homeland against long-range missile threats. 171 00:07:32,840 --> 00:07:35,640 We are requesting $275 million to continue 172 00:07:35,640 --> 00:07:37,225 the Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii, 173 00:07:37,225 --> 00:07:40,303 which is scheduled to be available in 2023. 174 00:07:41,240 --> 00:07:43,190 We are also requesting $7 million 175 00:07:43,190 --> 00:07:44,902 for the Pacific Discriminating Radar, 176 00:07:44,902 --> 00:07:47,594 to be available in the 2026 timeframe 177 00:07:47,594 --> 00:07:49,883 at a location to be determined. 178 00:07:50,890 --> 00:07:51,723 Next chart. 179 00:07:53,468 --> 00:07:56,350 Moving now to regional defenses. 180 00:07:56,350 --> 00:08:00,660 Our FY20 request for Aegis BMD is $1.7 billion, 181 00:08:00,660 --> 00:08:03,588 which includes sustaining deployed Standard Missile 3 fleet, 182 00:08:03,588 --> 00:08:07,393 and upgrading Aegis ships to add BMDS capability. 183 00:08:08,470 --> 00:08:10,920 We will procure 30 Aegis SM-3 Block 184 00:08:10,920 --> 00:08:13,090 IB missiles for deployment on land, 185 00:08:13,090 --> 00:08:15,645 at the Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland, 186 00:08:15,645 --> 00:08:19,660 and at sea on multi-mission Aegis BMD ships. 187 00:08:19,660 --> 00:08:21,713 This will bring the total number of SM-3 Block 188 00:08:21,713 --> 00:08:26,713 IB missiles procured to 361 by the end of FY20. 189 00:08:27,910 --> 00:08:30,500 In FY20, we will also continue the multi-year 190 00:08:30,500 --> 00:08:32,863 procurement for the SM-3 Block IB missile. 191 00:08:35,240 --> 00:08:38,430 We will procure seven SM-3 Block IIA missiles, 192 00:08:38,430 --> 00:08:42,620 for a total of 54 missiles procured through FY20. 193 00:08:42,620 --> 00:08:47,180 In FY20, we will also continue SM-3 Block IB modernization, 194 00:08:47,180 --> 00:08:51,010 and the SM-3 Block IIA software upgrade programs. 195 00:08:51,010 --> 00:08:52,876 We will also continue work with the US Navy 196 00:08:52,876 --> 00:08:55,691 to integrate the SPY-6 Aegis Missile Defense 197 00:08:55,691 --> 00:08:58,163 Radar with the Aegis weapons system. 198 00:08:59,495 --> 00:09:02,330 Our FY20 request for the Terminal High Altitude 199 00:09:02,330 --> 00:09:07,130 Area Defense, or THAAD, program is $854 million. 200 00:09:07,130 --> 00:09:08,830 This will allow us to support the maintenance, 201 00:09:08,830 --> 00:09:11,010 sustainment of all BMDS-unique items 202 00:09:11,010 --> 00:09:12,829 for the seven fielded THAAD batteries, 203 00:09:12,829 --> 00:09:15,193 and all of the THAAD training devices. 204 00:09:16,370 --> 00:09:18,710 This budget also procures 37 THAAD 205 00:09:18,710 --> 00:09:20,742 interceptors in support of the US Army, 206 00:09:20,742 --> 00:09:25,453 bringing the total to 568 by the end of FY20. 207 00:09:26,530 --> 00:09:28,490 Additionally in FY20, 208 00:09:28,490 --> 00:09:30,100 we will continue THAAD's software development 209 00:09:30,100 --> 00:09:32,960 and upgrades and integration of missile 210 00:09:32,960 --> 00:09:35,313 defense capabilities on the Korean Peninsula. 211 00:09:36,720 --> 00:09:38,766 We are requesting $543 million 212 00:09:38,766 --> 00:09:42,450 to support and sustain 12 TPY-2 radars, 213 00:09:42,450 --> 00:09:45,544 which includes the forward-based mode radars in Japan, 214 00:09:45,544 --> 00:09:49,063 Turkey, Israel, and US Central Command. 215 00:09:50,010 --> 00:09:52,380 This funding also continues software development 216 00:09:52,380 --> 00:09:54,360 to improve discrimination capabilities, 217 00:09:54,360 --> 00:09:57,683 and other upgrades to improve the TPY-2 radar performance. 218 00:09:58,690 --> 00:10:01,150 Our budget request of $500 million in FY20 219 00:10:01,150 --> 00:10:05,020 for Israeli programs continues MDA's longstanding support 220 00:10:05,020 --> 00:10:08,810 of US-Israeli cooperative programs to include Iron Dome, 221 00:10:08,810 --> 00:10:11,483 David's Sling, and the Arrow weapons systems. 222 00:10:12,410 --> 00:10:14,030 Finally, in support of phase three of 223 00:10:14,030 --> 00:10:17,672 the European Phased Adaptive Approach, or EPAA, 224 00:10:17,672 --> 00:10:21,112 our PB20 budget request includes $64 million to complete 225 00:10:21,112 --> 00:10:25,153 the Aegis Ashore site in Poland to be available in 2020, 226 00:10:25,153 --> 00:10:27,410 and also to make capability improvements 227 00:10:27,410 --> 00:10:29,687 at other Aegis Ashore sites. 228 00:10:29,687 --> 00:10:30,723 Next chart. 229 00:10:33,690 --> 00:10:35,840 MDA is developing advanced missile defense 230 00:10:35,840 --> 00:10:38,490 technologies for integration into the BMDS 231 00:10:38,490 --> 00:10:41,170 to defeat the rapidly evolving threats. 232 00:10:41,170 --> 00:10:43,370 The investment strategy for these technologies 233 00:10:43,370 --> 00:10:45,179 balances the need to address the most dangerous 234 00:10:45,179 --> 00:10:47,832 current threats with the need to position 235 00:10:47,832 --> 00:10:51,884 the US to respond to threat developments in the future. 236 00:10:51,884 --> 00:10:56,760 We are requesting $157 million for hypersonic defense. 237 00:10:56,760 --> 00:10:58,670 The FY20 plan includes software 238 00:10:58,670 --> 00:11:01,270 modifications to current BMDS assets, 239 00:11:01,270 --> 00:11:03,240 and further defines the architecture 240 00:11:03,240 --> 00:11:05,373 for future capability demonstrations. 241 00:11:06,670 --> 00:11:08,490 Our request for technology maturation 242 00:11:08,490 --> 00:11:10,983 initiatives is $304 million. 243 00:11:10,983 --> 00:11:13,141 This includes a new effort for the development 244 00:11:13,141 --> 00:11:15,737 of a neutral particle beam that will leverage past 245 00:11:15,737 --> 00:11:18,040 and current work on particle beams, 246 00:11:18,040 --> 00:11:20,539 related enabling technology, laser pointing, 247 00:11:20,539 --> 00:11:23,627 and laser stability to provide a component technology 248 00:11:23,627 --> 00:11:27,010 for a future system that will offer new kill options 249 00:11:27,010 --> 00:11:29,303 for the BMDS and will add another layer 250 00:11:29,303 --> 00:11:31,073 of protection for the homeland. 251 00:11:32,180 --> 00:11:35,660 This funding also provides laser scaling efforts to scale up 252 00:11:35,660 --> 00:11:40,140 power levels to support DOD-wide capability objectives. 253 00:11:40,140 --> 00:11:42,200 Our FY20 budget request also continues 254 00:11:42,200 --> 00:11:44,763 discrimination sensor technology development 255 00:11:44,763 --> 00:11:47,623 and supports advanced technology testing. 