1 00:00:00,670 --> 00:00:02,330 - Hagerty. 2 00:00:02,330 --> 00:00:04,010 Victorino Mercado, 3 00:00:04,010 --> 00:00:06,600 performing the duties of Assistant Secretary of Defense. 4 00:00:06,600 --> 00:00:09,340 That has to be the longest title I've ever seen. 5 00:00:09,340 --> 00:00:10,710 Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe, 6 00:00:10,710 --> 00:00:12,334 Lieutenant General Richard Clark, 7 00:00:12,334 --> 00:00:14,617 and Allison Bawden of the GAO. 8 00:00:15,810 --> 00:00:17,830 This subcommittee hearing has to be on one 9 00:00:17,830 --> 00:00:19,540 of the most important, most complicated 10 00:00:19,540 --> 00:00:22,270 topics of any subcommittee hearing 11 00:00:22,270 --> 00:00:23,890 so I hope that all members will try 12 00:00:23,890 --> 00:00:25,269 to stick to the five minute rule 13 00:00:25,269 --> 00:00:27,000 so that we can have plenty of time 14 00:00:27,000 --> 00:00:29,670 in closed session following the public hearing. 15 00:00:29,670 --> 00:00:33,810 I plan on referring my time to the closed session. 16 00:00:33,810 --> 00:00:36,400 As I mentioned at last week's subcommittee hearing, 17 00:00:36,400 --> 00:00:38,179 the main issues seem to be budgetary 18 00:00:38,179 --> 00:00:40,600 and we have that high class problem 19 00:00:40,600 --> 00:00:43,402 of unexpected largess from the administration, 20 00:00:43,402 --> 00:00:48,360 nearly a $3 billion increase for NNSA over FY '20. 21 00:00:48,360 --> 00:00:50,620 Although we appreciate the nearly 20% increase, 22 00:00:50,620 --> 00:00:52,382 the burden of proof is on the administrator 23 00:00:52,382 --> 00:00:54,070 to justify the amounts, 24 00:00:54,070 --> 00:00:57,787 particularly in view of the NNSA's 25 00:00:57,787 --> 00:01:00,730 $8 billion in uncosted funds. 26 00:01:00,730 --> 00:01:02,450 Now, let me recognize the Ranking Member 27 00:01:02,450 --> 00:01:04,470 for his opening statement. 28 00:01:04,470 --> 00:01:05,303 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 29 00:01:05,303 --> 00:01:07,070 I would also like to extend a warm welcome 30 00:01:07,070 --> 00:01:08,730 to all of our witnesses today. 31 00:01:08,730 --> 00:01:11,140 We do have a very large panel 32 00:01:11,140 --> 00:01:13,640 but you all contribute to our work here 33 00:01:13,640 --> 00:01:15,120 on the House Armed Services Committee 34 00:01:15,120 --> 00:01:16,730 in unique and meaningful ways 35 00:01:16,730 --> 00:01:18,000 and I appreciate your expertise 36 00:01:18,000 --> 00:01:19,780 that you bring to the table. 37 00:01:19,780 --> 00:01:22,110 The budget request for the entire nuclear enterprise 38 00:01:22,110 --> 00:01:23,790 across both the Department of Energy 39 00:01:23,790 --> 00:01:24,670 and the Department of Defense 40 00:01:24,670 --> 00:01:28,700 for Fiscal Year 2021 is approximately $49 billion. 41 00:01:28,700 --> 00:01:32,180 This request includes consistent, predicted cost growth 42 00:01:32,180 --> 00:01:34,763 for nuclear modernization programs within the DOD, 43 00:01:35,940 --> 00:01:39,233 nuclear weapons stockpile surveillance within the DOE, 44 00:01:39,233 --> 00:01:40,500 and the nuclear command and control 45 00:01:40,500 --> 00:01:42,770 systems across the government. 46 00:01:42,770 --> 00:01:45,440 As we have continued to hear from DOD leadership, 47 00:01:45,440 --> 00:01:48,046 supporting our nuclear modernization efforts remains 48 00:01:48,046 --> 00:01:51,970 the number one priority of the Department of Defense. 49 00:01:51,970 --> 00:01:53,021 In partnership with the National 50 00:01:53,021 --> 00:01:54,800 Nuclear Security Administration, 51 00:01:54,800 --> 00:01:57,060 the United States will continue to provide 52 00:01:57,060 --> 00:02:01,040 a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent. 53 00:02:01,040 --> 00:02:04,190 The DOD budget request for Fiscal Year 2021 54 00:02:04,190 --> 00:02:07,110 invests approximately $17.7 billion 55 00:02:07,110 --> 00:02:08,800 to support modernization of all 56 00:02:08,800 --> 00:02:10,810 three legs of the nuclear triad. 57 00:02:10,810 --> 00:02:12,740 This year's budget request for the ground-based 58 00:02:12,740 --> 00:02:15,510 strategic deterrent is $1.5 billion. 59 00:02:15,510 --> 00:02:17,480 That money will ensure that the replacement 60 00:02:17,480 --> 00:02:20,980 for our only ground-based intercontinental ballistic system, 61 00:02:20,980 --> 00:02:24,570 which has seen continuous service for 60 years, 62 00:02:24,570 --> 00:02:28,343 will be able to enter its next phase of use and development. 63 00:02:29,480 --> 00:02:31,410 There is no margin for slipping this program. 64 00:02:31,410 --> 00:02:32,830 We must continue to support it 65 00:02:32,830 --> 00:02:35,240 while ensuring the best value for our government. 66 00:02:35,240 --> 00:02:37,130 The budget request also supports 67 00:02:37,130 --> 00:02:39,970 the B-21 bomber at $2.18 billion 68 00:02:39,970 --> 00:02:44,400 and long-range standoff weapon LRSO at $744 million. 69 00:02:45,660 --> 00:02:49,650 The LRSO is meant to replace our aging air-launched 70 00:02:49,650 --> 00:02:53,470 cruise missile which entered service 40 years ago. 71 00:02:53,470 --> 00:02:55,080 This year's budget request supports 72 00:02:55,080 --> 00:02:57,450 the Navy's strategic deterrence requirements 73 00:02:57,450 --> 00:02:59,210 with the Columbia class submarine, 74 00:02:59,210 --> 00:03:01,340 the Trident D5 modernization, 75 00:03:01,340 --> 00:03:03,730 and the initiation of the work for the Mark 7 76 00:03:03,730 --> 00:03:07,377 reentry vehicle which will receive the W93 warhead. 77 00:03:07,377 --> 00:03:09,790 The National Nuclear Security Administration 78 00:03:09,790 --> 00:03:13,354 also has a robust and necessary $19.7 billion 79 00:03:13,354 --> 00:03:16,390 budget request for Fiscal Year 2021. 80 00:03:16,390 --> 00:03:18,740 That includes $15.6 billion 81 00:03:18,740 --> 00:03:20,860 in their Weapons Activities Programs 82 00:03:20,860 --> 00:03:22,260 to support the life extension 83 00:03:22,260 --> 00:03:24,841 and modifications to existing warheads, 84 00:03:24,841 --> 00:03:26,870 stockpile surveillance, 85 00:03:26,870 --> 00:03:28,760 and investment in strategic materials 86 00:03:28,760 --> 00:03:31,680 like plutonium and uranium enrichment. 87 00:03:31,680 --> 00:03:34,297 NNSA is an essential partner in the nuclear enterprise 88 00:03:34,297 --> 00:03:36,159 and while we have started to improve 89 00:03:36,159 --> 00:03:38,670 on the decrepit infrastructure, 90 00:03:38,670 --> 00:03:40,380 we have a long way to go. 91 00:03:40,380 --> 00:03:42,123 Additionally, the W93 is a critical 92 00:03:42,123 --> 00:03:44,460 program of record to the NNSA. 93 00:03:44,460 --> 00:03:45,904 I look forward to today's testimony 94 00:03:45,904 --> 00:03:49,598 on the requirements and path ahead for this warhead. 95 00:03:49,598 --> 00:03:51,780 Last week we heard from Admiral Richard, 96 00:03:51,780 --> 00:03:52,858 the commander of Strategic Command 97 00:03:52,858 --> 00:03:55,677 about the military requirements for nuclear modernization 98 00:03:55,677 --> 00:03:58,550 and the consequences of delay or failure. 99 00:03:58,550 --> 00:04:01,160 I appreciate his candidness when he said that we 100 00:04:01,160 --> 00:04:04,809 are approaching irreversible points of no return 101 00:04:04,809 --> 00:04:07,030 with regard to our nuclear modernization. 102 00:04:07,030 --> 00:04:09,812 He testified that we are approaching a point 103 00:04:09,812 --> 00:04:11,498 where if we do not support 104 00:04:11,498 --> 00:04:13,491 these nuclear modernization efforts, 105 00:04:13,491 --> 00:04:15,976 that we will be starting down a path 106 00:04:15,976 --> 00:04:19,910 of unilateral nuclear disarmament. 107 00:04:19,910 --> 00:04:21,200 While we debate whether or not 108 00:04:21,200 --> 00:04:23,110 we will support the budget request 109 00:04:23,110 --> 00:04:25,920 for nuclear modernization of our existing stockpile, 110 00:04:25,920 --> 00:04:27,958 Russia and China continue to increase 111 00:04:27,958 --> 00:04:31,490 their nuclear arsenals at an alarming rate. 112 00:04:31,490 --> 00:04:34,460 Russia continues to increase the number 113 00:04:34,460 --> 00:04:37,171 and type of nuclear delivery systems 114 00:04:37,171 --> 00:04:40,440 and specifically they will continue to develop and field 115 00:04:40,440 --> 00:04:43,670 new, non-treaty accountable systems that indicate 116 00:04:43,670 --> 00:04:46,453 a more aggressive deployment strategy. 117 00:04:47,920 --> 00:04:50,270 Russia remains in violation of their obligations 118 00:04:50,270 --> 00:04:51,400 under the Open Skies Treaty 119 00:04:51,400 --> 00:04:53,450 and continues to exploit the loopholes 120 00:04:53,450 --> 00:04:55,240 in the New START treaty to their advantage 121 00:04:55,240 --> 00:04:57,690 after, of course, having violated the INF treaty. 122 00:05:01,370 --> 00:05:03,620 China will field its own nuclear triad 123 00:05:03,620 --> 00:05:05,440 in the next decade with the development 124 00:05:05,440 --> 00:05:07,496 of a nuclear-capable strategic bomber, 125 00:05:07,496 --> 00:05:11,530 road mobile ICBMs, and sub-launched ballistic missiles. 126 00:05:11,530 --> 00:05:13,940 China also continues to build and deploy 127 00:05:13,940 --> 00:05:16,173 new intermediate-range ballistic missiles, 128 00:05:16,173 --> 00:05:18,820 outpacing the United States. 129 00:05:18,820 --> 00:05:20,570 China has never been subject to the limits 130 00:05:20,570 --> 00:05:23,670 and transparency required by an arms control treaty 131 00:05:23,670 --> 00:05:25,120 and it is unclear how 132 00:05:25,120 --> 00:05:29,290 to incentivize them to join such a regime. 133 00:05:29,290 --> 00:05:31,620 This year's budget request for nuclear modernization 134 00:05:31,620 --> 00:05:34,300 is just enough and just in time. 135 00:05:34,300 --> 00:05:36,440 None of these programs have any margin. 136 00:05:36,440 --> 00:05:38,530 Any attempt to delay, defund, 137 00:05:38,530 --> 00:05:41,230 or otherwise deprioritize our nuclear enterprise 138 00:05:41,230 --> 00:05:43,670 will leave us less safe in an era 139 00:05:43,670 --> 00:05:46,100 of near peer strategic competition. 140 00:05:46,100 --> 00:05:47,507 And I want to thank our administrator 141 00:05:47,507 --> 00:05:49,970 for both your integrity and commitment 142 00:05:49,970 --> 00:05:52,340 and also your advocacy during this budgetary process. 143 00:05:52,340 --> 00:05:53,320 And to all the witnesses, 144 00:05:53,320 --> 00:05:54,860 I want to thank you again for being here today 145 00:05:54,860 --> 00:05:56,733 and we look forward to their testimony. 146 00:05:56,733 --> 00:05:58,500 I yield back. 147 00:05:58,500 --> 00:05:59,610 - I thank the gentleman. 148 00:05:59,610 --> 00:06:00,870 Now, let's hear from the witnesses. 149 00:06:00,870 --> 00:06:01,943 Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. 150 00:06:05,430 --> 00:06:07,680 - Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, 151 00:06:07,680 --> 00:06:09,570 and members of the subcommittee, 152 00:06:09,570 --> 00:06:11,720 thank you for the opportunity to present 153 00:06:11,720 --> 00:06:15,220 the President's Fiscal Year FY '21 budget request 154 00:06:15,220 --> 00:06:16,650 for the Department of Energy's 155 00:06:16,650 --> 00:06:19,670 National Nuclear Security Administration. 156 00:06:19,670 --> 00:06:22,980 As always, it is a privilege to testify before you today 157 00:06:22,980 --> 00:06:25,540 representing the extraordinary men and women 158 00:06:25,540 --> 00:06:28,160 that make up the DOE and NNSA enterprise. 159 00:06:28,160 --> 00:06:31,682 We are grateful for your demonstrated strong, bipartisan 160 00:06:31,682 --> 00:06:35,090 support for the NNSA's national security missions 161 00:06:35,090 --> 00:06:37,885 and the people who execute them every day. 162 00:06:37,885 --> 00:06:39,660 Chairman Cooper, a written statement 163 00:06:39,660 --> 00:06:41,210 has been provided to the subcommittee 164 00:06:41,210 --> 00:06:44,110 and I respectfully request it be submitted for the record. 165 00:06:44,110 --> 00:06:45,480 - [Cooper] Without objection, so ordered. 166 00:06:45,480 --> 00:06:46,920 - Thank you. 167 00:06:46,920 --> 00:06:48,690 2020 marks the 20th anniversary 168 00:06:48,690 --> 00:06:51,620 of the NNSA's establishment by Congress. 169 00:06:51,620 --> 00:06:54,170 Although, of course, our heritage goes back much further 170 00:06:54,170 --> 00:06:55,420 to the Manhattan Project 171 00:06:55,420 --> 00:06:57,700 and to the Atomic Energy Commission. 172 00:06:57,700 --> 00:06:59,973 And, as has always been the case, 173 00:06:59,973 --> 00:07:01,699 the effectiveness and credibility 174 00:07:01,699 --> 00:07:04,720 of America's nuclear weapons capability 175 00:07:04,720 --> 00:07:06,317 reassures our friends and allies 176 00:07:06,317 --> 00:07:08,589 and serves as the ultimate deterrent 177 00:07:08,589 --> 00:07:12,734 against a nuclear attack by those who wish to harm us. 178 00:07:12,734 --> 00:07:16,569 In this regard, NNSA is unique in our responsibilities 179 00:07:16,569 --> 00:07:20,194 to support our nation's nuclear security missions. 180 00:07:20,194 --> 00:07:24,965 The $19.8 billion FY '21 budget request for NNSA 181 00:07:24,965 --> 00:07:27,610 reflects President Trump's strong commitment 182 00:07:27,610 --> 00:07:30,340 to ensuring America has a safe, secure, 183 00:07:30,340 --> 00:07:34,610 and effective nuclear deterrent for many decades to come. 184 00:07:34,610 --> 00:07:36,616 This funding also affirms the administration's 185 00:07:36,616 --> 00:07:38,308 continued work to reduce threats 186 00:07:38,308 --> 00:07:41,166 posed by nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism 187 00:07:41,166 --> 00:07:44,220 as well as to provide militarily effective 188 00:07:44,220 --> 00:07:46,248 nuclear propulsion for the United States Navy 189 00:07:46,248 --> 00:07:50,200 fleet of aircraft carriers and submarines. 190 00:07:50,200 --> 00:07:53,065 The Weapons Activities' request of $15.6 billion 191 00:07:53,065 --> 00:07:55,980 will allow us to modernize the nation's 192 00:07:55,980 --> 00:07:58,259 nuclear weapons stockpile and infrastructure 193 00:07:58,259 --> 00:08:00,644 and meet national security requirements 194 00:08:00,644 --> 00:08:04,270 after several decades of neglect. 195 00:08:04,270 --> 00:08:05,960 It will modernize the stockpile 196 00:08:05,960 --> 00:08:08,379 with five weapons modernization programs, 197 00:08:08,379 --> 00:08:11,369 execute stockpile sustainment activities, 198 00:08:11,369 --> 00:08:13,790 and conduct annual assessment activities 199 00:08:13,790 --> 00:08:15,950 on all weapon systems. 200 00:08:15,950 --> 00:08:17,836 With this request, we will continue 201 00:08:17,836 --> 00:08:21,590 the dismantlement and disposition of weapons and components 202 00:08:21,590 --> 00:08:23,447 from weapons retired from the stockpile 203 00:08:23,447 --> 00:08:26,700 and support production modernization activities 204 00:08:26,700 --> 00:08:30,345 for non-nuclear components and strategic materials 205 00:08:30,345 --> 00:08:33,893 including a two-site plutonium pit strategy. 206 00:08:34,900 --> 00:08:36,230 We will also continue 207 00:08:36,230 --> 00:08:39,350 to recapitalize NNSA's aging infrastructure, 208 00:08:39,350 --> 00:08:42,244 including the Y-12 Uranium Processing Facility, 209 00:08:42,244 --> 00:08:46,090 the NNSA U1a Complex Enhancements Project, 210 00:08:46,090 --> 00:08:48,130 and the High Explosive Science 211 00:08:48,130 --> 00:08:50,600 and Engineering Facility at Pantex. 