1 00:00:03,740 --> 00:00:06,930 this stuff . 2807 2 00:00:07,230 --> 00:00:09,174 pending military nominations . All 3 00:00:09,174 --> 00:00:11,341 these nominations before the committee 4 00:00:11,341 --> 00:00:13,397 and required the length of time . Is 5 00:00:13,397 --> 00:00:15,563 there a motion of favorably reported ? 6 00:00:15,563 --> 00:00:18,510 Some of second in favor , say Aye , I 7 00:00:18,520 --> 00:00:22,440 propose . No . And I 8 00:00:22,440 --> 00:00:24,580 don't have a pen so exciting . This 9 00:00:24,590 --> 00:00:28,520 somebody Thank 10 00:00:28,520 --> 00:00:29,520 you . 11 00:00:35,430 --> 00:00:37,210 The defendant Very 12 00:00:40,140 --> 00:00:42,418 Okay . Thank you . Thank you very much . 13 00:00:42,770 --> 00:00:46,450 The , uh , before the opening 14 00:00:46,450 --> 00:00:48,650 statement , let me just observe 15 00:00:48,650 --> 00:00:50,761 something here , and I And this comes 16 00:00:50,761 --> 00:00:52,983 from the heart . Ive been around here a 17 00:00:52,983 --> 00:00:54,983 long time , served in the house for 18 00:00:54,983 --> 00:00:57,206 eight years . I started in the Senate . 19 00:00:57,206 --> 00:00:59,206 It was on the Senate Armed Services 20 00:00:59,206 --> 00:01:02,510 Committee starting in 1994 . And I 21 00:01:02,510 --> 00:01:04,399 don't think I've ever seen a more 22 00:01:04,399 --> 00:01:06,860 impressive group of witnesses on a 23 00:01:06,860 --> 00:01:08,810 specific subject who the better 24 00:01:08,810 --> 00:01:11,470 qualified than this in all that time , 25 00:01:11,700 --> 00:01:13,760 and I really mean it . I mean , you 26 00:01:13,760 --> 00:01:17,160 talk about Mr Deasy , who is the 27 00:01:17,520 --> 00:01:19,687 Department of Defense ? Chief of Chief 28 00:01:19,687 --> 00:01:22,420 Information Office officer . He was 29 00:01:22,420 --> 00:01:25,580 also the C i . O of J . P . Morgan 30 00:01:25,580 --> 00:01:29,150 Chase , British Petroleum Company , and , 31 00:01:29,160 --> 00:01:31,590 um , in General Motors . I mean , you 32 00:01:31,590 --> 00:01:33,730 know , that's we're not had one like 33 00:01:33,730 --> 00:01:36,620 that before . And Dr Griffin 34 00:01:37,220 --> 00:01:39,910 certainly knows this this issue as well 35 00:01:39,910 --> 00:01:43,750 as anyone anywhere . He's , uh , then 36 00:01:43,750 --> 00:01:47,050 are nice administrator , And , uh , 37 00:01:47,940 --> 00:01:51,040 then we have every road . Allen's dead 38 00:01:51,040 --> 00:01:53,430 Allen . He has been the chairman and 39 00:01:53,430 --> 00:01:55,330 NASA's space base positioning 40 00:01:55,330 --> 00:01:58,300 navigation in time in time National 41 00:01:58,300 --> 00:02:01,730 advisory board . That's GPS . And so 42 00:02:01,730 --> 00:02:03,841 he's he's the authority on that . And 43 00:02:03,841 --> 00:02:06,008 that , of course , obviously the chief 44 00:02:06,008 --> 00:02:09,000 of our space operations . Um , 45 00:02:09,610 --> 00:02:13,410 General Uh , J . Raymond . So it's 46 00:02:13,410 --> 00:02:15,940 just a privilege to have you guys here 47 00:02:15,990 --> 00:02:18,370 have this much quality here . This much 48 00:02:18,370 --> 00:02:20,203 authority is what we're gonna be 49 00:02:20,203 --> 00:02:22,560 talking about is a new issue that could 50 00:02:22,560 --> 00:02:26,150 be really damaging . Teoh , our company 51 00:02:26,160 --> 00:02:29,080 country of something is wrong . So I 52 00:02:29,080 --> 00:02:31,302 would say good morning to the committee 53 00:02:31,302 --> 00:02:33,720 and say good afternoon and appreciate 54 00:02:33,720 --> 00:02:35,770 your being here now because of the 55 00:02:35,770 --> 00:02:37,900 unusual circumstances . There's a new 56 00:02:37,900 --> 00:02:40,011 little required thing that we have to 57 00:02:40,011 --> 00:02:42,178 go through . So bear with me before we 58 00:02:42,178 --> 00:02:44,400 begin . And when I think all of you for 59 00:02:44,400 --> 00:02:46,567 being here , it's required that we are 60 00:02:46,660 --> 00:02:49,770 binding . We are inviting by 61 00:02:50,240 --> 00:02:52,018 guidance from the office of the 62 00:02:52,018 --> 00:02:54,240 Attending Physician Sergeant Arms Rules 63 00:02:54,240 --> 00:02:56,240 Committee . As we hold this hearing 64 00:02:56,240 --> 00:02:59,490 today , many steps were taken to 65 00:02:59,500 --> 00:03:01,580 minimize the risk of our members or 66 00:03:01,580 --> 00:03:03,580 witnesses our staff in the public . 