WEBVTT

00:00.690 --> 00:02.850
- Appreciate having such
distinguished witnesses

00:02.850 --> 00:04.810
before the subcommittee.

00:04.810 --> 00:07.140
We face a high class problem.

00:07.140 --> 00:10.440
You've been kinder to the
programs under our jurisdiction,

00:10.440 --> 00:13.700
the President's budget than
perhaps we expected or deserved,

00:13.700 --> 00:16.690
but we look forward to
hearing the justification.

00:16.690 --> 00:19.013
So the first witness will be Dr. Anderson.

00:20.400 --> 00:25.390
Let me ask too by unanimous
consent, we will not only accept

00:25.390 --> 00:27.800
our honorary member, Mr.
Lamborn for questioning

00:27.800 --> 00:30.570
after subcommittee members
have asked their questions,

00:30.570 --> 00:32.000
but has unanimous consent

00:32.000 --> 00:33.680
that any member's opening statement

00:33.680 --> 00:35.053
be stated for the record.

00:36.550 --> 00:39.680
The ranking member, Mr. Turner,
is your opening statement.

00:39.680 --> 00:42.203
Okay, Dr. Anderson.

00:43.952 --> 00:46.840
- Chairman Cooper, Ranking
Member Turner and distinguished

00:46.840 --> 00:48.130
members of the committee.

00:48.130 --> 00:50.530
Thank you for the opportunity to testify.

00:50.530 --> 00:53.110
Today, the United States
faces an increasingly complex

00:53.110 --> 00:55.510
global security environment
in which the central challenge

00:55.510 --> 00:59.300
to our prosperity and security
is reemergence of long-term

00:59.300 --> 01:03.150
strategic competition by
revisionist powers in the PRC

01:03.150 --> 01:04.810
and Russia.

01:04.810 --> 01:06.690
At the same time, we must
be prepared to counter

01:06.690 --> 01:09.710
the clear and present dangers
imposed by rogue regimes,

01:09.710 --> 01:11.800
such as North Korea and Iran.

01:11.800 --> 01:14.760
Each of these competitors
confronts us with unique

01:14.760 --> 01:17.700
and overlapping challenge
in our strategic forces,

01:17.700 --> 01:20.130
nuclear, space and missile defense offer

01:20.130 --> 01:24.331
critical capabilities necessary
to meet these challenges.

01:24.331 --> 01:27.230
Nuclear deterrence is the
department's highest priority

01:27.230 --> 01:28.210
mission.

01:28.210 --> 01:29.510
Our deterrence is the foundation

01:29.510 --> 01:31.910
and backstop of our national defense.

01:31.910 --> 01:35.030
It under rides every US military
operation around the world

01:35.030 --> 01:38.490
and provides extended assurance
guarantees over to 30 allies

01:38.490 --> 01:40.110
and partners.

01:40.110 --> 01:42.880
Effective deterrents requires
tailored strategies supported

01:42.880 --> 01:45.512
by flexible capabilities,
capabilities that reside

01:45.512 --> 01:47.570
in the nuclear Triad.

01:47.570 --> 01:49.570
This committee is well aware of the age

01:49.570 --> 01:50.720
of these Triad systems

01:50.720 --> 01:52.720
and the challenge that
the department faces

01:52.720 --> 01:56.540
in sustaining these systems as
we proceed with modernization

01:56.540 --> 01:59.920
modernizing US nuclear forces
after decades of deferred

01:59.920 --> 02:01.930
recapitalization.

02:01.930 --> 02:05.770
Last fiscal year, Congress
funded 98% of DOD budget requests

02:05.770 --> 02:09.680
for nuclear force modernization,
operations and sustainment.

02:09.680 --> 02:13.760
We appreciate this support
and request continued support.

02:13.760 --> 02:18.360
The FY21 budget requests for
nuclear forces is 28.9 billion

02:18.360 --> 02:22.830
or roughly 4.1% of the
total DOD budget request.

02:22.830 --> 02:25.990
Modernization or recapitalization
of our nuclear forces is

02:25.990 --> 02:30.990
about 1.7% of the total
DOD budget request.

02:31.010 --> 02:33.640
Funding these critical
requirements ensures that modern

02:33.640 --> 02:35.320
replacements will be available

02:35.320 --> 02:37.270
before the nation's legacy systems

02:37.270 --> 02:39.510
reach the end of their
extended service lives

02:39.510 --> 02:41.673
and we lose them altogether.

02:41.673 --> 02:43.490
Turning to space systems,

02:43.490 --> 02:47.400
they underpin virtually every
weapon system in our arsenal,

02:47.400 --> 02:48.560
but many of them were designed

02:48.560 --> 02:52.680
in an era when there were
few threats in space.

02:52.680 --> 02:54.530
This is not the case today.

02:54.530 --> 02:58.550
The PRC and Russian Federation
both seek to be able to deny

02:58.550 --> 03:02.903
the United States and our
allies the advantages of space.

03:02.903 --> 03:05.090
The United States is
responding to this threat

03:05.090 --> 03:08.080
by transforming our space enterprise,

03:08.080 --> 03:09.780
fielding Brazilian architectures,

03:09.780 --> 03:12.600
developing space war fighting expertise

03:12.600 --> 03:16.620
and working closely with
allies in combined operations.

03:16.620 --> 03:18.160
I want to acknowledge and recognize

03:18.160 --> 03:21.580
the bipartisan leadership role
that this subcommittee played

03:21.580 --> 03:22.470
over several years

03:22.470 --> 03:25.850
to establish the United States
Space Force as a 6th branch

03:25.850 --> 03:30.600
of the armed forces and to make
this historic step possible.

03:30.600 --> 03:34.510
The President's FY21 budget
request provides $18 billion

03:34.510 --> 03:38.890
for space programs including
111 million to support stand up

03:38.890 --> 03:40.210
of the new service.

03:40.210 --> 03:43.430
In addition to the Space Force,
the President's budget also

03:43.430 --> 03:46.770
provides for funding of the
new Space Combatant Command.

03:46.770 --> 03:50.080
U.S Space Command and the
Space Development Agency

03:50.080 --> 03:51.880
which will accelerate the development

03:51.880 --> 03:55.230
and fielding of military
space capabilities.

03:55.230 --> 03:59.160
Turning to missile defense, as
adversary missile technology

03:59.160 --> 04:01.770
advances, the threat to the
United States homeland, allies

04:01.770 --> 04:03.940
and partners and our forces in the field

04:03.940 --> 04:07.580
has become increasingly dynamic
and difficult to predict.

04:07.580 --> 04:10.090
While traditional fixed and
mobile ballistic threats

04:10.090 --> 04:13.338
continue to grow, adversaries
are also investing in ground,

04:13.338 --> 04:16.910
air and sea launch cruise
missiles as well as hypersonic

04:16.910 --> 04:19.540
weapons with diverse ranges.

04:19.540 --> 04:21.960
Adversaries are incorporating
these missile technologies

04:21.960 --> 04:23.920
into their strategies to coerce

04:23.920 --> 04:25.966
and intimidate the United
States and its allies

04:25.966 --> 04:29.500
by threatening critical homeland targets,

04:29.500 --> 04:31.760
our ability to reinforce allies in crisis

04:31.760 --> 04:35.320
or conflict and our
ability to project power.

04:35.320 --> 04:37.490
To address these challenges,
the United States is focused

04:37.490 --> 04:40.750
on a layered defense
with adaptable systems.

04:40.750 --> 04:43.944
US policy is to stay ahead of
rogue state missile threats

04:43.944 --> 04:47.062
while relying on nuclear
deterrents to address the large

04:47.062 --> 04:51.780
and more sophisticated
Russian and PRC ICBMs.

04:51.780 --> 04:55.950
Within this framework, the
2019 Missile Defense Review

04:55.950 --> 04:59.750
centers our policy on 1.
Defending the homeland, military

04:59.750 --> 05:01.740
forces abroad, allies and partners.

05:01.740 --> 05:05.210
2. Mitigating against
adversary coercive threats

05:05.210 --> 05:06.043
and attacks.

05:06.043 --> 05:08.580
3. Assuring allies and partners,

05:08.580 --> 05:10.420
preserving their freedom of action

05:10.420 --> 05:14.764
and 4, hedging against
future unanticipated threats.

05:14.764 --> 05:15.810
In conclusion,

05:15.810 --> 05:17.710
I wanna thank the subcommittee
for the opportunity

05:17.710 --> 05:22.710
to testify and its support
to our strategic forces.

05:23.040 --> 05:24.400
Along with our allies and partners,

05:24.400 --> 05:26.830
we must ensure that we have
the capabilities needed

05:26.830 --> 05:27.940
both now and in the future

05:27.940 --> 05:30.573
to protect our people and
the freedoms we cherish.

05:31.472 --> 05:34.580
And to be able to engage
potential adversaries

05:34.580 --> 05:37.530
diplomatically from a
position of strength.

05:37.530 --> 05:40.590
To do so, I urge you to support
the important capabilities

05:40.590 --> 05:44.650
funded in the President's
FY21 budget request.

05:44.650 --> 05:46.850
I look forward to your
questions, thank you.

05:47.760 --> 05:50.034
- I thank the witness, General Raymond.

05:50.034 --> 05:52.310
- Turner Cooper, Rank Commander Turner,

05:52.310 --> 05:54.000
members of the subcommittee.

05:54.000 --> 05:56.740
It's an honor to appear before you today.

05:56.740 --> 05:58.920
I've had the privilege of testifying

05:58.920 --> 06:01.290
in front of this subcommittee
on many occasions.

06:01.290 --> 06:04.640
However, this is my first
opportunity to appear since taking

06:04.640 --> 06:08.730
command of the United States
Space Command in August 2019.

06:08.730 --> 06:10.823
And being appointed the
Chief of Space Operations

06:10.823 --> 06:14.470
for the United States Space
Force this past December.

06:14.470 --> 06:17.710
I am truly honored and humbled
by this responsibility.

06:17.710 --> 06:19.990
On behalf of the Joint
Space professionals,

06:19.990 --> 06:21.690
that I am privileged to lead,

06:21.690 --> 06:23.620
I would like to thank
you for your leadership,

06:23.620 --> 06:25.320
personally, thank you for your leadership

06:25.320 --> 06:28.160
in helping elevate space
to a level commensurate

06:28.160 --> 06:30.830
with its importance to
our national security

06:30.830 --> 06:33.120
and the security of our allies.

06:33.120 --> 06:35.200
We are the best in the
world at space today

06:35.200 --> 06:38.480
and with this historic
establishment of a new arms service

06:38.480 --> 06:42.733
and combatant command, we're
even better and we need to be.

06:43.610 --> 06:46.160
As we are laser focused on
meeting the requirements

06:46.160 --> 06:48.050
of the National Defense Strategy.

06:48.050 --> 06:51.520
Both China and Russia continue
to build and modernize

06:51.520 --> 06:53.460
their space capabilities.

06:53.460 --> 06:55.990
They are building capabilities
for their own benefit

06:55.990 --> 06:59.250
while also building capabilities
to deny us the military

06:59.250 --> 07:01.240
and economic advantages
that the United States

07:01.240 --> 07:05.190
and its allies have enjoyed for decades,

07:05.190 --> 07:07.220
an advantage that is eroding.

07:07.220 --> 07:10.320
As I have testified to in
the past, the scope, scale

07:10.320 --> 07:12.970
and complexity of the
threat in space is real,

07:12.970 --> 07:15.600
it's growing and it's concerning.

07:15.600 --> 07:18.250
We can no longer assume
that our space superiority

07:18.250 --> 07:19.138
is a given.

07:19.138 --> 07:20.750
If deterrent fails,

07:20.750 --> 07:24.210
we must be ready to fight
for space superiority.

07:24.210 --> 07:26.490
We are today and with the
establishment of the United States

07:26.490 --> 07:29.410
Space Command and the Space
Force we will be tomorrow.

07:29.410 --> 07:31.680
To this end, US Space
Command will deter aggression

07:31.680 --> 07:35.150
from conflict and do it too
from a position of strength.

07:35.150 --> 07:37.765
Accordingly, we will remain
ready to defend US and allied

07:37.765 --> 07:40.400
freedom of action in
space, we will deliver

07:40.400 --> 07:43.860
space combat power for the
Joint and Coalition Force

07:43.860 --> 07:46.910
and we're gonna develop joint
war fighters to serve in

07:46.910 --> 07:49.520
from and through the Space Command.

07:49.520 --> 07:51.990
Since the establishment of the
United States Space Command,

07:51.990 --> 07:54.330
we have strengthened our
integration with our combatant

07:54.330 --> 07:57.630
command war-fighting partners,
inform the global integration

07:57.630 --> 08:00.420
needed to carry out the
National Defense Strategy,

08:00.420 --> 08:02.787
advance our partnership with
our allies and our strength

08:02.787 --> 08:04.800
and our voice and requirements.

08:04.800 --> 08:06.700
I am proud of the Joint Space war fighters

08:06.700 --> 08:08.110
that I am privileged to lead.

08:08.110 --> 08:11.550
I assure you these professionals
are approaching our mission

08:11.550 --> 08:14.410
with an eager and innovative
boldness that will assure

08:14.410 --> 08:17.100
America remains the world
leader in the space domain.

08:17.100 --> 08:19.000
It's an honor also to be here today

08:19.000 --> 08:21.910
and testify with Admiral
Richard and Dr. Anderson.

08:21.910 --> 08:23.560
I look forward to your questions.

08:24.660 --> 08:25.800
- Thank you, General.

08:25.800 --> 08:27.320
Before I introduce Admiral
Richard, I wanna note that

08:27.320 --> 08:30.820
the this is the second Alabaman
in a row to head STRATCOM,

08:30.820 --> 08:31.920
so, congratulations.

08:31.920 --> 08:33.970
Long may that tradition continue.

08:33.970 --> 08:34.870
(laughing)

08:34.870 --> 08:36.033
Admiral Richard.

08:37.340 --> 08:40.060
- Good afternoon, Chairman
Cooper, Ranking Member Turner

08:40.060 --> 08:42.120
and distinguished
members of the committee.

08:42.120 --> 08:45.690
It is an honor to be here
today alongside General Raymond

08:45.690 --> 08:47.030
and Dr. Anderson.

08:47.030 --> 08:49.990
It's a privilege to represent
150,000 men and women

08:49.990 --> 08:52.330
performing in United States
Strategic Commands missions

08:52.330 --> 08:53.186
every day.

08:53.186 --> 08:56.840
I'd like to start by thanking
Congress for your support

08:56.840 --> 08:58.730
in ensuring that the
department and STRATCOM

08:58.730 --> 09:01.688
have the required resources to
execute our mission to deter

09:01.688 --> 09:05.270
strategic attack and guarantee
the security of our nation

09:05.270 --> 09:06.720
and our allies.

09:06.720 --> 09:09.622
Continued congressional support,
budget stability, on-time

09:09.622 --> 09:13.700
preparations are fundamental
assumptions for a long view

09:13.700 --> 09:17.210
approach to defense and
allow our command to realize

09:17.210 --> 09:19.970
presidential and department guidance.

09:19.970 --> 09:22.770
The proposed FY21 budget
supports irreversible

09:22.770 --> 09:25.320
implementation of the
National Defense Strategy,

09:25.320 --> 09:28.340
meets our current operational
requirements and outpaces

09:28.340 --> 09:31.052
the growing existential threats we face.

09:31.052 --> 09:32.730
I wanna come back to that point.

09:32.730 --> 09:37.000
I wanna note that the
commitments are necessary

09:37.000 --> 09:40.400
because this nation faces
an existential threat.

