1
00:00:01,550 --> 00:00:03,814
- The committee meets
today to receive testimony

2
00:00:03,814 --> 00:00:04,680
for the Department of Defense

3
00:00:04,680 --> 00:00:09,450
Fiscal Year 2021 budget request.

4
00:00:09,450 --> 00:00:10,946
We welcome our witnesses

5
00:00:10,946 --> 00:00:11,860
and thank them for their service.

6
00:00:11,860 --> 00:00:15,700
Both Dr. Mark Esper and General Mark.

7
00:00:15,700 --> 00:00:17,623
We got a pair of Marks this morning.

8
00:00:18,550 --> 00:00:21,250
This committee's top priority

9
00:00:21,250 --> 00:00:22,820
is ensuring the effectiveness

10
00:00:22,820 --> 00:00:25,030
and implementation of the
National Defense Strategy,

11
00:00:25,030 --> 00:00:28,750
that's our book that we
have been adhering to

12
00:00:28,750 --> 00:00:31,423
for a long period of time
now, about three years.

13
00:00:32,740 --> 00:00:34,590
Unfortunately in the last administration

14
00:00:34,590 --> 00:00:37,270
we asked our military
to do more with less.

15
00:00:37,270 --> 00:00:38,590
And that got us into trouble.

16
00:00:38,590 --> 00:00:41,500
Between 2012 and 2017,

17
00:00:41,500 --> 00:00:45,600
we lost $150 billion to sequestration.

18
00:00:45,600 --> 00:00:47,610
Our Defense budget and the readiness

19
00:00:47,610 --> 00:00:49,860
of our forces were devastated.

20
00:00:49,860 --> 00:00:52,750
I think we all understand
that as a result,

21
00:00:52,750 --> 00:00:54,580
when President Trump came to office,

22
00:00:54,580 --> 00:00:57,700
he inherited American military in crisis,

23
00:00:57,700 --> 00:00:59,930
thankfully he delivered on his promise

24
00:00:59,930 --> 00:01:02,740
to begin rebuilding the U.S. Armed Forces.

25
00:01:02,740 --> 00:01:04,830
Last, year President Trump negotiated

26
00:01:04,830 --> 00:01:07,550
the highest level of
defense spending ever.

27
00:01:07,550 --> 00:01:09,900
A down payment toward getting our military

28
00:01:09,900 --> 00:01:12,200
back to where it needs to be.

29
00:01:12,200 --> 00:01:14,000
But that's not enough.

30
00:01:14,000 --> 00:01:16,140
We face a more dangerous world today

31
00:01:16,140 --> 00:01:18,630
than we anticipated we would.

32
00:01:18,630 --> 00:01:22,124
Since then the Russians invaded Crimea,

33
00:01:22,124 --> 00:01:25,830
backed Assad in Syria,

34
00:01:25,830 --> 00:01:27,530
sent mercenaries to Libya,

35
00:01:27,530 --> 00:01:29,680
and violated the INF treaty,

36
00:01:29,680 --> 00:01:33,807
China began building islands
in the South China Sea,

37
00:01:33,807 --> 00:01:36,130
harassing its neighbors more frequently,

38
00:01:36,130 --> 00:01:40,670
and accelerating its military
in nuclear modernization.

39
00:01:40,670 --> 00:01:45,570
The bipartisan National Defense
Strategy commission report

40
00:01:45,570 --> 00:01:47,337
said if we're going to adequately fund

41
00:01:47,337 --> 00:01:51,240
the National Defense Strategy
and take on these threats

42
00:01:51,240 --> 00:01:55,480
it's going to take a three
to five percent net increase

43
00:01:58,810 --> 00:02:00,850
above inflation each year.

44
00:02:00,850 --> 00:02:02,387
Now we're not doing that.

45
00:02:02,387 --> 00:02:05,330
But that's what we committed
to, we had a meeting here,

46
00:02:05,330 --> 00:02:07,780
everyone adheres to the logic

47
00:02:11,084 --> 00:02:13,070
of the contract that we agreed to,

48
00:02:13,070 --> 00:02:15,200
but we're not carrying through with it.

49
00:02:15,200 --> 00:02:17,470
That should mean a budget
request would have been

50
00:02:17,470 --> 00:02:22,470
if we had adhered to that $775
to $790 billion this year.

51
00:02:22,810 --> 00:02:24,660
Instead we've got a budget agreement

52
00:02:24,660 --> 00:02:29,217
that provides $740.5 billion for all that

53
00:02:29,217 --> 00:02:31,840
we've got to do for our military defense.

54
00:02:31,840 --> 00:02:34,440
That's not your fault, not you guys,

55
00:02:34,440 --> 00:02:36,270
but the Congress needs to do more,

56
00:02:36,270 --> 00:02:39,160
be more realistic about what it's going

57
00:02:39,160 --> 00:02:41,570
to take to maintain a force capable

58
00:02:41,570 --> 00:02:46,103
of deterring and, if needed,
defeating our enemies.

59
00:02:47,310 --> 00:02:49,590
We're trying to do more
while spending less

60
00:02:49,590 --> 00:02:52,480
and the math just doesn't work that way.

61
00:02:52,480 --> 00:02:55,460
That's why we've, you've
seen so many stories

62
00:02:55,460 --> 00:02:58,830
about how we can't buy
necessary equipment,

63
00:02:58,830 --> 00:03:02,090
that's why we can't do the
training that we need to do,

64
00:03:02,090 --> 00:03:04,290
that's why we can't give our troops

65
00:03:04,290 --> 00:03:06,720
the tools that they
need to keep the peace.

66
00:03:06,720 --> 00:03:09,800
It's all in the NDS.

67
00:03:09,800 --> 00:03:13,090
We can pay them now, or we pay them later,

68
00:03:13,090 --> 00:03:17,763
and leave the debt to our
children and grandchildren to pay

69
00:03:18,600 --> 00:03:23,600
and they'll be doing so
in a more dangerous world

70
00:03:23,830 --> 00:03:26,764
if we don't fix the budget tragedy

71
00:03:26,764 --> 00:03:29,220
that we're facing right now.

72
00:03:29,220 --> 00:03:31,110
I know you've tried to do the best you can

73
00:03:31,110 --> 00:03:33,590
within the limits of
what you have been given

74
00:03:33,590 --> 00:03:37,246
and I appreciate that you've
already done and found

75
00:03:37,246 --> 00:03:41,300
a lot of savings and you are
to be applauded for that.

76
00:03:41,300 --> 00:03:43,930
That's hard to do with
the decreasing budget

77
00:03:43,930 --> 00:03:45,720
which we have today.

78
00:03:45,720 --> 00:03:46,590
On that happy note,

79
00:03:46,590 --> 00:03:49,280
I look forward to
continuing to work with you

80
00:03:49,280 --> 00:03:50,503
to make sure our troops have

81
00:03:50,503 --> 00:03:53,970
the resources they need to fight and win.

82
00:03:53,970 --> 00:03:54,803
Senator Reed.

83
00:03:56,330 --> 00:03:57,610
- Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,

84
00:03:57,610 --> 00:03:59,730
let me join you in welcoming
our witnesses today,

85
00:03:59,730 --> 00:04:01,755
thank them for their service to the nation

86
00:04:01,755 --> 00:04:04,110
and I look forward to their testimony.

87
00:04:04,110 --> 00:04:07,490
Before we consider the
details of the budget request,

88
00:04:07,490 --> 00:04:09,480
I'd like to address some broader concerns

89
00:04:09,480 --> 00:04:11,240
I have with the Department.

90
00:04:11,240 --> 00:04:13,360
The National Defense
Strategy commission report

91
00:04:13,360 --> 00:04:16,590
released in November 2018
expressed significant concern

92
00:04:16,590 --> 00:04:18,280
about the balance of power between

93
00:04:18,280 --> 00:04:20,280
civilian and military leadership

94
00:04:20,280 --> 00:04:21,750
at the Department of Defense.

95
00:04:21,750 --> 00:04:23,570
Specifically the commission report stated,

96
00:04:23,570 --> 00:04:26,470
civilian voices have been relatively muted

97
00:04:26,470 --> 00:04:28,630
on issues at the center of U.S. defense

98
00:04:28,630 --> 00:04:30,000
and national security policy,

99
00:04:30,000 --> 00:04:33,130
undermining the concept
of civilian control.

100
00:04:33,130 --> 00:04:35,300
Unfortunately, the situation
has only gotten worse

101
00:04:35,300 --> 00:04:37,670
since the commission issued its report.

102
00:04:37,670 --> 00:04:38,920
The Office of the Secretary of Defense

103
00:04:38,920 --> 00:04:40,750
is without Senate-confirmed leadership

104
00:04:40,750 --> 00:04:42,920
in many of its most important positions.

105
00:04:42,920 --> 00:04:44,470
In the policy office,

106
00:04:44,470 --> 00:04:47,120
of the seven positions
requiring Senate confirmation,

107
00:04:47,120 --> 00:04:49,041
there are only two confirmed individuals

108
00:04:49,041 --> 00:04:51,466
and one of these is now serving

109
00:04:51,466 --> 00:04:53,860
as the acting undersecretary.

110
00:04:53,860 --> 00:04:55,270
We just received a nomination

111
00:04:55,270 --> 00:04:57,400
for Undersecretary of
Personnel and Readiness

112
00:04:57,400 --> 00:04:59,500
after a two year vacancy.

113
00:04:59,500 --> 00:05:01,280
Then on Monday, the
administration withdrew

114
00:05:01,280 --> 00:05:03,010
the nomination of Elaine McCusker

115
00:05:03,010 --> 00:05:05,130
to be the Department's comptroller.

116
00:05:05,130 --> 00:05:06,960
These vacancies continue to challenge

117
00:05:06,960 --> 00:05:08,990
the Department's ability
to effectively respond

118
00:05:08,990 --> 00:05:10,502
to national security challenges

119
00:05:10,502 --> 00:05:12,310
and undermines civilian inputs

120
00:05:12,310 --> 00:05:14,305
into the decision-making process.

121
00:05:14,305 --> 00:05:16,630
With political appointees largely absent,

122
00:05:16,630 --> 00:05:18,270
a large amount of work in the Department

123
00:05:18,270 --> 00:05:20,930
is now being done by career civil servants

124
00:05:20,930 --> 00:05:22,510
and they too are beleaguered.

125
00:05:22,510 --> 00:05:24,480
Congress shares the blame in adding

126
00:05:24,480 --> 00:05:27,390
to civilian workforce woes
with headquarters cuts.

127
00:05:27,390 --> 00:05:29,500
However, pay freezes, hiring freezes,

128
00:05:29,500 --> 00:05:31,120
exemption from collective bargaining,

129
00:05:31,120 --> 00:05:33,300
and having career civil
servants carry the weight

130
00:05:33,300 --> 00:05:34,780
of defending political decisions

131
00:05:34,780 --> 00:05:37,242
is likely to lead to a
hollowing out of the workforce

132
00:05:37,242 --> 00:05:40,910
whose experience and
expertise we desperately need.

133
00:05:40,910 --> 00:05:44,610
Furthermore, October 23rd
of last year, I should say,

134
00:05:44,610 --> 00:05:46,057
last year not this year,

135
00:05:46,057 --> 00:05:48,480
our joint Chairman Inhofe
and our HASC counterparts

136
00:05:48,480 --> 00:05:49,961
in sending you, Mr. Secretary,

137
00:05:49,961 --> 00:05:51,900
a letter expressing concern about

138
00:05:51,900 --> 00:05:54,820
the Department's failure to
properly empower and staff

139
00:05:54,820 --> 00:05:56,600
the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense

140
00:05:56,600 --> 00:05:59,470
for Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict

141
00:05:59,470 --> 00:06:01,630
in order to fully
exercise its Congressional

142
00:06:01,630 --> 00:06:03,510
mandated responsibilities for oversight

143
00:06:03,510 --> 00:06:06,730
and advocacy of special operations forces.

144
00:06:06,730 --> 00:06:08,414
This is another position that has had

145
00:06:08,414 --> 00:06:11,322
an acting principle for more
than half the administration

146
00:06:11,322 --> 00:06:13,630
and it's unacceptable, frankly,

147
00:06:13,630 --> 00:06:15,340
that we still haven't received response

148
00:06:15,340 --> 00:06:17,690
to our letter more than four months later.

149
00:06:17,690 --> 00:06:19,760
Now, turning to the
budget request before us,

150
00:06:19,760 --> 00:06:21,670
the Fiscal Year 2021 budget

151
00:06:21,670 --> 00:06:22,657
for the Department of Defense seeks

152
00:06:22,657 --> 00:06:25,951
$636.4 billion for the base budget

153
00:06:25,951 --> 00:06:28,280
and $69 billion budget in Overseas

154
00:06:28,280 --> 00:06:29,591
Contingency Operations funds

155
00:06:29,591 --> 00:06:32,060
of which $16 billion is designated

156
00:06:32,060 --> 00:06:34,300
to pay for base requirements.

157
00:06:34,300 --> 00:06:35,660
In its base budget requests,

158
00:06:35,660 --> 00:06:38,060
the Defense Department
highlights resources targeted

159
00:06:38,060 --> 00:06:40,322
for the modernization
of a more lethal force

160
00:06:40,322 --> 00:06:42,120
that has is prepared for a high-end

161
00:06:42,120 --> 00:06:43,690
fight against near peer competitors

162
00:06:43,690 --> 00:06:48,020
and to operationalize the
National Defense Strategy.

163
00:06:48,020 --> 00:06:50,532
Including investments in
space and cyber domains,

164
00:06:50,532 --> 00:06:53,180
the recapitalization of
our nuclear deterrent,

165
00:06:53,180 --> 00:06:55,630
and the largest ever research
and development budget

166
00:06:55,630 --> 00:06:58,350
for artificial intelligence,
directed energy,

167
00:06:58,350 --> 00:07:00,070
and hypersonic weapons.

168
00:07:00,070 --> 00:07:01,760
The base budget request also supports

169
00:07:01,760 --> 00:07:03,630
the quality of life
for our service members

170
00:07:03,630 --> 00:07:05,457
by sustaining family support initiatives

171
00:07:05,457 --> 00:07:09,040
and by authorizing a
three percent pay raise.

172
00:07:09,040 --> 00:07:10,970
However, it is clear that
the base budget request

173
00:07:10,970 --> 00:07:13,441
will not cover all of the Defense
Department's requirements.

174
00:07:13,441 --> 00:07:15,560
So, once again, we have been presented

175
00:07:15,560 --> 00:07:18,268
with an overly generous
use of the OCO account.

176
00:07:18,268 --> 00:07:20,290
I acknowledge that both Congress

177
00:07:20,290 --> 00:07:22,490
and other administrations
have included elements

178
00:07:22,490 --> 00:07:24,480
of base funding in OCO
accounts in the past,

179
00:07:24,480 --> 00:07:26,660
but overloading the OCO request

180
00:07:26,660 --> 00:07:28,920
with $16 billion worth of activities

181
00:07:28,920 --> 00:07:30,780
that truly belong in the base budget

182
00:07:30,780 --> 00:07:32,850
is difficult to justify.

183
00:07:32,850 --> 00:07:35,010
I would also highlight
that this year's budget

184
00:07:35,010 --> 00:07:35,960
will reflect the outcomes

185
00:07:35,960 --> 00:07:38,310
of the Secretary's Defense-wide review.

186
00:07:38,310 --> 00:07:40,470
The Department submitted a
report to Congress in January

187
00:07:40,470 --> 00:07:43,280
that stated in an era
of flattening budgets

188
00:07:43,280 --> 00:07:45,100
it is more important than ever that we

189
00:07:45,100 --> 00:07:48,610
find creative ways to fund
NDS-driven activities.

190
00:07:48,610 --> 00:07:50,660
The review identified more than $5 billion

191
00:07:50,660 --> 00:07:52,570
of savings from Defense-wide programs

192
00:07:52,570 --> 00:07:54,310
that were deemed a lower priority

193
00:07:54,310 --> 00:07:57,090
or inconsistent with the
priorities in the NDS.

194
00:07:57,090 --> 00:07:59,800
Mr. Secretary, let me commend
you for taking this review on.

195
00:07:59,800 --> 00:08:02,630
It's a tough job and you did it thoroughly

196
00:08:02,630 --> 00:08:05,930
and you did it with quite a bit of energy.

197
00:08:05,930 --> 00:08:08,290
Now, these savings will
be taking, however,

198
00:08:08,290 --> 00:08:10,586
from among other things, health affairs,

199
00:08:10,586 --> 00:08:14,550
DOD schools, and cooperative
threat reduction programs.

200
00:08:14,550 --> 00:08:16,740
So, I'm interesting in hearing
more about the analysis

201
00:08:16,740 --> 00:08:18,840
behind that programs that
were cut or eliminated

202
00:08:18,840 --> 00:08:21,913
and the areas in which these
resources were reinvested.

203
00:08:21,913 --> 00:08:24,280
Scrutinizing current programs to determine

204
00:08:24,280 --> 00:08:26,240
which ones support the
Department's priorities

205
00:08:26,240 --> 00:08:28,580
and which ones should be
reduced or eliminated,

206
00:08:28,580 --> 00:08:30,580
is appropriate and necessary.

207
00:08:30,580 --> 00:08:31,413
And, again, I commend you.

208
00:08:31,413 --> 00:08:33,610
However, it is somewhat
disingenuous to argue

209
00:08:33,610 --> 00:08:35,990
that flat Defense budgets
have forced the Department

210
00:08:35,990 --> 00:08:39,903
to realign funds internally
to support NDS implementation

211
00:08:39,903 --> 00:08:42,510
when the Department is making
an affirmative decision

212
00:08:42,510 --> 00:08:45,110
to divert funding for NDS priorities,

213
00:08:45,110 --> 00:08:47,000
for example, the Department
recently approved

214
00:08:47,000 --> 00:08:49,710
the transfer of $3.8 billion

215
00:08:49,710 --> 00:08:51,290
from National Guard equipment,

216
00:08:51,290 --> 00:08:53,580
additional combat aircraft, ISR assets,

217
00:08:53,580 --> 00:08:56,270
and amphibious ships in order to pay

218
00:08:56,270 --> 00:08:58,100
for the President's border wall.

219
00:08:58,100 --> 00:09:00,340
In addition, the budget request before us

220
00:09:00,340 --> 00:09:02,370
proposes significant cuts to initiatives

221
00:09:02,370 --> 00:09:04,730
like the European Defense Initiative.

222
00:09:04,730 --> 00:09:06,450
This is after funding for several

223
00:09:06,450 --> 00:09:08,580
military construction projects in EDI

224
00:09:08,580 --> 00:09:11,720
was taken out last year to,
again, pay for the wall.

225
00:09:11,720 --> 00:09:14,030
Our close bond with our
European allies and partners

226
00:09:14,030 --> 00:09:16,040
is one of our greatest
strategic advantages

227
00:09:16,040 --> 00:09:19,710
and key to countering the near
peer competition of Russia,

228
00:09:19,710 --> 00:09:22,100
however the cut to EDI sends
exactly the wrong message

229
00:09:22,100 --> 00:09:24,570
to our allies and our adversaries.

230
00:09:24,570 --> 00:09:26,060
It is the responsibility of this committee

231
00:09:26,060 --> 00:09:28,150
to ensure the men and women
we send into harm's way

232
00:09:28,150 --> 00:09:29,184
have the resources necessary

233
00:09:29,184 --> 00:09:32,050
to complete their mission
and return home safely.

234
00:09:32,050 --> 00:09:33,540
And I'm proud that this committee

235
00:09:33,540 --> 00:09:34,740
under the Chairman's leadership

236
00:09:34,740 --> 00:09:36,330
has always worked in a bipartisan

237
00:09:36,330 --> 00:09:37,430
fashion during this process

238
00:09:37,430 --> 00:09:38,900
and I look forward to working

239
00:09:38,900 --> 00:09:39,860
with all of the committee members

240
00:09:39,860 --> 00:09:42,590
to come to reasonable
agreement again this year.

241
00:09:42,590 --> 00:09:43,668
Thank you.

242
00:09:43,668 --> 00:09:44,696
- Thank you, Senator Reed.

243
00:09:44,696 --> 00:09:45,529
We'll now have opening statements

244
00:09:45,529 --> 00:09:48,440
from Secretary Esper and General Milley.

245
00:09:48,440 --> 00:09:51,530
Your entire statement will
be made a part of the record

246
00:09:51,530 --> 00:09:52,680
and you are recognized.

247
00:09:53,710 --> 00:09:55,230
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

248
00:09:55,230 --> 00:09:56,873
Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed,

249
00:09:56,873 --> 00:09:58,923
distinguished members of this committee,

250
00:09:58,923 --> 00:10:00,675
I appreciate the opportunity to testify

251
00:10:00,675 --> 00:10:02,510
in support of the President's

252
00:10:02,510 --> 00:10:05,400
budget request for Fiscal Year 2021.

253
00:10:05,400 --> 00:10:07,060
I'm joined today by the
Chairman of the Joint

254
00:10:07,060 --> 00:10:09,192
Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley.

255
00:10:09,192 --> 00:10:11,730
The 2018 National
Defense Strategy provides

256
00:10:11,730 --> 00:10:13,990
a clear roadmap for the
Department of Defense

257
00:10:13,990 --> 00:10:15,270
to address the reemergence

258
00:10:15,270 --> 00:10:17,590
of long-term strategic competition

259
00:10:17,590 --> 00:10:20,555
from near peer competitors,
China, then Russia.

260
00:10:20,555 --> 00:10:23,000
Throughout the Pentagon
and across the Joint Force,

261
00:10:23,000 --> 00:10:25,530
the NDS guides our decisions and actions

262
00:10:25,530 --> 00:10:27,444
as we adapt the force to simultaneously

263
00:10:27,444 --> 00:10:29,400
contend with the threats of today

264
00:10:29,400 --> 00:10:32,390
while preparing for the
challenges of tomorrow.

265
00:10:32,390 --> 00:10:33,940
We do this by increasing the readiness

266
00:10:33,940 --> 00:10:35,242
and lethality of our warfighters,

267
00:10:35,242 --> 00:10:37,750
strengthening our
alliances and partnerships,

268
00:10:37,750 --> 00:10:40,410
and reforming the way the
Department does business.

269
00:10:40,410 --> 00:10:42,550
Additionally, we have
placed renewed emphasis

270
00:10:42,550 --> 00:10:45,510
on taking care of our service
members and their families.

271
00:10:45,510 --> 00:10:47,370
The Department is grateful
for the strong support

272
00:10:47,370 --> 00:10:50,816
provided in the FY '20
NDAA and DOD appropriations

273
00:10:50,816 --> 00:10:53,200
which allowed us to make vital investments

274
00:10:53,200 --> 00:10:54,678
in our military's modernization,

275
00:10:54,678 --> 00:10:57,080
enabled the creation of the Space Force,

276
00:10:57,080 --> 00:10:58,620
and provided our service members

277
00:10:58,620 --> 00:11:01,720
with the largest pay increase in a decade.

278
00:11:01,720 --> 00:11:04,630
Our continued success is
contingent upon predictable,

279
00:11:04,630 --> 00:11:07,150
adequate, sustained, and timely funding.

280
00:11:07,150 --> 00:11:08,540
And I encourage Congress to pass

281
00:11:08,540 --> 00:11:12,100
a full year spending package
for all FY '21 on time

282
00:11:12,100 --> 00:11:14,000
to avoid the debilitating effects

283
00:11:14,000 --> 00:11:15,823
of another continuing resolution.

284
00:11:16,670 --> 00:11:18,550
The Department's total FY '21 budget

285
00:11:18,550 --> 00:11:20,933
request is $705.4 billion,

286
00:11:22,000 --> 00:11:24,340
this represents a minor
increase from FY '20

287
00:11:24,340 --> 00:11:27,203
enacted amount of $704.6 billion

288
00:11:27,203 --> 00:11:30,160
but does not keep pace with inflation.

289
00:11:30,160 --> 00:11:31,730
Given this flattened funding level

290
00:11:31,730 --> 00:11:33,490
we were required to make
many tough decisions

291
00:11:33,490 --> 00:11:36,510
to ensure our highest priorities
were adequately funded.

292
00:11:36,510 --> 00:11:37,640
To enable our decision making,

293
00:11:37,640 --> 00:11:40,046
we conducted a comprehensive
Defense-wide review

294
00:11:40,046 --> 00:11:42,010
aimed at reallocating resources

295
00:11:42,010 --> 00:11:43,220
from programs and activities

296
00:11:43,220 --> 00:11:44,618
that offered low return on investment

297
00:11:44,618 --> 00:11:48,080
relative to the goals and
objectives of the NDS.

298
00:11:48,080 --> 00:11:49,760
Over a four month period we conducted over

299
00:11:49,760 --> 00:11:53,020
20 review sessions examining
almost $100 billion

300
00:11:53,020 --> 00:11:55,170
in programs, agencies, and activities

301
00:11:55,170 --> 00:11:57,260
that make up the fourth estate.

302
00:11:57,260 --> 00:12:00,970
This review generated $5.7
billion in FY '21 savings

303
00:12:00,970 --> 00:12:02,843
that were reinvested back

304
00:12:02,843 --> 00:12:05,787
into readiness and lethality efforts.

305
00:12:05,787 --> 00:12:07,580
Each of the military Services

306
00:12:07,580 --> 00:12:08,940
is also instituting a similar

307
00:12:08,940 --> 00:12:10,710
review process across their budgets

308
00:12:10,710 --> 00:12:13,790
to achieve the same outcome
of realigning resources

309
00:12:13,790 --> 00:12:15,320
and finding savings that can

310
00:12:15,320 --> 00:12:17,881
be reinvested into higher priorities.

311
00:12:17,881 --> 00:12:19,920
Additionally, I have initiated the process

312
00:12:19,920 --> 00:12:22,870
of conducting full reviews
of all combatant commands

313
00:12:22,870 --> 00:12:26,590
to properly align our global
military posture to the NDS.

314
00:12:26,590 --> 00:12:28,080
This effort will enable the Department

315
00:12:28,080 --> 00:12:29,250
to shift greater emphasis to our

316
00:12:29,250 --> 00:12:31,440
highest priority region, the Indo-Pacific,

317
00:12:31,440 --> 00:12:34,930
or allow us to return troops
home to build readiness.

318
00:12:34,930 --> 00:12:37,800
Thus far, we have ongoing
reviews of AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM,

319
00:12:37,800 --> 00:12:40,890
and we'll expand to other
commands over the coming months.

320
00:12:40,890 --> 00:12:42,520
My recent decision to deploy elements

321
00:12:42,520 --> 00:12:45,550
of an Army security force
assistance brigade to Africa

322
00:12:45,550 --> 00:12:48,370
to replace units from an
infantry brigade combat team

323
00:12:48,370 --> 00:12:49,990
is an example of how this process

324
00:12:49,990 --> 00:12:51,729
is enabling us to better match resources

325
00:12:51,729 --> 00:12:54,510
to the mission of each combatant command.

326
00:12:54,510 --> 00:12:56,960
The Department's FY '21 budget request

327
00:12:56,960 --> 00:12:59,860
reflects the same disciplined
adherence to the NDS.

328
00:12:59,860 --> 00:13:00,906
To preserve our overmatch,

329
00:13:00,906 --> 00:13:02,840
we have made significant investments

330
00:13:02,840 --> 00:13:04,340
into several critical technologies

331
00:13:04,340 --> 00:13:06,036
that will alter the future battlefield.

332
00:13:06,036 --> 00:13:09,230
Our RDT&E budget is the
largest in our history

333
00:13:09,230 --> 00:13:12,170
and prioritizes hypersonics,
microelectronics,

334
00:13:12,170 --> 00:13:14,770
5G communications, autonomous systems,

335
00:13:14,770 --> 00:13:17,060
and artificial intelligence.

336
00:13:17,060 --> 00:13:18,660
We are moving forward with a long overdue

337
00:13:18,660 --> 00:13:20,792
recapitalization of the
nation's nuclear triad,

338
00:13:20,792 --> 00:13:22,230
with key investments

339
00:13:22,230 --> 00:13:24,040
in the ground-based strategic deterrent,

340
00:13:24,040 --> 00:13:27,100
the B-21 stealth bomber, the
Columbia class submarine,

341
00:13:27,100 --> 00:13:28,890
and improved nuclear command, control,

342
00:13:28,890 --> 00:13:31,690
and communications systems to name a few.

343
00:13:31,690 --> 00:13:33,730
We're also enhancing our
missile defense capabilities

344
00:13:33,730 --> 00:13:35,300
to protect against the growing threat

345
00:13:35,300 --> 00:13:37,670
of advanced enemy missile systems.

346
00:13:37,670 --> 00:13:39,507
This budget request expands our capacity

347
00:13:39,507 --> 00:13:41,230
to defend our interests in space

348
00:13:41,230 --> 00:13:42,700
as we consolidate much of our space

349
00:13:42,700 --> 00:13:44,810
enterprise into the Space Force.

350
00:13:44,810 --> 00:13:46,895
It also advances the
Department's cyber capabilities,

351
00:13:46,895 --> 00:13:49,245
allowing us to protect
our digital infrastructure

352
00:13:49,245 --> 00:13:52,510
while disrupting covert
foreign malign activity.

353
00:13:52,510 --> 00:13:54,493
This includes defending the
integrity of our democracy

354
00:13:54,493 --> 00:13:58,250
by assisting in the
security of our elections.

355
00:13:58,250 --> 00:14:00,350
Finally, in the traditional
air, land, and sea domains,

356
00:14:00,350 --> 00:14:02,210
we are focused on
modernizing our formations

357
00:14:02,210 --> 00:14:04,190
by divesting from platforms and equipment

358
00:14:04,190 --> 00:14:05,370
that are no longer suited

359
00:14:05,370 --> 00:14:07,790
for the emerging strategic environment.

360
00:14:07,790 --> 00:14:09,290
The Department appreciates
this committee's

361
00:14:09,290 --> 00:14:11,380
advocacy of the National Defense Strategy

362
00:14:11,380 --> 00:14:13,900
and we value Congress' guidance on reform.

363
00:14:13,900 --> 00:14:15,420
I now ask for your support so that we may

364
00:14:15,420 --> 00:14:16,640
fully implement our decisions

365
00:14:16,640 --> 00:14:18,610
and move forward with
the investments needed

366
00:14:18,610 --> 00:14:19,790
to ensure America's military

367
00:14:19,790 --> 00:14:21,652
maintains our competitive advantage,

368
00:14:21,652 --> 00:14:23,550
continues to deter war,

369
00:14:23,550 --> 00:14:25,250
and preserves our nation's security.

370
00:14:25,250 --> 00:14:26,140
Thank you.

371
00:14:26,140 --> 00:14:27,310
- [Inhofe] Thank you, Secretary Esper.

372
00:14:27,310 --> 00:14:28,143
General Milley.

373
00:14:30,820 --> 00:14:32,670
- Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed,

374
00:14:32,670 --> 00:14:33,810
distinguished members of the committee,

375
00:14:33,810 --> 00:14:35,670
thank you for the opportunity

376
00:14:35,670 --> 00:14:37,960
to join Secretary Esper here today.

377
00:14:37,960 --> 00:14:39,640
It's my distinct honor and privilege

378
00:14:39,640 --> 00:14:41,390
to represent the almost
three million soldiers,

379
00:14:41,390 --> 00:14:43,007
sailors, airmen, and
Marines, Coast Guardsmen

380
00:14:43,007 --> 00:14:45,550
and civilians of the
United States Armed Forces,

381
00:14:45,550 --> 00:14:47,230
the best trained, best equipped,

382
00:14:47,230 --> 00:14:49,354
and best led military force in the world,

383
00:14:49,354 --> 00:14:50,320
and that would not be possible

384
00:14:50,320 --> 00:14:52,870
without your continued support.

385
00:14:52,870 --> 00:14:55,036
This budget is a strategy-driven budget,

386
00:14:55,036 --> 00:14:57,080
it is driven by the NDS which you

387
00:14:57,080 --> 00:15:00,290
are fully aware of and I fully support.

388
00:15:00,290 --> 00:15:03,066
We stand ready and capable to deter war,

389
00:15:03,066 --> 00:15:05,610
defend our homeland from attack,

390
00:15:05,610 --> 00:15:08,551
support our allies, and
if deterrence fails,

391
00:15:08,551 --> 00:15:11,174
we are fully capable
today to fight and win

392
00:15:11,174 --> 00:15:14,127
our nation's wars against
any potential adversary,

393
00:15:14,127 --> 00:15:17,713
anywhere on the earth's
surface, at any time.

394
00:15:18,870 --> 00:15:21,610
But our competitive advantage has eroded

395
00:15:21,610 --> 00:15:24,040
and no one should have
any doubt about that.

396
00:15:24,040 --> 00:15:26,267
China and Russia are increasing
their military capabilities

397
00:15:26,267 --> 00:15:28,810
to outmatch the United
States and its allies

398
00:15:28,810 --> 00:15:31,510
in order to exert their global influence.

399
00:15:31,510 --> 00:15:34,900
And China's objective is
to do that by mid-century.

400
00:15:34,900 --> 00:15:37,441
North Korea, Iran, and violent
extremist organizations

401
00:15:37,441 --> 00:15:41,320
fuel regional instability
and pose direct threats

402
00:15:41,320 --> 00:15:43,800
to partner nations and U.S. citizens.

403
00:15:43,800 --> 00:15:46,770
And while the nature of war is constant,

404
00:15:46,770 --> 00:15:49,730
advanced technologies have
stressed our industrial age

405
00:15:49,730 --> 00:15:51,849
capabilities, concepts, and processes.

406
00:15:51,849 --> 00:15:53,998
And the changing character of war

407
00:15:53,998 --> 00:15:57,223
is happening in a very,
very fundamental way.

408
00:15:58,310 --> 00:16:00,280
Additionally, we are
recovering from readiness

409
00:16:00,280 --> 00:16:02,409
shortfalls and modernization deferments

410
00:16:02,409 --> 00:16:04,951
from 20 years of continuous warfare

411
00:16:04,951 --> 00:16:08,540
and a decade of fiscal instability.

412
00:16:08,540 --> 00:16:10,810
This year's budget builds on previous

413
00:16:10,810 --> 00:16:12,177
readiness and modernization gains

414
00:16:12,177 --> 00:16:14,865
and I believe the FY '21 budget submission

415
00:16:14,865 --> 00:16:17,034
is the best allocation of resources

416
00:16:17,034 --> 00:16:21,200
in a balanced way to support
the National Defense Strategy.

417
00:16:21,200 --> 00:16:22,997
It builds a more lethal force,

418
00:16:22,997 --> 00:16:25,527
it strengthens allies and partners,

419
00:16:25,527 --> 00:16:27,222
and it reforms the Department

420
00:16:27,222 --> 00:16:30,400
for greater performance and affordability.

421
00:16:30,400 --> 00:16:32,835
It also prioritizes,
as the Secretary said,

422
00:16:32,835 --> 00:16:35,990
the Indo-Pacific region to
deter Chinese aggression,

423
00:16:35,990 --> 00:16:36,970
maintain stability,

424
00:16:36,970 --> 00:16:39,100
and ensure access to common domains

425
00:16:39,100 --> 00:16:42,720
in order to preserve a free,
and open international system

426
00:16:42,720 --> 00:16:46,490
for which my parents fought
for in the second world war.

427
00:16:46,490 --> 00:16:50,353
It continues in Europe to
counter Russian aggression

428
00:16:50,353 --> 00:16:53,810
and it will continue to allow
the United States military,

429
00:16:53,810 --> 00:16:56,780
in concert with our allies and partners,

430
00:16:56,780 --> 00:16:58,888
to deter provocative North Korea and Iran

431
00:16:58,888 --> 00:17:01,950
from aggressive action in their regions.

432
00:17:01,950 --> 00:17:03,330
And all the while,

433
00:17:03,330 --> 00:17:06,260
it provides money to continue
our counter terrorist

434
00:17:06,260 --> 00:17:09,520
operations in various parts of the world.