67 00:03:03,770 --> 00:03:07,410 That means we're all , uh , six feet 68 00:03:07,420 --> 00:03:09,620 from one another . You've also got 69 00:03:09,630 --> 00:03:12,010 cleaning supplies at your seats and , 70 00:03:12,120 --> 00:03:16,080 uh , maintaining six feet of the 71 00:03:16,090 --> 00:03:18,270 separation becomes a problem . That I 72 00:03:18,270 --> 00:03:21,950 encourage you to use your mass and that 73 00:03:21,950 --> 00:03:23,561 we're here today under these 74 00:03:23,561 --> 00:03:25,228 circumstances underscores the 75 00:03:25,228 --> 00:03:28,650 importance of the subject that we're 76 00:03:29,140 --> 00:03:32,480 addressing today . There's a 77 00:03:33,440 --> 00:03:35,551 and what we're gonna do , we're gonna 78 00:03:35,551 --> 00:03:37,607 have our opening statements and then 79 00:03:37,607 --> 00:03:40,240 proceed on with five minutes . Uh huh . 80 00:03:41,240 --> 00:03:44,430 Questions . And we're gonna have a 81 00:03:44,430 --> 00:03:47,680 second round of questions , too . This 82 00:03:47,680 --> 00:03:50,440 is a complex issue but ultimately boils 83 00:03:50,440 --> 00:03:53,130 down to risk . And I don't think it's a 84 00:03:53,130 --> 00:03:55,490 good idea to place at risk the GPS 85 00:03:55,490 --> 00:03:57,750 signals that enable our national and 86 00:03:57,760 --> 00:04:00,460 economic security for the benefit of 87 00:04:00,460 --> 00:04:03,090 one company and its investors . 88 00:04:04,230 --> 00:04:07,100 After extensive testing and analysis , 89 00:04:07,110 --> 00:04:10,160 experts at almost every federal agency 90 00:04:10,640 --> 00:04:13,250 tell us that Leg Oddo's plan will 91 00:04:13,260 --> 00:04:16,380 interfere with our GPS systems . 92 00:04:18,040 --> 00:04:19,707 This was certainly affect our 93 00:04:19,707 --> 00:04:22,590 warfighters who rely on GPS navigation , 94 00:04:22,590 --> 00:04:26,120 logistics and , uh , precision guidance 95 00:04:26,120 --> 00:04:28,780 munitions , whether in training or in 96 00:04:28,780 --> 00:04:31,400 the on the battlefield , but that this 97 00:04:31,400 --> 00:04:33,900 is about much more than risking our 98 00:04:33,900 --> 00:04:36,011 military readiness and capabilities . 99 00:04:36,170 --> 00:04:38,590 Interfering with GPS will hurt the 100 00:04:38,590 --> 00:04:41,050 entire American economy . We'll have 101 00:04:41,050 --> 00:04:43,330 some good witnesses . Talk about that . 102 00:04:43,330 --> 00:04:46,320 Elaborate on that . Our farmers rely on 103 00:04:46,320 --> 00:04:48,790 GPS to harvest . The crops are truckers 104 00:04:48,790 --> 00:04:50,970 and airlines rely on GPS to move 105 00:04:51,130 --> 00:04:53,730 supplies , and people are banks rely on 106 00:04:53,730 --> 00:04:56,440 GPS timing function . Every American 107 00:04:56,450 --> 00:04:59,690 uses GPS every day in it . The end of 108 00:04:59,690 --> 00:05:02,230 the day . Economic security is national 109 00:05:02,240 --> 00:05:05,610 security now . We all agree 110 00:05:06,140 --> 00:05:09,070 that we need to compete with China in 111 00:05:09,070 --> 00:05:11,360 the five G development . No one is 112 00:05:11,360 --> 00:05:13,193 disputing that fact . We've been 113 00:05:13,193 --> 00:05:15,304 working on that for months , with the 114 00:05:15,304 --> 00:05:17,416 Department of Defense and the telecom 115 00:05:17,416 --> 00:05:19,471 industry cooperating with each other 116 00:05:19,471 --> 00:05:21,471 and accomplishing that very thing . 