256 00:11:49,330 --> 00:11:52,480 We are requesting $63 million for MDA space efforts 257 00:11:52,480 --> 00:11:55,139 in FY20 to sustain the two Space Tracking 258 00:11:55,139 --> 00:11:57,040 and Surveillance System satellites operating 259 00:11:57,040 --> 00:12:00,228 in low earth orbit and to continue development 260 00:12:00,228 --> 00:12:03,123 of the space based kill assessment sensor network. 261 00:12:04,300 --> 00:12:06,770 We are requesting $14 million for 262 00:12:06,770 --> 00:12:09,436 the Multi-Object Kill Vehicle, or MOKV, 263 00:12:09,436 --> 00:12:11,680 to fund technology risk reduction efforts 264 00:12:11,680 --> 00:12:14,360 to establish a foundation for killing multiple 265 00:12:14,360 --> 00:12:16,913 lethal objects with a single interceptor. 266 00:12:17,790 --> 00:12:18,623 Next chart. 267 00:12:21,280 --> 00:12:24,870 We are requesting $564 million in FY20 268 00:12:24,870 --> 00:12:26,750 for the Command and Control Battle Management 269 00:12:26,750 --> 00:12:29,363 Communications system, or C2BMC. 270 00:12:30,230 --> 00:12:33,210 We will continue to support current C2BMC capability 271 00:12:33,210 --> 00:12:36,450 in CENTCOM, EUCOM, INDOPACOM and NORTHCOM, 272 00:12:36,450 --> 00:12:38,547 with upgrades that integrate the Aegis 273 00:12:38,547 --> 00:12:42,776 engage-on-remote and LRDR capabilities. 274 00:12:42,776 --> 00:12:45,920 We are requesting $554 million in FY20 275 00:12:45,920 --> 00:12:47,880 to develop threat representative targets 276 00:12:47,880 --> 00:12:52,880 and $396 million to conduct BMDS flight and ground testing. 277 00:12:53,190 --> 00:12:56,940 Critical flight tests in FY20 include FTM-44, 278 00:12:56,940 --> 00:12:59,437 which is an Aegis BMD test against a long range target, 279 00:12:59,437 --> 00:13:03,490 and FTO-03, which is an integrated THAAD, 280 00:13:03,490 --> 00:13:07,653 Aegis and Patriot operational test against multiple targets. 281 00:13:08,500 --> 00:13:09,333 Next chart. 282 00:13:10,660 --> 00:13:14,811 In summary, the MDA FY20 budget request continues to focus 283 00:13:14,811 --> 00:13:18,690 on sustaining and increasing system reliability for BMDS 284 00:13:18,690 --> 00:13:23,690 elements such as THAAD, GMD, Aegis, TPY-2 and Cobra Dane. 285 00:13:25,250 --> 00:13:27,740 It also focuses on increasing engagement capability 286 00:13:27,740 --> 00:13:30,732 with efforts such as the new LRDR radar in Alaska, 287 00:13:30,732 --> 00:13:34,039 and it also addresses the advanced threat with efforts 288 00:13:34,039 --> 00:13:37,020 such as the hypersonic defense program. 289 00:13:37,020 --> 00:13:39,985 In FY20, MDA will continue to make progress 290 00:13:39,985 --> 00:13:43,800 in the development and deployment of a reliable layered 291 00:13:43,800 --> 00:13:46,604 Ballistic Missile Defense System to defend our homeland, 292 00:13:46,604 --> 00:13:50,150 our deployed forces, our allies and partners, 293 00:13:50,150 --> 00:13:52,160 from missile attacks of all ranges 294 00:13:52,160 --> 00:13:53,603 and in all phases of flight. 295 00:13:54,810 --> 00:13:57,210 The Admiral and I will now take a few questions. 296 00:13:58,690 --> 00:14:00,210 - Hi, good afternoon, thanks for doing this. 297 00:14:00,210 --> 00:14:03,340 My name is Tom Squiteri, I'm with Talk Media News. 298 00:14:03,340 --> 00:14:05,600 I had, two questions, one off of what you said 299 00:14:05,600 --> 00:14:07,690 and one from something that happened yesterday. 300 00:14:07,690 --> 00:14:09,230 The radar in the Pacific that you 301 00:14:09,230 --> 00:14:11,256 didn't say where it's going to be yet, 302 00:14:11,256 --> 00:14:14,343 is that going to be on United States territory 303 00:14:14,343 --> 00:14:16,703 or is it going to be some place offshore? 304 00:14:18,020 --> 00:14:20,120 Can you answer that or is that classified? 305 00:14:20,120 --> 00:14:23,720 - So I'll go ahead and give you the best answer that I can, 306 00:14:23,720 --> 00:14:24,680 given where we are today. 307 00:14:24,680 --> 00:14:25,672 - [Tom] Right, that's always the one I prefer. 308 00:14:25,672 --> 00:14:26,505 - Right. 309 00:14:26,505 --> 00:14:28,125 So you know, capability and capacity increase 310 00:14:28,125 --> 00:14:30,880 for the overall INDOPACOM region 311 00:14:30,880 --> 00:14:32,606 is an important enough priority 312 00:14:32,606 --> 00:14:35,930 and it's part of a broader sensor architecture, right? 313 00:14:35,930 --> 00:14:37,249 So in coordination with the Department 314 00:14:37,249 --> 00:14:38,930 and with the combatant commands, 315 00:14:38,930 --> 00:14:41,340 we are continuing to assess potential sites. 316 00:14:41,340 --> 00:14:43,800 And so I would say all of the above. 317 00:14:43,800 --> 00:14:46,370 You know, as we assess the threat and different sites, 318 00:14:46,370 --> 00:14:48,030 then we'll determine where it should be. 319 00:14:48,030 --> 00:14:49,270 - The reason I asked that question, 320 00:14:49,270 --> 00:14:51,360 it leads to one I had in mind when I came here. 321 00:14:51,360 --> 00:14:55,700 Yesterday, Austin Long spoke at the Hudson Institute 322 00:14:55,700 --> 00:14:57,980 and the the topic was hypersonics, 323 00:14:57,980 --> 00:15:01,070 and he noted how far, this is a Pentagon person, 324 00:15:01,070 --> 00:15:03,872 he noted how far China is on hypersonics 325 00:15:03,872 --> 00:15:08,121 and the idea of having a network to determine hypersonics, 326 00:15:08,121 --> 00:15:09,786 including a sensor network, 327 00:15:09,786 --> 00:15:11,202 that the United States had 328 00:15:11,202 --> 00:15:15,510 a road map while China had investments. 329 00:15:15,510 --> 00:15:19,810 How do you judge the timeframe to when we'll have some 330 00:15:19,810 --> 00:15:22,563 type of sensor-based network that they spoke of yesterday, 331 00:15:22,563 --> 00:15:26,210 to help fulfill the goal that 332 00:15:26,210 --> 00:15:28,083 Michelle had said at her conclusion? 333 00:15:29,781 --> 00:15:31,576 - Yeah, I think it's a mix of investments 334 00:15:31,576 --> 00:15:34,105 and really understanding the projections 335 00:15:34,105 --> 00:15:38,010 of where the threat is and where it is going. 336 00:15:38,010 --> 00:15:40,890 So Miss Atkinson mentioned the. 337 00:15:40,890 --> 00:15:41,950 - [Tom] Pardon me. 338 00:15:41,950 --> 00:15:43,010 - That's okay. 339 00:15:43,010 --> 00:15:45,270 She lets me call her Michelle every now and then. 340 00:15:45,270 --> 00:15:47,549 So she talked about the initial investment 341 00:15:47,549 --> 00:15:50,210 on existing sensors today and how we can bring 342 00:15:50,210 --> 00:15:54,870 those together to handle those advanced threats, 343 00:15:54,870 --> 00:15:57,131 and that's kind of where you normally start, right? 344 00:15:57,131 --> 00:16:00,280 And then we moved to radar technology 345 00:16:00,280 --> 00:16:03,440 and place those in specific places to give us 346 00:16:03,440 --> 00:16:05,780 as much of the track custody as was mentioned earlier, 347 00:16:05,780 --> 00:16:08,010 from launch all the way to intercept point. 