435
00:17:09,520 --> 00:17:12,860
In short, FY '21 supports a ready, agile,

436
00:17:12,860 --> 00:17:15,929
and capable Joint Force that
can compete, deter, and win

437
00:17:15,929 --> 00:17:19,560
across all domains
today and in the future.

438
00:17:19,560 --> 00:17:21,120
And it targets specific investments

439
00:17:21,120 --> 00:17:23,510
in readiness, modernization,
leader developments,

440
00:17:23,510 --> 00:17:26,480
support to our people and their families.

441
00:17:26,480 --> 00:17:28,034
It invests in our readiness recovery

442
00:17:28,034 --> 00:17:30,220
that was built over the last three years.

443
00:17:30,220 --> 00:17:31,380
With this committee's support,

444
00:17:31,380 --> 00:17:33,406
all Services are scheduled to meet

445
00:17:33,406 --> 00:17:36,796
their readiness recovery
goals in this FYDP.

446
00:17:36,796 --> 00:17:40,700
It funds modernization for
great power competition

447
00:17:40,700 --> 00:17:42,346
across all warfighting domains

448
00:17:42,346 --> 00:17:44,999
and it also improves safety,
security, and reliability

449
00:17:44,999 --> 00:17:48,200
of our very critical nuclear enterprise.

450
00:17:48,200 --> 00:17:50,800
It invests in and stands
up the Space Force.

451
00:17:50,800 --> 00:17:53,410
It increases resiliency,
deterrence, capability,

452
00:17:53,410 --> 00:17:56,840
and warfighting options in
both space and cyberspace.

453
00:17:56,840 --> 00:17:59,420
It funds joint all domain
command and control

454
00:17:59,420 --> 00:18:00,900
to improve our interoperability across

455
00:18:00,900 --> 00:18:03,647
all the services and with our allies.

456
00:18:03,647 --> 00:18:05,978
And it invests in the
advanced technologies

457
00:18:05,978 --> 00:18:08,850
that the Secretary mentioned to address

458
00:18:08,850 --> 00:18:11,590
the more complex threats
and the faster pace

459
00:18:11,590 --> 00:18:13,570
as the character of war changes.

460
00:18:13,570 --> 00:18:17,460
This budget also invests
in our most valuable asset.

461
00:18:17,460 --> 00:18:18,320
The most valuable asset

462
00:18:18,320 --> 00:18:21,130
of the United States
military is our people.

463
00:18:21,130 --> 00:18:22,890
It also funds the facilities,

464
00:18:22,890 --> 00:18:24,260
infrastructure, family support,

465
00:18:24,260 --> 00:18:27,250
and quality of life
programs in a balanced way.

466
00:18:27,250 --> 00:18:29,558
And it invests in educations
and talent management

467
00:18:29,558 --> 00:18:31,550
in order to develop our junior leaders

468
00:18:31,550 --> 00:18:33,830
with the values and intellectual agility

469
00:18:33,830 --> 00:18:36,270
to fight and win future conflicts.

470
00:18:36,270 --> 00:18:37,864
The lieutenants and ensigns of today

471
00:18:37,864 --> 00:18:41,270
will be the generals and
admirals of tomorrow.

472
00:18:41,270 --> 00:18:43,590
Ultimately, our military
needs sustained, predictable,

473
00:18:43,590 --> 00:18:45,710
adequate, and timely funding to retain

474
00:18:45,710 --> 00:18:47,010
its competitive advantage

475
00:18:47,010 --> 00:18:49,200
in this era of great power competition.

476
00:18:49,200 --> 00:18:50,110
with the understanding that we

477
00:18:50,110 --> 00:18:52,230
must be good stewards of the resources

478
00:18:52,230 --> 00:18:55,086
entrusted to us by the American
people and by Congress.

479
00:18:55,086 --> 00:18:56,730
I want to thank this committee

480
00:18:56,730 --> 00:18:58,270
for your continued support,

481
00:18:58,270 --> 00:18:59,467
to all of our military,

482
00:18:59,467 --> 00:19:02,440
and I look forward to
answering your questions.

483
00:19:02,440 --> 00:19:04,010
- Thank you, General Milley.

484
00:19:04,010 --> 00:19:06,493
Because of his scheduling problem,

485
00:19:06,493 --> 00:19:11,493
we'll begin our questions
with Senator Cotton.

486
00:19:12,910 --> 00:19:16,060
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I
appreciate your consideration.

487
00:19:16,060 --> 00:19:19,620
I have to go preside over
the Senate in 10 minutes.

488
00:19:19,620 --> 00:19:20,730
Presiding officer duty,

489
00:19:20,730 --> 00:19:22,370
which Lieutenant Esper
and Lieutenant Milley

490
00:19:22,370 --> 00:19:25,640
could relate to staff
duty back in their days.

491
00:19:25,640 --> 00:19:26,760
It's a duty, not an honor,

492
00:19:26,760 --> 00:19:29,283
and only the most junior
personnel get to pull it.

493
00:19:30,470 --> 00:19:32,730
Secretary Esper, I want
to commend your remarks

494
00:19:32,730 --> 00:19:34,190
at the Munich security conference

495
00:19:34,190 --> 00:19:36,220
about the threat that Huawei poses

496
00:19:36,220 --> 00:19:38,970
to the United States and our NATO allies.

497
00:19:38,970 --> 00:19:40,590
Unfortunately, it doesn't seem like

498
00:19:40,590 --> 00:19:44,100
all of our NATO allies got
the message or agree with it.

499
00:19:44,100 --> 00:19:45,878
Could you talk about the threat

500
00:19:45,878 --> 00:19:48,000
that Huawei's presence in Europe,

501
00:19:48,000 --> 00:19:51,230
especially in nations where
we have troop presence

502
00:19:51,230 --> 00:19:54,398
threatens our security and NATO security?

503
00:19:54,398 --> 00:19:56,710
- Yes, Senator, since my
first NATO ministerial,

504
00:19:56,710 --> 00:19:58,620
defense ministerial in June of last year,

505
00:19:58,620 --> 00:20:00,010
so I've been to three or four now,

506
00:20:00,010 --> 00:20:02,248
I've had a common message, one of many,

507
00:20:02,248 --> 00:20:03,470
and this is the threat

508
00:20:03,470 --> 00:20:08,470
that Huawei technology
imposes on our networks.

509
00:20:08,536 --> 00:20:10,920
The message has been that if countries,

510
00:20:10,920 --> 00:20:13,635
if our NATO allies
incorporate Huawei technology,

511
00:20:13,635 --> 00:20:17,490
it may very well have a severe impact

512
00:20:17,490 --> 00:20:19,150
on our ability to share information,

513
00:20:19,150 --> 00:20:21,840
to share intelligence, to
share operational plans,

514
00:20:21,840 --> 00:20:24,449
and for the Alliance to
conduct itself as an alliance.

515
00:20:24,449 --> 00:20:26,810
The fact of the matter
is some countries get it,

516
00:20:26,810 --> 00:20:29,046
many more don't, it's a continued process

517
00:20:29,046 --> 00:20:30,770
where we're trying to work

518
00:20:30,770 --> 00:20:32,576
and I think we also need to
work together, some countries,

519
00:20:32,576 --> 00:20:35,619
on alternatives to
Huawei because otherwise

520
00:20:35,619 --> 00:20:39,450
we will find the Alliance
compromised in due course.

521
00:20:39,450 --> 00:20:41,660
- Should some of our allies in Europe

522
00:20:41,660 --> 00:20:43,830
move forward with Huawei
and their networks

523
00:20:43,830 --> 00:20:45,770
will we have to at least consider

524
00:20:45,770 --> 00:20:47,870
our force posture in these countries

525
00:20:47,870 --> 00:20:49,340
given what it means for the security

526
00:20:49,340 --> 00:20:51,720
and privacy of our troops
and their families?

527
00:20:51,720 --> 00:20:53,935
- I think, Senator, depending
on how they move forward,

528
00:20:53,935 --> 00:20:55,130
we're gonna have to
assess what they've done

529
00:20:55,130 --> 00:20:55,963
and how they've done it

530
00:20:55,963 --> 00:20:58,298
and make an assessment for each country

531
00:20:58,298 --> 00:21:00,810
and then from there decide
what we're going to do

532
00:21:00,810 --> 00:21:02,420
with regard to those
things that I mentioned,

533
00:21:02,420 --> 00:21:05,560
information sharing, intelligence
sharing, and so forth.

534
00:21:05,560 --> 00:21:07,310
- Last month, there were media reports

535
00:21:07,310 --> 00:21:09,390
that the Department of
Defense had reservations

536
00:21:09,390 --> 00:21:11,410
about a regulation related to Huawei

537
00:21:11,410 --> 00:21:12,930
the Commerce Department has proposed.

538
00:21:12,930 --> 00:21:16,060
That regulation has now moved
forward, those objections.

539
00:21:16,060 --> 00:21:17,790
Could you just make clear for us

540
00:21:17,790 --> 00:21:20,300
and maybe all of the people
that work for you directly

541
00:21:20,300 --> 00:21:23,520
what the Secretary's
position is on Huawei?

542
00:21:23,520 --> 00:21:24,410
- I'm very concerned about

543
00:21:24,410 --> 00:21:26,210
Huawei and other Chinese technologies.

544
00:21:26,210 --> 00:21:27,760
So, I think we need to
take a very careful eye

545
00:21:27,760 --> 00:21:30,560
with regard to our export controls,

546
00:21:30,560 --> 00:21:34,540
Chinese technology in
general, Huawei specifically,

547
00:21:34,540 --> 00:21:36,134
and I think we need to be very conscious

548
00:21:36,134 --> 00:21:39,270
of Chinese technology in our system.

549
00:21:39,270 --> 00:21:40,103
By the same token,

550
00:21:40,103 --> 00:21:41,900
I also want to, I need
to balance the equation,

551
00:21:41,900 --> 00:21:45,099
make sure we understand our
own technology companies

552
00:21:45,099 --> 00:21:48,530
and ensuring that we have
access to that as well.

553
00:21:48,530 --> 00:21:51,060
Overall, I'm very concerned
about Chinese technology,

554
00:21:51,060 --> 00:21:53,240
espionage, cyber theft, you name it.

555
00:21:53,240 --> 00:21:55,940
It's ongoing and has been for
many years in our country.

556
00:21:55,940 --> 00:21:56,840
- Thank you.

557
00:21:56,840 --> 00:21:58,220
On the topic of espionage,

558
00:21:58,220 --> 00:22:01,480
let's turn to Russia and
specifically the Open Skies treaty

559
00:22:01,480 --> 00:22:02,890
and how they use that

560
00:22:02,890 --> 00:22:04,590
and how they cheat on
it in their own country,

561
00:22:04,590 --> 00:22:06,500
specifically refusing to allow us

562
00:22:06,500 --> 00:22:10,890
to fly Open Skies
flights over Kaliningrad,

563
00:22:10,890 --> 00:22:13,864
their strategically
located enclave in Europe

564
00:22:13,864 --> 00:22:17,923
and also around and near Georgia.

565
00:22:20,040 --> 00:22:22,520
Other witnesses in the past
in front of this committee

566
00:22:22,520 --> 00:22:25,230
like General Dunford,
General Milley's predecessor,

567
00:22:25,230 --> 00:22:27,320
Vince Stewart, former head of DIA,

568
00:22:27,320 --> 00:22:29,285
testified that Russia has been

569
00:22:29,285 --> 00:22:30,750
cheating on the Open Skies treaty,

570
00:22:30,750 --> 00:22:32,210
that we don't get much benefit out of it

571
00:22:32,210 --> 00:22:33,650
as long as they're cheating,

572
00:22:33,650 --> 00:22:35,663
even called it a relic of the past.

573
00:22:36,720 --> 00:22:38,210
Do you think the Open Skies treaty

574
00:22:38,210 --> 00:22:40,320
still serves the United States interests

575
00:22:40,320 --> 00:22:41,380
given the fact that Russia

576
00:22:41,380 --> 00:22:42,930
continually cheats on that treaty?

577
00:22:42,930 --> 00:22:44,770
- Senator, the have been
cheating for many years.

578
00:22:44,770 --> 00:22:47,352
I raised this at the defense
ministerial last month

579
00:22:47,352 --> 00:22:49,710
with all of our NATO partners that we need

580
00:22:49,710 --> 00:22:53,610
to speak out more clearly
about Russian noncompliance.

581
00:22:53,610 --> 00:22:55,730
You mentioned Georgia and Kaliningrad,

582
00:22:55,730 --> 00:22:56,790
those are two good examples.

583
00:22:56,790 --> 00:22:58,510
We've also been denied access

584
00:22:58,510 --> 00:23:01,580
to military exercise overflights,

585
00:23:01,580 --> 00:23:02,627
there are some other issues that

586
00:23:02,627 --> 00:23:04,610
we cannot discuss in this session,

587
00:23:04,610 --> 00:23:06,337
which we should come
and talk to you about,

588
00:23:06,337 --> 00:23:10,480
but I have a lot of concerns
about the treaty as it stands.

589
00:23:10,480 --> 00:23:13,060
- So, I noted the President's budget

590
00:23:13,060 --> 00:23:14,649
did not include money to recapitalize

591
00:23:14,649 --> 00:23:17,680
the Open Skies treaty aircraft,

592
00:23:17,680 --> 00:23:20,490
the OC-135s but I've also heard that there

593
00:23:20,490 --> 00:23:22,560
may be as early as next month

594
00:23:22,560 --> 00:23:24,430
the possibility of contracts announced

595
00:23:24,430 --> 00:23:26,060
to modernize those aircraft.

596
00:23:26,060 --> 00:23:28,310
What can you tell us
about that use of funds?

597
00:23:29,170 --> 00:23:30,003
- At this point of time,

598
00:23:30,003 --> 00:23:32,763
until we make a final
decision on that path forward,

599
00:23:32,763 --> 00:23:35,980
I'm not prepared to recapitalize aircraft,

600
00:23:35,980 --> 00:23:38,920
I want to make sure we
understand what the direction is.

601
00:23:38,920 --> 00:23:40,500
I would note that many of our allies

602
00:23:40,500 --> 00:23:41,650
are in Open Skies treaty

603
00:23:41,650 --> 00:23:42,483
and I've talked to them a lot,

604
00:23:42,483 --> 00:23:44,620
this is important many of our NATO allies,

605
00:23:44,620 --> 00:23:46,920
that they have the means
to conduct the overflights.

606
00:23:46,920 --> 00:23:48,881
We still have the means
to conduct overflights.

607
00:23:48,881 --> 00:23:51,840
I was at Offutt Air Force
Base just last week.

608
00:23:51,840 --> 00:23:55,887
I had a chance to walk
about one of the OC-135s

609
00:23:55,887 --> 00:23:58,377
and talk to the crew and
take a look at the aircraft.

610
00:23:58,377 --> 00:23:59,880
But at this point in time,

611
00:23:59,880 --> 00:24:02,070
we're holding until we
get a better direction.

612
00:24:02,070 --> 00:24:02,903
- Good.

613
00:24:02,903 --> 00:24:03,736
Thank you.

614
00:24:06,266 --> 00:24:07,099
- Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

615
00:24:07,099 --> 00:24:10,180
Again, thank you, gentlemen,
for being here today.

616
00:24:10,180 --> 00:24:11,640
Mr. Secretary let me return to some

617
00:24:11,640 --> 00:24:12,920
of my comments in the opening statement

618
00:24:12,920 --> 00:24:16,290
about the vacancies in the Department.

619
00:24:16,290 --> 00:24:17,530
There are two significant issues,

620
00:24:17,530 --> 00:24:20,310
one is, I highlighted, civilian
control of the military

621
00:24:20,310 --> 00:24:22,070
which you need civilians to do that.

622
00:24:22,070 --> 00:24:23,970
And also institutional capacity.

623
00:24:23,970 --> 00:24:25,220
People who've been on the job,

624
00:24:25,220 --> 00:24:28,120
have the credibility and the legitimacy

625
00:24:28,120 --> 00:24:30,220
of being confirmed and they're not acting.

626
00:24:31,420 --> 00:24:33,500
Can you tell us why we have so many

627
00:24:34,340 --> 00:24:37,183
unfilled positions and acting personnel?

628
00:24:38,550 --> 00:24:39,460
Speaking for the Chairman,

629
00:24:39,460 --> 00:24:40,820
I think he's done a remarkable job

630
00:24:40,820 --> 00:24:42,850
of getting people through
when they get up here.

631
00:24:42,850 --> 00:24:43,683
Could you comment?

632
00:24:43,683 --> 00:24:44,516
- Yes, Senator.

633
00:24:45,350 --> 00:24:46,183
Let me first give you a
rundown on the numbers.

634
00:24:46,183 --> 00:24:47,690
So, of 60 confirmed slots,

635
00:24:47,690 --> 00:24:49,870
it was 58 until the NDAA was passed.

636
00:24:49,870 --> 00:24:52,338
We added two new space positions.

637
00:24:52,338 --> 00:24:54,530
So, of 58, 39 are currently filled.

638
00:24:54,530 --> 00:24:56,800
We have two nominees waiting
on the floor for a vote,

639
00:24:56,800 --> 00:24:58,720
we have four nominees in committee,

640
00:24:58,720 --> 00:25:00,350
we have two intents to nominate,

641
00:25:00,350 --> 00:25:02,130
we have four more that
are right behind them,

642
00:25:02,130 --> 00:25:04,300
and then we have five more in the process.

643
00:25:04,300 --> 00:25:06,999
So, the balance, I think,
six in the balance,

644
00:25:06,999 --> 00:25:09,300
that we have to identify positions for.

645
00:25:09,300 --> 00:25:11,000
Now as you know, many of us have been

646
00:25:11,000 --> 00:25:12,490
in this town a long time.

647
00:25:12,490 --> 00:25:13,990
It becomes more challenging as you get

648
00:25:13,990 --> 00:25:16,670
into the fourth year of the first term

649
00:25:16,670 --> 00:25:19,450
in terms of finding people
and that is a challenge.

650
00:25:19,450 --> 00:25:20,650
We also have challenges with

651
00:25:20,650 --> 00:25:24,063
moving people through the
process, these are long processes.

652
00:25:25,450 --> 00:25:26,380
With regard to where we are,

653
00:25:26,380 --> 00:25:29,380
I don't think the situation
is as dire as some may think.

654
00:25:29,380 --> 00:25:31,630
We have very capable
people in the positions.

655
00:25:33,050 --> 00:25:34,380
I've gotten the chance to work with them

656
00:25:34,380 --> 00:25:35,213
both in the current role

657
00:25:35,213 --> 00:25:37,590
and in my previous role
as Secretary of the Army,

658
00:25:37,590 --> 00:25:40,295
and we have very capable DOD civilians,

659
00:25:40,295 --> 00:25:42,860
career civilians who also help out.

660
00:25:42,860 --> 00:25:44,930
At no time, have I had any concerns

661
00:25:44,930 --> 00:25:47,420
about civilian control in
the military, to be frank,

662
00:25:47,420 --> 00:25:49,860
I know that's part of the NDS review.

663
00:25:49,860 --> 00:25:52,480
When I came in my first
week or two on the job,

664
00:25:52,480 --> 00:25:53,963
I instituted a number of changes

665
00:25:53,963 --> 00:25:56,270
where the uniform and civilian leadership

666
00:25:56,270 --> 00:25:58,704
works together, sits
together in weekly meetings.

667
00:25:58,704 --> 00:25:59,750
We, together,

668
00:25:59,750 --> 00:26:02,008
review our National Defense
Strategy implementation.

669
00:26:02,008 --> 00:26:05,920
We, together, review OPLAN
implementation or development

670
00:26:05,920 --> 00:26:08,775
and we have a much
better integration today

671
00:26:08,775 --> 00:26:11,430
between civilians and
military then we did,

672
00:26:11,430 --> 00:26:13,370
I think, nine months ago.

673
00:26:13,370 --> 00:26:16,170
- In regard to the nominations
that are coming up to us,

674
00:26:16,170 --> 00:26:18,430
I don't think I'm alone
when I was surprised

675
00:26:18,430 --> 00:26:22,070
that Elaine McCusker's
nomination was withdrawn.

676
00:26:22,070 --> 00:26:23,340
From everything I've heard,

677
00:26:23,340 --> 00:26:28,150
she's a very capable and
experienced individual,

678
00:26:28,150 --> 00:26:30,366
in fact that's why she was
nominated in the first place.

679
00:26:30,366 --> 00:26:31,450
To your knowledge,

680
00:26:31,450 --> 00:26:34,327
can you tell us why her
nomination was withdrawn?

681
00:26:34,327 --> 00:26:37,360
- Elaine is a very capable
and dedicated public servant,

682
00:26:37,360 --> 00:26:38,490
but the President has a right

683
00:26:38,490 --> 00:26:41,270
to choose his members
who he's gonna nominate.

684
00:26:41,270 --> 00:26:43,230
- So, it was a presidential decision?

685
00:26:43,230 --> 00:26:46,210
Not a recommendation by you or anyone else

686
00:26:46,210 --> 00:26:47,660
in the Department of Defense?

687
00:26:47,660 --> 00:26:49,420
- It was a PPO decision at this point,

688
00:26:49,420 --> 00:26:52,543
I don't have any more
fidelity at this juncture.

689
00:26:53,580 --> 00:26:55,778
- Again, I think, one of
the concerns we go back to

690
00:26:55,778 --> 00:26:58,940
is that your role as Secretary of Defense,

691
00:26:58,940 --> 00:27:00,370
you should have a critical voice

692
00:27:00,370 --> 00:27:01,400
on all of these nominations.

693
00:27:01,400 --> 00:27:03,710
That goes with the territory.

694
00:27:03,710 --> 00:27:04,810
You should have it.

695
00:27:04,810 --> 00:27:05,950
If you didn't have it in this case,

696
00:27:05,950 --> 00:27:09,490
I think that is a problem
which I hope we can address.

697
00:27:09,490 --> 00:27:11,690
The other area I spoke
in my opening remarks,

698
00:27:11,690 --> 00:27:13,440
was the SO/LIC position

699
00:27:13,440 --> 00:27:16,130
and you realize that over several years

700
00:27:16,130 --> 00:27:17,570
through several NDAAs,

701
00:27:17,570 --> 00:27:21,330
we've tried to build up
the capacity of the SO/LIC

702
00:27:21,330 --> 00:27:24,550
to be a Secretary-like individual.

703
00:27:24,550 --> 00:27:27,800
And, again, we have someone
who is in an acting position

704
00:27:29,460 --> 00:27:33,620
that's been since last June
when Secretary West retired.

705
00:27:33,620 --> 00:27:36,450
So, can you promptly provide the committee

706
00:27:36,450 --> 00:27:38,370
with a plan for implementing,

707
00:27:38,370 --> 00:27:40,010
not just getting a person in place,

708
00:27:40,010 --> 00:27:43,760
but making that person act
like a Service Secretary?

709
00:27:43,760 --> 00:27:44,593
- Yes, Senator.

710
00:27:44,593 --> 00:27:45,580
First of all, thanks again,

711
00:27:45,580 --> 00:27:47,080
I think you brought this up a month ago

712
00:27:47,080 --> 00:27:48,050
when we sat down together

713
00:27:48,050 --> 00:27:50,800
and I was not tracking it, that's on me.

714
00:27:50,800 --> 00:27:52,580
I have a high regard for
SO/LIC, believe or not,

715
00:27:52,580 --> 00:27:56,210
I worked as an IMA reservist
in SO/LIC many, many years ago.

716
00:27:56,210 --> 00:27:58,316
But since then we've
taken a number of actions,

717
00:27:58,316 --> 00:28:00,649
so we're pushing forward on the nominee.

718
00:28:00,649 --> 00:28:03,530
We are looking at, we
are gonna reconsolidate

719
00:28:03,530 --> 00:28:05,360
SO/LIC back in the Pentagon.

720
00:28:05,360 --> 00:28:07,620
I've tasked the SO/LIC to provide

721
00:28:07,620 --> 00:28:11,120
a number of recommendations
on section 922 implementation.

722
00:28:11,120 --> 00:28:14,560
We will begin frequent meetings
between SO/LIC and myself

723
00:28:14,560 --> 00:28:17,053
and or the Deputy on a routine basis.

724
00:28:19,016 --> 00:28:21,020
Also, we're committed to recruiting

725
00:28:21,020 --> 00:28:22,540
and retaining more talent in SO/LIC.

726
00:28:22,540 --> 00:28:24,480
So, I think we're taking a number of steps

727
00:28:24,480 --> 00:28:27,106
to integrate SO/LIC and to achieve

728
00:28:27,106 --> 00:28:30,430
what was in law that you talked about.

729
00:28:30,430 --> 00:28:32,830
And I look forward to updating
you on this as we go forward.

730
00:28:32,830 --> 00:28:34,020
- Thank you.

731
00:28:34,020 --> 00:28:35,640
Just a different topic here.

732
00:28:35,640 --> 00:28:38,108
Did exceptional staff work on both

733
00:28:38,108 --> 00:28:40,010
the majority and minority side,

734
00:28:40,010 --> 00:28:42,580
we discovered that about two years ago,

735
00:28:42,580 --> 00:28:47,310
that many of our allies
were not paying for fuel,

736
00:28:47,310 --> 00:28:49,060
the Saudis and Emiratis, for example.

737
00:28:49,060 --> 00:28:51,009
It was about a $300 million bill.

738
00:28:51,009 --> 00:28:53,700
The Emiratis, when
confronted with it, paid up.

739
00:28:53,700 --> 00:28:55,270
The Saudis are still paying.

740
00:28:55,270 --> 00:28:57,840
But just today the GAO
has released a report

741
00:28:57,840 --> 00:28:59,740
indicating that the Department

742
00:28:59,740 --> 00:29:01,270
has failed to secure a reimbursement

743
00:29:01,270 --> 00:29:06,240
for more than $1 billion worth
of support to other nations.

744
00:29:06,240 --> 00:29:07,470
I have no time left,

745
00:29:07,470 --> 00:29:11,410
but can you briefly, very briefly, comment

746
00:29:11,410 --> 00:29:13,170
and also indicate what you're

747
00:29:13,170 --> 00:29:15,270
gonna do to collect the money basically?

748
00:29:15,270 --> 00:29:16,103
- Yes, Senator.

749
00:29:16,103 --> 00:29:17,090
I've tried to track that number down.

750
00:29:17,090 --> 00:29:18,710
I can't find the billion dollar number.

751
00:29:18,710 --> 00:29:21,209
I am tracking that with
regard to payments,

752
00:29:21,209 --> 00:29:23,170
they are caught up at this time.

753
00:29:23,170 --> 00:29:26,011
They've reimbursed for
approximately $113 million,

754
00:29:26,011 --> 00:29:28,900
there are still approximately $38 million

755
00:29:28,900 --> 00:29:30,780
outstanding and flying costs,

756
00:29:30,780 --> 00:29:32,370
but I want to pull the
thread a little bit more

757
00:29:32,370 --> 00:29:33,350
on that billion dollar number

758
00:29:33,350 --> 00:29:35,260
to make sure I'm not missing something

759
00:29:35,260 --> 00:29:37,004
and that GAO report is helpful.

760
00:29:37,004 --> 00:29:37,987
- [Reed] Thank you.

761
00:29:37,987 --> 00:29:40,630
- [Inhofe] Senator Fischer.

762
00:29:40,630 --> 00:29:41,900
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

763
00:29:41,900 --> 00:29:44,280
Mr. Secretary and General Milley,

764
00:29:44,280 --> 00:29:45,409
there's been a lot of reporting

765
00:29:45,409 --> 00:29:47,404
about the reduction in funding

766
00:29:47,404 --> 00:29:49,580
for the Virginia class submarine

767
00:29:49,580 --> 00:29:53,490
in connection with the
NNSA's budget increase.

768
00:29:53,490 --> 00:29:55,337
Critics of nuclear modernization

769
00:29:55,337 --> 00:29:58,737
are equating concern for
the Navy shipbuilding plan

770
00:29:58,737 --> 00:30:02,167
with opposition to funding the NNSA

771
00:30:02,167 --> 00:30:04,319
and are using some recent comments

772
00:30:04,319 --> 00:30:09,140
made by acting Secretary Modly,
and also you General Milley,

773
00:30:09,140 --> 00:30:11,560
to suggest the DOD does not support

774
00:30:11,560 --> 00:30:15,290
the current budget request for NNSA.

775
00:30:15,290 --> 00:30:18,827
Now I share the concern for
the Navy's shipbuilding budget.

776
00:30:18,827 --> 00:30:21,630
And Congress will have an
opportunity to look at that,

777
00:30:21,630 --> 00:30:23,500
but I know that you are both

778
00:30:23,500 --> 00:30:26,683
very strong supporters
of nuclear modernization.

779
00:30:27,730 --> 00:30:31,130
And also, Admiral Richard
was before this committee

780
00:30:31,130 --> 00:30:32,770
when he was here several weeks ago,

781
00:30:32,770 --> 00:30:34,710
testifying that there was

782
00:30:34,710 --> 00:30:38,150
no excess margin in the NNSA's budget.

783
00:30:38,150 --> 00:30:39,998
So, I just want to be clear on this.

784
00:30:39,998 --> 00:30:43,191
Do you both support the
requested level of funding

785
00:30:43,191 --> 00:30:46,453
for nuclear modernization at the NNSA?

786
00:30:47,486 --> 00:30:49,404
- Senator, I do and if you don't mind,

787
00:30:49,404 --> 00:30:50,780
I'll give a little bit of an explanation.

788
00:30:50,780 --> 00:30:52,680
I think it's vitally critical

789
00:30:52,680 --> 00:30:54,660
that we recapitalize our nuclear triad,

790
00:30:54,660 --> 00:30:56,440
that's why we placed it as number one

791
00:30:56,440 --> 00:30:58,590
defense priority in terms of our funding,

792
00:30:58,590 --> 00:31:00,710
that means not just the platforms,

793
00:31:00,710 --> 00:31:04,580
the B-21, the ground-based
strategic deterrent,

794
00:31:04,580 --> 00:31:06,090
and the Columbia class submarine,

795
00:31:06,090 --> 00:31:07,470
but also nuclear command and control

796
00:31:07,470 --> 00:31:10,500
and a few other things
like long-range strike.

797
00:31:10,500 --> 00:31:13,840
But you also have to have the
packages, the warheads, etc.,

798
00:31:13,840 --> 00:31:15,130
the plutonium pits to with that.

799
00:31:15,130 --> 00:31:16,956
So, it's critical that those be funded

800
00:31:16,956 --> 00:31:18,820
and move quickly forward so we

801
00:31:18,820 --> 00:31:20,440
can have them paired up in time

802
00:31:20,440 --> 00:31:21,990
to recapitalize and ensure that

803
00:31:21,990 --> 00:31:24,680
the strategic deterrent
is modern by the year,

804
00:31:24,680 --> 00:31:25,513
beginning in the year 2030.

805
00:31:25,513 --> 00:31:28,823
- [Fischer] And there's
no room for pausing.

806
00:31:30,566 --> 00:31:32,160
- Ma'am, there is no room for margin.

807
00:31:32,160 --> 00:31:34,250
I have been working with our folks at OSD

808
00:31:34,250 --> 00:31:35,960
and Admiral Richard to try

809
00:31:35,960 --> 00:31:37,940
and actually build margin
into our current fleet

810
00:31:37,940 --> 00:31:39,560
so that we have some room,

811
00:31:39,560 --> 00:31:42,350
but it's critical that
we meet that timeline.

812
00:31:42,350 --> 00:31:43,613
- [Fischer] General Milley?

813
00:31:47,135 --> 00:31:48,890
- I absolutely support fully
funding the nuclear enterprise.

814
00:31:48,890 --> 00:31:49,980
It's the number one priority.

815
00:31:49,980 --> 00:31:52,030
It's kept the peace,
world peace, actually,

816
00:31:52,030 --> 00:31:52,920
from great power war

817
00:31:52,920 --> 00:31:55,250
for going on seven and a half decades.

818
00:31:55,250 --> 00:31:56,990
I absolutely support that.

819
00:31:56,990 --> 00:31:58,190
I think what we're talking about

820
00:31:58,190 --> 00:32:00,430
is the HASC testimony from last week.

821
00:32:00,430 --> 00:32:02,170
I was not involved in the decision

822
00:32:02,170 --> 00:32:03,789
to move the money from the SCN

823
00:32:03,789 --> 00:32:07,070
but I fully support fully
funding our nuclear enterprise.

824
00:32:07,070 --> 00:32:07,998
- Thank you.

825
00:32:07,998 --> 00:32:11,146
I think it's important that
the record reflect that.

826
00:32:11,146 --> 00:32:16,146
Mr. Secretary, section
1039 of the 2013 NDAA

827
00:32:17,650 --> 00:32:21,031
requires the Nuclear Weapons Council

828
00:32:21,031 --> 00:32:23,490
to certify NNSA's budget

829
00:32:23,490 --> 00:32:26,549
and ensure it's adequate
to meet requirements.

830
00:32:26,549 --> 00:32:29,467
Clearly stated in the accompanying report

831
00:32:29,467 --> 00:32:32,404
their expectation that
through this provision,

832
00:32:32,404 --> 00:32:36,097
the Nuclear Weapons Council will

833
00:32:36,097 --> 00:32:38,087
"Take an active role in shaping

834
00:32:38,087 --> 00:32:40,227
"and reviewing the NNSA budget

835
00:32:40,227 --> 00:32:42,927
"as it is prepared for
submission to Congress,

836
00:32:42,927 --> 00:32:45,707
"and negotiated with the
Office of Management and Budget

837
00:32:45,707 --> 00:32:47,977
"during the budget review process."

838
00:32:48,960 --> 00:32:50,960
This year, the certification letter

839
00:32:50,960 --> 00:32:54,307
submitted pursuant to this provision read,

840
00:32:54,307 --> 00:32:58,361
"NNSA is unable to provide
detailed budget information

841
00:32:58,361 --> 00:33:02,116
"to support certification in
advance of the budget release

842
00:33:02,116 --> 00:33:05,897
"of the President's Fiscal
Year 2021 budget request

843
00:33:05,897 --> 00:33:08,437
"by the Office of Management and Budget.

844
00:33:08,437 --> 00:33:12,497
"The NWC cannot perform
the analysis required

845
00:33:12,497 --> 00:33:14,768
"to produce a budget certification letter

846
00:33:14,768 --> 00:33:17,157
"without this information."

847
00:33:18,120 --> 00:33:22,260
I think it's obvious that
the process is not working.

848
00:33:22,260 --> 00:33:24,309
But what is your view of the situation

849
00:33:24,309 --> 00:33:27,136
and how can we resolve this to ensure

850
00:33:27,136 --> 00:33:30,860
the intent of the provision is being met?

851
00:33:30,860 --> 00:33:31,960
- Senator, I completely agree.

852
00:33:31,960 --> 00:33:34,590
I think we need to let the
Nuclear Weapons Council work.

853
00:33:34,590 --> 00:33:37,191
I think that looking at budgets needs

854
00:33:37,191 --> 00:33:38,867
to begin very, very early,

855
00:33:38,867 --> 00:33:40,800
arguably in the late
summer of the year before.

856
00:33:40,800 --> 00:33:42,560
I would like to have a
look at that as well,

857
00:33:42,560 --> 00:33:44,020
I want to make sure
that we're prioritizing

858
00:33:44,020 --> 00:33:45,686
the right things so that

859
00:33:45,686 --> 00:33:47,080
we have a capable strategic deterrent.

860
00:33:47,080 --> 00:33:48,270
I think, if that were the case

861
00:33:48,270 --> 00:33:50,980
then we would've been in a
much different situation.

862
00:33:50,980 --> 00:33:53,447
We've already gotten agreement
from the NNSA to do that

863
00:33:53,447 --> 00:33:55,525
DOE and I got agreement also from OMB

864
00:33:55,525 --> 00:33:56,850
to support us on that.

865
00:33:56,850 --> 00:33:58,607
So, I think it's very important

866
00:33:58,607 --> 00:34:01,310
and we intend to implement
that going forward.

867
00:34:01,310 --> 00:34:02,220
- Thank you.