117 00:05:21,471 --> 00:05:25,360 That's not the issue . The 118 00:05:25,360 --> 00:05:29,320 Gardas leg . Oddo's proposal is not 119 00:05:29,320 --> 00:05:31,660 tied to that work whatsoever . Now 120 00:05:31,660 --> 00:05:33,716 we're talking about the G five , the 121 00:05:33,716 --> 00:05:37,110 competition with China . They've tried 122 00:05:37,110 --> 00:05:40,400 to conflate this their proposal with 123 00:05:40,410 --> 00:05:42,750 other mid band spectrum sharing 124 00:05:42,750 --> 00:05:44,830 discussions . But in reality , these 125 00:05:44,830 --> 00:05:47,530 two issues are completely separate 126 00:05:47,670 --> 00:05:50,760 stability separate from each other . In 127 00:05:50,760 --> 00:05:53,770 answering the argument that GPS would 128 00:05:53,770 --> 00:05:57,750 be disruptive , the FCC says the God 129 00:05:57,750 --> 00:06:00,450 O will be forced to pay for any 130 00:06:00,450 --> 00:06:03,990 disruptions . It's it's service caused 131 00:06:04,000 --> 00:06:07,620 to GPS now , the reality is that the 132 00:06:07,620 --> 00:06:10,660 FCC order only requires the gado to 133 00:06:10,930 --> 00:06:13,470 replace government owned devices that 134 00:06:13,470 --> 00:06:15,480 doesn't accomplish if it if it were 135 00:06:15,490 --> 00:06:17,700 doable . Ultimately , the burden of 136 00:06:17,840 --> 00:06:20,380 mitigating arm and interference will be 137 00:06:20,380 --> 00:06:22,930 placed on the Department of Defense and 138 00:06:22,930 --> 00:06:25,710 American taxpayers would end up Aziz . 139 00:06:25,740 --> 00:06:27,796 Normally , is the case having to pay 140 00:06:27,796 --> 00:06:29,930 for it ? A few powerful people made a 141 00:06:29,930 --> 00:06:32,540 hasty decision over the weekend in the 142 00:06:32,540 --> 00:06:34,762 middle of the national crisis , against 143 00:06:34,762 --> 00:06:37,120 the judgment of every other agency 144 00:06:37,120 --> 00:06:39,050 involved and without 145 00:06:42,040 --> 00:06:44,830 clue ing the president in on any of 146 00:06:44,830 --> 00:06:46,886 this and I've had conversations with 147 00:06:46,886 --> 00:06:48,886 the recognition Syria . That's best 148 00:06:48,886 --> 00:06:52,270 case . The FCC may not be in this 149 00:06:52,270 --> 00:06:54,214 committee's jurisdiction , but the 150 00:06:54,214 --> 00:06:56,960 effects of his decision you really are . 151 00:06:56,960 --> 00:06:59,127 And I think we all understand that . I 152 00:06:59,127 --> 00:07:01,880 hope our witnesses we'll speak to the 153 00:07:01,880 --> 00:07:04,100 enormous risk this decision has for 154 00:07:04,100 --> 00:07:06,690 everyone who relies on GPS in America . 155 00:07:06,870 --> 00:07:09,680 With the technical and the an important 156 00:07:09,680 --> 00:07:11,670 nature of this topic , we would 157 00:07:11,740 --> 00:07:13,940 structure this hearing with a 158 00:07:14,140 --> 00:07:16,410 consolidated opening statement from the 159 00:07:16,420 --> 00:07:18,800 three Department of Defense witnesses , 160 00:07:18,800 --> 00:07:21,670 followed by the fourth witness . This 161 00:07:21,670 --> 00:07:23,726 will allow a detailed explanation of 162 00:07:23,726 --> 00:07:26,170 the national security amplifications of 163 00:07:26,530 --> 00:07:29,610 the FCC's decision and what steps the 164 00:07:29,610 --> 00:07:31,777 military will need to take to mitigate 165 00:07:31,777 --> 00:07:33,666 these effects . The Department of 166 00:07:33,666 --> 00:07:35,770 Events has provided materials to 167 00:07:35,770 --> 00:07:38,000 accompany their statement that are 168 00:07:38,000 --> 00:07:39,833 available in front of you and on 169 00:07:39,833 --> 00:07:42,890 display for the public view . Now this 170 00:07:42,890 --> 00:07:44,890 is this is very significant because 171 00:07:44,890 --> 00:07:46,834 some people are familiar with this 172 00:07:46,834 --> 00:07:48,860 organization and some are not . But 173 00:07:48,860 --> 00:07:51,370 those who are know that this is where 174 00:07:51,460 --> 00:07:55,330 all of the defense people are . I 175 00:07:55,330 --> 00:07:57,500 plan to submit for the record a letter 176 00:07:57,500 --> 00:07:59,740 I received from the National Defense 177 00:07:59,750 --> 00:08:02,410 Industrial Association , which is made 178 00:08:02,410 --> 00:08:05,530 up of 1700 businesses , 179 00:08:05,540 --> 00:08:09,080 70,000 individual members stating their 180 00:08:09,080 --> 00:08:11,750 strong opposition to leg Oddo's 181 00:08:11,750 --> 00:08:14,350 proposal , along with a list of 71 182 00:08:14,350 --> 00:08:17,250 companies and associations that are 183 00:08:17,250 --> 00:08:20,060 opposed as well there and all that . 