1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:00,000 2 00:00:07,310 --> 00:00:09,421 Good morning , ladies and gentlemen . 3 00:00:09,421 --> 00:00:11,643 Thank you for joining us . Realize most 4 00:00:11,643 --> 00:00:13,810 of you are on the telephone due to our 5 00:00:13,810 --> 00:00:15,810 current circumstances . Today . The 6 00:00:15,810 --> 00:00:15,760 Honorable Dana Deasy , the Department 7 00:00:15,760 --> 00:00:17,816 of Defense Chief Information Officer 8 00:00:17,816 --> 00:00:19,816 and Air Force Lieutenant General BJ 9 00:00:19,816 --> 00:00:21,704 Sweet Oh , Director for Command , 10 00:00:21,704 --> 00:00:23,982 Control , communications and Computers . 11 00:00:23,982 --> 00:00:25,982 Cyber and Chief Information Officer 12 00:00:25,982 --> 00:00:28,440 Joint Staff J six . We'll speak to you 13 00:00:28,440 --> 00:00:31,080 about the coded 19 Tele Work Readiness 14 00:00:31,090 --> 00:00:34,320 Task Force . This is a 30 minute on the 15 00:00:34,320 --> 00:00:36,690 record on camera briefing . Mr . Deasy 16 00:00:36,690 --> 00:00:38,746 and General Psuedo have some opening 17 00:00:38,746 --> 00:00:40,857 remarks and then we'll open the floor 18 00:00:40,857 --> 00:00:42,857 to your questions . And with that , 19 00:00:42,857 --> 00:00:45,023 we'll turn it over to Mr Deasy , sir . 20 00:00:45,023 --> 00:00:47,190 Thank you , sir . Good morning . Thank 21 00:00:47,190 --> 00:00:49,301 you for being here today . Also thank 22 00:00:49,301 --> 00:00:51,468 you to everyone who's dialed in on the 23 00:00:51,468 --> 00:00:53,720 lines this morning were truly an 24 00:00:53,720 --> 00:00:56,240 unprecedented times in our nation . The 25 00:00:56,240 --> 00:00:58,296 national emergency due to the Corona 26 00:00:58,296 --> 00:01:02,170 virus covert 19 global at Pandemic has 27 00:01:02,170 --> 00:01:04,670 no doubt brought new changes to the 28 00:01:04,670 --> 00:01:06,670 ways Americans go about their daily 29 00:01:06,670 --> 00:01:09,790 jobs . Specifically , the way we work 30 00:01:09,790 --> 00:01:11,790 has changed dramatically within the 31 00:01:11,790 --> 00:01:14,350 last month , as Secretary Esper has 32 00:01:14,350 --> 00:01:17,190 stated on numerous occasions protecting 33 00:01:17,190 --> 00:01:19,840 the health of the d . O d workforce is 34 00:01:19,840 --> 00:01:22,040 paramount . We're committed to the 35 00:01:22,040 --> 00:01:23,940 health and safety of not only our 36 00:01:23,940 --> 00:01:26,600 service members that are civilians are 37 00:01:26,600 --> 00:01:28,670 contractors and their families . 38 00:01:29,440 --> 00:01:31,107 Therefore , as you know , the 39 00:01:31,107 --> 00:01:33,550 department has offered maximum tele 40 00:01:33,550 --> 00:01:35,610 work flexibility to the D . O D 41 00:01:35,610 --> 00:01:37,970 workforce consistent with the 42 00:01:37,970 --> 00:01:40,150 operational needs of the department . 43 00:01:41,140 --> 00:01:43,520 Do the expanded need for massive tele 44 00:01:43,520 --> 00:01:46,530 work capabilities across the force . I 45 00:01:46,530 --> 00:01:49,560 stood up the Kobe 19 tele work reading 46 00:01:49,560 --> 00:01:52,440 this task force . This task force is 47 00:01:52,440 --> 00:01:54,720 comprised of the United States Cyber 48 00:01:54,720 --> 00:01:57,890 Command Joint Force Headquarters Don't 49 00:01:57,890 --> 00:02:00,480 in information networks . The National 50 00:02:00,480 --> 00:02:02,650 Security Agency , the Defense 51 00:02:02,660 --> 00:02:05,280 Information Systems Agency , the Joint 52 00:02:05,280 --> 00:02:07,370 Staff and , of course , military 53 00:02:07,370 --> 00:02:09,740 service is , as well a senior leaders 54 00:02:09,750 --> 00:02:12,980 from my own organization as a task 55 00:02:12,980 --> 00:02:15,160 force . We meet daily for about two 56 00:02:15,160 --> 00:02:18,210 hours to review and address various 57 00:02:18,210 --> 00:02:21,030 technical issues and request as they 58 00:02:21,030 --> 00:02:23,490 arise . We have a very structured 59 00:02:23,490 --> 00:02:25,940 approach to these meetings . We 60 00:02:25,940 --> 00:02:28,250 discussed seven key areas to include 61 00:02:28,260 --> 00:02:30,680 equipment needs network capacity , 62 00:02:31,610 --> 00:02:34,330 including operational readiness , I t 63 00:02:34,330 --> 00:02:36,850 personal contracting readiness , supply , 64 00:02:36,850 --> 00:02:39,590 Jane , financial requirements , cyber 65 00:02:39,590 --> 00:02:42,160 security , intel and high interest 66 00:02:42,160 --> 00:02:44,750 items with the majority the workforce 67 00:02:44,750 --> 00:02:46,470 teleworking . We have seen 68 00:02:46,480 --> 00:02:48,960 unprecedented man for new equipment 69 00:02:49,280 --> 00:02:52,790 ranging from tablets , laptops and 70 00:02:52,790 --> 00:02:55,230 network equipment to secure devices . 71 00:02:56,020 --> 00:02:58,131 Additionally , our networks have seen 72 00:02:58,131 --> 00:03:00,550 significant increase in traffic as well . 73 00:03:01,400 --> 00:03:03,178 The task force has successfully 74 00:03:03,178 --> 00:03:05,560 navigated this increase in demand and 75 00:03:05,560 --> 00:03:07,338 we're rolling out equipment and 76 00:03:07,338 --> 00:03:09,720 increasing network capacity where 77 00:03:09,720 --> 00:03:12,500 needed . For example , in the Pentagon 78 00:03:12,500 --> 00:03:14,620 alone , 2000 personnel have been 79 00:03:14,620 --> 00:03:17,490 provided with additional devices . In 80 00:03:17,490 --> 00:03:20,570 the Navy , 65,000 additional users air 81 00:03:20,570 --> 00:03:23,130 now ableto work remotely with mobile 82 00:03:23,230 --> 00:03:25,940 and desktop service is regarding 83 00:03:25,940 --> 00:03:28,630 network capacity . DISA and the joint 84 00:03:28,630 --> 00:03:32,520 service provider has increased virtual 85 00:03:32,580 --> 00:03:34,850 Internet service provider connections 86 00:03:34,850 --> 00:03:38,710 by 30% . Additionally , our telecom 87 00:03:38,850 --> 00:03:41,120 provider has increased our current call 88 00:03:41,230 --> 00:03:43,590 volume capacity in the Pentagon by over 89 00:03:43,590 --> 00:03:44,450 50% 90 00:03:47,330 --> 00:03:49,497 says Beginning of Marched DIS . It has 91 00:03:49,497 --> 00:03:51,420 on board additional endpoints 92 00:03:51,600 --> 00:03:53,820 increasing compay capability by over 93 00:03:53,820 --> 00:03:57,510 300% . The Air Force has 94 00:03:57,510 --> 00:03:59,780 upgraded 12 key sites , resulting in 95 00:03:59,790 --> 00:04:02,760 130 plus percent increase in their band . 