868
00:34:02,220 --> 00:34:05,050
As you stated earlier,
this has to work together,

869
00:34:05,050 --> 00:34:07,080
it has to be on time in order

870
00:34:07,080 --> 00:34:10,720
to meet our number one
priority of the NDS.

871
00:34:10,720 --> 00:34:12,169
Also, Mr. Secretary,

872
00:34:12,169 --> 00:34:14,970
in the time since the budget was released,

873
00:34:14,970 --> 00:34:17,880
we've heard complaints,
including many here in Congress,

874
00:34:17,880 --> 00:34:20,084
about things that either weren't included,

875
00:34:20,084 --> 00:34:23,670
or were perceived to be
underfunded in this budget.

876
00:34:23,670 --> 00:34:27,290
Ships, aerial refueling
tankers, Stars and Stripes,

877
00:34:27,290 --> 00:34:29,338
rumors about a withdrawal from Africa,

878
00:34:29,338 --> 00:34:31,796
the European Deterrence Initiative,

879
00:34:31,796 --> 00:34:35,070
the list goes on and
on, you've heard those.

880
00:34:35,070 --> 00:34:36,677
What's forgotten, sometimes,

881
00:34:36,677 --> 00:34:40,850
is that it is Congress that
sets the funding level,

882
00:34:40,850 --> 00:34:42,730
not the administration.

883
00:34:42,730 --> 00:34:44,979
So, Mr. Secretary, is it fair to say

884
00:34:44,979 --> 00:34:47,350
that these trade-offs are the result

885
00:34:47,350 --> 00:34:50,950
of the lower topline that was
been approved by Congress?

886
00:34:50,950 --> 00:34:52,016
- They are, Senator.

887
00:34:52,016 --> 00:34:55,180
I would still scrub my budget
really hard year after year

888
00:34:55,180 --> 00:34:56,930
regardless 'cause I think it's necessary

889
00:34:56,930 --> 00:34:58,410
to do Defense-wide reviews,

890
00:34:58,410 --> 00:35:00,050
but as the Chairman mentioned up front,

891
00:35:00,050 --> 00:35:01,700
we have to get back on the trajectory

892
00:35:01,700 --> 00:35:04,260
of three to five percent
annual real growth

893
00:35:04,260 --> 00:35:07,630
if we're going to modernize the
force and implement the NDS.

894
00:35:07,630 --> 00:35:09,300
I was shown a number of few days ago

895
00:35:09,300 --> 00:35:11,810
that if you would go back
to the Budget Control Act

896
00:35:11,810 --> 00:35:13,287
I think was it was August 2011,

897
00:35:13,287 --> 00:35:15,120
and the amount of funding we would've had

898
00:35:15,120 --> 00:35:16,270
if we hadn't gone that course,

899
00:35:16,270 --> 00:35:20,810
it's somewhere between
$450 to $550 billion lost

900
00:35:20,810 --> 00:35:23,340
that we could've put into modernization.

901
00:35:23,340 --> 00:35:24,360
And so, that's the catch up

902
00:35:24,360 --> 00:35:26,330
we have to look at this point in time.

903
00:35:26,330 --> 00:35:27,418
- [Fischer] Thank you.

904
00:35:27,418 --> 00:35:29,810
- [Inhofe] Senator Shaheen.

905
00:35:29,810 --> 00:35:30,730
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman,

906
00:35:30,730 --> 00:35:33,473
thank you both for being
here and for your service.

907
00:35:34,990 --> 00:35:37,673
Secretary Esper, I appreciate
all of the comments

908
00:35:37,673 --> 00:35:39,930
that you've made about your efforts

909
00:35:39,930 --> 00:35:43,580
to find additional
funding within your budget

910
00:35:43,580 --> 00:35:45,759
given the constraints
that you're looking at.

911
00:35:45,759 --> 00:35:49,010
But as you're aware I'm sure,

912
00:35:49,010 --> 00:35:51,856
last year the Department
realigned $6.1 billion

913
00:35:51,856 --> 00:35:54,569
for its budget towards
constructing a border wall

914
00:35:54,569 --> 00:35:57,483
along the U.S. southern
border with Mexico.

915
00:35:58,410 --> 00:36:00,925
And more recently, the
administration is going

916
00:36:00,925 --> 00:36:03,140
to divert another $3.8 billion

917
00:36:03,140 --> 00:36:05,240
from the Pentagon toward the border wall,

918
00:36:05,240 --> 00:36:07,710
you're taking that from
a number of programs

919
00:36:07,710 --> 00:36:11,160
as Senator Reed outlined
in his opening statement

920
00:36:11,160 --> 00:36:13,860
including eight MQ-9 Reapers

921
00:36:15,020 --> 00:36:17,874
which we heard from General Wolters,

922
00:36:17,874 --> 00:36:19,820
are very important as they're looking

923
00:36:19,820 --> 00:36:22,800
at ISR along the Eastern European border.

924
00:36:22,800 --> 00:36:25,517
So, I guess, explain to me,

925
00:36:25,517 --> 00:36:30,517
how we can feel comfortable
with raiding the Defense budget

926
00:36:31,330 --> 00:36:33,550
at a time when you're telling us

927
00:36:33,550 --> 00:36:37,607
you have needs and are
expecting a shortfall

928
00:36:37,607 --> 00:36:42,060
based on a flatter budget for 2021?

929
00:36:42,060 --> 00:36:44,110
Why should we assume if you can divert

930
00:36:44,110 --> 00:36:45,804
that kind of money for the border wall

931
00:36:45,804 --> 00:36:47,390
that we should give you additional

932
00:36:47,390 --> 00:36:50,933
funding to address other areas of need?

933
00:36:52,290 --> 00:36:54,261
- Senator, as you know
the southwest border

934
00:36:54,261 --> 00:36:57,140
was declared a national
emergency by the President

935
00:36:57,140 --> 00:37:00,130
based on what has been
happening down there.

936
00:37:00,130 --> 00:37:01,553
- And as I'm sure you know,

937
00:37:02,400 --> 00:37:05,260
Congress actually voted that

938
00:37:05,260 --> 00:37:07,500
we did not agree with that designation

939
00:37:07,500 --> 00:37:10,590
and in fact it's only
because the President

940
00:37:10,590 --> 00:37:12,180
vetoed it that that didn't change

941
00:37:12,180 --> 00:37:14,160
and I think there are some real questions

942
00:37:14,160 --> 00:37:17,210
about whether taking money that has

943
00:37:17,210 --> 00:37:19,870
been appropriated by the Congress,

944
00:37:19,870 --> 00:37:23,260
signed into law for another use,

945
00:37:23,260 --> 00:37:26,730
is actually legal and constitutional.

946
00:37:26,730 --> 00:37:28,180
- Yes, Senator, I understand.

947
00:37:29,220 --> 00:37:31,570
With the declaration of
the national emergency,

948
00:37:33,600 --> 00:37:34,976
we were asked the support

949
00:37:34,976 --> 00:37:36,700
the Department of Homeland Security,

950
00:37:36,700 --> 00:37:38,570
border security is national security,

951
00:37:38,570 --> 00:37:41,380
with that, it is our
understanding under the law

952
00:37:41,380 --> 00:37:43,928
that as directed we are able to transfer

953
00:37:43,928 --> 00:37:45,840
that money to support that much like

954
00:37:45,840 --> 00:37:47,880
we do many other things

955
00:37:47,880 --> 00:37:49,510
whether it's fighting wildfires,

956
00:37:49,510 --> 00:37:50,710
or helping with floods,

957
00:37:50,710 --> 00:37:51,830
whatever the case may be.

958
00:37:51,830 --> 00:37:53,880
But I think the larger issues

959
00:37:53,880 --> 00:37:55,478
with regard to modernizing the force,

960
00:37:55,478 --> 00:37:58,763
we're talking about you know making

961
00:37:58,763 --> 00:38:00,512
some big investments that are going

962
00:38:00,512 --> 00:38:02,510
to require a divestiture of things

963
00:38:02,510 --> 00:38:04,260
we've done in the past in order to invest

964
00:38:04,260 --> 00:38:05,688
in the things we need in the future.

965
00:38:05,688 --> 00:38:09,200
I think, the demands
there pale in comparison

966
00:38:09,200 --> 00:38:13,220
to what is being used to
support DHS on the wall.

967
00:38:13,220 --> 00:38:16,570
- We had the Acting Secretary of DHS

968
00:38:16,570 --> 00:38:18,962
before the Appropriations
subcommittee last week,

969
00:38:18,962 --> 00:38:20,725
and he showed us numbers

970
00:38:20,725 --> 00:38:24,660
that indicated there are
significant dollars there

971
00:38:24,660 --> 00:38:26,910
for additional construction
on a border wall

972
00:38:26,910 --> 00:38:29,440
that they are not likely
to use in the next year.

973
00:38:29,440 --> 00:38:30,900
So, it's hard for me to understand

974
00:38:30,900 --> 00:38:33,010
how we can justify taking money

975
00:38:33,010 --> 00:38:34,742
that we need from our military

976
00:38:34,742 --> 00:38:37,960
to construct a wall along
the southern border.

977
00:38:37,960 --> 00:38:39,780
I'm not gonna ask you to respond to that,

978
00:38:39,780 --> 00:38:41,670
because I'm going to
be running out of time,

979
00:38:41,670 --> 00:38:43,860
but I think it's a very real question

980
00:38:43,860 --> 00:38:46,131
and I certainly hope that we won't see

981
00:38:46,131 --> 00:38:49,531
past this year any further
effort to take money

982
00:38:49,531 --> 00:38:52,810
from our military and I hope
you will commit to that.

983
00:38:52,810 --> 00:38:55,474
- Senator, at this time,
we don't foresee the need

984
00:38:55,474 --> 00:38:59,723
at this time to draw upon
these sources next year.

985
00:39:00,920 --> 00:39:02,820
I will follow up with
the Secretary to find out

986
00:39:02,820 --> 00:39:04,480
because we want to support DHS

987
00:39:04,480 --> 00:39:07,501
but not over support
DHS if that makes sense.

988
00:39:07,501 --> 00:39:09,130
- Thank you.

989
00:39:09,130 --> 00:39:13,320
I want to commend you on the
day that you were sworn in,

990
00:39:13,320 --> 00:39:14,690
appointing a commission to deal

991
00:39:14,690 --> 00:39:16,170
with PFAS contamination

992
00:39:16,170 --> 00:39:18,020
and it is an issue for us New Hampshire,

993
00:39:18,020 --> 00:39:19,040
as I know you're aware,

994
00:39:19,040 --> 00:39:21,670
as it is in so many other states.

995
00:39:21,670 --> 00:39:25,750
And I'm sure you know that the FY '20 NDAA

996
00:39:25,750 --> 00:39:27,440
included a provision to phase out

997
00:39:27,440 --> 00:39:29,676
the use of fluorine-containing
firefighting

998
00:39:29,676 --> 00:39:33,020
for military use by 2024.

999
00:39:33,020 --> 00:39:34,797
Can you give us an update on where

1000
00:39:34,797 --> 00:39:38,520
the military is in finding an alternative?

1001
00:39:38,520 --> 00:39:42,080
- Yes, ma'am, we're working
that issue, hard to replace,

1002
00:39:42,080 --> 00:39:45,220
it's what the AFFF, I
think, it's an acronym.

1003
00:39:45,220 --> 00:39:46,410
The three things we're focusing on

1004
00:39:46,410 --> 00:39:47,480
is the replacement for that.

1005
00:39:47,480 --> 00:39:49,550
Number two, making sure we're
taking care of our people

1006
00:39:49,550 --> 00:39:52,660
and then the communities
that they live in or near.

1007
00:39:52,660 --> 00:39:53,730
And then, number three,

1008
00:39:53,730 --> 00:39:55,444
making sure we understand
the health effects

1009
00:39:55,444 --> 00:39:58,253
on humans from these foams.

1010
00:39:59,219 --> 00:40:00,250
So, the task force has been

1011
00:40:00,250 --> 00:40:02,910
working very hard since I launched them,

1012
00:40:02,910 --> 00:40:04,150
integrating well with EPA

1013
00:40:04,150 --> 00:40:05,460
and other parts of the government.

1014
00:40:05,460 --> 00:40:07,810
I hope to have a report
come up here very soon

1015
00:40:07,810 --> 00:40:10,380
within a week or two to update you on that

1016
00:40:10,380 --> 00:40:12,640
and the progress we're making.

1017
00:40:12,640 --> 00:40:14,130
And I know we have some hard marks to make

1018
00:40:14,130 --> 00:40:19,130
in terms of replacing the current
foam with a new mechanism.

1019
00:40:19,370 --> 00:40:20,203
But we've been putting a lot

1020
00:40:20,203 --> 00:40:21,240
of dollars into researching that,

1021
00:40:21,240 --> 00:40:24,520
I wanna say we went from
$139 million last year

1022
00:40:24,520 --> 00:40:25,690
to $200 million this year

1023
00:40:25,690 --> 00:40:28,820
requested to tackle PFAS, PFOA.

1024
00:40:28,820 --> 00:40:29,816
- Thank you

1025
00:40:29,816 --> 00:40:30,840
I appreciate your continued commitment.

1026
00:40:30,840 --> 00:40:32,783
I think it's something that
we all need to work on.

1027
00:40:32,783 --> 00:40:34,343
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1028
00:40:39,750 --> 00:40:41,400
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1029
00:40:41,400 --> 00:40:42,590
Gentlemen, first let me begin

1030
00:40:42,590 --> 00:40:44,441
by thanking you and your families

1031
00:40:44,441 --> 00:40:47,477
for your decades of service.

1032
00:40:47,477 --> 00:40:48,870
It is not unnoticed

1033
00:40:48,870 --> 00:40:51,470
and we most certainly
appreciate what you have done.

1034
00:40:53,460 --> 00:40:55,537
General Milley, I'd
like to begin with you,

1035
00:40:55,537 --> 00:40:57,190
part of the discussion,

1036
00:40:57,190 --> 00:40:59,630
and Senator Shaheen has
started this discussion,

1037
00:40:59,630 --> 00:41:01,870
with regard to the resources that we have

1038
00:41:01,870 --> 00:41:03,921
and the needs for those resources.

1039
00:41:03,921 --> 00:41:05,610
I'd like to give you an opportunity

1040
00:41:05,610 --> 00:41:07,410
to talk a little bit about a modernization

1041
00:41:07,410 --> 00:41:10,470
but also I want to talk
about readiness today.

1042
00:41:10,470 --> 00:41:12,820
I want to preface it by simply sharing

1043
00:41:12,820 --> 00:41:14,314
that over the last number of years

1044
00:41:14,314 --> 00:41:17,240
this committee has received reports

1045
00:41:17,240 --> 00:41:18,810
about the challenges we have

1046
00:41:18,810 --> 00:41:23,780
and readiness of our Armed Forces today.

1047
00:41:23,780 --> 00:41:24,843
And the fact that over a period of years

1048
00:41:24,843 --> 00:41:27,790
and the fact that as you
have both alluded to,

1049
00:41:27,790 --> 00:41:30,160
we've had or we've been
at war for 20 years

1050
00:41:30,160 --> 00:41:31,910
and that takes its toll.

1051
00:41:31,910 --> 00:41:33,190
When it comes to the equipment

1052
00:41:33,190 --> 00:41:35,635
that our young men and women use,

1053
00:41:35,635 --> 00:41:37,310
I'm just gonna list 'em out

1054
00:41:37,310 --> 00:41:40,340
and I'd like to have you, if
you could, give us an update.

1055
00:41:40,340 --> 00:41:42,990
B-1s, May of last year we had six of them

1056
00:41:42,990 --> 00:41:44,830
that were actually operational.

1057
00:41:44,830 --> 00:41:48,090
FA-18s, at one point, a
little over a year ago,

1058
00:41:48,090 --> 00:41:50,050
was reported at less than 40%

1059
00:41:50,050 --> 00:41:53,187
or at about 40% were operational.

1060
00:41:53,187 --> 00:41:55,690
F-15Cs, you were limited

1061
00:41:55,690 --> 00:41:58,290
to about two Gs in terms of maneuvering,

1062
00:41:58,290 --> 00:42:03,290
less than what a king air
would do in regular aviation.

1063
00:42:03,710 --> 00:42:05,990
You've got approximately, on F-22s,

1064
00:42:05,990 --> 00:42:09,040
you've got perhaps 125 remaining

1065
00:42:09,040 --> 00:42:13,891
that might be operational at
a time, a percentage of those.

1066
00:42:13,891 --> 00:42:15,590
With regard to your nuclear submarines,

1067
00:42:15,590 --> 00:42:17,150
your attack submarines,

1068
00:42:17,150 --> 00:42:19,610
you've got four of them
right now that are at dock.

1069
00:42:19,610 --> 00:42:21,960
I believe the Boise may be in dry dock now

1070
00:42:21,960 --> 00:42:24,053
but nonetheless, clearly,

1071
00:42:24,053 --> 00:42:26,171
we've got a shortfall there

1072
00:42:26,171 --> 00:42:28,570
of nuclear attack submarines

1073
00:42:28,570 --> 00:42:32,205
that are sitting, waiting
for their half-life to begin.

1074
00:42:32,205 --> 00:42:34,140
Along with that right now,

1075
00:42:34,140 --> 00:42:38,520
I think you've got somewhere
around 31 BCTs in the Army.

1076
00:42:38,520 --> 00:42:39,560
I'd like to know, I think,

1077
00:42:39,560 --> 00:42:43,823
at one point we had a few
as less than single digits,

1078
00:42:43,823 --> 00:42:45,839
the numbers that were
ready to fight tonight.

1079
00:42:45,839 --> 00:42:49,070
General Milley, are we making progress?

1080
00:42:49,070 --> 00:42:50,360
And can you give us an update just

1081
00:42:50,360 --> 00:42:52,050
on these particular ones with regard

1082
00:42:52,050 --> 00:42:54,660
to where we may have
improved on those numbers

1083
00:42:54,660 --> 00:42:56,163
over the last couple of years?

1084
00:42:57,890 --> 00:43:00,242
- Thanks, Senator, for the opportunity.

1085
00:43:00,242 --> 00:43:01,720
What I'd like to do, if I could,

1086
00:43:01,720 --> 00:43:03,455
is get you the specific numbers,

1087
00:43:03,455 --> 00:43:05,550
they're on this card, but
this card's classified.

1088
00:43:05,550 --> 00:43:08,640
So, actual readiness data
by type weapon system,

1089
00:43:08,640 --> 00:43:10,862
with numbers that you're talking about,

1090
00:43:10,862 --> 00:43:12,390
is classified information.

1091
00:43:12,390 --> 00:43:14,720
We don't want the enemy of
our country to know all that.

1092
00:43:14,720 --> 00:43:16,106
On the one hand.

1093
00:43:16,106 --> 00:43:17,091
On the other hand,

1094
00:43:17,091 --> 00:43:18,240
I can tell you that it has improved.

1095
00:43:18,240 --> 00:43:22,050
And I would put in about a third or so

1096
00:43:22,050 --> 00:43:23,320
as I look at these numbers,

1097
00:43:23,320 --> 00:43:24,440
about a third improved over

1098
00:43:24,440 --> 00:43:25,840
the numbers you probably saw

1099
00:43:25,840 --> 00:43:28,280
anywhere between 12 and 24 months ago.

1100
00:43:28,280 --> 00:43:30,220
So, there is two steps
forward, one step backward

1101
00:43:30,220 --> 00:43:32,350
in some of the stuff
in terms of readiness,

1102
00:43:32,350 --> 00:43:34,400
and we monitor very,
very closely every month.

1103
00:43:34,400 --> 00:43:37,571
And it has improved and I
can get you the exact data,

1104
00:43:37,571 --> 00:43:40,502
if you'd allow me to do
that in a classified way.

1105
00:43:40,502 --> 00:43:41,690
- That's fine, sir.

1106
00:43:41,690 --> 00:43:42,523
I just want to make it clear,

1107
00:43:42,523 --> 00:43:43,760
the numbers that I gave you

1108
00:43:43,760 --> 00:43:46,490
I received in a non-classified session.

1109
00:43:46,490 --> 00:43:49,240
As a matter of fact, in an
open session just like this.

1110
00:43:50,180 --> 00:43:52,320
But, the reason for my point,

1111
00:43:52,320 --> 00:43:53,720
is not to be critical but rather

1112
00:43:53,720 --> 00:43:55,950
to point out how important it is

1113
00:43:55,950 --> 00:43:57,520
that we have the resources available

1114
00:43:57,520 --> 00:44:00,543
to you to continue to
make those improvements.

1115
00:44:01,450 --> 00:44:02,980
- Readiness is our number one

1116
00:44:02,980 --> 00:44:06,050
in terms of the amount of money that

1117
00:44:06,050 --> 00:44:08,420
we're putting towards this
budget and in past budgets.

1118
00:44:08,420 --> 00:44:09,630
We're trying to radically improve

1119
00:44:09,630 --> 00:44:10,720
the readiness of our force.

1120
00:44:10,720 --> 00:44:12,130
The fight tonight sort of thing.

1121
00:44:12,130 --> 00:44:13,981
And at the same time,

1122
00:44:13,981 --> 00:44:14,814
you have to have balance for modernization

1123
00:44:14,814 --> 00:44:15,700
for the changing character war.

1124
00:44:15,700 --> 00:44:18,220
Against those investments that

1125
00:44:18,220 --> 00:44:20,370
the Secretary talked about earlier.

1126
00:44:20,370 --> 00:44:21,601
- I think the fact that we're modernizing

1127
00:44:21,601 --> 00:44:24,074
our nuclear weapons system
is probably absolutely,

1128
00:44:24,074 --> 00:44:26,793
it is absolutely critical
because right now

1129
00:44:26,793 --> 00:44:31,793
based upon our non-military capabilities,

1130
00:44:32,132 --> 00:44:33,970
they fear our military because

1131
00:44:33,970 --> 00:44:37,250
of our nuclear capabilities
as much as anything else.

1132
00:44:37,250 --> 00:44:38,344
- There is no question about it.

1133
00:44:38,344 --> 00:44:41,090
Peace through strength is
not just a bumper sticker,

1134
00:44:41,090 --> 00:44:42,869
it matters and the whole
idea of deterrence,

1135
00:44:42,869 --> 00:44:46,010
you have to have the capability
and the will to use it

1136
00:44:46,010 --> 00:44:46,870
and your enemies gotta know

1137
00:44:46,870 --> 00:44:48,340
that you have the capability and the will.

1138
00:44:48,340 --> 00:44:50,080
And so, the capability is important

1139
00:44:50,080 --> 00:44:51,800
and that goes right
into the readiness piece

1140
00:44:51,800 --> 00:44:52,850
and we want to make sure that

1141
00:44:52,850 --> 00:44:54,610
our enemies know that we are ready.

1142
00:44:54,610 --> 00:44:57,540
In my opening statement
I said that we are ready.

1143
00:44:57,540 --> 00:44:59,490
I don't expect you to take it on faith,

1144
00:44:59,490 --> 00:45:01,050
I'd like to report out in a classified way

1145
00:45:01,050 --> 00:45:04,000
exactly how ready by
type system if I could.

1146
00:45:04,000 --> 00:45:05,334
- Thank you.

1147
00:45:05,334 --> 00:45:06,167
- Senator, if I may,
what you're looking at

1148
00:45:06,167 --> 00:45:07,120
is a trade-off between

1149
00:45:07,120 --> 00:45:08,790
current readiness and future readiness.

1150
00:45:08,790 --> 00:45:10,190
And Senator Fischer draws this out,

1151
00:45:10,190 --> 00:45:14,013
I talk about $450 to $550
billion of lost funding.

1152
00:45:14,013 --> 00:45:16,170
It's really important when
you're trying to recapitalize,

1153
00:45:16,170 --> 00:45:17,480
whether it is the Army, Navy,

1154
00:45:17,480 --> 00:45:19,400
or the Air Force, or Marine Corps,

1155
00:45:19,400 --> 00:45:21,730
particularly big capital
projects like shipbuilding,

1156
00:45:21,730 --> 00:45:22,990
if you don't have that funding,

1157
00:45:22,990 --> 00:45:25,940
if it's not predictable and
steady for the industrial base,

1158
00:45:27,170 --> 00:45:28,550
you just can't build what you do,

1159
00:45:28,550 --> 00:45:29,593
so what you're doing is,

1160
00:45:29,593 --> 00:45:30,970
it's like driving an old car,

1161
00:45:30,970 --> 00:45:32,150
you reach the point where you're putting

1162
00:45:32,150 --> 00:45:33,910
so much maintenance into the old car,

1163
00:45:33,910 --> 00:45:36,520
you gotta buy the new one or
else it's a losing battle.

1164
00:45:36,520 --> 00:45:37,353
- No question, sir,

1165
00:45:37,353 --> 00:45:39,210
and you're making the point

1166
00:45:39,210 --> 00:45:40,510
that I think we want to have made,

1167
00:45:40,510 --> 00:45:43,750
which is you can't do it
without continued resources

1168
00:45:43,750 --> 00:45:46,920
on an expected basis year to year.

1169
00:45:46,920 --> 00:45:48,217
I think you are making progress

1170
00:45:48,217 --> 00:45:50,930
and I was hoping to be able
to share some of that progress

1171
00:45:50,930 --> 00:45:53,037
but if given the appropriate resources

1172
00:45:53,037 --> 00:45:56,816
we are making improvements
and will continue to.

1173
00:45:56,816 --> 00:45:59,830
But I agree, it's readiness
versus modernization

1174
00:45:59,830 --> 00:46:01,120
in many, many cases.

1175
00:46:01,120 --> 00:46:04,210
That trade-off is tough
to handle once in a while.

1176
00:46:04,210 --> 00:46:05,410
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1177
00:46:07,960 --> 00:46:09,550
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1178
00:46:09,550 --> 00:46:12,580
We're all monitoring
the coronavirus closely

1179
00:46:12,580 --> 00:46:14,242
and I appreciate the Department

1180
00:46:14,242 --> 00:46:16,240
taking this seriously and working

1181
00:46:16,240 --> 00:46:19,060
to keep our service members
and their families safe.

1182
00:46:19,060 --> 00:46:21,699
And while in Hawaii we do
not have any confirmed cases,

1183
00:46:21,699 --> 00:46:24,040
we are a gateway for travelers

1184
00:46:24,040 --> 00:46:27,160
from China, South Korea, Japan,

1185
00:46:27,160 --> 00:46:30,480
so we must be exceptionally
vigilant and coordinated.

1186
00:46:30,480 --> 00:46:31,860
Mr. Secretary, will you commit to me

1187
00:46:31,860 --> 00:46:35,380
that the DOD Will act
quickly on requests made

1188
00:46:35,380 --> 00:46:38,017
by the state of Hawaii
to assist with response

1189
00:46:38,017 --> 00:46:39,770
in the event it is needed,

1190
00:46:39,770 --> 00:46:41,770
I know there's some
factors we have to meet,

1191
00:46:41,770 --> 00:46:44,080
pursuant to the national
response framework

1192
00:46:44,080 --> 00:46:48,480
and DOD directive 30325.18?

1193
00:46:48,480 --> 00:46:49,800
- Yes, ma'am, under Title X,

1194
00:46:49,800 --> 00:46:51,440
of course Title 32 would require

1195
00:46:51,440 --> 00:46:52,760
action by the governor first.

1196
00:46:52,760 --> 00:46:53,720
- Yes, I understand.

1197
00:46:53,720 --> 00:46:55,350
That's my question.

1198
00:46:55,350 --> 00:46:57,983
So, Mr. Secretary you said
in your posture statement

1199
00:46:57,983 --> 00:46:59,924
that the Indo-Pacific remains

1200
00:46:59,924 --> 00:47:03,240
DOD's number one priority region.

1201
00:47:03,240 --> 00:47:04,570
I have a series of questions about

1202
00:47:04,570 --> 00:47:05,910
the threat in this region

1203
00:47:05,910 --> 00:47:08,910
and as I have only now four minutes left,

1204
00:47:08,910 --> 00:47:10,760
I'd really appreciate your answers

1205
00:47:10,760 --> 00:47:13,703
to be very brief and a
yes or no would be great.

1206
00:47:14,710 --> 00:47:16,360
In your statement you say North Korea

1207
00:47:16,360 --> 00:47:18,090
is seeking to build legitimacy

1208
00:47:18,090 --> 00:47:19,740
through the development of a variety

1209
00:47:19,740 --> 00:47:22,375
of nuclear conventional
and unconventional weapons

1210
00:47:22,375 --> 00:47:26,260
and by growing its ballistic
missile capabilities.

1211
00:47:26,260 --> 00:47:28,240
Is the threat of North
Korea's ballistic missile

1212
00:47:28,240 --> 00:47:31,820
capabilities becoming
increasingly dangerous?

1213
00:47:31,820 --> 00:47:33,570
- It's becoming increasingly complicated

1214
00:47:33,570 --> 00:47:36,930
as they seek to modernize the
full range of missile systems.

1215
00:47:36,930 --> 00:47:38,810
- So, I'd say that's a yes.

1216
00:47:38,810 --> 00:47:40,170
You say in your posture statement

1217
00:47:40,170 --> 00:47:42,020
that the FY '21 budget request

1218
00:47:42,020 --> 00:47:44,947
is directed toward achieving, and I quote,

1219
00:47:44,947 --> 00:47:48,630
"Irreversible implementation of NDS"

1220
00:47:48,630 --> 00:47:51,700
which includes enhancing
missile defense capabilities

1221
00:47:51,700 --> 00:47:54,237
pursuant to the 2019
missile defense review,

1222
00:47:54,237 --> 00:47:56,110
that's correct isn't?

1223
00:47:56,110 --> 00:47:57,580
- Yes, we are putting additional money

1224
00:47:57,580 --> 00:47:59,630
into missile defense and defeat.

1225
00:47:59,630 --> 00:48:01,640
- Do the North Korean
long-range ballistic missiles

1226
00:48:01,640 --> 00:48:03,220
pose a threat to the United States

1227
00:48:03,220 --> 00:48:04,933
which, of course, includes Hawaii?

1228
00:48:07,090 --> 00:48:10,760
- Yes, if our intelligence
is correct they would.

1229
00:48:10,760 --> 00:48:12,038
- Yes.

1230
00:48:12,038 --> 00:48:13,354
And you also state your budget request

1231
00:48:13,354 --> 00:48:17,176
"Increases this missile
defense capability and capacity

1232
00:48:17,176 --> 00:48:20,572
"to keep pace with
adversary missile systems"

1233
00:48:20,572 --> 00:48:24,950
while investing in a layered
defense of the homeland.

1234
00:48:24,950 --> 00:48:27,948
But Mr. Secretary, in spite of
four years of authorizations

1235
00:48:27,948 --> 00:48:30,512
and three years of
appropriations from Congress,

1236
00:48:30,512 --> 00:48:33,870
and your own 2019 missile defense review,

1237
00:48:33,870 --> 00:48:36,240
you have zeroed out the HDR Hawaii,

1238
00:48:36,240 --> 00:48:38,410
which is radar for Hawaii,

1239
00:48:38,410 --> 00:48:40,590
which is part of a system that provides

1240
00:48:40,590 --> 00:48:42,719
layered defense of the homeland.

1241
00:48:42,719 --> 00:48:47,719
Is this decision to zero
out the funding for HDR-H

1242
00:48:48,000 --> 00:48:52,220
a decision to not build
this radar at all in Hawaii?

1243
00:48:52,220 --> 00:48:53,667
- Not necessarily, Senator.

1244
00:48:53,667 --> 00:48:54,900
As you know for many years now

1245
00:48:54,900 --> 00:48:57,170
we've had a problem with
state and local authorities

1246
00:48:57,170 --> 00:48:58,940
giving us permission
to get on to that site

1247
00:48:58,940 --> 00:49:01,240
and do what we need to
do, if I recall correctly.

1248
00:49:01,240 --> 00:49:02,840
And it's seemed that their latest report

1249
00:49:02,840 --> 00:49:04,520
we had the time building the budget

1250
00:49:04,520 --> 00:49:06,210
is we probably wouldn't see any resolution

1251
00:49:06,210 --> 00:49:08,030
for another year or two or three.

1252
00:49:08,030 --> 00:49:10,900
- So, does that mean that we
can expect you to request?

1253
00:49:10,900 --> 00:49:13,640
I'm very familiar with certain delays

1254
00:49:13,640 --> 00:49:14,958
with regards to the siting.

1255
00:49:14,958 --> 00:49:17,532
Does this mean that we
can expect a request

1256
00:49:17,532 --> 00:49:21,550
of money for the HDR-H in Fiscal Year '22?

1257
00:49:21,550 --> 00:49:23,390
- I think when we see a light
at the end of the tunnel

1258
00:49:23,390 --> 00:49:26,470
with regard to getting
clearance to build, yes, ma'am.

1259
00:49:26,470 --> 00:49:27,570
- That's good to know.

1260
00:49:29,940 --> 00:49:32,060
Because otherwise the decision to zero out

1261
00:49:32,060 --> 00:49:35,990
the HDR-H and reprioritizing the funds

1262
00:49:35,990 --> 00:49:39,300
from DOD's number one
priority region as you say

1263
00:49:39,300 --> 00:49:41,633
for another purpose
really doesn't make sense.

1264
00:49:43,700 --> 00:49:45,090
I'd also like to have a commitment

1265
00:49:45,090 --> 00:49:48,250
from you now that you will not seek

1266
00:49:48,250 --> 00:49:51,462
to repurpose F-20 funding for this radar

1267
00:49:51,462 --> 00:49:53,020
that is still being used

1268
00:49:53,020 --> 00:49:56,200
to continue the HDR-H Hawaii contract.

1269
00:49:56,200 --> 00:49:57,770
- Senator, I'm not sure I
can make that commitment

1270
00:49:57,770 --> 00:50:00,150
'cause I'm not sure I fully
understand what you're asking

1271
00:50:00,150 --> 00:50:01,700
but again what we're trying to do

1272
00:50:01,700 --> 00:50:03,020
is in the era of tight budgets

1273
00:50:03,020 --> 00:50:04,730
make sure we don't put
money against something that

1274
00:50:04,730 --> 00:50:07,670
has no possibility of being
affected in the near term.

1275
00:50:07,670 --> 00:50:10,250
- Well I don't know what you
mean by the near term because.

1276
00:50:10,250 --> 00:50:12,440
This radar is part of the system

1277
00:50:12,440 --> 00:50:16,000
and it was supposed to be
pretty much operational by 2023,

1278
00:50:16,000 --> 00:50:18,489
which means that aside from the delays

1279
00:50:18,489 --> 00:50:21,460
that I understand that's occurred,

1280
00:50:21,460 --> 00:50:22,750
we're supposed to be on track,

1281
00:50:22,750 --> 00:50:26,170
because that's what the National
Defense Strategy calls for.

1282
00:50:26,170 --> 00:50:30,518
So, in 2020 there was $188 million.

1283
00:50:30,518 --> 00:50:34,040
This is being expended even as we speak,

1284
00:50:34,040 --> 00:50:36,740
so I would like to know
that you are not going

1285
00:50:36,740 --> 00:50:40,600
to repurpose this funding
that's already there

1286
00:50:43,250 --> 00:50:44,290
for other purposes.

1287
00:50:44,290 --> 00:50:45,916
- Yes, ma'am.

1288
00:50:45,916 --> 00:50:46,960
If I recall the issue properly,

1289
00:50:46,960 --> 00:50:49,130
it's developing of the
system is one thing,

1290
00:50:49,130 --> 00:50:52,100
but if I develop a system
and I can't put it somewhere,

1291
00:50:52,100 --> 00:50:53,820
it has no effect, it's wasted money.

1292
00:50:53,820 --> 00:50:57,231
- Well, you know that this
contract, as far as I know,

1293
00:50:57,231 --> 00:51:00,050
Lockheed Martin is already
building this radar,

1294
00:51:00,050 --> 00:51:02,790
so there's already a contract for them.

1295
00:51:02,790 --> 00:51:06,400
This thing was supposed
to be operational in 2023.