09:40.400 --> 09:43.530
Today's security environment
is the most challenging we have

09:43.530 --> 09:45.347
seen since the Cold War.

09:45.347 --> 09:48.810
Both Russia and China are
investing considerable resources

09:48.810 --> 09:52.010
to advance and expand
their arsenals of nuclear

09:52.010 --> 09:53.430
and conventional forces

09:53.430 --> 09:56.010
while adopting an
increasingly assertive posture

09:56.010 --> 09:59.060
at the expense of accepted
international norms and rules

09:59.060 --> 10:01.541
and at the expense of our
nation and our allies.

10:01.541 --> 10:02.740
Although North Korea and Iran

10:02.740 --> 10:04.372
continue to conduct malign activity

10:04.372 --> 10:08.630
fostering regional instability,
defying international norms

10:08.630 --> 10:10.050
and threatening the
United States, our allies

10:10.050 --> 10:10.913
and our partners.

10:11.890 --> 10:14.180
I want you to know as global
war fighters, the forces

10:14.180 --> 10:17.110
under my command are ready
to respond decisively

10:17.110 --> 10:18.730
should deterrents fail.

10:18.730 --> 10:22.350
A powerful ready Triad,
survivable nuclear command control

10:22.350 --> 10:25.660
and communication systems
and supporting infrastructure

10:25.660 --> 10:29.140
are the foundation for strategic
deterrence and assurance.

10:29.140 --> 10:31.970
These capabilities are
fundamental to our survival

10:31.970 --> 10:35.350
as a nation and underpins
the department's strategy

10:35.350 --> 10:38.246
to conduct global all domain
operations that communicate

10:38.246 --> 10:42.560
the strength of our alliances,
the credibility of our forces

10:42.560 --> 10:44.790
and the willingness to act decisively

10:44.790 --> 10:46.559
to protect our vital interests in a time

10:46.559 --> 10:48.600
and place of our choosing.

10:48.600 --> 10:50.870
Strategic deterrence is an active mission

10:50.870 --> 10:53.360
and I do operations every day

10:53.360 --> 10:55.803
to ensure we have a safe
secure and effective deterrent.

10:55.803 --> 10:59.330
Nevertheless, our nation is at
a critical juncture regarding

10:59.330 --> 11:01.282
the future of our nuclear forces.

11:01.282 --> 11:05.970
Over 40 years ago, our
leaders made wise decisions

11:05.970 --> 11:08.380
to recapitalize our strategic capabilities

11:08.380 --> 11:11.550
that we have benefited from to this day.

11:11.550 --> 11:14.270
Since the end of the Cold
War, we have led the world

11:14.270 --> 11:16.530
in reducing the numbers and
types of nuclear weapons

11:16.530 --> 11:20.130
in our arsenal while at the
same time our adversaries went

11:20.130 --> 11:23.430
in the other direction and
expanded their capabilities.

11:23.430 --> 11:25.280
It's now our generation's turn

11:25.280 --> 11:27.680
to make the same wise investments

11:27.680 --> 11:30.782
required to deter nuclear use
and future great power war

11:30.782 --> 11:33.130
for the next few generations.

11:33.130 --> 11:36.530
If we do not invest smartly
in our nuclear enterprise now,

11:36.530 --> 11:39.780
we may begin to reach points of no return.

11:39.780 --> 11:42.380
And I predict they'll start in
the nuclear weapons complex,

11:42.380 --> 11:43.600
next in the nuclear command and control

11:43.600 --> 11:46.780
and finally in the Triad delivery systems.

11:46.780 --> 11:51.720
It may result in our need to
rebuild, nearly from scratch

11:51.720 --> 11:54.120
over one or more decades,

11:54.120 --> 11:56.340
our enterprise talent and infrastructure

11:56.340 --> 11:58.780
required to be a nuclear power.

11:58.780 --> 12:01.240
We must continue the
department's number 1 priority

12:01.240 --> 12:03.003
to recapitalize our nuclear forces

12:03.003 --> 12:05.163
and strengthen homeland defense.

12:05.163 --> 12:08.930
Know that our department's
proposals do not pursue parity

12:08.930 --> 12:12.740
with our adversaries' arsenals
or seek a new arms race

12:12.740 --> 12:15.800
or provide a qualitative
and comprehensive approach

12:15.800 --> 12:18.660
towards a viable deterrent
for the future at a time

12:18.660 --> 12:20.194
of increasing threats.

12:20.194 --> 12:23.100
Our command is focused on
maintaining a safe secure

12:23.100 --> 12:26.240
and effective deterrent and
providing tailored strategies

12:26.240 --> 12:28.590
in coordination with our
fellow combatant commanders

12:28.590 --> 12:31.260
to meet our responsibilities
to the nation.

12:31.260 --> 12:34.360
We're ready to be tested and
continue to look for solutions

12:34.360 --> 12:37.407
to strengthen military readiness
and increase lethality.

12:37.407 --> 12:40.030
And this includes continuing
a seamless transition

12:40.030 --> 12:42.200
of our space operations to General Raymond

12:42.200 --> 12:43.883
of the United States Space Command.

12:43.883 --> 12:47.020
I'm grateful for your continued
support, which will aid

12:47.020 --> 12:49.400
in developing the future force necessary

12:49.400 --> 12:52.480
to execute the department's
highest priority mission.

12:52.480 --> 12:54.270
Thank you for the
opportunity to be here today

12:54.270 --> 12:56.942
and I also look forward to your questions.

12:56.942 --> 12:58.360
- Thank you, Admiral.

12:58.360 --> 12:59.330
Thank you, gentlemen.

12:59.330 --> 13:01.270
I'm going to withhold most of my questions

13:01.270 --> 13:03.730
for the classified session,
which will be held immediately

13:03.730 --> 13:06.180
afterwards in 2337.

13:06.180 --> 13:08.533
I yield now to the
Ranking Member Mr. Turner.

13:10.816 --> 13:12.160
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

13:12.160 --> 13:17.160
Admiral Richard, we've been
able to have some discussion

13:17.200 --> 13:22.200
of the activities that
Russia has undertaken

13:22.690 --> 13:27.690
for its nuclear arsenal that
go well beyond modernization.

13:28.760 --> 13:31.160
We use the term modernization
frequently when we talk

13:31.160 --> 13:34.330
about what Russia has done,
but in fact, they're fielding

13:34.330 --> 13:39.066
absolutely new weapons with
new and complete unforeseen

13:39.066 --> 13:40.796
capabilities.

13:40.796 --> 13:43.670
The avant garde with its
hypersonic capabilities,

13:43.670 --> 13:44.743
which is deployed,

13:46.020 --> 13:49.820
the weapon that's been
deployed in violation

13:49.820 --> 13:54.820
of the INF Treaty, their
development of Skyfall

13:56.300 --> 13:59.360
or recently we just saw an
accident where they've developed

13:59.360 --> 14:04.360
a missile that is itself
not just a nuclear weapon,

14:05.690 --> 14:07.770
but also nuclear powered.

14:07.770 --> 14:11.390
And Poseidon where they're
looking at a weapon that would

14:11.390 --> 14:14.743
go under the ocean unmanned.

14:16.800 --> 14:18.380
Before we go into classified session,

14:18.380 --> 14:20.600
I wanted to give you an
opportunity in the public session

14:20.600 --> 14:22.451
because we're gonna have
a significant debate

14:22.451 --> 14:25.010
of our investment into the NNSA.

14:25.010 --> 14:27.030
Where there's been a significant increase

14:27.030 --> 14:28.860
in the NNSA's funding.

14:28.860 --> 14:30.980
Which has been needed and necessary.

14:30.980 --> 14:33.030
If we're going to modernize
ours and we're not trying

14:33.030 --> 14:34.360
to do what Russia has done.

14:34.360 --> 14:37.060
We're not gonna create
new nuclear weapons.

14:37.060 --> 14:40.560
We're only undertaking the modernization

14:40.560 --> 14:43.143
of our current capabilities.

14:43.143 --> 14:45.960
We have to invest in the
infrastructure to be able

14:45.960 --> 14:50.920
to do that, otherwise our
deterrent won't remain credible.

14:50.920 --> 14:53.900
Could you take a moment
in a very public session,

14:53.900 --> 14:56.730
give us that picture of what
our adversaries are doing

14:56.730 --> 14:59.329
and why that's a real threat
and then secondly, why there

14:59.329 --> 15:04.329
is a must in our current efforts

15:04.991 --> 15:09.991
to modernize our nuclear
enterprises, our Triad.

15:10.380 --> 15:15.380
And what you see as to the
importance of why Congress needs

15:15.970 --> 15:18.840
to step up now to ensure
you have in the future,

15:18.840 --> 15:21.593
the capabilities that you currently have.

15:21.593 --> 15:22.460
Admiral.

15:22.460 --> 15:24.195
- Thank you Ranking Member Turner.

15:24.195 --> 15:25.795
- To summarize,

15:25.795 --> 15:28.820
and I will go into more detail
in the classified session...

15:28.820 --> 15:30.663
- Admiral, I just wanna make it clear.

15:30.663 --> 15:35.070
Telling us in classified
session does not help Congress

15:35.070 --> 15:38.580
have a debate to be able to
conclude budgetary issues.

15:38.580 --> 15:42.010
It informs us as to what
you know, but the debate

15:42.010 --> 15:46.530
on the budget happens in public
and it will be contested.

15:46.530 --> 15:50.320
So your statements in public
are as much as important

15:50.320 --> 15:52.420
as the ones that you're
gonna make in private.

15:52.420 --> 15:53.810
In private, you will inform us

15:53.810 --> 15:55.487
and make certain that we
understand the capabilities

15:55.487 --> 15:56.580
and the issues.

15:56.580 --> 15:59.610
But in public, that's where
your language and your words

15:59.610 --> 16:00.873
will be entered into our debate.

16:00.873 --> 16:02.333
- Thank you, sir.

16:02.333 --> 16:04.116
So let me summarize,

16:04.116 --> 16:06.970
I would characterize what Russia is doing

16:06.970 --> 16:10.400
with her strategic and
nuclear forces as an explosion

16:10.400 --> 16:12.070
in capability.

16:12.070 --> 16:13.760
They started long ago.

16:13.760 --> 16:18.700
They started in 2006 and it
goes beyond a mere if, you will,

16:18.700 --> 16:21.170
recapitalization or
renewal of their Triad.

16:21.170 --> 16:24.140
It is everything that Russia has.

16:24.140 --> 16:28.020
It is an enormous number of
non-treaty accountable weapons.

16:28.020 --> 16:31.070
These are sometimes referred
to as non-strategic.

16:31.070 --> 16:34.390
It's actually and it's not
only the weapons themselves,

16:34.390 --> 16:36.910
it is the delivery systems that they use.

16:36.910 --> 16:38.430
It is actually probably easier

16:38.430 --> 16:41.550
to listen to the ones Russia
has that are not dual capable,

16:41.550 --> 16:42.704
ie, conventional and nuclear,

16:42.704 --> 16:45.943
than to list the ones that are
because they almost all are.

16:46.830 --> 16:47.900
On top of that,

16:47.900 --> 16:50.840
you mentioned the new capabilities
that they're developing.

16:50.840 --> 16:55.810
Hypersonic glide, nuclear
powered cruise, undersea unmanned

16:55.810 --> 16:56.830
nuclear powered.

16:56.830 --> 16:58.640
The story goes beyond that.

16:58.640 --> 17:00.110
They have new command and control.

17:00.110 --> 17:03.140
They have new warning systems,
they have new doctrine,

17:03.140 --> 17:06.266
they are exercising a level
that we hadn't seen before.

17:06.266 --> 17:08.400
They even do Civil Defense

17:08.400 --> 17:10.260
That is a concept the
United States abandoned

17:10.260 --> 17:11.848
back in the early '60s.

17:11.848 --> 17:15.210
So this is a very comprehensive approach

17:15.210 --> 17:17.556
that Russia's undertaking and
in many cases with Russia,

17:17.556 --> 17:19.730
you gotta look at what they do,

17:19.730 --> 17:21.680
not necessarily what they say.

17:21.680 --> 17:24.480
I'll draw you an equivalent
picture on China,

17:24.480 --> 17:26.350
it's just that China
doesn't tell you about it.

17:26.350 --> 17:28.980
Russia will tell you exactly
what they're doing and why,

17:28.980 --> 17:30.240
China does not,

17:30.240 --> 17:33.680
but they are also rapidly
expanding their capabilities

17:33.680 --> 17:36.307
and a particular concern
to me, is the fact

17:36.307 --> 17:39.500
that what they are doing is
inconsistent with their stated

17:39.500 --> 17:42.360
No First Use policy, and
a more general minimum

17:42.360 --> 17:43.330
deterrent strategy.

17:43.330 --> 17:46.520
And while they're very opaque
and they don't speak about it

17:46.520 --> 17:48.941
very frequently, they will
have all the same capabilities

17:48.941 --> 17:52.437
that Russia has giving
them all the same options.

17:52.437 --> 17:55.260
And then to your final point is why now.

17:55.260 --> 17:58.100
When we talk about the
modernization of the Triad,

17:58.100 --> 18:00.460
what we leave out is the or else

18:00.460 --> 18:03.270
and the other choice that we have,

18:03.270 --> 18:05.810
is not to keep what we have.

18:05.810 --> 18:09.700
The entire Triad is reaching
the end of its useful life.

18:09.700 --> 18:14.070
And so we either replace what
we have now or we start to

18:14.070 --> 18:17.920
divest almost on a path
to disarmament in the face

18:17.920 --> 18:19.323
of this growing threat.

18:21.370 --> 18:26.370
- Admiral, Russia has publicly announced

18:27.070 --> 18:32.070
that it has deployed
hypersonic capable weapons

18:32.171 --> 18:37.171
named I think the Avant Garde
is the name we've given it.

18:39.430 --> 18:41.113
Why does that weapon concern you?

18:42.319 --> 18:44.760
- Well, it concerns me
for a couple of reasons.

18:44.760 --> 18:46.960
1, They have, you've correctly stated,

18:46.960 --> 18:49.052
that they have a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle,

18:49.052 --> 18:53.130
that challenges our warning
capability and we not only base

18:53.130 --> 18:54.660
our active defenses on that,

18:54.660 --> 18:57.760
but I base our posture and
response on that as well.

18:57.760 --> 18:59.610
And where you might wanna back up

18:59.610 --> 19:00.880
is the things you wanna remember,

19:00.880 --> 19:02.680
Russia didn't have to do that.

19:02.680 --> 19:04.950
That was a choice by their part.

19:04.950 --> 19:08.980
China is right behind them in
terms of those capabilities.

19:08.980 --> 19:12.580
So in the face of our restraint,
in the face of our delaying

19:12.580 --> 19:15.560
or recapitalization to
the last possible moment,

19:15.560 --> 19:16.710
that's a great example

19:16.710 --> 19:19.400
of going in the exact opposite direction.

19:19.400 --> 19:21.636
- Would you consider
these weapons provocative?

19:21.636 --> 19:24.953
- They are certainly unhelpful
to me in terms of my mission

19:24.953 --> 19:27.920
is that it is an additional
threat that I'm required

19:27.920 --> 19:31.300
to work through the strategic
deterrence equation in order

19:31.300 --> 19:32.630
to defend this nation.

19:32.630 --> 19:35.410
- So while they deploy these weapons

19:35.410 --> 19:38.488
that have new capabilities,
brand new weapons,

19:38.488 --> 19:39.740
what is the danger

19:39.740 --> 19:43.480
if we allow our current
capabilities then to decay

19:43.480 --> 19:44.940
or degrade?