184 00:08:20,060 --> 00:08:23,070 Also , the FCC was fully aware of this . 185 00:08:23,280 --> 00:08:25,224 They received the letter from this 186 00:08:25,224 --> 00:08:27,240 organization a week before their 187 00:08:27,240 --> 00:08:31,020 weekend vote , so you must 188 00:08:31,020 --> 00:08:33,076 believe that it couldn't get worse . 189 00:08:33,076 --> 00:08:35,930 But it But it is The God O took over a 190 00:08:35,940 --> 00:08:39,860 bankrupt company in 2015 and has been 191 00:08:39,860 --> 00:08:42,370 trying to obtain FCC licensing ever 192 00:08:42,370 --> 00:08:44,370 since . They waited until the whole 193 00:08:44,370 --> 00:08:48,150 world was distracted by the 194 00:08:48,160 --> 00:08:51,710 the virus and what everyone is looking 195 00:08:51,720 --> 00:08:54,830 the other way and unannounced to the 196 00:08:54,830 --> 00:08:56,274 public , wasn't announced 197 00:08:58,740 --> 00:09:02,700 in total secrecy on a weekend past 198 00:09:02,700 --> 00:09:04,922 the most controversial licensing bill . 199 00:09:04,922 --> 00:09:07,540 I think in the issue of the FCC , and I 200 00:09:07,540 --> 00:09:09,429 say this because a federal agency 201 00:09:10,040 --> 00:09:12,740 opposition was unanimous , you never 202 00:09:12,740 --> 00:09:15,830 see that we had all organizations , all 203 00:09:15,840 --> 00:09:18,860 federal agencies opposing this , not 204 00:09:18,860 --> 00:09:21,082 just the military but all of government 205 00:09:21,082 --> 00:09:23,249 and the private sector , including the 206 00:09:23,249 --> 00:09:25,471 airlines that farmers , that truckers , 207 00:09:25,471 --> 00:09:27,638 the maritime manufacturers opposed the 208 00:09:27,638 --> 00:09:30,850 licensing and the FCC knew it . 209 00:09:31,680 --> 00:09:35,040 And hence we had the weekend Russian 210 00:09:35,050 --> 00:09:37,860 vote surgery . 211 00:09:39,240 --> 00:09:41,462 Well , thank you , Mr Chairman . I also 212 00:09:41,462 --> 00:09:43,573 want to thank the witnesses preparing 213 00:09:43,573 --> 00:09:45,684 here today . This is a critical issue 214 00:09:45,684 --> 00:09:45,510 for the Defense Department and our 215 00:09:45,510 --> 00:09:47,510 nation , and it's important that we 216 00:09:47,510 --> 00:09:49,510 learn from these witnesses . We are 217 00:09:49,510 --> 00:09:52,480 holding this hearing in unusual 218 00:09:52,480 --> 00:09:54,647 circumstances . There has been a great 219 00:09:54,647 --> 00:09:56,869 deal discussion about whether we should 220 00:09:56,869 --> 00:09:58,924 be here in person with risk not only 221 00:09:58,924 --> 00:10:00,869 two centres but to all the support 222 00:10:00,869 --> 00:10:02,813 personnel were needed to keep this 223 00:10:02,813 --> 00:10:05,036 institution running . In addition , the 224 00:10:05,036 --> 00:10:07,091 compelling point is made that if the 225 00:10:07,091 --> 00:10:09,258 Senate is in session , its predominant 226 00:10:09,258 --> 00:10:11,536 focus should be combating the pandemic . 227 00:10:11,536 --> 00:10:13,647 But this is a hearing I think that is 228 00:10:13,647 --> 00:10:15,424 essential . I want to come in . 229 00:10:15,424 --> 00:10:17,536 Chairman in hall for establishing and 230 00:10:17,536 --> 00:10:19,758 holding a weekly call so that committee 231 00:10:19,758 --> 00:10:21,647 members can be briefed by Defense 232 00:10:21,647 --> 00:10:23,813 Department officials and ask questions 233 00:10:23,813 --> 00:10:25,647 regarding the Corona virus . The 234 00:10:25,647 --> 00:10:27,758 chairman ensured that we were able to 235 00:10:27,758 --> 00:10:29,758 conduct oversight even in difficult 236 00:10:29,758 --> 00:10:31,924 circumstances . But phone calls cannot 237 00:10:31,924 --> 00:10:34,091 replace a hearing . So when we planned 238 00:10:34,091 --> 00:10:36,313 future hearings as consideration of the 239 00:10:36,313 --> 00:10:38,424 Andrew annual defense bill allows , I 240 00:10:38,424 --> 00:10:40,202 would certainly request that we 241 00:10:40,202 --> 00:10:42,710 consider these hearings in the context 242 00:10:42,710 --> 00:10:44,690 of both physical and virtual 243 00:10:44,690 --> 00:10:46,700 