96 00:04:02,760 --> 00:04:05,390 With Finally , the U . S . Army has 97 00:04:05,390 --> 00:04:07,501 implemented a number of measures that 98 00:04:07,501 --> 00:04:10,090 have led to a 400% increase in network 99 00:04:10,090 --> 00:04:13,200 access for data and voice capacity . 100 00:04:14,230 --> 00:04:17,010 We have seen upwards of 10 times growth 101 00:04:17,160 --> 00:04:19,810 and global video service is outlook , 102 00:04:19,820 --> 00:04:22,240 Web access , an enterprise audio 103 00:04:22,240 --> 00:04:25,310 conferencing . I could go . I could 104 00:04:25,310 --> 00:04:27,540 continue to go on . But clearly , as 105 00:04:27,540 --> 00:04:30,630 you can see how the speed and magnitude 106 00:04:30,940 --> 00:04:33,107 of what the department has implemented 107 00:04:33,107 --> 00:04:35,329 in such a short amount of time is truly 108 00:04:35,329 --> 00:04:37,450 extraordinary has been accomplished . 109 00:04:37,450 --> 00:04:39,810 While ensuring mission operational 110 00:04:39,810 --> 00:04:43,640 needs are not impacted . The department 111 00:04:44,020 --> 00:04:46,400 has always been telling work ready long 112 00:04:46,400 --> 00:04:48,980 before the pandemic , however , is you 113 00:04:48,980 --> 00:04:51,540 may expect most of our work force did 114 00:04:51,540 --> 00:04:54,200 not work remotely the majority time , 115 00:04:54,200 --> 00:04:56,256 therefore leaving our workforce with 116 00:04:56,256 --> 00:04:58,410 many questions about the tools and 117 00:04:58,410 --> 00:05:00,620 platforms that were readily available 118 00:05:00,620 --> 00:05:03,190 for them to do their jobs outside the 119 00:05:03,190 --> 00:05:05,790 office . To effectively educate our 120 00:05:05,790 --> 00:05:08,310 workforce , we have created a menu of 121 00:05:08,310 --> 00:05:10,950 the top tele work tools for both 122 00:05:10,950 --> 00:05:14,170 classified and unclassified networks . 123 00:05:14,610 --> 00:05:18,050 The menu is located on our website , 124 00:05:18,640 --> 00:05:21,130 public dot cyber dot mil , and 125 00:05:21,130 --> 00:05:23,300 highlights tools available for email , 126 00:05:23,640 --> 00:05:27,400 collaboration , voice , antivirus and 127 00:05:27,400 --> 00:05:30,530 file sharing capabilities . As always , 128 00:05:30,530 --> 00:05:32,760 we requires the workforce on Lee used D 129 00:05:32,760 --> 00:05:35,300 o . D . Approved platforms for security 130 00:05:35,300 --> 00:05:37,880 reasons . One important tool I would 131 00:05:37,880 --> 00:05:40,880 like to point out is the new commercial 132 00:05:41,070 --> 00:05:43,620 virtual remote environment , known a 133 00:05:43,620 --> 00:05:47,080 CVR CVR , was created to support the 134 00:05:47,080 --> 00:05:49,380 department during the current large 135 00:05:49,380 --> 00:05:51,630 scale teleworking environment . Did the 136 00:05:51,630 --> 00:05:55,500 cove it 19 national emergency . The 137 00:05:55,500 --> 00:05:57,740 tool is just one of several tools 138 00:05:57,750 --> 00:06:00,330 available to the workforce and provide 139 00:06:00,340 --> 00:06:01,960 remote workers with enhanced 140 00:06:02,190 --> 00:06:05,280 collaboration capabilities . The CVR 141 00:06:05,280 --> 00:06:07,336 roll out to the force began on March 142 00:06:07,336 --> 00:06:10,240 27th and as of this morning , we 143 00:06:10,240 --> 00:06:13,560 already activated over 900,000 user 144 00:06:13,560 --> 00:06:16,550 accounts and have active Loggins of 145 00:06:16,550 --> 00:06:20,080 78,000 users this morning . At one 146 00:06:20,080 --> 00:06:23,580 point last week , we added over 250,000 147 00:06:23,580 --> 00:06:26,250 accounts in a single day . This is the 148 00:06:26,250 --> 00:06:29,070 largest rollout ever implemented in 149 00:06:29,070 --> 00:06:31,480 this short amount of time . As they 150 00:06:31,480 --> 00:06:33,480 mentioned earlier , we're moving at 151 00:06:33,480 --> 00:06:35,740 incredible pace , showing a significant 152 00:06:35,750 --> 00:06:38,660 amount of innovation . For example , 153 00:06:38,940 --> 00:06:40,840 the D . O D Joint Artificial 154 00:06:40,840 --> 00:06:43,080 Intelligence Center was able to move 155 00:06:43,080 --> 00:06:45,520 quickly to develop a prototype data 156 00:06:45,520 --> 00:06:47,570 aggregation of Predictive Analytics 157 00:06:47,570 --> 00:06:50,100 capability to support the U . S 158 00:06:50,100 --> 00:06:52,322 Northern Command and the National Guard 159 00:06:52,322 --> 00:06:55,480 Bureau . The Jakes Project Salis team 160 00:06:55,780 --> 00:06:58,270 was able to move from concept to feel 161 00:06:58,270 --> 00:07:02,080 the prototype in just two weeks . Not 162 00:07:02,080 --> 00:07:04,080 only are we providing tools for our 163 00:07:04,080 --> 00:07:06,136 workforce , but we're supporting the 164 00:07:06,136 --> 00:07:08,570 front line as well . As you know . New 165 00:07:08,570 --> 00:07:11,800 Orleans has had a high number of people 166 00:07:11,800 --> 00:07:14,550 diagnosed with Kobe , 19 within 167 00:07:14,550 --> 00:07:16,890 downtown New Orleans Department set up 168 00:07:16,890 --> 00:07:19,220 to field hospital tents and parking 169 00:07:19,220 --> 00:07:22,780 lots with over 500 beds , this 170 00:07:22,780 --> 00:07:25,420 site was in need of a one gigabyte 171 00:07:25,760 --> 00:07:28,040 Internet connection . I P phones 172 00:07:28,380 --> 00:07:30,490 connective ity between locations and 173 00:07:30,490 --> 00:07:32,268 then switches to connect it all 174 00:07:32,268 --> 00:07:34,390 together . It requests such as this 175 00:07:34,390 --> 00:07:36,557 generally require months of planning , 176 00:07:36,610 --> 00:07:38,721 procuring equipment and , of course , 177 00:07:38,721 --> 00:07:41,480 hiring the teams to install Dude are 178 00:07:41,480 --> 00:07:43,700 strong partnership with industry . The 179 00:07:43,700 --> 00:07:46,640 job is completed in just one day . The 180 00:07:46,640 --> 00:07:49,430 support staff was truly remarkable , 181 00:07:49,670 --> 00:07:51,614 allowing the teams to successfully 182 00:07:51,614 --> 00:07:53,781 communicate and execute their missions 183 00:07:54,640 --> 00:07:56,696 as more of the workforce . The telly 184 00:07:56,696 --> 00:07:59,030 working we continue the prioritize and 185 00:07:59,030 --> 00:08:00,530 stressed the importance of 186 00:08:00,530 --> 00:08:03,150 cybersecurity . We already have a D o D 187 00:08:03,150 --> 00:08:05,600 workforce that is well trained on best 188 00:08:05,600 --> 00:08:08,270 practices for cyber security . The 189 00:08:08,270 --> 00:08:10,580 further augment this , however , we 190 00:08:10,580 --> 00:08:12,913 have recently put out a do's and don'ts . 