19:44.940 --> 19:48.290
- We went through a Nuclear
Posture Review and determined

19:48.290 --> 19:50.390
that we needed tailored strategies

19:50.390 --> 19:51.858
for each of our adversaries

19:51.858 --> 19:54.040
and I think that was a
wise stack of decisions.

19:54.040 --> 19:56.530
The Triad is what gives
me the capabilities.

19:56.530 --> 19:59.690
It's the inherent flexibility
in the Triad thAT enables me

19:59.690 --> 20:01.456
to execute those strategies.

20:01.456 --> 20:05.160
If we don't modernize, I
don't have those capabilities

20:05.160 --> 20:05.993
anymore.

20:05.993 --> 20:09.080
I'm at the part where I will
have to take the Triad apart

20:09.080 --> 20:10.350
if we don't do that.

20:10.350 --> 20:12.770
Thankfully, we have wise
leaders in the past that gave me

20:12.770 --> 20:15.140
a Triad to be able to take apart.

20:15.140 --> 20:18.670
What that means fundamentally
I can't execute the strategy.

20:18.670 --> 20:20.240
There's a number of aspects to that.

20:20.240 --> 20:23.650
One important one to mention
is the extended deterrence

20:23.650 --> 20:27.630
and assurance commitments
that this nation provides

20:27.630 --> 20:29.260
without those capabilities,

20:29.260 --> 20:30.729
I am concerned about the
pressure on nonproliferation

20:30.729 --> 20:33.300
that will occur.

20:33.300 --> 20:37.476
- There's some that say the
W93 is a new nuclear weapon.

20:37.476 --> 20:40.510
It's not a new weapon.

20:40.510 --> 20:44.840
Admiral, answer the question
as to a critic that would say

20:44.840 --> 20:48.830
that the undertaking the W93
is a new weapon, why it's not.

20:48.830 --> 20:50.730
- Well, the W93,

20:50.730 --> 20:52.420
I think that is one of those things

20:52.420 --> 20:53.920
that makes me proud to be an American

20:53.920 --> 20:55.070
right, that we can come up

20:55.070 --> 20:57.830
with a program of record like the W93.

20:57.830 --> 20:59.342
Using existing designs,

20:59.342 --> 21:01.983
it will use existing
stockpile components--

21:01.983 --> 21:04.333
- That means that there's no new pit,

21:04.333 --> 21:07.232
there's not a new nuclear
weapon inside this.

21:07.232 --> 21:09.510
- It will use existing...

21:09.510 --> 21:13.240
right now, I need an ability
in general to be able to.

21:13.240 --> 21:16.430
We need to get to 30 and
regenerate the ability to have pits

21:16.430 --> 21:17.930
for any of the weapons.

21:17.930 --> 21:19.883
That's its own constraint right now.

21:19.883 --> 21:22.872
But the W93, and remember,
that's my requirement

21:22.872 --> 21:24.900
for the reason that I'm very pleased

21:24.900 --> 21:27.590
to see that the department
is taking the steps.

21:27.590 --> 21:30.840
This will enable me to address
the simultaneous age out

21:30.840 --> 21:32.430
of both weapons inside the

21:32.430 --> 21:34.501
Submarine Launch Ballistic Missile Leg,

21:34.501 --> 21:37.120
it will enable me to redress the imbalance

21:37.120 --> 21:39.349
that we currently have inside that leg.

21:39.349 --> 21:44.200
It will be parallel developed
with the United Kingdom's

21:44.200 --> 21:47.350
efforts in using existing
partnership arrangements

21:47.350 --> 21:50.670
and it will be vital to their
maintenance and continuation

21:50.670 --> 21:52.570
of their continuous at sea deterrents.

21:55.670 --> 21:59.760
- Thank you, General
Raymond, Secretary Esper,

21:59.760 --> 22:04.760
yesterday, spoke of the National
Space Intelligence Center

22:05.027 --> 22:06.490
at Greg Patterson Air Force
Base which he had just toured.

22:06.490 --> 22:09.860
And the importance of its contribution

22:09.860 --> 22:12.020
overall to our national security.

22:12.020 --> 22:15.308
I know you too are very
familiar with their operations

22:15.308 --> 22:18.777
and as we go to stand up
Space Force, there's obviously

22:18.777 --> 22:22.839
throughout the entire DOD
enterprise, individuals who wonder

22:22.839 --> 22:26.210
whether or not their job is moving

22:26.210 --> 22:27.800
or whether or not they're moving

22:27.800 --> 22:29.650
or whether or not they'll have a job.

22:30.830 --> 22:34.287
The secretary has said that he
wants to ensure that we don't

22:34.287 --> 22:35.810
duplicate efforts,

22:35.810 --> 22:39.070
that we don't diminish
our current capabilities

22:39.070 --> 22:40.300
and capacities.

22:40.300 --> 22:42.770
And if you might speak for a
moment about the importance

22:42.770 --> 22:46.130
of NASIC's overall contributions
to national security

22:46.130 --> 22:47.548
and our intelligence community?

22:47.548 --> 22:48.381
- Yes, sir, thank you for the opportunity.

22:48.381 --> 22:53.381
Yeah NASIC is provided
excellent technical intelligence

22:54.310 --> 22:56.170
for the space domain for years.

22:56.170 --> 22:58.209
We rely on them very, very heavily.

22:58.209 --> 23:00.790
I'll tell you the current
strategic environment,

23:00.790 --> 23:04.030
some of it was outlined by Admiral Richard

23:04.030 --> 23:05.560
advises space as well.

23:05.560 --> 23:08.080
And the need for increased
intelligence across the board

23:08.080 --> 23:10.780
foundational, technical,
acquisition intelligence

23:10.780 --> 23:12.600
is increasing.

23:12.600 --> 23:16.398
And so as we build the Space
Force and US Space command,

23:16.398 --> 23:19.040
I don't think anybody should
be worried about a job

23:19.040 --> 23:20.310
or a growth industry.

23:20.310 --> 23:23.500
And I would suggest that we
don't wanna break something,

23:23.500 --> 23:27.340
we wanna build on something to enhance it.

23:27.340 --> 23:28.173
- General, thank you very much.

23:28.173 --> 23:29.006
You're back.

23:30.020 --> 23:31.453
- Thank you, Mr. Garimandi.

23:39.830 --> 23:43.990
- Admiral Richards, did you
say our current policy is one

23:43.990 --> 23:45.340
of disarmament ,

23:45.340 --> 23:47.773
unless we do all the new
things you want done?

23:48.740 --> 23:49.830
Is that what I heard you say?

23:49.830 --> 23:51.840
- I didn't say that that
was our current policy.

23:51.840 --> 23:54.020
What I will give you is the operational

23:54.020 --> 23:56.283
implications of our decisions, yes.

23:57.550 --> 23:59.350
- I don't understand what that means.

23:59.350 --> 24:03.870
If we continue as we are
with the safe secure reliable

24:03.870 --> 24:08.870
the development of the B21,
LSRO and other delivery systems,

24:11.570 --> 24:12.570
is that disarmament?

24:14.283 --> 24:16.230
- I was answering the question,

24:16.230 --> 24:18.100
if we don't choose to do that.

24:18.100 --> 24:21.830
The existing systems we have
only have finite lifetimes

24:21.830 --> 24:23.350
and they require replacement,

24:23.350 --> 24:25.500
which will require a commitment

24:25.500 --> 24:28.960
by this nation to resources
and leadership to replace them.

24:28.960 --> 24:30.300
That's my point, sir.

24:30.300 --> 24:34.053
- Are we in the process of replacing?

24:35.070 --> 24:38.210
- We are just in the beginnings
of the programs that will be

24:38.210 --> 24:42.230
the replacements for the current
systems inside the delivery

24:42.230 --> 24:43.730
Triad.

24:43.730 --> 24:48.730
- I see, you said that the
W93 is or is not a new weapon?

24:51.390 --> 24:54.190
- The W93 is a new program of record

24:54.190 --> 24:56.352
that uses existing designs--

24:56.352 --> 24:58.413
- Wait, wait, wait.

24:59.790 --> 25:02.183
Yeah, let's answer the question.

25:03.150 --> 25:05.220
Is it a new weapon?

25:05.220 --> 25:09.190
It is a new program of
record, is it a new weapon?

25:09.190 --> 25:12.643
- It is a new program of record, sir.

25:14.470 --> 25:16.842
- I see, is it a new weapon then?

25:16.842 --> 25:19.540
- I'm gonna go back to it's
a new program of record.

25:19.540 --> 25:21.550
We're just now starting the program.

25:21.550 --> 25:23.722
- This dance is getting us nowhere.

25:23.722 --> 25:27.022
Does it use a new pit?

25:27.022 --> 25:30.000
- It hasn't been designed yet, sir,

25:30.000 --> 25:33.620
so we have to go do the designs
to answer that question.

25:33.620 --> 25:36.540
You know we have to ask
first to start the program

25:36.540 --> 25:38.793
before we can answer
some of these questions.

25:40.520 --> 25:44.670
- Why then are we going
to build 80 pits a year

25:44.670 --> 25:46.860
beginning in 10 years?

25:46.860 --> 25:50.250
- That is necessary overall
inside the weapons complex

25:50.250 --> 25:53.850
to refurbish the entire stockpile.

25:53.850 --> 25:56.910
- Will this be only be used
for the existing weapons

25:56.910 --> 26:00.003
and the leap of existing weapons?

26:01.600 --> 26:03.540
- I'm sorry, your question again, sir?

26:03.540 --> 26:08.540
- My question is what do you
intend to do with the 80 pits

26:08.960 --> 26:10.590
a year that they're supposed to be,

26:10.590 --> 26:14.810
or the 30 then 80 pits a
year that are to be produced

26:14.810 --> 26:16.820
in the next 15 years.

26:16.820 --> 26:18.770
- So actually this is a very good point.

26:18.770 --> 26:21.530
They are used overall in the
refurbishments of the weapons

26:21.530 --> 26:22.363
that we have.

26:22.363 --> 26:25.460
And this is a good example of
one of the points of no return

26:25.460 --> 26:26.900
that I'm talking about.

26:26.900 --> 26:29.570
In terms of NNSA's funding

26:29.570 --> 26:31.790
is right at the minimum to maintain it.

26:31.790 --> 26:34.860
All the nation has is an ability right now

26:34.860 --> 26:37.220
to refurbish existing weapons.

26:37.220 --> 26:42.110
If we drop funding, we push
the front of the pipeline back

26:42.110 --> 26:45.140
that then spills back into
the back of the pipeline

26:45.140 --> 26:45.973
showing up

26:45.973 --> 26:46.837
and you get to a point

26:46.837 --> 26:49.620
and my point here is you can't recover

26:49.620 --> 26:52.300
and you can't get a bigger
pipe in less than 10 years

26:52.300 --> 26:53.920
no matter how much money you spend.

26:53.920 --> 26:56.850
That's the basis of the 80
pit per year requirement.

26:56.850 --> 26:59.550
- So what do you intend to use them for?

26:59.550 --> 27:01.310
- Refurbishment of our existing weapons.

27:01.310 --> 27:02.564
- Which weapons?

27:02.564 --> 27:05.435
- The whole stockpile,
sir, it's all of them.

27:05.435 --> 27:07.687
- That's new news.

27:07.687 --> 27:10.070
That is new news.

27:10.070 --> 27:14.160
So you're saying that the new
pits that are to be produced

27:14.160 --> 27:17.265
will be used to replace the existing pits

27:17.265 --> 27:19.520
in existing weapons.

27:19.520 --> 27:21.000
Is that what I heard you say?

27:21.000 --> 27:25.330
- Sir, that is NNSA's
stockpile modernization plan.

27:25.330 --> 27:27.940
- Okay, well, we'll have
a meeting with the NNSA

27:27.940 --> 27:29.853
and we'll ask them that question, too.

27:32.670 --> 27:35.670
So the W93 is a new program of record

27:35.670 --> 27:37.450
but is not a new weapon.

27:37.450 --> 27:40.570
- Again, the W93 is a
new program of record.

27:40.570 --> 27:44.950
It is designed to address an
imbalance in the strategic leg.

27:44.950 --> 27:48.563
It doesn't require new
testing, it's not a new design.

27:51.630 --> 27:53.180
- I'm gonna yield back my time.

27:54.021 --> 27:55.573
- Thank you, Mr. Bishop.

27:59.150 --> 28:00.227
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

28:00.227 --> 28:03.330
Gentlemen, thank you for being here.

28:03.330 --> 28:05.430
You're answers to Mr.
Turner I thought were direct

28:05.430 --> 28:06.410
and sobering answers.

28:06.410 --> 28:08.090
So thank you for that.

28:08.090 --> 28:12.970
You know, the Minuteman
III is already 47 years old

28:12.970 --> 28:15.670
and in the depot where the
maintenance work is done on them,

28:15.670 --> 28:17.580
some of the engineers are
actually going to eBay

28:17.580 --> 28:20.320
to find spare parts, which
is not actually a joke.

28:20.320 --> 28:22.550
It's unfortunate it happens.

28:22.550 --> 28:25.930
So let me ask some really
simple questions basic questions

28:25.930 --> 28:28.479
about CBSD if I possibly could.

28:28.479 --> 28:32.219
And I guess, Admiral,
let me start with you.

28:32.219 --> 28:34.470
There are some people,
analysts that are saying,

28:34.470 --> 28:36.320
the DIAD is enough,

28:36.320 --> 28:38.880
that we could do this with
bombers and submarines.

28:38.880 --> 28:42.540
If you were to maintain
the same level of readiness

28:42.540 --> 28:45.850
and deterrence and you only had the DIAD,

28:45.850 --> 28:49.363
would you be forced to buy
new bombers, new submarines?

28:51.420 --> 28:53.650
- Congressman, maybe
if I could two points,

28:53.650 --> 28:57.623
1, that depot you're talking
about, or that Minuteman III,

28:57.623 --> 29:00.840
I think that is a credit to
the department of the defense

29:00.840 --> 29:01.810
and the Air Force

29:01.810 --> 29:03.860
and it shows you the lengths we have gone

29:03.860 --> 29:05.910
to to maintain these systems.

29:05.910 --> 29:08.930
That weapon system wasn't
designed to have a depot.

29:08.930 --> 29:10.360
That weapon system was designed

29:10.360 --> 29:12.310
to be in service for 10 years.

29:12.310 --> 29:15.830
In fact, our Air Force
figured out how to retrofit in

29:15.830 --> 29:17.803
a depot maintenance process into that.

29:17.803 --> 29:20.113
It's an extraordinary
engineering accomplishment

29:20.113 --> 29:22.880
and shows you it was a credit
to what the service is trying

29:22.880 --> 29:23.713
to do.

29:23.713 --> 29:25.960
To your answer, look, I could
give you a specific thing

29:25.960 --> 29:29.010
on attributes release, but
if you take the Triad apart,

29:29.010 --> 29:31.540
I can't execute tailored
deterrent strategies.

29:31.540 --> 29:34.490
That's it in a nutshell
and I'd have to come back

29:34.490 --> 29:36.150
with a different way

29:36.150 --> 29:38.030
to go do what the
President and the secretary

29:38.030 --> 29:38.863
have told me to do.

29:38.863 --> 29:41.760
- So it wouldn't necessarily
be cost efficient to do that?

29:41.760 --> 29:43.370
- It certainly wouldn't
be cost efficient...