212 00:08:50,600 --> 00:08:52,869 As many of you have witnessed firsthand, 213 00:08:52,869 --> 00:08:56,500 our entire enterprise continues to age 214 00:08:56,500 --> 00:08:58,500 with much of our infrastructure 215 00:08:58,500 --> 00:09:01,690 operating far beyond its design life. 216 00:09:01,690 --> 00:09:02,560 With this increase, 217 00:09:02,560 --> 00:09:03,840 we will finally be able 218 00:09:03,840 --> 00:09:08,680 to modernize the infrastructure which is old. 219 00:09:08,680 --> 00:09:11,230 Our Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation budget request 220 00:09:11,230 --> 00:09:14,850 of $2 billion marks the third year in a row 221 00:09:14,850 --> 00:09:16,120 that the Trump administration 222 00:09:16,120 --> 00:09:18,800 has sought increased funding for NNSA's 223 00:09:18,800 --> 00:09:21,710 non-proliferation and counterterrorism activities 224 00:09:21,710 --> 00:09:26,630 and fully funds all DNN priority program requirements. 225 00:09:26,630 --> 00:09:29,103 This reflects the the administration's strong commitment 226 00:09:29,103 --> 00:09:31,410 to reducing global nuclear threats 227 00:09:31,410 --> 00:09:33,660 and to arms control efforts that advance 228 00:09:33,660 --> 00:09:36,689 U.S., allied, and partner security. 229 00:09:36,689 --> 00:09:38,117 It will enable us to continue 230 00:09:38,117 --> 00:09:40,860 to build domestic and international capacity 231 00:09:40,860 --> 00:09:43,610 to secure, and where possible, eliminate, 232 00:09:43,610 --> 00:09:45,650 nuclear and radioactive materials 233 00:09:45,650 --> 00:09:47,293 and prevent nuclear smuggling. 234 00:09:48,140 --> 00:09:51,330 Further, this request allows us to maintain 235 00:09:51,330 --> 00:09:54,053 a robust nuclear counterterrorism capability 236 00:09:54,053 --> 00:09:57,160 to respond to nuclear and radiological incidents 237 00:09:57,160 --> 00:09:59,843 including nuclear forensics activities to attribute 238 00:09:59,843 --> 00:10:03,370 the source of material used in a terrorist attack. 239 00:10:03,370 --> 00:10:04,910 We will advance our capabilities 240 00:10:04,910 --> 00:10:07,900 for detecting and monitoring foreign nuclear material 241 00:10:07,900 --> 00:10:09,763 and weapons production activities. 242 00:10:10,610 --> 00:10:12,930 Equally important is the Naval Reactors 243 00:10:12,930 --> 00:10:15,073 budget request of $1.7 billion. 244 00:10:15,930 --> 00:10:18,023 It enables us to provide for the continued 245 00:10:18,023 --> 00:10:20,770 safe, reliable and long-lived operation 246 00:10:20,770 --> 00:10:22,824 of the U.S. Navy's nuclear fleet 247 00:10:22,824 --> 00:10:27,824 which account for more than 40% of the Navy's major vessels. 248 00:10:27,940 --> 00:10:31,100 Finally, our federal salaries and expenses budget request 249 00:10:31,100 --> 00:10:35,080 of $454 million will allow us to recruit, train, 250 00:10:35,080 --> 00:10:37,000 and retain a highly skilled workforce 251 00:10:37,000 --> 00:10:40,253 of 1,858 federal employees. 252 00:10:41,420 --> 00:10:43,750 Mr. Chairman, it is true that our timeline 253 00:10:43,750 --> 00:10:46,152 for modernizing the nuclear stockpile and recapitalizing 254 00:10:46,152 --> 00:10:49,460 the necessary infrastructure is aggressive. 255 00:10:49,460 --> 00:10:52,250 In some cases we are asking our sites and our partners 256 00:10:52,250 --> 00:10:56,540 to do in 10 years what would normally take 15 to 20 years. 257 00:10:56,540 --> 00:10:58,390 But in the two years since being confirmed, 258 00:10:58,390 --> 00:11:00,664 I have seen firsthand the nuclear 259 00:11:00,664 --> 00:11:02,840 security enterprise workforce 260 00:11:02,840 --> 00:11:06,600 passion and dedication and what we can accomplish. 261 00:11:06,600 --> 00:11:09,720 Consequently, while the schedule may be aggressive, 262 00:11:09,720 --> 00:11:11,630 I believe it is achievable. 263 00:11:11,630 --> 00:11:13,901 However, without doing so with 264 00:11:13,901 --> 00:11:15,946 consistent and sustained funding, 265 00:11:15,946 --> 00:11:17,350 and most importantly, 266 00:11:17,350 --> 00:11:19,940 our continued relationship with Congress, 267 00:11:19,940 --> 00:11:21,093 we will not achieve it. 268 00:11:22,060 --> 00:11:23,040 At this time I would like 269 00:11:23,040 --> 00:11:25,760 to personally thank Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe, 270 00:11:25,760 --> 00:11:29,250 Lieutenant General Clark and ASD Mercado, 271 00:11:29,250 --> 00:11:30,780 and all of our DOD colleagues 272 00:11:30,780 --> 00:11:33,860 of their professionalism, your collegiality, 273 00:11:33,860 --> 00:11:36,030 and for your service to our great nation. 274 00:11:36,030 --> 00:11:38,100 And I also look forward to working with GAO 275 00:11:38,100 --> 00:11:40,443 on future matters of mutual interest. 276 00:11:40,443 --> 00:11:43,335 Thank you again for the strong support of this subcommittee 277 00:11:43,335 --> 00:11:47,230 and for the opportunity to testify before you today. 278 00:11:47,230 --> 00:11:49,420 I stand ready to answers any questions you may have. 279 00:11:49,420 --> 00:11:50,253 Thank you. 280 00:11:51,100 --> 00:11:52,110 - [Cooper] Thank you very much. 281 00:11:52,110 --> 00:11:52,943 Mr. Mercado. 282 00:11:55,210 --> 00:11:57,540 - Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, 283 00:11:57,540 --> 00:11:59,100 and distinguished members of the committee, 284 00:11:59,100 --> 00:12:01,800 thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 285 00:12:01,800 --> 00:12:02,633 With your permission, 286 00:12:02,633 --> 00:12:04,320 I also have a longer statement for the record 287 00:12:04,320 --> 00:12:06,370 and will just make a few opening remarks. 288 00:12:08,090 --> 00:12:09,160 - [Cooper] Without objection, so ordered. 289 00:12:09,160 --> 00:12:11,490 We'll accept your written statement for the record. 290 00:12:11,490 --> 00:12:13,005 - Sir, today The United States faces 291 00:12:13,005 --> 00:12:16,522 an increasingly complex global security environment, 292 00:12:16,522 --> 00:12:18,220 in which the central challenge 293 00:12:18,220 --> 00:12:19,586 to our prosperity and security 294 00:12:19,586 --> 00:12:21,810 is the reemergence of great power 295 00:12:21,810 --> 00:12:24,330 competition with China and Russia. 296 00:12:24,330 --> 00:12:26,340 This remains a central theme of our National 297 00:12:26,340 --> 00:12:28,920 Defense Strategy which we are implementing. 298 00:12:28,920 --> 00:12:31,628 More over, regimes such as North Korea and Iran 299 00:12:31,628 --> 00:12:35,050 have mature and very capable ballistic missile programs 300 00:12:35,050 --> 00:12:36,810 with aspirations to be able 301 00:12:36,810 --> 00:12:39,263 to deliver nuclear weapons with these missiles. 302 00:12:40,190 --> 00:12:43,910 The foundation for our success in great power competition 303 00:12:43,910 --> 00:12:45,872 with nuclear powers China and Russia 304 00:12:45,872 --> 00:12:48,520 and dealing effectively with North Korea and Iran 305 00:12:48,520 --> 00:12:51,529 is a safe, secure, survivable, flexible 306 00:12:51,529 --> 00:12:53,633 and effective nuclear deterrent 307 00:12:53,633 --> 00:12:56,600 embodied by our nuclear triad. 308 00:12:56,600 --> 00:12:58,530 For this reason, nuclear deterrence 309 00:12:58,530 --> 00:13:01,683 is the Department's highest priority mission. 310 00:13:02,540 --> 00:13:03,850 For this important mission, 311 00:13:03,850 --> 00:13:05,471 the U.S. seeks only what it needs 312 00:13:05,471 --> 00:13:07,821 to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent 313 00:13:07,821 --> 00:13:09,805 in contrast to Russia who maintains 314 00:13:09,805 --> 00:13:13,440 about 2,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons 315 00:13:13,440 --> 00:13:15,010 and are pursuing and fielding 316 00:13:15,010 --> 00:13:17,287 other novel nuclear capabilities. 317 00:13:17,287 --> 00:13:21,631 We have no desire or intent to engage in an arms race 318 00:13:21,631 --> 00:13:23,740 nor match weapon for weapon 319 00:13:23,740 --> 00:13:26,390 the capabilities being fielded by Russia. 320 00:13:26,390 --> 00:13:29,268 Again, our objective is a credible nuclear deterrent 321 00:13:29,268 --> 00:13:31,960 supported by flexible capabilities 322 00:13:31,960 --> 00:13:33,342 residing in the nuclear triad 323 00:13:33,342 --> 00:13:37,870 that are tailorable to any potential adversary. 324 00:13:37,870 --> 00:13:41,010 After decades of referred recapitalization, 325 00:13:41,010 --> 00:13:43,874 we must proceed with modernizing U.S. nuclear forces 326 00:13:43,874 --> 00:13:46,380 and add additional flexibility 327 00:13:46,380 --> 00:13:48,640 consistent with our Nuclear Posture Review 328 00:13:48,640 --> 00:13:50,411 such as the sea-launched cruise missile 329 00:13:50,411 --> 00:13:54,720 to ensure that are no gains to be made 330 00:13:54,720 --> 00:13:56,720 through the use of any nuclear weapons, 331 00:13:56,720 --> 00:13:58,393 strategic or otherwise. 332 00:13:59,380 --> 00:14:00,797 The Department of Defense 333 00:14:00,797 --> 00:14:02,292 and the National Nuclear Security Administration 334 00:14:02,292 --> 00:14:04,510 are critical partners in maintaining 335 00:14:04,510 --> 00:14:06,822 and modernizing our nuclear triad 336 00:14:06,822 --> 00:14:09,486 to address the challenges we collectively face 337 00:14:09,486 --> 00:14:11,210 and appreciate the support 338 00:14:11,210 --> 00:14:13,460 that we enjoy from this committee. 339 00:14:13,460 --> 00:14:15,450 Funding these critical requirements ensures 340 00:14:15,450 --> 00:14:17,358 that modern replacements will be available 341 00:14:17,358 --> 00:14:19,640 before the nation's legacy systems 342 00:14:19,640 --> 00:14:21,610 reach the end of their extended service lives 343 00:14:21,610 --> 00:14:24,500 and we lose them altogether. 344 00:14:24,500 --> 00:14:26,070 The FY '21 budget request 345 00:14:26,070 --> 00:14:29,020 for nuclear forces is $28.9 billion, 346 00:14:29,020 --> 00:14:33,231 or roughly 4.1% of the total DOD budget request. 347 00:14:33,231 --> 00:14:36,480 Modernization or recapitalization of our nuclear forces 348 00:14:36,480 --> 00:14:40,560 is about 1.7% of the total DOD budget request. 349 00:14:40,560 --> 00:14:43,853 The nation's nuclear modernization program is affordable. 350 00:14:44,820 --> 00:14:47,130 Lastly, nuclear attack is the only 351 00:14:47,130 --> 00:14:49,032 existential threat to the United States 352 00:14:49,032 --> 00:14:51,075 and our nuclear arsenal is the nation's 353 00:14:51,075 --> 00:14:55,710 only ultimate insurance policy against such attack. 354 00:14:55,710 --> 00:14:57,350 Our nuclear triad underwrites 355 00:14:57,350 --> 00:15:00,410 every U.S. military operation around the world 356 00:15:00,410 --> 00:15:02,250 and also provides extended deterrence 357 00:15:02,250 --> 00:15:04,562 guarantees to over 30 allies and partners 358 00:15:04,562 --> 00:15:06,390 precluding the need for them 359 00:15:06,390 --> 00:15:09,100 to pursue their own nuclear arsenals. 360 00:15:09,100 --> 00:15:12,220 This is the return on investment of our nuclear forces. 361 00:15:12,220 --> 00:15:13,680 I thank this committee for its support 362 00:15:13,680 --> 00:15:16,288 and I look forward to your questions. 363 00:15:16,288 --> 00:15:17,220 - [Cooper] Thank you very much. 364 00:15:17,220 --> 00:15:19,080 Vice Admiral Wolfe. 365 00:15:19,080 --> 00:15:21,130 - Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, 366 00:15:21,130 --> 00:15:23,240 and distinguished members of the subcommittee, 367 00:15:23,240 --> 00:15:24,520 thank you for the opportunity 368 00:15:24,520 --> 00:15:26,625 to testify on the Department of Defense's 369 00:15:26,625 --> 00:15:29,150 budget request for nuclear forces. 370 00:15:29,150 --> 00:15:30,870 I'm honored to be here today. 371 00:15:30,870 --> 00:15:33,610 I'd like to thank this subcommittee for its continued 372 00:15:33,610 --> 00:15:35,920 support of the Navy's deterrent mission. 373 00:15:35,920 --> 00:15:37,120 I ask that you please accept 374 00:15:37,120 --> 00:15:39,410 my written statement for the record. 375 00:15:39,410 --> 00:15:40,920 - [Cooper] Without objection, so ordered. 376 00:15:40,920 --> 00:15:42,360 - The nation's nuclear triad 377 00:15:42,360 --> 00:15:44,890 of intercontinental ballistic missiles, heavy bombers, 378 00:15:44,890 --> 00:15:46,180 and submarines equipped 379 00:15:46,180 --> 00:15:47,980 with submarine-launched ballistic missiles 380 00:15:47,980 --> 00:15:51,310 is the bedrock of our ability to deter aggression, 381 00:15:51,310 --> 00:15:52,796 assure our allies and partners, 382 00:15:52,796 --> 00:15:55,800 achieve U.S. objectives should deterrence fail, 383 00:15:55,800 --> 00:15:58,420 and hedge against an uncertain future. 384 00:15:58,420 --> 00:16:00,207 Nuclear modernization is the Department 385 00:16:00,207 --> 00:16:02,850 of Defense's number one priority. 386 00:16:02,850 --> 00:16:06,530 Nuclear modernization is the Navy's number one priority. 387 00:16:06,530 --> 00:16:10,500 And nuclear modernization must be fully funded. 388 00:16:10,500 --> 00:16:12,330 The Navy's strategic systems programs 389 00:16:12,330 --> 00:16:15,129 or SSP Fiscal Year 2021 budget request 390 00:16:15,129 --> 00:16:17,752 reflects investment in our responsibility 391 00:16:17,752 --> 00:16:20,720 to maintain a safe and secure deterrent 392 00:16:20,720 --> 00:16:24,040 that is effective, flexible, and adaptable 393 00:16:24,040 --> 00:16:25,860 for the strategic environment. 394 00:16:25,860 --> 00:16:28,245 This investment is imperative both to sustaining 395 00:16:28,245 --> 00:16:32,040 and to recapitalizing this sea-based strategic deterrent. 396 00:16:32,040 --> 00:16:34,289 Our budget request represents the faith and trust 397 00:16:34,289 --> 00:16:36,317 that the Congress and this nation 398 00:16:36,317 --> 00:16:39,065 have placed in the Navy to responsibly steward 399 00:16:39,065 --> 00:16:41,880 the strategic deterrent mission. 400 00:16:41,880 --> 00:16:45,360 Our nuclear deterrent is credible but it is aging. 401 00:16:45,360 --> 00:16:47,242 Our modernization efforts are underway 402 00:16:47,242 --> 00:16:50,880 but we have much to accomplish over this decade. 403 00:16:50,880 --> 00:16:52,250 As I look to the future of our 404 00:16:52,250 --> 00:16:54,530 submarine-launched ballistic missile force, 405 00:16:54,530 --> 00:16:56,960 I must urgently express a critical 406 00:16:56,960 --> 00:16:58,720 juncture that we have reached. 407 00:16:58,720 --> 00:17:00,554 National capabilities and technologies 408 00:17:00,554 --> 00:17:03,502 that underpin our needed recapitalization efforts 409 00:17:03,502 --> 00:17:06,160 have eroded and atrophied. 410 00:17:06,160 --> 00:17:07,360 We are feeling today 411 00:17:07,360 --> 00:17:09,620 the consequences of historical decisions 412 00:17:09,620 --> 00:17:12,030 and we have reached the inflection point. 413 00:17:12,030 --> 00:17:15,282 The SSP FY 2021 budget request wholly funds 414 00:17:15,282 --> 00:17:17,870 the sustainment of today's deterrent 415 00:17:17,870 --> 00:17:20,719 but it also begins the investment needed to build 416 00:17:20,719 --> 00:17:25,186 and re-energize capabilities, technologies, workforce, 417 00:17:25,186 --> 00:17:29,720 and critical skills required of any nuclear nation. 418 00:17:29,720 --> 00:17:31,551 This very foundation is timeless, 419 00:17:31,551 --> 00:17:34,500 is agnostic to a future warfighter solution, 420 00:17:34,500 --> 00:17:36,180 and will be a collaborator effort 421 00:17:36,180 --> 00:17:37,880 with the United States Air Force. 