348 00:16:08,010 --> 00:16:11,001 We have been very consistent in the need to take sensors 349 00:16:11,001 --> 00:16:14,380 and go into space so that you have that global coverage, 350 00:16:14,380 --> 00:16:16,100 particularly for advanced threats that would 351 00:16:16,100 --> 00:16:18,628 overfly or under-fly field of view of a radar. 352 00:16:18,628 --> 00:16:20,980 So we're working with the Department now 353 00:16:20,980 --> 00:16:22,723 to work through that architecture, 354 00:16:22,723 --> 00:16:24,817 make those investments and be a part of 355 00:16:24,817 --> 00:16:29,040 a multi-mission sensor layer capability for the Department. 356 00:16:29,040 --> 00:16:29,930 - [Tom] Thank you. 357 00:16:29,930 --> 00:16:30,763 - [Mark] Tony? 358 00:16:30,763 --> 00:16:31,760 - [Tony] Tony Capaccio with Bloomberg. 359 00:16:31,760 --> 00:16:35,430 You flicked the problem with the Redesigned Kill Vehicle. 360 00:16:35,430 --> 00:16:38,190 How much is, how serious are the technical problems, 361 00:16:38,190 --> 00:16:39,730 or is this more quality of parts 362 00:16:39,730 --> 00:16:41,530 issues that Raytheon is having? 363 00:16:41,530 --> 00:16:44,660 - Yeah, so I'll just, for those who may not be familiar 364 00:16:44,660 --> 00:16:47,670 with it, so the RKV is the Redesigned Kill Vehicle. 365 00:16:47,670 --> 00:16:48,910 We went down this path, 366 00:16:48,910 --> 00:16:51,650 signed an acquisition plan back in 2015, 367 00:16:51,650 --> 00:16:53,460 the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, 368 00:16:53,460 --> 00:16:55,640 Technology, and Logistics at the time, 369 00:16:55,640 --> 00:16:57,740 signed that out and we're moving through, 370 00:16:57,740 --> 00:17:00,350 came through a preliminary design review as we approached 371 00:17:00,350 --> 00:17:03,260 the Critical Design Review at the end of last year. 372 00:17:03,260 --> 00:17:06,230 And those of you who aren't familiar with what a CDR is, 373 00:17:06,230 --> 00:17:07,481 when you get there, you're satisfied 374 00:17:07,481 --> 00:17:09,650 with the robustness of your design, 375 00:17:09,650 --> 00:17:11,260 you've done all the modeling and simulation, 376 00:17:11,260 --> 00:17:13,860 and you believe that you're ready to go to production. 377 00:17:13,860 --> 00:17:17,870 We have specific entrance criteria to take us there. 378 00:17:17,870 --> 00:17:20,700 We do not believe as a government team that we are ready 379 00:17:20,700 --> 00:17:23,160 to take that step into that Critical Design Review, 380 00:17:23,160 --> 00:17:25,410 and so through coordination into the department, 381 00:17:25,410 --> 00:17:27,070 all the way up to the Undersecretary 382 00:17:27,070 --> 00:17:28,100 for Research and Engineering, 383 00:17:28,100 --> 00:17:29,876 we determined that the best thing to do was to go back 384 00:17:29,876 --> 00:17:33,920 and assess that design and take the time to do it right. 385 00:17:33,920 --> 00:17:36,522 We could do what some programs do 386 00:17:36,522 --> 00:17:39,860 and what the Missile Defense Agency did years ago, 387 00:17:39,860 --> 00:17:42,468 which is to go ahead and produce what we've got 388 00:17:42,468 --> 00:17:44,950 and then deal with reliability issues in 389 00:17:44,950 --> 00:17:47,510 the fleet and erode the confidence of the war fighter. 390 00:17:47,510 --> 00:17:49,310 We know that is the wrong step. 391 00:17:49,310 --> 00:17:51,144 So we're going back to assess that design 392 00:17:51,144 --> 00:17:54,540 and do the proper testing, do the analysis, 393 00:17:54,540 --> 00:17:55,550 and then we'll go to the Critical 394 00:17:55,550 --> 00:17:56,980 Design Review when we're ready. 395 00:17:56,980 --> 00:18:00,140 We're following our normal process of rigorous engineering, 396 00:18:00,140 --> 00:18:02,360 gated reviews, milestone driven. 397 00:18:02,360 --> 00:18:04,670 - To what extent, though, are these quality of part issues? 398 00:18:04,670 --> 00:18:06,270 I obviously understand there's been parts failures 399 00:18:06,270 --> 00:18:09,230 and thermal testing of late parts in the production lines. 400 00:18:09,230 --> 00:18:10,950 - No, this is the, 401 00:18:10,950 --> 00:18:12,470 we've got to take a look at the whole design, 402 00:18:12,470 --> 00:18:13,303 which is what we're doing. 403 00:18:13,303 --> 00:18:14,770 We're assessing that and we're looking at 404 00:18:14,770 --> 00:18:17,150 the impact to what that means over the long haul. 405 00:18:17,150 --> 00:18:18,930 So over the course of the next few months, 406 00:18:18,930 --> 00:18:19,830 we'll have a better feel, 407 00:18:19,830 --> 00:18:22,136 but we're working that very hard today. 408 00:18:22,136 --> 00:18:23,830 - All right, well to what extent is the fielding 409 00:18:23,830 --> 00:18:26,650 expansion of 64 now jeopardized because of this? 410 00:18:26,650 --> 00:18:30,240 - Okay, so since the additional 20 ground-based interceptors 411 00:18:30,240 --> 00:18:33,160 were going to be tipped with the Redesigned Kill Vehicle, 412 00:18:33,160 --> 00:18:34,360 a two year delay, 413 00:18:34,360 --> 00:18:37,430 again up to two years based on our assessment today, 414 00:18:37,430 --> 00:18:38,760 would mean that those interceptors will 415 00:18:38,760 --> 00:18:40,211 move to the right by two years. 416 00:18:40,211 --> 00:18:41,648 - [Tony] Thank you. 417 00:18:41,648 --> 00:18:42,846 - [Mark] Thank you. 418 00:18:42,846 --> 00:18:43,679 - [Reporter] And a follow up on that, 419 00:18:43,679 --> 00:18:46,643 they were initially supposed to be ready 420 00:18:46,643 --> 00:18:50,310 in 2023 and now they'll be ready in 2025? 421 00:18:50,310 --> 00:18:51,143 - That's correct. 422 00:18:51,143 --> 00:18:52,860 - Thank you, and just to follow up, 423 00:18:52,860 --> 00:18:54,268 sorry, my original question. 424 00:18:54,268 --> 00:18:56,410 Your directed energy budget for the year, 425 00:18:56,410 --> 00:18:59,077 do you have a break out for that one please? 426 00:19:00,488 --> 00:19:01,780 - Michelle, I'll turn to you. 427 00:19:01,780 --> 00:19:02,800 - Yes sir, so I'll take, 428 00:19:02,800 --> 00:19:04,920 I'll have to get back to you on the specifics, 429 00:19:04,920 --> 00:19:07,530 but our budget, as I stated in my briefing earlier, 430 00:19:07,530 --> 00:19:10,655 our budget includes funding for laser scaling and for other 431 00:19:10,655 --> 00:19:15,363 directed energy like the neutral particle beam-type efforts. 432 00:19:16,480 --> 00:19:18,464 - [Mark] We'll come back to you. 433 00:19:18,464 --> 00:19:19,297 Jason. 434 00:19:19,297 --> 00:19:20,530 - [Jason] Okay, Jason Sherman, Inside Defense. 