29:43.370 --> 29:46.400
- Or if you were to say, when
people are saying let's wait

29:46.400 --> 29:49.820
for this until we have less
strife that we're put on,

29:49.820 --> 29:51.796
less pressure put on the Air Force budget,

29:51.796 --> 29:54.445
if we were to wait 3 to 5 years,

29:54.445 --> 29:57.740
that would not be necessarily
more cost effective?

29:57.740 --> 30:00.030
- Sir, it certainly wouldn't
be more cost effective

30:00.030 --> 30:03.550
and the bottom line is I
wouldn't have the capabilities

30:03.550 --> 30:06.670
necessary to execute
the tailored strategies,

30:06.670 --> 30:08.470
the Nuclear Posture Review calls for.

30:08.470 --> 30:11.660
- Okay, let's assume then that
since these are old weapon

30:11.660 --> 30:14.610
systems, I'm still talking
about the missile system,

30:14.610 --> 30:17.870
there is a natural
deterioration, natural attrition

30:17.870 --> 30:19.630
that comes along with that.

30:19.630 --> 30:23.190
If we were not to go forward
with the GBSD program,

30:23.190 --> 30:25.773
if we were to delay it
in any way shape or form,

30:27.160 --> 30:32.160
how would our adversaries
perceive that force reduction?

30:32.487 --> 30:35.380
- It certainly works to their advantage.

30:35.380 --> 30:38.190
It again takes away a
capability, you're quite correct

30:38.190 --> 30:40.484
that systems will age out and start to

30:40.484 --> 30:42.420
is true for Minuteman III

30:42.420 --> 30:46.150
it's true for all the
missile systems in the Triad.

30:46.150 --> 30:48.390
- And would it make it easier

30:48.390 --> 30:50.380
or more difficult to do any kind

30:50.380 --> 30:52.683
of arms reduction treaties in the future?

30:53.890 --> 30:56.259
- We would be doing an
arms reduction ourselves.

30:56.259 --> 30:57.500
- Unilateral?

30:57.500 --> 30:58.333
- [Admiral] Yes, sir.

30:58.333 --> 31:00.800
- Well, I would probably
win that one then.

31:00.800 --> 31:01.633
Let me also go...

31:01.633 --> 31:05.530
I'm making the assumption
that we have had 45 years

31:05.530 --> 31:09.910
there were people talking
about doing a life extension

31:09.910 --> 31:11.980
for these 45 year old missiles.

31:11.980 --> 31:14.324
I'm assuming that in the 10
years you have been working on

31:14.324 --> 31:18.070
this issue that all those
criteria, all those factors

31:18.070 --> 31:20.000
have been factored into the system

31:20.000 --> 31:21.931
before you made your decision?

31:21.931 --> 31:23.970
- Congressman, that's absolutely correct.

31:23.970 --> 31:26.510
We're well past the point
of diminishing returns

31:26.510 --> 31:29.250
and cost effectiveness to not
replace the Minuteman III.

31:29.250 --> 31:32.434
- So in 30 seconds, could you
just remind me of the purpose

31:32.434 --> 31:34.640
for the new system in the first place.

31:34.640 --> 31:36.473
- The purpose for the GBSD,

31:36.473 --> 31:40.070
is it provides a land based portion

31:40.070 --> 31:41.320
of the strategic Triad,

31:41.320 --> 31:44.260
it presents the enemy of an
intractable targeting problem

31:44.260 --> 31:47.930
one that gives you the most
responsive leg of the Triad

31:47.930 --> 31:49.370
and it provides capabilities

31:49.370 --> 31:51.340
that complement the other two legs.

31:51.340 --> 31:53.400
- I certainly hope we
move forward with that

31:53.400 --> 31:54.520
for a whole bunch of reasons.

31:54.520 --> 31:56.830
I don't know to whom I
ask this next question

31:56.830 --> 31:58.430
whether it's you or the general,

31:59.710 --> 32:01.703
can you get a better name than GBSD?

32:02.620 --> 32:05.550
I'm sorry, in all due respect,
GBSD sounds like a disease

32:05.550 --> 32:06.383
we're trying to solve.

32:06.383 --> 32:09.520
It's corona virus, GBSD
is the new form of it.

32:09.520 --> 32:11.030
Can you please come up with a nicer name?

32:11.030 --> 32:11.863
Minuteman III's cute...

32:11.863 --> 32:15.660
- Congressman, I will...That
is an Air Force decision.

32:15.660 --> 32:16.770
The Navy had the same thing.

32:16.770 --> 32:18.790
We used to called it the
Sea-Based Strategic Deterrent

32:18.790 --> 32:19.950
and now we call it Columbia.

32:19.950 --> 32:22.610
We'll do the same thing
I'm sure with GBSD.

32:22.610 --> 32:24.730
- General, you wanna
take a stab at that one?

32:24.730 --> 32:26.440
- Sir, I'm on the Space Force.

32:26.440 --> 32:29.089
(laughing)

32:29.089 --> 32:32.000
- Well, there's a Star
Wars term coming up here.

32:32.000 --> 32:33.220
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

32:33.220 --> 32:34.630
- [Someone] I've heard them all.

32:34.630 --> 32:35.980
- Thank you.
Mr. Carbajal.

32:38.450 --> 32:40.500
- Thank you very much Mr. Chair.

32:40.500 --> 32:42.990
Admiral Richard as commander of STRATCOM,

32:42.990 --> 32:46.780
you generate the requirements
for our nuclear forces.

32:46.780 --> 32:51.310
STRATCOM requirements then
drive which warheads the NNSA

32:52.240 --> 32:56.123
life extends, maintains and
in what quantities, correct?

32:57.150 --> 32:59.090
- I originate the requirement.

32:59.090 --> 33:00.900
I don't have the
authority to approve them.

33:00.900 --> 33:03.330
That's done up inside the
Department of Defense,

33:03.330 --> 33:04.880
but basically yes.

33:04.880 --> 33:08.273
- Thank you, in the case
of the submarine leg,

33:08.273 --> 33:13.273
we just completed the life
extension of the W76-1

33:13.880 --> 33:17.870
and the development of the W76-2.

33:17.870 --> 33:20.273
We are only a couple of
years away from finishing

33:20.273 --> 33:23.720
the refresh of the W88.

33:23.720 --> 33:27.560
Both are expected to last
until the late 2030s.

33:27.560 --> 33:32.560
Why is starting development
of the W93 necessary in 2021

33:32.830 --> 33:36.450
and why was it moved up two years?

33:36.450 --> 33:37.723
- So Congressman,

33:37.723 --> 33:40.490
two points on that and
this is what happens

33:40.490 --> 33:42.860
when you work in a resource
constrained environment.

33:42.860 --> 33:45.760
Both of those life
extensions that you refer to

33:45.760 --> 33:48.750
did not life extend the
nuclear explosive package

33:48.750 --> 33:49.950
inside those weapons.

33:49.950 --> 33:54.250
We simply didn't have the
resources and the pit capacity

33:54.250 --> 33:55.310
to be able to do that.

33:55.310 --> 33:56.700
So we had to make a choice

33:56.700 --> 34:00.420
and so those life extensions were modest.

34:00.420 --> 34:03.840
So if you wanna replace those
weapons or life extend them

34:03.840 --> 34:06.960
in the '30s based on the
historical timelines,

34:06.960 --> 34:08.260
we need to start now.

34:08.260 --> 34:12.400
And that's why the W93 is
in the program this year.

34:12.400 --> 34:14.810
So you're asking, your second question

34:14.810 --> 34:19.260
really gets into NNSA's budget submission,

34:19.260 --> 34:21.940
which I don't have complete visibility on,

34:21.940 --> 34:25.890
but what I'll note on FY21
is that's the first time

34:25.890 --> 34:27.190
where we have synchronized

34:27.190 --> 34:29.410
the Department of Defense's budget request

34:29.410 --> 34:31.090
along with NNSA's.

34:31.090 --> 34:33.870
So they do a piece of it and
then the Navy, or I'm sorry,

34:33.870 --> 34:36.893
the DOD has to marry that
out so we have synchronized

34:36.893 --> 34:40.670
standing list budget submission
and it is also designed

34:40.670 --> 34:43.740
to give us time so that
we don't simultaneously

34:43.740 --> 34:46.330
have all three programs
starting at the same point

34:46.330 --> 34:48.040
in the late '30s.

34:48.040 --> 34:49.620
- Thank you, to that end,

34:49.620 --> 34:51.110
what is the plan regarding the other

34:51.110 --> 34:54.320
warheads in the submarine force

34:54.320 --> 34:56.660
and will one of them be retired?

34:56.660 --> 34:59.920
- See, I think this is the
best part about the W93.

34:59.920 --> 35:01.441
Again, it's another thing
that just makes me proud

35:01.441 --> 35:02.701
to be an American.

35:02.701 --> 35:07.140
One, it's going to wind up
initially being a third warhead.

35:07.140 --> 35:09.941
And we do have to get through
the design piece of it.

35:09.941 --> 35:11.570
But it gives us an opportunity.

35:11.570 --> 35:14.570
Remember, part of where my
requirement is coming from

35:14.570 --> 35:16.820
is that the ballistic missile
submarines that we have today

35:16.820 --> 35:20.277
have 20 tubes, Columbia has 16.

35:20.277 --> 35:23.330
And so I will need capabilities
that will address the fact

35:23.330 --> 35:24.980
that we don't have as many tubes

35:24.980 --> 35:26.610
in the new class of submarines

35:26.610 --> 35:29.290
and the overall number of
warheads is going down.

35:29.290 --> 35:32.881
So we have an opportunity
here to redress the imbalance

35:32.881 --> 35:35.424
between the 76-1s and the W88s.

35:35.424 --> 35:38.405
It will not raise the stockpile numbers.

35:38.405 --> 35:40.260
Let us finish the design.

35:40.260 --> 35:43.960
We might even be able to lower
it and then either do that

35:43.960 --> 35:45.300
and leave it as a third weapon

35:45.300 --> 35:46.750
or potentially make it a replacement form

35:46.750 --> 35:47.910
of the two that we have.

35:47.910 --> 35:50.000
We just need to get through the work.

35:50.000 --> 35:51.820
- Thank you, let me continue.

35:51.820 --> 35:54.050
Secretary Esper told us yesterday,

35:54.050 --> 35:55.240
in the full committee hearing

35:55.240 --> 35:59.850
that he hopes to engage soon
on the new start extension.

35:59.850 --> 36:01.520
I have a couple questions.

36:01.520 --> 36:03.390
Do you share General Heighton's view,

36:03.390 --> 36:05.820
which he testified to last year

36:05.820 --> 36:10.000
that insight into Russian
forces gained from New Start

36:10.000 --> 36:12.807
is "unbelievably important"?

36:13.943 --> 36:17.950
If New Start expired on February 5, 2021

36:17.950 --> 36:20.100
with no follow-on agreements,

36:20.100 --> 36:22.800
would your job be easier or harder?

36:22.800 --> 36:24.260
- So in general, Congressman,

36:24.260 --> 36:26.220
I have testified to this before.

36:26.220 --> 36:28.430
I support any arms control agreement

36:28.430 --> 36:30.970
that enhances the security of this nation.

36:30.970 --> 36:32.103
General Highton was correct,

36:32.103 --> 36:34.973
that New Start does
provide a level of insight

36:34.973 --> 36:37.360
into confidence building measure Russia

36:37.360 --> 36:39.210
has largely been compliant with it.

36:39.210 --> 36:40.400
It does set a limit

36:40.400 --> 36:43.140
on the number of strategic
weapons they have.

36:43.140 --> 36:44.550
All our benefits.

36:44.550 --> 36:47.000
But what it doesn't do is account at all

36:47.000 --> 36:51.830
for a class of thousands
of weapons that Russia has.

36:51.830 --> 36:55.510
They're developing new weapon
systems that are not covered

36:55.510 --> 36:58.010
by the treaty that are also threats to us

36:58.010 --> 36:59.716
and it's a bilateral treaty.

36:59.716 --> 37:02.180
My best military advice would be;

37:02.180 --> 37:04.010
I'd like to have all of that.

37:04.010 --> 37:06.007
That would make my job the easiest.

37:06.007 --> 37:08.779
- Thank you, and lastly, General Raymond,

37:08.779 --> 37:12.600
being that I have Vanderbilt
Air Force Base in my district,

37:12.600 --> 37:14.200
what are the challenges and opportunities

37:14.200 --> 37:16.593
in standing up to Space
Development Agency?

37:18.670 --> 37:23.670
- The Space Development Agency
actually today works for OSD

37:24.077 --> 37:28.330
and RNM and what it's
designed to do is to go fast.

37:28.330 --> 37:30.790
I get asked frequently what
keeps you awake at night

37:30.790 --> 37:31.623
and there's not a lot,

37:31.623 --> 37:33.050
but the thing that does is our ability

37:33.050 --> 37:33.883
to go fast.

37:33.883 --> 37:37.298
And SDA is designed to be
able to go fast and stay ahead

37:37.298 --> 37:38.938
of that threat

37:38.938 --> 37:43.220
and largely looking at
disaggregating architectures in space

37:43.220 --> 37:45.080
which would be more resilient.

37:45.080 --> 37:47.290
- Thank you, Mr. Chair, I yield back.

37:47.290 --> 37:48.540
- Thank you,
Mr. Rogers.

37:50.438 --> 37:51.778
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

37:51.778 --> 37:54.590
General Raymond, General
Highton's talked about

37:54.590 --> 37:58.490
the all domains operations
of being the biggest key

37:58.490 --> 38:01.438
to our entire budget in
the future of our ability

38:01.438 --> 38:05.760
to compete with a global
competitor in the near future

38:05.760 --> 38:06.980
at all levels.

38:06.980 --> 38:10.770
What role does Space Command
play in working that problem

38:10.770 --> 38:13.610
and just to the point you just now made,

38:13.610 --> 38:14.490
how are we gonna balance

38:14.490 --> 38:17.330
advocating to deal with emerging threats

38:17.330 --> 38:18.800
while we all at the same time,

38:18.800 --> 38:20.450
try to deal with present threats?

38:22.003 --> 38:26.030
- First of all, Congressman
Rogers, the space program

38:26.030 --> 38:27.190
plays a critical role in it.

38:27.190 --> 38:30.860
The J is joint and we're
part of that joint team

38:30.860 --> 38:33.060
and all domain in space.

38:33.060 --> 38:36.370
What you'll hear referred to
as JADC2, Joint All Domain

38:36.370 --> 38:38.120
Command and Control.

38:38.120 --> 38:39.210
It's the connective tissue.

38:39.210 --> 38:41.920
It's the DNA that brings the
full weight of the joint force

38:41.920 --> 38:46.920
together to provide
advantage for our nation

38:47.050 --> 38:48.620
against any adversary.

38:48.620 --> 38:51.990
A lot of work that we have
done and I know we've testified

38:51.990 --> 38:56.560
in front of you before on
enterprise space battle management

38:56.560 --> 38:59.150
was built with this in mind.

38:59.150 --> 39:03.010
And so we use an open
standards, open architectures,

39:03.010 --> 39:08.010
unified data libraries
to have data more easily

39:08.450 --> 39:10.410
not just among us but also our allies.

39:10.410 --> 39:12.330
So we are playing a critical role in that.

39:12.330 --> 39:15.130
On the balancing near term
and far term, it's a unique

39:15.130 --> 39:16.790
position that I'm in as
a combatant commander.

39:16.790 --> 39:20.610
I have a three year look if
you will as a service chief

39:20.610 --> 39:21.740
I'm looking long.