422 00:17:37,880 --> 00:17:40,660 Today, SSP continues to extend the life 423 00:17:40,660 --> 00:17:43,140 of the Trident D5 strategic weapons system 424 00:17:43,140 --> 00:17:46,430 and to demonstrate its highly reliable performance. 425 00:17:46,430 --> 00:17:51,430 Just last month we reached 178 successful flight tests. 426 00:17:51,480 --> 00:17:54,150 An exceptional record for any weapons system. 427 00:17:54,150 --> 00:17:55,900 Our current life extension is designed 428 00:17:55,900 --> 00:17:58,830 to meet today's form, fit, and function 429 00:17:58,830 --> 00:18:01,860 to match the Ohio class submarine service life, 430 00:18:01,860 --> 00:18:03,890 and to serve as the initial weapons system 431 00:18:03,890 --> 00:18:05,950 on the Columbia class submarine. 432 00:18:05,950 --> 00:18:07,740 As the Navy carefully manages 433 00:18:07,740 --> 00:18:09,840 the transition of our SSBN force, 434 00:18:09,840 --> 00:18:13,027 so, too, must we manage the age out and attrition 435 00:18:13,027 --> 00:18:15,620 of our strategic weapons system. 436 00:18:15,620 --> 00:18:20,110 The SSP FY '21 budget reflects important investments 437 00:18:20,110 --> 00:18:23,430 in our follow on Trident II D5 life extension II 438 00:18:23,430 --> 00:18:27,410 needed for strategic deployment no later than 2039. 439 00:18:27,410 --> 00:18:29,864 This funding focuses on technical maturation 440 00:18:29,864 --> 00:18:33,040 of complex and fundamental technologies 441 00:18:33,040 --> 00:18:36,599 and opportunities to provide flexibility and adaptability 442 00:18:36,599 --> 00:18:40,200 in a dynamic and evolving threat environment. 443 00:18:40,200 --> 00:18:42,141 As our triad's delivery systems and platforms 444 00:18:42,141 --> 00:18:44,560 are exceeding their planned service lives, 445 00:18:44,560 --> 00:18:45,910 our modernization efforts 446 00:18:45,910 --> 00:18:48,180 will produce just in time replacements. 447 00:18:48,180 --> 00:18:50,420 Deferred recapitalization has left no margin 448 00:18:50,420 --> 00:18:53,623 for any anticipated challenges in technical work 449 00:18:53,623 --> 00:18:56,970 that we have not executed in over 30 years. 450 00:18:56,970 --> 00:18:59,323 Historical timelines from our first life extension 451 00:18:59,323 --> 00:19:02,500 coupled with the increased complexity and scope 452 00:19:02,500 --> 00:19:04,415 of the D5 life extension II 453 00:19:04,415 --> 00:19:07,440 signal that we must begin now. 454 00:19:07,440 --> 00:19:10,388 Now is the right time to ensure that the sea-based deterrent 455 00:19:10,388 --> 00:19:13,410 continues to meet strategic requirements. 456 00:19:13,410 --> 00:19:14,632 From a warhead perspective, 457 00:19:14,632 --> 00:19:16,260 the Navy and our partners at 458 00:19:16,260 --> 00:19:18,920 the National Nuclear Security Administration 459 00:19:18,920 --> 00:19:20,270 have successfully completed 460 00:19:20,270 --> 00:19:23,110 the refurbishment of the W76 warhead family 461 00:19:23,110 --> 00:19:25,530 and have modified a small number of warheads 462 00:19:25,530 --> 00:19:27,270 to fill the low-yield option 463 00:19:27,270 --> 00:19:30,080 to address and identify deterrence need. 464 00:19:30,080 --> 00:19:32,740 As we continue to refurbish today's aging warheads, 465 00:19:32,740 --> 00:19:34,110 we have revised the timeline 466 00:19:34,110 --> 00:19:37,610 for completion of the W88 alteration 370 program 467 00:19:37,610 --> 00:19:38,980 which is now scheduled to reach 468 00:19:38,980 --> 00:19:41,250 first production unit next year. 469 00:19:41,250 --> 00:19:43,566 The FY 2021 budget also reflects 470 00:19:43,566 --> 00:19:45,510 the Department of Defense's direction 471 00:19:45,510 --> 00:19:48,920 to pursue a W93 Mark 7 warhead, 472 00:19:48,920 --> 00:19:51,200 an aeroshell program of record. 473 00:19:51,200 --> 00:19:54,740 The W93 Mark 7 will address an evolving threat environment 474 00:19:54,740 --> 00:19:57,439 and ballistic missile warhead modernization requirements, 475 00:19:57,439 --> 00:19:59,540 will improve operational effectiveness 476 00:19:59,540 --> 00:20:01,010 for U.S. Strategic Command, 477 00:20:01,010 --> 00:20:04,440 and will mitigate technical, operational, programmatic, 478 00:20:04,440 --> 00:20:08,150 and geopolitical risk in the sea-based leg of the deterrent. 479 00:20:08,150 --> 00:20:10,430 The Navy's funding request supports solution 480 00:20:10,430 --> 00:20:13,350 agnostic re-entry body components and materials 481 00:20:13,350 --> 00:20:15,657 and is the first step toward rebuilding 482 00:20:15,657 --> 00:20:18,602 a national industrial base to produce aeroshells 483 00:20:18,602 --> 00:20:20,145 and other critical components 484 00:20:20,145 --> 00:20:22,738 which the United States has not exercised 485 00:20:22,738 --> 00:20:25,510 since the early 1990s. 486 00:20:25,510 --> 00:20:27,640 This investment is also critically important 487 00:20:27,640 --> 00:20:29,120 to our other U.S. programs 488 00:20:29,120 --> 00:20:31,030 and to our United Kingdom partners 489 00:20:31,030 --> 00:20:34,394 as they too face significant recapitalization demands 490 00:20:34,394 --> 00:20:38,290 and execute an independent but parallel warhead effort. 491 00:20:38,290 --> 00:20:39,281 As the 14th director, 492 00:20:39,281 --> 00:20:41,670 it is my highest honor to represent 493 00:20:41,670 --> 00:20:42,992 the men and women of SSP, 494 00:20:42,992 --> 00:20:45,956 comprising approximately 1,700 sailors, 495 00:20:45,956 --> 00:20:50,715 1,000 Marines, 300 Coast Guardsmen, 1,200 civilians, 496 00:20:50,715 --> 00:20:53,510 and thousands of contractor personnel. 497 00:20:53,510 --> 00:20:55,470 It is my personal goal to ensure that 498 00:20:55,470 --> 00:20:57,760 they are poised to execute the mission 499 00:20:57,760 --> 00:21:00,940 with the same level of success, passion, and rigor, 500 00:21:00,940 --> 00:21:02,820 both today and tomorrow, 501 00:21:02,820 --> 00:21:06,580 as they have since our program's inception, since 1955. 502 00:21:06,580 --> 00:21:07,800 Thank you for the opportunity 503 00:21:07,800 --> 00:21:10,320 to testify today on behalf of the men and women 504 00:21:10,320 --> 00:21:13,230 who truly make nuclear deterrence their life's work. 505 00:21:13,230 --> 00:21:15,440 I look forward to your questions. 506 00:21:15,440 --> 00:21:16,360 - [Cooper] Thank you, Admiral. 507 00:21:16,360 --> 00:21:17,723 Now General Clark. 508 00:21:19,970 --> 00:21:22,360 - Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, 509 00:21:22,360 --> 00:21:24,690 distinguished members of the subcommittee, 510 00:21:24,690 --> 00:21:26,510 thank you for this opportunity to discuss 511 00:21:26,510 --> 00:21:29,920 the Air Force contributions to the nuclear triad. 512 00:21:29,920 --> 00:21:32,079 And thank you for your support in ensuring 513 00:21:32,079 --> 00:21:33,710 the Department of the Air Force 514 00:21:33,710 --> 00:21:35,149 has the required resources 515 00:21:35,149 --> 00:21:38,300 to execute our nuclear deterrence mission. 516 00:21:38,300 --> 00:21:39,500 I prepared a written statement 517 00:21:39,500 --> 00:21:41,140 that conveys the current status 518 00:21:41,140 --> 00:21:43,530 of the Air Force portion of the nuclear enterprise 519 00:21:43,530 --> 00:21:45,128 and I respectfully request that 520 00:21:45,128 --> 00:21:47,140 it be submitted for the record. 521 00:21:47,140 --> 00:21:48,550 - [Cooper] Without objection, so ordered. 522 00:21:48,550 --> 00:21:50,070 - Thank you, sir. 523 00:21:50,070 --> 00:21:51,610 In addition to my written statement, 524 00:21:51,610 --> 00:21:53,370 I would like to emphasize three points 525 00:21:53,370 --> 00:21:55,420 before the subcommittee today. 526 00:21:55,420 --> 00:21:57,457 First, we are grateful for the men 527 00:21:57,457 --> 00:21:59,677 and women of the U.S. Air Force 528 00:21:59,677 --> 00:22:02,377 who built and currently maintain 529 00:22:02,377 --> 00:22:04,507 the resilient nuclear triad 530 00:22:04,507 --> 00:22:06,550 and the nuclear command, control, 531 00:22:06,550 --> 00:22:09,580 and communications systems we're using today. 532 00:22:09,580 --> 00:22:12,385 It's a testament to their ingenuity and hard work 533 00:22:12,385 --> 00:22:14,360 that the systems built to deter 534 00:22:14,360 --> 00:22:16,399 their generation's nuclear threat 535 00:22:16,399 --> 00:22:20,710 are still meeting America's deterrent needs today. 536 00:22:20,710 --> 00:22:22,390 But those systems are decades 537 00:22:22,390 --> 00:22:24,600 past their intended service lives. 538 00:22:24,600 --> 00:22:29,510 Minuteman III is 39 years past its planned retirement. 539 00:22:29,510 --> 00:22:31,150 And the air-launched cruise missile 540 00:22:31,150 --> 00:22:34,400 is 26 years past its original service life. 541 00:22:34,400 --> 00:22:36,698 Decades of airmen have performed valiantly 542 00:22:36,698 --> 00:22:39,354 to sustain the capabilities and credibility 543 00:22:39,354 --> 00:22:42,768 of these systems but we no longer have the luxury 544 00:22:42,768 --> 00:22:44,989 of deferring these system's upgrades 545 00:22:44,989 --> 00:22:47,993 or replacements to future generations. 546 00:22:49,270 --> 00:22:52,270 Second, we need your continued support. 547 00:22:52,270 --> 00:22:53,760 There's very little margin between 548 00:22:53,760 --> 00:22:55,500 the age out of our existing systems 549 00:22:55,500 --> 00:22:58,870 and the fielding of the replacement capabilities. 550 00:22:58,870 --> 00:23:02,080 We need the support of Congress to establish stable funding 551 00:23:02,080 --> 00:23:04,570 for the National Nuclear Security Agency 552 00:23:04,570 --> 00:23:07,380 and all of our DOD nuclear systems 553 00:23:07,380 --> 00:23:09,170 both in sustaining current capabilities 554 00:23:09,170 --> 00:23:11,260 and developing future capabilities. 555 00:23:11,260 --> 00:23:13,540 Without stable funding we cannot 556 00:23:13,540 --> 00:23:15,430 deliver these systems on time 557 00:23:15,430 --> 00:23:17,620 and run the risk of a deterrence gap 558 00:23:17,620 --> 00:23:20,033 that will put our national security at risk. 559 00:23:21,190 --> 00:23:22,873 Third, and most importantly, 560 00:23:22,873 --> 00:23:26,399 these capabilities will backstop the next generation 561 00:23:26,399 --> 00:23:29,860 of American security and diplomacy. 562 00:23:29,860 --> 00:23:34,640 Future airmen will see GBSDs replace Minuteman IIIs 563 00:23:34,640 --> 00:23:37,160 as the ready and responsive ICBM force 564 00:23:37,160 --> 00:23:39,220 deterring tomorrow's threats. 565 00:23:39,220 --> 00:23:42,290 They'll see B-21s take up the bomber mission from B-2s 566 00:23:42,290 --> 00:23:44,236 giving America the flexibility 567 00:23:44,236 --> 00:23:46,717 of a tailored deterrent response 568 00:23:46,717 --> 00:23:49,853 visible to adversary and ally alike. 569 00:23:51,217 --> 00:23:53,200 Men and women across this country 570 00:23:53,200 --> 00:23:56,290 will live in a world where future American ambassadors 571 00:23:56,290 --> 00:23:58,379 can conduct diplomacy with the confidence 572 00:23:58,379 --> 00:24:00,121 underwritten by stealthy, 573 00:24:00,121 --> 00:24:03,620 survivable Columbia class submarines. 574 00:24:03,620 --> 00:24:05,250 And together our airmen and sailors 575 00:24:05,250 --> 00:24:07,416 will connect with the warriors of the Space Force 576 00:24:07,416 --> 00:24:10,151 to guarantee seamless command and control 577 00:24:10,151 --> 00:24:14,633 of nuclear forces all day, every day without fail. 578 00:24:15,478 --> 00:24:19,550 These points may sound grandiose but to me it's very real. 579 00:24:19,550 --> 00:24:21,834 My son Milo is heading to college this fall 580 00:24:21,834 --> 00:24:24,650 and he desires an Air Force career. 581 00:24:24,650 --> 00:24:26,590 He may find himself as one of the airmen 582 00:24:26,590 --> 00:24:30,210 fielding, operating, or sustaining these systems. 583 00:24:30,210 --> 00:24:32,507 My hope is that we set up his generation 584 00:24:32,507 --> 00:24:35,608 and the generation to follow with a nuclear deterrent 585 00:24:35,608 --> 00:24:40,260 every bit as robust as the one that was bestowed upon us. 586 00:24:40,260 --> 00:24:43,160 So, in summary please let me reiterate my three points. 587 00:24:43,160 --> 00:24:45,750 First, past generations have given us 588 00:24:45,750 --> 00:24:47,809 a credible and effective nuclear deterrent 589 00:24:47,809 --> 00:24:49,960 but a day is coming in the future 590 00:24:49,960 --> 00:24:52,490 where it will be impossible to sustain it. 591 00:24:52,490 --> 00:24:56,140 Next, we need your continued support to stabilize funding 592 00:24:56,140 --> 00:24:57,838 so we can modernize and recapitalize 593 00:24:57,838 --> 00:25:01,260 these systems to maintain their credibility. 594 00:25:01,260 --> 00:25:03,483 And finally, the investments we make today 595 00:25:03,483 --> 00:25:05,501 will ensure tomorrow's generation 596 00:25:05,501 --> 00:25:07,729 and the generations that follow 597 00:25:07,729 --> 00:25:09,750 have the capabilities they need 598 00:25:09,750 --> 00:25:11,793 for the continued defense of our nation. 599 00:25:13,050 --> 00:25:13,883 Through all of this, 600 00:25:13,883 --> 00:25:16,090 the nuclear enterprise remains the number 601 00:25:16,090 --> 00:25:18,900 one responsibility of the Department of Defense 602 00:25:18,900 --> 00:25:22,350 and my fellow airmen and I are proud of the role we play 603 00:25:22,350 --> 00:25:26,170 in maintaining a credible and capable nuclear deterrent. 604 00:25:26,170 --> 00:25:28,300 Again, I appreciate the opportunity 605 00:25:28,300 --> 00:25:30,540 to share my thoughts on strategic deterrence 606 00:25:30,540 --> 00:25:33,560 and I look forward to answering your questions. 607 00:25:33,560 --> 00:25:34,660 - [Cooper] Thank you very much, General. 608 00:25:34,660 --> 00:25:35,770 Ms. Bawden. 609 00:25:37,690 --> 00:25:39,510 - Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, 610 00:25:39,510 --> 00:25:40,900 and members of the subcommittee, 611 00:25:40,900 --> 00:25:43,530 thank you for inviting me to discuss GAO's views 612 00:25:43,530 --> 00:25:45,560 on NNSA's plans for modernizing 613 00:25:45,560 --> 00:25:47,480 the nation's nuclear security enterprise 614 00:25:47,480 --> 00:25:49,193 and aligning its efforts with DOD's 615 00:25:49,193 --> 00:25:51,640 to modernize delivery systems. 616 00:25:51,640 --> 00:25:52,870 These remarks should be viewed 617 00:25:52,870 --> 00:25:56,330 as helping NNSA set itself up for success. 618 00:25:56,330 --> 00:25:57,442 I also have submitted a written statement 619 00:25:57,442 --> 00:26:00,380 for the record and ask that it be entered. 620 00:26:00,380 --> 00:26:02,100 - [Cooper] Without objection, so ordered. 621 00:26:02,100 --> 00:26:03,390 - The nuclear security enterprise 622 00:26:03,390 --> 00:26:05,030 is embarking on its most ambitious 623 00:26:05,030 --> 00:26:07,510 level of effort since the Cold War era. 624 00:26:07,510 --> 00:26:09,410 NNSA is currently managing four weapon 625 00:26:09,410 --> 00:26:11,587 modernization programs proposing a fifth 626 00:26:11,587 --> 00:26:13,970 and undertaking infrastructure projects 627 00:26:13,970 --> 00:26:15,880 that effect every strategic material 628 00:26:15,880 --> 00:26:18,410 and component used in nuclear weapons. 