191 00:08:13,540 --> 00:08:15,850 Four teleworking across the workforce . 192 00:08:16,740 --> 00:08:19,080 Our task force receives a daily update 193 00:08:19,090 --> 00:08:22,200 from U . S Cyber Command and J . F H Q . 194 00:08:22,200 --> 00:08:25,050 Dodon on what they're seeing and how 195 00:08:25,050 --> 00:08:27,720 they are successfully adjusting to the 196 00:08:27,720 --> 00:08:29,850 significant teleworking environment . 197 00:08:30,620 --> 00:08:32,880 Defending the dodo is a 24 by seven 198 00:08:32,880 --> 00:08:35,170 mission and will never cease , 199 00:08:35,400 --> 00:08:37,567 regardless of the national emergency . 200 00:08:38,440 --> 00:08:40,650 The top priority of the D O . D will 201 00:08:40,660 --> 00:08:42,920 always be the protection in the welfare 202 00:08:42,920 --> 00:08:45,070 of our people . Prioritizing 203 00:08:45,070 --> 00:08:47,181 teleworking allows us the flexibility 204 00:08:47,181 --> 00:08:50,050 to keep the force healthy , and I could 205 00:08:50,050 --> 00:08:52,160 not be more proud of the collective 206 00:08:52,170 --> 00:08:54,600 actions of the service's the joint 207 00:08:54,600 --> 00:08:57,730 staff combatant commands and the whole 208 00:08:57,740 --> 00:09:00,720 of the department defense . I liked to 209 00:09:00,720 --> 00:09:02,887 turn it over now to Lieutenant General 210 00:09:02,887 --> 00:09:04,840 BJ Psuedo , who will provide more 211 00:09:04,840 --> 00:09:07,610 details about specific accomplishments 212 00:09:07,990 --> 00:09:10,220 we've achieved across department and 213 00:09:10,220 --> 00:09:12,164 how our military is supporting the 214 00:09:12,164 --> 00:09:15,230 fight against Cove in 19 . As always , 215 00:09:15,230 --> 00:09:17,452 thank you for coming today to hear more 216 00:09:17,452 --> 00:09:19,680 about the covert 19 tele work writing 217 00:09:19,680 --> 00:09:21,680 this task force . I look forward to 218 00:09:21,680 --> 00:09:24,330 your questions . Thank you , Mr Deasy , 219 00:09:24,340 --> 00:09:26,284 and thank you to everyone here and 220 00:09:26,284 --> 00:09:28,618 everyone else who's teleconference then , 221 00:09:28,618 --> 00:09:30,396 for as long as I've been in the 222 00:09:30,396 --> 00:09:32,618 military have always been proud to be a 223 00:09:32,618 --> 00:09:32,360 part of this team , but I'm 224 00:09:32,360 --> 00:09:34,527 particularly humble today to represent 225 00:09:34,527 --> 00:09:36,527 the efforts of this task force . Of 226 00:09:36,527 --> 00:09:39,050 course , Kobe 19 is a serious issue , 227 00:09:39,140 --> 00:09:41,140 and the chairman of Joint Chiefs of 228 00:09:41,140 --> 00:09:43,307 Staff General Milley , recognizes that 229 00:09:43,307 --> 00:09:45,418 as such , the chairman said earlier , 230 00:09:45,418 --> 00:09:47,584 were at war . It's a different type of 231 00:09:47,584 --> 00:09:49,751 war , but it's war nonetheless . And I 232 00:09:49,751 --> 00:09:51,640 can assure you this topic has the 233 00:09:51,640 --> 00:09:53,862 undivided attention of the chairman and 234 00:09:53,862 --> 00:09:56,029 the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff . The 235 00:09:56,029 --> 00:09:57,751 support I've received from the 236 00:09:57,751 --> 00:09:59,584 leadership is unparalleled , and 237 00:09:59,584 --> 00:10:01,751 they've removed any impediments in our 238 00:10:01,751 --> 00:10:03,973 way as we attack this invisible enemy . 239 00:10:03,973 --> 00:10:05,807 As Mr Deasy described their many 240 00:10:05,807 --> 00:10:08,029 positive developments in this cove , it 241 00:10:08,029 --> 00:10:10,084 battle . But we're also enabling the 242 00:10:10,084 --> 00:10:11,973 Department of Defense's worldwide 243 00:10:11,973 --> 00:10:13,973 mission to defend this country from 244 00:10:13,973 --> 00:10:15,918 anyone who would mistakenly try to 245 00:10:15,918 --> 00:10:17,751 exploit this current situation . 246 00:10:17,770 --> 00:10:19,714 There's no light between the Joint 247 00:10:19,714 --> 00:10:21,881 Staff and Mr Deasy's office as we work 248 00:10:21,881 --> 00:10:24,048 with combatant commands and service is 249 00:10:24,048 --> 00:10:25,992 to support our troops and civilian 250 00:10:25,992 --> 00:10:27,937 personnel across the Department of 251 00:10:27,937 --> 00:10:30,159 Defense . You'll also find our solution 252 00:10:30,159 --> 00:10:32,270 sets incorporate considerations for a 253 00:10:32,270 --> 00:10:34,480 larger U . S population who is also in 254 00:10:34,480 --> 00:10:37,030 the midst of telework distance learning 255 00:10:37,030 --> 00:10:39,000 for our Children and the overall 256 00:10:39,000 --> 00:10:41,480 greater demands on the Net associated 257 00:10:41,480 --> 00:10:43,647 with these current stay at home orders 258 00:10:44,090 --> 00:10:46,430 to appreciate the scope and scale of 259 00:10:46,430 --> 00:10:48,910 our task . Our work is to enable 260 00:10:48,910 --> 00:10:51,910 productive collaboration for over four 261 00:10:51,910 --> 00:10:54,620 million military and civilian worldwide , 262 00:10:54,620 --> 00:10:57,420 teleworkers with innovative tools that 263 00:10:57,420 --> 00:11:00,090 are both cutting edge and secure , 264 00:11:00,210 --> 00:11:03,780 often with overnight demands . The army 265 00:11:03,780 --> 00:11:06,620 alone roughly has 800,000 tele work 266 00:11:06,620 --> 00:11:08,676 enabled members on the Department of 267 00:11:08,676 --> 00:11:10,650 Defense networks and the overall 268 00:11:10,650 --> 00:11:12,940 demands their increasing daily . The 269 00:11:12,940 --> 00:11:15,340 Navy , for instance , which just had 270 00:11:15,390 --> 00:11:17,930 100,000 remote workers on his networks 271 00:11:17,930 --> 00:11:19,986 before the pandemic , currently have 272 00:11:19,986 --> 00:11:23,440 250,000 workers . Planned improvements 273 00:11:23,440 --> 00:11:25,662 in the next 2 to 3 weeks will bring the 274 00:11:25,662 --> 00:11:29,120 total to 500,000 remote users . The 275 00:11:29,120 --> 00:11:32,400 Navy's outlook Web access O W . A . 