39:21.740 --> 39:23.407
And as you look at the
budget that we submitted

39:23.407 --> 39:25.740
in my Space Force hat,

39:25.740 --> 39:29.607
it's this balance of making
sure we're not taking

39:29.607 --> 39:32.570
too much near term risk by
getting to the future faster.

39:32.570 --> 39:36.087
- Great, Admiral Richard, first Roll Tide.

39:36.087 --> 39:39.584
We wanna get that on the
record for General Raymond

39:39.584 --> 39:42.478
and Chairman Cooper.

39:42.478 --> 39:44.140
(laughing)

39:44.140 --> 39:45.190
- [Chairman] We had hoped to avoid that.

39:45.190 --> 39:46.340
(laughing)

39:46.340 --> 39:47.942
- [Someone] Go tigers!

39:47.942 --> 39:51.000
- Admiral Richard, in your
opening statement, you referred

39:51.000 --> 39:53.250
to the increase in the Russian

39:53.250 --> 39:55.323
and Chinese nuclear stockpiles.

39:55.323 --> 39:58.760
China you expect to double their stockpile

39:58.760 --> 39:59.810
within the next decade

39:59.810 --> 40:04.810
and Russia you expect a sizable
increase in the near future.

40:05.340 --> 40:07.503
Does our current program of
record of modernization expand

40:07.503 --> 40:09.082
our nuclear forces?

40:09.082 --> 40:10.870
- Congressman, no.

40:10.870 --> 40:13.430
- Okay, a few weeks ago,
the New York Times column

40:13.430 --> 40:18.430
summed up the budgets investment
in nuclear modernization

40:19.802 --> 40:21.870
by saying, "The President's
spending proposal requests money

40:21.870 --> 40:25.150
for a new arms race with
Russia and with China

40:25.150 --> 40:26.820
and restores nuclear weapons

40:26.820 --> 40:29.840
as a central to military policy."

40:29.840 --> 40:32.530
truth is, the budget does
actually the opposite, doesn't it?

40:32.530 --> 40:34.080
- Congressman, that is correct.

40:36.090 --> 40:39.430
- In your testimony, you
speak a lot about the age

40:39.430 --> 40:43.360
of our current systems
and that we have no margin

40:43.360 --> 40:44.290
as we move forward

40:44.290 --> 40:45.123
with these programs.

40:45.123 --> 40:47.820
Do you have enough funding
in this year's budget request

40:47.820 --> 40:50.570
for a nuclear modernization
programs and does the NNSA?

40:51.520 --> 40:53.880
- Congressman, the short
answer is yes, I was pleased

40:53.880 --> 40:56.400
with the priority the
department placed on it.

40:56.400 --> 40:57.700
You heard our secretary and chairman

40:57.700 --> 40:59.530
testify to that yesterday.

40:59.530 --> 41:01.940
So yes, in the main they are fully funded.

41:01.940 --> 41:05.670
- Great, and if you take the
warhead modernization program

41:05.670 --> 41:07.490
from the NNSA on one hand

41:07.490 --> 41:09.170
and you take the Triad modernization

41:09.170 --> 41:11.930
of delivery systems on the
other hand, are these numbers

41:11.930 --> 41:13.990
satisfactory to keep those
two things integrated

41:13.990 --> 41:15.660
over the next several years.

41:15.660 --> 41:17.830
- Congressman, for this budget, yes.

41:17.830 --> 41:21.120
- Excellent, and finally, are
these investments we're making

41:21.120 --> 41:23.642
right now, do they plan
for the future threat?

41:23.642 --> 41:25.050
- Absolutely, sir.

41:25.050 --> 41:25.883
- Excellent, thank you.

41:25.883 --> 41:27.550
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

41:27.550 --> 41:29.250
- Thank you,
Mr. Larsen.

41:29.250 --> 41:30.550
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

41:31.430 --> 41:35.250
I had the chair moved 'cause
it was the tallest chair

41:35.250 --> 41:37.570
in front of me and I don't
know why it ended up in front

41:37.570 --> 41:40.193
of me, but I think Garimandi put it there.

41:42.030 --> 41:43.770
So thanks for coming.

41:43.770 --> 41:46.120
I had a couple of questions for all you,

41:46.120 --> 41:51.120
but I'm gonna start with Mr. Anderson.

41:51.277 --> 41:56.090
Dr. Anderson, on the 25th,
General Walters testified

41:56.090 --> 41:59.320
to SASK, the Senate Armed
Search Committee, saying he was

41:59.320 --> 42:03.748
in favor of a flexible First Use policy.

42:03.748 --> 42:08.000
Does the department have a
definition of flexible First Use

42:08.000 --> 42:11.743
policy and is that US
policy for nuclear use?

42:13.240 --> 42:18.220
- So the question of whether
to adopt a No First Use policy

42:18.220 --> 42:22.520
has come up periodically over
quite some period of time

42:22.520 --> 42:24.760
and our approach has been

42:24.760 --> 42:28.320
not to adapt a No First Use policy.

42:28.320 --> 42:30.630
And there are essentially
several reasons for that.

42:30.630 --> 42:34.713
One is if we work to adopt
a No First Use policy,

42:34.713 --> 42:37.230
we think it would
undermine the credibility

42:37.230 --> 42:38.900
of our nuclear deterrents.

42:38.900 --> 42:42.300
It would undermine our
security guarantees...

42:42.300 --> 42:44.250
- I understand all those arguments.

42:44.250 --> 42:45.580
I well understand all those arguments.

42:45.580 --> 42:48.094
So what's a flexible First Use policy

42:48.094 --> 42:51.360
if not a First Use policy
or a No First Use policy?

42:51.360 --> 42:54.703
- So as outlined in our Nuclear
Posture Review, we reserve

42:54.703 --> 42:59.703
the right to use nuclear
weapons in extreme circumstances

43:02.030 --> 43:03.623
as a First Use.

43:04.470 --> 43:07.970
- Okay, I wanted to get that clear.

43:07.970 --> 43:10.240
That sounds like a First Use policy

43:10.240 --> 43:12.220
not a flexible one or not.

43:12.220 --> 43:15.310
I just the language
just didn't sound right.

43:15.310 --> 43:19.228
So I wanted to talk to Admiral
Richard and General Raymond,

43:19.228 --> 43:24.228
now that we set up SpaceCom
and maybe you can give us some

43:25.310 --> 43:28.290
enlighten us here and maybe
talk a little bit later,

43:28.290 --> 43:30.740
are there seams between your commands,

43:30.740 --> 43:32.570
have you found them yet,

43:32.570 --> 43:37.050
how are you working to close
those tighten up those seams?

43:37.050 --> 43:38.340
- Congressman, let me start

43:38.340 --> 43:40.670
as the proud parents of US Space Command

43:40.670 --> 43:42.820
given that all of General
Raymond's responsibilities

43:42.820 --> 43:45.060
came from US strategic command.

43:45.060 --> 43:50.060
I am pleased in that not
only do we not have seams,

43:50.990 --> 43:53.290
we're actually serving the nation better.

43:53.290 --> 43:56.760
General Raymond can get into
detail about his censor manager

43:56.760 --> 44:00.179
responsibilities, but he's
actually serving missile warning

44:00.179 --> 44:02.430
better than we used to do

44:02.430 --> 44:04.650
by bringing in his other responsibilities

44:04.650 --> 44:07.940
in missile defense and
space situational awareness.

44:07.940 --> 44:09.860
So there's anything but seams.

44:09.860 --> 44:12.380
We're actually performing better
as a result of what I think

44:12.380 --> 44:14.765
was a wise decision by the
nation and the department.

44:14.765 --> 44:16.057
- [Larsen] General Raymond.

44:16.057 --> 44:17.121
- I would agree, we've been
very reliant on STRATCOM

44:17.121 --> 44:22.121
and we stood up, we took part
of Space Command initial core

44:23.260 --> 44:26.220
it was about 120 folks that
came from US Strategic command.

44:26.220 --> 44:30.115
We have a team embedded in
the command today to make sure

44:30.115 --> 44:32.870
that if there were any
seams that they're gloss.

44:32.870 --> 44:33.930
Sir, I'm not aware of any seams.

44:33.930 --> 44:38.130
I think we've actually, our
ability to work together has

44:38.130 --> 44:38.983
been enhanced.

44:40.311 --> 44:42.400
- Admiral Richard, if
you're the parent of,

44:42.400 --> 44:46.170
note that Mr. Cooper and Mr.
Rogers may be the grandparents

44:46.170 --> 44:48.480
of absence.

44:48.480 --> 44:50.719
Well, I had to put you
somewhere in the family tree.

44:50.719 --> 44:53.953
I'm giving you credit.

44:56.080 --> 45:01.080
General Raymond and Dr. Anderson,
have you thought through

45:01.474 --> 45:04.520
the role and the increasing reliance

45:04.520 --> 45:08.979
on commercial capabilities
as well as partnering

45:08.979 --> 45:11.230
and are you looking at any differently

45:11.230 --> 45:15.483
than we looked at it before space command?

45:18.230 --> 45:19.290
- We are absolutely reliant

45:19.290 --> 45:21.490
on the commercial space capabilities today

45:21.490 --> 45:23.040
and I think we're gonna be more

45:24.395 --> 45:25.228
reliant on it in the future.

45:25.228 --> 45:26.061
If you look,

45:26.061 --> 45:27.490
there's a terrible word they
use in the space business,

45:27.490 --> 45:29.409
but there's an explosion
in commercial space.

45:29.409 --> 45:32.029
We need to be able to leverage that.

45:32.029 --> 45:34.999
They have a business
model that goes faster.

45:34.999 --> 45:38.779
They have operational
capabilities that are relevant

45:38.779 --> 45:43.190
and we are eager to develop an
architecture that capitalizes

45:43.190 --> 45:44.023
on that.

45:44.023 --> 45:46.676
So I would suggest that we will be doing

45:46.676 --> 45:50.110
a lot more commercial work
than we've done in the past.

45:50.110 --> 45:52.553
- Where does that sit in
your priorities of life?

45:52.553 --> 45:55.533
- Partnerships is one
of the top priorities

45:55.533 --> 45:59.320
of both US Space Command
and the Space Force.

45:59.320 --> 46:01.500
And as I said, there's
several partnerships

46:01.500 --> 46:04.230
that are critical to us,
commercial being one,

46:04.230 --> 46:07.130
the intelligence community being
two and allies being three.

46:07.130 --> 46:08.630
- [Larsen] Yeah, Dr. Anderson?

46:09.507 --> 46:11.340
- Sir, I would certainly second that

46:11.340 --> 46:14.954
commercial space activities
are vitally important

46:14.954 --> 46:16.630
and that they will in fact

46:16.630 --> 46:18.900
grow going forward and into the future.

46:18.900 --> 46:21.700
And I think this has been
widely acknowledged not only

46:21.700 --> 46:23.310
with the statements from
the department of defense,

46:23.310 --> 46:27.230
but also our National Security
strategy which is signed

46:27.230 --> 46:28.877
by the President of the United States.

46:28.877 --> 46:32.200
It talks about the US leadership
role in space and also

46:32.200 --> 46:36.080
the need for the United States
to consider unfettered access

46:36.080 --> 46:41.080
to and freedom to operate in
space to be a vital interest.

46:41.810 --> 46:43.858
- Okay, thank you.

46:43.858 --> 46:45.540
- Thank you, gentlemen.

46:45.540 --> 46:47.130
Ms. Ching was going to be recognized next,

46:47.130 --> 46:49.140
but it's my understanding
she's withholding her questions

46:49.140 --> 46:50.070
for the closed session.

46:50.070 --> 46:50.924
I appreciate that.

46:50.924 --> 46:52.583
Ms. Davis.

46:55.410 --> 46:56.330
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

46:56.330 --> 47:00.803
Thank you to all of you and I
think congratulations as well.

47:03.300 --> 47:06.300
You probably know that we
were having some concerns

47:06.300 --> 47:09.130
and questions in our services committee

47:09.130 --> 47:10.640
over the last two days

47:10.640 --> 47:15.640
and I wonder if you could
discuss with us the unplanned

47:15.690 --> 47:16.810
increase in NNSA?

47:18.548 --> 47:23.548
I understand that that's
necessary for modernization.

47:24.010 --> 47:25.460
Is that correct?

47:25.460 --> 47:27.430
What drove this increase

47:27.430 --> 47:31.050
where all did you all weigh in on that?

47:31.050 --> 47:34.900
- Well, ma'am, one, in terms
of the history, I don't know

47:34.900 --> 47:37.240
if I have to characterize
it or not characterize it

47:37.240 --> 47:38.870
as an unplanned increase.

47:38.870 --> 47:41.420
The requirements that I
have asked for in terms of

47:41.420 --> 47:45.558
for the my needs for the
nuclear delivery systems

47:45.558 --> 47:47.109
have not changed

47:47.109 --> 47:50.090
and so this is certainly
what is necessary for us

47:50.090 --> 47:52.090
to recapitalize the weapons that

47:52.090 --> 47:54.473
I have in the weapons complex.

47:56.750 --> 47:58.450
- Did anybody else wanna comment on that?

47:58.450 --> 48:03.450
And where is that funding as
it exist prior to the increase?

48:05.467 --> 48:09.117
- Ma'am, I'm not sure I
understand your question.

48:09.117 --> 48:12.940
- I'm just wondering whether
there is unspent dollars

48:12.940 --> 48:14.710
in those accounts that...

48:14.710 --> 48:17.140
- Ma'am, I'd have to defer
your question to NNSA.

48:17.140 --> 48:19.390
- Okay, thank you.

48:19.390 --> 48:24.390
Talk a little bit about
the strategic stability

48:26.030 --> 48:29.240
that hypersonic weapons brings.

48:29.240 --> 48:32.301
As you know there are different
points of view on this

48:32.301 --> 48:36.710
in terms of risk, benefits,
the messages that we send,

48:36.710 --> 48:39.250
do you consider them strategic weapons?

48:39.250 --> 48:42.310
- Oh, hypersonics, yes, ma'am.

48:42.310 --> 48:44.945
- And they get us to the fight faster?

48:44.945 --> 48:49.945
- No, again, this is just
another capability and again,

48:50.110 --> 48:52.940
I think it is important to
remember that our competitors

48:52.940 --> 48:56.211
chose on their own
initiatives to add this.

48:56.211 --> 48:59.100
In the end, to do strategic deterrents,

48:59.100 --> 49:01.835
the fundamental equation has not changed.

49:01.835 --> 49:05.840
For whatever action the
adversary considers,

49:05.840 --> 49:07.480
can I either deny their aim

49:07.480 --> 49:10.220
or impose a cost greater
than what they see.

49:10.220 --> 49:13.680
This changes that calculus and
what I have to do is to make

49:13.680 --> 49:16.310
sure that I can make it
hold such that the benefit

49:16.310 --> 49:18.260
of restraint still continues to outweigh

49:18.260 --> 49:20.050
the benefit of action.

49:20.050 --> 49:23.270
- Can we integrate these technologies,

49:23.270 --> 49:26.617
hypersonic technologies
with our NATO partners?

49:26.617 --> 49:30.030
- Ma'am, again, it depends
on whether you're talking

49:30.030 --> 49:33.720
about defensive technologies
or warning technologies

49:33.720 --> 49:36.087
and, or our own use of those.

49:36.087 --> 49:38.630
In both cases, though, the answer is yes,

49:38.630 --> 49:40.418
we can integrate those.