participation . And we also should 244 00:10:46,700 --> 00:10:49,330 focus on the effects of the pandemic on 245 00:10:49,330 --> 00:10:51,590 the department defense and on threats 246 00:10:51,590 --> 00:10:54,440 that face the nation . Let me now turn 247 00:10:54,450 --> 00:10:56,506 to today's hearing about decision by 248 00:10:56,506 --> 00:10:58,617 the Federal Communications Question , 249 00:10:58,617 --> 00:11:00,783 or FCC , to permit the company llegado 250 00:11:00,783 --> 00:11:02,950 off Wait , a land based network that , 251 00:11:02,950 --> 00:11:05,061 by its own admission , will interfere 252 00:11:05,061 --> 00:11:07,172 with the GPS systems as well as those 253 00:11:07,172 --> 00:11:09,117 and other federal agencies and the 254 00:11:09,117 --> 00:11:11,400 civilian sector . Over 10 years ago , 255 00:11:11,410 --> 00:11:13,521 Llegado is predecessor . LIGHTSQUARED 256 00:11:13,521 --> 00:11:15,360 applied to the FCC to permit a 257 00:11:15,360 --> 00:11:17,920 satellite based for GI system with a 258 00:11:17,920 --> 00:11:20,090 secondary land based network in areas 259 00:11:20,090 --> 00:11:22,257 where satellite reception could not be 260 00:11:22,257 --> 00:11:24,470 obtained . The application was denied 261 00:11:24,480 --> 00:11:26,536 because of interference with the GPS 262 00:11:26,536 --> 00:11:28,620 system , and Lightsquared was forced 263 00:11:28,620 --> 00:11:31,680 into bankruptcy . Lightsquared and its 264 00:11:31,680 --> 00:11:34,160 Spectrum licence was then brought in 265 00:11:34,160 --> 00:11:36,690 bankruptcy and reorganized his llegado 266 00:11:37,240 --> 00:11:40,390 in 2016 . Llegado Saprissa bitter 267 00:11:40,400 --> 00:11:42,550 amended licensing application of the 268 00:11:42,550 --> 00:11:45,060 FCC to build a new ground tower Onley 269 00:11:45,060 --> 00:11:47,480 Transportation system llegado switched 270 00:11:47,480 --> 00:11:50,260 to a system of closely spaced powerful 271 00:11:50,260 --> 00:11:52,170 ground tower signals threatens to 272 00:11:52,170 --> 00:11:55,330 interfere with GPS despite jeopardizing 273 00:11:55,330 --> 00:11:57,552 GPS and ignoring the scientific view of 274 00:11:57,552 --> 00:12:00,000 many federal agencies , the aviation 275 00:12:00,000 --> 00:12:02,720 industry and GPS dependent companies . 276 00:12:03,020 --> 00:12:05,410 The FCC granted the license without a 277 00:12:05,410 --> 00:12:07,470 public rulemaking to change for a 278 00:12:07,470 --> 00:12:09,637 satellite based network toe , one that 279 00:12:09,637 --> 00:12:12,000 is totally land based . I believe the 280 00:12:12,000 --> 00:12:14,056 FCC's decision to grant a licence is 281 00:12:14,056 --> 00:12:16,630 problematic for several reasons . First , 282 00:12:16,630 --> 00:12:18,574 the Commerce Department's National 283 00:12:18,574 --> 00:12:20,519 Telecommunications and Information 284 00:12:20,519 --> 00:12:22,741 Administration . He is supposed to form 285 00:12:22,741 --> 00:12:24,810 a consensus among executive branch 286 00:12:24,820 --> 00:12:26,487 stakeholders like the Defense 287 00:12:26,487 --> 00:12:28,420 Department and FCC Independent 288 00:12:28,420 --> 00:12:30,310 Commission . In this case , the 289 00:12:30,310 --> 00:12:32,421 department events and other executive 290 00:12:32,421 --> 00:12:34,199 departments like the department 291 00:12:34,199 --> 00:12:35,921 Transportation objected to the 292 00:12:35,921 --> 00:12:38,143 application because of the interference 293 00:12:38,143 --> 00:12:40,310 with the GPS signal , Yet no consensus 294 00:12:40,310 --> 00:12:42,254 was reached before the license was 295 00:12:42,254 --> 00:12:44,920 granted . Second , the FCC license does 296 00:12:44,920 --> 00:12:47,142 not recognize the complicated nature of 297 00:12:47,142 --> 00:12:48,976 the Defense Department's weapons 298 00:12:48,976 --> 00:12:50,976 systems . Llegado maintains that Do 299 00:12:50,976 --> 00:12:54,130 deacon simply replace it affected GPS 300 00:12:54,130 --> 00:12:56,040 cars . But there are hundreds of 301 00:12:56,040 --> 00:12:58,540 thousands of GPS chips embedded in duty 302 00:12:58,540 --> 00:13:01,690 weapon systems , and each chip is not 303 00:13:01,690 --> 00:13:04,450 only tuned to GPS but invented with 304 00:13:04,460 --> 00:13:06,560 interconnected electron ICS , each 305 00:13:06,610 --> 00:13:09,760 tuned to each other . Replacing a GPS 306 00:13:09,760 --> 00:13:12,390 card will also impact other features of 307 00:13:12,390 --> 00:13:14,400 a weapon system . How many weapons 308 00:13:14,400 --> 00:13:16,830 systems are affected , how they could 309 00:13:16,830 --> 00:13:19,052 be fixed , and the time and cost of the 310 00:13:19,052 --> 00:13:21,108 remedy is unknowable at this point . 