1296
00:51:06,400 --> 00:51:08,740
So, if we don't go ahead with this

1297
00:51:08,740 --> 00:51:09,770
I think that you are gonna have

1298
00:51:09,770 --> 00:51:12,840
some contractual things to deal with,

1299
00:51:12,840 --> 00:51:15,830
but what I'm hearing from you is,

1300
00:51:15,830 --> 00:51:17,550
aside from the delays that were caused

1301
00:51:17,550 --> 00:51:20,470
by the siting mainly of this radar,

1302
00:51:20,470 --> 00:51:24,020
that you have a commitment
to pursue the radar

1303
00:51:24,020 --> 00:51:24,980
and have it built in Hawaii

1304
00:51:24,980 --> 00:51:27,140
as part of our system, our
missile defense system.

1305
00:51:27,140 --> 00:51:28,123
- I'm making a commitment to you

1306
00:51:28,123 --> 00:51:30,100
that we of course intend to defend

1307
00:51:30,100 --> 00:51:32,230
all 50 United States and territories

1308
00:51:32,230 --> 00:51:34,100
with radars and effectors as necessary,

1309
00:51:34,100 --> 00:51:36,560
what I need to come back to you with

1310
00:51:36,560 --> 00:51:38,400
is a better understanding
of where things lie.

1311
00:51:38,400 --> 00:51:39,780
It's one thing to build radar

1312
00:51:39,780 --> 00:51:42,250
but if I invest hundreds of
million dollars in a radar,

1313
00:51:42,250 --> 00:51:44,170
and then cannot place it somewhere,

1314
00:51:44,170 --> 00:51:45,670
then it's wasted many.

1315
00:51:45,670 --> 00:51:46,795
- Of course I realize that.

1316
00:51:46,795 --> 00:51:48,380
That's not what I'm asking.

1317
00:51:48,380 --> 00:51:49,213
Thank you.

1318
00:51:51,510 --> 00:51:52,343
- [Inhofe] Senator Ernst is recognized,

1319
00:51:52,343 --> 00:51:54,053
Senator Fischer is presiding.

1320
00:51:55,540 --> 00:51:56,500
- Thank you, Mr. Chair,

1321
00:51:56,500 --> 00:51:58,080
and thank you, gentlemen, very much

1322
00:51:58,080 --> 00:52:00,840
for being with us this afternoon.

1323
00:52:00,840 --> 00:52:03,625
There are a few things
that I'm very interested in

1324
00:52:03,625 --> 00:52:07,780
as the chair of Emerging
Threats and Capabilities

1325
00:52:07,780 --> 00:52:11,360
and, of course, one of
those is hypersonics.

1326
00:52:11,360 --> 00:52:14,680
And Secretary Esper if I could
focus on that for a moment.

1327
00:52:14,680 --> 00:52:16,810
A key component of our NDS

1328
00:52:16,810 --> 00:52:19,021
is assessing and recalibrating our posture

1329
00:52:19,021 --> 00:52:23,940
with regards, of course, to
the great power competition.

1330
00:52:23,940 --> 00:52:27,920
China has a leg up, we can't dispute that,

1331
00:52:27,920 --> 00:52:29,550
in developing technologies

1332
00:52:29,550 --> 00:52:32,270
like hypersonic aircraft and missiles.

1333
00:52:32,270 --> 00:52:34,330
And the technology could give users

1334
00:52:34,330 --> 00:52:36,604
the tactical long-range capability

1335
00:52:36,604 --> 00:52:40,747
to hit targets yet with
such speed and surprise

1336
00:52:40,747 --> 00:52:44,460
that defending against them
is very, very difficult.

1337
00:52:44,460 --> 00:52:46,690
Great concern to all of us.

1338
00:52:46,690 --> 00:52:48,850
So, how is the DOD investing

1339
00:52:48,850 --> 00:52:52,178
in deconflicting research
priorities across the Services?

1340
00:52:52,178 --> 00:52:54,850
We have a lot of research
going on out there

1341
00:52:54,850 --> 00:52:58,530
to limit the duplicative
spending on hypersonics.

1342
00:52:58,530 --> 00:52:59,852
- Thank you, Senator.

1343
00:52:59,852 --> 00:53:00,877
First of all you're correct,

1344
00:53:00,877 --> 00:53:02,640
hypersonics is one of our top priorities

1345
00:53:02,640 --> 00:53:05,770
in terms of developing capability,
lethality in that field.

1346
00:53:05,770 --> 00:53:07,260
We are doing very innovative work

1347
00:53:07,260 --> 00:53:09,240
and I will tell you it's more innovative

1348
00:53:09,240 --> 00:53:10,290
than what you would see coming out

1349
00:53:10,290 --> 00:53:12,087
of Russia or China I can assure you that.

1350
00:53:12,087 --> 00:53:12,920
- Good.

1351
00:53:12,920 --> 00:53:15,230
- We have maximized every
dollar we put into this year,

1352
00:53:15,230 --> 00:53:18,279
I think it's $3.2 billion over the FYDP,

1353
00:53:18,279 --> 00:53:20,440
to make sure that we get inventory

1354
00:53:20,440 --> 00:53:22,019
out in the field as soon as possible.

1355
00:53:22,019 --> 00:53:24,590
Each of the Services has
a variety of programs,

1356
00:53:24,590 --> 00:53:26,580
DARPA has programs as well,

1357
00:53:26,580 --> 00:53:29,329
and through either collaboration
between the Services

1358
00:53:29,329 --> 00:53:32,094
or through work through our
R&E shop under Dr. GRiffin,

1359
00:53:32,094 --> 00:53:33,330
we're working very hard

1360
00:53:33,330 --> 00:53:34,860
to make sure there's not duplication

1361
00:53:34,860 --> 00:53:36,220
but more importantly sharing

1362
00:53:36,220 --> 00:53:38,242
and we see a lot of sharing
between the Services.

1363
00:53:38,242 --> 00:53:40,859
So, I'm very confident
that in the next few years

1364
00:53:40,859 --> 00:53:44,663
we'll be deploying hypersonic
weapons as the commanders,

1365
00:53:44,663 --> 00:53:45,990
and even throughout the theater,

1366
00:53:45,990 --> 00:53:48,400
but in the Indo-Pacific
theater in particular.

1367
00:53:48,400 --> 00:53:49,233
- Just to be clear,

1368
00:53:49,233 --> 00:53:52,270
you said it's $3.2 billion over FYDP.

1369
00:53:52,270 --> 00:53:54,280
- No, ma'am, it's $3.2 billion this year.

1370
00:53:54,280 --> 00:53:55,113
- This year?

1371
00:53:55,113 --> 00:53:55,946
Okay.

1372
00:53:57,512 --> 00:53:59,000
And you feel that that is sufficient?

1373
00:53:59,000 --> 00:54:00,970
- I asked multiple times to make sure,

1374
00:54:00,970 --> 00:54:03,280
is that every single dollar
we can put against it

1375
00:54:03,280 --> 00:54:04,982
and effectively use, in other words,

1376
00:54:04,982 --> 00:54:08,060
one more extra dollar
would be a wasted dollar.

1377
00:54:08,060 --> 00:54:09,647
I was assured multiple times that was

1378
00:54:09,647 --> 00:54:12,250
the max we could put into that.

1379
00:54:12,250 --> 00:54:13,507
- Thank you, Secretary.

1380
00:54:13,507 --> 00:54:18,180
How does this fit into our
nuclear modernization efforts?

1381
00:54:18,180 --> 00:54:19,030
- It certainly gives us,

1382
00:54:19,030 --> 00:54:21,112
we're talking about
conventional systems here.

1383
00:54:21,112 --> 00:54:24,980
It gives us incredible strike capability

1384
00:54:24,980 --> 00:54:26,190
below the nuclear threshold

1385
00:54:26,190 --> 00:54:28,380
which is important to
reach out at long-ranges

1386
00:54:28,380 --> 00:54:29,920
to strike somebody with precision

1387
00:54:29,920 --> 00:54:34,117
at speeds of five, 10
times the speed of sound

1388
00:54:34,117 --> 00:54:35,590
with great capability

1389
00:54:35,590 --> 00:54:38,480
and it's going to give us a lot of reach

1390
00:54:38,480 --> 00:54:39,780
which is what we'll need

1391
00:54:39,780 --> 00:54:41,451
in a conflict against a near peer.

1392
00:54:41,451 --> 00:54:42,540
- Absolutely.

1393
00:54:42,540 --> 00:54:43,373
Thank you.

1394
00:54:43,373 --> 00:54:45,516
And Mr. Secretary,

1395
00:54:45,516 --> 00:54:48,208
I know that we're embracing innovation

1396
00:54:48,208 --> 00:54:50,610
at every level possible,

1397
00:54:50,610 --> 00:54:52,300
and I appreciate that within the DOD,

1398
00:54:52,300 --> 00:54:54,760
and we're modernizing
to give our warfighters

1399
00:54:54,760 --> 00:54:57,920
that tactical advantage
over our adversaries

1400
00:54:57,920 --> 00:55:00,830
and, of course, another
area I'm interested in

1401
00:55:00,830 --> 00:55:04,050
is quantum information
systems, technology,

1402
00:55:04,050 --> 00:55:06,183
again one of Mr. Griffin's areas.

1403
00:55:07,880 --> 00:55:09,400
We are exploring options

1404
00:55:09,400 --> 00:55:12,450
for quantum integration
in a variety of areas.

1405
00:55:12,450 --> 00:55:15,520
However, we hear from various industry

1406
00:55:15,520 --> 00:55:19,030
that DOD requirements are too broad

1407
00:55:19,030 --> 00:55:21,940
for the current scope of research.

1408
00:55:21,940 --> 00:55:24,575
And what the industry
leaders are recommending

1409
00:55:24,575 --> 00:55:28,280
is that the DOD refine their requirements

1410
00:55:28,280 --> 00:55:33,280
and this can help drive unified
efforts to advance rapidly,

1411
00:55:33,320 --> 00:55:35,370
first in a narrow area instead

1412
00:55:35,370 --> 00:55:40,050
of slowly across a very large spectrum.

1413
00:55:40,050 --> 00:55:44,090
Can you speak a little bit
to some of the advances

1414
00:55:44,090 --> 00:55:46,700
we're seeing in quantum
information systems?

1415
00:55:46,700 --> 00:55:47,811
- Yes ma'am.

1416
00:55:47,811 --> 00:55:49,176
Quantum definitely is a top priority,

1417
00:55:49,176 --> 00:55:50,410
it's probably in the
top tier, if you will.

1418
00:55:50,410 --> 00:55:53,000
Dr. Griffin's very passionate about this.

1419
00:55:53,000 --> 00:55:55,090
I'll have to go back
and get you an answer.

1420
00:55:55,090 --> 00:55:56,710
Typically what we ask of industry, though,

1421
00:55:56,710 --> 00:56:00,410
is, they ask us not to give
them requirements per se,

1422
00:56:00,410 --> 00:56:03,344
and they ask us to tell them
the solution we're looking for,

1423
00:56:03,344 --> 00:56:05,330
tell them the problem
we're trying to solve

1424
00:56:05,330 --> 00:56:07,551
and let them help us develop a solution,

1425
00:56:07,551 --> 00:56:09,930
so this is a little bit different

1426
00:56:09,930 --> 00:56:10,810
than what I typically hear

1427
00:56:10,810 --> 00:56:13,280
so I'd like to run this
down and come back to you.

1428
00:56:13,280 --> 00:56:15,988
- And certainly, we'd
love to partner on that.

1429
00:56:15,988 --> 00:56:18,575
It's just critical that
in some of these areas

1430
00:56:18,575 --> 00:56:21,100
that we see in Emerging
Threats and Capabilities,

1431
00:56:21,100 --> 00:56:22,620
a lot of the discussions that we have

1432
00:56:22,620 --> 00:56:25,910
that we are very focused
on advancing technology

1433
00:56:25,910 --> 00:56:30,041
and working with industry
partners, small businesses

1434
00:56:30,041 --> 00:56:32,020
and so forth in that area.

1435
00:56:32,020 --> 00:56:34,350
But I do appreciate you both, gentlemen,

1436
00:56:34,350 --> 00:56:35,820
very much for being here today.

1437
00:56:35,820 --> 00:56:37,401
And look forward to
working further with you.

1438
00:56:37,401 --> 00:56:38,234
Thank you.

1439
00:56:39,367 --> 00:56:41,534
- [Fischer] Senator Jones.

1440
00:56:43,730 --> 00:56:45,600
- Thank you both for being
here, for your service,

1441
00:56:45,600 --> 00:56:48,343
I really appreciate your
opportunity to come here.

1442
00:56:49,400 --> 00:56:52,482
Secretary Esper, it
would come as no surprise

1443
00:56:52,482 --> 00:56:54,688
to folks here that I have been advocating

1444
00:56:54,688 --> 00:56:57,470
Redstone Arsenal to be
the head of Space Command,

1445
00:56:57,470 --> 00:57:00,173
you and I have talked
about that a good bit.

1446
00:57:01,415 --> 00:57:05,664
In May of 2019, before you
were even the acting Secretary,

1447
00:57:05,664 --> 00:57:08,140
the list was whittled down,

1448
00:57:08,140 --> 00:57:12,590
there was a series of
visits, an extensive process,

1449
00:57:12,590 --> 00:57:14,220
it was whittled down to a few sites

1450
00:57:14,220 --> 00:57:16,750
and Redstone Arsenal was a part of those.

1451
00:57:16,750 --> 00:57:17,730
Space Command was supposed

1452
00:57:17,730 --> 00:57:19,620
to be announced in the fall, it wasn't.

1453
00:57:19,620 --> 00:57:22,320
We're still now, we're
in March, it's still not.

1454
00:57:22,320 --> 00:57:24,488
Yesterday, Lieutenant General Thompson,

1455
00:57:24,488 --> 00:57:27,766
testified before the House
Armed Services Committee

1456
00:57:27,766 --> 00:57:31,610
that the Air Force had been directed,

1457
00:57:31,610 --> 00:57:33,310
and I emphasize the word directed,

1458
00:57:33,310 --> 00:57:34,860
to go back and open this up.

1459
00:57:34,860 --> 00:57:36,910
He said open up the aperture

1460
00:57:36,910 --> 00:57:38,300
and look at all of them including

1461
00:57:38,300 --> 00:57:40,117
some non-traditional locations,

1462
00:57:40,117 --> 00:57:41,850
and that they would establish

1463
00:57:41,850 --> 00:57:44,050
the criteria which I thought

1464
00:57:44,050 --> 00:57:45,831
had already been established months,

1465
00:57:45,831 --> 00:57:48,297
if not a couple of years ago,

1466
00:57:48,297 --> 00:57:52,000
and that none of these, that the list,

1467
00:57:52,000 --> 00:57:53,590
Redstone Arsenal and others were on there.

1468
00:57:53,590 --> 00:57:56,700
So, a cynical person
would, in today's world,

1469
00:57:56,700 --> 00:57:58,120
would think that there was some political

1470
00:57:58,120 --> 00:58:01,800
electoral politics coming
into this and play into this.

1471
00:58:01,800 --> 00:58:03,835
Because Congress has wanted to do this

1472
00:58:03,835 --> 00:58:05,322
and we've been supportive,

1473
00:58:05,322 --> 00:58:07,220
but now we're going to get delayed

1474
00:58:07,220 --> 00:58:08,960
again in opening this process up.

1475
00:58:08,960 --> 00:58:10,650
So, I have a series of question.

1476
00:58:10,650 --> 00:58:12,730
Number one, did this comes
from the White House?

1477
00:58:12,730 --> 00:58:13,680
If so, who?

1478
00:58:13,680 --> 00:58:16,020
If it didn't, or if it
did, was there pushback?

1479
00:58:16,020 --> 00:58:17,454
If not, if it came from you or others?

1480
00:58:17,454 --> 00:58:21,030
Tell me how that process came
up to open this up again?

1481
00:58:21,030 --> 00:58:22,070
'Cause a lot of folks have been

1482
00:58:22,070 --> 00:58:24,223
looking at this for a long time.

1483
00:58:24,223 --> 00:58:25,830
- Yes, Senator, it came from me.

1484
00:58:25,830 --> 00:58:27,140
I'm the responsible party.

1485
00:58:27,140 --> 00:58:29,905
During my talks on the Hill
prior to my nomination,

1486
00:58:29,905 --> 00:58:33,240
more particularly after my hearing here,

1487
00:58:33,240 --> 00:58:35,220
I visited the House and I heard

1488
00:58:35,220 --> 00:58:36,890
from members on both sides of the aisle

1489
00:58:36,890 --> 00:58:38,370
that they felt that the process

1490
00:58:38,370 --> 00:58:40,476
that had been run was
unfair, not transparent

1491
00:58:40,476 --> 00:58:43,340
and there were a number of complaints.

1492
00:58:43,340 --> 00:58:47,830
So, I directed at that time
that we pause in place.

1493
00:58:47,830 --> 00:58:50,702
I took a briefing on it along
with Deputy Secretary Norquist

1494
00:58:50,702 --> 00:58:54,210
and we did not feel as well
that it was transparent enough,

1495
00:58:54,210 --> 00:58:57,590
that enough states, members, etc.

1496
00:58:57,590 --> 00:58:59,160
had a chance to participate.

1497
00:58:59,160 --> 00:59:00,599
So, we directed it be revisited

1498
00:59:00,599 --> 00:59:02,631
and a different approach be taken

1499
00:59:02,631 --> 00:59:04,975
where they outlined the criteria,

1500
00:59:04,975 --> 00:59:07,240
the screening criteria by which

1501
00:59:07,240 --> 00:59:10,970
a place would meet as
a qualifying material,

1502
00:59:10,970 --> 00:59:12,520
that we would go out to all members

1503
00:59:12,520 --> 00:59:15,790
and offer them to nominate
locations, if you will.

1504
00:59:15,790 --> 00:59:17,070
We'd screen from there,

1505
00:59:17,070 --> 00:59:19,320
but do a very iterative transparent thing,

1506
00:59:19,320 --> 00:59:21,402
where members can also
comment on the criteria.

1507
00:59:21,402 --> 00:59:24,390
We would update at various points in time

1508
00:59:24,390 --> 00:59:27,710
and then keep narrowing down much

1509
00:59:27,710 --> 00:59:29,603
like we did on Futures Command,

1510
00:59:29,603 --> 00:59:31,750
'til you get to the final site.

1511
00:59:31,750 --> 00:59:33,390
So, everybody had
confidence that it was fair

1512
00:59:33,390 --> 00:59:35,250
and there were no politics involved in it.

1513
00:59:35,250 --> 00:59:38,456
And that it was the best
sight for the mission at hand.

1514
00:59:38,456 --> 00:59:41,610
I regret to say that
that process began late.

1515
00:59:41,610 --> 00:59:44,050
I had another revisit with
them about a month ago

1516
00:59:44,050 --> 00:59:46,090
which is what probably
prompted that testimony,

1517
00:59:46,090 --> 00:59:48,430
but I'm the one that did
it, it was my initiative,

1518
00:59:48,430 --> 00:59:50,500
simply to make sure that
there was transparency

1519
00:59:50,500 --> 00:59:53,613
and buy-in and consent from members.

1520
00:59:54,561 --> 00:59:55,400
- [Jones] How long will
the process take now?

1521
00:59:55,400 --> 00:59:58,450
- It's going to take
several months, I think.

1522
00:59:58,450 --> 01:00:00,160
I don't see anything being announced.

1523
01:00:00,160 --> 01:00:01,390
If it helps assure you,

1524
01:00:01,390 --> 01:00:04,173
I don't see anything being
announced before the election.

1525
01:00:05,020 --> 01:00:06,553
In fact, regardless,

1526
01:00:06,553 --> 01:00:08,990
I think it's best to
keep it out of election

1527
01:00:08,990 --> 01:00:10,610
for the reasons that you cited.

1528
01:00:10,610 --> 01:00:12,906
- Let me ask you about some concerns

1529
01:00:12,906 --> 01:00:15,580
that I think was raised
by a couple of folks here.

1530
01:00:15,580 --> 01:00:19,223
And that is the transfer of
funds to build the border wall.

1531
01:00:20,790 --> 01:00:24,395
Taken out of that was $261 million out

1532
01:00:24,395 --> 01:00:27,690
of Mobile Alabama at
Austal to build an EPF

1533
01:00:27,690 --> 01:00:30,510
which is, I think, a
very, very important ship,

1534
01:00:30,510 --> 01:00:33,720
and it was one that is
part of this transition.

1535
01:00:33,720 --> 01:00:36,550
Austal as you know is the only shipbuilder

1536
01:00:36,550 --> 01:00:40,460
that's delivering ships to the
Navy on time and on budget.

1537
01:00:40,460 --> 01:00:44,989
Was any consideration given
to how that might impact folks

1538
01:00:44,989 --> 01:00:48,310
down in Mobile when these
decisions were made?

1539
01:00:48,310 --> 01:00:50,290
And the first part of that question

1540
01:00:50,290 --> 01:00:52,900
is I want to make sure I
understood the reasons.

1541
01:00:52,900 --> 01:00:55,560
The reasons for this part of the money

1542
01:00:55,560 --> 01:00:59,810
is strictly for trying to
close off drug smuggling.

1543
01:00:59,810 --> 01:01:02,330
It has nothing to do with immigration,

1544
01:01:02,330 --> 01:01:04,100
but drug smuggling, is that correct?

1545
01:01:04,100 --> 01:01:06,810
- It's under the authority,
the 284 authority,

1546
01:01:06,810 --> 01:01:10,550
it's directed at counter drug,

1547
01:01:10,550 --> 01:01:13,920
narco trafficking routes, if
you will, in support of DHS.

1548
01:01:13,920 --> 01:01:16,823
That's the provisional
law under which it falls.

1549
01:01:18,301 --> 01:01:19,810
- Talk to me about Austal.

1550
01:01:19,810 --> 01:01:21,045
- Yes, sir.

1551
01:01:21,045 --> 01:01:21,878
So, what we try to do in this process

1552
01:01:21,878 --> 01:01:23,090
is to make sure that we could find,

1553
01:01:23,090 --> 01:01:24,623
as best as possible,

1554
01:01:25,838 --> 01:01:27,490
a way to look at the problem

1555
01:01:27,490 --> 01:01:29,913
that was objective, and apolitical,

1556
01:01:31,668 --> 01:01:33,623
and that we could stand behind.

1557
01:01:34,989 --> 01:01:37,760
And the staff came up
with, as they looked at it,

1558
01:01:37,760 --> 01:01:39,590
is a fact that the items that were

1559
01:01:39,590 --> 01:01:43,040
either not requested in the FY '20 budget

1560
01:01:43,040 --> 01:01:44,170
or items that were early to meet.

1561
01:01:44,170 --> 01:01:46,690
So, excess to need or early to need.

1562
01:01:46,690 --> 01:01:48,322
It was a very clean cut line

1563
01:01:48,322 --> 01:01:50,650
that did not take politics

1564
01:01:50,650 --> 01:01:52,570
or anything like that into account.

1565
01:01:52,570 --> 01:01:53,780
And was very objective

1566
01:01:53,780 --> 01:01:55,427
and that was the standard
by which we went.

1567
01:01:55,427 --> 01:01:57,827
I consulted with my Service secretaries,

1568
01:01:57,827 --> 01:02:00,759
the Chairman consulted
with the Chiefs of Staff,

1569
01:02:00,759 --> 01:02:02,413
the Joint Chiefs.

1570
01:02:03,760 --> 01:02:06,110
That was the basis upon
which we made the decision.

1571
01:02:06,110 --> 01:02:07,447
Recognizing fully that there

1572
01:02:07,447 --> 01:02:11,420
are a lot of different
players and equipment

1573
01:02:11,420 --> 01:02:12,390
and things caught up in that,

1574
01:02:12,390 --> 01:02:14,584
but that was the way we approached it.

1575
01:02:14,584 --> 01:02:16,360
- I'm out of time but I will have

1576
01:02:16,360 --> 01:02:17,410
some questions for the record,

1577
01:02:17,410 --> 01:02:18,680
including maybe a little bit more

1578
01:02:18,680 --> 01:02:21,460
of an explanation on the Space Command

1579
01:02:21,460 --> 01:02:23,930
and also a report with current conditions

1580
01:02:23,930 --> 01:02:25,070
of the facilities used by

1581
01:02:25,070 --> 01:02:27,150
the senior reserve officer training corps,

1582
01:02:27,150 --> 01:02:28,840
already serving institution,

1583
01:02:28,840 --> 01:02:32,810
another on the commitment to
the junior ROTC pilot program,

1584
01:02:32,810 --> 01:02:34,660
scholarship program that we're doing.

1585
01:02:35,800 --> 01:02:36,835
- [Esper] Great program by the way.

1586
01:02:36,835 --> 01:02:37,668
- Thank you.

1587
01:02:37,668 --> 01:02:39,390
And also reviewing a report about

1588
01:02:39,390 --> 01:02:41,980
the Department of Defense
child development centers.

1589
01:02:41,980 --> 01:02:43,401
So, I'll have those for the record.

1590
01:02:43,401 --> 01:02:44,234
Thank you.

1591
01:02:44,234 --> 01:02:45,340
Thank you, Madam Chairman

1592
01:02:47,950 --> 01:02:48,950
- Thank you, Madam Chairman.

1593
01:02:48,950 --> 01:02:51,530
Thank you, Secretary and
General for your service

1594
01:02:51,530 --> 01:02:54,300
for your appearance today.

1595
01:02:54,300 --> 01:02:55,880
Special thank you, Mr. Secretary,

1596
01:02:55,880 --> 01:02:59,520
for your recent trip to Minot
and please thank Leah as well.

1597
01:02:59,520 --> 01:03:01,351
It was an exceptional day

1598
01:03:01,351 --> 01:03:04,723
for the airmen and missiliers in Minot.

1599
01:03:05,660 --> 01:03:07,170
I hope you took something
away from it as well

1600
01:03:07,170 --> 01:03:08,620
and since we're on the topic.

1601
01:03:09,559 --> 01:03:11,640
- [Esper] I went there in the winter.

1602
01:03:11,640 --> 01:03:12,960
- The fact that you came in February

1603
01:03:12,960 --> 01:03:15,560
does add to your street
cred without a doubt,

1604
01:03:15,560 --> 01:03:16,620
but you also got to see them

1605
01:03:16,620 --> 01:03:19,470
at their best in the toughest conditions.

1606
01:03:19,470 --> 01:03:22,170
Working with some very old
equipment, as you noticed.

1607
01:03:22,170 --> 01:03:23,870
No doubt some very old airplanes,

1608
01:03:23,870 --> 01:03:27,440
flown and maintained by
some very young airmen

1609
01:03:27,440 --> 01:03:28,860
and some very old missiles,

1610
01:03:28,860 --> 01:03:31,920
maintained by some very young missiliers.

1611
01:03:31,920 --> 01:03:36,741
So, we appreciate the priority
of modernization obviously.

1612
01:03:36,741 --> 01:03:39,513
With regard to the missiles, specifically,

1613
01:03:42,060 --> 01:03:47,060
ever since the GBSD's
been on the planning board

1614
01:03:48,680 --> 01:03:51,180
I pressed pretty hard about the timeline

1615
01:03:51,180 --> 01:03:52,650
and particularly knowing there

1616
01:03:52,650 --> 01:03:53,940
are detractors here and there,

1617
01:03:53,940 --> 01:03:58,738
of course the lack of
competitive R&E added to that.

1618
01:03:58,738 --> 01:04:01,073
If you could just give an update on GBSD,

1619
01:04:01,073 --> 01:04:03,445
the progress and what you see if any,

1620
01:04:03,445 --> 01:04:06,010
challenges there might be

1621
01:04:06,010 --> 01:04:09,573
and what risks we run if there is a delay?

1622
01:04:10,410 --> 01:04:11,243
- Thank you, Senator.

1623
01:04:11,243 --> 01:04:14,450
Yes, we continue to move forward on GBSD.

1624
01:04:14,450 --> 01:04:15,290
It's vitally important

1625
01:04:15,290 --> 01:04:18,420
as the land-based leg of
the triad as you know.

1626
01:04:18,420 --> 01:04:20,300
What concerns me most is the same thing

1627
01:04:20,300 --> 01:04:22,130
that I discussed with Senator Fischer,

1628
01:04:22,130 --> 01:04:25,480
is we have no margin left
with regard to the timeline.

1629
01:04:25,480 --> 01:04:27,700
It's utterly important
that we move out quickly.

1630
01:04:27,700 --> 01:04:29,900
I share your concerns
about lack of competition,

1631
01:04:29,900 --> 01:04:32,109
so we're gonna have to be very clever.

1632
01:04:32,109 --> 01:04:34,430
Undersecretary Lord is
working on a number of ways

1633
01:04:34,430 --> 01:04:36,840
by which we keep the
pressure on the contractor

1634
01:04:39,672 --> 01:04:41,250
to stick to cost, and
stick to performance,

1635
01:04:41,250 --> 01:04:43,390
and timeline to the schedule
associated with that.

1636
01:04:43,390 --> 01:04:46,760
Because there is no margin
with regard to replacing that.

1637
01:04:46,760 --> 01:04:49,360
We tend to have this
recapitalization problem

1638
01:04:49,360 --> 01:04:51,850
coming all together at
around the same time,

1639
01:04:51,850 --> 01:04:53,240
but that said I'm also looking for ways

1640
01:04:53,240 --> 01:04:55,130
to build margin in that leg of the triad.

1641
01:04:55,130 --> 01:04:58,113
There are different things
we can do to extend it

1642
01:04:58,113 --> 01:04:59,731
and then as you know,

1643
01:04:59,731 --> 01:05:03,360
I have personal concern
after speaking to folks here,

1644
01:05:03,360 --> 01:05:04,740
is to make sure we maintain

1645
01:05:04,740 --> 01:05:05,840
the health and vitality

1646
01:05:05,840 --> 01:05:08,380
and readiness of the missile force itself.

1647
01:05:08,380 --> 01:05:10,280
It is a very important mission

1648
01:05:10,280 --> 01:05:11,840
and a very tough mission when you have

1649
01:05:11,840 --> 01:05:13,340
a chance to get down to one of those silos

1650
01:05:13,340 --> 01:05:15,180
and experience what they go through.

1651
01:05:15,180 --> 01:05:16,300
- It is that.

1652
01:05:16,300 --> 01:05:18,220
General Milley, with regard to,

1653
01:05:18,220 --> 01:05:20,790
I think the Secretary referred to the,

1654
01:05:20,790 --> 01:05:22,974
divest of some of the things of the past

1655
01:05:22,974 --> 01:05:25,260
to invest in things of the future.

1656
01:05:25,260 --> 01:05:27,460
We hear a lot lately in this budget

1657
01:05:27,460 --> 01:05:31,403
about the risks associated with
getting from here to there,

1658
01:05:32,619 --> 01:05:35,360
and the divestiture of some
of those legacy systems.

1659
01:05:35,360 --> 01:05:37,060
One of the things that
comes up often, of course,

1660
01:05:37,060 --> 01:05:42,060
is the ISR demands in the theater,

1661
01:05:42,119 --> 01:05:45,230
I think pretty much
every combatant commander

1662
01:05:45,230 --> 01:05:47,290
I've talked to says we're woefully short

1663
01:05:47,290 --> 01:05:49,160
and yet some of the legacy systems,

1664
01:05:49,160 --> 01:05:51,777
they're being targeted for retirement

1665
01:05:51,777 --> 01:05:54,600
to make room for modernization,

1666
01:05:54,600 --> 01:05:57,061
include some very important ISR assets.

1667
01:05:57,061 --> 01:05:59,850
I'd be interested in
your take on all that.

1668
01:05:59,850 --> 01:06:03,689
If you're comfortable with
for example global hawk,

1669
01:06:03,689 --> 01:06:05,740
future of MQ-9,

1670
01:06:06,986 --> 01:06:08,500
whether the risk is worth it

1671
01:06:08,500 --> 01:06:10,050
or what the risk might even be?

1672
01:06:13,110 --> 01:06:13,943
- You're off.

1673
01:06:14,890 --> 01:06:16,770
- Well, depends on what adversary

1674
01:06:16,770 --> 01:06:18,150
or enemy you're talking about.

1675
01:06:18,150 --> 01:06:20,440
Many of the ISR systems
that we have today,

1676
01:06:20,440 --> 01:06:21,560
they're in very high demand

1677
01:06:21,560 --> 01:06:24,380
are very, very useful against
terrorists, insurgents,

1678
01:06:24,380 --> 01:06:26,750
against fixed sites, etc.

1679
01:06:26,750 --> 01:06:29,880
They have clear penetration capability

1680
01:06:29,880 --> 01:06:31,800
when there's no significant
air defense threat

1681
01:06:31,800 --> 01:06:34,100
or there's no other types of threats.

1682
01:06:34,100 --> 01:06:36,250
If you're talking about
great power competition,

1683
01:06:36,250 --> 01:06:38,130
which is what this NDS talks about,

1684
01:06:38,130 --> 01:06:40,060
and what this budget is all about,

1685
01:06:40,060 --> 01:06:42,400
that's a different type of ISR.

1686
01:06:42,400 --> 01:06:43,780
We're trying to divest ourselves

1687
01:06:43,780 --> 01:06:45,054
of the ISR that is not particularly useful

1688
01:06:45,054 --> 01:06:46,560
against Russia or China

1689
01:06:46,560 --> 01:06:48,703
or even high dense air defense systems

1690
01:06:48,703 --> 01:06:50,610
over in Iran or North Korea

1691
01:06:50,610 --> 01:06:52,390
and invest in those ISR systems

1692
01:06:52,390 --> 01:06:54,234
that do have penetration capabilities.

1693
01:06:54,234 --> 01:06:58,450
That's why you see some of
the divest in order to invest.

1694
01:06:58,450 --> 01:07:00,679
There's no need, it makes no sense to me

1695
01:07:00,679 --> 01:07:02,504
to continue to buy stuff that

1696
01:07:02,504 --> 01:07:05,770
isn't in alignment with the NDS.

1697
01:07:05,770 --> 01:07:08,660
It's a depends question
on what your enemy is.

1698
01:07:08,660 --> 01:07:12,190
With respect to the quantity or capacity

1699
01:07:12,190 --> 01:07:13,450
relative to the COCOMs,

1700
01:07:13,450 --> 01:07:17,680
you'll never find a combatant
commander who has enough ISR.

1701
01:07:17,680 --> 01:07:20,180
It's just not gonna happen.

1702
01:07:20,180 --> 01:07:21,840
We have been, every single year,

1703
01:07:21,840 --> 01:07:24,070
year in and year out, for 20 years,

1704
01:07:24,070 --> 01:07:25,383
always been short of ISR.

1705
01:07:26,240 --> 01:07:28,120
We continue to build it,

1706
01:07:28,120 --> 01:07:30,090
you're never going to buy
your way out of the problem,

1707
01:07:30,090 --> 01:07:31,850
because it has to do with information

1708
01:07:31,850 --> 01:07:34,330
and having to do with
knowledge and decision-making.

1709
01:07:34,330 --> 01:07:37,000
We will always be
chronically short of ISR.

1710
01:07:37,000 --> 01:07:39,265
But the key, though,
for the divest to invest

1711
01:07:39,265 --> 01:07:41,920
is it depends on who you're going against.

1712
01:07:41,920 --> 01:07:43,320
We need to invest in the capabilities

1713
01:07:43,320 --> 01:07:46,271
that are worthwhile
against China or Russia.

1714
01:07:46,271 --> 01:07:47,255
- Thank you, both of you.

1715
01:07:47,255 --> 01:07:48,276
Thank you.

1716
01:07:48,276 --> 01:07:50,193
Thank you, Madam Chair.

1717
01:07:51,394 --> 01:07:52,227
- Thank you, Madam Chairman.

1718
01:07:52,227 --> 01:07:53,480
And thank both of you
all for your service,

1719
01:07:53,480 --> 01:07:55,330
I appreciate very much
your being here today.

1720
01:07:55,330 --> 01:07:57,310
Secretary Esper, I support the wall

1721
01:07:57,310 --> 01:07:58,840
and I always supported the wall

1722
01:07:58,840 --> 01:08:01,750
but I really have a
problem with the funding,

1723
01:08:01,750 --> 01:08:03,820
which I think you all know our position

1724
01:08:03,820 --> 01:08:06,330
should be appropriated
by us and that's our job.