629 00:26:18,410 --> 00:26:20,780 Today, I will discuss the schedule risks presented 630 00:26:20,780 --> 00:26:22,427 by the integrated nature of NNSA's 631 00:26:22,427 --> 00:26:25,230 and DOD's nuclear modernization efforts, 632 00:26:25,230 --> 00:26:26,610 budget and schedule estimates 633 00:26:26,610 --> 00:26:28,370 for implementing the overall program, 634 00:26:28,370 --> 00:26:30,941 and the importance of NNSA setting priorities 635 00:26:30,941 --> 00:26:32,970 among its efforts in the event 636 00:26:32,970 --> 00:26:36,420 of budget shortfalls or cost or schedule overruns. 637 00:26:36,420 --> 00:26:37,765 First, on the schedule risks, 638 00:26:37,765 --> 00:26:41,466 because NSSA's modernization program is highly integrated, 639 00:26:41,466 --> 00:26:43,324 any delay could have a significant 640 00:26:43,324 --> 00:26:46,180 cascading effect on the overall effort. 641 00:26:46,180 --> 00:26:47,950 Here are three scenarios. 642 00:26:47,950 --> 00:26:50,359 First, weapons programs depend on the completion 643 00:26:50,359 --> 00:26:52,710 of certain infrastructure projects. 644 00:26:52,710 --> 00:26:55,940 For example, the W87-1 program will require 645 00:26:55,940 --> 00:26:59,090 all new components including plutonium pits. 646 00:26:59,090 --> 00:27:02,550 The construction schedule for pit facilities is aggressive 647 00:27:02,550 --> 00:27:04,070 and a delay could have an impact on 648 00:27:04,070 --> 00:27:06,831 the schedule for the weapons programs it supports. 649 00:27:06,831 --> 00:27:10,390 Also, because NNSA uses the same production infrastructure 650 00:27:10,390 --> 00:27:13,170 for each weapon program and capacity is limited, 651 00:27:13,170 --> 00:27:16,072 each program's schedule can impact the next. 652 00:27:16,072 --> 00:27:19,440 In addition, NNSA's weapons programs schedules 653 00:27:19,440 --> 00:27:21,340 must remain aligned with the schedules 654 00:27:21,340 --> 00:27:23,580 for DOD's new delivery systems 655 00:27:23,580 --> 00:27:27,570 to ensure essential testing is completed at critical times. 656 00:27:27,570 --> 00:27:30,221 This is especially for the W80-4 warhead 657 00:27:30,221 --> 00:27:32,588 and the Air Force's long-range stand off missile 658 00:27:32,588 --> 00:27:34,881 as well as the W87-1 warhead 659 00:27:34,881 --> 00:27:37,774 and the Air Force's ICBM replacement. 660 00:27:37,774 --> 00:27:40,903 The current schedules have little margin for delay. 661 00:27:40,903 --> 00:27:43,420 Second, on budget and schedule aspects, 662 00:27:43,420 --> 00:27:47,460 in the past GAO has been critical of NNSA's performance 663 00:27:47,460 --> 00:27:49,830 on a number of weapon modernization programs 664 00:27:49,830 --> 00:27:51,910 and major construction projects. 665 00:27:51,910 --> 00:27:53,430 We identified poor planning 666 00:27:53,430 --> 00:27:56,400 and overly optimistic assumptions about performance 667 00:27:56,400 --> 00:27:58,640 that contributed to cost and overruns, 668 00:27:58,640 --> 00:28:02,142 schedule delays, and program and project cancellations. 669 00:28:02,142 --> 00:28:03,877 NNSA has made improvements 670 00:28:03,877 --> 00:28:06,370 to management controls for these efforts 671 00:28:06,370 --> 00:28:09,240 especially around cost and schedule estimating. 672 00:28:09,240 --> 00:28:11,150 And it is increasingly paying attention 673 00:28:11,150 --> 00:28:14,290 to program and project management capacity. 674 00:28:14,290 --> 00:28:17,230 As NNSA undertakes an increased scope of work, 675 00:28:17,230 --> 00:28:19,410 it is essential that its overall plans 676 00:28:19,410 --> 00:28:22,150 reflect realistic cost and schedule estimates 677 00:28:22,150 --> 00:28:24,500 rather than best case estimates. 678 00:28:24,500 --> 00:28:27,512 For example, while NNSA has not yet fully developed 679 00:28:27,512 --> 00:28:30,220 its schedule for constructing pit facilities, 680 00:28:30,220 --> 00:28:32,514 its own analysis of alternatives suggests 681 00:28:32,514 --> 00:28:35,980 current dates will be difficult to achieve. 682 00:28:35,980 --> 00:28:38,060 Finally, on setting priorities, 683 00:28:38,060 --> 00:28:40,209 the President's FY '21 budget request includes 684 00:28:40,209 --> 00:28:43,950 a 25% increase for NNSA's modernization program 685 00:28:43,950 --> 00:28:46,830 and anticipates sustaining this increased funding level 686 00:28:46,830 --> 00:28:49,340 for at least the next five years. 687 00:28:49,340 --> 00:28:53,051 In 2017, GAO reviewed NNSA's long-term plans 688 00:28:53,051 --> 00:28:55,170 for its modernization program. 689 00:28:55,170 --> 00:28:57,669 At the time, we found that NNSA planned to defer work 690 00:28:57,669 --> 00:29:01,440 to a period beyond its five year programming window. 691 00:29:01,440 --> 00:29:03,530 We concluded that these deferrals created 692 00:29:03,530 --> 00:29:07,150 a significant bow wave of funding needs in future years 693 00:29:07,150 --> 00:29:09,779 to undertake the simultaneous weapons programs 694 00:29:09,779 --> 00:29:12,007 and construction projects it planned. 695 00:29:12,007 --> 00:29:14,098 The requested budget increase for next year 696 00:29:14,098 --> 00:29:17,560 suggests this bow wave has arrived. 697 00:29:17,560 --> 00:29:19,630 Requesting a funding increase is one way 698 00:29:19,630 --> 00:29:21,500 to address the bow wave and maintain 699 00:29:21,500 --> 00:29:24,520 the overall scope of planned modernization efforts. 700 00:29:24,520 --> 00:29:26,610 However, actual funding in future years 701 00:29:26,610 --> 00:29:28,680 could fall short of budget estimates 702 00:29:28,680 --> 00:29:30,755 and programs or projects could, and have, 703 00:29:30,755 --> 00:29:34,808 encountered cost overruns or schedule delays. 704 00:29:34,808 --> 00:29:38,010 GAO recommended in 2017 that to increase 705 00:29:38,010 --> 00:29:39,945 the credibility of its modernization plans, 706 00:29:39,945 --> 00:29:42,937 NNSA should develop a portfolio approach 707 00:29:42,937 --> 00:29:46,160 as a way to manage these risks. 708 00:29:46,160 --> 00:29:47,948 Such an approach would present options 709 00:29:47,948 --> 00:29:49,640 that could be exercised 710 00:29:49,640 --> 00:29:52,770 if budget or schedule risks materialize. 711 00:29:52,770 --> 00:29:54,880 This would include identifying programs 712 00:29:54,880 --> 00:29:56,627 for which starts could be deferred. 713 00:29:56,627 --> 00:29:59,000 Any such plan would need to be put 714 00:29:59,000 --> 00:30:00,970 forward in collaboration with DOD. 715 00:30:00,970 --> 00:30:04,210 NNSA's most recent long-term plan 716 00:30:04,210 --> 00:30:06,890 includes an assessment of whether its budget requests 717 00:30:06,890 --> 00:30:09,720 fall within the range of its program cost estimates. 718 00:30:09,720 --> 00:30:11,270 However, it has not yet adopted 719 00:30:11,270 --> 00:30:13,560 a portfolio approach to setting its priorities 720 00:30:13,560 --> 00:30:16,080 should cost or schedule risks materialize. 721 00:30:16,080 --> 00:30:19,164 NNSA's planning could further benefit from this approach 722 00:30:19,164 --> 00:30:22,290 in light of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review 723 00:30:22,290 --> 00:30:25,040 and additional programs it anticipates. 724 00:30:25,040 --> 00:30:26,730 I appreciate your time this afternoon 725 00:30:26,730 --> 00:30:28,730 and I am happy to answer your questions. 726 00:30:30,040 --> 00:30:32,170 - Thank you very much. I'm going to hold most of my 727 00:30:32,170 --> 00:30:34,280 questions for the closed session 728 00:30:34,280 --> 00:30:36,490 but I would like to ask Ms. Gordon-Hagerty 729 00:30:36,490 --> 00:30:40,403 about a sentence of her testimony on page 11. 730 00:30:41,250 --> 00:30:44,383 It reads, additionally, the request for M3, 731 00:30:44,383 --> 00:30:47,650 that is material management and minimization program, 732 00:30:47,650 --> 00:30:50,230 supports the removal and disposal 733 00:30:50,230 --> 00:30:52,495 of weapons-usable nuclear material, 734 00:30:52,495 --> 00:30:55,688 with priority on removing surplus plutonium 735 00:30:55,688 --> 00:30:58,193 from the state of South Carolina. 736 00:30:59,400 --> 00:31:01,060 I was wondering about the urgency of that 737 00:31:01,060 --> 00:31:03,470 given the fact that second sight for pit production 738 00:31:03,470 --> 00:31:06,210 is supposed to be the state of South Carolina. 739 00:31:06,210 --> 00:31:08,090 Why are we so interested in getting 740 00:31:08,090 --> 00:31:09,750 plutonium out of South Carolina 741 00:31:09,750 --> 00:31:11,110 if we're just going to be returning 742 00:31:11,110 --> 00:31:13,250 plutonium to South Carolina? 743 00:31:13,250 --> 00:31:15,128 - Mr. Chairman, the removal of the material 744 00:31:15,128 --> 00:31:17,540 from South Carolina is through 745 00:31:17,540 --> 00:31:20,087 a program for our non-proliferation needs 746 00:31:20,087 --> 00:31:22,691 that resulted in the agreement that we had 747 00:31:22,691 --> 00:31:25,860 with the former Soviet Union, with Russia, 748 00:31:25,860 --> 00:31:30,690 to remove 34 metric tons of excess plutonium from the world. 749 00:31:30,690 --> 00:31:32,420 And we were planning on doing that through 750 00:31:32,420 --> 00:31:35,623 the MOX program at the Savannah River site. 751 00:31:36,836 --> 00:31:40,710 But since MOX was over construction, over budget, 752 00:31:40,710 --> 00:31:42,311 under construction, over budget, 753 00:31:42,311 --> 00:31:44,920 we decided to bring that program to termination 754 00:31:44,920 --> 00:31:46,040 and we made that decision, 755 00:31:46,040 --> 00:31:48,480 Secretary Perry did in 2018. 756 00:31:48,480 --> 00:31:51,196 Subsequently we have been working aggressively 757 00:31:51,196 --> 00:31:54,960 to remove the 9.5 metric tons of material 758 00:31:54,960 --> 00:31:57,814 still in the state of South Carolina 759 00:31:57,814 --> 00:32:00,040 and we are committed to that approach, 760 00:32:00,040 --> 00:32:02,410 we're committed to removing 34 metric tons 761 00:32:02,410 --> 00:32:05,490 of excess plutonium from the United States. 762 00:32:05,490 --> 00:32:07,730 And we are doing it through a tried and true process 763 00:32:07,730 --> 00:32:12,700 called dilute and dispose or surplus plutonium disposition. 764 00:32:12,700 --> 00:32:14,160 So, that is material that would 765 00:32:14,160 --> 00:32:16,840 not otherwise be used in our stockpile. 766 00:32:16,840 --> 00:32:19,960 It is excess material, it is not in a good form 767 00:32:19,960 --> 00:32:22,732 and we would have to put it through quite a number of steps 768 00:32:22,732 --> 00:32:25,502 before we were able to use it for the stockpile. 769 00:32:25,502 --> 00:32:27,800 That material will go through a process 770 00:32:27,800 --> 00:32:29,160 and then be ultimately buried 771 00:32:29,160 --> 00:32:32,150 at the waste isolation pilot plant. 772 00:32:32,150 --> 00:32:34,144 We have made a commitment to the state of South Carolina. 773 00:32:34,144 --> 00:32:36,370 We're sticking with our commitment. 774 00:32:36,370 --> 00:32:38,963 In fact, last year we were under a court order to remove 775 00:32:38,963 --> 00:32:41,950 a metric ton of material from the state of South Carolina. 776 00:32:41,950 --> 00:32:44,254 We did it six months ahead of schedule. 777 00:32:44,254 --> 00:32:46,210 So, we're moving on that 778 00:32:46,210 --> 00:32:47,850 and we have an aggressive schedule 779 00:32:47,850 --> 00:32:49,610 but it's a doable schedule. 780 00:32:49,610 --> 00:32:51,820 We've got long lead procurements going on 781 00:32:51,820 --> 00:32:53,430 for the state of South Carolina. 782 00:32:53,430 --> 00:32:55,160 We've got a program to undertake 783 00:32:55,160 --> 00:32:57,713 that mission at South Carolina. 784 00:32:59,380 --> 00:33:00,213 - Thank you. 785 00:33:00,213 --> 00:33:01,046 Mr. Turner. 786 00:33:02,450 --> 00:33:03,283 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 787 00:33:03,283 --> 00:33:07,130 I first want to open by giving the heartfelt sorrow, 788 00:33:07,130 --> 00:33:08,070 I think, from everybody in the room 789 00:33:08,070 --> 00:33:11,470 about the tornadoes that have hit your community. 790 00:33:11,470 --> 00:33:12,980 And it's a very difficult. 791 00:33:12,980 --> 00:33:14,870 My community last summer had eight tornadoes 792 00:33:14,870 --> 00:33:19,363 that hit the city of Dayton and the surrounding areas. 793 00:33:20,421 --> 00:33:23,373 It did not make the extent of damage that you have had. 794 00:33:24,214 --> 00:33:26,400 And I know to what extent a community has to rally 795 00:33:26,400 --> 00:33:27,810 and I want you to know that certainly 796 00:33:27,810 --> 00:33:29,510 you have our support and sympathy. 797 00:33:32,252 --> 00:33:34,230 I'm a big fan of GAO because, 798 00:33:34,230 --> 00:33:36,630 I mean, your reports are almost prophetic. 799 00:33:36,630 --> 00:33:37,660 You go back and you read them 800 00:33:37,660 --> 00:33:40,203 and you think, gosh, I wish we'd done that. 801 00:33:42,514 --> 00:33:44,758 I appreciate really just the extent 802 00:33:44,758 --> 00:33:48,760 to which you pore over things 803 00:33:48,760 --> 00:33:51,240 and Allison, looking at your resume and bio, 804 00:33:51,240 --> 00:33:54,290 what a great academic work you've done. 805 00:33:54,290 --> 00:33:56,960 I appreciate you've dedicated yourself to the GAO. 806 00:33:58,400 --> 00:34:00,140 I'm gonna ask the group a question 807 00:34:00,140 --> 00:34:01,690 then I'm gonna ask you slightly differently 808 00:34:01,690 --> 00:34:04,440 'cause it applies to you slightly differently. 809 00:34:04,440 --> 00:34:08,700 So, I'm gonna begin by reading the quote. 810 00:34:08,700 --> 00:34:11,150 So, last week Admiral Richard, 811 00:34:11,150 --> 00:34:12,980 the commander of STRATCOM, 812 00:34:12,980 --> 00:34:15,130 testified before this subcommittee 813 00:34:15,130 --> 00:34:17,460 and I read this quote in my opening statement. 814 00:34:17,460 --> 00:34:21,317 He stated, "The entire triad is reaching 815 00:34:21,317 --> 00:34:23,497 "the end of its useful life. 816 00:34:23,497 --> 00:34:26,473 "And so either we replace what we have now 817 00:34:26,473 --> 00:34:30,006 "or we start to divest almost on a path to unilateral 818 00:34:30,006 --> 00:34:33,470 "disarmament in the face of this growing threat." 819 00:34:33,470 --> 00:34:35,310 I'm gonna ask each of you if you agree with that 820 00:34:35,310 --> 00:34:37,126 and then with Allison I'm just gonna ask 821 00:34:37,126 --> 00:34:39,780 does GAO disagree 'cause you're not really 822 00:34:39,780 --> 00:34:41,630 in a position to agree but I don't think you disagree. 823 00:34:41,630 --> 00:34:43,260 So, to our administrator, 824 00:34:43,260 --> 00:34:45,110 do you agree with that quote? 825 00:34:45,110 --> 00:34:46,340 - Yes, I do. 826 00:34:46,340 --> 00:34:47,720 - [Turner] Mr. Mercado? 827 00:34:47,720 --> 00:34:49,220 - Yes, sir, I do. 828 00:34:49,220 --> 00:34:50,053 - [Turner] Vice Admiral Wolfe. 829 00:34:50,053 --> 00:34:50,886 - Yes, sir, I do. 830 00:34:51,880 --> 00:34:53,390 - [Turner] General Clark? 831 00:34:53,390 --> 00:34:55,320 - Yes, sir, absolutely. 832 00:34:55,320 --> 00:34:57,379 - [Turner] Does GAO disagree with that quote? 833 00:34:57,379 --> 00:34:58,395 - No. 834 00:34:58,395 --> 00:35:00,780 - Great, excellent. 835 00:35:00,780 --> 00:35:04,220 Administrator, you have been just dogmatic 836 00:35:04,220 --> 00:35:08,750 in ensuring that people understand that you 837 00:35:08,750 --> 00:35:10,720 need infrastructure, that you need production. 