311 00:13:21,190 --> 00:13:23,190 But the process will be lengthy and 312 00:13:23,190 --> 00:13:25,890 expensive for a sense of what the FCC's 313 00:13:25,890 --> 00:13:27,946 decision could mean . We have a real 314 00:13:27,946 --> 00:13:31,620 life example . In 1992 an FCC spectrum 315 00:13:31,620 --> 00:13:33,920 repurpose ING decision eliminated the B 316 00:13:33,920 --> 00:13:36,900 two radar band for D . O D . Moving 317 00:13:36,900 --> 00:13:39,700 that radar to a new van took 30 years 318 00:13:39,810 --> 00:13:42,330 and $3 billion use depo cycle 319 00:13:42,330 --> 00:13:44,497 rescheduling and operational demands . 320 00:13:45,040 --> 00:13:47,090 While the FCC order states that the 321 00:13:47,100 --> 00:13:49,570 onus is on llegado to fix problems in 322 00:13:49,570 --> 00:13:51,850 reality , the burden is actually on the 323 00:13:51,850 --> 00:13:53,683 Defense Department to find which 324 00:13:53,683 --> 00:13:55,630 weapons systems are affected , how 325 00:13:55,630 --> 00:13:57,720 severe the impacts are and then 326 00:13:57,720 --> 00:13:59,664 negotiate with llegado to get them 327 00:13:59,664 --> 00:14:02,090 fixed . Clearly , such a process will 328 00:14:02,090 --> 00:14:04,510 compromise military readiness . The 329 00:14:04,510 --> 00:14:06,677 Defense Department is working on a new 330 00:14:06,677 --> 00:14:08,621 state of hardened GPS chips called 331 00:14:08,621 --> 00:14:10,788 military grade user equipment , or M G 332 00:14:10,788 --> 00:14:13,010 U E , which are jammed resistant to the 333 00:14:13,010 --> 00:14:15,580 power levels of llegado towers . How 334 00:14:15,580 --> 00:14:17,358 are these chip sets will not be 335 00:14:17,358 --> 00:14:19,524 installed in our weapons systems until 336 00:14:19,524 --> 00:14:21,580 the 20 thirties . The best course of 337 00:14:21,580 --> 00:14:23,691 action for national security would be 338 00:14:23,691 --> 00:14:25,691 to stay the license application and 339 00:14:25,691 --> 00:14:27,858 periodically review it until such time 340 00:14:27,858 --> 00:14:30,330 as the new chip sets can be installed 341 00:14:30,330 --> 00:14:32,900 in critical weapons systems . Finally , 342 00:14:32,910 --> 00:14:34,966 I've only discussed the problems the 343 00:14:34,966 --> 00:14:36,854 Defense Department is facing as a 344 00:14:36,854 --> 00:14:39,077 result of the FCC decision . I have not 345 00:14:39,077 --> 00:14:41,188 discussed the myriad of problems that 346 00:14:41,188 --> 00:14:43,410 will be faced by literally everyone who 347 00:14:43,410 --> 00:14:45,466 uses GPS . I do not believe that the 348 00:14:45,466 --> 00:14:47,688 FCC's decision to grant this license is 349 00:14:47,688 --> 00:14:49,743 in the best interest of our national 350 00:14:49,743 --> 00:14:51,966 security or our nation . I look forward 351 00:14:51,966 --> 00:14:54,077 to today's discussion about the issue 352 00:14:54,077 --> 00:14:56,021 again . Thank the witnesses and my 353 00:14:56,021 --> 00:14:55,990 colleagues for appearing at this 354 00:14:55,990 --> 00:14:58,157 hearing in these unusual and demanding 355 00:14:58,157 --> 00:15:00,490 times . Thank you , Mr Chairman . Think . 