435 00:19:20,530 --> 00:19:24,930 So there has been an effort to accelerate the RKV program. 436 00:19:24,930 --> 00:19:29,530 Is that effectively off the table now? 437 00:19:29,530 --> 00:19:31,930 - We're re-assessing the whole program, right? 438 00:19:31,930 --> 00:19:34,730 So in terms of any sort of acceleration, 439 00:19:34,730 --> 00:19:36,650 we're very focused in on following 440 00:19:36,650 --> 00:19:39,100 the system engineering rigor and getting it right. 441 00:19:39,100 --> 00:19:40,120 So that's where we are. 442 00:19:40,120 --> 00:19:41,630 - What are the key milestones between 443 00:19:41,630 --> 00:19:44,600 now and that review in two years? 444 00:19:44,600 --> 00:19:45,900 Can you say a bit about who the key 445 00:19:45,900 --> 00:19:50,220 industry players are working on the RKV? 446 00:19:50,220 --> 00:19:52,600 - Yes, so the key is when we reset getting 447 00:19:52,600 --> 00:19:54,200 to a critical design review, 448 00:19:54,200 --> 00:19:56,080 you move those milestones to the right. 449 00:19:56,080 --> 00:19:58,800 So it's all the run-ups that would normally take you between 450 00:19:58,800 --> 00:20:01,360 a preliminary design review and getting to critical design. 451 00:20:01,360 --> 00:20:04,368 So it is the testing phase that is required 452 00:20:04,368 --> 00:20:06,900 is the modeling of the results of that, 453 00:20:06,900 --> 00:20:08,770 and then the full-up analysis before you get 454 00:20:08,770 --> 00:20:10,750 to the critical design review. 455 00:20:10,750 --> 00:20:11,583 - Great. 456 00:20:11,583 --> 00:20:15,003 And last year the MDA asked Congress for permission to put 457 00:20:15,003 --> 00:20:19,133 together a multi-year procurement of the SM-3 block IB. 458 00:20:21,570 --> 00:20:26,100 The FY20 request that MDA is putting forward shaves 459 00:20:27,090 --> 00:20:31,280 about 64 missiles from the plan that you told Congress 460 00:20:32,930 --> 00:20:35,780 you were going to execute on that multi-year procurement. 461 00:20:36,900 --> 00:20:40,743 It originally said that you could save 13%. 462 00:20:42,740 --> 00:20:45,080 Does the cost avoidance go up in smoke here? 463 00:20:45,080 --> 00:20:49,643 What's the reason for cutting the missiles from the plan? 464 00:20:52,150 --> 00:20:54,725 - So, I can answer that in FY20 the number 465 00:20:54,725 --> 00:20:59,725 of missiles decreased because in FY19 Congress did 466 00:20:59,990 --> 00:21:03,080 not appropriate the advanced procurement funding. 467 00:21:03,080 --> 00:21:05,110 And so that enabled us not to start 468 00:21:05,110 --> 00:21:06,610 those interceptors in '19. 469 00:21:06,610 --> 00:21:08,760 So we have to start those in '20. 470 00:21:08,760 --> 00:21:10,900 So that provided a ripple effect through 471 00:21:10,900 --> 00:21:13,270 the FYDP of the quantity of interceptors. 472 00:21:13,270 --> 00:21:15,710 We fully are committed to the multi-year procurement. 473 00:21:15,710 --> 00:21:18,257 And we plan on pursuing that and moving forward this year. 474 00:21:18,257 --> 00:21:20,030 - And will there be any savings associated 475 00:21:20,030 --> 00:21:21,600 with the multi-year procurement as a result? 476 00:21:21,600 --> 00:21:22,433 - Yes, sir. 477 00:21:22,433 --> 00:21:26,240 We're still projecting about as much savings. 478 00:21:26,240 --> 00:21:27,073 - [Jason] Oh you are, great. 479 00:21:27,073 --> 00:21:27,920 - Just a year later. 480 00:21:27,920 --> 00:21:29,350 - And can you tell us what the status 481 00:21:29,350 --> 00:21:33,049 of the SM-3 block IIA production is? 482 00:21:33,049 --> 00:21:34,290 Uh, production decision is? 483 00:21:34,290 --> 00:21:35,123 - Yes. 484 00:21:35,123 --> 00:21:38,350 So we just recently completed an independent technical 485 00:21:38,350 --> 00:21:41,880 review that is driven by the undersecretary for R&E. 486 00:21:41,880 --> 00:21:43,460 And the focus of that review was 487 00:21:43,460 --> 00:21:44,940 really on the overall reliability. 488 00:21:44,940 --> 00:21:48,242 So although we've completed the live fire test campaign 489 00:21:48,242 --> 00:21:52,209 and believe that we are almost ready to go to production, 490 00:21:52,209 --> 00:21:54,630 part of being almost ready to go to production is 491 00:21:54,630 --> 00:21:58,123 to complete the assessments on overall long-term reliability 492 00:21:58,123 --> 00:22:02,020 and to ensure that we have an absolute producible design. 493 00:22:02,020 --> 00:22:04,590 So it's just normal course at this point coming through 494 00:22:04,590 --> 00:22:06,340 the engineering to make sure that we're ready. 495 00:22:06,340 --> 00:22:07,830 But we anticipate that we'll be able 496 00:22:07,830 --> 00:22:09,310 to go to production this year. 497 00:22:09,310 --> 00:22:11,940 - An independent technical read review? 498 00:22:11,940 --> 00:22:13,210 An independent technical review 499 00:22:13,210 --> 00:22:14,730 before the production decision? 500 00:22:14,730 --> 00:22:15,563 - Yes. 501 00:22:15,563 --> 00:22:16,456 Just to. 502 00:22:16,456 --> 00:22:17,289 - [Jason] Do you have a lack 503 00:22:17,289 --> 00:22:18,710 of confidence in the capability? 504 00:22:18,710 --> 00:22:20,850 - It's being driven by Dr. Griffin. 505 00:22:20,850 --> 00:22:23,600 And we fully support, we want to have those outside looks. 506 00:22:23,600 --> 00:22:25,640 So we invite that in. 507 00:22:25,640 --> 00:22:28,340 And what we want to do is to ensure that because, you know, 508 00:22:28,340 --> 00:22:31,130 we're in a cooperative development on a complex system, 509 00:22:31,130 --> 00:22:33,000 we want to make sure that when we do go to production 510 00:22:33,000 --> 00:22:35,900 it's a robust design and it has got long-term reliability. 511 00:22:37,290 --> 00:22:38,490 - [Mark] Sandra. 512 00:22:38,490 --> 00:22:39,323 - Thank you. 513 00:22:39,323 --> 00:22:40,860 Sandra Irwin, SpaceNews. 514 00:22:41,830 --> 00:22:45,560 We were told by DOD that they're actually making 515 00:22:45,560 --> 00:22:49,210 some changes in how they resource missile defense. 516 00:22:49,210 --> 00:22:51,100 In terms of what the priorities 517 00:22:51,100 --> 00:22:52,380 of the Missile Defense Review, 518 00:22:52,380 --> 00:22:54,860 they said that they are actually shifting 519 00:22:54,860 --> 00:22:56,883 from traditional to non-traditional. 520 00:22:57,870 --> 00:23:01,210 It was not clear to us what exactly that meant. 521 00:23:01,210 --> 00:23:05,470 So I was wondering if you can explain what traditional, 522 00:23:05,470 --> 00:23:06,990 or resources from traditional missile 523 00:23:06,990 --> 00:23:09,620 defense are being shifted, 524 00:23:09,620 --> 00:23:13,510 and why do they call it missile defeat and defense? 525 00:23:13,510 --> 00:23:15,003 Is that a new thing? 