276 00:11:32,540 --> 00:11:34,610 Went from 10,000 users before the 277 00:11:34,610 --> 00:11:37,900 pandemic to 80,000 users within weeks , 278 00:11:37,910 --> 00:11:40,330 with a target of 300,000 users by the 279 00:11:40,330 --> 00:11:43,110 end of the month . Staying on Onda o W 280 00:11:43,110 --> 00:11:45,430 A . The U . S . Marine course capacity 281 00:11:45,430 --> 00:11:47,750 has increased from 70,000 to ah over 282 00:11:47,750 --> 00:11:51,510 105,000 in a couple weeks . Within just 283 00:11:51,510 --> 00:11:53,570 three days in March , the Marines 284 00:11:53,570 --> 00:11:55,650 increased their VPN capability from 285 00:11:55,650 --> 00:11:59,450 12,500 to 60,000 simultaneous users 286 00:12:00,040 --> 00:12:01,707 course . Mr Deasy has already 287 00:12:01,707 --> 00:12:04,040 highlighted the Army's 400% increase , 288 00:12:04,290 --> 00:12:06,512 and they've been very supportive of the 289 00:12:06,512 --> 00:12:09,420 CVR capabilities and of course , with 290 00:12:09,420 --> 00:12:11,570 the sharing of products and also 291 00:12:11,570 --> 00:12:13,626 meetings in real time , the Army's G 292 00:12:13,626 --> 00:12:15,737 six , my counterpart , has lauded the 293 00:12:15,737 --> 00:12:17,681 VTC capabilities saying There's no 294 00:12:17,681 --> 00:12:19,792 substitute for the ability to look in 295 00:12:19,792 --> 00:12:21,900 the eyes of those who you lead . The 296 00:12:21,900 --> 00:12:23,622 Air Force , for instance , has 297 00:12:23,622 --> 00:12:25,622 increased their VPN capability from 298 00:12:25,622 --> 00:12:27,870 10,000 and pre covert capabilities toe 299 00:12:27,870 --> 00:12:31,260 over 100,000 today . They're on track 300 00:12:31,270 --> 00:12:33,820 for 200,000 in the coming weeks , and 301 00:12:33,820 --> 00:12:36,340 they're now using a tool that is going 302 00:12:36,340 --> 00:12:38,340 to great bring this capability over 303 00:12:38,340 --> 00:12:41,220 400,000 users to give you a sense of 304 00:12:41,220 --> 00:12:43,770 the urgency . The previous pace was 1 305 00:12:43,770 --> 00:12:45,326 to 2 years from planning to 306 00:12:45,326 --> 00:12:47,730 implementation . Now these upgrades air 307 00:12:47,730 --> 00:12:49,860 happening and in completing and want 308 00:12:50,250 --> 00:12:52,830 from days to weeks . The overnight 309 00:12:52,840 --> 00:12:55,460 increasing capability also demanded a 310 00:12:55,460 --> 00:12:57,460 rapid retooling to enable combatant 311 00:12:57,460 --> 00:13:00,490 commands to battle Cove it , Of course , 312 00:13:00,500 --> 00:13:02,611 in this building , when we talk about 313 00:13:02,611 --> 00:13:04,611 war planning , we talk . We like to 314 00:13:04,611 --> 00:13:06,611 talk about supported and supporting 315 00:13:06,611 --> 00:13:08,444 commanders . And in this fight , 316 00:13:08,444 --> 00:13:10,667 Northern Command and the National Guard 317 00:13:10,667 --> 00:13:12,889 viewer are definitely our focus in more 318 00:13:12,889 --> 00:13:14,889 traditional military scenarios . We 319 00:13:14,889 --> 00:13:17,230 like to deploy as a unit , and within 320 00:13:17,230 --> 00:13:19,286 this scenario is usually those units 321 00:13:19,286 --> 00:13:21,286 have their supporting elements like 322 00:13:21,286 --> 00:13:23,397 command and control . Unfortunately , 323 00:13:23,397 --> 00:13:25,563 within this scenario , there are often 324 00:13:25,563 --> 00:13:28,120 requests for individual augment ease 325 00:13:28,130 --> 00:13:30,019 and first responders that are not 326 00:13:30,019 --> 00:13:33,290 confined to a unit or a location 327 00:13:34,120 --> 00:13:36,360 in my past . With these individual 328 00:13:36,360 --> 00:13:39,440 augment T scenarios , as these heroes 329 00:13:39,440 --> 00:13:42,100 often run to the sound of the guns , we 330 00:13:42,100 --> 00:13:44,590 sometimes run the risk of loss patrols . 331 00:13:45,040 --> 00:13:47,207 To counter this problem , Northcom has 332 00:13:47,207 --> 00:13:49,262 launched a pilot program to field an 333 00:13:49,262 --> 00:13:52,160 IPAD iPhone that actually gives you a 334 00:13:52,160 --> 00:13:54,490 common operational picture , personal 335 00:13:54,490 --> 00:13:57,120 tracking system and also collaboration 336 00:13:57,120 --> 00:13:59,570 and communication tools . I've already 337 00:13:59,570 --> 00:14:02,020 seen it work as the common operational 338 00:14:02,020 --> 00:14:04,131 picture was set for people working in 339 00:14:04,131 --> 00:14:06,187 the Javits Center and throughout New 340 00:14:06,187 --> 00:14:08,610 York City . This is just one focus area 341 00:14:08,610 --> 00:14:10,721 for our funding . As we're increasing 342 00:14:10,721 --> 00:14:13,610 the capacity for tools , we also need 343 00:14:13,610 --> 00:14:15,388 to get out for the needs of the 344 00:14:15,388 --> 00:14:18,300 workforce made possible by The Cares 345 00:14:18,300 --> 00:14:21,040 Act , which allocates $10.5 billion to 346 00:14:21,040 --> 00:14:23,262 the Department of Defense to respond to 347 00:14:23,262 --> 00:14:25,480 covet . When it comes to support for 348 00:14:25,480 --> 00:14:27,591 northcom , I'd also like to highlight 349 00:14:27,591 --> 00:14:29,591 some support . DISA is providing to 350 00:14:29,591 --> 00:14:31,480 facilitate all of these alternate 351 00:14:31,480 --> 00:14:33,536 medical facilities . Disa has worked 352 00:14:33,536 --> 00:14:35,647 with telecom service providers and is 353 00:14:35,647 --> 00:14:37,869 leveraging the FCC is national Security 354 00:14:37,869 --> 00:14:40,170 and emergency preparedness process to 355 00:14:40,170 --> 00:14:41,920 deliver nearly 100 critical 356 00:14:41,920 --> 00:14:43,920 communications lines supporting the 357 00:14:43,920 --> 00:14:45,770 department of defense to rapidly 358 00:14:45,770 --> 00:14:47,730 installing pier side circuits . 359 00:14:47,920 --> 00:14:50,770 Delivering service is to the USNS Mercy 360 00:14:50,770 --> 00:14:52,714 and Comfort . And to support these 361 00:14:52,714 --> 00:14:54,881 field officers in New Orleans , Dallas 362 00:14:54,881 --> 00:14:57,170 and other proposed locations as 363 00:14:57,170 --> 00:14:59,790 northcom is obviously the priority . 364 00:15:00,000 --> 00:15:02,056 Bad guys , we're not taking any time 365 00:15:02,056 --> 00:15:04,060 off , and we need to ensure all the 366 00:15:04,060 --> 00:15:06,060 other combatant commands are always 367 00:15:06,060 --> 00:15:07,949 ready to fill their roles . As an 368 00:15:07,949 --> 00:15:09,660 example , one command that's 369 00:15:09,660 --> 00:15:11,382 responsible for an interesting 370 00:15:11,382 --> 00:15:13,493 neighborhood is United States Central 371 00:15:13,493 --> 00:15:16,580 Command . Centcom's needs often expand 372 00:15:16,580 --> 00:15:19,550 beyond unclassified tele tele work , 373 00:15:19,740 --> 00:15:21,710 and they needed their capabilities 374 00:15:21,710 --> 00:15:23,750 increased for at home handling of 375 00:15:23,750 --> 00:15:25,890 classified information . And they 376 00:15:25,900 --> 00:15:27,567 rapidly increased their staff 377 00:15:27,567 --> 00:15:31,350 capabilities from 2 61 to 404 and 378 00:15:31,350 --> 00:15:34,310 then went forward with a pro pilot 379 00:15:34,310 --> 00:15:36,900 program that was exulted in the scaling 380 00:15:36,900 --> 00:15:40,370 from just one capability to 492 . 