49:40.418 --> 49:44.750
- Admiral Richard, China's
arsenal of nuclear warheads

49:44.750 --> 49:48.560
is something on the order of
1/10 of what Russia's are,

49:48.560 --> 49:49.503
is that correct?

49:51.310 --> 49:52.953
- For this hearing, yes, ma'am.

49:54.260 --> 49:59.260
- So in terms of our priority
over the next five years,

50:02.359 --> 50:06.720
what would that be then in
terms of maintaining and pushing

50:07.640 --> 50:10.970
to expand limits on
Russia's nuclear arsenal.

50:10.970 --> 50:12.600
How would you describe that?

50:12.600 --> 50:14.530
- Well, I would describe it one, ma'am,

50:14.530 --> 50:17.730
is that where China is
today is not the trajectory

50:17.730 --> 50:18.563
that they're on.

50:18.563 --> 50:20.981
Let's make sure we understand
where they're going.

50:20.981 --> 50:25.390
They're actions are inconsistent
with their stated policy

50:25.390 --> 50:29.041
both No First Use and what you
derive as a minimum deterrent

50:29.041 --> 50:29.941
strategy.

50:29.941 --> 50:32.210
And I guess in the end what I'd offer is

50:32.210 --> 50:33.840
I don't have the luxury of picking

50:33.840 --> 50:36.800
which threat to this nation
I'm not gonna defend.

50:36.800 --> 50:40.323
And so I have to look at the
collective of what we face

50:40.323 --> 50:43.640
and make sure that for each of
those individual competitors,

50:43.640 --> 50:48.640
I can make that equation hold
for all of them all the time.

50:48.691 --> 50:51.440
- Anybody else wanna weigh in on that?

50:51.440 --> 50:52.391
You agree?

50:52.391 --> 50:53.270
- Yes.

50:53.270 --> 50:54.283
- Okay, thank you.

50:54.283 --> 50:57.523
And our European allies,

50:58.740 --> 51:01.810
how are they perceiving
the new start treaty

51:01.810 --> 51:04.360
and the open skies treaty now?

51:04.360 --> 51:05.840
Do we need to...

51:07.251 --> 51:10.330
How are you assessing what
they have to say about that?

51:10.330 --> 51:15.330
And what if we withdraw from
the treaty, do we have other

51:15.700 --> 51:20.310
appropriate agreements in
place to ensure that we will be

51:20.310 --> 51:22.463
notified of flights over our assets?

51:23.712 --> 51:24.545
- Ma'am, one, if we
withdraw from the treaty,

51:24.545 --> 51:29.545
they wouldn't be able to
do flights over our assets.

51:30.480 --> 51:35.480
In terms of what the new start itself

51:36.070 --> 51:39.170
has not entered in very
much into my conversation,

51:39.170 --> 51:40.300
so I'm strictly referring

51:40.300 --> 51:44.730
to US strategic command and
so I'm confident that under

51:44.730 --> 51:49.010
any circumstances right now,
I can't continue to provide

51:49.010 --> 51:52.720
extended deterrents and assurance
commitments to our allies.

51:52.720 --> 51:55.090
Open skies, I'm probably
not the best person

51:55.090 --> 51:56.140
to answer your question

51:56.140 --> 51:59.050
in terms of not having direct
responsibility, but I will say

51:59.050 --> 52:03.353
that open skies provides
benefit to our allies.

52:03.353 --> 52:06.830
It does not provide very much
direct benefit to my command

52:06.830 --> 52:07.834
individually,

52:07.834 --> 52:10.560
and again, there's a
confidence building aspect

52:10.560 --> 52:11.650
to it that is favorable.

52:11.650 --> 52:13.540
- Mm-hm, I think overall,

52:13.540 --> 52:17.560
I think we could we certainly
would be very concerned

52:20.060 --> 52:21.660
and they would be very concerned

52:23.230 --> 52:25.150
if we do something different.

52:25.150 --> 52:28.400
- Yes, ma'am, I think it would
also be equally concerned

52:28.400 --> 52:30.020
if one party doesn't comply.

52:30.020 --> 52:33.330
And that is the political decision

52:33.330 --> 52:34.550
that the nation will face.

52:34.550 --> 52:36.350
- [Davis] Okay, thank you very much.

52:37.500 --> 52:38.640
- [Chairman] Mr. Wilson.

52:38.640 --> 52:39.620
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman

52:39.620 --> 52:41.166
and thank each of you for your service

52:41.166 --> 52:44.940
indeed what a critical
time of transitioning

52:44.940 --> 52:48.810
to great power competition
but yet existential threats

52:48.810 --> 52:52.510
to American families and as
you were citing decisions made

52:52.510 --> 52:55.036
decades ago that they've
had a positive impact.

52:55.036 --> 52:57.610
We look forward to working with you

52:57.610 --> 52:58.860
to have a positive impact.

52:58.860 --> 53:01.800
And indeed, I am grateful to be with you

53:01.800 --> 53:05.500
and I'm very grateful Navy dad.

53:05.500 --> 53:08.426
My Navy doctor son served in Iraq,

53:08.426 --> 53:12.080
but I'm also an Air Force uncle,

53:12.080 --> 53:16.380
who's with a nephew that served in Iraq.

53:16.380 --> 53:18.510
So thank all of you for your service.

53:18.510 --> 53:22.610
And Admiral, modernizing our
nuclear forces and associated

53:22.610 --> 53:25.360
infrastructure is necessary
to defend the homeland

53:25.360 --> 53:27.300
promoting peace through strength.

53:27.300 --> 53:28.970
How will the continued atrophy

53:28.970 --> 53:32.890
of our strategic nuclear
forces impact STRATCOM's

53:32.890 --> 53:36.108
ability to deter against strategic attack?

53:36.108 --> 53:39.580
- Well, it'd be harmful
to it, Senator, in short.

53:39.580 --> 53:43.210
And a good example is the submarine.

53:43.210 --> 53:45.890
Take the Ohio class submarine
again all those things makes

53:45.890 --> 53:47.890
me proud to be an American.

53:47.890 --> 53:49.670
You thought you were gonna
get 30 years out of it

53:49.670 --> 53:51.720
from those wise decisions
you talked about.

53:51.720 --> 53:53.520
We actually got 42.

53:53.520 --> 53:55.710
What a credit to the people
that designed it, built it,

53:55.710 --> 53:58.690
maintained it and took it to
this point that they'll start

53:58.690 --> 54:02.550
going away in '27 and that
there's nothing that can change

54:02.550 --> 54:05.920
that and without that I
start to lose survivability

54:05.920 --> 54:07.880
in that leg of the Triad.

54:07.880 --> 54:10.410
- And having grown up in
the holy city of Charleston,

54:10.410 --> 54:12.734
I remember the nautilus
submarines going back and forth.

54:12.734 --> 54:14.687
And the consequence of that.

54:14.687 --> 54:17.460
And that is peace through
strength through the implosion

54:17.460 --> 54:18.660
of the Soviet Union.

54:18.660 --> 54:21.100
So what you've done is so important.

54:21.100 --> 54:24.930
And Dr. Anderson, the President
requested a full funding

54:24.930 --> 54:28.400
for the plutonium sustainment
through both this year

54:28.400 --> 54:33.000
and last year to accommodate
80 pits per year by 2030.

54:33.000 --> 54:36.620
I appreciate this initiative
and want my colleagues

54:36.620 --> 54:39.410
to understand how important this is.

54:39.410 --> 54:40.960
If pit production is underfunded,

54:40.960 --> 54:43.380
how does this affect our national security

54:43.380 --> 54:45.533
over the next 10 to 15 years?

54:46.983 --> 54:51.650
- So as you suggest, pit
production needs crucial

54:51.650 --> 54:54.531
to our national security and
this is something that we have

54:54.531 --> 54:57.330
set these targets.

54:57.330 --> 55:01.460
In fact, 30 by 2026 and 80 by 2030.

55:01.460 --> 55:03.210
And this is absolutely essential

55:03.210 --> 55:06.870
to ensure that our nuclear
arsenal remains safe,

55:06.870 --> 55:10.309
secure and reliable
for deterrent purposes.

55:10.309 --> 55:14.369
I've had the good fortune
to visit both facilities,

55:14.369 --> 55:19.010
Savannah River and also Los
Alamo's where these pits

55:19.010 --> 55:23.760
are going to be produced
and was very impressed

55:23.760 --> 55:26.676
by the workforce there and the
professionalism and the great

55:26.676 --> 55:30.420
seriousness with which
they take this task.

55:30.420 --> 55:35.420
And this is absolutely crucial
to maintain the effectiveness

55:36.396 --> 55:39.760
and the credibility of
our nuclear deterrents.

55:39.760 --> 55:42.641
- And additionally, Dr. Anderson,
the nuclear modernization

55:42.641 --> 55:46.010
efforts are so important, and
thank you again for visiting

55:46.010 --> 55:48.910
the Savannah River site firsthand.

55:48.910 --> 55:51.991
My constituents are very
supportive in your activities

55:51.991 --> 55:55.560
and in fact, on November
the 28th this year,

55:55.560 --> 55:58.120
we'll be celebrating the 70th anniversary

55:58.120 --> 56:00.570
of the Savannah River National Laboratory.

56:00.570 --> 56:03.360
And we are very, very grateful.

56:03.360 --> 56:06.130
And how important are the
nuclear modernization efforts

56:06.130 --> 56:08.660
the department of defense
and what risk do we incur

56:08.660 --> 56:11.473
by not adequately funding these programs?

56:12.723 --> 56:15.970
- As Admiral Richard
has emphasized earlier

56:15.970 --> 56:17.490
and I would certainly agree

56:17.490 --> 56:19.422
that these modernization programs,

56:19.422 --> 56:23.400
these recapitalization programs
are absolutely essential

56:23.400 --> 56:25.133
to our national security.

56:25.133 --> 56:30.133
The legs, the Triad, the
existing legs are old

56:30.580 --> 56:31.722
and they're getting older.

56:31.722 --> 56:36.722
And to avoid what would in
effect be de facto disarmament,

56:37.063 --> 56:39.000
they need to be recapitalized.

56:39.000 --> 56:40.490
We are not as stated before,

56:40.490 --> 56:43.260
we are not growing the
overall nuclear arsenal,

56:43.260 --> 56:45.680
the number of warheads, these are one

56:45.680 --> 56:49.390
for one replacements with
the warheads and the legs

56:49.390 --> 56:53.600
of the Triad that are being
modernized with the ground base

56:53.600 --> 56:56.350
strategic deterrents,
the Columbia sub marine

56:56.350 --> 57:01.350
and the B21 radar will make
these systems more reliable,

57:03.150 --> 57:07.480
more survivable, more resilient
and therefore more credible.

57:07.480 --> 57:10.720
So as Secretary Esper and the the chairman

57:10.720 --> 57:13.366
and many other senior leaders have stated,

57:13.366 --> 57:18.100
this is our highest
priority in the department.

57:18.100 --> 57:19.910
- Again, I thank each
of you for your serving

57:19.910 --> 57:22.360
and we look forward in a
bipartisan manner to work with you

57:22.360 --> 57:23.570
in the future.

57:23.570 --> 57:25.100
I yield back.

57:25.100 --> 57:27.210
- [Chairman] Thank you,
Ms. Horn.

57:27.210 --> 57:28.330
- Thank you, Chairman

57:28.330 --> 57:31.220
and thank you all for being here today.

57:31.220 --> 57:34.960
I wanna turn the conversation
to national security space.

57:34.960 --> 57:38.040
So General Raymond, although
I don't have a problem

57:38.040 --> 57:40.460
with the tall chair that Rick did.

57:40.460 --> 57:41.910
I do have a problem with being short,

57:41.910 --> 57:43.786
so hopefully you can see me.

57:43.786 --> 57:44.619
Turning the conversation to space

57:44.619 --> 57:49.260
and the importance of
the work you're doing,

57:49.260 --> 57:53.526
I have a few things that I'd
like to hear from you on.

57:53.526 --> 57:58.526
First, I think it's clear that
we cannot do, you cannot do

58:00.330 --> 58:03.509
your jobs, none of you can
do your jobs and protect our

58:03.509 --> 58:05.799
forces without our space
assets, our national security

58:05.799 --> 58:08.250
space assets are absolutely integral.

58:08.250 --> 58:12.958
And as we have a growing
number of adversaries

58:12.958 --> 58:15.339
that are coming into this

58:15.339 --> 58:18.070
and making significant investments,

58:18.070 --> 58:20.770
I'd just like to start
with your assessment,

58:20.770 --> 58:25.770
General Raymond, of what
the actual threats look like

58:26.060 --> 58:27.860
to our national security
space environment.

58:27.860 --> 58:29.860
Then I'll follow up with
some more specifics.

58:29.860 --> 58:34.860
And following on that,
too, the most direct ways

58:35.240 --> 58:36.940
that we're addressing this threat?

58:38.980 --> 58:40.090
- First of all, thanks for the question.

58:40.090 --> 58:43.223
It's clearly space is a contested domain.

58:44.260 --> 58:45.748
There's a full range of threats.

58:45.748 --> 58:49.300
And if you'll allow me,
I'll lay out the full range

58:49.300 --> 58:51.860
at this level and I'll be happy
to go into much more detail

58:51.860 --> 58:53.000
in closed session.

58:53.000 --> 58:56.340
But as I mentioned in my opening
comments, the scope, scale

58:56.340 --> 58:58.340
and complexity of these
threats are real today.

58:58.340 --> 59:00.680
Everything from reversible jamming

59:00.680 --> 59:04.010
of satellite communications
and GPS satellites

59:04.010 --> 59:06.760
to directed energy, to cyber threats,

59:06.760 --> 59:09.826
to our on orbit activities including

59:09.826 --> 59:12.720
the one that I just talked about publicly

59:12.720 --> 59:16.047
where Russia has launched a satellite

59:16.047 --> 59:18.730
that released another
satellite in close proximity

59:18.730 --> 59:23.260
to a US satellite, which
is concerning to direct

59:23.260 --> 59:26.370
Where China shot down one of
their own satellites in 2007.

59:26.370 --> 59:29.863
So that full scope and scale
is why US Space Command

59:29.863 --> 59:32.995
and the United States Space
Force are both so important.

59:32.995 --> 59:36.860
- I agree and I think
the next question is,

59:36.860 --> 59:39.140
and there's a lot we can't
get to in this session,

59:39.140 --> 59:41.160
but just establishing a foundation,

59:41.160 --> 59:42.930
I chaired the Space and Aeronautics

59:42.930 --> 59:44.980
subcommittee in Science,
Space and Technology.

59:44.980 --> 59:48.180
So with that view of both
our national security

59:48.180 --> 59:51.350
space environment and our
civil space environment,

59:51.350 --> 59:54.840
space situational awareness
is another critical factor.

59:54.840 --> 59:58.530
And right now, that falls
to the Air Force essentially

59:58.530 --> 01:00:02.040
for all of the different aspects

01:00:02.992 --> 01:00:03.825
of space situational awareness,

01:00:05.611 --> 01:00:06.444
which is something that
we need to address.

01:00:09.471 --> 01:00:10.530
So, in terms of your capability
as you stand up Space Force

01:00:10.530 --> 01:00:13.227
as you've been working with Space Command,

01:00:13.227 --> 01:00:17.950
is addressing and taking
space situational awareness

01:00:17.950 --> 01:00:20.640
on a larger scale out of your domain,

01:00:20.640 --> 01:00:23.560
is that something that
would helpful, useful.

01:00:23.560 --> 01:00:24.810
Can you speak to that,

01:00:24.810 --> 01:00:27.563
if we were to move those responsibilities?