526 00:23:17,260 --> 00:23:20,217 - I'm not familiar with the statements that you said. 527 00:23:20,217 --> 00:23:22,164 But I will state that missile-defense, 528 00:23:22,164 --> 00:23:25,340 investments in missile defense don't all go to, 529 00:23:25,340 --> 00:23:27,620 nor should they go to, the Missile Defense Agency. 530 00:23:27,620 --> 00:23:29,856 As you listen to Miss Atkinson's overview brief, 531 00:23:29,856 --> 00:23:32,310 we discussed the other services. 532 00:23:32,310 --> 00:23:34,050 We're wedded closely to the Navy 533 00:23:34,050 --> 00:23:36,130 on Aegis Ballistic missile defense, for example, 534 00:23:36,130 --> 00:23:38,200 closely wedded to the Army with the deployment 535 00:23:38,200 --> 00:23:40,720 of the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense system 536 00:23:40,720 --> 00:23:42,487 and closely with the Air Force when it comes 537 00:23:42,487 --> 00:23:46,900 to the operation of large radars around the globe. 538 00:23:46,900 --> 00:23:48,790 So I would say the best way to answer your 539 00:23:48,790 --> 00:23:52,453 question is that it is a broad DOD-wide effort. 540 00:23:53,300 --> 00:23:57,128 It's a complex threat and it requires a full up, 541 00:23:57,128 --> 00:24:00,070 all hands on deck response to it. 542 00:24:00,070 --> 00:24:02,070 - For the space discrimination, 543 00:24:02,070 --> 00:24:04,906 space based discrimination for hypersonic defense 544 00:24:04,906 --> 00:24:08,950 are there investments being made now outside of MDA? 545 00:24:08,950 --> 00:24:11,550 - Absolutely, and so what I mentioned earlier 546 00:24:11,550 --> 00:24:13,700 is that it will be a multi-mission, 547 00:24:13,700 --> 00:24:16,700 department-wide effort to deploy the system 548 00:24:16,700 --> 00:24:19,210 that has more than just a missile defense mission. 549 00:24:19,210 --> 00:24:21,600 So we're tucked into that overall architecture 550 00:24:21,600 --> 00:24:24,128 and fully supportive of the department's efforts 551 00:24:24,128 --> 00:24:27,661 to get a multi-mission capability deployed. 552 00:24:27,661 --> 00:24:28,730 - Then why defeat, 553 00:24:28,730 --> 00:24:32,570 why do they have in your name defeat and defense. 554 00:24:32,570 --> 00:24:33,403 What is the difference? 555 00:24:33,403 --> 00:24:35,660 - So that has been around for a bit 556 00:24:35,660 --> 00:24:38,010 but I would say it is the integration which 557 00:24:38,010 --> 00:24:42,070 is important between the left of launch operations 558 00:24:42,070 --> 00:24:45,633 and the actual passive and active defense measures. 559 00:24:47,980 --> 00:24:48,813 - [Mark] Jen. 560 00:24:48,813 --> 00:24:50,530 - Hi, Jen Judson with Defense News. 561 00:24:50,530 --> 00:24:54,680 You had mentioned a GMD flight test for FY20 562 00:24:55,730 --> 00:24:58,810 and you said that you're using a GBI launch from Vandenberg 563 00:24:58,810 --> 00:25:03,810 and I seem to recall back when the big GMD test in May 2017, 564 00:25:04,570 --> 00:25:06,950 Admiral Syring said at the time that there would be 565 00:25:06,950 --> 00:25:11,950 a plan to have a test of the GMD system in 2018 in 566 00:25:12,540 --> 00:25:17,540 the fall or early winter, that involved two interceptors. 567 00:25:19,030 --> 00:25:21,370 Are you walking back from testing 568 00:25:21,370 --> 00:25:22,687 with two interceptors at this point 569 00:25:22,687 --> 00:25:27,687 and can you detail that GBI test that's scheduled for FY20? 570 00:25:29,030 --> 00:25:29,863 - Sure. 571 00:25:29,863 --> 00:25:32,406 So I will tell you I believe what you're talking about 572 00:25:32,406 --> 00:25:36,684 is the FTG 11 which is what we refer as the salvo shot 573 00:25:36,684 --> 00:25:39,900 and so we will be launching against an intercontinental 574 00:25:39,900 --> 00:25:43,670 ballistic missile range, ballistic missile range target, 575 00:25:43,670 --> 00:25:47,741 an ICBM, and we'll use the salvo of a newest version 576 00:25:47,741 --> 00:25:51,058 of GBI and an older version to characterize 577 00:25:51,058 --> 00:25:54,790 the interaction of those interceptors as they go after 578 00:25:54,790 --> 00:25:57,347 the ICBM and that's scheduled for this year actually. 579 00:25:57,347 --> 00:25:58,760 - Okay. 580 00:25:58,760 --> 00:26:02,313 And so then what would the FY20 test be accomplishing? 581 00:26:02,313 --> 00:26:04,406 - The FY20 test will be focused in 582 00:26:04,406 --> 00:26:07,053 on an upgrade to the booster. 583 00:26:08,058 --> 00:26:10,530 And so once we do that test in 2020 then we 584 00:26:10,530 --> 00:26:15,530 can marry it and evaluate the upgraded RKV downstream. 585 00:26:15,723 --> 00:26:16,556 - [Jen] Okay, all right. 586 00:26:16,556 --> 00:26:17,389 Thank you. 587 00:26:17,389 --> 00:26:18,222 - [Mark] In the back. 588 00:26:18,222 --> 00:26:19,055 - [Reporter] I think we're living in 589 00:26:19,055 --> 00:26:20,940 a neutral particle beam research. 590 00:26:20,940 --> 00:26:24,790 Is that because that's sort of a crude sounding thing? 591 00:26:24,790 --> 00:26:26,960 Is that something that you can actually 592 00:26:26,960 --> 00:26:29,650 test this year and where do you test it? 593 00:26:29,650 --> 00:26:32,690 - Yeah, so neutral particle beam, like any new technology, 594 00:26:32,690 --> 00:26:35,791 the focus will be on technology maturation 595 00:26:35,791 --> 00:26:40,120 and also feasibility for that kind of capability. 596 00:26:40,120 --> 00:26:42,548 And as you know it traces back to 597 00:26:42,548 --> 00:26:45,590 the Strategic Defense Initiative. 598 00:26:45,590 --> 00:26:47,870 We think it's got a lot of promise for 599 00:26:47,870 --> 00:26:50,240 the missile defense mission and so our focus 600 00:26:50,240 --> 00:26:52,980 in FY20 is to lay the foundation to get 601 00:26:52,980 --> 00:26:56,010 to an on orbit demo, I think in FY23. 602 00:26:56,010 --> 00:26:58,368 And so we'll be doing the ground tests, 603 00:26:58,368 --> 00:27:01,140 doing a demonstration on the ground before 604 00:27:01,140 --> 00:27:03,900 we're ready to go to the on orbit demo. 605 00:27:03,900 --> 00:27:06,530 And again, focus on maturing the technologies 606 00:27:06,530 --> 00:27:09,510 and focus on feasibility. 607 00:27:09,510 --> 00:27:11,980 - And that's something that's fundamentally different 608 00:27:11,980 --> 00:27:13,920 from the studies that are being done elsewhere 609 00:27:13,920 --> 00:27:17,210 on space-based intercept and the feasibility of those? 610 00:27:17,210 --> 00:27:18,580 - It is separate and distinct. 611 00:27:18,580 --> 00:27:22,460 It is a technology effort that will point in that direction. 612 00:27:22,460 --> 00:27:23,460 - [Reporter] Thanks. 613 00:27:25,550 --> 00:27:27,750 - Dan Watson with Jane's, 614 00:27:27,750 --> 00:27:30,670 you mentioned the space-based kill assessment. 