381 00:15:41,520 --> 00:15:43,687 Of course , with all of this speed and 382 00:15:43,687 --> 00:15:45,464 introduction of new tools , the 383 00:15:45,464 --> 00:15:47,353 immediate question becomes one of 384 00:15:47,353 --> 00:15:49,800 security , and the answer really is yin 385 00:15:49,800 --> 00:15:51,820 and yang . With great opportunities 386 00:15:52,020 --> 00:15:54,187 comes great challenges . But with that 387 00:15:54,187 --> 00:15:56,520 knowledge , you can shape your campaign , 388 00:15:56,520 --> 00:15:58,920 plan to maximize your mitigations and 389 00:15:58,920 --> 00:16:01,142 attempt to exploit the exploiters , the 390 00:16:01,142 --> 00:16:03,270 bad guys , throughout all our 391 00:16:03,270 --> 00:16:05,492 activities were aligned with the United 392 00:16:05,492 --> 00:16:07,603 States Cyber Command and the National 393 00:16:07,603 --> 00:16:09,603 Security Agency . Mitigating attack 394 00:16:09,603 --> 00:16:11,381 access is from the bad guys and 395 00:16:11,381 --> 00:16:13,714 learning a lot about them along the way . 396 00:16:13,714 --> 00:16:15,437 Risk is mitigated by providing 397 00:16:15,437 --> 00:16:17,159 Overwatch of R . I T and cyber 398 00:16:17,159 --> 00:16:19,710 environment and reducing attack vectors 399 00:16:19,710 --> 00:16:21,932 from entering the Department of Defense 400 00:16:21,932 --> 00:16:23,980 Information Networks Joint Force 401 00:16:23,980 --> 00:16:25,860 headquarters . Dodon is closely 402 00:16:25,860 --> 00:16:28,490 monitoring cybersecurity threats . In 403 00:16:28,490 --> 00:16:30,768 this increased tell a work environment , 404 00:16:30,780 --> 00:16:32,891 there's been a surge of spear fishing 405 00:16:32,891 --> 00:16:35,180 related to Cove in 19 . Of course , 406 00:16:35,180 --> 00:16:37,124 that's not surprising because most 407 00:16:37,124 --> 00:16:38,958 spear phishing campaigns tend to 408 00:16:38,958 --> 00:16:40,847 exploit current events to produce 409 00:16:40,847 --> 00:16:43,240 convincing products . Dis It continues 410 00:16:43,240 --> 00:16:45,910 to update our i T systems to block new 411 00:16:45,910 --> 00:16:49,210 malware and threat products . Although 412 00:16:49,210 --> 00:16:51,900 we've heard all these bad stories about 413 00:16:51,900 --> 00:16:54,620 price gouging , poor behavior in these 414 00:16:54,620 --> 00:16:56,564 tough times , that has not been my 415 00:16:56,564 --> 00:16:59,550 experience . I've had patriotic people 416 00:16:59,560 --> 00:17:02,670 offer I T tools for free in order to 417 00:17:02,670 --> 00:17:05,070 protect our first responders and attack 418 00:17:05,070 --> 00:17:07,600 this cove . It crisis . The I T and 419 00:17:07,600 --> 00:17:09,770 cyber related efforts happening across 420 00:17:09,770 --> 00:17:11,770 the department Mr Deasy and I about 421 00:17:11,770 --> 00:17:14,550 lighted for you represents increased 422 00:17:14,550 --> 00:17:16,850 innovation and positive partnerships 423 00:17:16,850 --> 00:17:18,794 between the U . S . Government and 424 00:17:18,794 --> 00:17:21,017 American companies . These partnerships 425 00:17:21,017 --> 00:17:23,239 are vital as the U . S . Military works 426 00:17:23,239 --> 00:17:25,461 every day to provide cutting in cutting 427 00:17:25,461 --> 00:17:28,360 edge innovation to improve our national 428 00:17:28,360 --> 00:17:31,390 defense capabilities . The teamwork and 429 00:17:31,390 --> 00:17:33,557 collective efforts to run to the sound 430 00:17:33,557 --> 00:17:35,550 of the guns represents the best in 431 00:17:35,550 --> 00:17:39,200 America . These partnerships and 432 00:17:39,200 --> 00:17:41,367 actions are exactly the right solution 433 00:17:41,367 --> 00:17:43,422 for these tough times . Once again , 434 00:17:43,422 --> 00:17:45,533 I'm proud to be a part of this team , 435 00:17:45,533 --> 00:17:47,478 and I'm humbled to represent their 436 00:17:47,478 --> 00:17:49,478 efforts . More importantly , I look 437 00:17:49,478 --> 00:17:49,070 forward to answering any of your 438 00:17:49,070 --> 00:17:51,640 questions . Thank you , gentlemen . 439 00:17:51,650 --> 00:17:53,650 Thank you . Let's first go , Thio . 440 00:17:53,650 --> 00:17:54,983 Phil Stuart , Reuters . 441 00:17:57,650 --> 00:18:00,910 Hey there . Thanks . Just what is the 442 00:18:00,910 --> 00:18:03,077 increase in spearfishing you've seen ? 443 00:18:03,077 --> 00:18:05,620 And who , exactly in the Pentagon is 444 00:18:05,620 --> 00:18:07,787 being targeted ? Most senior officials 445 00:18:07,787 --> 00:18:09,787 who are whose names are really well 446 00:18:09,787 --> 00:18:11,953 known . Uh , is it ? People throughout 447 00:18:11,953 --> 00:18:14,120 the throughout the military leadership 448 00:18:14,120 --> 00:18:15,787 were being targeted with your 449 00:18:15,787 --> 00:18:18,009 respective of well known they are . And 450 00:18:18,009 --> 00:18:20,176 then secondly , you could speak to the 451 00:18:20,176 --> 00:18:22,231 weather . There's any thought , more 452 00:18:22,231 --> 00:18:24,120 compartmentalization of , ah , of 453 00:18:24,120 --> 00:18:26,470 sensitive information during this hour 454 00:18:26,470 --> 00:18:29,630 period . Thanks , sir . I'll take that 455 00:18:29,630 --> 00:18:31,797 if you weren't so . Of course , spirit 456 00:18:31,797 --> 00:18:34,470 fishing campaigns go across the gamut 457 00:18:34,480 --> 00:18:37,150 and quite frankly , you you'll see lots 458 00:18:37,150 --> 00:18:39,440 on just the news . There . They'll 459 00:18:39,440 --> 00:18:42,400 shotgun blast across , You know , 460 00:18:42,410 --> 00:18:45,520 across America and everything else I 461 00:18:45,520 --> 00:18:47,242 will tell you when it comes to 462 00:18:47,242 --> 00:18:49,140 specifically who's being targeted 463 00:18:49,150 --> 00:18:51,150 inside the government . I prefer to 464 00:18:51,150 --> 00:18:53,317 stay away from that because that would 465 00:18:53,317 --> 00:18:55,372 give the bad guys inside on who were 466 00:18:55,372 --> 00:18:57,539 tracking and and give them inside into 467 00:18:57,539 --> 00:18:59,539 our Overwatch . But I'll tell you , 468 00:18:59,539 --> 00:19:02,100 that thean site that we're receiving 469 00:19:02,100 --> 00:19:04,322 we're getting better and better getting 470 00:19:04,322 --> 00:19:06,267 there tee tee pees and finding out 471 00:19:06,267 --> 00:19:08,378 where these threat vectors air coming 472 00:19:08,378 --> 00:19:10,600 from . But once again , I prefer not to 473 00:19:10,600 --> 