1725
01:08:06,330 --> 01:08:08,430
The reprogramming of the $3.8 billion

1726
01:08:08,430 --> 01:08:11,888
of appropriated funds to
support the border wall

1727
01:08:11,888 --> 01:08:15,000
and the reason it troubles
me is $1.3 billion

1728
01:08:15,000 --> 01:08:15,833
of that's taken out

1729
01:08:15,833 --> 01:08:18,530
of the National Guard and
the Reserve equipment.

1730
01:08:18,530 --> 01:08:20,920
National Guard, every one of us have

1731
01:08:20,920 --> 01:08:22,770
an affinity with our National Guards.

1732
01:08:24,910 --> 01:08:28,396
How do we justify the
disproportionate cuts to the Guard

1733
01:08:28,396 --> 01:08:31,490
despite knowing the vital
and ever-growing role

1734
01:08:31,490 --> 01:08:32,700
and aspects of national security.

1735
01:08:32,700 --> 01:08:34,180
I know about Homeland Security,

1736
01:08:34,180 --> 01:08:37,130
but the Guards' our frontline
defense in homeland security.

1737
01:08:38,000 --> 01:08:38,950
- Yes, sir.

1738
01:08:38,950 --> 01:08:39,783
Thank you, I appreciate that

1739
01:08:39,783 --> 01:08:42,277
and I think with regard to your
first remark we would agree,

1740
01:08:42,277 --> 01:08:45,750
our preference would be that
this be funded through DHS.

1741
01:08:45,750 --> 01:08:48,740
With that said, we are where we are.

1742
01:08:48,740 --> 01:08:51,770
And DOD Will support DHS in this regard

1743
01:08:51,770 --> 01:08:55,480
and as I was saying to Senator Jones

1744
01:08:55,480 --> 01:08:57,740
when we try to find a clear line,

1745
01:08:57,740 --> 01:09:01,910
an objective line by
which to draw the sources,

1746
01:09:01,910 --> 01:09:03,840
we came up with the one
with regard to either

1747
01:09:03,840 --> 01:09:05,770
early to need or excess to need.

1748
01:09:05,770 --> 01:09:08,350
And as things popped out it became obvious

1749
01:09:08,350 --> 01:09:09,990
that the impact would be
on the National Guard.

1750
01:09:09,990 --> 01:09:14,000
It's no pleasure for me to
have to make that decision

1751
01:09:14,000 --> 01:09:16,490
as a former Guardsman myself.

1752
01:09:16,490 --> 01:09:19,150
We try to not play.

1753
01:09:19,150 --> 01:09:22,510
- Also, Secretary, you said
that your night court program

1754
01:09:22,510 --> 01:09:25,290
has been very successful
at freeing up money.

1755
01:09:25,290 --> 01:09:27,890
Could nothing be freed up
there, on the night court?

1756
01:09:29,371 --> 01:09:32,350
- I spent 22 sessions over four months

1757
01:09:32,350 --> 01:09:36,510
and we found $5.7 billion
out of 99 to free up,

1758
01:09:36,510 --> 01:09:38,523
but we've started again this year,

1759
01:09:38,523 --> 01:09:43,523
so I did find 5.7 to put into
our NDS priority, Senator.

1760
01:09:45,264 --> 01:09:46,550
- Another thing I would just say,

1761
01:09:46,550 --> 01:09:48,890
since the TAGS and the
governors are so intertwined,

1762
01:09:48,890 --> 01:09:52,770
had they had any forewarning
of this whatsoever?

1763
01:09:52,770 --> 01:09:54,790
- No, sir the only forewarnings went out

1764
01:09:54,790 --> 01:09:57,077
when the consultations I had
with the Service secretaries

1765
01:09:57,077 --> 01:09:58,450
and the Chairman had with

1766
01:09:59,850 --> 01:10:02,003
General Lengyel and the Service chiefs.

1767
01:10:03,360 --> 01:10:04,978
- Another question.

1768
01:10:04,978 --> 01:10:06,200
I've just been briefed on

1769
01:10:08,010 --> 01:10:10,697
the Afghan fighting that's going on,

1770
01:10:10,697 --> 01:10:13,950
the attacks from today,
I think the fourth,

1771
01:10:13,950 --> 01:10:15,250
I just got briefed on that.

1772
01:10:15,250 --> 01:10:18,036
Maybe you can bring me up to where we are

1773
01:10:18,036 --> 01:10:21,420
in Afghanistan with
the Taliban, right now.

1774
01:10:21,420 --> 01:10:22,660
Also, the peace agreement.

1775
01:10:22,660 --> 01:10:24,010
Do you think it might hold?

1776
01:10:24,010 --> 01:10:26,220
Because it hasn't held very long.

1777
01:10:26,220 --> 01:10:28,410
And what direction,

1778
01:10:28,410 --> 01:10:30,670
what do I tell West Virginian's

1779
01:10:30,670 --> 01:10:32,750
and people that have been upset

1780
01:10:32,750 --> 01:10:37,020
about promising releasing
5,000 enemy fighters?

1781
01:10:37,020 --> 01:10:39,610
That did not go over well in
the state of West Virginia.

1782
01:10:39,610 --> 01:10:41,010
- I'm not sure I can do it justice

1783
01:10:41,010 --> 01:10:42,410
in two minutes and 12 seconds

1784
01:10:42,410 --> 01:10:44,160
but I'll say this much.

1785
01:10:44,160 --> 01:10:45,053
It's my view,

1786
01:10:46,410 --> 01:10:47,840
and I'll save time for
the Chairman to speak,

1787
01:10:47,840 --> 01:10:50,920
but my view is the best, if not only,

1788
01:10:50,920 --> 01:10:53,490
path forward is through
a political agreement.

1789
01:10:53,490 --> 01:10:56,080
We have an historic opportunity here.

1790
01:10:56,080 --> 01:10:59,950
We signed on Saturday, in Qatar,

1791
01:10:59,950 --> 01:11:02,030
I was in Kabul at the same time,

1792
01:11:02,030 --> 01:11:03,819
this agreement that lays out a framework

1793
01:11:03,819 --> 01:11:06,160
by which we could proceed toward

1794
01:11:06,160 --> 01:11:08,570
an eventual intra-Afghan negotiation.

1795
01:11:08,570 --> 01:11:11,700
It's supposed to happen, at
this point, five days from now.

1796
01:11:11,700 --> 01:11:13,888
And the results so far have been mixed.

1797
01:11:13,888 --> 01:11:15,110
- What kind of signals did we get today?

1798
01:11:15,110 --> 01:11:17,010
I'm pleased to see at least we supported

1799
01:11:17,010 --> 01:11:18,300
and defended the Afghan fighters,

1800
01:11:18,300 --> 01:11:19,840
we didn't just leave 'em.

1801
01:11:19,840 --> 01:11:21,670
- Which has allowed us under the document,

1802
01:11:21,670 --> 01:11:22,980
under the agreement, to defend them,

1803
01:11:22,980 --> 01:11:24,010
and it's the commitment I made

1804
01:11:24,010 --> 01:11:25,810
to the Afghans when I
was there on Saturday.

1805
01:11:25,810 --> 01:11:29,000
We will continue to defend
the Afghans, support them.

1806
01:11:29,000 --> 01:11:32,470
The Taliban, to their, are
honoring their peace agreements

1807
01:11:32,470 --> 01:11:35,830
in terms of not attacking
U.S. and coalition forces,

1808
01:11:35,830 --> 01:11:38,753
but not in terms of sustaining
a reduction of violence.

1809
01:11:38,753 --> 01:11:41,740
Our special envoy's over there now,

1810
01:11:41,740 --> 01:11:44,300
he's gonna be pulling the
parties back together.

1811
01:11:44,300 --> 01:11:47,780
The critical thing in the
next five days, few days,

1812
01:11:47,780 --> 01:11:51,110
will be getting the conditions
set for them to sit down

1813
01:11:51,110 --> 01:11:52,858
with regard to negotiations.

1814
01:11:52,858 --> 01:11:53,691
- [Manchin] Did we see
any retreat whatsoever

1815
01:11:53,691 --> 01:11:55,473
once we hit the Taliban today?

1816
01:11:56,370 --> 01:11:58,180
From their aggressiveness
against the Afghan fighters?

1817
01:11:58,180 --> 01:12:00,633
- Chairman and I spoke to
General miller earlier.

1818
01:12:01,820 --> 01:12:03,030
Do you want to comment?

1819
01:12:03,030 --> 01:12:04,960
- Yes, Senator, bottom line is there was

1820
01:12:04,960 --> 01:12:08,069
a variety of attacks over
the last 24 to 48 hours.

1821
01:12:08,069 --> 01:12:09,420
They're all beaten back.

1822
01:12:09,420 --> 01:12:10,750
They're at small little outposts.

1823
01:12:10,750 --> 01:12:12,952
We did use U.S. air support

1824
01:12:12,952 --> 01:12:15,165
as part of our Afghan allies.

1825
01:12:15,165 --> 01:12:16,800
What is important,
though, for the agreement,

1826
01:12:16,800 --> 01:12:18,600
we're on day four.

1827
01:12:18,600 --> 01:12:20,950
This was small, lower level attacks

1828
01:12:20,950 --> 01:12:23,150
out on checkpoints, etc.

1829
01:12:23,150 --> 01:12:25,056
But the Taliban have signed up to

1830
01:12:25,056 --> 01:12:27,300
a whole series of conditions

1831
01:12:27,300 --> 01:12:28,978
of which I believe the committee

1832
01:12:28,978 --> 01:12:30,670
and all members of Congress

1833
01:12:30,670 --> 01:12:33,340
have all the documents
associated with this agreement,

1834
01:12:33,340 --> 01:12:35,030
you can go through all of it.

1835
01:12:35,030 --> 01:12:36,470
Of significance, there's no attacks

1836
01:12:36,470 --> 01:12:38,020
in 34 provincial capitals,

1837
01:12:38,020 --> 01:12:39,370
there's no attacks in Kabul,

1838
01:12:39,370 --> 01:12:40,203
there's no high profile attacks,

1839
01:12:40,203 --> 01:12:42,150
there's no suicide bombers,

1840
01:12:42,150 --> 01:12:44,540
there's no vehicle borne suicides,

1841
01:12:44,540 --> 01:12:46,310
no attacks against U.S. forces,

1842
01:12:46,310 --> 01:12:47,721
no attack against the coalition.

1843
01:12:47,721 --> 01:12:49,070
There's a whole laundry list

1844
01:12:49,070 --> 01:12:50,890
of these things that aren't happening.

1845
01:12:50,890 --> 01:12:53,871
Yes, there were significant
numbers of small attacks,

1846
01:12:53,871 --> 01:12:56,800
they were all beaten back and
we will continue to support.

1847
01:12:56,800 --> 01:12:58,850
- We've seen that they have been able

1848
01:12:58,850 --> 01:13:00,540
to control their field fighters, right?

1849
01:13:00,540 --> 01:13:02,160
- We saw that over the seven days

1850
01:13:02,160 --> 01:13:04,310
where they they were
able to go from a high

1851
01:13:04,310 --> 01:13:07,131
of about 125 attacks a day
down to about 15 a day.

1852
01:13:07,131 --> 01:13:09,490
They issued out
instructions not to attack.

1853
01:13:09,490 --> 01:13:10,323
That's correct.

1854
01:13:10,323 --> 01:13:13,460
- So, what we don't
know what the cause is?

1855
01:13:13,460 --> 01:13:14,330
- [Esper] Keeping that group

1856
01:13:14,330 --> 01:13:15,690
of people on board is a challenge.

1857
01:13:15,690 --> 01:13:18,440
They've got their range of
hard-liners and soft liners.

1858
01:13:19,870 --> 01:13:22,270
They're wrestling with that, too, I think.

1859
01:13:22,270 --> 01:13:23,103
Yes, sir.

1860
01:13:27,020 --> 01:13:28,580
- Thank you, Chairman.

1861
01:13:28,580 --> 01:13:30,820
Thank you both for being here.

1862
01:13:30,820 --> 01:13:34,640
General Milley, I want to
address, and both of you actually.

1863
01:13:34,640 --> 01:13:37,760
You mentioned ISR just
now and I agree 100%.

1864
01:13:37,760 --> 01:13:39,080
One of those perfect examples,

1865
01:13:39,080 --> 01:13:41,830
I want to lead into my question
about asset allocation,

1866
01:13:42,680 --> 01:13:44,300
is JSTARS going to ABMS

1867
01:13:44,300 --> 01:13:46,440
and then the JDC II to development?

1868
01:13:46,440 --> 01:13:48,780
This is a lot of moving parts very rapidly

1869
01:13:48,780 --> 01:13:50,500
and I'm shocked at really the progress

1870
01:13:50,500 --> 01:13:53,630
we've made in the last year.

1871
01:13:53,630 --> 01:13:54,850
I know we're not in classified environment

1872
01:13:54,850 --> 01:13:56,090
and I'm not gonna go there.

1873
01:13:56,090 --> 01:13:59,060
I want to know, first,
Secretary if you don't mind,

1874
01:13:59,060 --> 01:14:00,310
the allocation of resources,

1875
01:14:00,310 --> 01:14:04,420
after we take about 14 or
15% for overhead in the DOD,

1876
01:14:05,290 --> 01:14:06,600
what's remaining after that,

1877
01:14:06,600 --> 01:14:08,840
we allocate almost a
third, a third, a third.

1878
01:14:08,840 --> 01:14:10,920
Is that consistent with the NDS

1879
01:14:10,920 --> 01:14:12,940
refocus on the maritime

1880
01:14:12,940 --> 01:14:15,940
that General Mattis
talked about back in '17

1881
01:14:15,940 --> 01:14:20,813
relative to standing up to
our major competitor China?

1882
01:14:20,813 --> 01:14:21,830
- Yes, sir.

1883
01:14:21,830 --> 01:14:22,700
First of all it's not cleanly
a third, a third, a third.

1884
01:14:22,700 --> 01:14:24,360
There's a traditional background.

1885
01:14:24,360 --> 01:14:26,870
Normally Navy has the highest,

1886
01:14:26,870 --> 01:14:28,230
Army usually has the lowest,

1887
01:14:28,230 --> 01:14:30,840
Air Force in between and there's
a lot of different things.

1888
01:14:30,840 --> 01:14:32,320
- I'm sorry correct but,

1889
01:14:32,320 --> 01:14:37,010
the '21 budget Army and
Navy are almost equal.

1890
01:14:37,010 --> 01:14:39,550
- No sir, they're quite different.

1891
01:14:39,550 --> 01:14:41,010
- We'll take that offline

1892
01:14:41,010 --> 01:14:41,850
but I'd like to see that

1893
01:14:41,850 --> 01:14:43,760
'cause the numbers I have are different.

1894
01:14:43,760 --> 01:14:48,760
- The Navy's at $207 billion,
and the Army at $177.

1895
01:14:50,280 --> 01:14:51,130
- Okay, go ahead.

1896
01:14:52,800 --> 01:14:55,040
- That said, that is where it is.

1897
01:14:55,040 --> 01:14:56,770
As the Chairman and
I've talked about this,

1898
01:14:56,770 --> 01:14:58,050
we've talked about the chain of command.

1899
01:14:58,050 --> 01:14:59,689
What we need to do, I think,

1900
01:14:59,689 --> 01:15:03,200
is first of all update our war plans.

1901
01:15:03,200 --> 01:15:04,730
They haven't been updated.

1902
01:15:04,730 --> 01:15:07,560
And have OPLANs that are relevant

1903
01:15:07,560 --> 01:15:09,890
in the post NDS environment number one.

1904
01:15:09,890 --> 01:15:11,430
Number two, and the
Chairman's working on this,

1905
01:15:11,430 --> 01:15:13,687
we need a new joint warfighting concept

1906
01:15:13,687 --> 01:15:16,070
that takes into account
all domains of warfare.

1907
01:15:16,070 --> 01:15:18,340
The Joint staff is
working on that right now.

1908
01:15:18,340 --> 01:15:20,430
I think once we have updated war plans

1909
01:15:20,430 --> 01:15:23,030
and we have a new warfighting concept

1910
01:15:23,030 --> 01:15:24,020
and we have a good sense

1911
01:15:24,020 --> 01:15:25,700
of what future systems will look like,

1912
01:15:25,700 --> 01:15:27,790
I do think we need to
look at that reallocation

1913
01:15:27,790 --> 01:15:29,670
but to kind of scramble it up right now,

1914
01:15:29,670 --> 01:15:31,730
I think, would be premature.

1915
01:15:31,730 --> 01:15:34,120
- That's a great
characterization, I accept that.

1916
01:15:34,120 --> 01:15:36,360
I have all the respect
in the world for you two

1917
01:15:36,360 --> 01:15:37,710
and I'm not questioning
your authority at all.

1918
01:15:37,710 --> 01:15:39,590
I know this is a moving target right now.

1919
01:15:39,590 --> 01:15:43,390
The shipbuilding plan, though,
was due with the budget.

1920
01:15:43,390 --> 01:15:44,630
I know it's on your desk

1921
01:15:45,888 --> 01:15:47,220
and I think I understand
all the reasons why,

1922
01:15:47,220 --> 01:15:48,060
it's a tough decision.

1923
01:15:48,060 --> 01:15:50,270
You've got the Columbia class requirement,

1924
01:15:50,270 --> 01:15:51,660
sitting right there's
a number one priority.

1925
01:15:51,660 --> 01:15:53,050
I wouldn't argue with that at all.

1926
01:15:53,050 --> 01:15:54,447
That's going to be about 25%,

1927
01:15:54,447 --> 01:15:56,640
and some years as much as 30 plus percent

1928
01:15:56,640 --> 01:15:58,290
of the total shipbuilding budget.

1929
01:15:59,580 --> 01:16:01,010
I want to highlight some numbers

1930
01:16:01,010 --> 01:16:02,300
that are just shocking today.

1931
01:16:02,300 --> 01:16:04,816
I mean today China has about 345,

1932
01:16:04,816 --> 01:16:05,649
I think these numbers are correct,

1933
01:16:05,649 --> 01:16:06,870
345 service ships.

1934
01:16:06,870 --> 01:16:08,600
Ours to 295.

1935
01:16:08,600 --> 01:16:10,330
Over the next 15 years,

1936
01:16:10,330 --> 01:16:11,730
their plan right now,

1937
01:16:11,730 --> 01:16:13,080
based on what we're seeing publicly,

1938
01:16:13,080 --> 01:16:15,310
as they're taking it to 435,

1939
01:16:15,310 --> 01:16:17,990
and we have a 355 plan
that comes from '16.

1940
01:16:17,990 --> 01:16:20,930
Is the 355 consistent with the NDS?

1941
01:16:20,930 --> 01:16:22,800
And secondarily, is that being looked

1942
01:16:22,800 --> 01:16:25,630
at seriously in the 30
year shipbuilding plan that

1943
01:16:25,630 --> 01:16:29,090
we're gonna see when it
comes out of your office?

1944
01:16:29,090 --> 01:16:30,260
- On the plan I think the Navy's

1945
01:16:30,260 --> 01:16:32,070
gonna brief me sometime
in the next few days

1946
01:16:32,070 --> 01:16:34,720
on what their proposal is
with regard to the plan.

1947
01:16:34,720 --> 01:16:35,610
With regard to the number,

1948
01:16:35,610 --> 01:16:37,460
I'll look at what the CNO says.

1949
01:16:37,460 --> 01:16:40,600
The CNO says 355 is the number

1950
01:16:40,600 --> 01:16:42,765
but we need to look at
effects and capabilities.

1951
01:16:42,765 --> 01:16:44,415
If you want to stick to a number,

1952
01:16:44,415 --> 01:16:47,940
my gut feeling is we need more than 355.

1953
01:16:47,940 --> 01:16:50,110
Not just to deliver effects,
but we need presence.

1954
01:16:50,110 --> 01:16:52,136
- Is that a function of lethality as well?

1955
01:16:52,136 --> 01:16:54,133
We're not hamstrung by,

1956
01:16:55,867 --> 01:16:58,030
and with ranges and new capabilities?

1957
01:16:58,030 --> 01:17:00,840
- I think as I've laid
out my plan, my thinking,

1958
01:17:00,840 --> 01:17:03,140
we're gonna run some internal war games

1959
01:17:03,140 --> 01:17:04,430
to look at a range of options,

1960
01:17:04,430 --> 01:17:06,480
Navy has some ideas, CAPE has some ideas,

1961
01:17:06,480 --> 01:17:08,500
some think tanks have done some good work.

1962
01:17:08,500 --> 01:17:10,360
I think some core
principles we worked around

1963
01:17:10,360 --> 01:17:13,910
is we have to have more ships but smaller.

1964
01:17:13,910 --> 01:17:16,530
We need to have, I believe,
more attack submarines,

1965
01:17:16,530 --> 01:17:19,190
we need to move more
quickly into unmanned,

1966
01:17:19,190 --> 01:17:20,890
and in all cases we need to have

1967
01:17:20,890 --> 01:17:22,810
distributed sensors and shooters,

1968
01:17:22,810 --> 01:17:24,330
we need to have the ability

1969
01:17:24,330 --> 01:17:25,826
to be survivable in this environment.

1970
01:17:25,826 --> 01:17:27,720
And there are a number of other things

1971
01:17:27,720 --> 01:17:29,237
but, again, I was just
meeting with the CNO

1972
01:17:29,237 --> 01:17:31,180
and the acting Secretary
yesterday on this.

1973
01:17:31,180 --> 01:17:34,974
We agree lethality is critical at range,

1974
01:17:34,974 --> 01:17:37,260
but for the Navy it's also presence.

1975
01:17:37,260 --> 01:17:39,270
You have to have enough surface combatants

1976
01:17:39,270 --> 01:17:41,770
available at any one
time to have a presence

1977
01:17:41,770 --> 01:17:44,930
to show U.S. assurance, deterrence etc.

1978
01:17:44,930 --> 01:17:48,110
Which is why my instinct is
that we need more than 355.

1979
01:17:48,110 --> 01:17:50,252
- We have many more
combatant commanding areas

1980
01:17:50,252 --> 01:17:53,490
other than Indo-Pacific
that we are responsible for.

1981
01:17:53,490 --> 01:17:54,740
- Yes, sir, many responsibilities

1982
01:17:54,740 --> 01:17:55,690
whether it's counter drug

1983
01:17:55,690 --> 01:17:57,900
or maintaining freedom
of the seas and all that.

1984
01:17:57,900 --> 01:17:59,160
We have the world's greatest Navy

1985
01:17:59,160 --> 01:18:00,490
and we need to keep it that way.

1986
01:18:00,490 --> 01:18:02,160
- General Milley, going
to one other thing.

1987
01:18:02,160 --> 01:18:03,970
We're talking finding
every billion dollars

1988
01:18:03,970 --> 01:18:05,547
and you railed about this I have, too,

1989
01:18:05,547 --> 01:18:07,192
and so has the Secretary.

1990
01:18:07,192 --> 01:18:09,650
You've got 23 seconds, go after CRs.

1991
01:18:09,650 --> 01:18:13,380
Tell us exactly, 12 of the last 13 years

1992
01:18:13,380 --> 01:18:15,840
we've hamstrung the military
with a continuing resolution

1993
01:18:15,840 --> 01:18:18,170
for at least the first
quarter of the fiscal year,

1994
01:18:18,170 --> 01:18:20,077
we're in the six month of our fiscal year

1995
01:18:20,077 --> 01:18:22,340
and we haven't even
started this process yet.

1996
01:18:22,340 --> 01:18:24,647
So, we're facing down
another a CR this year,

1997
01:18:24,647 --> 01:18:26,780
this will be the 13th in 14 years.

1998
01:18:26,780 --> 01:18:28,140
And so, we're estimating now,

1999
01:18:28,140 --> 01:18:30,659
your service director, surface commanders

2000
01:18:30,659 --> 01:18:32,600
have told us roughly in aggregate,

2001
01:18:32,600 --> 01:18:34,390
it's about $5 billion per quarter.

2002
01:18:34,390 --> 01:18:35,660
- [Milley] Per quarter.

2003
01:18:35,660 --> 01:18:36,493
- Per quarter.

2004
01:18:36,493 --> 01:18:37,326
- [Esper] Lost, buying power.

2005
01:18:37,326 --> 01:18:38,810
- General Milley, tell us how it really

2006
01:18:38,810 --> 01:18:42,373
effects our readiness and
our recapitalization efforts.

2007
01:18:43,742 --> 01:18:45,260
That's $50 billion,
that takes care of a lot

2008
01:18:45,260 --> 01:18:46,623
of these long-term shipbuilding issues

2009
01:18:46,623 --> 01:18:48,150
that we're talking about.

2010
01:18:48,150 --> 01:18:50,128
- I'm already over time
and I haven't even started.

2011
01:18:50,128 --> 01:18:52,510
I will just tell you that
it's a very ineffective

2012
01:18:52,510 --> 01:18:54,890
and inefficient way of
managing the taxpayer's money

2013
01:18:54,890 --> 01:18:56,581
because industry can't rely

2014
01:18:56,581 --> 01:18:59,457
on a steady cash flow and stream

2015
01:18:59,457 --> 01:19:01,460
and predictability in the industry,

2016
01:19:01,460 --> 01:19:04,860
and then we in terms of
programming and acquisition, etc.

2017
01:19:04,860 --> 01:19:08,237
Our program managers can't
rely on steady billing as well.

2018
01:19:08,237 --> 01:19:09,860
So, it's a very inefficient way.

2019
01:19:09,860 --> 01:19:12,090
We're budgeting basically
nine out of 12 months

2020
01:19:12,090 --> 01:19:13,791
or six out of 12 months of the year

2021
01:19:13,791 --> 01:19:15,410
and that's no just no way
to run a railroad station,

2022
01:19:15,410 --> 01:19:17,920
it's just not a good way to do it.

2023
01:19:17,920 --> 01:19:19,021
CRs are not good.

2024
01:19:19,021 --> 01:19:19,854
- Yes, sir.

2025
01:19:19,854 --> 01:19:21,319
- A quick follow-up, one thing that DOD

2026
01:19:21,319 --> 01:19:23,520
is going to come with you soon, Senator,

2027
01:19:23,520 --> 01:19:25,039
is a legislative provision,

2028
01:19:25,039 --> 01:19:27,440
other Departments of the
federal government have it.

2029
01:19:27,440 --> 01:19:28,950
It would seek legislative authority

2030
01:19:28,950 --> 01:19:31,375
to transfer any expired Navy funds,

2031
01:19:31,375 --> 01:19:33,700
which otherwise would go back to Treasury,

2032
01:19:33,700 --> 01:19:35,510
back into the SCN account.

2033
01:19:35,510 --> 01:19:36,730
Our conservative estimate

2034
01:19:36,730 --> 01:19:39,090
is this would free up
another billion dollars

2035
01:19:39,090 --> 01:19:40,943
a year that we could put
back into shipbuilding,

2036
01:19:40,943 --> 01:19:43,120
otherwise it goes back into the Treasury

2037
01:19:43,120 --> 01:19:44,720
and it would be money that
you've already appropriated

2038
01:19:44,720 --> 01:19:46,620
and authorized to us for this purpose.

2039
01:19:46,620 --> 01:19:48,020
- I want to indulge the Chairman

2040
01:19:48,020 --> 01:19:49,110
for one last comment on this.

2041
01:19:49,110 --> 01:19:50,320
We're working with OMB, too.

2042
01:19:50,320 --> 01:19:52,114
I think there are opportunities in there

2043
01:19:52,114 --> 01:19:52,947
that will give you some freedom

2044
01:19:52,947 --> 01:19:54,490
and our appropriators
to give you some freedom

2045
01:19:54,490 --> 01:19:55,970
within the current rules that

2046
01:19:55,970 --> 01:19:57,080
they've never envisioned before

2047
01:19:57,080 --> 01:19:58,830
because they never realized
how expensive this is

2048
01:19:58,830 --> 01:20:01,300
to give you some latitude
that when you are in a CR

2049
01:20:01,300 --> 01:20:03,100
you're not as hamstrung as you are today.

2050
01:20:03,100 --> 01:20:04,610
But I agree with General Milley.

2051
01:20:04,610 --> 01:20:05,930
This is an absolute travesty.

2052
01:20:05,930 --> 01:20:07,270
- [Esper] Particularly
important for the shipyards.

2053
01:20:07,270 --> 01:20:08,320
- [Perdue] Thank you.

2054
01:20:11,580 --> 01:20:13,175
- Thank you, Madam Chair

2055
01:20:13,175 --> 01:20:14,646
and thank you to our two witnesses,

2056
01:20:14,646 --> 01:20:16,500
to the Chairman and the Secretary,

2057
01:20:16,500 --> 01:20:18,590
I appreciate each of your service.

2058
01:20:18,590 --> 01:20:20,020
Testimony today has been about this

2059
01:20:20,020 --> 01:20:23,440
budget being directed toward
the National Defense Strategy,

2060
01:20:23,440 --> 01:20:25,290
General Milley said about something,

2061
01:20:25,290 --> 01:20:26,830
why would I purchase something not

2062
01:20:26,830 --> 01:20:29,050
aligned with the National
Defense Strategy.

2063
01:20:29,050 --> 01:20:31,060
And we've also heard in
an era of tight budgets.

2064
01:20:31,060 --> 01:20:32,830
So, where in the National Defense Strategy

2065
01:20:32,830 --> 01:20:35,560
is there a phrase a border wall

2066
01:20:35,560 --> 01:20:37,790
on America's southern border?

2067
01:20:37,790 --> 01:20:39,550
- Senator, there's Homeland Security

2068
01:20:39,550 --> 01:20:42,030
is in the National Defense Strategy.

2069
01:20:42,030 --> 01:20:44,010
- It is but is there a mention

2070
01:20:44,010 --> 01:20:46,790
of a border wall on the southern border?

2071
01:20:46,790 --> 01:20:47,623
- I don't believe so,

2072
01:20:47,623 --> 01:20:49,220
but nor is there mention of dealing

2073
01:20:49,220 --> 01:20:51,230
with floods and putting out wildfires.

2074
01:20:51,230 --> 01:20:53,346
- I just read the NDS.

2075
01:20:53,346 --> 01:20:54,179
And you're talking about this

2076
01:20:54,179 --> 01:20:57,500
is a budget that is focused on the NDS.

2077
01:20:57,500 --> 01:20:58,670
The National Defense Strategy

2078
01:20:58,670 --> 01:21:00,620
has a 14 page synopsis,

2079
01:21:00,620 --> 01:21:03,870
the border wall on the southern
border is not mentioned.

2080
01:21:03,870 --> 01:21:06,420
The southern border of the
United States is not mentioned.

2081
01:21:06,420 --> 01:21:07,910
There's one mention of a border

2082
01:21:07,910 --> 01:21:11,010
in the 14 page public
synopsis and it is this,

2083
01:21:11,010 --> 01:21:15,380
Russia has violated the
borders of other nations.

2084
01:21:15,380 --> 01:21:16,860
So, when you come and tell me

2085
01:21:16,860 --> 01:21:19,163
that this is focused on the NDS,

2086
01:21:20,050 --> 01:21:21,500
I got a real problem with that

2087
01:21:21,500 --> 01:21:23,321
and I know that's maybe above decisions

2088
01:21:23,321 --> 01:21:25,270
or other people's decisions

2089
01:21:25,270 --> 01:21:30,270
but $6 billion came out of the
Pentagon's budget last year.

2090
01:21:31,100 --> 01:21:32,696
Three and a half from MILCON

2091
01:21:32,696 --> 01:21:36,117
and two and a half into
the counter drug fund

2092
01:21:36,117 --> 01:21:37,617
and then into the border wall.

2093
01:21:38,460 --> 01:21:41,580
You have done a reprogramming,
I believe, of 3.9.

2094
01:21:41,580 --> 01:21:42,873
There had been earlier
questions about that,

2095
01:21:42,873 --> 01:21:46,770
3.8 into this counter drug fund.

2096
01:21:46,770 --> 01:21:49,270
There's also been a report
in the Washington Post

2097
01:21:49,270 --> 01:21:51,410
that there's another shoe to drop

2098
01:21:51,410 --> 01:21:55,000
and about $3.7 billion is likely
to be taken out of MILCON.

2099
01:21:55,000 --> 01:21:55,860
Is that accurate?

2100
01:21:55,860 --> 01:21:57,650
Should we expect to see that?

2101
01:21:57,650 --> 01:21:59,060
- That is not an accurate number,

2102
01:21:59,060 --> 01:22:00,880
but there is a possibility that

2103
01:22:00,880 --> 01:22:02,440
that can happen, yes, Senator.

2104
01:22:02,440 --> 01:22:03,690
- So, the number may not be accurate,

2105
01:22:03,690 --> 01:22:05,710
but is it likely that we're gonna see

2106
01:22:05,710 --> 01:22:07,350
another tranche taken out of MILCON?

2107
01:22:07,350 --> 01:22:08,755
- We could.

2108
01:22:08,755 --> 01:22:11,163
I don't to put an estimate
on it at this point in time.

2109
01:22:12,280 --> 01:22:17,280
- I mean, it's just, I
can't imagine a scenario

2110
01:22:18,110 --> 01:22:19,480
in which this committee,

2111
01:22:19,480 --> 01:22:20,580
I'll just say it bluntly,

2112
01:22:20,580 --> 01:22:21,910
would allow a Democratic president

2113
01:22:21,910 --> 01:22:23,560
to take money out of the Defense budget

2114
01:22:23,560 --> 01:22:26,340
to use for non-defense priority.

2115
01:22:26,340 --> 01:22:28,410
I cannot imagine it.

2116
01:22:28,410 --> 01:22:29,790
I appreciate, Secretary Esper,

2117
01:22:29,790 --> 01:22:31,330
you in response to Senator Manchin,

2118
01:22:31,330 --> 01:22:33,243
said the preferred way would be

2119
01:22:33,243 --> 01:22:36,060
to have a tough appropriations battle,

2120
01:22:36,060 --> 01:22:37,639
appropriate money for the border wall

2121
01:22:37,639 --> 01:22:39,660
and then spend the money appropriated

2122
01:22:39,660 --> 01:22:42,960
for the DOD within DOD accounts.

2123
01:22:42,960 --> 01:22:45,000
I think that makes perfect sense,

2124
01:22:45,000 --> 01:22:48,150
but it's hard for you
to look us in the eye

2125
01:22:48,150 --> 01:22:50,340
and say this is very focused on the NDS

2126
01:22:50,340 --> 01:22:51,340
when I can't find mention

2127
01:22:51,340 --> 01:22:54,760
of the border wall or
the border in the NDS.

2128
01:22:54,760 --> 01:22:57,400
And when earlier witnesses have testified,

2129
01:22:57,400 --> 01:22:58,510
though this being an emergency,

2130
01:22:58,510 --> 01:23:00,870
it's not a military emergency.

2131
01:23:00,870 --> 01:23:03,230
Let me dig into another issue.

2132
01:23:03,230 --> 01:23:05,710
Just using the 3.8 figure.

2133
01:23:05,710 --> 01:23:07,820
You do that transfer within the DOD

2134
01:23:07,820 --> 01:23:09,740
into the counter drug fund,

2135
01:23:09,740 --> 01:23:11,760
and then use that for the wall.

2136
01:23:11,760 --> 01:23:13,240
Is that transfer subject

2137
01:23:13,240 --> 01:23:15,658
to the transfer authority
that we give you,

2138
01:23:15,658 --> 01:23:18,232
where there's a general transfer authority

2139
01:23:18,232 --> 01:23:20,590
in the appropriations act where you

2140
01:23:20,590 --> 01:23:22,507
can transfer up to $4 billion a year

2141
01:23:22,507 --> 01:23:25,360
within DOD accounts with notice

2142
01:23:25,360 --> 01:23:27,000
to Congress but without approval.

2143
01:23:27,000 --> 01:23:29,180
Is that 3.8 transfer within

2144
01:23:29,180 --> 01:23:31,490
that $4 billion transfer authority?