01:00:28.781 --> 01:00:31.500
- Move them to the Space Force?

01:00:31.500 --> 01:00:35.480
- No, having another entity and, or group

01:00:35.480 --> 01:00:38.100
that would address non-national security

01:00:38.100 --> 01:00:40.028
space related situational
awareness issues.

01:00:40.028 --> 01:00:40.861
- I understand.

01:00:40.861 --> 01:00:44.300
So space situational awareness
is foundational to everything

01:00:44.300 --> 01:00:45.133
that we do in space.

01:00:45.133 --> 01:00:47.630
And in fact, I've changed the
terminology that we're using

01:00:47.630 --> 01:00:50.320
in it and I'm talking about
space domain awareness

01:00:50.320 --> 01:00:51.153
rather than space situational awareness,

01:00:51.153 --> 01:00:53.256
cause we have to have
a deeper understanding.

01:00:53.256 --> 01:00:56.330
It is critical that our
national security space experts

01:00:56.330 --> 01:00:58.550
are focused on that deeper understanding.

01:00:58.550 --> 01:01:02.100
Today, we service the space
traffic control for the world,

01:01:02.100 --> 01:01:03.253
the Space Force does,

01:01:05.446 --> 01:01:06.630
and I don't need to do that in my opinion.

01:01:06.630 --> 01:01:08.300
You have better things
for me to do than that.

01:01:08.300 --> 01:01:10.070
We would really like to transfer that over

01:01:10.070 --> 01:01:11.710
to the Department of Commerce.

01:01:11.710 --> 01:01:12.580
We're working very closely

01:01:12.580 --> 01:01:14.210
with the Department of
Commerce to do that.

01:01:14.210 --> 01:01:16.500
We're still gonna maintain
all of our systems

01:01:16.500 --> 01:01:18.370
to have that situational awareness

01:01:18.370 --> 01:01:20.525
and space domain awareness,
but I don't need to be,

01:01:20.525 --> 01:01:23.760
our folks don't need to be the people

01:01:23.760 --> 01:01:26.880
that open up the Rolodex
and make notifications.

01:01:26.880 --> 01:01:28.480
- This is a longer conversation,

01:01:28.480 --> 01:01:29.880
but I think important to establish.

01:01:29.880 --> 01:01:33.110
And finally, more in closed session,

01:01:33.110 --> 01:01:37.550
I know, but I'd like to know
what the biggest challenge is

01:01:37.550 --> 01:01:40.150
that you're facing in
standing up Space Force

01:01:40.150 --> 01:01:42.590
and understanding all of these
varying threats right now?

01:01:42.590 --> 01:01:45.280
- We have a great opportunity
in setting up the Space Force.

01:01:45.280 --> 01:01:46.113
We have challenges,

01:01:46.113 --> 01:01:48.340
but I think the opportunities
are even greater.

01:01:48.340 --> 01:01:49.778
And I appreciate, as I said upfront,

01:01:49.778 --> 01:01:51.838
the work that this community did.

01:01:51.838 --> 01:01:54.340
The Law gives us a lot of flexibility

01:01:54.340 --> 01:01:56.060
to build this with a clean sheet of paper.

01:01:56.060 --> 01:01:59.520
This is a startup company
and we have an opportunity

01:01:59.520 --> 01:02:03.060
to not be tied to the
past and build a service

01:02:03.060 --> 01:02:05.017
that is purpose built for this domain.

01:02:05.017 --> 01:02:09.170
Two challenges that I see,
one, we have to be bold

01:02:09.170 --> 01:02:10.960
and we need to make sure that
we're thinking bold enough.

01:02:10.960 --> 01:02:14.540
And two, as we are bold,
we're gonna need support

01:02:14.540 --> 01:02:16.625
to get those initiatives through.

01:02:16.625 --> 01:02:19.140
- Thank you, I yield back.

01:02:19.140 --> 01:02:20.990
- [Chairman] Thank you,
Mr. Moulton.

01:02:21.890 --> 01:02:24.110
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

01:02:24.110 --> 01:02:26.280
Gentlemen, thank you very
much for being here today.

01:02:26.280 --> 01:02:27.203
We appreciate it.

01:02:28.460 --> 01:02:30.040
Admiral Richard, you
testified two weeks ago

01:02:30.040 --> 01:02:31.980
that the New Start
Treaty provides STRATCOM

01:02:31.980 --> 01:02:33.360
with a vital threat assessment

01:02:33.360 --> 01:02:35.716
of Russia's strategic nuclear
arsenal and that it provides

01:02:35.716 --> 01:02:38.416
transparency and confidence
building measures that are good

01:02:38.416 --> 01:02:40.260
for deterrence.

01:02:40.260 --> 01:02:43.083
So do you support an extension
of the New Start Treaty?

01:02:44.300 --> 01:02:48.540
- So Congressman, that is
exactly what I said and it is

01:02:48.540 --> 01:02:51.230
that is it gives us insight
in terms of the threat levels.

01:02:51.230 --> 01:02:53.642
It puts a limit on the threat levels.

01:02:53.642 --> 01:02:56.350
- And do you think it's a
good idea, a realistic idea

01:02:56.350 --> 01:02:59.995
to include China in some
kind of trilateral agreement

01:02:59.995 --> 01:03:01.777
in place of Start?

01:03:01.777 --> 01:03:04.110
In place of New Start, rather?

01:03:04.110 --> 01:03:06.970
- What I would love to be
able to convince China,

01:03:06.970 --> 01:03:09.977
is the benefits of arms
control in general.

01:03:09.977 --> 01:03:11.827
Forget the numbers..

01:03:13.594 --> 01:03:15.706
- But just to be clear,
the numbers right now,

01:03:15.706 --> 01:03:17.637
are that China has about a
tenth the number of weapons

01:03:17.637 --> 01:03:21.440
`as Russia or thereabouts,
maybe around somewhere 300.

01:03:21.440 --> 01:03:24.710
So we don't exactly wanna
treaty that equalizes numbers

01:03:24.710 --> 01:03:27.600
and therefore encourages
China to bring its numbers up.

01:03:27.600 --> 01:03:29.664
- Right, I would like to encourage China

01:03:29.664 --> 01:03:33.910
to understand the mutual
benefit of arms control,

01:03:33.910 --> 01:03:36.554
the benefit to China of arms control,

01:03:36.554 --> 01:03:39.380
confidence building
measures, transparency,

01:03:39.380 --> 01:03:40.830
avoiding miscalculation.

01:03:40.830 --> 01:03:44.130
That's what I would like
to see added to the table.

01:03:44.130 --> 01:03:45.146
- Great, thank you, Admiral.

01:03:45.146 --> 01:03:48.390
I wanna move on to some
questions about hypersonics

01:03:48.390 --> 01:03:50.250
because I think it's incredibly important

01:03:50.250 --> 01:03:52.890
that we counter the emerging technologies

01:03:52.890 --> 01:03:54.390
from Russia and China,

01:03:54.390 --> 01:03:55.500
but we also just have to be careful

01:03:55.500 --> 01:03:56.600
about how we're doing that.

01:03:56.600 --> 01:03:57.930
One of the things that
Russia and China are doing,

01:03:57.930 --> 01:04:00.013
very smartly is they're not
countering all our technologies.

01:04:00.013 --> 01:04:02.680
They're trying to leap-frog
us in certain areas.

01:04:02.680 --> 01:04:04.346
And fundamentally,

01:04:04.346 --> 01:04:06.420
we'll have a closed session

01:04:06.420 --> 01:04:07.710
to ask some more detailed questions,

01:04:07.710 --> 01:04:11.563
but in this open session
so that people understand,

01:04:12.420 --> 01:04:14.980
are hypersonic weapons faster

01:04:14.980 --> 01:04:18.081
than our existing ballistic missiles?

01:04:18.081 --> 01:04:19.870
- Congressman, to your point,

01:04:19.870 --> 01:04:21.670
actually a hypersonic weapon is slower

01:04:21.670 --> 01:04:22.503
- [Moulton] It's actually slower.

01:04:22.503 --> 01:04:23.850
- Slower than a ballistic missile.

01:04:23.850 --> 01:04:26.420
- Right, so another question,

01:04:26.420 --> 01:04:30.589
is our existing missile defense
program designed to protect

01:04:30.589 --> 01:04:35.080
us from an ICBM attack from Russia?

01:04:35.080 --> 01:04:36.290
- By policy,

01:04:36.290 --> 01:04:38.930
our existing missile
defense systems are designed

01:04:38.930 --> 01:04:40.670
to protect us from rogue nations

01:04:40.670 --> 01:04:43.614
and intentionally not
designed to interfere

01:04:43.614 --> 01:04:46.320
with either Russia or
China's strategic deterrent.

01:04:46.320 --> 01:04:48.643
- Right, because the point
is we just don't have enough

01:04:48.643 --> 01:04:51.300
interceptors to counter
the type, the numbers...

01:04:51.300 --> 01:04:53.630
- It is not only a technically infeasible

01:04:53.630 --> 01:04:54.730
cost imposing piece,

01:04:54.730 --> 01:04:57.470
but there are significant
strategic stability concerns

01:04:57.470 --> 01:04:59.480
if you were to go down those lines.

01:04:59.480 --> 01:05:00.313
- Right,

01:05:00.313 --> 01:05:03.140
so essentially what does
protect us is this doctrine

01:05:03.140 --> 01:05:04.730
of Mutually Assured Destruction.

01:05:04.730 --> 01:05:07.040
- I wouldn't call it Mutually
Assured Destruction, sir.

01:05:07.040 --> 01:05:08.980
That's what it was back in the Cold War.

01:05:08.980 --> 01:05:11.790
I have an ability to
impose a cost on them,

01:05:11.790 --> 01:05:14.555
that is greater than that which they seek.

01:05:14.555 --> 01:05:17.180
- Okay, so our terminology
has become more polite

01:05:17.180 --> 01:05:18.700
since the Cold War,

01:05:18.700 --> 01:05:21.030
but essentially what they can expect

01:05:21.030 --> 01:05:22.623
is that we will respond in kind.

01:05:22.623 --> 01:05:24.630
If they shoot 100 missiles our way,

01:05:24.630 --> 01:05:26.730
we're gonna be able to shoot
100 missiles back at them.

01:05:26.730 --> 01:05:29.590
- Oh, I might not necessarily
recommend that at all, sir.

01:05:29.590 --> 01:05:33.550
I will simply recommend options
that will provide a cost

01:05:33.550 --> 01:05:35.570
that they will find unacceptable

01:05:35.570 --> 01:05:37.370
relative to what they're trying to gain.

01:05:37.370 --> 01:05:41.470
- Fair enough, so what do we
do if Russia or China launches

01:05:41.470 --> 01:05:42.833
a hypersonic missile?

01:05:43.924 --> 01:05:47.570
- I'd do the same and
I should be very clear,

01:05:47.570 --> 01:05:49.692
I don't have direct
operational responsibility

01:05:49.692 --> 01:05:52.910
for the missile defense
system over North America

01:05:52.910 --> 01:05:53.920
or any other theater.

01:05:53.920 --> 01:05:57.774
I do have worldwide advocacy
responsibilities for that.

01:05:57.774 --> 01:06:01.540
We do the same thing that
we do for any other threat

01:06:01.540 --> 01:06:02.670
to North America which is just;

01:06:02.670 --> 01:06:04.850
step one is I have to characterize that,

01:06:04.850 --> 01:06:06.590
I have to understand what it is,

01:06:06.590 --> 01:06:07.527
how big is it...

01:06:07.527 --> 01:06:09.360
- How do you characterize that?

01:06:09.360 --> 01:06:12.330
Because when a hypersonic
missile is launched...

01:06:12.330 --> 01:06:15.610
I mean, look, if Russia
launches a whole bunch of ICBMs,

01:06:15.610 --> 01:06:17.840
we know exactly what's coming at us.

01:06:17.840 --> 01:06:19.240
We even know where they're going

01:06:19.240 --> 01:06:21.060
and when they're gonna land.

01:06:21.060 --> 01:06:24.750
If they launch one
single hypersonic weapon,

01:06:24.750 --> 01:06:27.653
Russia or China, we don't know
what warhead it's carrying,

01:06:28.777 --> 01:06:30.800
we don't know where it's gonna land

01:06:30.800 --> 01:06:31.900
because we can see it launch

01:06:31.900 --> 01:06:33.420
but we don't know where it's gonna go.

01:06:33.420 --> 01:06:35.089
- Congressman, I'm still
trying to argue with you

01:06:35.089 --> 01:06:36.238
cause you're absolutely correct.

01:06:36.238 --> 01:06:39.260
With certain HGV systems today

01:06:39.260 --> 01:06:41.578
because our systems were
not designed against them

01:06:41.578 --> 01:06:43.420
do challenge us.

01:06:43.420 --> 01:06:47.100
It's not that we have no ability
to characterize the threat

01:06:47.100 --> 01:06:48.140
to this nation,

01:06:48.140 --> 01:06:52.810
the size of the raid alone
starts to give the information

01:06:52.810 --> 01:06:54.370
as to what I'd be able to do.

01:06:54.370 --> 01:06:56.330
We already don't have the ability

01:06:56.330 --> 01:06:57.649
to characterize the payload

01:06:57.649 --> 01:07:02.602
on any inbound weapon system
to the US, hypersonic or not.

01:07:02.602 --> 01:07:06.090
- Well, we have a pretty darn
good idea what's coming at us

01:07:06.090 --> 01:07:07.862
if we get an ICBM attack.

01:07:07.862 --> 01:07:09.490
And this is my point,

01:07:09.490 --> 01:07:12.290
is just to get we only
have a few seconds left,

01:07:12.290 --> 01:07:15.160
but I'm very concerned that these weapons

01:07:15.160 --> 01:07:17.810
are strategically destabilizing.

01:07:17.810 --> 01:07:20.980
And I think that we need
to carefully consider that

01:07:20.980 --> 01:07:24.940
as we determine what our
appropriate response to China

01:07:24.940 --> 01:07:27.398
and Russia's development
of hypersonics is.

01:07:27.398 --> 01:07:29.800
- Congressman, I would
agree with you 100%,

01:07:29.800 --> 01:07:31.480
but what I wanna assure you is that,

01:07:31.480 --> 01:07:35.440
I can still today with
the threats that we face,

01:07:35.440 --> 01:07:38.759
make sure that there's adequate
deterrents to defend...

01:07:38.759 --> 01:07:39.592
- I understand that

01:07:39.592 --> 01:07:41.310
and I appreciate you
emphasizing that point.

01:07:41.310 --> 01:07:42.610
Thank you, Admiral.

01:07:42.610 --> 01:07:44.410
- [Chairman] Thank you.
Mr. Brooks.

01:07:46.870 --> 01:07:47.933
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

01:07:47.933 --> 01:07:49.573
General Raymond,

01:07:50.620 --> 01:07:52.540
you've previously
highlighted to this committee

01:07:52.540 --> 01:07:54.730
the importance of modernizing
our nation's fleet

01:07:54.730 --> 01:07:58.030
of national security launch
vehicles in a timely manner.

01:07:58.030 --> 01:07:59.300
As the Air Force has outlined,

01:07:59.300 --> 01:08:02.030
the goals of the National
Security Space Launch phase II

01:08:02.030 --> 01:08:03.390
launch procurement

01:08:03.390 --> 01:08:06.213
are to encourage competition,
assure our access to space

01:08:06.213 --> 01:08:08.720
and end our reliance on Russians engines.