838 00:35:10,720 --> 00:35:13,904 That in order for there to be a viable deterrent 839 00:35:13,904 --> 00:35:16,297 then there has to be production 840 00:35:16,297 --> 00:35:18,410 and that your system has not been 841 00:35:18,410 --> 00:35:21,350 in a production mode for a very, very long time. 842 00:35:21,350 --> 00:35:25,600 That in order for us to just stay with what we have, 843 00:35:25,600 --> 00:35:30,600 we have to invest to be able to able to respond now. 844 00:35:30,880 --> 00:35:32,080 Most people don't understand 845 00:35:32,080 --> 00:35:34,990 that NNSA under the Department of Energy 846 00:35:34,990 --> 00:35:37,510 is actually where these things are made, 847 00:35:37,510 --> 00:35:41,370 where you have to invest in the nuclear infrastructure 848 00:35:41,370 --> 00:35:45,253 in order for you to be able to perform and to deliver. 849 00:35:46,270 --> 00:35:48,860 Give us a picture of what you're facing 850 00:35:52,452 --> 00:35:54,369 because as Allison from GAO was saying, 851 00:35:54,369 --> 00:35:56,301 all these are critical paths 852 00:35:56,301 --> 00:35:59,910 which means if we don't fund these, we miss. 853 00:35:59,910 --> 00:36:03,060 You've gotta deliver, you can't make a mistake 854 00:36:03,060 --> 00:36:04,560 but we've gotta deliver first 855 00:36:04,560 --> 00:36:05,853 or you surely can't. 856 00:36:06,770 --> 00:36:08,550 So, tell us what you're facing as 857 00:36:08,550 --> 00:36:11,813 to why currently we have to fund this bill? 858 00:36:13,100 --> 00:36:15,160 - Mr. Turner, let me start by saying 859 00:36:15,160 --> 00:36:17,650 I'm very proud to be able to represent 860 00:36:17,650 --> 00:36:19,794 the 50,000 men and women that support 861 00:36:19,794 --> 00:36:22,310 our nuclear security enterprise. 862 00:36:22,310 --> 00:36:25,100 And in that regard, we are talking about an infrastructure 863 00:36:25,100 --> 00:36:28,200 that was developed and build in the Manhattan project. 864 00:36:28,200 --> 00:36:30,040 30% of our facilities were built 865 00:36:30,040 --> 00:36:32,350 and constructed in the Manhattan project 866 00:36:32,350 --> 00:36:34,710 and we are operating in those facilities. 867 00:36:34,710 --> 00:36:36,142 Now we are operating to the point 868 00:36:36,142 --> 00:36:39,560 of obviously past their lifetimes. 869 00:36:39,560 --> 00:36:42,780 More than 50% of our facilities are more than 40 years old. 870 00:36:42,780 --> 00:36:46,200 Most of our facilities are in the single point of failure 871 00:36:46,200 --> 00:36:47,760 where we don't have replication, 872 00:36:47,760 --> 00:36:48,593 where we don't have 873 00:36:48,593 --> 00:36:51,430 a resilient and responsive infrastructure. 874 00:36:51,430 --> 00:36:54,240 We have waited for almost three decades now. 875 00:36:54,240 --> 00:36:55,880 We've endured budget caps, 876 00:36:55,880 --> 00:36:58,614 we've endured promises to be able 877 00:36:58,614 --> 00:37:01,859 to increase and to modernize our infrastructure 878 00:37:01,859 --> 00:37:04,820 as well as our capacity to support 879 00:37:04,820 --> 00:37:06,920 the Department of Defense requirements. 880 00:37:06,920 --> 00:37:10,400 We are at a turning point, Representative Turner. 881 00:37:10,400 --> 00:37:13,240 We have got to get on with this. 882 00:37:13,240 --> 00:37:15,920 We have no margin built in any longer 883 00:37:15,920 --> 00:37:18,070 for our infrastructure or modernization. 884 00:37:18,070 --> 00:37:19,401 And on top of all of that, 885 00:37:19,401 --> 00:37:22,620 while over the last 20 years we were effectively 886 00:37:22,620 --> 00:37:25,030 working on one major modernization program, 887 00:37:25,030 --> 00:37:27,068 that of the 76-1 which we completed 888 00:37:27,068 --> 00:37:29,284 ahead of schedule and on budget, 889 00:37:29,284 --> 00:37:32,470 we are now committed to supporting five major 890 00:37:32,470 --> 00:37:35,530 modernization efforts of the Department of Defense. 891 00:37:35,530 --> 00:37:36,560 So, we are working. 892 00:37:36,560 --> 00:37:37,810 We have a schedule. 893 00:37:37,810 --> 00:37:39,260 We are working, we are committed, 894 00:37:39,260 --> 00:37:40,540 and we are completely aligned 895 00:37:40,540 --> 00:37:41,710 with the Department of Defense, 896 00:37:41,710 --> 00:37:42,650 with our colleagues who are 897 00:37:42,650 --> 00:37:44,308 sitting with me today at the table. 898 00:37:44,308 --> 00:37:46,877 But we have very little margin for error. 899 00:37:46,877 --> 00:37:48,334 We know we've got the schedule, 900 00:37:48,334 --> 00:37:51,340 we know we can commit to and we can execute. 901 00:37:51,340 --> 00:37:53,930 However, we have limited capacity. 902 00:37:53,930 --> 00:37:55,260 What we saw recently with 903 00:37:55,260 --> 00:37:57,853 the capacitor issue with the 61-12 and the 88 904 00:37:57,853 --> 00:38:01,363 was a result of the fragility of our complex. 905 00:38:01,363 --> 00:38:06,083 We have allowed programs to basically evaporate. 906 00:38:07,030 --> 00:38:08,680 Our business sector, if you will. 907 00:38:10,270 --> 00:38:13,000 Pretty much our defense industrial complex 908 00:38:13,000 --> 00:38:16,230 of which we are our own defense industrial complex. 909 00:38:16,230 --> 00:38:18,040 You can't go out and buy plutonium 910 00:38:18,040 --> 00:38:20,150 or put out a bid for things like that 911 00:38:20,150 --> 00:38:21,997 and for manufacturing the unique components 912 00:38:21,997 --> 00:38:25,110 that we put into our nuclear weapons systems. 913 00:38:25,110 --> 00:38:27,280 Those programs are long gone. 914 00:38:27,280 --> 00:38:29,040 And so, what we are doing is basically 915 00:38:29,040 --> 00:38:31,093 building up capacity from the ground up. 916 00:38:32,379 --> 00:38:34,660 We would have liked to have avoided this situation 917 00:38:34,660 --> 00:38:37,770 that we find ourselves in with the 61 and the 88. 918 00:38:37,770 --> 00:38:40,460 That said, we've had lessons learned from that. 919 00:38:40,460 --> 00:38:42,600 We're able to apply them to our other systems 920 00:38:42,600 --> 00:38:44,010 under which we are operating now 921 00:38:44,010 --> 00:38:45,600 and which we are modernizing. 922 00:38:45,600 --> 00:38:47,140 We're working closely to continue 923 00:38:47,140 --> 00:38:49,084 to be aligned with the Department of Defense. 924 00:38:49,084 --> 00:38:53,100 So, we are really at, as I said before, a tipping point. 925 00:38:53,100 --> 00:38:55,010 We have no more margin for error. 926 00:38:55,010 --> 00:38:57,910 We've got facilities that need to be modernized. 927 00:38:57,910 --> 00:38:59,760 We've got personnel that need to be hired 928 00:38:59,760 --> 00:39:01,930 so we can undertake and execute 929 00:39:01,930 --> 00:39:04,173 our nation's nuclear deterrent. 930 00:39:05,010 --> 00:39:07,333 - Two more quick questions for you, administrator. 931 00:39:08,768 --> 00:39:12,129 You used numbers, 61, 88. 932 00:39:12,129 --> 00:39:14,200 Can you tell us what those relate to? 933 00:39:14,200 --> 00:39:16,737 Where do those numbers come from, 61, 88? 934 00:39:16,737 --> 00:39:20,840 - So, the B-61 mod 12 is the gravity bomb 935 00:39:20,840 --> 00:39:24,320 that the U.S. Air Force deploys. 936 00:39:24,320 --> 00:39:27,170 That is a modernization program. 937 00:39:27,170 --> 00:39:28,700 It was actually fielded. 938 00:39:28,700 --> 00:39:32,706 The first B-61 was fielded in the early 1960s. 939 00:39:32,706 --> 00:39:33,791 - Okay, and that's what I wanted you to get to. 940 00:39:33,791 --> 00:39:36,380 So, 61 refers to 1961? 941 00:39:36,380 --> 00:39:37,910 - Roughly the age at which, 942 00:39:37,910 --> 00:39:39,419 about the time where it was deployed. 943 00:39:39,419 --> 00:39:40,752 - [Turner] And 88? 944 00:39:40,752 --> 00:39:43,530 - And the 88 was 1988 or so. 945 00:39:43,530 --> 00:39:46,360 - Can you tell us how long has it been 946 00:39:46,360 --> 00:39:49,850 since we've called on you to do this? 947 00:39:49,850 --> 00:39:53,790 Because, I mean, it's been over 20 years has it not? 948 00:39:53,790 --> 00:39:55,120 - Yes, sir. 949 00:39:55,120 --> 00:39:58,290 - Since your, the NNSA, has been required 950 00:39:58,290 --> 00:40:02,840 to actually construct the pit, 951 00:40:02,840 --> 00:40:06,440 the nuclear weapon portion of a weapon? 952 00:40:06,440 --> 00:40:07,577 Now, what's important about that, 953 00:40:07,577 --> 00:40:09,440 and I want to hear what the year is, 954 00:40:09,440 --> 00:40:10,570 how long you think it's been 955 00:40:10,570 --> 00:40:13,693 because people think that once you have 956 00:40:13,693 --> 00:40:15,770 a nuclear weapon you have a nuclear weapon. 957 00:40:15,770 --> 00:40:20,770 But if you have it and it sits there for 20, 30, 40 years, 958 00:40:21,230 --> 00:40:24,893 it begins to degrade so you're gonna have to replace it. 959 00:40:26,867 --> 00:40:29,080 And I think the understanding that people have of this, 960 00:40:29,080 --> 00:40:30,756 that once you buy one, you've got one, 961 00:40:30,756 --> 00:40:33,591 is contrary to what you're experience is. 962 00:40:33,591 --> 00:40:35,210 Could you speak about that for a moment? 963 00:40:35,210 --> 00:40:36,210 - Certainly. 964 00:40:38,229 --> 00:40:39,990 Let me begin my statement by saying 965 00:40:39,990 --> 00:40:43,240 that the United States is the only nuclear weapon state 966 00:40:43,240 --> 00:40:47,973 that is neither designing nor fielding new nuclear weapons. 967 00:40:47,973 --> 00:40:52,340 We are modernizing our current nuclear weapons stockpile. 968 00:40:52,340 --> 00:40:55,440 A stockpile that was built for approximately 20 years 969 00:40:55,440 --> 00:40:58,100 for the weapons when they were fielded. 970 00:40:58,100 --> 00:41:01,081 We have stockpile modernization programs 971 00:41:01,081 --> 00:41:05,800 for all the weapons that are in our stockpile currently. 972 00:41:05,800 --> 00:41:07,101 And to your point, 973 00:41:07,101 --> 00:41:10,810 we are modernizing them so what we're doing, 974 00:41:10,810 --> 00:41:14,630 just like I referred to the W76-1. 975 00:41:14,630 --> 00:41:16,990 That was introduced into the stockpile, 976 00:41:16,990 --> 00:41:20,900 into the deployable stockpile in the mid 1970s. 977 00:41:20,900 --> 00:41:23,660 We modernized that over a 20 year plan. 978 00:41:23,660 --> 00:41:25,570 It took 10 years to develop 979 00:41:25,570 --> 00:41:28,076 the technical modernization programs 980 00:41:28,076 --> 00:41:31,580 and then we did the production for another 10 years 981 00:41:31,580 --> 00:41:34,840 and we finished that in the beginning of 2019. 982 00:41:34,840 --> 00:41:37,590 That gives you some idea about the progress that it took. 983 00:41:37,590 --> 00:41:39,200 But that was the only modernization 984 00:41:39,200 --> 00:41:40,900 program we had at that time. 985 00:41:40,900 --> 00:41:44,723 We are now going through some major modernization programs, 986 00:41:44,723 --> 00:41:47,051 life extension programs for other systems 987 00:41:47,051 --> 00:41:49,490 that are currently in the stockpile. 988 00:41:49,490 --> 00:41:51,818 At some point, however, to your point, sir, 989 00:41:51,818 --> 00:41:55,500 that we are not gonna be able to life extend our way out 990 00:41:55,500 --> 00:41:57,853 of our current nuclear weapons stockpile. 991 00:41:59,031 --> 00:42:00,866 It speaks to the unbelievable talent 992 00:42:00,866 --> 00:42:03,980 of our laboratories, plants, and our sites 993 00:42:03,980 --> 00:42:06,303 that they designed and fielded nuclear weapons 994 00:42:06,303 --> 00:42:08,696 for approximately 20 years. 995 00:42:08,696 --> 00:42:10,810 And we're going to have weapons 996 00:42:10,810 --> 00:42:13,730 in our stockpile for 60 plus years. 997 00:42:13,730 --> 00:42:15,780 - Chairman, thank you for the indulgence. 998 00:42:15,780 --> 00:42:17,320 I have additional questions for the rest of them 999 00:42:17,320 --> 00:42:18,880 but I'll hold those 'til afterwards. 1000 00:42:18,880 --> 00:42:19,713 Thank you. 1001 00:42:19,713 --> 00:42:21,990 - I thank the gentlemen for forbearing. 1002 00:42:21,990 --> 00:42:23,380 Ms. Davis. 1003 00:42:23,380 --> 00:42:24,410 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman 1004 00:42:24,410 --> 00:42:26,980 and thank you to all of you for being here 1005 00:42:26,980 --> 00:42:27,900 and joining with us 1006 00:42:27,900 --> 00:42:30,810 and doing the exceptional work that you do. 1007 00:42:30,810 --> 00:42:35,810 I wanted to just turn first, Secretary Gordon-Hagerty to you 1008 00:42:36,190 --> 00:42:37,820 because as you may know 1009 00:42:38,700 --> 00:42:43,330 there was bipartisan concern expressed 1010 00:42:43,330 --> 00:42:46,000 in our hearing of last week 1011 00:42:47,380 --> 00:42:49,730 and it goes back to the fact that last year 1012 00:42:49,730 --> 00:42:52,900 you told us that you needed $16.9 billion 1013 00:42:52,900 --> 00:42:56,290 for FY '21 to execute the program of record. 1014 00:42:56,290 --> 00:42:57,969 And now only one year later, 1015 00:42:57,969 --> 00:43:00,944 we're speaking about another $3 billion 1016 00:43:00,944 --> 00:43:04,270 more than you planned for just a year ago. 1017 00:43:04,270 --> 00:43:06,910 So, I want, if you could express for us, 1018 00:43:06,910 --> 00:43:08,530 do you consider it important that 1019 00:43:08,530 --> 00:43:11,570 this committee understand why a Virginia class submarine 1020 00:43:11,570 --> 00:43:14,520 was cut to pay for this increase. 1021 00:43:14,520 --> 00:43:18,100 General Milley specifically said in the last hearing that 1022 00:43:18,100 --> 00:43:21,223 he did not think that this was good prioritization. 1023 00:43:24,900 --> 00:43:27,078 - The administration has made it clear as has 1024 00:43:27,078 --> 00:43:29,960 the Department of Defense, the Secretary of Defense, 1025 00:43:29,960 --> 00:43:32,800 that modernization of our nuclear triad 1026 00:43:32,800 --> 00:43:34,600 is the number one priority. 1027 00:43:34,600 --> 00:43:38,590 And NNSA is part and parcel of that process. 1028 00:43:38,590 --> 00:43:41,700 And so, the requirements that we laid out 1029 00:43:41,700 --> 00:43:45,460 for our '21 request was something that went like this. 1030 00:43:45,460 --> 00:43:48,920 This was a requirements-based year-long approach 1031 00:43:48,920 --> 00:43:51,334 that I shepherded personally with our 1032 00:43:51,334 --> 00:43:54,240 laboratory, plants, site, field office, 1033 00:43:54,240 --> 00:43:55,900 and headquarters leadership 1034 00:43:55,900 --> 00:43:59,151 to look at every single requirement across our enterprise. 1035 00:43:59,151 --> 00:44:01,946 What was executable and we can execute 1036 00:44:01,946 --> 00:44:04,330 at this level of funding, 1037 00:44:04,330 --> 00:44:05,640 what were our priorities, 1038 00:44:05,640 --> 00:44:07,070 what were our commitments 1039 00:44:07,070 --> 00:44:09,490 based on the requirements set forth by 1040 00:44:09,490 --> 00:44:12,460 the Department of Defense in the Nuclear Weapons Council? 1041 00:44:12,460 --> 00:44:14,570 This was not just a number that we grabbed 1042 00:44:14,570 --> 00:44:17,530 this was a number that we said can you execute? 1043 00:44:17,530 --> 00:44:20,500 And I asked in our internal discussions 1044 00:44:20,500 --> 00:44:22,810 with our labs, plants, and sites leadership, 1045 00:44:22,810 --> 00:44:26,470 will you be able to execute if we receive these resources, 1046 00:44:26,470 --> 00:44:28,020 if they're appropriated by Congress? 1047 00:44:28,020 --> 00:44:30,360 And the answer was a resounding yes. 1048 00:44:30,360 --> 00:44:32,500 We know we have an aggressive schedule. 1049 00:44:32,500 --> 00:44:35,130 I also recognize last year we had not 1050 00:44:35,130 --> 00:44:38,033 asked or sought this amount of resources 1051 00:44:38,033 --> 00:44:40,560 but that was because we have a budget cap 1052 00:44:40,560 --> 00:44:44,870 and we were operating under other situations. 