356 00:15:00,490 --> 00:15:02,500 Thank you , Senator Reid , I we're 357 00:15:02,500 --> 00:15:05,000 gonna have opening statements by our 358 00:15:05,000 --> 00:15:08,070 witnesses before we dio without 359 00:15:08,080 --> 00:15:11,170 objection . I ask unanimous consent 360 00:15:11,170 --> 00:15:13,059 that we enter into the record the 361 00:15:13,059 --> 00:15:14,781 National Defense Into Industry 362 00:15:14,781 --> 00:15:16,670 Association letter . I've already 363 00:15:16,670 --> 00:15:19,500 referred to that the industry coalition 364 00:15:19,500 --> 00:15:22,260 letter with the 68 signatories that 365 00:15:22,260 --> 00:15:25,130 strongly oppose it . The the 366 00:15:25,610 --> 00:15:28,200 Aerospace and Indust Industries 367 00:15:28,200 --> 00:15:31,000 Association letter on behalf of a 300 368 00:15:31,300 --> 00:15:33,400 leading aerospace and defense 369 00:15:33,400 --> 00:15:36,190 manufacturers suppliers who opposed the 370 00:15:36,190 --> 00:15:39,280 FCC's decision . The Airline Pilots 371 00:15:39,280 --> 00:15:41,760 Association International Letter asking 372 00:15:41,760 --> 00:15:44,250 in the Senate Armed Services Committee 373 00:15:44,450 --> 00:15:46,800 this committee to take action and stay 374 00:15:46,800 --> 00:15:50,130 this FCC ruling and the Transportation 375 00:15:50,130 --> 00:15:52,810 Construction Coalition letter stating 376 00:15:52,820 --> 00:15:56,360 that they oppose the guy does 377 00:15:56,360 --> 00:15:58,416 proposed network . And , of course , 378 00:15:58,416 --> 00:16:00,320 the letter from llegado without 379 00:16:00,320 --> 00:16:02,264 objection to be made a part of the 380 00:16:02,264 --> 00:16:04,153 record was Start with our opening 381 00:16:04,153 --> 00:16:07,950 statements with you , Mr Mr DZ , 382 00:16:08,340 --> 00:16:10,630 you've been a great contributed to 383 00:16:10,630 --> 00:16:12,741 everything that we do around here and 384 00:16:12,741 --> 00:16:14,920 you stand for and we appreciate your 385 00:16:14,920 --> 00:16:16,809 taking the time to be here and to 386 00:16:16,809 --> 00:16:19,031 really getting involved in this issue . 387 00:16:19,520 --> 00:16:22,000 You're recognized . Thank you , Mr 388 00:16:22,000 --> 00:16:24,430 Chairman , Ranking member and members 389 00:16:24,430 --> 00:16:26,652 of the committee . Good afternoon . I'm 390 00:16:26,652 --> 00:16:28,597 Dana D . C . Department of Defense 391 00:16:28,597 --> 00:16:31,520 Chief Information Officer , sir , As 392 00:16:31,520 --> 00:16:33,464 you stated in your opening with me 393 00:16:33,464 --> 00:16:35,870 today on behalf of department or Dr 394 00:16:35,870 --> 00:16:37,703 Griffin , the undersecretary for 395 00:16:37,703 --> 00:16:40,037 research and engineering in General . J . 396 00:16:40,037 --> 00:16:42,290 Raymond , chief of space operations , 397 00:16:42,300 --> 00:16:45,510 United States Space Force . In place of 398 00:16:45,510 --> 00:16:47,732 reading individual opening statements , 399 00:16:48,200 --> 00:16:50,422 we have prepared a short overview where 400 00:16:50,422 --> 00:16:52,422 Dr Griffin will briefly explain the 401 00:16:52,422 --> 00:16:55,260 technical issues associated with FCC's 402 00:16:55,260 --> 00:16:57,980 ruling to allow llegado to repurpose 403 00:16:57,980 --> 00:17:00,750 spectrum . Next General Raymond will 404 00:17:00,750 --> 00:17:02,639 then explain the military mission 405 00:17:02,639 --> 00:17:04,580 impacts of that order on the 406 00:17:04,580 --> 00:17:07,190 department's operations , and I will 407 00:17:07,190 --> 00:17:09,640 briefly cover five G And what actions ? 408 00:17:09,650 --> 00:17:11,817 The D . O . D . Is taking toe leverage 409 00:17:11,817 --> 00:17:13,872 this important technology as well as 410 00:17:13,872 --> 00:17:16,030 cover briefly how we're pursuing 411 00:17:16,170 --> 00:17:19,130 sharing mid band spectrum . Finally , I 412 00:17:19,130 --> 00:17:21,241 have a chart world summarised the key 413 00:17:21,241 --> 00:17:23,241 takeaways . With that , I'd like to 414 00:17:23,241 --> 00:17:25,810 turn to Dr Griffin to begin . Dr . 415 00:17:25,820 --> 00:17:26,820 Griffin , 416 00:17:31,740 --> 00:17:32,740 Thank you . 417 00:17:37,840 --> 00:17:39,930 I'd like to take this chart and 418 00:17:39,930 --> 00:17:42,550 clockwise order . And 419 00:17:43,630 --> 00:17:46,090 first , uh , key off of the point 420 00:17:46,090 --> 00:17:49,820 Senator Reid made , which is that GPS 421 00:17:49,830 --> 00:17:53,230 is , although designed , originally 422 00:17:53,240 --> 00:17:56,620 developed , deployed and sustained by 423 00:17:56,620 --> 00:18:00,600 the d . O D . That GPS is now ah , 424 00:18:00,600 --> 00:18:03,820 public utility . Um , it's service is , 425 00:18:03,820 --> 00:18:06,530 of course , our national security needs . 