2145
01:23:31,490 --> 01:23:32,840
- I think so, Senator,

2146
01:23:32,840 --> 01:23:34,890
but I'd want to come back
with you to affirm it.

2147
01:23:34,890 --> 01:23:37,530
- I'd love that that my
belief that it is, too.

2148
01:23:37,530 --> 01:23:39,254
You have $4 billion of transfer authority,

2149
01:23:39,254 --> 01:23:41,270
we're a few months into the fiscal year,

2150
01:23:41,270 --> 01:23:43,470
it's often the case that
transfer authorities

2151
01:23:43,470 --> 01:23:44,870
are mostly at the end of the fiscal year

2152
01:23:44,870 --> 01:23:47,350
and you've used $3.8
billion of the transfer

2153
01:23:47,350 --> 01:23:49,803
authority by the beginning of March

2154
01:23:49,803 --> 01:23:53,980
when we have a whole lot of
months left in the fiscal year.

2155
01:23:53,980 --> 01:23:56,940
For example, how much in the
President's budget for DOD

2156
01:23:56,940 --> 01:23:58,980
is coronavirus response

2157
01:23:58,980 --> 01:24:01,430
if we need to maintain people and place

2158
01:24:01,430 --> 01:24:04,930
on South Korean bases
and on bases in Italy,

2159
01:24:04,930 --> 01:24:07,610
bases in Germany, bases in
other places around the world.

2160
01:24:07,610 --> 01:24:08,850
Our troops and our families.

2161
01:24:08,850 --> 01:24:11,068
It's probably not in the PB.

2162
01:24:11,068 --> 01:24:12,890
But that would be the kind of thing

2163
01:24:12,890 --> 01:24:16,210
for which we give you transfer authority,

2164
01:24:16,210 --> 01:24:18,810
but you've now almost bumped up against

2165
01:24:18,810 --> 01:24:20,483
the limit of your transfer authority

2166
01:24:20,483 --> 01:24:23,310
out of that $4 billion to
build money at the wall

2167
01:24:23,310 --> 01:24:24,950
and we still have eight months left

2168
01:24:24,950 --> 01:24:27,000
in the fiscal year isn't that right?

2169
01:24:27,000 --> 01:24:28,900
- Your assessment is correct, Senator.

2170
01:24:32,350 --> 01:24:34,250
- Would it make your job easier

2171
01:24:34,250 --> 01:24:36,480
if we eliminated your transfer authority

2172
01:24:36,480 --> 01:24:37,740
and said any transfer authority

2173
01:24:37,740 --> 01:24:39,790
you had to come to us for permission?

2174
01:24:39,790 --> 01:24:42,120
The $4 billion, you can do
it without our permission,

2175
01:24:42,120 --> 01:24:44,040
over $4 billion you have
to get our permission.

2176
01:24:44,040 --> 01:24:45,720
If we had said you can't do any

2177
01:24:45,720 --> 01:24:48,413
transfers without Congress' position,

2178
01:24:48,413 --> 01:24:51,051
would that actually help you
because it would enable us

2179
01:24:51,051 --> 01:24:54,280
to say you gotta get it
through appropriations?

2180
01:24:54,280 --> 01:24:55,450
If you want something for a wall,

2181
01:24:55,450 --> 01:24:57,240
if you want to fight climate change,

2182
01:24:57,240 --> 01:24:58,470
if you want to fight gun violence,

2183
01:24:58,470 --> 01:25:00,360
you've got to get it
through appropriations.

2184
01:25:00,360 --> 01:25:01,380
Because if you had to come back

2185
01:25:01,380 --> 01:25:05,170
to us to ask for authority to
do that $4 billion transfer,

2186
01:25:05,170 --> 01:25:08,256
then we could actually keep
the money in the budget

2187
01:25:08,256 --> 01:25:11,273
that is directed toward the
National Defense Strategy.

2188
01:25:12,670 --> 01:25:15,242
- Senator, there is no
head of any organization

2189
01:25:15,242 --> 01:25:19,460
that wants his or her hands
tied by narrowing the options.

2190
01:25:19,460 --> 01:25:20,647
You always want to expand your options

2191
01:25:20,647 --> 01:25:23,500
and your maneuver space
so, no, not necessarily.

2192
01:25:23,500 --> 01:25:26,120
- In an odd way aren't your
hands kind of tied in this way?

2193
01:25:26,120 --> 01:25:28,250
If money can be taken
out of your budget to use

2194
01:25:28,250 --> 01:25:32,350
for DHS or to battle climate
change or gun violence.

2195
01:25:32,350 --> 01:25:34,610
If it can be taken out of your hands

2196
01:25:34,610 --> 01:25:36,135
that's sort of a tying of your hands

2197
01:25:36,135 --> 01:25:38,190
in terms of putting together a budget that

2198
01:25:38,190 --> 01:25:40,440
promotes National Defense
Strategy, isn't it?

2199
01:25:41,360 --> 01:25:43,090
- Senator, I recognize what you're saying.

2200
01:25:43,090 --> 01:25:43,923
Like I said,

2201
01:25:43,923 --> 01:25:45,310
the President's declared
a national emergency.

2202
01:25:45,310 --> 01:25:47,243
We've been tasked support DHS,

2203
01:25:49,100 --> 01:25:51,960
if it's legally available
we intend to support DHS.

2204
01:25:51,960 --> 01:25:53,010
- I appreciate your answers.

2205
01:25:53,010 --> 01:25:54,010
Thanks, Madam Chair.

2206
01:25:56,090 --> 01:25:57,390
- Thank you, Madam Chair.

2207
01:25:57,390 --> 01:25:59,653
Good to see you again Secretary
Esper and General Milley.

2208
01:25:59,653 --> 01:26:01,400
I want to talk about the killing

2209
01:26:01,400 --> 01:26:02,970
of terrorist leader Qassem Soleimani.

2210
01:26:02,970 --> 01:26:05,040
It's been about two months.

2211
01:26:05,040 --> 01:26:06,860
I agreed with that important decision

2212
01:26:06,860 --> 01:26:08,170
to take out that terrorist leader.

2213
01:26:08,170 --> 01:26:10,580
He has a lot of American
blood on his hands.

2214
01:26:10,580 --> 01:26:13,771
Despite the ridiculous politicizing
that we saw at the time,

2215
01:26:13,771 --> 01:26:15,990
people almost cheering that we were

2216
01:26:15,990 --> 01:26:17,260
about to go to war with Iran,

2217
01:26:17,260 --> 01:26:18,950
unfortunately it should
have been a unifying issue.

2218
01:26:18,950 --> 01:26:20,240
It's now been two months.

2219
01:26:20,240 --> 01:26:21,940
Can you share at all what you've seen?

2220
01:26:21,940 --> 01:26:23,470
I believe that that was a body blow.

2221
01:26:23,470 --> 01:26:26,300
We heard from you and others
that it was a body blow

2222
01:26:26,300 --> 01:26:27,950
and the impact that that's having

2223
01:26:28,831 --> 01:26:30,650
on Iran's terrorist activities,

2224
01:26:30,650 --> 01:26:31,483
their threats in the region,

2225
01:26:31,483 --> 01:26:34,463
their proxy forces and the
threat to us and Israel?

2226
01:26:35,370 --> 01:26:39,793
- I think, Senator, that as you well know,

2227
01:26:40,715 --> 01:26:42,610
Soleimani was a terrorist leader

2228
01:26:42,610 --> 01:26:46,143
of a terrorist organization who
killed many, many Americans.

2229
01:26:47,300 --> 01:26:48,980
He wounded thousands more,
killed his own people,

2230
01:26:48,980 --> 01:26:52,180
killed people throughout the
region, very capable adversary,

2231
01:26:52,180 --> 01:26:55,775
but I think it's clear that
taking him off the battlefield

2232
01:26:55,775 --> 01:27:00,775
has set back the IRGC and
the Iranian government

2233
01:27:00,900 --> 01:27:01,970
with regard to spreading their

2234
01:27:01,970 --> 01:27:03,910
malign activity throughout the region.

2235
01:27:03,910 --> 01:27:06,350
I think by the same action,

2236
01:27:06,350 --> 01:27:08,923
we have restored deterrence to a degree.

2237
01:27:10,490 --> 01:27:11,790
So, for all those things,

2238
01:27:11,790 --> 01:27:14,180
I still believe it was the right call

2239
01:27:14,180 --> 01:27:15,790
made by the commander in chief.

2240
01:27:15,790 --> 01:27:16,623
- As do I.

2241
01:27:16,623 --> 01:27:17,456
Thanks.

2242
01:27:17,456 --> 01:27:19,137
General Milley, got
anything to add to that?

2243
01:27:19,137 --> 01:27:22,373
- I would add that I absolutely
think it was the right call.

2244
01:27:24,389 --> 01:27:27,470
I second the idea that we
reestablished deterrence.

2245
01:27:27,470 --> 01:27:28,740
I think that's really critical

2246
01:27:28,740 --> 01:27:30,560
and we can talk about
that in a classified forum

2247
01:27:30,560 --> 01:27:31,923
exactly what makes me believe that,

2248
01:27:31,923 --> 01:27:34,270
but I do believe it's been reestablished.

2249
01:27:34,270 --> 01:27:35,103
- Thanks.

2250
01:27:35,103 --> 01:27:38,150
Staying on Iran, the reports
of coronavirus there,

2251
01:27:38,150 --> 01:27:40,140
again another totalitarian,
opaque country,

2252
01:27:40,140 --> 01:27:42,270
I don't believe anything they're reporting

2253
01:27:42,270 --> 01:27:44,070
or the way they're gonna handle it.

2254
01:27:44,070 --> 01:27:46,340
There's been reports that
23 members of parliament,

2255
01:27:46,340 --> 01:27:47,760
10% of their parliament,

2256
01:27:47,760 --> 01:27:50,950
a senior adviser to the supreme leader,

2257
01:27:50,950 --> 01:27:52,590
vice president, deputy health minister,

2258
01:27:52,590 --> 01:27:54,130
all contracted the virus.

2259
01:27:54,130 --> 01:27:56,260
Are you seeing anything
related to the impact,

2260
01:27:56,260 --> 01:27:59,300
especially with Iraq, with
our forces in the region,

2261
01:27:59,300 --> 01:28:02,370
or how that may further
put pressure on the regime

2262
01:28:03,540 --> 01:28:06,290
both internally from their own people

2263
01:28:06,290 --> 01:28:08,390
as they are failing to deal with this?

2264
01:28:08,390 --> 01:28:09,590
- I think that, Senator,

2265
01:28:09,590 --> 01:28:13,370
becomes a factor obviously
as we see this unfold.

2266
01:28:13,370 --> 01:28:15,520
Authoritarian countries having a problem

2267
01:28:15,520 --> 01:28:18,700
with transparency and being
forthright with their folks.

2268
01:28:18,700 --> 01:28:19,840
Quite honestly, though, my attention

2269
01:28:19,840 --> 01:28:22,240
has been focused on three priorities

2270
01:28:22,240 --> 01:28:24,890
I've been outlining
internally to my commanders.

2271
01:28:24,890 --> 01:28:26,250
One is protection of our force,

2272
01:28:26,250 --> 01:28:27,480
our service members and their families.

2273
01:28:27,480 --> 01:28:29,740
Number two, safeguarding
our mission capability.

2274
01:28:29,740 --> 01:28:31,925
And number three,
supporting the interagency.

2275
01:28:31,925 --> 01:28:33,361
- Great, thank you.

2276
01:28:33,361 --> 01:28:34,910
I want to totally change topics

2277
01:28:34,910 --> 01:28:36,871
here on military sexual assault.

2278
01:28:36,871 --> 01:28:39,178
Last year, I worked with your predecessors

2279
01:28:39,178 --> 01:28:43,380
and I championed reforms
that made it into the NDAA,

2280
01:28:43,380 --> 01:28:46,070
specifically focused on improving

2281
01:28:46,070 --> 01:28:48,570
the process from a report forward,

2282
01:28:48,570 --> 01:28:52,150
the investigative process
and the support going forward

2283
01:28:52,150 --> 01:28:54,060
after a report has been made.

2284
01:28:54,060 --> 01:28:56,220
When I went to Yuma in Arizona,

2285
01:28:56,220 --> 01:28:57,280
I had heard that they had

2286
01:28:57,280 --> 01:28:59,720
no specials victims
councils there full-time.

2287
01:28:59,720 --> 01:29:02,630
Oftentimes victims were waiting
a significant amount of time

2288
01:29:02,630 --> 01:29:04,040
before they get to meet with an SVC

2289
01:29:04,040 --> 01:29:05,220
which they often wanted before

2290
01:29:05,220 --> 01:29:09,500
their first meeting with investigators.

2291
01:29:09,500 --> 01:29:12,191
I put in the bill that
they needed to have an SVC

2292
01:29:12,191 --> 01:29:15,040
available within 72 hours
for every single victim.

2293
01:29:15,040 --> 01:29:17,910
We now have a full-time
one at Yuma, for example,

2294
01:29:17,910 --> 01:29:20,410
but we're seeing this
all over the country now.

2295
01:29:20,410 --> 01:29:23,834
Victims are able to get
their special victims council

2296
01:29:23,834 --> 01:29:27,090
quicker and have a more
immediate response.

2297
01:29:27,090 --> 01:29:28,910
We're also hearing other reports

2298
01:29:28,910 --> 01:29:30,620
of just increases to NCIS

2299
01:29:30,620 --> 01:29:32,440
and how that's having a positive impact.

2300
01:29:32,440 --> 01:29:35,160
So, just a question, given
the successes we still need

2301
01:29:35,160 --> 01:29:38,140
to prioritize implementation
of those provisions.

2302
01:29:38,140 --> 01:29:39,530
Can you report back to me on anything

2303
01:29:39,530 --> 01:29:41,840
else you're seeing in the
field on implementation?

2304
01:29:41,840 --> 01:29:43,700
- First of all your efforts and assistance

2305
01:29:43,700 --> 01:29:45,498
in establishing the sexual assault

2306
01:29:45,498 --> 01:29:47,290
accountability investigative task force

2307
01:29:47,290 --> 01:29:48,730
are directly helping service members,

2308
01:29:48,730 --> 01:29:51,230
we have a lot of good
information, data so far

2309
01:29:51,230 --> 01:29:54,090
both factually and anecdotally.

2310
01:29:54,090 --> 01:29:56,320
The Department has approved
all 22 recommendations

2311
01:29:56,320 --> 01:29:58,750
in the four critical focus areas.

2312
01:29:58,750 --> 01:30:01,210
They are all now policy
which I'm pleased to report.

2313
01:30:01,210 --> 01:30:04,140
And we're in the process of
implementation across the board,

2314
01:30:04,140 --> 01:30:05,565
and the task force continues

2315
01:30:05,565 --> 01:30:07,363
to meet the track implementations.

2316
01:30:09,092 --> 01:30:09,925
A lot of this is moving on.

2317
01:30:09,925 --> 01:30:12,020
It's critical to reducing
timelines for cases

2318
01:30:12,020 --> 01:30:14,350
and ensuring the best
evidence for consideration.

2319
01:30:14,350 --> 01:30:16,440
I'd love to come back or
send a team to update you

2320
01:30:16,440 --> 01:30:19,366
but it seems to be moving
in the right direction,

2321
01:30:19,366 --> 01:30:22,310
generally, and it's having an impact.

2322
01:30:22,310 --> 01:30:23,143
- Great, thanks.

2323
01:30:23,143 --> 01:30:23,990
And the next thing we want

2324
01:30:23,990 --> 01:30:25,450
to now focus on obviously is prevention,

2325
01:30:25,450 --> 01:30:28,040
stopping these crimes from
happening in the first place.

2326
01:30:28,040 --> 01:30:29,640
We've talked extensively about this.

2327
01:30:29,640 --> 01:30:32,180
I don't know, General Milley,
if you want to pipe in.

2328
01:30:32,180 --> 01:30:34,230
In your long experience in the military,

2329
01:30:34,230 --> 01:30:36,090
how we get to the front end

2330
01:30:36,090 --> 01:30:37,449
and preventing these crimes from happening

2331
01:30:37,449 --> 01:30:39,790
in the age groups where it's happening.

2332
01:30:39,790 --> 01:30:42,000
We know exactly what we need to get after,

2333
01:30:42,000 --> 01:30:43,619
but what we've been doing for training

2334
01:30:43,619 --> 01:30:45,630
and prevention is just not working.

2335
01:30:45,630 --> 01:30:48,020
- Again I want to thank you
for your personal leadership

2336
01:30:48,020 --> 01:30:51,787
but the key here is the chain
of command and commanders

2337
01:30:51,787 --> 01:30:54,077
and non-commissioned officers starting

2338
01:30:54,077 --> 01:30:56,792
at the senior levels but also going all

2339
01:30:56,792 --> 01:30:59,730
the way down to team
sergeants and team leaders

2340
01:30:59,730 --> 01:31:01,080
and first line supervisors.

2341
01:31:02,890 --> 01:31:04,840
Sergeant Major of the Army used to say,

2342
01:31:05,700 --> 01:31:07,070
not in my squad, sort of thing,

2343
01:31:07,070 --> 01:31:09,220
not in my squadron or not in my battalion.

2344
01:31:09,220 --> 01:31:10,480
Now, this takes ownership

2345
01:31:10,480 --> 01:31:12,770
and you have to embrace it completely.

2346
01:31:12,770 --> 01:31:15,740
It's a function of good order
and discipline of the force

2347
01:31:15,740 --> 01:31:17,520
for which commanders and commanders alone

2348
01:31:17,520 --> 01:31:19,613
are personally responsible
and should be held accountable

2349
01:31:19,613 --> 01:31:21,600
for the good order and
discipline of their force,

2350
01:31:21,600 --> 01:31:23,610
regardless of whether it's sexual assault,

2351
01:31:23,610 --> 01:31:28,032
or drugs, or crimes of
violence, or whatever it is.

2352
01:31:28,032 --> 01:31:30,810
The key here to success is commanders.

2353
01:31:30,810 --> 01:31:31,995
- Thanks.

2354
01:31:31,995 --> 01:31:32,972
I'm over my time.

2355
01:31:32,972 --> 01:31:34,280
I look forward to continue
working with you on this issue.

2356
01:31:34,280 --> 01:31:35,113
Thanks.

2357
01:31:37,600 --> 01:31:38,940
- Thanks, Madam Chair.

2358
01:31:38,940 --> 01:31:42,393
Thank you both for your service
and for being here today.

2359
01:31:43,330 --> 01:31:45,400
I sent a letter last month

2360
01:31:46,960 --> 01:31:50,070
along with Senator Murphy

2361
01:31:50,070 --> 01:31:51,760
to express my frustration that

2362
01:31:51,760 --> 01:31:53,950
the Navy budget included funding

2363
01:31:53,950 --> 01:31:56,773
for only one Virginia class submarine.

2364
01:31:58,060 --> 01:32:01,440
And reports that you
signed off on this decision

2365
01:32:01,440 --> 01:32:04,300
to shift $1.6 billion in funding

2366
01:32:04,300 --> 01:32:07,800
from Virginia class submarine construction

2367
01:32:07,800 --> 01:32:11,883
to the National Nuclear
Security Administration.

2368
01:32:13,270 --> 01:32:15,190
I'm not here to ask any questions about it

2369
01:32:15,190 --> 01:32:19,530
because I hope that you continue

2370
01:32:19,530 --> 01:32:23,313
to believe as you expressed
when you visited Groton,

2371
01:32:23,313 --> 01:32:25,950
the last time you were
there, Mr. Secretary,

2372
01:32:25,950 --> 01:32:30,950
the undersea warfare
superiority of the United States

2373
01:32:31,160 --> 01:32:33,010
cannot and should not be compromised.

2374
01:32:33,010 --> 01:32:35,890
We need to meet the goals
for submarine production

2375
01:32:35,890 --> 01:32:40,670
and that hopefully two
Virginia class submarines

2376
01:32:40,670 --> 01:32:45,670
for FY '21 will be accomplished.

2377
01:32:45,870 --> 01:32:47,500
But I'm concerned also about

2378
01:32:47,500 --> 01:32:50,980
the delay in delivering the
force structure assessment

2379
01:32:50,980 --> 01:32:53,300
and 30 year shipbuilding plan

2380
01:32:54,160 --> 01:32:57,710
that apparently is still on your desk

2381
01:32:57,710 --> 01:33:00,423
or somewhere in the Pentagon for approval.

2382
01:33:01,500 --> 01:33:03,750
I expect that both will be delivered

2383
01:33:03,750 --> 01:33:07,830
to Congress and the
Navy as soon as possible

2384
01:33:07,830 --> 01:33:11,263
both in a classified and
unclassified version.

2385
01:33:12,730 --> 01:33:14,120
I hope that's true.

2386
01:33:14,120 --> 01:33:15,720
Would you confirm that it is?

2387
01:33:15,720 --> 01:33:17,580
- Senator, I've been
briefed about a week ago

2388
01:33:17,580 --> 01:33:19,330
on the INFSA, the integrated naval

2389
01:33:19,330 --> 01:33:20,680
force structure assessment.

2390
01:33:21,729 --> 01:33:22,910
I have yet to be briefed on
the 30 year shipbuilding plan.

2391
01:33:22,910 --> 01:33:24,780
Of course, they cover different timelines,

2392
01:33:24,780 --> 01:33:26,180
different horizons.

2393
01:33:26,180 --> 01:33:27,710
But what I want to do is step back

2394
01:33:27,710 --> 01:33:31,880
and look not just one view
in terms of the future fleet,

2395
01:33:31,880 --> 01:33:34,120
but I want to take in a range of views.

2396
01:33:34,120 --> 01:33:35,260
I regret that it's late.

2397
01:33:35,260 --> 01:33:36,570
I don't have a good reason why.

2398
01:33:36,570 --> 01:33:38,474
But what I want to do is give you

2399
01:33:38,474 --> 01:33:40,610
a full good assessment of
what I think the future is.

2400
01:33:40,610 --> 01:33:45,053
And I'll give you a quick note on this.

2401
01:33:46,000 --> 01:33:47,740
I'm a big believer in attack subs,

2402
01:33:47,740 --> 01:33:49,240
I believe it's an advantage we have,

2403
01:33:49,240 --> 01:33:50,940
a distinct advantage we need to grow

2404
01:33:50,940 --> 01:33:53,540
both in terms of capability and capacity.

2405
01:33:53,540 --> 01:33:56,499
I was very impressed by
the trip I had up to Groton

2406
01:33:56,499 --> 01:33:58,535
but the numbers I see in at least

2407
01:33:58,535 --> 01:34:02,040
the INFSA right now for attack subs,

2408
01:34:02,040 --> 01:34:03,710
I think the number needs to be higher.

2409
01:34:03,710 --> 01:34:06,151
What I want to do is
take a broad look at this

2410
01:34:06,151 --> 01:34:08,680
in light of an approved OPLAN,

2411
01:34:08,680 --> 01:34:10,640
in light of other ideas out there

2412
01:34:10,640 --> 01:34:12,448
and make sure that
before I sign off on it,

2413
01:34:12,448 --> 01:34:14,660
albeit late, while it may be late,

2414
01:34:14,660 --> 01:34:16,746
I want to make sure I get it right

2415
01:34:16,746 --> 01:34:17,579
or at least I'm comfortable with it

2416
01:34:17,579 --> 01:34:19,570
because I do think we need a bigger fleet,

2417
01:34:19,570 --> 01:34:21,428
and I think we need to put

2418
01:34:21,428 --> 01:34:22,261
more emphasis on attack submarines.

2419
01:34:22,261 --> 01:34:24,760
- Well, you couldn't
find a more enthusiastic

2420
01:34:24,760 --> 01:34:28,830
and passionate supporter of
a bigger submarine fleet.

2421
01:34:28,830 --> 01:34:31,060
And I hope we have an
opportunity to discuss that.

2422
01:34:31,060 --> 01:34:31,893
- [Esper] I think the
Chairman's with me, too.

2423
01:34:31,893 --> 01:34:35,647
- Before our markup in
May on this committee.

2424
01:34:35,647 --> 01:34:37,683
I want to shift slightly

2425
01:34:37,683 --> 01:34:40,550
to a point that's been raised

2426
01:34:40,550 --> 01:34:42,140
by at least one of my colleagues,

2427
01:34:42,140 --> 01:34:44,440
Senator Hirono, the coronavirus

2428
01:34:44,440 --> 01:34:47,420
impact on not only our service

2429
01:34:47,420 --> 01:34:49,059
men and women and their families,

2430
01:34:49,059 --> 01:34:51,350
grave and important as it is,

2431
01:34:51,350 --> 01:34:56,133
but also on, for example, F-35 production.

2432
01:34:57,700 --> 01:35:02,700
Today the supply line in Japan
was completely shut down.

2433
01:35:04,090 --> 01:35:07,522
That's just one example of
our defense industrial base

2434
01:35:07,522 --> 01:35:11,863
that could be gravely
impaired by coronavirus.

2435
01:35:12,810 --> 01:35:15,570
I'd like, from you and the Chairman,

2436
01:35:15,570 --> 01:35:19,990
an assessment of what the
impact is likely to be,

2437
01:35:19,990 --> 01:35:21,420
what you're doing about it,

2438
01:35:21,420 --> 01:35:24,060
and what your plans are
to be more specific.

2439
01:35:24,060 --> 01:35:29,060
And by the way, I was disappointed
by a report that I saw.

2440
01:35:30,150 --> 01:35:32,620
I'm not vouching necessarily
for its accuracy,

2441
01:35:32,620 --> 01:35:36,980
that you indicated that
American military commanders

2442
01:35:36,980 --> 01:35:40,278
were warned overseas "Not
to surprise President Trump

2443
01:35:40,278 --> 01:35:42,457
"on the coronavirus."

2444
01:35:44,270 --> 01:35:45,240
Maybe you can respond?

2445
01:35:45,240 --> 01:35:46,681
- Yes, sir.

2446
01:35:46,681 --> 01:35:48,144
First of all I was disappointed
by that story as well.

2447
01:35:48,144 --> 01:35:51,870
It's completely wrong and it's
bad reporting at it's worst.

2448
01:35:51,870 --> 01:35:53,230
I've been very clear with my commanders,

2449
01:35:53,230 --> 01:35:55,430
both privately and publicly.

2450
01:35:55,430 --> 01:35:57,260
I said this at a press
conference on Monday.

2451
01:35:57,260 --> 01:35:58,660
Our three priorities, in this order,

2452
01:35:58,660 --> 01:36:01,160
are protection of our service
members and their families,

2453
01:36:01,160 --> 01:36:03,930
number two, safeguarding our missions

2454
01:36:03,930 --> 01:36:06,010
which could include production,

2455
01:36:06,010 --> 01:36:09,380
and then number three,
support to the interagency.

2456
01:36:09,380 --> 01:36:11,480
The commanders have all
the authorities they need

2457
01:36:11,480 --> 01:36:13,510
and I'm providing them with
resources to make decisions.

2458
01:36:13,510 --> 01:36:15,320
They've made any number of decisions.

2459
01:36:15,320 --> 01:36:17,020
I don't think I've had to make one.

2460
01:36:17,020 --> 01:36:18,130
My one request of them,

2461
01:36:18,130 --> 01:36:19,850
and the Chairman will vouch for this,

2462
01:36:19,850 --> 01:36:21,440
if you're going to make
a very big decision,

2463
01:36:21,440 --> 01:36:24,260
a high-profile decision,
give me a heads up,

2464
01:36:24,260 --> 01:36:25,930
because I want to make sure that we're

2465
01:36:25,930 --> 01:36:27,360
integrated across the interagency,

2466
01:36:27,360 --> 01:36:29,490
that HHS knows, that State knows,

2467
01:36:29,490 --> 01:36:32,290
indeed the White House knows,
and the Congress knows.

2468
01:36:32,290 --> 01:36:34,362
Because that's what I gotta do.

2469
01:36:34,362 --> 01:36:35,579
I gotta make sure we're integrated across.

2470
01:36:35,579 --> 01:36:37,210
That was a bad report, completely false,

2471
01:36:37,210 --> 01:36:40,250
and Chairman if you want
to add anything on that.

2472
01:36:40,250 --> 01:36:41,950
- Senator, thanks.

2473
01:36:41,950 --> 01:36:44,441
Two things, one is I was in the VTC.

2474
01:36:44,441 --> 01:36:47,505
All the secretaries said,
it was to General Abrams,

2475
01:36:47,505 --> 01:36:49,650
over in Korea, all he
said was if you're going

2476
01:36:49,650 --> 01:36:51,360
to make the decision of imposing

2477
01:36:51,360 --> 01:36:54,010
this emergency declaration
that he has authority to do

2478
01:36:54,010 --> 01:36:55,550
please give me a heads
up so I can make sure

2479
01:36:55,550 --> 01:36:56,680
everybody here in D.C. is informed.

2480
01:36:56,680 --> 01:36:57,513
That's all it was.

2481
01:36:57,513 --> 01:37:00,340
It wasn't any kind of thing
where trying to squelch people.

2482
01:37:00,340 --> 01:37:01,610
That was a mischaracterization.

2483
01:37:01,610 --> 01:37:03,650
I read the article and I was in the thing

2484
01:37:03,650 --> 01:37:06,030
and it struck me as very odd.

2485
01:37:06,030 --> 01:37:08,940
But more importantly is
the impact on the military.

2486
01:37:08,940 --> 01:37:10,140
On the uniform military,

2487
01:37:10,140 --> 01:37:11,880
we have a demographic that's

2488
01:37:11,880 --> 01:37:13,340
different than the society at large.

2489
01:37:13,340 --> 01:37:15,180
Young, healthy, fit.

2490
01:37:15,180 --> 01:37:16,710
To date we've only got,

2491
01:37:16,710 --> 01:37:18,740
unless some new ones today or something,

2492
01:37:18,740 --> 01:37:21,800
the reporting I've got as of 24 hours ago,

2493
01:37:21,800 --> 01:37:23,052
we've got one uniform member

2494
01:37:23,052 --> 01:37:26,150
that's come down with it over in Korea.

2495
01:37:26,150 --> 01:37:27,870
A couple of family members.

2496
01:37:27,870 --> 01:37:29,420
We're screening lots of people.

2497
01:37:30,350 --> 01:37:31,820
So, in terms of the numbers

2498
01:37:31,820 --> 01:37:34,090
relative to the whole, very small impact.

2499
01:37:34,090 --> 01:37:35,600
Secondly, is on exercises.

2500
01:37:35,600 --> 01:37:37,905
There are exercises,
mostly in the Indo-Pacific

2501
01:37:37,905 --> 01:37:39,665
that we're taking a hard look at.

2502
01:37:39,665 --> 01:37:41,510
One of the CPXs, for example,

2503
01:37:41,510 --> 01:37:43,640
at the request of the ROK Chairman

2504
01:37:43,640 --> 01:37:46,550
was canceled over on
the peninsula of Korea.

2505
01:37:46,550 --> 01:37:47,610
There are some other exercises

2506
01:37:47,610 --> 01:37:49,500
that are being looked at scaled down

2507
01:37:49,500 --> 01:37:51,150
or canceled or postponed.

2508
01:37:51,150 --> 01:37:53,260
There might be some impact on exercises.

2509
01:37:53,260 --> 01:37:54,907
But broadly speaking right now,

2510
01:37:54,907 --> 01:37:57,055
the impact on uniformed military

2511
01:37:57,055 --> 01:38:01,130
is very, very minimal, break.

2512
01:38:01,130 --> 01:38:05,790
We are also preparing to help
whatever the nation needs.

2513
01:38:05,790 --> 01:38:06,840
We've got all kinds of plans

2514
01:38:06,840 --> 01:38:10,900
and we're able to support
other agencies as necessary

2515
01:38:10,900 --> 01:38:13,330
and as required by the
President and Congress.

2516
01:38:13,330 --> 01:38:15,480
- [Esper] To include our
medical research institutes etc.

2517
01:38:15,480 --> 01:38:17,290
We're all hands in terms

2518
01:38:17,290 --> 01:38:20,340
of supporting this effort
to come up with solutions.

2519
01:38:20,340 --> 01:38:21,320
- My time is expired.

2520
01:38:21,320 --> 01:38:22,480
I want to thank you both.

2521
01:38:22,480 --> 01:38:24,450
I want to suggest respectfully

2522
01:38:24,450 --> 01:38:26,840
that telling American people more

2523
01:38:26,840 --> 01:38:31,840
about those plans to use your
word, would be reassuring.

2524
01:38:32,540 --> 01:38:37,540
The enemy here, really, it seems stronger.

2525
01:38:38,609 --> 01:38:39,810
- [Milley] Lack of information, a panic.

2526
01:38:39,810 --> 01:38:40,990
- Exactly.

2527
01:38:40,990 --> 01:38:42,550
- And these aren't classified plans

2528
01:38:42,550 --> 01:38:43,957
and all that kind of stuff.

2529
01:38:43,957 --> 01:38:45,764
It's stuff that we could easily.

2530
01:38:45,764 --> 01:38:46,900
- [Blumenthal] It's not like the enemy.

2531
01:38:46,900 --> 01:38:48,600
- We could easily let people know.

2532
01:38:49,510 --> 01:38:50,667
- [Blumenthal] Thank you.

2533
01:39:00,480 --> 01:39:01,800
- Thank you, Madam Chair.

2534
01:39:01,800 --> 01:39:03,030
Gentlemen I want to thank you

2535
01:39:03,030 --> 01:39:04,730
for your exceptional service.

2536
01:39:04,730 --> 01:39:06,763
I appreciate our meetings yesterday.

2537
01:39:07,780 --> 01:39:08,900
I think both of you are doing

2538
01:39:08,900 --> 01:39:11,123
an excellent job for our nation.

2539
01:39:12,795 --> 01:39:16,920
General Milley, I wanted to
just get a little bit more.

2540
01:39:16,920 --> 01:39:19,040
You have stated, publicly stated in our

2541
01:39:19,040 --> 01:39:21,210
classified hearing on
the Soleimani strike,

2542
01:39:21,210 --> 01:39:22,930
which I thought was
not only constitutional

2543
01:39:22,930 --> 01:39:25,670
but in the nation's interest.

2544
01:39:25,670 --> 01:39:28,540
You mentioned about your duty,

2545
01:39:28,540 --> 01:39:32,280
how you saw that strike,
after you read the intel,

2546
01:39:32,280 --> 01:39:34,130
as we all know General Soleimani

2547
01:39:34,130 --> 01:39:36,260
wasn't in Iraq on vacation.

2548
01:39:36,260 --> 01:39:38,402
He was there targeting the killing

2549
01:39:38,402 --> 01:39:41,010
of more American service members

2550
01:39:41,010 --> 01:39:42,820
which he has a long history of doing.

2551
01:39:42,820 --> 01:39:45,330
Almost half the service
members in Iraq at the time

2552
01:39:45,330 --> 01:39:47,490
were Alaskan base forces,

2553
01:39:47,490 --> 01:39:48,910
so this was something that

2554
01:39:48,910 --> 01:39:51,000
was particularly of interest to me.

2555
01:39:51,000 --> 01:39:54,150
Can you succinctly say
what you've said otherwise

2556
01:39:54,150 --> 01:39:55,330
'cause I think it's very important

2557
01:39:55,330 --> 01:39:56,460
to hear directly from you,

2558
01:39:56,460 --> 01:39:59,303
someone with over 35 years
of military experience,

2559
01:39:59,303 --> 01:40:00,570
service to your country,

2560
01:40:00,570 --> 01:40:01,720
about what you thought your duty

2561
01:40:01,720 --> 01:40:03,120
was after reading the intel?

2562
01:40:05,650 --> 01:40:06,610
- What I had said publicly

2563
01:40:06,610 --> 01:40:10,776
and I reiterated it in
classified sessions was,

2564
01:40:10,776 --> 01:40:12,515
and reiterated in more detail

2565
01:40:12,515 --> 01:40:15,933
was I believe the
intelligence was compelling.