01:08:08.720 --> 01:08:11.320
You've also outlined that two
providers is the right number

01:08:11.320 --> 01:08:14.740
of providers based on the
Air Force's past experience.

01:08:14.740 --> 01:08:16.230
So two quick questions,

01:08:16.230 --> 01:08:17.940
can you please provide this committee

01:08:17.940 --> 01:08:20.150
with an update on the program and second,

01:08:20.150 --> 01:08:22.550
are you still on track
to make awards this year?

01:08:23.700 --> 01:08:25.318
- All three of those fundamental tenants

01:08:25.318 --> 01:08:28.120
serve access to space,
increase competition,

01:08:28.120 --> 01:08:30.140
get the RD180Ms and we're on track

01:08:30.140 --> 01:08:33.250
and we're on track to
make an award this summer.

01:08:33.250 --> 01:08:34.110
- All right, thank you.

01:08:34.110 --> 01:08:37.950
Admiral Richard, in your
written testimony, you highlight

01:08:39.122 --> 01:08:41.410
the need for a concerted effort

01:08:41.410 --> 01:08:43.780
to expand and improve
existing capabilities

01:08:43.780 --> 01:08:46.500
for both homeland and
regional missile defense.

01:08:46.500 --> 01:08:48.430
Aside from technology development efforts

01:08:48.430 --> 01:08:50.760
to build new capabilities
10 years down the road

01:08:50.760 --> 01:08:53.411
as part of the next generation
interceptor program,

01:08:53.411 --> 01:08:55.380
excuse me,

01:08:55.380 --> 01:08:57.200
what investments to improve the current

01:08:57.200 --> 01:08:59.783
homeland missile defense
system are being made?

01:09:01.040 --> 01:09:04.650
- So Congressman, one, I'm
responsible for the requirements

01:09:04.650 --> 01:09:08.430
Right, the requirements that
we have asked to provide,

01:09:08.430 --> 01:09:10.990
I think are very sound in
terms of our ability to defend

01:09:10.990 --> 01:09:12.710
against a rogue nation threat.

01:09:12.710 --> 01:09:13.543
And I'd think you'd be pleased

01:09:13.543 --> 01:09:16.420
with the budget submission in
terms of the additional things

01:09:16.420 --> 01:09:17.770
that we're asking for.

01:09:17.770 --> 01:09:20.300
My biggest priority as
the commander of STRATCOM,

01:09:20.300 --> 01:09:22.903
gets after improved warning capability

01:09:22.903 --> 01:09:27.858
that provides me the ability
to posture my forces.

01:09:27.858 --> 01:09:30.160
And I would look to where we're going

01:09:30.160 --> 01:09:31.879
with our space based sensing layer

01:09:31.879 --> 01:09:33.460
and then defer to General Raymond

01:09:33.460 --> 01:09:34.997
to give you more details on that.

01:09:34.997 --> 01:09:36.960
- Well, it's gonna be absolutely critical

01:09:36.960 --> 01:09:39.156
that we develop a missile
defense layer in space

01:09:39.156 --> 01:09:42.330
to be able to get after
that warning challenge

01:09:42.330 --> 01:09:43.809
that you articulated

01:09:43.809 --> 01:09:45.830
- This question is for General Raymond,

01:09:45.830 --> 01:09:48.396
but if Dr. Anderson or Admiral
Richard want to chime in,

01:09:48.396 --> 01:09:51.700
please feel free to do so.

01:09:51.700 --> 01:09:53.830
There is great interest around the country

01:09:53.830 --> 01:09:57.210
as to where the Space Force
is going to be located.

01:09:57.210 --> 01:09:58.630
There is also great interest

01:09:58.630 --> 01:10:03.130
with respect to the Battle Command portion

01:10:03.130 --> 01:10:04.768
of the Space Force.

01:10:04.768 --> 01:10:09.768
What are the criteria for the
location of the Battle Command

01:10:10.656 --> 01:10:12.170
in particular,

01:10:12.170 --> 01:10:16.100
how much focus is there on
whether that ultimate site

01:10:16.100 --> 01:10:20.547
ought to be hardened in
order to best stay functional

01:10:20.547 --> 01:10:24.728
when the missiles fly and
the nuclear bombs go off?

01:10:24.728 --> 01:10:28.420
- Sir, there's actually, let
me, two parts as you said.

01:10:28.420 --> 01:10:31.040
There's a Space Force and a Space Command.

01:10:31.040 --> 01:10:34.040
Space Force like the Army,
Navy, Air Force, Marines,

01:10:34.040 --> 01:10:34.908
is going to be heckled
away in the pentagon

01:10:34.908 --> 01:10:36.380
that's where all the services are.

01:10:36.380 --> 01:10:38.020
- All the top brass
will be in the Pentagon.

01:10:38.020 --> 01:10:38.853
That makes sense.

01:10:38.853 --> 01:10:43.403
- So the question that is
being analyzed right now

01:10:44.830 --> 01:10:46.870
is where does US Space Command reside.

01:10:46.870 --> 01:10:50.410
Today, that US Space Command
resides in Colorado Springs.

01:10:50.410 --> 01:10:53.900
So that's the Joint Force Space
Component Command stood up.

01:10:53.900 --> 01:10:57.770
The Air Force is responsible
to do that basing decision,

01:10:57.770 --> 01:10:59.976
they're going through the
announcements as we speak.

01:10:59.976 --> 01:11:02.970
And sometime later this year
or the next year, they'll make

01:11:02.970 --> 01:11:04.110
a decision on where that should be.

01:11:04.110 --> 01:11:05.910
There's a whole list of criteria.

01:11:05.910 --> 01:11:08.816
The Air Force just announced
everything from schools

01:11:08.816 --> 01:11:13.710
to licensing for spouses all the way up,

01:11:13.710 --> 01:11:16.680
through mission workforce.

01:11:16.680 --> 01:11:17.910
I mean, there's a whole laundry list

01:11:17.910 --> 01:11:19.190
and I'd be happy to come back to you

01:11:19.190 --> 01:11:20.830
and share that list with you.

01:11:20.830 --> 01:11:25.830
- How much weight is given to
how hardened the site can be

01:11:26.250 --> 01:11:28.137
for the location of the Battle Command?

01:11:28.137 --> 01:11:31.960
- Yeah, so that would be
linked in under the mission,

01:11:31.960 --> 01:11:35.818
make sure that you have an
ability to conduct a mission

01:11:35.818 --> 01:11:38.200
and we do that in a variety of ways.

01:11:38.200 --> 01:11:40.660
And again in a closed session,

01:11:40.660 --> 01:11:42.240
I could give you more details.

01:11:42.240 --> 01:11:43.214
- All right, thank you, sir.

01:11:43.214 --> 01:11:44.820
Anyone else wish to add anything,

01:11:44.820 --> 01:11:46.144
Dr. Anderson, Admiral Richard?

01:11:46.144 --> 01:11:47.610
- No
- No, sir.

01:11:47.610 --> 01:11:50.085
- All right, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

01:11:50.085 --> 01:11:52.735
- [Chairman] Thank you, now
the patient, Mr. Lamborn.

01:11:54.360 --> 01:11:55.503
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman
for having this hearing,

01:11:55.503 --> 01:11:57.880
I thank the three of you for what you do

01:11:57.880 --> 01:11:58.848
to protect our country.

01:11:58.848 --> 01:12:00.920
General Raymond,

01:12:00.920 --> 01:12:04.450
I know establishing a new
service must be a daunting task.

01:12:04.450 --> 01:12:06.810
In fact, I commiserate with you.

01:12:06.810 --> 01:12:10.580
You have to move from Colorado
to Washington anytime now.

01:12:10.580 --> 01:12:12.900
So good luck with that move.

01:12:12.900 --> 01:12:15.950
But I applaud you for
your leadership so far

01:12:15.950 --> 01:12:16.870
in this endeavor.

01:12:16.870 --> 01:12:20.220
Among your challenges is to
develop war fighting doctrine,

01:12:20.220 --> 01:12:21.790
build a force around that doctrine

01:12:21.790 --> 01:12:24.490
and educate space professionals.

01:12:24.490 --> 01:12:27.120
So on the education aspect,

01:12:27.120 --> 01:12:27.953
you have plans

01:12:27.953 --> 01:12:30.918
to establish a space training
center of excellence.

01:12:30.918 --> 01:12:34.288
- I think thank you, Council member.

01:12:34.288 --> 01:12:35.959
I think one of the things,

01:12:35.959 --> 01:12:38.470
first of all, setting up Space Force

01:12:38.470 --> 01:12:41.326
is really cool and it's
exciting and I'm honored

01:12:41.326 --> 01:12:44.570
and absolutely privileged
to be a part of this.

01:12:44.570 --> 01:12:45.700
I've got a great team.

01:12:45.700 --> 01:12:47.760
I think there's several
things that are foundational

01:12:47.760 --> 01:12:48.700
to a separate service.

01:12:48.700 --> 01:12:51.480
One of them is you have to be
able to develop your people

01:12:51.480 --> 01:12:53.160
and you have to be able
to develop your doctrine.

01:12:53.160 --> 01:12:54.970
I think those two things are foundational

01:12:54.970 --> 01:12:55.803
to the separate service.

01:12:55.803 --> 01:12:59.807
So we are doing organization
work as we speak.

01:12:59.807 --> 01:13:04.226
The plan how we will do
that, my expectation will be

01:13:04.226 --> 01:13:08.330
that we will have an organization

01:13:08.330 --> 01:13:11.223
that's focused on training
and development and doctrine.

01:13:13.236 --> 01:13:14.470
- And as a parenthetical,

01:13:14.470 --> 01:13:17.640
I know that that technical training

01:13:17.640 --> 01:13:21.102
would be different from
and build on academic

01:13:21.102 --> 01:13:23.150
and scientific engineering training

01:13:23.150 --> 01:13:26.450
that people in the Space Force would get

01:13:26.450 --> 01:13:29.162
at a place like the Air Force
Academy in Colorado Springs.

01:13:29.162 --> 01:13:32.664
- So where our expectation is and this,

01:13:32.664 --> 01:13:36.370
Tony and I'll get us through
this, I know what to do.

01:13:36.370 --> 01:13:41.370
Where my expectation is is we
begin the development of this

01:13:41.870 --> 01:13:44.882
is that we have a great opportunity here.

01:13:44.882 --> 01:13:49.882
We just published and advertised
30 jobs that were open

01:13:52.220 --> 01:13:54.130
to the Pentagon for the Space Force.

01:13:54.130 --> 01:13:55.970
I think the number was and
don't quote me on this,

01:13:55.970 --> 01:13:58.300
like 5,000 people applied,
a significant number.

01:13:58.300 --> 01:14:01.440
We have this is generating
interest across the nation.

01:14:01.440 --> 01:14:03.686
It's generating interest in our colleges,

01:14:03.686 --> 01:14:05.670
in our recruiting things.

01:14:05.670 --> 01:14:08.309
But I think what wound up
happening is that the Air Force

01:14:08.309 --> 01:14:12.230
will bring in the human capital
raw material if you will.

01:14:12.230 --> 01:14:13.560
They'll recruit,

01:14:13.560 --> 01:14:16.574
they'll have a space focus
part about recruiting

01:14:16.574 --> 01:14:17.430
but the recruiting machine will leverage

01:14:17.430 --> 01:14:20.010
the Air Force to keep this
light, lean and mission focused.

01:14:20.010 --> 01:14:21.123
We'll leverage the Air Force Academy.

01:14:21.123 --> 01:14:23.797
The boat officer will
leverage ROTC and OTS.

01:14:23.797 --> 01:14:26.400
And then once folks get
commissioned or enlisted

01:14:26.400 --> 01:14:28.267
into the service, the
Space Force will take them

01:14:28.267 --> 01:14:30.960
and develop them into the space
war fighters that they need.

01:14:30.960 --> 01:14:32.080
That's where our head is today.

01:14:32.080 --> 01:14:34.810
- Excellent and will the
National Security Space Institute

01:14:34.810 --> 01:14:36.529
be a part of this?

01:14:36.529 --> 01:14:37.540
- Absolutely,

01:14:37.540 --> 01:14:39.887
they're a fundamental
part of what we do today.

01:14:39.887 --> 01:14:42.130
They teach space 100, 200, 300

01:14:42.130 --> 01:14:42.963
professional development course

01:14:42.963 --> 01:14:44.270
and they'll be built in to that.

01:14:44.270 --> 01:14:47.523
- Excellent, do you need
anything more from us.

01:14:47.523 --> 01:14:49.993
We're working on the NDAA as we speak,

01:14:49.993 --> 01:14:53.380
funding authorities, et cetera.

01:14:53.380 --> 01:14:54.333
- Yes, sir, so we are,

01:14:54.333 --> 01:14:57.835
one of the tasks that
came out of the last NDA

01:14:57.835 --> 01:15:00.364
was to come back with
a legislative proposal,

01:15:00.364 --> 01:15:02.470
for next year's.

01:15:02.470 --> 01:15:04.800
One of the things that the law said today

01:15:04.800 --> 01:15:09.800
was that this started out by taking folks

01:15:10.970 --> 01:15:13.070
on missions and key
players from the Air Force,

01:15:13.070 --> 01:15:15.100
the department's vision is that we will

01:15:15.100 --> 01:15:17.290
broaden this to other
services in the future.

01:15:17.290 --> 01:15:18.235
- Okay, excellent.

01:15:18.235 --> 01:15:20.800
Changing gears a little bit,

01:15:20.800 --> 01:15:22.580
someone told me that there are elements

01:15:22.580 --> 01:15:24.960
of our nation's civil space program,

01:15:24.960 --> 01:15:29.800
which obviously includes manned
space travel that carry over

01:15:29.800 --> 01:15:32.160
into our National Defense Program.

01:15:32.160 --> 01:15:34.950
These elements are said to
add unnecessary paperwork

01:15:34.950 --> 01:15:38.440
and red tape to national
space procurement.

01:15:38.440 --> 01:15:42.321
Are you aware of any spillover
from civil to national space

01:15:42.321 --> 01:15:44.670
procurement of this nature?

01:15:44.670 --> 01:15:45.920
- No, sir, I'm not.

01:15:45.920 --> 01:15:48.080
I can do some digging in get that to you.

01:15:48.080 --> 01:15:49.840
We do have a partnership with NASA,

01:15:49.840 --> 01:15:51.520
a strong relationship with NASA,

01:15:51.520 --> 01:15:55.410
we support the launch
operations and this year,

01:15:55.410 --> 01:15:56.510
we'll start matching humans again.

01:15:56.510 --> 01:15:58.149
NASA will start launching humans again

01:15:58.149 --> 01:16:00.303
out of Cape Canaveral.

01:16:02.740 --> 01:16:05.070
We in fact, we've developed
an internship program

01:16:05.070 --> 01:16:06.130
for some training opportunities,

01:16:06.130 --> 01:16:11.130
but I'm not aware of any
spillover on acquisition things,

01:16:11.450 --> 01:16:13.040
but I'll come back to you.

01:16:13.040 --> 01:16:14.300
- Okay, thank you, please do.

01:16:14.300 --> 01:16:16.560
And I'll save the rest of my questions

01:16:16.560 --> 01:16:17.393
for the closed session

01:16:17.393 --> 01:16:18.353
and I'll yield back.

01:16:19.370 --> 01:16:20.203
- Thank you,

01:16:20.203 --> 01:16:23.510
the open session of the
subcommittee will adjourn

01:16:23.510 --> 01:16:26.607
and will reopen almost immediately in 2337

01:16:26.607 --> 01:16:28.457
for the closed session, thank you.