615 00:27:30,670 --> 00:27:32,150 When were those sensors deployed 616 00:27:32,150 --> 00:27:33,300 and how many are there? 617 00:27:34,584 --> 00:27:36,674 And what does that technology have to prove 618 00:27:36,674 --> 00:27:39,810 or go through before it can be integrated into like 619 00:27:39,810 --> 00:27:41,860 the operational actual system? 620 00:27:41,860 --> 00:27:44,406 - Okay, so we did leverage commercial lift 621 00:27:44,406 --> 00:27:46,900 and that capability is deployed today. 622 00:27:46,900 --> 00:27:49,970 I'm not going to tell you the number that's there 623 00:27:49,970 --> 00:27:53,010 but it is there and they are operational now. 624 00:27:53,010 --> 00:27:54,320 What they haven't been, 625 00:27:54,320 --> 00:27:56,060 what we haven't done yet is completed 626 00:27:56,060 --> 00:27:57,884 the integration with the ballistic missile defense 627 00:27:57,884 --> 00:28:00,490 so they've been operational through a couple of 628 00:28:00,490 --> 00:28:02,349 the last flight tests and we're working very closely 629 00:28:02,349 --> 00:28:05,465 with NORTHCOM and STRATCOM to ensure as we bring 630 00:28:05,465 --> 00:28:07,568 it in for integration that the war fighters 631 00:28:07,568 --> 00:28:10,270 are satisfied with the interfaces and those sorts of things, 632 00:28:10,270 --> 00:28:11,970 but they're operational now and provides us 633 00:28:11,970 --> 00:28:14,950 the capability that we need to ensure 634 00:28:14,950 --> 00:28:18,560 that as we move with salvo doctrine or hit policy, 635 00:28:18,560 --> 00:28:21,520 those sorts of things, we can actually detect that in space. 636 00:28:21,520 --> 00:28:23,273 - When you say flight testing, you mean GBI tests or? 637 00:28:24,988 --> 00:28:25,821 - No. 638 00:28:25,821 --> 00:28:28,340 We can leverage that capability on any live-fire test. 639 00:28:28,340 --> 00:28:29,353 It doesn't matter what the system is. 640 00:28:29,353 --> 00:28:31,520 - But you said you've used it already? 641 00:28:31,520 --> 00:28:32,988 - Yes, and we're going to use it and 642 00:28:32,988 --> 00:28:35,563 the salvo test that was asked about earlier. 643 00:28:38,160 --> 00:28:39,840 - [Steve] Steve Trimble with Aviation Week, 644 00:28:39,840 --> 00:28:41,383 I was going to ask about the neutral particle beam 645 00:28:41,383 --> 00:28:46,353 but is there anything in the budget for boost phase defense? 646 00:28:50,010 --> 00:28:52,627 - I think that the closest that we can get to 647 00:28:52,627 --> 00:28:55,530 in the MDA budget would be our efforts 648 00:28:55,530 --> 00:28:57,560 in the directed energy side of the house 649 00:28:57,560 --> 00:29:00,359 where we're focused in on scaling that laser, 650 00:29:00,359 --> 00:29:03,450 those different types of lasers that we're working with 651 00:29:03,450 --> 00:29:06,857 the UARC and the FFRDCs and with industry to mature 652 00:29:06,857 --> 00:29:10,390 the power levels and to get it to the space, weight, 653 00:29:10,390 --> 00:29:13,320 and power that's required for a missile defense mission. 654 00:29:13,320 --> 00:29:14,490 Michelle, am I leaving anything out? 655 00:29:14,490 --> 00:29:16,970 No, so that is the focus for boost phase. 656 00:29:16,970 --> 00:29:18,390 - Still the identity as an airborne 657 00:29:18,390 --> 00:29:20,620 application versus space application? 658 00:29:20,620 --> 00:29:21,680 - There is an option there. 659 00:29:21,680 --> 00:29:22,960 There are investments being made on 660 00:29:22,960 --> 00:29:26,633 a potential kinetic energy options from aircraft, yes. 661 00:29:28,440 --> 00:29:29,620 - [Mark] In the back. 662 00:29:29,620 --> 00:29:30,950 - Paul Sonne from the Washington Post. 663 00:29:30,950 --> 00:29:32,390 I just wanted to ask a broad question. 664 00:29:32,390 --> 00:29:34,607 You know the President was here earlier this year 665 00:29:34,607 --> 00:29:38,850 and the Defense Secretary made a lot of comments, 666 00:29:38,850 --> 00:29:40,230 ambitious comments about the future 667 00:29:40,230 --> 00:29:42,471 of missile defense and I think some people 668 00:29:42,471 --> 00:29:44,631 will therefore be slightly confused by why 669 00:29:44,631 --> 00:29:48,590 then the Missile Defense Agency's budget is declining. 670 00:29:48,590 --> 00:29:51,040 And is that because most of those investments 671 00:29:51,040 --> 00:29:52,930 are happening outside the Missile Defense Agency 672 00:29:52,930 --> 00:29:55,150 or is there some other explanation for that? 673 00:29:55,150 --> 00:29:59,230 Can you just give us a sense of how that squares? 674 00:29:59,230 --> 00:30:01,180 - So I'll start with the Missile Defense Review 675 00:30:01,180 --> 00:30:03,137 was approved by the President of the United States 676 00:30:03,137 --> 00:30:06,370 and so we're aligned to the Missile Defense Review. 677 00:30:06,370 --> 00:30:07,520 If you look at our budget, 678 00:30:07,520 --> 00:30:11,630 that's a significant investment in missile defenses. 679 00:30:11,630 --> 00:30:12,670 And as I mentioned before, 680 00:30:12,670 --> 00:30:13,960 there are investments being made 681 00:30:13,960 --> 00:30:16,823 elsewhere because it makes sense. 682 00:30:17,850 --> 00:30:20,700 - And do you have an overall figure for missile defense, 683 00:30:20,700 --> 00:30:23,920 including Missile Defense Agency and other investments 684 00:30:23,920 --> 00:30:26,907 outside and whether that's increased or decreased? 685 00:30:26,907 --> 00:30:29,170 - Yes, so first of all I would like to mention also, 686 00:30:29,170 --> 00:30:30,930 just to add to the Admiral's remarks, 687 00:30:30,930 --> 00:30:35,050 that what you're seeing is actually, in FY18 and FY19, 688 00:30:35,050 --> 00:30:37,040 MDA received significant increases 689 00:30:37,040 --> 00:30:39,720 for the missile defense and defeat enhancement related items 690 00:30:39,720 --> 00:30:41,152 and other Congressional plus-ups. 691 00:30:41,152 --> 00:30:43,832 And what you're seeing in '20 actually looks 692 00:30:43,832 --> 00:30:46,500 like a decrease but it's really just the declining 693 00:30:46,500 --> 00:30:51,083 funding as we complete those efforts and those tails. 694 00:30:52,870 --> 00:30:55,010 I do not have a dollar figure. 695 00:30:55,010 --> 00:30:56,080 That would probably, 696 00:30:56,080 --> 00:30:57,787 for the funding elsewhere in the Department 697 00:30:57,787 --> 00:31:00,003 that would be a question for the Department. 698 00:31:03,687 --> 00:31:05,120 - [Reporter] I want to follow up on the question about 699 00:31:05,120 --> 00:31:06,700 the sensors that you were talking about 700 00:31:06,700 --> 00:31:10,450 that will already be, already working in the system. 