00:19:12,767 give the bad guys any insight on where 474 00:19:12,767 --> 00:19:14,544 we're going . Yeah , regards to 475 00:19:14,544 --> 00:19:16,890 classifications . Since the beginning 476 00:19:16,890 --> 00:19:19,510 of creating the our task force , we 477 00:19:19,510 --> 00:19:22,310 have started with this basic principle 478 00:19:22,320 --> 00:19:24,910 of how do we take the way we've always 479 00:19:24,910 --> 00:19:27,243 worked inside the Pentagon or , frankly , 480 00:19:27,500 --> 00:19:30,020 any of our command locations and allow 481 00:19:30,020 --> 00:19:32,242 that work to take place appropriately , 482 00:19:32,242 --> 00:19:33,909 insecurely from a hole in the 483 00:19:33,909 --> 00:19:35,964 environment . So I would say we have 484 00:19:35,964 --> 00:19:37,909 changed the of our classifications 485 00:19:37,909 --> 00:19:39,853 other than we've come up with some 486 00:19:39,853 --> 00:19:42,076 innovative ways to allow people to work 487 00:19:42,076 --> 00:19:43,798 within their classifications . 488 00:19:45,880 --> 00:19:47,910 Okay , just follow up on the spear 489 00:19:47,910 --> 00:19:50,077 fishing . So is there any data you can 490 00:19:50,077 --> 00:19:52,132 give us that all you know there's an 491 00:19:52,132 --> 00:19:54,243 increase in spear fishing , but , you 492 00:19:54,243 --> 00:19:54,070 know , which is interesting , but I 493 00:19:54,070 --> 00:19:56,070 don't know howto explain that to an 494 00:19:56,070 --> 00:19:58,070 intelligent reader with is not more 495 00:19:58,070 --> 00:20:00,348 information , I would say , sir , When ? 496 00:20:00,348 --> 00:20:02,459 When it comes to spear fishing , what 497 00:20:02,459 --> 00:20:04,626 we've seen is , uh , these These folks 498 00:20:04,626 --> 00:20:06,910 are very adept at capturing whatever is 499 00:20:06,910 --> 00:20:09,132 the current situation . And right now , 500 00:20:09,132 --> 00:20:12,210 Covitz Cove in 19 is a current 501 00:20:12,620 --> 00:20:14,880 emphasis item . When we go across the 502 00:20:14,880 --> 00:20:17,710 board fire , I and others have put out 503 00:20:17,710 --> 00:20:19,970 many products that show how they're 504 00:20:19,970 --> 00:20:22,192 manipulating people . And you see a lot 505 00:20:22,192 --> 00:20:24,303 of these things as an end result of a 506 00:20:24,303 --> 00:20:26,248 scam . Of course , they get you to 507 00:20:26,248 --> 00:20:28,920 click click on either websites that 508 00:20:28,930 --> 00:20:32,120 redirect you Thio to compromise 509 00:20:32,120 --> 00:20:35,310 yourself . And the bottom line is , I 510 00:20:35,320 --> 00:20:37,376 really don't want to go too far into 511 00:20:37,376 --> 00:20:39,431 what we're learning about these guys 512 00:20:39,431 --> 00:20:41,487 because I don't want to give them in 513 00:20:41,487 --> 00:20:43,542 any insight into what we're learning 514 00:20:43,542 --> 00:20:45,910 right now about them . Okay , let's go 515 00:20:45,910 --> 00:20:47,350 to marry Walsh , CBS . 516 00:20:51,340 --> 00:20:53,451 Thank you . I don't have a question . 517 00:20:53,451 --> 00:20:55,507 Thank you . All right , Mary . Thank 518 00:20:55,507 --> 00:20:57,396 you , Sydney . Freedberg breaking 519 00:20:57,396 --> 00:20:58,396 defense . 520 00:21:01,680 --> 00:21:05,650 Hi . Thank you , Dylan . Very much . It 521 00:21:05,650 --> 00:21:07,761 will be very helpful if you guys went 522 00:21:07,761 --> 00:21:09,660 through . Ah , a lot of facts and 523 00:21:09,670 --> 00:21:11,837 figures very quickly . If we could get 524 00:21:11,837 --> 00:21:13,892 whatever two cards or documents were 525 00:21:13,892 --> 00:21:16,114 reading from for our reference , we can 526 00:21:16,114 --> 00:21:18,226 come get me to regale those figures , 527 00:21:18,226 --> 00:21:20,860 right ? Is there no end ? That's a B . 528 00:21:20,870 --> 00:21:24,070 Is there a way to wrap up ? You know , 529 00:21:24,070 --> 00:21:27,080 in a few , there's a lot of six figures 530 00:21:27,090 --> 00:21:29,201 by targets reminiscent of the overall 531 00:21:29,350 --> 00:21:31,340 is the way to characterize percent 532 00:21:31,350 --> 00:21:34,300 increase in telling work across D o . D 533 00:21:34,750 --> 00:21:37,870 as a whole , by whatever means not 534 00:21:37,880 --> 00:21:41,520 focus on one service one provider , but 535 00:21:41,520 --> 00:21:45,000 actually a wrap up of you know , how 536 00:21:45,000 --> 00:21:46,940 many more people in duty or tell 537 00:21:46,940 --> 00:21:50,470 looking now then we're , ah , freak o 538 00:21:50,470 --> 00:21:53,570 bit . And you know what ? The next 539 00:21:53,580 --> 00:21:55,691 phase of growth but what you might be 540 00:21:55,691 --> 00:21:59,080 going to a next weeks and months . Yeah , 541 00:21:59,090 --> 00:22:01,530 first of all , will be happy to pass 542 00:22:01,530 --> 00:22:03,808 along the facts and figures here today . 543 00:22:05,840 --> 00:22:07,970 Answering that question is somewhat 544 00:22:07,970 --> 00:22:10,290 complicated by the fact that we've 545 00:22:10,290 --> 00:22:12,810 always had a work force that has been 546 00:22:12,810 --> 00:22:14,977 able to go home , whether it be in the 547 00:22:14,977 --> 00:22:17,310 evening while they're out of the office , 548 00:22:17,310 --> 00:22:19,510 for whatever reasons , and being able 549 00:22:19,820 --> 00:22:21,987 to do different forms of teleworking . 550 00:22:22,120 --> 00:22:24,231 We break our teleworking kind of into 551 00:22:24,231 --> 00:22:26,790 three categories . A tier one would be 552 00:22:27,320 --> 00:22:29,930 those people who just need access to an 553 00:22:29,940 --> 00:22:32,980 email and a phone . Tier two would be 554 00:22:32,980 --> 00:22:35,260 those people who need access to email , 555 00:22:35,440 --> 00:22:38,660 a phone and some form of collaboration , 556 00:22:39,110 --> 00:22:41,166 and then tear . Three would be those 557 00:22:41,166 --> 00:22:44,250 people who need a like experience as if 558 00:22:44,250 --> 00:22:46,472 they were sitting in their office doing 559 00:22:46,472 --> 00:22:48,583 their job versus there now sitting at 560 00:22:48,583 --> 00:22:50,990 their home . So for each of those , we 561 00:22:50,990 --> 00:22:52,990 have different sorts of equipment , 562 00:22:52,990 --> 00:22:54,768 different sorts of networks and 563 00:22:54,768 --> 00:22:56,934 solutions that were providing . So the 564 00:22:56,934 --> 00:22:59,157 numbers are gonna vary depending on the 565 00:22:59,157 --> 00:23:01,490 type of teleworking we're talking about . 566 00:23:01,490 --> 00:23:03,546 But we will be happy to pass on with 567 00:23:03,546 --> 00:23:03,260 facts and figures we do have . 