1053 00:44:44,870 --> 00:44:47,063 This is the number, this is a realistic number 1054 00:44:47,063 --> 00:44:50,627 to get us to resolve the decades long neglect 1055 00:44:50,627 --> 00:44:53,210 that has been applied to NNSA and our enterprise. 1056 00:44:53,210 --> 00:44:54,767 - Thank you. 1057 00:44:54,767 --> 00:44:56,353 I want to just turn now to Ms. Bawden, 1058 00:44:58,330 --> 00:44:59,960 and you can answer this with either 1059 00:44:59,960 --> 00:45:02,500 a yes or a no if you wish. 1060 00:45:02,500 --> 00:45:06,117 Are you confident that NNSA can execute an unplanned 1061 00:45:06,117 --> 00:45:09,473 $3 billion, 20% increase in a single year? 1062 00:45:10,916 --> 00:45:12,193 - It will be very challenging. 1063 00:45:14,310 --> 00:45:16,080 - So, we're kind of faced with 1064 00:45:16,080 --> 00:45:19,320 both of those somewhat realities, I guess. 1065 00:45:19,320 --> 00:45:20,650 Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, 1066 00:45:20,650 --> 00:45:22,110 so given past practice, 1067 00:45:22,110 --> 00:45:26,640 NNSA is likely to only increase its uncosted balances 1068 00:45:26,640 --> 00:45:31,640 in FY 2020 given the large increase NNSA received. 1069 00:45:31,950 --> 00:45:32,913 Is that correct? 1070 00:45:34,950 --> 00:45:36,410 - There's a great deal. 1071 00:45:36,410 --> 00:45:37,476 - [Davis] Those are gonna grow a lot. 1072 00:45:37,476 --> 00:45:39,790 - There's been a great deal talked about 1073 00:45:39,790 --> 00:45:42,130 the uncosted balances in the Department of Energy, 1074 00:45:42,130 --> 00:45:43,860 at NNSA in particular. 1075 00:45:43,860 --> 00:45:47,030 I'm happy to report at the end of FY '19 1076 00:45:47,030 --> 00:45:52,030 NNSA had a net funds of only $637 million. 1077 00:45:52,130 --> 00:45:55,519 That $8 billion carry over, despite the impressive number, 1078 00:45:55,519 --> 00:45:59,130 is in fact a reasonable amount for NNSA to carry over 1079 00:45:59,130 --> 00:46:01,190 when you look at $100 billion 1080 00:46:01,190 --> 00:46:03,040 program over the next five years. 1081 00:46:03,040 --> 00:46:06,010 In fact, we are comparable to or less than 1082 00:46:06,010 --> 00:46:07,640 most other federal agencies 1083 00:46:07,640 --> 00:46:09,480 when it comes to major construction 1084 00:46:09,480 --> 00:46:11,372 and the life extension programs 1085 00:46:11,372 --> 00:46:14,760 and all of the other programs that we have to administer. 1086 00:46:14,760 --> 00:46:16,948 - And can I turn to you again, Ms. Bawden. 1087 00:46:16,948 --> 00:46:19,409 Forgive me for going back and forth like this 1088 00:46:19,409 --> 00:46:21,734 but the reality is I think this is helpful 1089 00:46:21,734 --> 00:46:26,734 for us to get a sense of the evaluation on both ends. 1090 00:46:26,800 --> 00:46:30,080 Can you comment on what the Secretary has said? 1091 00:46:30,080 --> 00:46:32,341 How likely are we to see significant increases 1092 00:46:32,341 --> 00:46:35,167 in the already very large $8 billion 1093 00:46:35,167 --> 00:46:39,260 uncosted and unobligated balances 1094 00:46:39,260 --> 00:46:43,487 if NNSA were to receive all the money that it's requested? 1095 00:46:43,487 --> 00:46:44,320 - It's a great question 1096 00:46:44,320 --> 00:46:46,470 and it really depends on how quickly 1097 00:46:46,470 --> 00:46:48,862 NNSA can ramp up its spending rate. 1098 00:46:48,862 --> 00:46:51,010 There are really two ways to do that 1099 00:46:51,010 --> 00:46:52,918 which is through hiring people 1100 00:46:52,918 --> 00:46:57,090 and increasing activity on their contracts. 1101 00:46:57,090 --> 00:46:58,193 There are plans to do that. 1102 00:46:58,193 --> 00:47:01,490 The administrator spoke about the federal salaries 1103 00:47:01,490 --> 00:47:03,555 and expenses increase that's being requested 1104 00:47:03,555 --> 00:47:05,118 and we do see a lot 1105 00:47:05,118 --> 00:47:08,300 of hiring activity among the contractors. 1106 00:47:08,300 --> 00:47:09,680 But that spend rate has to go up 1107 00:47:09,680 --> 00:47:11,902 very quickly to not see those balances. 1108 00:47:11,902 --> 00:47:14,418 - And Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, 1109 00:47:14,418 --> 00:47:17,910 so, one of the issues of course is that the NNSA didn't 1110 00:47:17,910 --> 00:47:20,630 share their budget information in a timely manner. 1111 00:47:20,630 --> 00:47:23,570 So, part of the concern here is that we want 1112 00:47:23,570 --> 00:47:24,970 to be certain that the proper planning 1113 00:47:24,970 --> 00:47:27,380 was done for this budget if it was not 1114 00:47:27,380 --> 00:47:29,240 shared with the DOD in a timely manner. 1115 00:47:29,240 --> 00:47:32,923 So, in fact, they had no way of responding to your request. 1116 00:47:34,490 --> 00:47:36,910 - [Cooper] The gentle lady's time has expired. 1117 00:47:36,910 --> 00:47:38,277 If you could give us a quick answer here, 1118 00:47:38,277 --> 00:47:39,450 that would be great. 1119 00:47:39,450 --> 00:47:41,793 - We worked through the Nuclear Weapons Council process 1120 00:47:41,793 --> 00:47:45,580 and we worked collaboratively with our counterparts 1121 00:47:45,580 --> 00:47:46,610 in the Department of Defense 1122 00:47:46,610 --> 00:47:48,814 to ensure that we continue to be aligned 1123 00:47:48,814 --> 00:47:51,443 with the requirements set forth by DOD. 1124 00:47:52,750 --> 00:47:54,790 - So, in the future that information 1125 00:47:54,790 --> 00:47:56,750 will be shared with DOD in a timely fashion? 1126 00:47:56,750 --> 00:47:57,760 - [Gordon-Hagerty] We will continue to work 1127 00:47:57,760 --> 00:47:59,010 through the executive branch process. 1128 00:47:59,010 --> 00:48:01,260 - Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 1129 00:48:01,260 --> 00:48:03,720 - The gentlemen from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson. 1130 00:48:03,720 --> 00:48:04,553 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman 1131 00:48:04,553 --> 00:48:06,552 and thank each of you for being here today. 1132 00:48:06,552 --> 00:48:08,720 And Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, 1133 00:48:08,720 --> 00:48:09,865 I want to thank you very much. 1134 00:48:09,865 --> 00:48:12,497 Several weeks ago visiting the Savannah River site, 1135 00:48:12,497 --> 00:48:15,599 hosting Chairman Adam Smith to witness 1136 00:48:15,599 --> 00:48:18,880 the crucial national security work 1137 00:48:18,880 --> 00:48:21,400 that NNSA does at the site. 1138 00:48:21,400 --> 00:48:24,654 And I am also very happy to extend a warm welcome 1139 00:48:24,654 --> 00:48:28,000 to any of my colleagues who'd like to visit the site 1140 00:48:28,000 --> 00:48:31,310 to see the critical work that's taking place there 1141 00:48:31,310 --> 00:48:33,600 and it's especially meaningful to me. 1142 00:48:33,600 --> 00:48:35,140 I'm the only member of Congress who's 1143 00:48:35,140 --> 00:48:37,230 ever worked at the Savannah River site 1144 00:48:37,230 --> 00:48:39,400 and so I know how capable the people are who 1145 00:48:39,400 --> 00:48:43,040 are there on behalf of the American citizens. 1146 00:48:43,040 --> 00:48:46,519 With that, Administrator, how is the site progressing 1147 00:48:46,519 --> 00:48:49,360 with the conceptual design for the proposed 1148 00:48:49,360 --> 00:48:52,156 Savannah River plutonium processing facility 1149 00:48:52,156 --> 00:48:53,920 and what is the current schedule 1150 00:48:53,920 --> 00:48:56,443 for the crucial Decision 1 package? 1151 00:48:58,600 --> 00:49:00,060 - Representative Wilson, 1152 00:49:00,060 --> 00:49:03,390 we are making great progress in conceptual design 1153 00:49:03,390 --> 00:49:05,170 and we are hopeful that the contractor 1154 00:49:05,170 --> 00:49:08,060 that is working that process at Savannah River site 1155 00:49:08,060 --> 00:49:09,760 will have that to us this year. 1156 00:49:09,760 --> 00:49:14,720 Critical Decision 1 or CD1 will be provided 1157 00:49:14,720 --> 00:49:17,639 and will be executed in FY '21 with 1158 00:49:17,639 --> 00:49:22,159 the request for our funding at $442 million. 1159 00:49:22,159 --> 00:49:25,130 - That's very encouraging and I know my constituents 1160 00:49:25,130 --> 00:49:30,130 are very happy about any expedited effort. 1161 00:49:30,720 --> 00:49:34,950 Admiral Wolfe, the Navy fielded the W76-2 1162 00:49:34,950 --> 00:49:37,770 low-yield warhead earlier this month. 1163 00:49:37,770 --> 00:49:39,865 The Nuclear Posture Review identifies 1164 00:49:39,865 --> 00:49:42,550 the requirement to modify a small number 1165 00:49:42,550 --> 00:49:45,090 of submarine-launched ballistic missile warheads 1166 00:49:45,090 --> 00:49:47,841 to combat potential adversaries such as Russia 1167 00:49:47,841 --> 00:49:52,841 who believe that employment of the low-yield nuclear weapons 1168 00:49:53,410 --> 00:49:56,270 give them an advantage over the United States. 1169 00:49:56,270 --> 00:50:01,270 However, the W76-2 is one of two varieties of W76 1170 00:50:02,710 --> 00:50:07,670 which just completed its life service extension program. 1171 00:50:07,670 --> 00:50:10,428 These systems will require modernization in the coming years 1172 00:50:10,428 --> 00:50:13,700 as their cores are increasingly older. 1173 00:50:13,700 --> 00:50:16,604 What are the steps is the Department taking 1174 00:50:16,604 --> 00:50:21,046 to ensure seamless modernization of these systems 1175 00:50:21,046 --> 00:50:24,164 and to ensure that readiness is not impacted given 1176 00:50:24,164 --> 00:50:28,000 the growing nuclear threat of other countries? 1177 00:50:28,000 --> 00:50:30,740 Additionally, what steps are being taken to ensure 1178 00:50:30,740 --> 00:50:33,503 that the U.S. maintains its nuclear deterrent? 1179 00:50:34,907 --> 00:50:35,840 - Yes, sir, thank you for the questions. 1180 00:50:35,840 --> 00:50:38,630 So, the answer to your first part of that 1181 00:50:38,630 --> 00:50:40,621 is we continue to work with NNSA 1182 00:50:40,621 --> 00:50:43,507 as Ms. Gordon-Hagerty said on the modernization, 1183 00:50:43,507 --> 00:50:45,837 on the life extension, particularly the 76. 1184 00:50:45,837 --> 00:50:47,729 And as we went through that program 1185 00:50:47,729 --> 00:50:50,700 we were lockstep with NNSA 1186 00:50:50,700 --> 00:50:52,850 and so as we've received custody of those 1187 00:50:52,850 --> 00:50:53,930 and started to deploy those 1188 00:50:53,930 --> 00:50:55,531 we have absolute confidence that 1189 00:50:55,531 --> 00:50:58,520 those weapons are what they need to be. 1190 00:50:58,520 --> 00:51:01,722 As we look to the future, as I said, 1191 00:51:01,722 --> 00:51:03,833 the W88 as we continue 1192 00:51:03,833 --> 00:51:06,730 the alt 370 for that particular weapon, 1193 00:51:06,730 --> 00:51:10,880 that will give us additional life extension for it 1194 00:51:10,880 --> 00:51:13,910 so that will give us the deterrent that we need for the W88. 1195 00:51:13,910 --> 00:51:14,990 And then, in the future, 1196 00:51:14,990 --> 00:51:17,740 that is the whole reason why we are moving forward 1197 00:51:17,740 --> 00:51:21,860 with NNSA on the new program of record, the W93 Mark 7. 1198 00:51:21,860 --> 00:51:25,550 That will give us what we need going into the future 1199 00:51:25,550 --> 00:51:29,160 to help what a STRATCOM requirement is to meet that, 1200 00:51:29,160 --> 00:51:32,000 as well as make sure that we have a viable deterrent, 1201 00:51:32,000 --> 00:51:34,770 we have a viable path forward for everything that we do 1202 00:51:34,770 --> 00:51:37,210 both on Ohio and with what we're doing 1203 00:51:37,210 --> 00:51:40,490 with our modernization for the Columbia submarine as well. 1204 00:51:40,490 --> 00:51:41,323 - Thank you very much. 1205 00:51:41,323 --> 00:51:42,930 Indeed, peace through strength. 1206 00:51:42,930 --> 00:51:45,270 So, thank you for what you're doing. 1207 00:51:45,270 --> 00:51:48,610 General Clark, I appreciate the administration is undergoing 1208 00:51:48,610 --> 00:51:52,010 a review of the U.S. participation in the Open Skies treaty. 1209 00:51:52,010 --> 00:51:55,587 There's significant costs associated with modernizing 1210 00:51:55,587 --> 00:52:00,120 our Open Skies aircraft for arguably little pay off. 1211 00:52:00,120 --> 00:52:02,315 Additionally, Russia's violated the treaty by 1212 00:52:02,315 --> 00:52:07,315 restricting our access for certain areas to fly over 1213 00:52:08,937 --> 00:52:12,564 and also using the treaty for surveillance of our President 1214 00:52:12,564 --> 00:52:16,393 and his home and the nuclear command and control. 1215 00:52:18,986 --> 00:52:20,556 With commercial providers able to provide 1216 00:52:20,556 --> 00:52:24,350 the same if not better imagery for our NATO allies, 1217 00:52:24,350 --> 00:52:25,910 is there any strategic reason 1218 00:52:25,910 --> 00:52:28,563 to remain in this outdated treaty? 1219 00:52:30,970 --> 00:52:32,680 - Sir, thank you for your question. 1220 00:52:32,680 --> 00:52:37,166 And currently we are executing Open Skies completely as 1221 00:52:37,166 --> 00:52:41,200 an Air Force to execute within the bounds of the treaty 1222 00:52:41,200 --> 00:52:43,980 and we are also moving forward on modernization 1223 00:52:43,980 --> 00:52:48,650 of the programs until told otherwise. 1224 00:52:48,650 --> 00:52:51,024 Regarding whether or not we should be in the treaty, 1225 00:52:51,024 --> 00:52:53,104 from an Air Force perspective, 1226 00:52:53,104 --> 00:52:56,761 we are in favor of any treaty that is verifiable, 1227 00:52:56,761 --> 00:52:59,340 enforceable, equitable, 1228 00:52:59,340 --> 00:53:01,955 and to the best interest of the United States. 1229 00:53:01,955 --> 00:53:03,970 But you are correct that we have 1230 00:53:03,970 --> 00:53:08,220 noted some violations by Russia in the treaty. 1231 00:53:08,220 --> 00:53:11,474 And really it's up to the administration 1232 00:53:11,474 --> 00:53:13,987 to make a decision on the cost benefit 1233 00:53:13,987 --> 00:53:17,070 of whether or not it's worth us staying in. 1234 00:53:17,070 --> 00:53:19,140 But until that decision is made, 1235 00:53:19,140 --> 00:53:22,930 the Air Force will continue to abide by the treaty 1236 00:53:22,930 --> 00:53:25,000 and execute it as appropriate. 1237 00:53:25,000 --> 00:53:26,340 - Thank you, again. 1238 00:53:26,340 --> 00:53:27,740 - The gentleman's time has expired. 1239 00:53:27,740 --> 00:53:28,573 Mr. Carbajal. 1240 00:53:29,800 --> 00:53:30,740 - Thank you, Mr. Chair. 1241 00:53:30,740 --> 00:53:35,740 Ms. Bawden, the NNSA is requesting $15.6 billion 1242 00:53:35,800 --> 00:53:40,490 for weapons activities in Fiscal Year 2021. 1243 00:53:41,430 --> 00:53:46,430 The request is $2.8 billion above the NNSA's plan to request 1244 00:53:47,890 --> 00:53:52,890 for Fiscal Year 2021 as of the Fiscal Year 2020 budget plan. 1245 00:53:53,230 --> 00:53:55,380 How concerned are you about the long-term 1246 00:53:55,380 --> 00:53:58,830 affordability of the NNSA's nuclear weapons 1247 00:53:58,830 --> 00:54:01,970 sustainment and modernization plans? 1248 00:54:01,970 --> 00:54:05,390 And what steps, if any, is the NNSA taking 1249 00:54:05,390 --> 00:54:08,990 to ensure the affordability and executability 1250 00:54:08,990 --> 00:54:11,603 of the 2018 Nuclear Posture review? 1251 00:54:14,020 --> 00:54:15,220 - Thank you. 1252 00:54:15,220 --> 00:54:16,370 We are concerned about 1253 00:54:16,370 --> 00:54:18,380 the long-term affordability of the plans. 