701 00:31:10,450 --> 00:31:13,420 When did they go online and he specifically 702 00:31:13,420 --> 00:31:14,990 asked you about North Korean launches, 703 00:31:14,990 --> 00:31:16,900 would that be able to detect those? 704 00:31:16,900 --> 00:31:20,320 - Okay, so again back to Space Based Kill assessment, 705 00:31:20,320 --> 00:31:22,020 leveraging commercial lift. 706 00:31:22,020 --> 00:31:24,248 I'm not going to talk about the numbers. 707 00:31:24,248 --> 00:31:28,750 Yes, so they were deployed through last calendar year 708 00:31:28,750 --> 00:31:30,840 and put on station and we're going through 709 00:31:30,840 --> 00:31:33,320 the final integration of those as a system now 710 00:31:33,320 --> 00:31:38,320 and they will collect data and operate during FTG 11. 711 00:31:38,669 --> 00:31:39,998 - But what I asked is, 712 00:31:39,998 --> 00:31:42,480 when would have been the first time they would 713 00:31:42,480 --> 00:31:44,650 have been able to detect something like? 714 00:31:44,650 --> 00:31:46,557 - So, remember, there weren't any launches coming out 715 00:31:46,557 --> 00:31:49,080 of the INDOPACOM arena from the countries 716 00:31:49,080 --> 00:31:51,440 I think you're mentioning during FY17 717 00:31:51,440 --> 00:31:52,840 which is when we were deploying the system. 718 00:31:52,840 --> 00:31:53,780 - [Reporter] Okay. 719 00:31:53,780 --> 00:31:54,613 Thank you. 720 00:31:55,590 --> 00:31:56,423 - [Mark] Jason. 721 00:31:56,423 --> 00:31:57,256 - Thanks. 722 00:31:57,256 --> 00:32:00,748 I wonder if you could talk a little bit about 723 00:32:00,748 --> 00:32:05,529 the difference between what the space-based kill 724 00:32:05,529 --> 00:32:10,529 assessment is doing and what the agency is looking 725 00:32:10,667 --> 00:32:14,433 for from the space sensor layer, 726 00:32:14,433 --> 00:32:17,880 how those two overlap, or how they're similar, 727 00:32:17,880 --> 00:32:18,935 how they're different. 728 00:32:18,935 --> 00:32:19,768 - Okay. 729 00:32:19,768 --> 00:32:21,240 So I'll use an Aegis model. 730 00:32:21,240 --> 00:32:22,470 - [Jason] If I could also just ask you to give us 731 00:32:22,470 --> 00:32:24,420 an update on space sensor layer, 732 00:32:24,420 --> 00:32:27,480 what's happening now and where is it going to go in 2020? 733 00:32:27,480 --> 00:32:28,900 - So, just to kind of simplify what 734 00:32:28,900 --> 00:32:30,501 can be a pretty complex story, right, 735 00:32:30,501 --> 00:32:33,060 so you have indications and warning, 736 00:32:33,060 --> 00:32:35,370 there's a set of capabilities that do that, 737 00:32:35,370 --> 00:32:37,570 so think of that as when you have a launch, 738 00:32:37,570 --> 00:32:39,110 right, so indications of warning. 739 00:32:39,110 --> 00:32:41,900 And normally you would hand that over to radars to get 740 00:32:41,900 --> 00:32:44,162 to a track so you can build a fire control solution, right? 741 00:32:44,162 --> 00:32:47,050 So indications and warning happen first, 742 00:32:47,050 --> 00:32:48,610 and so let's just say rather than passing 743 00:32:48,610 --> 00:32:50,830 to a radar to get that track, 744 00:32:50,830 --> 00:32:53,853 if this is some global advanced threat, 745 00:32:53,853 --> 00:32:56,490 then now you would go to the space sensor layer, 746 00:32:56,490 --> 00:32:57,599 a Department-wide capability 747 00:32:57,599 --> 00:33:00,280 that can not only do indications 748 00:33:00,280 --> 00:33:03,610 and warning but also handle the tracking capability. 749 00:33:03,610 --> 00:33:06,460 And when you get to the backend and you start to intercept, 750 00:33:06,460 --> 00:33:07,580 and let's just say it's a kinetic 751 00:33:07,580 --> 00:33:09,133 interceptor coming from the ground, 752 00:33:09,133 --> 00:33:12,260 then the space base kill assessment would be 753 00:33:12,260 --> 00:33:15,080 that capability that determines whether or not you hit. 754 00:33:15,080 --> 00:33:17,590 And then you can make decisions on firing again. 755 00:33:17,590 --> 00:33:19,411 It affects your salvo policy. 756 00:33:19,411 --> 00:33:20,570 Does that make sense? 757 00:33:20,570 --> 00:33:21,403 - [Jason] It does. 758 00:33:21,403 --> 00:33:23,880 And what's the status of the space sensor layer effort? 759 00:33:23,880 --> 00:33:26,307 - So now we're making investments across the Department 760 00:33:26,307 --> 00:33:29,090 to get to that multi-mission capabilities. 761 00:33:29,090 --> 00:33:31,324 So there are, I would tell you where we are today 762 00:33:31,324 --> 00:33:34,420 is going through a deep assessment on what 763 00:33:34,420 --> 00:33:35,660 that architecture should look like, 764 00:33:35,660 --> 00:33:37,340 not only the numbers and capabilities 765 00:33:37,340 --> 00:33:39,054 but how you would spread those capabilities 766 00:33:39,054 --> 00:33:41,607 because you may not put them all on one bird, 767 00:33:41,607 --> 00:33:45,150 how many do you need and on what orbitology. 768 00:33:45,150 --> 00:33:45,983 - Right. 769 00:33:45,983 --> 00:33:47,790 And so what are the main goals for FY19 770 00:33:47,790 --> 00:33:50,440 and FY20 for space sensor layer? 771 00:33:50,440 --> 00:33:52,700 - It is the development of the sensors 772 00:33:52,700 --> 00:33:56,053 that would go on as part of the payload. 773 00:33:57,080 --> 00:33:59,630 - And that was one of the things that was highlighted 774 00:33:59,630 --> 00:34:02,160 during the Missile Defense Review rollout here, 775 00:34:02,160 --> 00:34:05,100 yet it's not mentioned at all, I don't believe, 776 00:34:05,100 --> 00:34:07,270 in the presentation that you gave here. 777 00:34:07,270 --> 00:34:09,200 - Right, because it is a broader Department 778 00:34:09,200 --> 00:34:10,840 initiative that we are a part of. 779 00:34:10,840 --> 00:34:12,590 And I say multi-mission and maybe 780 00:34:12,590 --> 00:34:14,560 that's just too broad of a term, 781 00:34:14,560 --> 00:34:17,207 but I mentioned indications and warning, 782 00:34:17,207 --> 00:34:20,130 I talk about detection and tracking, 783 00:34:20,130 --> 00:34:22,042 there are other capabilities that that system 784 00:34:22,042 --> 00:34:25,119 will be required to do and we're just part of that. 785 00:34:25,119 --> 00:34:27,620 - [Jason] But who has the lead on space sensor layer? 786 00:34:27,620 --> 00:34:30,250 - It's at the Department level. 787 00:34:30,250 --> 00:34:32,030 - [Jason] OSD? 788 00:34:32,030 --> 00:34:35,540 - It'll be, it's within the Department. 789 00:34:35,540 --> 00:34:37,393 I'm just not prepared to talk about it today. 790 00:34:40,230 --> 00:34:41,162 - [Mark] Yes, sir. 791 00:34:41,162 --> 00:34:42,230 Gentleman in the back. 792 00:34:42,230 --> 00:34:46,910 - Hi, I'm (mumbles) with NHK Japan Broadcasting Corporation. 793 00:34:46,910 --> 00:34:48,470 I have a question regarding 794 00:34:48,470 --> 00:34:52,350 the Homeland Defense Pacific radar. 