568 00:23:07,650 --> 00:23:10,050 Let's go Thio Aaron Meta Defense News 569 00:23:14,110 --> 00:23:16,221 Thanks , guys , for doing this , um , 570 00:23:16,310 --> 00:23:18,199 for Mr D . C . Actually got a non 571 00:23:18,199 --> 00:23:20,254 covert question for you . The FCC is 572 00:23:20,254 --> 00:23:22,421 currently considering application from 573 00:23:22,421 --> 00:23:24,643 a company called Delgado . The use of a 574 00:23:24,643 --> 00:23:26,960 band spectrum . You wrote a note on 575 00:23:26,960 --> 00:23:29,310 March 12 along with the undersecretary 576 00:23:29,310 --> 00:23:31,930 Griffin , asking that they f c not move 577 00:23:31,930 --> 00:23:33,930 forward application given potential 578 00:23:33,930 --> 00:23:36,390 damage GPS . I want to know if you felt 579 00:23:36,390 --> 00:23:38,446 the department's concerned are being 580 00:23:38,446 --> 00:23:40,279 addressed and if you see any way 581 00:23:40,279 --> 00:23:42,334 forward where llegado could tweak it 582 00:23:42,334 --> 00:23:44,501 system to somehow be acceptable to the 583 00:23:44,501 --> 00:23:46,779 department to meet those concerns Yeah , 584 00:23:46,779 --> 00:23:48,890 What I would say about , um , llegado 585 00:23:48,890 --> 00:23:51,112 is that we have state or of you we have 586 00:23:51,112 --> 00:23:53,730 put that view in writing . We have very 587 00:23:53,730 --> 00:23:55,786 strong technical evidence that would 588 00:23:55,786 --> 00:23:58,590 suggest that moving forward with that 589 00:23:58,590 --> 00:24:02,220 proposal would cause harm to the 590 00:24:02,220 --> 00:24:05,190 adjacent GPS spectrum . 591 00:24:05,480 --> 00:24:07,702 Therefore , we continue to believe it's 592 00:24:07,702 --> 00:24:09,869 in the best interest . And I believe I 593 00:24:09,869 --> 00:24:11,758 can say this on behalf of all the 594 00:24:11,758 --> 00:24:13,813 agencies . Is in the interest of the 595 00:24:13,813 --> 00:24:16,770 government not to pursue the llegado 596 00:24:16,770 --> 00:24:18,714 licensing requirements a request . 597 00:24:21,240 --> 00:24:23,240 Do you feel it ? Concerns are being 598 00:24:23,240 --> 00:24:25,800 hard graft administration . Yes , there 599 00:24:25,800 --> 00:24:28,010 have been active conversations that 600 00:24:28,010 --> 00:24:30,480 myself General psuedo a cz you 601 00:24:30,480 --> 00:24:32,710 mentioned Dr Griffin and others Drought 602 00:24:32,710 --> 00:24:34,780 department , including the secretary 603 00:24:35,340 --> 00:24:37,440 the vice chairman have all been 604 00:24:37,440 --> 00:24:39,520 actively involved in in working with 605 00:24:39,520 --> 00:24:42,390 the administration , the FCC and T i et 606 00:24:42,390 --> 00:24:45,330 cetera . Thanks , Aaron . Let's go to a 607 00:24:45,340 --> 00:24:49,190 jury . Federal news network . Hey , 608 00:24:49,190 --> 00:24:51,357 Good morning . Thanks for doing this . 609 00:24:51,357 --> 00:24:53,468 Um , I wanted to ask about commercial 610 00:24:53,468 --> 00:24:55,468 virtual remote and some big numbers 611 00:24:55,468 --> 00:24:57,357 that Mr Deasy mentioned it . As I 612 00:24:57,357 --> 00:24:59,523 understand it , the plan is to destroy 613 00:24:59,523 --> 00:25:01,634 all the data that people were storing 614 00:25:01,634 --> 00:25:03,690 in CPR once this is all over , which 615 00:25:03,690 --> 00:25:05,746 would seem to suggest the department 616 00:25:05,746 --> 00:25:05,550 could be creating potentially , like 617 00:25:05,560 --> 00:25:07,616 months worth records that are beyond 618 00:25:07,616 --> 00:25:10,120 the reach of things like FOIA and he 619 00:25:10,120 --> 00:25:12,120 discovery because they'll have been 620 00:25:12,120 --> 00:25:14,287 deleted . So how are you balancing the 621 00:25:14,287 --> 00:25:16,509 need to be responsive to this emergency 622 00:25:16,509 --> 00:25:18,676 against things like that ? But records 623 00:25:18,676 --> 00:25:20,580 act . Yeah , it's a really good 624 00:25:20,580 --> 00:25:23,440 question . And I will tell you , even 625 00:25:23,440 --> 00:25:25,218 though we have stood this up an 626 00:25:25,218 --> 00:25:27,384 extraordinary amount of time , we have 627 00:25:27,384 --> 00:25:29,162 also had ah lot of very healthy 628 00:25:29,162 --> 00:25:31,390 discussions regarding what does this 629 00:25:31,390 --> 00:25:33,723 mean from a cyber security implications ? 630 00:25:33,760 --> 00:25:35,538 What does this mean to existing 631 00:25:35,538 --> 00:25:37,850 policies into your very point ? What 632 00:25:37,850 --> 00:25:40,072 does this mean with the data that we've 633 00:25:40,072 --> 00:25:42,294 created ? So , first of all , the whole 634 00:25:42,294 --> 00:25:44,800 task force exists specifically to 635 00:25:44,800 --> 00:25:47,520 address ? How do we handle cove it ? 19 636 00:25:47,520 --> 00:25:49,720 teleworking requirements . This was 637 00:25:49,720 --> 00:25:51,831 stood up specifically to allow people 638 00:25:51,831 --> 00:25:53,900 to collaborate in an unclassified 639 00:25:53,900 --> 00:25:57,460 manner specifically for covert 19 . We 640 00:25:57,460 --> 00:25:59,571 recognize that a lot of data is being 641 00:25:59,571 --> 00:26:01,182 created . It's going onto an 642 00:26:01,182 --> 00:26:03,293 unclassified environment . I wouldn't 643 00:26:03,293 --> 00:26:05,516 say that We've concluded right now that 644 00:26:05,516 --> 00:26:07,738 we will quote , destroy . We're looking 645 00:26:07,738 --> 00:26:09,904 at options on how do we take this data 646 00:26:10,000 --> 00:26:12,111 and preserve it and or poured it into 647 00:26:12,111 --> 00:26:14,278 other collaboration environments going 648 00:26:14,278 --> 00:26:16,333 forward ? That decision has not been 649 00:26:16,333 --> 00:26:18,167 taken . But I would also not pre 650 00:26:18,167 --> 00:26:20,222 conclude that we've taken decision . 651 00:26:20,222 --> 00:26:22,556 The day will just be flat out destroyed . 652 00:26:23,410 --> 00:26:26,540 Okay , Can I follow real quickly Beyond 653 00:26:26,550 --> 00:26:28,740 CVR itself , the taskforce started to 654 00:26:28,740 --> 00:26:30,860 think through how much of that these 655 00:26:30,860 --> 00:26:32,910 other capabilities like , added 656 00:26:32,910 --> 00:26:35,130 bandwidth and VPN . You might just 657 00:26:35,130 --> 00:26:37,270 leave in place after the emergency to 658 00:26:37,270 --> 00:26:39,950 enable more tele work on a steady state 659 00:26:39,950 --> 00:26:43,930 basis . Obviously , we are 660 00:26:43,930 --> 00:26:46,280 creating a much more robust enhanced 661 00:26:46,280 --> 00:26:48,002 teleworking capability . We've 662 00:26:48,002 --> 00:26:50,002 obviously always had one . But what 663 00:26:50,002 --> 00:26:52,113 we've now done it is we've just put a 664 00:26:52,113 --> 00:26:54,370 multiplier effect into the quantity . 