2566
01:40:17,420 --> 01:40:18,253
I believe it was imminent

2567
01:40:19,372 --> 01:40:22,110
and not only did Soleimani
have a long track record

2568
01:40:22,110 --> 01:40:24,520
going all the way back
to the Beirut bombing

2569
01:40:24,520 --> 01:40:25,440
and being involved in that,

2570
01:40:25,440 --> 01:40:27,030
but more importantly his command

2571
01:40:27,030 --> 01:40:30,120
and control role and
what he was about to do.

2572
01:40:30,120 --> 01:40:33,000
I believe that I, Secretary
Esper, the President,

2573
01:40:33,000 --> 01:40:34,510
and many, many others would have been

2574
01:40:34,510 --> 01:40:36,916
culpably negligent had we
not taken the action we did

2575
01:40:36,916 --> 01:40:40,680
because I think many Americans
would've died as a result.

2576
01:40:40,680 --> 01:40:43,643
I believe it was the
right thing to do then

2577
01:40:43,643 --> 01:40:44,680
and I still believe that

2578
01:40:44,680 --> 01:40:47,530
and I believe we contributed
to reestablishing deterrence

2579
01:40:47,530 --> 01:40:49,310
with aggressive action from Iran.

2580
01:40:49,310 --> 01:40:50,230
- I appreciate that.

2581
01:40:50,230 --> 01:40:51,750
I think reestablishing deterrence

2582
01:40:51,750 --> 01:40:54,500
anywhere in any theater is
actually really hard to do.

2583
01:40:54,500 --> 01:40:57,080
And you've been able to do it
so far and I appreciate that.

2584
01:40:57,080 --> 01:40:59,820
Mr. Secretary, we had a
good discussion yesterday

2585
01:40:59,820 --> 01:41:01,913
on this issue of the DPRI.

2586
01:41:02,950 --> 01:41:04,260
I'd like to get your views.

2587
01:41:04,260 --> 01:41:06,510
You know there was language in the NDAA

2588
01:41:06,510 --> 01:41:08,290
from last year that essentially has

2589
01:41:08,290 --> 01:41:11,076
the two of you focusing on the DPRI

2590
01:41:11,076 --> 01:41:14,730
and the issue of I think the
National Defense Strategy

2591
01:41:14,730 --> 01:41:17,560
is warmly and strongly received

2592
01:41:17,560 --> 01:41:19,870
here in the Senate in a bipartisan way.

2593
01:41:19,870 --> 01:41:21,260
But if you look at our force posture,

2594
01:41:21,260 --> 01:41:23,780
particularly in the Asia
Pacific, it's stale.

2595
01:41:23,780 --> 01:41:25,870
A lot of it exists
really after World War II

2596
01:41:25,870 --> 01:41:26,703
or the Korean war.

2597
01:41:26,703 --> 01:41:28,270
How are you thinking about that

2598
01:41:29,147 --> 01:41:32,400
and how should we be thinking
about that here in the Senate?

2599
01:41:32,400 --> 01:41:33,757
- Thank you, Senator.

2600
01:41:33,757 --> 01:41:34,776
I do think we need to take

2601
01:41:34,776 --> 01:41:36,860
a fresh look at our force
posture in the pacific.

2602
01:41:36,860 --> 01:41:37,840
By the way I think we need to take

2603
01:41:37,840 --> 01:41:40,440
a fresh look at our
force posture everywhere.

2604
01:41:40,440 --> 01:41:42,310
Which is why we're doing
those COCOM reviews.

2605
01:41:42,310 --> 01:41:44,302
So, I'll be working my way through these

2606
01:41:44,302 --> 01:41:46,078
to look at just these things.

2607
01:41:46,078 --> 01:41:47,760
By the way were finding some things

2608
01:41:47,760 --> 01:41:50,180
already that just don't make sense.

2609
01:41:50,180 --> 01:41:51,310
With regard to INDOPACOM,

2610
01:41:51,310 --> 01:41:52,947
absolutely we should
think about what it means

2611
01:41:52,947 --> 01:41:55,310
if we have to face off against China

2612
01:41:55,310 --> 01:41:58,380
in the year 2035 or 2049.

2613
01:41:58,380 --> 01:42:01,081
DPRI is one example of something

2614
01:42:01,081 --> 01:42:04,050
that was developed many, many years ago

2615
01:42:04,050 --> 01:42:06,370
and I know it's a little bit tricky.

2616
01:42:06,370 --> 01:42:07,920
There's a lot of
diplomacy involved in this

2617
01:42:07,920 --> 01:42:09,300
but I think that's something also we

2618
01:42:09,300 --> 01:42:10,480
should take a look at to make sure

2619
01:42:10,480 --> 01:42:12,020
that we are well postured,

2620
01:42:12,020 --> 01:42:14,456
particularly our Marine
capabilities, our Marine forces,

2621
01:42:14,456 --> 01:42:16,762
to not just be able to respond flexibly,

2622
01:42:16,762 --> 01:42:19,830
but also be able to train
and sustain our forces

2623
01:42:19,830 --> 01:42:22,860
in the region for an extended period.

2624
01:42:22,860 --> 01:42:24,700
- Can I dig into that
a little bit with you?

2625
01:42:24,700 --> 01:42:26,437
The issue of training, I think,

2626
01:42:26,437 --> 01:42:28,240
is a really important one,

2627
01:42:28,240 --> 01:42:29,160
whether it's on Guam

2628
01:42:29,160 --> 01:42:31,562
whether it's other places,
Okinawa for example.

2629
01:42:31,562 --> 01:42:33,300
We don't get the opportunity

2630
01:42:33,300 --> 01:42:34,810
to do a lot of training in those places

2631
01:42:34,810 --> 01:42:37,070
and I think to have
sustainable deployments

2632
01:42:37,070 --> 01:42:39,910
but also keeping our forces sharp,

2633
01:42:39,910 --> 01:42:41,160
we need good training areas,

2634
01:42:41,160 --> 01:42:42,570
would you agree with that?

2635
01:42:42,570 --> 01:42:43,403
- Absolutely, I mean,

2636
01:42:43,403 --> 01:42:46,330
training is the lifeblood
of a unit's effectiveness

2637
01:42:46,330 --> 01:42:49,530
is the ability to train,
maintain, and equip their force.

2638
01:42:49,530 --> 01:42:51,100
- We look forward to
working with both of you

2639
01:42:51,100 --> 01:42:54,798
on that continued important
reassessment that you're doing.

2640
01:42:54,798 --> 01:42:58,145
The other issue that I've been
raising quite a long time,

2641
01:42:58,145 --> 01:42:59,837
Mr. Secretary, you might remember

2642
01:42:59,837 --> 01:43:01,406
in your confirmation hearing

2643
01:43:01,406 --> 01:43:04,400
you mentioned that if the Air Force

2644
01:43:04,400 --> 01:43:06,688
in its upcoming OCONUS decision

2645
01:43:06,688 --> 01:43:11,688
on where to place the
next squadrons of KC-46s

2646
01:43:13,030 --> 01:43:17,700
did it in an area that was co-located

2647
01:43:17,700 --> 01:43:21,591
with over a 100 5th generation fighters,

2648
01:43:21,591 --> 01:43:25,240
that it would provide the United States

2649
01:43:25,240 --> 01:43:27,707
with extreme strategic reach

2650
01:43:27,707 --> 01:43:30,510
and it would show that to
our potential adversaries.

2651
01:43:30,510 --> 01:43:32,700
The TRANSCOM commander testified last week

2652
01:43:32,700 --> 01:43:37,700
that one of the most
stress capable aspects

2653
01:43:38,120 --> 01:43:39,781
and their number one readiness concern

2654
01:43:39,781 --> 01:43:43,250
was the air refueling fleet.

2655
01:43:43,250 --> 01:43:45,157
My question to him and to you

2656
01:43:45,157 --> 01:43:47,260
and the Secretary of
the Air Force yesterday,

2657
01:43:47,260 --> 01:43:52,260
having a deployment of
KC-46s in the OCONUS bed down

2658
01:43:53,361 --> 01:43:56,510
in an area that can reach multiple COCOMS

2659
01:43:56,510 --> 01:43:59,712
like a place like Alaska with
the 100 5th gen fighters.

2660
01:43:59,712 --> 01:44:01,080
From your perspective,

2661
01:44:01,080 --> 01:44:04,920
what message does that additionally
send to our adversaries?

2662
01:44:04,920 --> 01:44:06,320
You've already talked about the issue

2663
01:44:06,320 --> 01:44:08,330
of extreme strategic reach

2664
01:44:08,330 --> 01:44:10,380
when I asked that question earlier.

2665
01:44:10,380 --> 01:44:14,280
- Well, I think two critical
needs for our forces right now

2666
01:44:14,280 --> 01:44:17,170
are to have that
strategic lift, refueling,

2667
01:44:17,170 --> 01:44:18,980
and sealift by the way.

2668
01:44:18,980 --> 01:44:20,950
But the location of Alaska
gives you great reach

2669
01:44:20,950 --> 01:44:22,620
in terms of whether you go across

2670
01:44:22,620 --> 01:44:25,620
the pole into Russia or toward China,

2671
01:44:25,620 --> 01:44:28,303
when you couple it up with
the amalgamation of forces,

2672
01:44:28,303 --> 01:44:30,780
it does put the enemy
in a different posture,

2673
01:44:30,780 --> 01:44:32,050
your adversaries in a different posture

2674
01:44:32,050 --> 01:44:34,740
because you now have that
reach, that lethality at hand

2675
01:44:34,740 --> 01:44:37,430
and ready to do what it
might need to if called upon.

2676
01:44:37,430 --> 01:44:38,766
- Great

2677
01:44:38,766 --> 01:44:39,743
Thank you very much.

2678
01:44:39,743 --> 01:44:40,576
- Senator, if I might.

2679
01:44:40,576 --> 01:44:42,300
I also don't want any adversary

2680
01:44:42,300 --> 01:44:44,020
to walk away thinking that

2681
01:44:44,020 --> 01:44:46,040
the United States of
America cannot project power

2682
01:44:46,040 --> 01:44:47,910
because of the stress on the tanker fleet.

2683
01:44:47,910 --> 01:44:50,350
We can and they should
have no doubt about it.

2684
01:44:50,350 --> 01:44:55,350
Yes, we're giving up 10
KC-10s and 13 KC-135s,

2685
01:44:55,560 --> 01:44:57,980
but we still have almost 500.

2686
01:44:57,980 --> 01:44:59,910
We can get there, the
firstest with the mostest

2687
01:44:59,910 --> 01:45:01,630
and no one should doubt.

2688
01:45:01,630 --> 01:45:02,769
- But certainly one of the best ways

2689
01:45:02,769 --> 01:45:05,114
to relieve the stress is
to have tankers in place

2690
01:45:05,114 --> 01:45:06,080
'cause it can reach several COCOMS.

2691
01:45:06,080 --> 01:45:06,913
- We can get there.

2692
01:45:06,913 --> 01:45:08,560
I don't want anybody to think we can't.

2693
01:45:08,560 --> 01:45:09,542
- [Sullivan] Thank you.

2694
01:45:09,542 --> 01:45:10,625
Senator King.

2695
01:45:12,940 --> 01:45:15,093
- Thank you, Mr. Acting Chairman.

2696
01:45:15,934 --> 01:45:16,767
I appreciate it.

2697
01:45:16,767 --> 01:45:18,012
- [Sullivan] I know you're going

2698
01:45:18,012 --> 01:45:18,988
to ask a question on the Arctic.

2699
01:45:18,988 --> 01:45:19,821
- I am as a matter of fact.

2700
01:45:19,821 --> 01:45:20,995
- [Sullivan] Excellent.

2701
01:45:20,995 --> 01:45:22,017
- You left it for me.

2702
01:45:22,017 --> 01:45:22,870
Secretary Esper, first I want to thank you

2703
01:45:22,870 --> 01:45:25,090
personally for the
participation of the Department

2704
01:45:25,090 --> 01:45:29,510
and the national cyber solarium process.

2705
01:45:29,510 --> 01:45:32,080
Over a year we've worked
very hard with Ken,

2706
01:45:32,080 --> 01:45:35,730
and David Norquist made
significant contributions

2707
01:45:35,730 --> 01:45:39,690
in intellectual firepower and
criticism and thoughtfulness

2708
01:45:39,690 --> 01:45:40,990
and I just want to thank you

2709
01:45:40,990 --> 01:45:43,690
for your authorization
for that participation,

2710
01:45:43,690 --> 01:45:44,860
it was very meaningful.

2711
01:45:44,860 --> 01:45:45,693
- Thank you, Senator.

2712
01:45:45,693 --> 01:45:48,200
I'm very encouraged by all that, too.

2713
01:45:48,200 --> 01:45:49,510
There's a lot of good coming out of it.

2714
01:45:49,510 --> 01:45:50,880
- We'll be releasing our report

2715
01:45:50,880 --> 01:45:52,630
next Wednesday as a matter of fact,

2716
01:45:54,039 --> 01:45:56,220
and I think it's a good piece of work.

2717
01:45:56,220 --> 01:45:58,627
Indeed, there's been a whole session here

2718
01:45:58,627 --> 01:46:00,830
and we really haven't talked about cyber,

2719
01:46:00,830 --> 01:46:05,830
which is an essential,
that's not the right word,

2720
01:46:05,870 --> 01:46:08,988
a very real domain of warfare today.

2721
01:46:08,988 --> 01:46:10,300
That's what we'll be talking

2722
01:46:10,300 --> 01:46:11,530
about extensively next week

2723
01:46:11,530 --> 01:46:12,830
so I just wanted to thank you.

2724
01:46:12,830 --> 01:46:14,780
- Thanks, we're in cyber competition

2725
01:46:14,780 --> 01:46:16,480
if not conflict every single day.

2726
01:46:16,480 --> 01:46:19,130
- [King] Exactly, we're at war today.

2727
01:46:19,130 --> 01:46:19,963
- Yes, sir.

2728
01:46:22,176 --> 01:46:23,563
- General Milley,

2729
01:46:25,750 --> 01:46:28,623
I guess this is a
question for both of you.

2730
01:46:28,623 --> 01:46:31,600
I'm very concerned about a gap in defense

2731
01:46:31,600 --> 01:46:33,980
against hypersonic weapons.

2732
01:46:33,980 --> 01:46:37,680
Both of our principal adversaries,

2733
01:46:37,680 --> 01:46:39,620
China and Russia have
developed these weapons,

2734
01:46:39,620 --> 01:46:41,283
have actually deployed them.

2735
01:46:43,240 --> 01:46:47,940
This puts at risk particularly
our naval resources.

2736
01:46:47,940 --> 01:46:50,823
Talk to me about what we're
doing to counter that threat.

2737
01:46:51,700 --> 01:46:54,520
- Senator, as part of
our hypersonics research,

2738
01:46:54,520 --> 01:46:57,060
we are putting money
into defensive systems.

2739
01:46:57,060 --> 01:46:59,380
One of the early things we know we need

2740
01:46:59,380 --> 01:47:01,030
that money is going directly into

2741
01:47:02,165 --> 01:47:05,870
is a low earth orbit missile
tracking system, if you will,

2742
01:47:05,870 --> 01:47:08,761
that would be able to
track hypersonic systems

2743
01:47:08,761 --> 01:47:10,950
moving through the atmosphere.

2744
01:47:10,950 --> 01:47:11,783
- [King] Because one of the problems

2745
01:47:11,783 --> 01:47:14,010
with hypersonics is they
don't leave a radar.

2746
01:47:15,140 --> 01:47:17,533
They move so fast they
create a plasma shield,

2747
01:47:17,533 --> 01:47:20,160
but we need to track them.

2748
01:47:20,160 --> 01:47:22,040
- We've determined that you need a LEO

2749
01:47:22,040 --> 01:47:23,300
tracking system to do that.

2750
01:47:23,300 --> 01:47:24,510
So, that's one of the priorities

2751
01:47:24,510 --> 01:47:26,270
of our R&E efforts to do that.

2752
01:47:26,270 --> 01:47:28,840
And then, of course, you have
to figure out the effectors

2753
01:47:28,840 --> 01:47:31,250
by which you would knock
one out of the sky,

2754
01:47:31,250 --> 01:47:32,710
a variety of things that we're exploring.

2755
01:47:32,710 --> 01:47:34,250
But it is critical to have that defense,

2756
01:47:34,250 --> 01:47:37,410
because it is such, the
maneuverability, the speed,

2757
01:47:37,410 --> 01:47:41,480
the effectiveness of these
systems is remarkable.

2758
01:47:41,480 --> 01:47:44,190
- Two things, Senator King.

2759
01:47:44,190 --> 01:47:48,220
One, on the defense, if it
can be seen, it can be hit.

2760
01:47:48,220 --> 01:47:49,740
There is no defense against hypersonic,

2761
01:47:49,740 --> 01:47:51,350
it goes five to 10 times
the speed of sound.

2762
01:47:51,350 --> 01:47:53,200
You're not gonna defend against it.

2763
01:47:53,200 --> 01:47:54,950
What you have to do is be invisible.

2764
01:47:54,950 --> 01:47:56,300
And there's all kinds of techniques

2765
01:47:56,300 --> 01:47:57,840
and procedures we're working on

2766
01:47:57,840 --> 01:48:00,182
in order to make our forces very difficult

2767
01:48:00,182 --> 01:48:03,980
to see from an acquisition
standpoint of enemy radar.

2768
01:48:03,980 --> 01:48:05,060
So, that's on the defense.

2769
01:48:05,060 --> 01:48:07,680
On the other part, you're
not gonna shoot the arrow.

2770
01:48:07,680 --> 01:48:08,810
Those things are going so fast,

2771
01:48:08,810 --> 01:48:09,643
you're not gonna get it.

2772
01:48:09,643 --> 01:48:10,920
You gotta shoot the archer.

2773
01:48:10,920 --> 01:48:13,370
You gotta go deep, downtown

2774
01:48:13,370 --> 01:48:14,730
and you gotta get on the offensive.

2775
01:48:14,730 --> 01:48:16,010
If you want to defeat hypersonics,

2776
01:48:16,010 --> 01:48:18,010
you gotta go to the
source, the launch pads.

2777
01:48:18,010 --> 01:48:19,460
- And you have to have
the ISR in order to.

2778
01:48:19,460 --> 01:48:20,943
- That's right.

2779
01:48:20,943 --> 01:48:21,776
You've gotta have the ISR to get in there.

2780
01:48:21,776 --> 01:48:23,900
And if you're launching
hypersonics at the United States,

2781
01:48:23,900 --> 01:48:25,480
then you're going to war
with the United States,

2782
01:48:25,480 --> 01:48:27,670
and you're gonna pour it
on and pour it on with mass

2783
01:48:27,670 --> 01:48:29,420
and firepower and fast and hard.

2784
01:48:29,420 --> 01:48:30,750
- But I thought you
made an important point

2785
01:48:30,750 --> 01:48:32,830
earlier in the hearing
where you talked about ISR.

2786
01:48:32,830 --> 01:48:34,390
We've sort of had a vacation on ISR

2787
01:48:34,390 --> 01:48:36,802
because we've been acting against

2788
01:48:36,802 --> 01:48:41,250
enemies that don't have any air capacity.

2789
01:48:41,250 --> 01:48:42,410
It's a whole different ball game

2790
01:48:42,410 --> 01:48:45,880
when we're talking about
peer state competitors.

2791
01:48:45,880 --> 01:48:47,260
- And you want to invest
in ISR that can penetrate

2792
01:48:47,260 --> 01:48:51,890
the airspace of these
great power competitors.

2793
01:48:51,890 --> 01:48:54,093
- It's also why we talk, as I've laid out

2794
01:48:54,093 --> 01:48:56,420
the shipbuilding principles, if you will,

2795
01:48:56,420 --> 01:48:58,840
going forward and the
Navy agrees with this,

2796
01:48:58,840 --> 01:49:00,990
is move away from very large platforms

2797
01:49:00,990 --> 01:49:03,067
into smaller platforms
and more distributed force

2798
01:49:03,067 --> 01:49:05,384
so that you complicate the enemy's plans

2799
01:49:05,384 --> 01:49:08,453
particularly with regard to
the employment of hypersonics.

2800
01:49:09,720 --> 01:49:11,020
- You raised shipbuilding.

2801
01:49:12,675 --> 01:49:13,530
We talk about the Indo-Pacific

2802
01:49:13,530 --> 01:49:15,940
as being the most important region.

2803
01:49:15,940 --> 01:49:17,820
We talk about the
National Defense Strategy

2804
01:49:17,820 --> 01:49:20,390
and yet the budget talks about knocking

2805
01:49:20,390 --> 01:49:21,760
off four destroyers and I think

2806
01:49:21,760 --> 01:49:25,483
an amphib in the future plan.

2807
01:49:26,620 --> 01:49:28,280
How was that decision made?

2808
01:49:28,280 --> 01:49:29,930
How firm is it?

2809
01:49:29,930 --> 01:49:31,233
Can we revisit it?

2810
01:49:32,956 --> 01:49:34,510
I want to get a little
bit of thoughts on that.

2811
01:49:34,510 --> 01:49:37,050
By the way, the other thought is,

2812
01:49:37,050 --> 01:49:40,470
we're doing this recapitalization
out of operating costs,

2813
01:49:40,470 --> 01:49:43,070
in any other organization
you'd have a capital budget

2814
01:49:43,070 --> 01:49:45,620
and you're building 40 year an asset,

2815
01:49:45,620 --> 01:49:47,660
a Columbia submarine's a 40 year asset.

2816
01:49:47,660 --> 01:49:50,210
And yet we're building
them out of cash flow

2817
01:49:50,210 --> 01:49:53,508
instead of some kind of long-range

2818
01:49:53,508 --> 01:49:57,713
attributed to the cost over
the life of the object.

2819
01:50:00,419 --> 01:50:03,269
To get back, talk to me
about the shipbuilding.

2820
01:50:03,269 --> 01:50:04,294
- Yes, sir.

2821
01:50:04,294 --> 01:50:05,270
Well, as I said earlier,

2822
01:50:05,270 --> 01:50:06,323
I think we need, to me
I don't focus as much

2823
01:50:06,323 --> 01:50:09,010
on that number but that
number 355 is out there.

2824
01:50:09,010 --> 01:50:12,020
I think we need to have
a fleet larger than 355.

2825
01:50:12,020 --> 01:50:14,640
My gut tells me that,
I'm convinced of that.

2826
01:50:14,640 --> 01:50:16,130
- Senator Perdue had a chart this morning

2827
01:50:16,130 --> 01:50:17,390
at the Sea Power subcommittee.

2828
01:50:17,390 --> 01:50:20,256
If you saw it it shows what China's doing.

2829
01:50:20,256 --> 01:50:22,440
You'd feel vindicated.

2830
01:50:22,440 --> 01:50:23,549
- Yes, sir.

2831
01:50:23,549 --> 01:50:25,340
But we do have quality
and capability over them,

2832
01:50:25,340 --> 01:50:26,173
there are some other things out there.

2833
01:50:26,173 --> 01:50:29,420
But nonetheless it's not just
capability and lethality,

2834
01:50:29,420 --> 01:50:31,950
it's presence, you have
to have the presence.

2835
01:50:31,950 --> 01:50:33,510
I do think we need to get on that path.

2836
01:50:33,510 --> 01:50:35,060
I think there are a number
of things that we need to.

2837
01:50:35,060 --> 01:50:37,070
First of all, I completely
support what the CNO did.

2838
01:50:37,070 --> 01:50:40,790
The CNO decided reallocate
$4 billion or so out of SCN

2839
01:50:40,790 --> 01:50:43,220
and put it into O&M to get readiness up.

2840
01:50:43,220 --> 01:50:44,990
We have a readiness challenge,

2841
01:50:44,990 --> 01:50:46,040
it's been well documented.

2842
01:50:46,040 --> 01:50:47,220
- [King] A ship's no
good if it's in the dock.

2843
01:50:47,220 --> 01:50:48,481
- Yes, sir.

2844
01:50:48,481 --> 01:50:50,590
I think the GAO said last year in 2019

2845
01:50:50,590 --> 01:50:52,440
due to maintenance challenges,

2846
01:50:52,440 --> 01:50:54,970
the equivalent of 19
ships didn't go to sea.

2847
01:50:54,970 --> 01:50:56,990
And so, we've got to fix
the readiness challenge

2848
01:50:56,990 --> 01:50:58,730
and put more money into shipbuilding

2849
01:50:58,730 --> 01:51:01,650
if we can get the
legislative approval change,

2850
01:51:01,650 --> 01:51:03,240
Secretary Modly is digging in deep,

2851
01:51:03,240 --> 01:51:05,350
he's doing what the Army and Air Force did

2852
01:51:05,350 --> 01:51:07,440
to find $40 billion over five years,

2853
01:51:07,440 --> 01:51:08,940
that'll free up a good chunk

2854
01:51:08,940 --> 01:51:09,820
of what they think they need.

2855
01:51:09,820 --> 01:51:11,220
And then we gotta get this higher

2856
01:51:11,220 --> 01:51:13,120
topline moving in the right direction.

2857
01:51:14,330 --> 01:51:15,937
- What worries me about
what you're talking about,

2858
01:51:15,937 --> 01:51:18,254
and I'm sorry I'm over
time, I worry about,

2859
01:51:18,254 --> 01:51:23,254
you can't turn industrial
base off and on with a switch.

2860
01:51:23,564 --> 01:51:27,770
If we drive it down and you
have a loss of personnel,

2861
01:51:27,770 --> 01:51:30,650
loss of welders, lots
of skilled shipbuilders,

2862
01:51:30,650 --> 01:51:33,690
in Bath Maine or,

2863
01:51:33,690 --> 01:51:35,248
or Marinette Wisconsin,

2864
01:51:35,248 --> 01:51:36,930
you can't turn them back on.

2865
01:51:36,930 --> 01:51:38,150
- Completely agree, Senator.

2866
01:51:38,150 --> 01:51:39,760
That's why I think we need to look more

2867
01:51:39,760 --> 01:51:41,040
particularly with large capital

2868
01:51:41,040 --> 01:51:43,018
investments like ships, multi year,

2869
01:51:43,018 --> 01:51:45,610
and even I think the Navy,
we discussed yesterday is,

2870
01:51:45,610 --> 01:51:47,730
can you multi year O&M

2871
01:51:47,730 --> 01:51:49,710
so that you don't have
the same perturbations

2872
01:51:49,710 --> 01:51:51,880
in your maintenance cycle
because you can't afford

2873
01:51:51,880 --> 01:51:55,010
to go take a ship out of maintenance

2874
01:51:55,010 --> 01:51:56,740
and then have a month or two month gap.

2875
01:51:56,740 --> 01:51:58,580
And I know they're struggling with this up

2876
01:51:58,580 --> 01:52:02,720
in Groton right now with
the maintenance up there.

2877
01:52:02,720 --> 01:52:04,470
So you gotta figure out
a way to smooth that out

2878
01:52:04,470 --> 01:52:06,930
so workers will be incentivized
to stay in the trade.

2879
01:52:06,930 --> 01:52:08,730
- [King] Are you suggesting
consistent funding

2880
01:52:08,730 --> 01:52:10,380
from Congress might be a benefit?

2881
01:52:11,560 --> 01:52:12,393
I'm shocked.

2882
01:52:12,393 --> 01:52:13,500
- Consistent and timely.

2883
01:52:13,500 --> 01:52:14,464
- [King] Thank you.

2884
01:52:14,464 --> 01:52:15,440
Thank you, gentlemen.

2885
01:52:15,440 --> 01:52:16,810
- [Sullivan] Senator Hawley.

2886
01:52:16,810 --> 01:52:17,680
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

2887
01:52:17,680 --> 01:52:19,350
Secretary Esper, General,
thank you for being here,

2888
01:52:19,350 --> 01:52:21,459
thank you for your service.

2889
01:52:21,459 --> 01:52:22,292
Mr. Secretary let me start with you.

2890
01:52:22,292 --> 01:52:23,991
In your confirmation
testimony last summer,

2891
01:52:23,991 --> 01:52:26,800
you wrote that we needed a distributed

2892
01:52:26,800 --> 01:52:30,060
and resilient force posture
in the Indo-Pacific.

2893
01:52:30,060 --> 01:52:32,100
I'm concerned about the concentration

2894
01:52:32,100 --> 01:52:34,720
of our forces currently
in Japan and South Korea.

2895
01:52:34,720 --> 01:52:36,300
Give me your assessment about our ability

2896
01:52:36,300 --> 01:52:39,840
to compete effectively with
China given that concentration.

2897
01:52:39,840 --> 01:52:41,090
- Yes, sir.

2898
01:52:41,090 --> 01:52:44,670
Those forces are there
for a variety of reasons.

2899
01:52:44,670 --> 01:52:47,190
I think Senator Sullivan mentioned it.

2900
01:52:47,190 --> 01:52:49,510
We have a presence that largely reflects

2901
01:52:49,510 --> 01:52:51,680
where we've been for many, many years.

2902
01:52:51,680 --> 01:52:53,620
And so I do think we need to
step back and look at that.

2903
01:52:53,620 --> 01:52:55,650
I know Admiral Davidson is looking at that

2904
01:52:55,650 --> 01:52:57,692
to make sure we have more distribution.

2905
01:52:57,692 --> 01:52:59,053
I'm trying to get out there.

2906
01:52:59,053 --> 01:53:00,068
I've traveled to the INDOPACOM

2907
01:53:00,068 --> 01:53:02,010
two or three times now to
visit non-traditional partners.

2908
01:53:02,010 --> 01:53:03,293
I've been from Mongolia to Vietnam.

2909
01:53:03,293 --> 01:53:05,277
I'll be going to Indonesia.

2910
01:53:05,277 --> 01:53:07,930
I think there's much
more ground we can cover

2911
01:53:07,930 --> 01:53:10,030
and build more relationships
with more countries.

2912
01:53:10,030 --> 01:53:11,400
- You anticipate my next question

2913
01:53:11,400 --> 01:53:13,440
which is whether we can
disperse U.S. forces

2914
01:53:13,440 --> 01:53:15,160
to other locations in the Pacific

2915
01:53:15,160 --> 01:53:16,720
to improve survivability

2916
01:53:16,720 --> 01:53:18,220
and reduce risk to operations.

2917
01:53:18,220 --> 01:53:19,053
Do you think that we can?

2918
01:53:19,053 --> 01:53:21,159
- Improve survivability
but also grow more partners

2919
01:53:21,159 --> 01:53:23,020
and more people in terms of standing up

2920
01:53:23,020 --> 01:53:25,170
and telling the Chinese they have to obey

2921
01:53:25,170 --> 01:53:28,660
the international rules of
order and abide by that.

2922
01:53:28,660 --> 01:53:31,124
That's gonna take a lot of investment.

2923
01:53:31,124 --> 01:53:32,390
- What investment do we need to be able

2924
01:53:32,390 --> 01:53:35,260
to disperse our forces along those lines?

2925
01:53:35,260 --> 01:53:36,093
- I think we need to
think creatively, Senator,

2926
01:53:36,093 --> 01:53:38,050
about, you know, as you
think through the war plans,

2927
01:53:38,050 --> 01:53:39,740
how we might fight in the future,

2928
01:53:39,740 --> 01:53:40,796
where do we need to be?

2929
01:53:40,796 --> 01:53:42,713
Does it require MILCON?

2930
01:53:43,800 --> 01:53:45,910
The Chairman and I are
big believers in IMET.

2931
01:53:45,910 --> 01:53:48,640
So, get more countries
from the Indo-Pacific

2932
01:53:48,640 --> 01:53:49,830
even non-traditional partners

2933
01:53:49,830 --> 01:53:50,907
into our schoolhouses,

2934
01:53:50,907 --> 01:53:53,210
grow that relationship over a career.

2935
01:53:53,210 --> 01:53:54,670
There are number of things that we should

2936
01:53:54,670 --> 01:53:56,410
that by the way the DOD is doing

2937
01:53:56,410 --> 01:54:00,940
we're committed to 50% growth
in IMET over five years.

2938
01:54:00,940 --> 01:54:03,320
- Sticking with the
question of investment.

2939
01:54:03,320 --> 01:54:04,470
In your confirmation hearing

2940
01:54:04,470 --> 01:54:06,260
you said that you were open in principle

2941
01:54:06,260 --> 01:54:08,120
to using something like EDI

2942
01:54:08,120 --> 01:54:10,604
to accelerate investment in INDOPACOM.

2943
01:54:10,604 --> 01:54:12,050
I don't see anything like that,

2944
01:54:12,050 --> 01:54:13,010
however, in your budget.

2945
01:54:13,010 --> 01:54:13,843
Why is that?

2946
01:54:15,908 --> 01:54:17,477
- The more I think about that

2947
01:54:17,477 --> 01:54:18,900
and we've discussed this a lot.

2948
01:54:18,900 --> 01:54:20,470
Sometimes I get concerned if you bucket

2949
01:54:20,470 --> 01:54:23,105
a certain amount of money
for a certain region,

2950
01:54:23,105 --> 01:54:25,670
it can be both limiting and.

2951
01:54:25,670 --> 01:54:27,330
In other words if you
put so much money there

2952
01:54:27,330 --> 01:54:29,450
people say that's it, that's all you need,

2953
01:54:29,450 --> 01:54:31,290
or you get trapped by that fund.

2954
01:54:31,290 --> 01:54:33,720
I actually appreciate the flexibility

2955
01:54:33,720 --> 01:54:35,080
of putting more or less in depending

2956
01:54:35,080 --> 01:54:37,020
on how circumstances change.

2957
01:54:37,020 --> 01:54:38,150
Clearly I think,

2958
01:54:38,150 --> 01:54:39,750
and we're talking to
the commander out there

2959
01:54:39,750 --> 01:54:41,400
about what are your investment plans,

2960
01:54:41,400 --> 01:54:44,110
focusing more in terms of future presence.

2961
01:54:44,110 --> 01:54:44,943
What do we need to do,

2962
01:54:44,943 --> 01:54:46,620
where do we need to grow relationship?

2963
01:54:46,620 --> 01:54:49,570
- EDI has been so
successful in that theater

2964
01:54:49,570 --> 01:54:50,650
and for our needs there.

2965
01:54:50,650 --> 01:54:53,823
I continue to believe that
something like that mechanism.

2966
01:54:54,690 --> 01:54:55,620
- The only thing I'd say, Senator,

2967
01:54:55,620 --> 01:54:58,047
is sometimes it takes the
pressure off of countries

2968
01:54:58,047 --> 01:55:01,520
to invest their own
dollars into supporting us

2969
01:55:01,520 --> 01:55:03,570
and providing host nation support.

2970
01:55:03,570 --> 01:55:04,890
Because they see that fund out there

2971
01:55:04,890 --> 01:55:06,900
and they go after that instead of going

2972
01:55:06,900 --> 01:55:08,040
to their parliaments and saying how

2973
01:55:08,040 --> 01:55:10,096
can we support the U.S. presence?

2974
01:55:10,096 --> 01:55:11,184
- I just want to make sure that we

2975
01:55:11,184 --> 01:55:13,450
are getting the resources we need

2976
01:55:13,450 --> 01:55:17,120
to what is our priority theater,
I believe, under the NDS

2977
01:55:17,120 --> 01:55:19,010
in a timely fashion if we're gonna

2978
01:55:19,010 --> 01:55:20,453
be postured successfully.

2979
01:55:20,453 --> 01:55:22,510
We're behind the curve, I think.

2980
01:55:22,510 --> 01:55:23,343
- I'm impatient.

2981
01:55:23,343 --> 01:55:25,150
I think we can and should do more,

2982
01:55:25,150 --> 01:55:27,010
that's why I'm trying to
do these COCOM reviews

2983
01:55:27,010 --> 01:55:28,860
to free up time, money, and manpower

2984
01:55:28,860 --> 01:55:30,810
to invest more into that future fight.

2985
01:55:30,810 --> 01:55:32,911
- I applaud your COCOM
reviews, by the way.

2986
01:55:32,911 --> 01:55:35,239
Let's talk for a second about AFRICOM.