1254 00:54:18,380 --> 00:54:20,250 The request that was made for this year 1255 00:54:20,250 --> 00:54:22,270 sustained over the next five years 1256 00:54:22,270 --> 00:54:26,558 and we await the long-term 25 year plan from NNSA 1257 00:54:26,558 --> 00:54:31,073 to see what is anticipated as budgetary needs beyond that. 1258 00:54:32,590 --> 00:54:34,530 I talked earlier about a recommendation 1259 00:54:34,530 --> 00:54:38,330 that GAO made in 2017 concerning the importance 1260 00:54:38,330 --> 00:54:40,023 of prioritizing programs should there 1261 00:54:40,023 --> 00:54:41,627 be budgetary shortfalls 1262 00:54:41,627 --> 00:54:43,705 or should programs experience 1263 00:54:43,705 --> 00:54:45,930 cost overruns or schedule delays. 1264 00:54:45,930 --> 00:54:47,584 And we continue to believe it's important 1265 00:54:47,584 --> 00:54:50,410 that NNSA move toward those kinds of plans 1266 00:54:50,410 --> 00:54:52,573 in case those risks are experienced. 1267 00:54:53,800 --> 00:54:55,100 - Thank you. 1268 00:54:55,100 --> 00:54:57,940 Mr. Mercado, the New START treaty 1269 00:54:57,940 --> 00:54:59,870 expires in less than one year. 1270 00:54:59,870 --> 00:55:02,160 While the administration has said they intend to pursue 1271 00:55:02,160 --> 00:55:05,442 a nuclear arms control agreement with Russia and China, 1272 00:55:05,442 --> 00:55:08,333 China has publicly rejected negotiations. 1273 00:55:08,333 --> 00:55:10,863 What is the path forward to engage with China 1274 00:55:10,863 --> 00:55:13,680 and pursue an arms control agreement? 1275 00:55:13,680 --> 00:55:16,693 And what is the strategy if China will not participate? 1276 00:55:19,710 --> 00:55:24,273 - Mr. Carbajal, sir, I believe as we assess China's intent, 1277 00:55:24,273 --> 00:55:29,070 I think they see more benefit to be part of an agreement 1278 00:55:29,070 --> 00:55:33,780 for the purposes of just to gain information, to understand. 1279 00:55:33,780 --> 00:55:35,510 They have leverage because they 1280 00:55:35,510 --> 00:55:37,600 are expanding their nuclear arsenal 1281 00:55:37,600 --> 00:55:41,523 while we and Russia have a fairly robust mature arsenal. 1282 00:55:42,830 --> 00:55:45,990 What they would gain from trying to be part of a treaty 1283 00:55:45,990 --> 00:55:49,220 and still preserve the right to continue to expand, 1284 00:55:49,220 --> 00:55:51,770 we believe that there may be an incentive 1285 00:55:51,770 --> 00:55:53,960 for them to want to participate. 1286 00:55:53,960 --> 00:55:57,220 However, we have to continually assess their motives. 1287 00:55:57,220 --> 00:56:01,950 So, as you state, Russia and China and us 1288 00:56:01,950 --> 00:56:06,950 are in very different states of our nuclear capabilities 1289 00:56:09,620 --> 00:56:12,350 so we have to be very careful about that. 1290 00:56:12,350 --> 00:56:13,220 - Thank you, Mr. Chair. 1291 00:56:13,220 --> 00:56:14,053 I yield back. 1292 00:56:15,260 --> 00:56:16,400 - Thank the gentleman. 1293 00:56:16,400 --> 00:56:17,990 The next questioner was Ms. Cheney 1294 00:56:17,990 --> 00:56:19,380 but I believe she has left. 1295 00:56:19,380 --> 00:56:20,513 So, Mr. Khanna. 1296 00:56:24,150 --> 00:56:25,450 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 1297 00:56:27,120 --> 00:56:32,000 My understanding is that we have 1298 00:56:32,000 --> 00:56:35,320 about 6,550 nuclear weapons, 1299 00:56:35,320 --> 00:56:37,210 Russia has about 6,800, 1300 00:56:37,210 --> 00:56:41,290 and China has about 270. 1301 00:56:41,290 --> 00:56:43,223 Is that correct, Ms. Gordon-Hagerty? 1302 00:56:45,240 --> 00:56:47,430 Or whoever knows the answer. 1303 00:56:47,430 --> 00:56:48,283 Ballpark. 1304 00:56:49,910 --> 00:56:52,743 - Sir, I think China seems about right. 1305 00:56:54,164 --> 00:56:58,253 And I think we're capped at about roughly 1,500 or so. 1306 00:56:59,643 --> 00:57:00,666 - [Khanna] Deployed? 1307 00:57:00,666 --> 00:57:01,499 - Deployed. 1308 00:57:01,499 --> 00:57:03,055 - How many nuclear weapons do we have? 1309 00:57:03,055 --> 00:57:04,795 My understanding is Russia is about 6,800 1310 00:57:04,795 --> 00:57:06,280 and we have 6,550. 1311 00:57:06,280 --> 00:57:08,150 It seems like a pretty basic question. 1312 00:57:08,150 --> 00:57:10,753 I think we should know how many nuclear weapons we have. 1313 00:57:12,435 --> 00:57:13,627 - If the gentlemen would yield, 1314 00:57:13,627 --> 00:57:18,627 the question is to deployed weapons and long-range 1315 00:57:21,270 --> 00:57:24,106 and short-range and as they just said, 1316 00:57:24,106 --> 00:57:25,820 we're gonna go to a classified session. 1317 00:57:25,820 --> 00:57:28,110 Perhaps it would be best for that to be answered. 1318 00:57:28,110 --> 00:57:30,081 But the distinction, while they were all deer 1319 00:57:30,081 --> 00:57:31,940 in the headlights when you asked the question 1320 00:57:31,940 --> 00:57:34,400 is that you gotta give 'em questions based on categories 1321 00:57:34,400 --> 00:57:36,017 or they're not gonna be answering 1322 00:57:36,017 --> 00:57:37,679 a question as just an aggregate 1323 00:57:37,679 --> 00:57:40,660 'cause of the way things break down. 1324 00:57:40,660 --> 00:57:41,880 But we do have a classified session 1325 00:57:41,880 --> 00:57:44,030 that the Chairman has arranged. 1326 00:57:44,030 --> 00:57:46,240 - I guess what I'm trying to understand also 1327 00:57:48,300 --> 00:57:50,650 and maybe this would be in a classified setting. 1328 00:57:50,650 --> 00:57:53,270 10 years from now, let's say we didn't do anything, 1329 00:57:53,270 --> 00:57:54,810 because I appreciate Representative Turner's point. 1330 00:57:54,810 --> 00:57:58,300 At some point these weapons deteriorate, 1331 00:57:58,300 --> 00:58:00,440 but that's over 20, 30 years. 1332 00:58:00,440 --> 00:58:02,590 In 10 years, do we track how many 1333 00:58:02,590 --> 00:58:04,860 weapons will we still have operational, 1334 00:58:04,860 --> 00:58:06,973 in 10 years, in 20 years, in 30 years? 1335 00:58:11,600 --> 00:58:13,330 - So, from our perspective, sir, for the Navy, 1336 00:58:13,330 --> 00:58:16,364 absolutely but, again, the fundamental discussion 1337 00:58:16,364 --> 00:58:19,440 goes back to what Ms. Gordon-Hagerty said, 1338 00:58:19,440 --> 00:58:20,800 what we've been saying, 1339 00:58:20,800 --> 00:58:23,360 even those in the stockpile, they age every day 1340 00:58:23,360 --> 00:58:25,710 whether they're deployed or not, they're aging. 1341 00:58:27,020 --> 00:58:29,400 The physics of all of this starts to take over. 1342 00:58:29,400 --> 00:58:30,840 So, you can't just look at this 1343 00:58:30,840 --> 00:58:32,940 from a pure numbers perspective 1344 00:58:32,940 --> 00:58:37,463 because as we built these 30, 40 years ago, 1345 00:58:38,490 --> 00:58:39,447 they will continue to age 1346 00:58:39,447 --> 00:58:41,960 and so at some point, to remain credible, 1347 00:58:41,960 --> 00:58:43,780 you have to start modernizing. 1348 00:58:43,780 --> 00:58:45,325 - But we have, and maybe we could 1349 00:58:45,325 --> 00:58:47,850 present this in a classified setting, 1350 00:58:47,850 --> 00:58:51,177 we have a chart saying, like a corporation, 1351 00:58:51,177 --> 00:58:55,620 here's when these weapons will no longer be good 1352 00:58:55,620 --> 00:58:58,400 and here's in 2030, 1353 00:58:58,400 --> 00:59:00,000 we're gonna have these many weapons that work, 1354 00:59:00,000 --> 00:59:02,160 in 2035, these many. 1355 00:59:02,160 --> 00:59:04,690 Is that correct, somewhere that exists? 1356 00:59:04,690 --> 00:59:07,110 - Sir, I think, from my perspective, 1357 00:59:07,110 --> 00:59:09,122 our plans for modernization aren't 1358 00:59:09,122 --> 00:59:12,270 about increasing the numbers of the weapons 1359 00:59:12,270 --> 00:59:15,033 it's about the quality and modernizing them so that 1360 00:59:15,033 --> 00:59:19,010 they're still credible, capable into the future 1361 00:59:19,010 --> 00:59:22,280 but as far as greater numbers of weapons 1362 00:59:22,280 --> 00:59:24,457 is not the direction that we were. 1363 00:59:24,457 --> 00:59:25,850 - But I guess it would be different, right, 1364 00:59:25,850 --> 00:59:26,960 I mean it would make a difference 1365 00:59:26,960 --> 00:59:29,080 for people to know whether in 2030 1366 00:59:29,080 --> 00:59:31,350 we're gonna have 100 weapons that work 1367 00:59:31,350 --> 00:59:35,140 or whether in 2030 we're gonna have 2,500 weapons that work. 1368 00:59:35,140 --> 00:59:37,390 I guess the question is on deterrence. 1369 00:59:37,390 --> 00:59:39,760 I believe, I mean you may disagree, 1370 00:59:39,760 --> 00:59:41,700 that there's no way in the world, 1371 00:59:41,700 --> 00:59:43,700 and this is on tape, 1372 00:59:43,700 --> 00:59:44,980 that Russia is going to launch 1373 00:59:44,980 --> 00:59:46,310 a nuclear weapon against China 1374 00:59:46,310 --> 00:59:49,270 even though China only has 270 weapons. 1375 00:59:49,270 --> 00:59:51,483 So, the question is what is their thinking 1376 00:59:51,483 --> 00:59:54,770 on what a deterrence stockpile is, 1377 00:59:54,770 --> 00:59:57,090 on what a second credible, second threat is, 1378 00:59:57,090 --> 00:59:59,500 how many weapons we need to sufficiently 1379 00:59:59,500 --> 01:00:03,330 achieve deterrence and a second strike? 1380 01:00:03,330 --> 01:00:04,920 Because it's all priorities. 1381 01:00:04,920 --> 01:00:06,770 My bigger concern is is Russia gonna launch 1382 01:00:06,770 --> 01:00:09,233 a cyber attack or election interference. 1383 01:00:09,233 --> 01:00:12,393 And so, are people doing that kind of analysis? 1384 01:00:13,330 --> 01:00:15,161 - Sir, in a closed session we can go 1385 01:00:15,161 --> 01:00:18,365 into what we have observed and assessed 1386 01:00:18,365 --> 01:00:21,260 with regard to Russia's recent exercises 1387 01:00:21,260 --> 01:00:23,435 they've conducted just late last year 1388 01:00:23,435 --> 01:00:26,880 to try to glean their doctrine and their intent 1389 01:00:26,880 --> 01:00:28,783 with regard to nuclear weapons. 1390 01:00:29,827 --> 01:00:30,660 - And my final question, 1391 01:00:30,660 --> 01:00:32,100 I don't know if you can answer it in open session is 1392 01:00:32,100 --> 01:00:35,160 what is Russia's strategy in terms of, 1393 01:00:35,160 --> 01:00:37,860 let's say they have 6,000 and they go up to 15,000. 1394 01:00:37,860 --> 01:00:39,000 What are they hoping, 1395 01:00:39,000 --> 01:00:42,420 what strategic advantage does that afford them 1396 01:00:42,420 --> 01:00:44,460 because they would know even if we had 5,000 1397 01:00:44,460 --> 01:00:47,230 we could obliterate them if they struck? 1398 01:00:47,230 --> 01:00:49,360 So, what is the marginal advantage 1399 01:00:49,360 --> 01:00:53,270 of going from 6,000 to whatever give Russia? 1400 01:00:53,270 --> 01:00:56,290 - Sir, as I said in my opening remarks 1401 01:00:56,290 --> 01:00:58,090 is that our biggest concern at this point, 1402 01:00:58,090 --> 01:01:01,464 one of the biggest concerns is the 2,000 numbers 1403 01:01:01,464 --> 01:01:04,880 of non-strategic nuclear weapons that Russia 1404 01:01:04,880 --> 01:01:08,450 is maintaining and how they are updating that arsenal 1405 01:01:10,751 --> 01:01:12,630 and I guess we can go, again, in closed session 1406 01:01:12,630 --> 01:01:15,510 about how we see their doctrine of employing 1407 01:01:15,510 --> 01:01:20,510 those 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear weapons. 1408 01:01:20,600 --> 01:01:22,570 - My final question for the record is I fundamentally 1409 01:01:22,570 --> 01:01:24,290 believe Russia is a has been power, 1410 01:01:24,290 --> 01:01:26,260 they're about 1/10 of our economy, 1411 01:01:26,260 --> 01:01:28,020 they're not nearly as innovative, 1412 01:01:28,020 --> 01:01:29,670 we won the Cold War. 1413 01:01:29,670 --> 01:01:31,280 I think they're on the last grasp. 1414 01:01:31,280 --> 01:01:32,360 I'm far more concerned about 1415 01:01:32,360 --> 01:01:35,183 the rise of China and other nations. 1416 01:01:36,480 --> 01:01:37,770 - [Cooper] The gentleman's time has expired. 1417 01:01:37,770 --> 01:01:38,643 Mr. Larson. 1418 01:01:43,950 --> 01:01:45,454 - Thank you Mr. Chairman. 1419 01:01:45,454 --> 01:01:50,090 Ms. Bawden, could you explain what 1420 01:01:50,090 --> 01:01:52,960 a portfolio management approach is compared 1421 01:01:52,960 --> 01:01:56,213 to what NNSA is doing now and why that would be better? 1422 01:01:57,670 --> 01:01:58,691 - Thank you. 1423 01:01:58,691 --> 01:01:59,890 - [Larson] In the opinion of GAO. 1424 01:01:59,890 --> 01:02:00,870 - Sure. 1425 01:02:00,870 --> 01:02:02,640 So, a portfolio management approach 1426 01:02:02,640 --> 01:02:04,700 essentially looks at the big picture. 1427 01:02:04,700 --> 01:02:07,057 It looks across all of the programs and projects 1428 01:02:07,057 --> 01:02:08,980 and it would think about sort of where 1429 01:02:08,980 --> 01:02:10,540 are the performance cliffs, 1430 01:02:10,540 --> 01:02:12,450 what has to be done by a certain date, 1431 01:02:12,450 --> 01:02:14,640 and what are potential trade-offs? 1432 01:02:14,640 --> 01:02:17,189 And it identifies what that trade space 1433 01:02:17,189 --> 01:02:20,850 is so that the agency can select between programs 1434 01:02:20,850 --> 01:02:23,603 and projects if such a thing was necessary. 1435 01:02:26,877 --> 01:02:29,487 - And are you arguing in your report 1436 01:02:29,487 --> 01:02:32,397 that that is more likely to happen 1437 01:02:32,397 --> 01:02:36,723 and therefore the NNSA ought to take that approach? 1438 01:02:36,723 --> 01:02:37,556 - What we're arguing is that 1439 01:02:37,556 --> 01:02:39,860 it's an effective risk mitigation strategy. 1440 01:02:39,860 --> 01:02:42,270 And that it should sort of be in their 1441 01:02:42,270 --> 01:02:44,490 back pocket should it be needed. 1442 01:02:44,490 --> 01:02:46,950 And effectively communicating that strategy, 1443 01:02:46,950 --> 01:02:49,490 we believe would engender a level of trust 1444 01:02:49,490 --> 01:02:52,199 to understand what requests they're putting forward, 1445 01:02:52,199 --> 01:02:55,930 what that request funds and what options are 1446 01:02:55,930 --> 01:02:58,113 should what they've requested differ 1447 01:02:58,113 --> 01:03:00,030 from what actually happens. 1448 01:03:00,030 --> 01:03:01,624 Of course, looking back historically, 1449 01:03:01,624 --> 01:03:04,956 there have been differences between what NNSA 1450 01:03:04,956 --> 01:03:07,270 and the President have requested in their budgets 1451 01:03:07,270 --> 01:03:09,090 and what has been actually received. 1452 01:03:09,090 --> 01:03:10,570 So, we feel that this is an effective 1453 01:03:10,570 --> 01:03:12,963 risk mitigation strategy should that be needed. 1454 01:03:16,070 --> 01:03:18,636 - Ms. Gordon-Hagerty, thanks for coming. 1455 01:03:18,636 --> 01:03:19,990 And I don't mean this question, 1456 01:03:19,990 --> 01:03:22,050 'cause I respect you and respect the work you're doing, 1457 01:03:22,050 --> 01:03:24,750 so I don't mean this question to be too snarky 1458 01:03:24,750 --> 01:03:27,000 but it seems like the risk strategy right now 1459 01:03:27,000 --> 01:03:31,700 is to throw more money at the enterprise 1460 01:03:31,700 --> 01:03:34,283 instead of manage the portfolio. 1461 01:03:36,940 --> 01:03:38,430 Tell me where I'm wrong. 1462 01:03:38,430 --> 01:03:42,860 - I would respectfully disagree with your comment. 