665 00:26:54,430 --> 00:26:55,986 The types of service is the 666 00:26:55,986 --> 00:26:58,510 collaboration tools , et cetera . So 667 00:26:58,510 --> 00:27:00,860 there will be some permanency to what 668 00:27:00,860 --> 00:27:03,550 we have here specifically I think more 669 00:27:03,550 --> 00:27:05,880 on the network side and we will also 670 00:27:05,880 --> 00:27:08,040 have a create a base of teleworking 671 00:27:08,040 --> 00:27:10,200 equipment that we will be able to in 672 00:27:10,200 --> 00:27:13,320 some cases re use for other purposes . 673 00:27:13,670 --> 00:27:15,990 But yes , you are correct that there is 674 00:27:15,990 --> 00:27:18,240 going to be an enhanced teleworking 675 00:27:18,240 --> 00:27:20,650 capability that will be sustained at 676 00:27:20,650 --> 00:27:23,710 the end of covert 19 . Just to pitch in 677 00:27:23,710 --> 00:27:25,821 what we'll find is to enable of these 678 00:27:25,821 --> 00:27:27,877 capabilities . We had to do a lot of 679 00:27:27,877 --> 00:27:29,821 back end work , and we're not just 680 00:27:29,821 --> 00:27:32,530 procuring laptops and other devices . 681 00:27:32,530 --> 00:27:34,252 We also have to manipulate the 682 00:27:34,252 --> 00:27:36,474 individual combatant commands back in . 683 00:27:36,510 --> 00:27:38,454 That doesn't go away , and this is 684 00:27:38,454 --> 00:27:40,454 gonna be a force multiplier for the 685 00:27:40,454 --> 00:27:42,566 future case of another pandemic . But 686 00:27:42,566 --> 00:27:44,121 it also gives us additional 687 00:27:44,121 --> 00:27:46,232 capabilities with any other worldwide 688 00:27:46,232 --> 00:27:48,288 crisis . There's one more thing I'll 689 00:27:48,288 --> 00:27:50,610 say about this . There's not only the 690 00:27:50,620 --> 00:27:53,160 facts and the figures on equipment we 691 00:27:53,160 --> 00:27:55,500 provided today and on networking , but 692 00:27:55,500 --> 00:27:58,310 we've also just develops a new tactics 693 00:27:58,310 --> 00:28:00,600 and techniques that allow us to ramp up 694 00:28:00,750 --> 00:28:03,560 quite quickly . I can't stress enough 695 00:28:03,560 --> 00:28:05,980 that this isn't just a D . O . D effort . 696 00:28:05,990 --> 00:28:08,620 We have had significant help from our 697 00:28:08,630 --> 00:28:11,160 industry partners on this , and I want 698 00:28:11,160 --> 00:28:13,327 to just take this opportunity to point 699 00:28:13,327 --> 00:28:14,882 out that much of what we've 700 00:28:14,882 --> 00:28:17,104 accomplished we've accomplished through 701 00:28:17,104 --> 00:28:19,271 that , that we've gotten help from our 702 00:28:19,271 --> 00:28:21,150 industry partners . I've said it 703 00:28:21,160 --> 00:28:23,810 earlier in my comments , but we found 704 00:28:23,810 --> 00:28:25,977 some of these industry partners coming 705 00:28:25,977 --> 00:28:27,866 in so concerned about the current 706 00:28:27,866 --> 00:28:29,866 crisis and they say , Hey , you can 707 00:28:29,866 --> 00:28:31,977 have this I t for free We're really , 708 00:28:31,977 --> 00:28:31,650 really concerned about where we're 709 00:28:31,650 --> 00:28:34,060 going . One capability that comes to 710 00:28:34,060 --> 00:28:37,640 mind prevents a first responder from 711 00:28:37,640 --> 00:28:40,610 having any contact with the individuals 712 00:28:40,610 --> 00:28:44,060 that they're doing . It's a a iPhone 713 00:28:44,060 --> 00:28:47,320 capability that shoots messages back 714 00:28:47,320 --> 00:28:49,487 and forth . You never leave your car , 715 00:28:49,487 --> 00:28:51,730 and folks and KAOS basically said you 716 00:28:51,730 --> 00:28:53,841 can have it . So there's been lots of 717 00:28:53,841 --> 00:28:55,952 different capabilities out there that 718 00:28:56,230 --> 00:28:58,286 we may not have been aware of that's 719 00:28:58,286 --> 00:29:00,508 rapidly coming to the forefront , which 720 00:29:00,508 --> 00:29:02,563 is just a great opportunity to start 721 00:29:02,563 --> 00:29:04,619 going after these opportunities . So 722 00:29:04,619 --> 00:29:06,674 we're right At 30 minutes , sir , we 723 00:29:06,674 --> 00:29:08,674 think one more will go to Sylvie on 724 00:29:08,674 --> 00:29:09,674 Sylvie from Ft . 725 00:29:13,300 --> 00:29:16,590 You know , thank you for doing that . I 726 00:29:16,590 --> 00:29:19,370 would like to put it up on the question . 727 00:29:20,600 --> 00:29:22,830 You are speaking about the cell's off 728 00:29:23,080 --> 00:29:25,024 spear fishing . I understand . You 729 00:29:25,024 --> 00:29:27,710 don't want to say we targeted , but 730 00:29:27,980 --> 00:29:31,420 Venice wearing come from Russia , 731 00:29:31,430 --> 00:29:35,410 China or anyway , white 732 00:29:35,410 --> 00:29:37,632 national money . Can you tell us that ? 733 00:29:37,840 --> 00:29:40,270 Yeah . You have to understand that part 734 00:29:40,270 --> 00:29:43,350 of having a very good active defense 735 00:29:43,360 --> 00:29:45,830 and being able to deploy some the 736 00:29:45,830 --> 00:29:47,663 tactics and techniques that have 737 00:29:47,663 --> 00:29:50,050 allowed us to be able to keep our 738 00:29:50,440 --> 00:29:52,970 workforce working in a cyber secure 739 00:29:52,970 --> 00:29:55,530 manner is the fact that we don't 740 00:29:55,530 --> 00:29:58,620 publish where we get the attack vectors 741 00:29:58,620 --> 00:30:01,120 from , because that would just give 742 00:30:01,130 --> 00:30:04,040 insight to the adversary to know how to 743 00:30:04,240 --> 00:30:06,230 vector and pivot and change their 744 00:30:06,230 --> 00:30:08,610 tactics and techniques . So it's in the 745 00:30:08,610 --> 00:30:11,210 best interest that we actually don't go 746 00:30:11,210 --> 00:30:12,766 on public record in share . 747 00:30:12,766 --> 00:30:15,260 Specifically , who are the actors and 748 00:30:15,260 --> 00:30:17,427 where the attack techniques air coming 749 00:30:17,427 --> 00:30:21,360 from . Okay , 750 00:30:21,360 --> 00:30:23,527 thank you . If you have any additional 751 00:30:23,527 --> 00:30:25,582 questions that we didn't get to this 752 00:30:25,582 --> 00:30:27,582 morning , please send them to me an 753 00:30:27,582 --> 00:30:29,804 email and we'll get back to you just as 754 00:30:29,804 --> 00:30:32,138 quickly as we can . Thank you very much . 755 00:30:32,138 --> 00:30:32,050 Thank you .