2987
01:55:35,239 --> 01:55:37,430
The AFRICOM commander, General Townsend,

2988
01:55:37,430 --> 01:55:38,790
recently testified that he thought

2989
01:55:38,790 --> 01:55:42,014
our European allies could send
more forces to West Africa

2990
01:55:42,014 --> 01:55:44,389
and take over some of
the missions currently

2991
01:55:44,389 --> 01:55:47,130
being done by our forces
like airlift for instance

2992
01:55:47,130 --> 01:55:47,980
and aerial refueling.

2993
01:55:47,980 --> 01:55:49,120
Do you agree with that assessment?

2994
01:55:49,120 --> 01:55:51,820
- Absolutely and I've talked
to the allies about this.

2995
01:55:51,820 --> 01:55:54,820
We've talked a few times
about aerial refueling.

2996
01:55:54,820 --> 01:55:57,630
We provide that to the
French for free, if you will.

2997
01:55:57,630 --> 01:55:59,190
That's one of the areas where
I've talked to the French

2998
01:55:59,190 --> 01:56:00,550
to say, look, I'm having a problem

2999
01:56:00,550 --> 01:56:02,410
with air refuelers right now.

3000
01:56:02,410 --> 01:56:03,910
If somebody else can pick up that mission,

3001
01:56:03,910 --> 01:56:05,020
that helps us all out a lot.

3002
01:56:05,020 --> 01:56:06,750
That's part of the
review is looking at how

3003
01:56:06,750 --> 01:56:09,254
do we do the same mission
but maybe do it differently?

3004
01:56:09,254 --> 01:56:11,350
- This seems to me like a clear situation

3005
01:56:11,350 --> 01:56:13,190
where we can and should expect our allies

3006
01:56:13,190 --> 01:56:16,010
to do more and again I
applaud your COCOM reviews.

3007
01:56:16,010 --> 01:56:17,676
General Milley, let me switch topics.

3008
01:56:17,676 --> 01:56:19,110
Let's talk about Iran.

3009
01:56:19,110 --> 01:56:21,955
If Iran resumes provocations
in coming months,

3010
01:56:21,955 --> 01:56:25,720
what is your assessment of
how many troops we can send

3011
01:56:25,720 --> 01:56:27,112
to that the theater without

3012
01:56:27,112 --> 01:56:31,380
risking our situation in INDOPACOM,

3013
01:56:31,380 --> 01:56:32,990
without undermining deterrence,

3014
01:56:32,990 --> 01:56:34,640
if you like, in the Indo-Pacific?

3015
01:56:36,817 --> 01:56:39,413
- I don't think I can answer
that in an open session.

3016
01:56:40,390 --> 01:56:41,223
I'd rather come back to you

3017
01:56:41,223 --> 01:56:43,150
in a classified session, point one.

3018
01:56:43,150 --> 01:56:45,001
Point two, just to be clear, though,

3019
01:56:45,001 --> 01:56:49,921
there is a significant amount
of force in Indo-Pacific.

3020
01:56:49,921 --> 01:56:52,570
300,000 troops, seven aircraft carriers.

3021
01:56:52,570 --> 01:56:55,730
There's a lot of force in the Pacific.

3022
01:56:55,730 --> 01:56:57,050
And in Central Command you're

3023
01:56:57,050 --> 01:57:00,290
looking at about 70,000
troops currently, right now.

3024
01:57:00,290 --> 01:57:01,600
There's an adequate amount of force

3025
01:57:01,600 --> 01:57:03,600
in Central Command to maintain deterrence.

3026
01:57:03,600 --> 01:57:04,900
If deterrence breaks down,

3027
01:57:04,900 --> 01:57:06,410
we'll analyze the situation

3028
01:57:06,410 --> 01:57:07,592
and we'll do whatever's required

3029
01:57:07,592 --> 01:57:10,220
to achieve whatever
national security objectives

3030
01:57:10,220 --> 01:57:13,240
are necessary relative to Iran.

3031
01:57:13,240 --> 01:57:14,360
I'd rather get back to you in

3032
01:57:14,360 --> 01:57:16,210
a classified session on
exactly what that would be.

3033
01:57:16,210 --> 01:57:17,579
- You bet.

3034
01:57:17,579 --> 01:57:18,412
I'll pursue that with you
in a classified setting.

3035
01:57:18,412 --> 01:57:20,610
My last question on this, Mr. Chairman,

3036
01:57:20,610 --> 01:57:22,470
is just your comments about

3037
01:57:22,470 --> 01:57:25,330
the relative balance
between CENTCOM and PACOM.

3038
01:57:25,330 --> 01:57:26,560
Is it you're sense that there's

3039
01:57:26,560 --> 01:57:29,020
a little bit of slack then,
General, in INDOPACOM?

3040
01:57:29,020 --> 01:57:30,520
I mean is that?

3041
01:57:30,520 --> 01:57:32,000
- Again, it's a depends,

3042
01:57:32,000 --> 01:57:34,126
if you think that you're close

3043
01:57:34,126 --> 01:57:37,372
to a war with Korea or
China, then probably not.

3044
01:57:37,372 --> 01:57:39,263
So, it depends on what the situation

3045
01:57:39,263 --> 01:57:41,393
is in INDOPACOM at the moment in time.

3046
01:57:42,340 --> 01:57:43,526
We will do whatever is required

3047
01:57:43,526 --> 01:57:45,460
to achieve U.S. national security interest

3048
01:57:45,460 --> 01:57:47,870
no matter where it's at in the world.

3049
01:57:47,870 --> 01:57:49,470
And if something were to happen,

3050
01:57:50,930 --> 01:57:52,210
very significantly more than

3051
01:57:52,210 --> 01:57:54,160
what's current in the Middle East,

3052
01:57:54,160 --> 01:57:56,100
then decisions will be
made by the President,

3053
01:57:56,100 --> 01:57:56,933
the Secretary of Defense

3054
01:57:56,933 --> 01:57:58,140
to move the right amount

3055
01:57:58,140 --> 01:57:59,750
of forces to achieve our objectives.

3056
01:57:59,750 --> 01:58:00,583
- Thank you, General.

3057
01:58:00,583 --> 01:58:02,020
Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

3058
01:58:02,020 --> 01:58:02,853
- On behalf of the Chairman,

3059
01:58:02,853 --> 01:58:04,630
let me recognize Senator Peters.

3060
01:58:04,630 --> 01:58:06,120
- Thank you, Ranking Member Reed

3061
01:58:06,120 --> 01:58:08,070
and to both the gentlemen,

3062
01:58:08,070 --> 01:58:10,550
thank you for your testimony
here today and your service.

3063
01:58:10,550 --> 01:58:12,450
Secretary Esper, briefly I'd like

3064
01:58:12,450 --> 01:58:16,440
to discuss prescription
drug prices under TRICARE.

3065
01:58:16,440 --> 01:58:18,213
This is an issue that Senator Rounds and I

3066
01:58:18,213 --> 01:58:19,770
have been working on along with some

3067
01:58:19,770 --> 01:58:21,360
of the members of the committee here.

3068
01:58:21,360 --> 01:58:22,750
This committee previously authorized

3069
01:58:22,750 --> 01:58:24,070
a pilot program that would lower

3070
01:58:24,070 --> 01:58:26,758
the cost of prescription drugs
for TRICARE beneficiaries

3071
01:58:26,758 --> 01:58:28,530
including service members,

3072
01:58:28,530 --> 01:58:31,440
their families and our military retirees.

3073
01:58:31,440 --> 01:58:32,410
I know that the Department

3074
01:58:32,410 --> 01:58:33,960
has begun the process of preparing

3075
01:58:33,960 --> 01:58:37,328
for those prescription
drug parity pilot program,

3076
01:58:37,328 --> 01:58:39,210
but it still has not begun.

3077
01:58:39,210 --> 01:58:41,224
My question is, can you commit to working

3078
01:58:41,224 --> 01:58:43,880
with us on action to lower the cost

3079
01:58:43,880 --> 01:58:46,240
of prescription drugs
for our service members

3080
01:58:46,240 --> 01:58:47,550
under TRICARE and particularly

3081
01:58:47,550 --> 01:58:51,500
expanding their opportunities
to purchase these drugs?

3082
01:58:51,500 --> 01:58:53,678
- Yes, sir, without having too much detail

3083
01:58:53,678 --> 01:58:57,714
I'm always committed to
improving quality and access.

3084
01:58:57,714 --> 01:59:00,450
- Secretary Esper, last
week Senator Cotton and I

3085
01:59:00,450 --> 01:59:02,470
sent a letter urging you to establish

3086
01:59:02,470 --> 01:59:05,805
a U.S. Israel operations
technology working group.

3087
01:59:05,805 --> 01:59:07,034
This group would coordinate

3088
01:59:07,034 --> 01:59:09,623
and catalyze military research

3089
01:59:09,623 --> 01:59:11,530
and development efforts between

3090
01:59:11,530 --> 01:59:13,060
the United States and Israel,

3091
01:59:13,060 --> 01:59:15,690
focusing on the shared threats
that our countries face

3092
01:59:15,690 --> 01:59:17,370
and capitalizing on clearly

3093
01:59:17,370 --> 01:59:18,760
the world's leading national security

3094
01:59:18,760 --> 01:59:20,370
innovation base in both countries,

3095
01:59:20,370 --> 01:59:21,784
both the U.S. and Israel.

3096
01:59:21,784 --> 01:59:25,440
This is to both Secretary
Esper and General Milley,

3097
01:59:25,440 --> 01:59:26,780
what is your view on enhancing

3098
01:59:26,780 --> 01:59:28,860
the security cooperation with Israel,

3099
01:59:28,860 --> 01:59:29,910
particularly in the areas

3100
01:59:29,910 --> 01:59:31,850
of technology, research, and development.

3101
01:59:31,850 --> 01:59:34,420
How can we strengthen that
between our two countries?

3102
01:59:34,420 --> 01:59:36,230
- Senator, without having
seen your letter yet

3103
01:59:36,230 --> 01:59:39,300
I would tell you we have a
very good innovative base.

3104
01:59:39,300 --> 01:59:40,810
They have a very good innovative base.

3105
01:59:40,810 --> 01:59:42,050
I think the more we can cooperate

3106
01:59:42,050 --> 01:59:43,800
together as allies and partners

3107
01:59:43,800 --> 01:59:46,250
to come up with common
solutions the better.

3108
01:59:46,250 --> 01:59:48,720
We do a lot of work with them
now on a number of things,

3109
01:59:48,720 --> 01:59:50,410
certainly at the industrial level

3110
01:59:50,410 --> 01:59:53,750
they compete, too, against
and with American companies.

3111
01:59:53,750 --> 01:59:54,660
I think if there are ways

3112
01:59:54,660 --> 01:59:57,077
to improve that we should pursue it.

3113
01:59:57,077 --> 01:59:59,190
- As you know we work very closely

3114
01:59:59,190 --> 02:00:01,140
with Israel in a lot of areas,

3115
02:00:01,140 --> 02:00:04,791
specifically in our R&D and
S&T and combat developments.

3116
02:00:04,791 --> 02:00:08,397
For example, we have the
active protective system

3117
02:00:08,397 --> 02:00:12,600
on our armored vehicles.

3118
02:00:12,600 --> 02:00:13,916
That's an Israeli-produced system.

3119
02:00:13,916 --> 02:00:15,210
We've looked at the arrow

3120
02:00:15,210 --> 02:00:17,050
for our ballistic missile defense systems

3121
02:00:17,050 --> 02:00:19,070
and a wide variety of other systems.

3122
02:00:19,070 --> 02:00:20,760
So, there's an exchange of ideas

3123
02:00:20,760 --> 02:00:22,790
and knowledge and research and development

3124
02:00:22,790 --> 02:00:24,949
between us and the Israelis
on a regular basis.

3125
02:00:24,949 --> 02:00:28,590
- Secretary Esper, on
February 24th of this year

3126
02:00:28,590 --> 02:00:29,748
the DOD officially adopted

3127
02:00:29,748 --> 02:00:31,440
a series of ethical principles

3128
02:00:31,440 --> 02:00:34,122
for the military use of
artificial intelligence.

3129
02:00:34,122 --> 02:00:36,000
The principles were designed

3130
02:00:36,000 --> 02:00:37,802
to complement existing ethical frameworks

3131
02:00:37,802 --> 02:00:40,356
and you structured the ethical framework

3132
02:00:40,356 --> 02:00:44,510
around five specific areas
for military use of AI,

3133
02:00:44,510 --> 02:00:48,630
responsible, equitable, traceable,
reliable, and governable.

3134
02:00:48,630 --> 02:00:50,440
I've had longstanding concerns

3135
02:00:50,440 --> 02:00:52,630
about the consequences
of the United States

3136
02:00:52,630 --> 02:00:54,810
and our allies adopting ethical standards

3137
02:00:54,810 --> 02:00:56,770
without similar and equitable standards

3138
02:00:56,770 --> 02:00:59,190
being adopted by our
competitors and adversaries

3139
02:00:59,190 --> 02:01:02,660
that operate under a different
framework than we do.

3140
02:01:02,660 --> 02:01:04,410
My question is, is the U.S. placed

3141
02:01:04,410 --> 02:01:05,770
at a competitive disadvantage

3142
02:01:05,770 --> 02:01:07,560
at the tactical and operational level

3143
02:01:07,560 --> 02:01:09,740
by adopting AI ethical standards

3144
02:01:09,740 --> 02:01:11,700
not shared by our adversaries

3145
02:01:11,700 --> 02:01:14,843
and if so, how do we compensate
for that disadvantage?

3146
02:01:14,843 --> 02:01:15,910
- Yes, Senator.

3147
02:01:15,910 --> 02:01:17,300
First of all it's a lot of good work

3148
02:01:17,300 --> 02:01:18,960
done by the defense industrial board

3149
02:01:18,960 --> 02:01:21,004
with a lot of outreach to a wide range

3150
02:01:21,004 --> 02:01:23,850
of persons and organizations
to develop these.

3151
02:01:23,850 --> 02:01:24,950
I was briefed on them.

3152
02:01:24,950 --> 02:01:26,640
I had a number of discussions

3153
02:01:26,640 --> 02:01:28,180
with a lot of leaders about them,

3154
02:01:28,180 --> 02:01:32,040
but I think this is an area where we lead

3155
02:01:32,040 --> 02:01:34,020
and I think the principles from what

3156
02:01:34,020 --> 02:01:35,360
I've read and studied and learned,

3157
02:01:35,360 --> 02:01:37,030
I think they put us in
a leadership position.

3158
02:01:37,030 --> 02:01:39,860
So, I think we're establishing
the standard, if you will,

3159
02:01:39,860 --> 02:01:42,020
and I think it will make us better.

3160
02:01:42,020 --> 02:01:43,740
The more we can get other countries

3161
02:01:43,740 --> 02:01:46,653
to come on board and align
themselves to those the better.

3162
02:01:47,800 --> 02:01:49,780
- In the past the U.S. has successfully

3163
02:01:49,780 --> 02:01:52,570
used international agreements
and arms controls treaties

3164
02:01:52,570 --> 02:01:53,950
to provide some stability,

3165
02:01:53,950 --> 02:01:56,103
particularly with emerging technologies,

3166
02:01:56,103 --> 02:01:58,526
and the attempt to minimize potential

3167
02:01:58,526 --> 02:02:01,260
catastrophic mistakes that can occur.

3168
02:02:01,260 --> 02:02:03,836
In terms of AI, are we at a stage where AI

3169
02:02:03,836 --> 02:02:07,210
requires the equivalent
of an arms control treaty

3170
02:02:07,210 --> 02:02:10,750
to ensure the current
rules-based international order?

3171
02:02:10,750 --> 02:02:13,280
And if so, how would that look?

3172
02:02:13,280 --> 02:02:15,070
- It's a good question, Senator.

3173
02:02:15,070 --> 02:02:16,850
I'd have to think about
it and get back to you

3174
02:02:16,850 --> 02:02:18,010
and consult with people.

3175
02:02:18,010 --> 02:02:19,170
I just don't know.

3176
02:02:19,170 --> 02:02:21,350
It's not something I
would take off the table

3177
02:02:21,350 --> 02:02:22,330
but it's a fair question.

3178
02:02:22,330 --> 02:02:23,970
Again I think we want to develop

3179
02:02:23,970 --> 02:02:25,760
some common standards, if you will.

3180
02:02:25,760 --> 02:02:27,210
We tried to set the bar by my

3181
02:02:27,210 --> 02:02:30,480
signing those AI ethical principles

3182
02:02:30,480 --> 02:02:32,260
and set a high bar from the beginning

3183
02:02:32,260 --> 02:02:34,920
and urge others to come on board.

3184
02:02:34,920 --> 02:02:37,070
- General Milley, any thoughts?

3185
02:02:37,070 --> 02:02:38,467
- I think artificial intelligence,

3186
02:02:38,467 --> 02:02:40,380
as I've testified before,

3187
02:02:40,380 --> 02:02:42,275
is the mother of all
technologies out there.

3188
02:02:42,275 --> 02:02:44,834
It's extraordinarily powerful

3189
02:02:44,834 --> 02:02:47,130
and there's no doubt in my mind

3190
02:02:47,130 --> 02:02:49,130
that it's gonna be used
for military purposes

3191
02:02:49,130 --> 02:02:51,169
in the not too distant future.

3192
02:02:51,169 --> 02:02:53,480
There's a wide variety of
ethical concerns with that.

3193
02:02:53,480 --> 02:02:54,480
I don't know if arms control

3194
02:02:54,480 --> 02:02:56,383
agreements are the right mechanism or not.

3195
02:02:56,383 --> 02:02:58,587
But all countries, not
just the United States,

3196
02:02:58,587 --> 02:03:00,250
are gonna have to come to grips

3197
02:03:00,250 --> 02:03:02,060
with the introduction of
artificial intelligence

3198
02:03:02,060 --> 02:03:03,610
for use in military operations.

3199
02:03:03,610 --> 02:03:05,450
It is extremely powerful

3200
02:03:05,450 --> 02:03:06,730
and it's gonna have to be dealt with.

3201
02:03:06,730 --> 02:03:08,038
- Great.

3202
02:03:08,038 --> 02:03:09,020
Thank you, gentlemen.

3203
02:03:09,020 --> 02:03:10,050
- [Reed] On behalf of the Chairman

3204
02:03:10,050 --> 02:03:11,800
let me recognize Senator Duckworth.

3205
02:03:14,370 --> 02:03:15,203
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

3206
02:03:15,203 --> 02:03:16,360
I'd like to thank both the witnesses

3207
02:03:16,360 --> 02:03:18,290
for appearing before the committee today.

3208
02:03:18,290 --> 02:03:19,960
I'd like to follow up what

3209
02:03:19,960 --> 02:03:21,816
my colleague Mr. Hawley touched on

3210
02:03:21,816 --> 02:03:24,283
which is the Indo-Pacific strategy.

3211
02:03:25,650 --> 02:03:28,090
I feel very strongly that this is a part

3212
02:03:28,090 --> 02:03:31,070
of the world we need to
spend more attention on.

3213
02:03:31,070 --> 02:03:35,820
And I have heard from both of
you your emphasis on INDOPACOM

3214
02:03:36,796 --> 02:03:38,280
and the importance of our role there.

3215
02:03:38,280 --> 02:03:40,400
And while I applaud the
Department's messaging

3216
02:03:40,400 --> 02:03:42,520
about prioritizing great power competition

3217
02:03:42,520 --> 02:03:44,217
in this region over other activities,

3218
02:03:44,217 --> 02:03:46,170
I do remain concerned that we've

3219
02:03:46,170 --> 02:03:49,693
not matched our rhetoric with our actions.

3220
02:03:49,693 --> 02:03:52,190
How are we able to divert some $7 billion

3221
02:03:52,190 --> 02:03:53,637
to border wall construction

3222
02:03:53,637 --> 02:03:56,670
and yet we're not,

3223
02:03:56,670 --> 02:04:00,063
and credibly say the Pacific
region is our main effort?

3224
02:04:02,107 --> 02:04:02,940
Secretary Esper,

3225
02:04:02,940 --> 02:04:05,490
I agree with you that IMET
is certainly very important.

3226
02:04:05,490 --> 02:04:10,400
In fact I recently met with
General Apirat Kongsompong,

3227
02:04:10,400 --> 02:04:12,450
who is the Thai army leader,

3228
02:04:12,450 --> 02:04:14,583
and he talked very fondly about his time

3229
02:04:14,583 --> 02:04:17,300
that he spent at U.S. training facilities.

3230
02:04:17,300 --> 02:04:20,160
And, in fact, he said it
was his joint experience

3231
02:04:20,160 --> 02:04:21,190
training at the U.S. facilities

3232
02:04:21,190 --> 02:04:23,580
as that of General, from Indonesia

3233
02:04:23,580 --> 02:04:25,054
that led them to form a friendship

3234
02:04:25,054 --> 02:04:27,820
based on their experience in the U.S.

3235
02:04:27,820 --> 02:04:30,070
that then led to this recent
agreement they just signed

3236
02:04:30,070 --> 02:04:32,903
two few months ago on information sharing.

3237
02:04:34,350 --> 02:04:36,380
But I think it takes more than IMET.

3238
02:04:36,380 --> 02:04:38,370
I think you need to put
some MILCON on this.

3239
02:04:38,370 --> 02:04:40,950
I think we need to look
at staffing and resources

3240
02:04:40,950 --> 02:04:43,421
increasing for INDOPACOM

3241
02:04:43,421 --> 02:04:45,920
in order to really deter
Chinese aggression.

3242
02:04:45,920 --> 02:04:47,240
So, I'd love to hear from both of you

3243
02:04:47,240 --> 02:04:50,070
as to when we're going
to see more of a plus up

3244
02:04:50,070 --> 02:04:55,070
in this region beyond just
talking about how great this is.

3245
02:04:55,210 --> 02:04:57,300
- Senator, I think first of all you know

3246
02:04:57,300 --> 02:04:59,925
I agree with the importance of INDOPACOM

3247
02:04:59,925 --> 02:05:01,290
and it's because it's number one

3248
02:05:01,290 --> 02:05:03,673
in our strategy to say the least.

3249
02:05:04,610 --> 02:05:07,964
If you look at the simple
disposition of forces,

3250
02:05:07,964 --> 02:05:09,620
INDOPACOM has five times

3251
02:05:09,620 --> 02:05:13,630
as many forces as any other
theater, over 350,000.

3252
02:05:13,630 --> 02:05:15,970
The next closest theater is 70,000.

3253
02:05:15,970 --> 02:05:17,660
If you added up every other theater,

3254
02:05:17,660 --> 02:05:19,751
INDOPACOM would still be twice

3255
02:05:19,751 --> 02:05:22,990
as big as all of them combined,

3256
02:05:22,990 --> 02:05:25,500
so we have a lot of forces in the theater.

3257
02:05:25,500 --> 02:05:27,530
I think the challenge isn't necessarily

3258
02:05:27,530 --> 02:05:29,360
putting more forces in it's making sure

3259
02:05:29,360 --> 02:05:32,020
that we look at our
disposition on the ground

3260
02:05:32,020 --> 02:05:34,393
and think how do we use
them more effectively

3261
02:05:34,393 --> 02:05:36,209
to grow partners and allies

3262
02:05:36,209 --> 02:05:39,932
and how do we exercise
with them etc., etc.?

3263
02:05:39,932 --> 02:05:41,699
That's my quick assessment.

3264
02:05:41,699 --> 02:05:43,170
- I don't disagree with you

3265
02:05:44,446 --> 02:05:45,360
that it's not just about

3266
02:05:45,360 --> 02:05:47,340
the number of truth
that are on the ground.

3267
02:05:47,340 --> 02:05:49,240
It's about resourcing INDOPACOM

3268
02:05:49,240 --> 02:05:50,460
so that they can go out.

3269
02:05:50,460 --> 02:05:51,820
I think we need to be focused

3270
02:05:51,820 --> 02:05:53,040
and you're already talking about this,

3271
02:05:53,040 --> 02:05:54,930
more basing agreements.

3272
02:05:54,930 --> 02:05:56,060
I was very impressed with what

3273
02:05:56,060 --> 02:05:58,760
was done in South Korea

3274
02:05:58,760 --> 02:06:00,120
when we didn't have enough ammunition

3275
02:06:00,120 --> 02:06:05,120
and you guys took that out
of hide and plused them up.

3276
02:06:05,234 --> 02:06:06,870
The reason you have more troops

3277
02:06:06,870 --> 02:06:08,530
is because it's a larger geographic

3278
02:06:08,530 --> 02:06:11,643
region then say CENTCOM is.

3279
02:06:12,570 --> 02:06:14,870
Maybe AFRICOM would be
more geographic area,

3280
02:06:14,870 --> 02:06:16,780
but the geography is different.

3281
02:06:16,780 --> 02:06:18,380
General, you were gonna say something.

3282
02:06:18,380 --> 02:06:19,470
- You're exactly right,

3283
02:06:19,470 --> 02:06:21,220
the geography's completely different,

3284
02:06:21,220 --> 02:06:22,554
the politics are different,

3285
02:06:22,554 --> 02:06:24,830
the international politics.

3286
02:06:24,830 --> 02:06:27,110
The threats are different,
the allies are different.

3287
02:06:27,110 --> 02:06:27,943
All of that is different.

3288
02:06:27,943 --> 02:06:29,460
You have to factor all of that in.

3289
02:06:29,460 --> 02:06:32,790
In terms of main effort
versus supporting efforts,

3290
02:06:32,790 --> 02:06:34,300
and the economy of force efforts.

3291
02:06:34,300 --> 02:06:36,545
In the NDS, the Central Command area,

3292
02:06:36,545 --> 02:06:39,160
AFRICOM, and SOUTHCOM are all designated

3293
02:06:39,160 --> 02:06:40,520
as economy of force and you're familiar

3294
02:06:40,520 --> 02:06:42,970
with that term from your
military experience.

3295
02:06:42,970 --> 02:06:44,972
And EUCOM is a supporting effort

3296
02:06:44,972 --> 02:06:47,410
and PACOM is "the main effort."

3297
02:06:47,410 --> 02:06:49,430
It's all part of a globally integrated

3298
02:06:49,430 --> 02:06:51,681
level of effort with all of the resources

3299
02:06:51,681 --> 02:06:52,800
the Department of Defense has.

3300
02:06:52,800 --> 02:06:54,420
With respect to INDOPACOM,

3301
02:06:54,420 --> 02:06:56,900
the Secretary mentioned 350,000.

3302
02:06:56,900 --> 02:06:59,810
He's also got 200 ships,
seven aircraft carriers,

3303
02:06:59,810 --> 02:07:04,810
he's got three, he's got 1,600
high performance aircraft.

3304
02:07:05,130 --> 02:07:06,730
This is a highly resourced,

3305
02:07:06,730 --> 02:07:09,895
from a military standpoint,
highly resourced theater.

3306
02:07:09,895 --> 02:07:11,652
It's not so much the numbers

3307
02:07:11,652 --> 02:07:14,970
of the ships, planes, trains,
and automobiles sort of thing.

3308
02:07:14,970 --> 02:07:16,625
It's how we use it, where we put it,

3309
02:07:16,625 --> 02:07:19,290
and what our broader
strategy is with respect

3310
02:07:19,290 --> 02:07:20,300
to what we think is gonna be

3311
02:07:20,300 --> 02:07:21,740
the most significant adversary

3312
02:07:21,740 --> 02:07:23,330
for the next hundred years which is China

3313
02:07:23,330 --> 02:07:25,270
and the rise of China,

3314
02:07:25,270 --> 02:07:26,877
how we as a nation deal with that.

3315
02:07:26,877 --> 02:07:28,244
The military is one aspect

3316
02:07:28,244 --> 02:07:29,730
of a much broader strategy that

3317
02:07:29,730 --> 02:07:31,180
we've got to come to grips with.

3318
02:07:31,180 --> 02:07:33,353
But I do think that
INDOPACOM is well resourced

3319
02:07:33,353 --> 02:07:35,490
from a Departmental standpoint

3320
02:07:35,490 --> 02:07:37,250
in terms of military capability right now.

3321
02:07:37,250 --> 02:07:39,560
- But the Chinese are really moving

3322
02:07:39,560 --> 02:07:42,130
ahead of us when it
comes to basing issues.

3323
02:07:42,130 --> 02:07:44,200
We have to have more than
a little toehold there

3324
02:07:44,200 --> 02:07:47,270
in order to ensure freedom of navigation.

3325
02:07:47,270 --> 02:07:48,530
- Access, basing, overflight,

3326
02:07:48,530 --> 02:07:50,510
all of that stuff plays into it.

3327
02:07:50,510 --> 02:07:52,059
- Adjacent to this issue.

3328
02:07:52,059 --> 02:07:55,984
I want to shift slightly to the other.

3329
02:07:55,984 --> 02:07:57,410
Like if there was a bet on
what questions I was gonna ask

3330
02:07:57,410 --> 02:07:58,243
I'm sure this is one of the ones

3331
02:07:58,243 --> 02:08:00,120
that would come up which is logistics.

3332
02:08:01,476 --> 02:08:02,309
I'm deeply concerned about

3333
02:08:02,309 --> 02:08:03,820
our ability to transport and sustain

3334
02:08:03,820 --> 02:08:06,900
our forces overseas especially
to places like INDOPACOM.

3335
02:08:06,900 --> 02:08:08,130
Contested logistics is something

3336
02:08:08,130 --> 02:08:11,300
I believe we need to pay
far more attention to.

3337
02:08:11,300 --> 02:08:13,350
This year's cuts to the tanker fleet

3338
02:08:13,350 --> 02:08:15,660
and anemic investment
in sealift replacement

3339
02:08:15,660 --> 02:08:17,690
and maintenance really worry me.

3340
02:08:17,690 --> 02:08:18,960
Secretary Esper and General Milley,

3341
02:08:18,960 --> 02:08:21,080
can you tell me how this
year's Defense budget request

3342
02:08:21,080 --> 02:08:22,950
preserves or improves our ability

3343
02:08:22,950 --> 02:08:25,193
to transport and sustain our forces

3344
02:08:25,193 --> 02:08:26,670
in a contested environment?

3345
02:08:26,670 --> 02:08:27,503
The days that we're gonna be able

3346
02:08:27,503 --> 02:08:29,520
to send ships full of what we need

3347
02:08:29,520 --> 02:08:31,370
without our enemies trying to attack,

3348
02:08:31,370 --> 02:08:33,330
take those ships out, are behind us.

3349
02:08:33,330 --> 02:08:34,715
- Senator, you're exactly right.

3350
02:08:34,715 --> 02:08:37,010
I don't know if you were here
earlier but I mentioned this.

3351
02:08:37,010 --> 02:08:39,223
I'm concerned that two important things

3352
02:08:39,223 --> 02:08:40,380
that often get overlooked

3353
02:08:40,380 --> 02:08:41,549
because they're not sexy

3354
02:08:41,549 --> 02:08:43,240
are things like airlift

3355
02:08:43,240 --> 02:08:46,200
and aerial refueling
and strategic sealift.

3356
02:08:46,200 --> 02:08:49,967
We've invested in two
surge ships this year.

3357
02:08:49,967 --> 02:08:52,430
And I've had a lot of
conversations with General Lyons.

3358
02:08:52,430 --> 02:08:54,483
We need to do more and
we need to do more soon.

3359
02:08:54,483 --> 02:08:56,140
That's why we've talked a few times

3360
02:08:56,140 --> 02:08:57,240
about the shipbuilding plan,

3361
02:08:57,240 --> 02:08:58,640
but one of the things
the shipbuilding plan

3362
02:08:58,640 --> 02:09:01,325
doesn't incorporate is
strategic lift, sealift.

3363
02:09:01,325 --> 02:09:02,850
I sent a letter to the committees

3364
02:09:02,850 --> 02:09:04,750
and I said when I look
at the shipbuilding plan

3365
02:09:04,750 --> 02:09:07,850
I think we should factor
in strategic sealift

3366
02:09:07,850 --> 02:09:11,376
because it also competes
for budget dollars.

3367
02:09:11,376 --> 02:09:12,910
It's a critical factor.

3368
02:09:12,910 --> 02:09:14,080
So, between that,

3369
02:09:14,080 --> 02:09:16,650
I'm very concerned about
the delays in the KC-46.

3370
02:09:16,650 --> 02:09:17,970
I had the chance to crawl through one

3371
02:09:17,970 --> 02:09:19,240
about a week, two weeks ago

3372
02:09:19,240 --> 02:09:20,692
and look at the problems.

3373
02:09:20,692 --> 02:09:22,191
So, we're gonna have to look at

3374
02:09:22,191 --> 02:09:25,690
restoring maybe some 10s, some 135s

3375
02:09:25,690 --> 02:09:29,440
so we keep at least 479 aircraft going.

3376
02:09:29,440 --> 02:09:30,760
But it's a very capable airplane,

3377
02:09:30,760 --> 02:09:32,430
it's just gonna take some time.

3378
02:09:32,430 --> 02:09:33,350
Those are critical things

3379
02:09:33,350 --> 02:09:35,080
particularly when you see the distances

3380
02:09:35,080 --> 02:09:39,440
from CONUS or Alaska
all the way into theater

3381
02:09:39,440 --> 02:09:40,930
into INDOPACOM theater.

3382
02:09:40,930 --> 02:09:41,980
And forward basing is another

3383
02:09:41,980 --> 02:09:43,530
way you offset that, of course.

3384
02:09:43,530 --> 02:09:45,663
- And you're right because it's
not just about the sealift,

3385
02:09:45,663 --> 02:09:48,140
it's about the tanker
fleet as you're mentioning

3386
02:09:48,140 --> 02:09:49,814
but it's also fueling.

3387
02:09:49,814 --> 02:09:51,850
We gotta have forward fueling capability.

3388
02:09:51,850 --> 02:09:54,000
We can't just be shipping our fuel there

3389
02:09:54,000 --> 02:09:57,245
for everything that sucks gas, right?

3390
02:09:57,245 --> 02:09:58,930
- That's right.

3391
02:09:58,930 --> 02:09:59,994
- You're right.

3392
02:09:59,994 --> 02:10:01,040
We're over time.

3393
02:10:01,040 --> 02:10:02,500
So, I can get you an answer for the record

3394
02:10:02,500 --> 02:10:03,620
but you're absolutely right

3395
02:10:03,620 --> 02:10:05,750
to be concerned about
the maritime sealift.

3396
02:10:05,750 --> 02:10:07,050
We've given that up as a nation

3397
02:10:07,050 --> 02:10:09,510
for the most part over
the last many, many years.

3398
02:10:09,510 --> 02:10:12,820
And the tanker fleet
and the airlift fleet.

3399
02:10:12,820 --> 02:10:13,653
On the tankers, though,

3400
02:10:13,653 --> 02:10:15,940
I just want to be clear again,

3401
02:10:15,940 --> 02:10:19,454
we've got almost 500 tankers.

3402
02:10:19,454 --> 02:10:24,350
In this budget, there's
10 KC-10s and 13 KC-135s.

3403
02:10:24,350 --> 02:10:25,830
Yes, there's stress on the force.

3404
02:10:25,830 --> 02:10:26,663
No question about it.

3405
02:10:26,663 --> 02:10:28,690
You've heard from
General Lyons and others.

3406
02:10:28,690 --> 02:10:29,523
But at the same time,

3407
02:10:29,523 --> 02:10:31,401
I don't want people who are watching this,

3408
02:10:31,401 --> 02:10:32,703
especially in certain countries,

3409
02:10:32,703 --> 02:10:34,960
to think that the United States of America

3410
02:10:34,960 --> 02:10:37,430
cannot project power overseas when needed.

3411
02:10:37,430 --> 02:10:40,130
We can and we will if required.

3412
02:10:40,130 --> 02:10:40,963
- Thank you.

3413
02:10:44,290 --> 02:10:45,860
- Let me thank you for your testimony

3414
02:10:45,860 --> 02:10:47,440
and thank you particularly
for your service.

3415
02:10:47,440 --> 02:10:49,410
And on behalf of the
Chairman, Chairman Inhofe,

3416
02:10:49,410 --> 02:10:52,410
let me call a adjournment of the hearing.

3417
02:10:52,410 --> 02:10:53,460
Thank you, gentlemen.