1463 01:03:42,860 --> 01:03:44,460 What we have done is as I said, 1464 01:03:44,460 --> 01:03:45,710 we took a year-long approach, 1465 01:03:45,710 --> 01:03:47,128 it was requirements-based 1466 01:03:47,128 --> 01:03:49,530 meaning the priorities set forth 1467 01:03:49,530 --> 01:03:50,863 by the Nuclear Weapons Council 1468 01:03:50,863 --> 01:03:53,010 and by all of the requirements set forth 1469 01:03:53,010 --> 01:03:54,640 in the Nuclear Posture Review 1470 01:03:54,640 --> 01:03:56,150 and all of the documents that 1471 01:03:56,150 --> 01:03:59,705 are guiding requirements for the NNSA. 1472 01:03:59,705 --> 01:04:00,916 - Can I stop you there, though? 1473 01:04:00,916 --> 01:04:05,916 If it is requirements-based, I'll grant you that, 1474 01:04:07,470 --> 01:04:08,880 that means you always have to meet 1475 01:04:08,880 --> 01:04:12,365 the requirements even if you run into delays, 1476 01:04:12,365 --> 01:04:17,143 you run into the issues of programs, platforms, 1477 01:04:18,020 --> 01:04:20,810 delivery platforms and weapons being integrated. 1478 01:04:20,810 --> 01:04:23,460 If there's delays in one and not delay in the other, 1479 01:04:23,460 --> 01:04:27,120 then the only way to address meeting the requirement 1480 01:04:27,120 --> 01:04:29,340 is to put more money at it. 1481 01:04:29,340 --> 01:04:30,380 - Not necessarily, sir. 1482 01:04:30,380 --> 01:04:32,870 What we do is we remain very closely aligned, 1483 01:04:32,870 --> 01:04:35,110 almost on a daily basis with our colleagues 1484 01:04:35,110 --> 01:04:36,570 in the Navy and the Air Force 1485 01:04:36,570 --> 01:04:38,050 through the Nuclear Weapons Council, 1486 01:04:38,050 --> 01:04:39,600 through action officer groups 1487 01:04:39,600 --> 01:04:42,350 to ensure that we remain aligned through all the programs. 1488 01:04:42,350 --> 01:04:45,240 If we have slips, we are working together. 1489 01:04:45,240 --> 01:04:48,540 In fact, we've recently had one with the capacitor issue 1490 01:04:48,540 --> 01:04:51,405 and we remain fully aligned with our colleagues 1491 01:04:51,405 --> 01:04:56,405 to ensure that any slippage in the program continues. 1492 01:04:57,050 --> 01:05:00,730 - I would note that last week we perhaps heard 1493 01:05:00,730 --> 01:05:02,890 that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1494 01:05:02,890 --> 01:05:05,680 is not part of that group that's fully aligned with you 1495 01:05:06,550 --> 01:05:11,110 in testimony where he wasn't part of that decision making 1496 01:05:11,110 --> 01:05:13,730 where the money was taken out of ship building 1497 01:05:13,730 --> 01:05:16,290 and put into nuclear weapons. 1498 01:05:16,290 --> 01:05:18,070 So, you all might agree 1499 01:05:18,070 --> 01:05:21,060 but maybe it's not everyone is agreeing. 1500 01:05:21,060 --> 01:05:23,490 I would just note that. 1501 01:05:23,490 --> 01:05:25,050 - If I may, sir, just one final thing. 1502 01:05:25,050 --> 01:05:27,160 We have updated our weapons activities 1503 01:05:27,160 --> 01:05:30,110 where we modernized, if you will, 1504 01:05:30,110 --> 01:05:31,690 or aligned our programs where all 1505 01:05:31,690 --> 01:05:34,380 of our strategic materials now are in alignment, 1506 01:05:34,380 --> 01:05:35,939 all of our bombs, all of our weapons, 1507 01:05:35,939 --> 01:05:38,027 all of our systems are now aligned 1508 01:05:38,027 --> 01:05:40,953 to reflect modern and future requirements 1509 01:05:40,953 --> 01:05:44,520 that we have so that we find more efficiencies 1510 01:05:45,846 --> 01:05:47,634 and continue to find efficiencies and improvements 1511 01:05:47,634 --> 01:05:49,830 to apply higher fidelity 1512 01:05:49,830 --> 01:05:52,630 to our programs throughout all of NNSA. 1513 01:05:52,630 --> 01:05:55,240 - Ms. Bawden, noted that in your report 1514 01:05:55,240 --> 01:06:00,240 that NNSA has agreed to some of your recommendations 1515 01:06:00,330 --> 01:06:02,670 and some of them are still open. 1516 01:06:02,670 --> 01:06:04,080 Are they open because there's disagreement 1517 01:06:04,080 --> 01:06:05,760 or are they open because they 1518 01:06:05,760 --> 01:06:08,100 haven't got around to them yet? 1519 01:06:08,100 --> 01:06:10,458 - We don't see disagreement on this recommendation 1520 01:06:10,458 --> 01:06:13,780 but typically we measure implementation over 1521 01:06:13,780 --> 01:06:16,320 a four year period which we haven't reached yet. 1522 01:06:16,320 --> 01:06:18,240 We acknowledge some progress in terms 1523 01:06:18,240 --> 01:06:20,620 of planning toward portfolio management. 1524 01:06:20,620 --> 01:06:24,014 Their last long-term plan that was put out last year 1525 01:06:24,014 --> 01:06:26,494 included an affordability analysis 1526 01:06:26,494 --> 01:06:30,080 but it didn't expose what those sort of trade-offs might 1527 01:06:30,080 --> 01:06:33,713 be should budget shortfalls or performance problems occur. 1528 01:06:35,640 --> 01:06:36,940 - Thank you, I yield back. 1529 01:06:38,610 --> 01:06:39,950 - Thank the gentleman. 1530 01:06:39,950 --> 01:06:40,783 Mr. Garamendi. 1531 01:06:42,650 --> 01:06:43,660 I thought Ms. Horn was here 1532 01:06:43,660 --> 01:06:45,930 but it looks like she's departed as well. 1533 01:06:45,930 --> 01:06:47,258 You're in luck. 1534 01:06:47,258 --> 01:06:48,970 - [Garamendi] I think I prefer to get to the. 1535 01:06:48,970 --> 01:06:50,030 - [Cooper] Classified session. 1536 01:06:50,030 --> 01:06:52,160 You are my hero. 1537 01:06:52,160 --> 01:06:53,260 What a great American. 1538 01:06:53,260 --> 01:06:54,960 - I'll take what praise I can get. 1539 01:06:57,490 --> 01:06:59,373 - Mr. Lamborn, our honorary member. 1540 01:07:00,330 --> 01:07:01,880 - Thank you, Mr. Chairman 1541 01:07:01,880 --> 01:07:03,540 for letting me be part of this hearing 1542 01:07:03,540 --> 01:07:05,300 and for having this hearing. 1543 01:07:05,300 --> 01:07:06,730 I'm gonna have a question or two 1544 01:07:06,730 --> 01:07:09,180 so I may not be as much of a hero at this moment. 1545 01:07:10,990 --> 01:07:14,889 Ms. Gordon-Hagerty, let me just ask several questions 1546 01:07:14,889 --> 01:07:18,140 drilling down a little bit on the W93. 1547 01:07:18,140 --> 01:07:19,940 What is driving the requirements 1548 01:07:19,940 --> 01:07:23,113 for the W93 that NNSA is pursuing? 1549 01:07:26,140 --> 01:07:29,258 - The W93 Mark 7 is a Nuclear Weapons 1550 01:07:29,258 --> 01:07:31,140 Council directed program, 1551 01:07:31,140 --> 01:07:32,393 a program of record. 1552 01:07:33,876 --> 01:07:36,516 It was approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense 1553 01:07:36,516 --> 01:07:41,460 and at this time NNSA is being directed to conduct 1554 01:07:41,460 --> 01:07:45,720 a rigorous phase one study to inform us better on the W93. 1555 01:07:45,720 --> 01:07:47,849 I would defer to my colleague from the Navy 1556 01:07:47,849 --> 01:07:51,423 who sets the requirements for the W73 Mark 7. 1557 01:07:53,120 --> 01:07:54,566 - Yes, sir, thank you. 1558 01:07:54,566 --> 01:07:56,730 So, I think you heard Admiral Richard last week 1559 01:07:56,730 --> 01:07:58,730 talk about this is a STRATCOM requirement. 1560 01:07:58,730 --> 01:08:00,853 He has a need, he's laid that requirement 1561 01:08:00,853 --> 01:08:02,410 into the Nuclear Weapons Council. 1562 01:08:02,410 --> 01:08:04,450 The Nuclear Weapons Council has validated that 1563 01:08:04,450 --> 01:08:06,680 and that's why the Nuclear Weapons Council directed 1564 01:08:06,680 --> 01:08:11,680 a new program of record called the W93 Mark 7. 1565 01:08:11,700 --> 01:08:15,390 My portion of that is the actual aeroshell development 1566 01:08:15,390 --> 01:08:18,680 and all of the non-nuclear components that go with that. 1567 01:08:18,680 --> 01:08:21,088 Which is why as we look into the future, 1568 01:08:21,088 --> 01:08:23,280 this is an opportunity not only 1569 01:08:23,280 --> 01:08:24,470 to meet a STRATCOM requirement 1570 01:08:24,470 --> 01:08:25,631 but as I said earlier, 1571 01:08:25,631 --> 01:08:28,220 to really recapitalize everything that we do. 1572 01:08:28,220 --> 01:08:30,740 We haven't developed aeroshells 1573 01:08:30,740 --> 01:08:34,340 or built aeroshells in this nation for almost 30 years. 1574 01:08:34,340 --> 01:08:36,910 That is a technology that's very unique to our business, 1575 01:08:36,910 --> 01:08:38,550 to the Air Force and to the Navy. 1576 01:08:38,550 --> 01:08:40,530 And if we don't start now, 1577 01:08:40,530 --> 01:08:42,480 just looking at the basic technologies, 1578 01:08:42,480 --> 01:08:43,730 and as I talked to the Chairman 1579 01:08:43,730 --> 01:08:45,566 about in a closed session recently, 1580 01:08:45,566 --> 01:08:48,127 and look at where we get those materials, 1581 01:08:48,127 --> 01:08:49,983 we will find ourselves short. 1582 01:08:49,983 --> 01:08:51,820 And so we've got to start 1583 01:08:51,820 --> 01:08:54,340 that now as we move into the future. 1584 01:08:54,340 --> 01:08:58,107 - How will this warhead have an effect on the British allies 1585 01:08:58,107 --> 01:09:03,000 and their ability to support their modernization efforts? 1586 01:09:03,000 --> 01:09:03,930 For either one of you. 1587 01:09:03,930 --> 01:09:05,771 - So, as I said, sir, earlier, 1588 01:09:05,771 --> 01:09:07,643 the UK has a parallel program. 1589 01:09:07,643 --> 01:09:10,200 They just announced it to their parliament. 1590 01:09:10,200 --> 01:09:12,210 Under the Polaris Sales Agreement 1591 01:09:12,210 --> 01:09:13,899 with what I do for the Navy 1592 01:09:13,899 --> 01:09:15,850 and I'll let Ms. Gordon-Hagerty talk 1593 01:09:15,850 --> 01:09:17,400 about the mutual defense agreement, 1594 01:09:17,400 --> 01:09:19,240 but we are lockstep with the UK 1595 01:09:19,240 --> 01:09:20,806 on what they need to do to modernize 1596 01:09:20,806 --> 01:09:23,350 everything that they're doing in their business. 1597 01:09:23,350 --> 01:09:24,940 For the Navy's portion of this, 1598 01:09:24,940 --> 01:09:27,520 the aeroshell and all the non-nuclear components 1599 01:09:27,520 --> 01:09:29,210 they will be involved with us, 1600 01:09:29,210 --> 01:09:31,320 they will understand what we're doing so they 1601 01:09:31,320 --> 01:09:33,610 can leverage that for their program. 1602 01:09:33,610 --> 01:09:36,536 So, it is absolutely critical for them to be able 1603 01:09:36,536 --> 01:09:40,243 to do that as we move through our program of record. 1604 01:09:40,243 --> 01:09:41,560 - And for the nuclear explosive package 1605 01:09:41,560 --> 01:09:43,250 for which NNSA is responsible, 1606 01:09:43,250 --> 01:09:45,830 we work very closely with our MOD counterparts 1607 01:09:45,830 --> 01:09:48,870 through the mutual defense agreement of 1958. 1608 01:09:48,870 --> 01:09:50,302 - Okay, thank you. 1609 01:09:50,302 --> 01:09:52,718 And lastly, is this to be considered 1610 01:09:52,718 --> 01:09:55,160 a new weapon or weapon system 1611 01:09:55,160 --> 01:09:57,859 or a different configuration 1612 01:09:57,859 --> 01:10:01,033 of previously produced components? 1613 01:10:03,040 --> 01:10:05,210 - The warhead as we know it today, 1614 01:10:05,210 --> 01:10:06,627 that's what will inform us 1615 01:10:06,627 --> 01:10:09,180 and that will be borne out in phase one study 1616 01:10:09,180 --> 01:10:10,970 as we undertake that phase one study. 1617 01:10:10,970 --> 01:10:14,610 Right now, it is based on previously deployed 1618 01:10:14,610 --> 01:10:19,420 and also previously tested nuclear explosive components. 1619 01:10:19,420 --> 01:10:23,090 So, it will not be considered in that vein 1620 01:10:23,090 --> 01:10:25,810 of we will be producing a whole new system. 1621 01:10:25,810 --> 01:10:29,440 We are, however, required to and will be borne out in, 1622 01:10:29,440 --> 01:10:31,380 the study that is called the phase one study. 1623 01:10:31,380 --> 01:10:33,590 So, answering questions about whether or not this 1624 01:10:33,590 --> 01:10:36,270 is a new weapon or we will require pits for this, 1625 01:10:36,270 --> 01:10:38,060 it's premature to answer those questions. 1626 01:10:38,060 --> 01:10:39,950 We do not know which is why we need 1627 01:10:39,950 --> 01:10:43,283 to be fully informed by the phase one study. 1628 01:10:44,700 --> 01:10:46,126 - Yes, sir, and on the Navy side 1629 01:10:46,126 --> 01:10:48,540 this will be for the non-nuclear 1630 01:10:48,540 --> 01:10:49,890 components outside of the aeroshell. 1631 01:10:49,890 --> 01:10:52,420 This will be a continued evolution 1632 01:10:53,489 --> 01:10:55,090 and a modernization of all 1633 01:10:55,090 --> 01:10:57,420 of the non-nuclear components, electronics, 1634 01:10:57,420 --> 01:11:01,070 things that are very unique to what we do in this business. 1635 01:11:01,070 --> 01:11:02,079 For the aeroshell, 1636 01:11:02,079 --> 01:11:04,870 we will start to look for all of those technologies, 1637 01:11:04,870 --> 01:11:07,090 like I said, for 30 years that we haven't done, 1638 01:11:07,090 --> 01:11:08,824 and we've basically got to look 1639 01:11:08,824 --> 01:11:12,050 and figure out how we can even produce an aeroshell 1640 01:11:12,050 --> 01:11:15,140 agnostic of whatever the final solution is from NNSA. 1641 01:11:15,140 --> 01:11:17,310 We've got to have this for all of our systems 1642 01:11:17,310 --> 01:11:18,420 as we move into the future. 1643 01:11:18,420 --> 01:11:21,109 So, the budget that we requested starting in '21 1644 01:11:21,109 --> 01:11:23,730 goes to develop all those technologies 1645 01:11:23,730 --> 01:11:28,250 so that as we marry up we've got a solution moving forward. 1646 01:11:28,250 --> 01:11:30,830 - When I look at what the Russians are doing with talk 1647 01:11:30,830 --> 01:11:32,730 about a nuclear-powered cruise missile 1648 01:11:33,843 --> 01:11:38,717 or an underwater nuclear-tipped submarine, 1649 01:11:41,150 --> 01:11:43,831 unmanned submarine or some kind of vessel 1650 01:11:43,831 --> 01:11:46,140 that goes at high speed, 1651 01:11:46,140 --> 01:11:47,950 those to me are new weapons. 1652 01:11:47,950 --> 01:11:51,710 But to me, it strikes me and my personal opinion 1653 01:11:51,710 --> 01:11:55,050 is that this is an upgrade of an existing weapon. 1654 01:11:55,050 --> 01:11:59,190 Would you share that perspective? 1655 01:11:59,190 --> 01:12:00,100 - [Gordon-Hagerty] Our perspective is that 1656 01:12:00,100 --> 01:12:01,977 these are new and novel approaches. 1657 01:12:01,977 --> 01:12:04,570 They are not something that we would ever undertake. 1658 01:12:04,570 --> 01:12:05,763 - [Larson] You mean the Russians? 1659 01:12:05,763 --> 01:12:07,600 - That the Russians are undertaking, 1660 01:12:07,600 --> 01:12:08,570 that is not something that 1661 01:12:08,570 --> 01:12:11,720 is even anything we're even considering. 1662 01:12:11,720 --> 01:12:14,160 And we think that those do not help 1663 01:12:14,160 --> 01:12:16,550 with strategic stability talks. 1664 01:12:16,550 --> 01:12:21,110 - But the W93 is an upgrade of an existing weapon? 1665 01:12:21,110 --> 01:12:22,749 - Yes, sir, and at this time we believe 1666 01:12:22,749 --> 01:12:25,580 that because it's based on previously tested designs 1667 01:12:25,580 --> 01:12:26,950 we will not need to test. 1668 01:12:26,950 --> 01:12:29,280 There will be no nuclear explosive 1669 01:12:29,280 --> 01:12:31,250 testing required for this system. 1670 01:12:31,250 --> 01:12:33,000 - Thank you, I yield back. 1671 01:12:33,000 --> 01:12:34,200 - Thank the gentlemen. 1672 01:12:34,200 --> 01:12:35,640 The honorary member was in danger 1673 01:12:35,640 --> 01:12:37,523 of losing his honorary status there. 1674 01:12:40,160 --> 01:12:42,320 The subcommittee will adjourn the public session 1675 01:12:42,320 --> 01:12:46,873 and resume in 2337 as soon as we can get up there.