795 00:34:52,350 --> 00:34:56,293 So, do you already decide where are you deployed? 796 00:34:57,477 --> 00:34:59,853 And if not, when do you decide it? 797 00:35:01,720 --> 00:35:04,440 - So, I talked about it earlier, maybe you weren't here. 798 00:35:04,440 --> 00:35:06,911 But the overall sensor architecture 799 00:35:06,911 --> 00:35:09,160 and the drive from our war fighters, 800 00:35:09,160 --> 00:35:12,551 particularly in the INDOPACOM region drives us, 801 00:35:12,551 --> 00:35:13,930 as part of the architecture 802 00:35:13,930 --> 00:35:16,098 to need another sensor in the area. 803 00:35:16,098 --> 00:35:20,030 We are going through a site assessment today. 804 00:35:20,030 --> 00:35:24,520 We have made no decisions on the location but really, 805 00:35:24,520 --> 00:35:26,140 the decision for it will be driven 806 00:35:26,140 --> 00:35:28,060 by the evolution of the threat. 807 00:35:28,060 --> 00:35:29,660 So as the threat becomes more complex, 808 00:35:29,660 --> 00:35:30,640 that'll drive a decision 809 00:35:30,640 --> 00:35:32,590 and that's a department-level decision. 810 00:35:34,940 --> 00:35:36,006 - [Reporter] Follow-up on that, 811 00:35:36,006 --> 00:35:39,530 is that going to be similar in capability to the LRDR? 812 00:35:39,530 --> 00:35:42,180 - They're all, I would say that you tailor 813 00:35:42,180 --> 00:35:44,380 the sensor for the needs in the area. 814 00:35:44,380 --> 00:35:46,790 So LRDR, geographically where it's at, 815 00:35:46,790 --> 00:35:48,253 has a particular view. 816 00:35:49,150 --> 00:35:51,500 We are going to be defending Hawaii, 817 00:35:51,500 --> 00:35:53,070 we're going to increase our defense capability 818 00:35:53,070 --> 00:35:55,026 of Hawaii with a radar that we're placing 819 00:35:55,026 --> 00:35:57,040 in Hawaii and we're still coming through 820 00:35:57,040 --> 00:35:59,170 that site selection process as well. 821 00:35:59,170 --> 00:36:02,010 And so as we think about where it might go 822 00:36:02,010 --> 00:36:05,120 in the Pacific and hone down on locations and sites, 823 00:36:05,120 --> 00:36:09,163 it'll be tailored both in size and the power requirements. 824 00:36:10,839 --> 00:36:12,200 - [Mark] Yes, ma'am, probably our last question. 825 00:36:12,200 --> 00:36:13,913 - Mark, can I just go back? 826 00:36:15,041 --> 00:36:16,453 Just back to the space sensor layer, right, 827 00:36:16,453 --> 00:36:19,190 because you asked who specifically is doing it. 828 00:36:19,190 --> 00:36:21,190 We're in very close collaboration with 829 00:36:21,190 --> 00:36:23,050 the Air Force and we're tied very closely 830 00:36:23,050 --> 00:36:26,010 to the efforts that are being executed by DARPA today. 831 00:36:26,010 --> 00:36:27,140 And that's probably the answer I should have 832 00:36:27,140 --> 00:36:29,180 given you earlier but my mind was elsewhere. 833 00:36:29,180 --> 00:36:30,240 Okay, I'm sorry. 834 00:36:30,240 --> 00:36:31,860 - Yeah, I'm looking for an update 835 00:36:31,860 --> 00:36:35,134 on where you are with Aegis Ashore in Poland. 836 00:36:35,134 --> 00:36:35,967 - [Admiral Hill] Sure. 837 00:36:35,967 --> 00:36:36,800 - It's my understanding that it looks 838 00:36:36,800 --> 00:36:37,633 like you're delayed to FY20, 839 00:36:37,633 --> 00:36:40,373 is it for operational capability, initial, full? 840 00:36:41,370 --> 00:36:44,990 Can you update us on what some of the issues were around 841 00:36:44,990 --> 00:36:48,540 that site since it looks like it's about a two year delay? 842 00:36:48,540 --> 00:36:50,050 - Yeah, the best way to summarize it 843 00:36:50,050 --> 00:36:52,280 is that we've had construction delays. 844 00:36:52,280 --> 00:36:53,589 In fact, Lieutenant General Greaves 845 00:36:53,589 --> 00:36:57,283 was just out there last week in Poland meeting 846 00:36:57,283 --> 00:37:00,530 with the team that is bringing it forward. 847 00:37:00,530 --> 00:37:02,290 I talked to him during his trip 848 00:37:02,290 --> 00:37:04,620 and he talked about the amazing progress 849 00:37:04,620 --> 00:37:06,240 that was made since the last time he was there. 850 00:37:06,240 --> 00:37:07,740 So we're progressing along. 851 00:37:07,740 --> 00:37:10,798 We believe that we will complete that effort 852 00:37:10,798 --> 00:37:13,220 this year and that we'll be able to install 853 00:37:13,220 --> 00:37:15,330 the combat system which is on-site now, 854 00:37:15,330 --> 00:37:16,997 we're phasing that work in now, 855 00:37:16,997 --> 00:37:19,390 and then we'll complete it in '20. 856 00:37:19,390 --> 00:37:21,520 - Did you switch out construction companies? 857 00:37:21,520 --> 00:37:23,870 Or what did you do to resolve the issues? 858 00:37:23,870 --> 00:37:26,392 - I tell you, it's been a lot of hardcore heavy leadership 859 00:37:26,392 --> 00:37:30,120 and partnership with the US Army Corps of Engineers 860 00:37:30,120 --> 00:37:32,770 and with the combatant command EUCOM, 861 00:37:32,770 --> 00:37:37,501 the local governments there in the area directly engaging 862 00:37:37,501 --> 00:37:41,260 with Poland and with senior leadership in those companies. 863 00:37:41,260 --> 00:37:43,010 So everyone has banded together, 864 00:37:43,010 --> 00:37:45,000 the commitment is there to get it done. 865 00:37:45,000 --> 00:37:47,170 As you know, we had some tough weather last year 866 00:37:47,170 --> 00:37:49,050 which contributed to the delays 867 00:37:49,050 --> 00:37:51,240 but it's really been about just completing 868 00:37:51,240 --> 00:37:52,710 the construction so that we can move 869 00:37:52,710 --> 00:37:54,660 in with the weapon system and get that installed. 870 00:37:54,660 --> 00:37:55,610 - So what specifically were 871 00:37:55,610 --> 00:37:58,124 the problems with the construction? 872 00:37:58,124 --> 00:38:00,701 - It wasn't a quality issue, it was really just the speed 873 00:38:00,701 --> 00:38:03,790 of getting it done and not sticking to the schedule. 874 00:38:03,790 --> 00:38:06,480 Again, weather was part of it, expertise, 875 00:38:06,480 --> 00:38:09,300 number of people onsite to get the work done. 876 00:38:09,300 --> 00:38:11,490 And so there's been a lot of senior leadership pressure, 877 00:38:11,490 --> 00:38:13,920 all the way up to the Deputy Secretary 878 00:38:13,920 --> 00:38:16,320 of Defense helping us to bring this one through. 879 00:38:18,420 --> 00:38:19,253 - [Mark] All right, guys, 880 00:38:19,253 --> 00:38:20,850 I think that's all we've got time for. 881 00:38:20,850 --> 00:38:22,850 Thank you very much for coming. 882 00:38:22,850 --> 00:38:26,520 Ma'am, sir, thank you very much for your time today. 883 00:38:26,520 --> 00:38:27,717 - Thank you. 884 00:38:27,717 --> 00:38:28,817 - [Reporter] Thank you