426 00:18:06,530 --> 00:18:08,940 His General Raymond will address , but 427 00:18:08,940 --> 00:18:10,996 it also services the requirements of 428 00:18:10,996 --> 00:18:13,840 first responders navigating to a 429 00:18:13,840 --> 00:18:17,380 particular address every time using a T 430 00:18:17,380 --> 00:18:20,680 M machine , you are using the GPS 431 00:18:20,690 --> 00:18:23,560 timing signal . You're not asking where 432 00:18:23,560 --> 00:18:25,840 the A t M is . You're using the timing 433 00:18:25,840 --> 00:18:28,007 signal that it is provided in order to 434 00:18:28,007 --> 00:18:31,000 conduct an encrypted transaction . Um , 435 00:18:31,730 --> 00:18:34,170 civil aircraft , military aircraft , 436 00:18:34,440 --> 00:18:37,550 commercial shipping are deployed troops , 437 00:18:38,900 --> 00:18:41,310 credit card swiping machines . All of 438 00:18:41,310 --> 00:18:43,588 these things are in one way or another , 439 00:18:43,588 --> 00:18:46,840 dependent upon GPS . It's forecast to 440 00:18:46,840 --> 00:18:48,840 be 100 and 40 plus $1,000,000,000 441 00:18:48,840 --> 00:18:51,610 industry by 2025 . It's over $100 442 00:18:51,610 --> 00:18:54,860 billion today in economic value , a 443 00:18:54,860 --> 00:18:57,260 Department of Commerce study estimated . 444 00:18:57,480 --> 00:19:01,430 And it cited in my testimony $1.4 445 00:19:01,430 --> 00:19:04,300 trillion of economic benefit generated 446 00:19:04,300 --> 00:19:07,210 by GPS since the system was first 447 00:19:07,210 --> 00:19:10,550 deployed . So that's what's at risk . 448 00:19:12,090 --> 00:19:15,100 How is it a risk if you go to the upper 449 00:19:15,100 --> 00:19:17,220 right quadrant ? You can see on your 450 00:19:17,220 --> 00:19:20,310 chart that the fundamental aspect of 451 00:19:20,320 --> 00:19:22,780 the GPS , infrastructure , space and 452 00:19:22,780 --> 00:19:25,760 ground the entire GPS infrastructure 453 00:19:26,140 --> 00:19:29,100 was designed under the assumption that 454 00:19:29,100 --> 00:19:32,140 GPS would radio radio navigation 455 00:19:32,140 --> 00:19:35,090 systems would be placed in a very quiet 456 00:19:35,090 --> 00:19:38,130 band of the radio spectrum that ground 457 00:19:38,130 --> 00:19:40,680 based transmitters would not be allowed 458 00:19:41,440 --> 00:19:44,360 in that spectrum because they drown out 459 00:19:44,600 --> 00:19:46,656 the very weak signals that come from 460 00:19:46,656 --> 00:19:50,030 satellites . Um , at this point , with 461 00:19:50,030 --> 00:19:52,200 the FCC's decision , the goal posts 462 00:19:52,200 --> 00:19:54,690 have been moved . Um , now 463 00:19:55,640 --> 00:19:58,470 receivers meant to detect the extremely 464 00:19:58,470 --> 00:20:00,710 weak signals from satellites have to 465 00:20:00,710 --> 00:20:04,190 cope with very loud signals in the band 466 00:20:04,190 --> 00:20:07,590 next door . The practical effect of 467 00:20:07,590 --> 00:20:10,890 this , irrespective of who pays for the 468 00:20:10,890 --> 00:20:13,112 changes in equipment that would have to 469 00:20:13,112 --> 00:20:15,510 occur . And again , I'll make Senator 470 00:20:15,510 --> 00:20:19,260 Reid's point for emphasis that the 471 00:20:19,810 --> 00:20:23,170 llegado proposal proposes only to fix 472 00:20:23,170 --> 00:20:26,010 federal receivers , whereas by far the 473 00:20:26,010 --> 00:20:29,790 majority of use is in various 474 00:20:29,790 --> 00:20:31,790 aspects of the civil and commercial 475 00:20:31,790 --> 00:20:34,930 sector . Um , the replacement of that 476 00:20:34,930 --> 00:20:37,130 equipment , regardless of who pays for 477 00:20:37,130 --> 00:20:40,120 it , provides a marketing niche 478 00:20:40,130 --> 00:20:43,280 opportunity . Ah , refreshing of 479 00:20:43,280 --> 00:20:45,920 equipment that will be available to our 480 00:20:45,920 --> 00:20:48,580 competitors . So rather than the 481 00:20:48,580 --> 00:20:51,630 installed base of US equipment holding 482 00:20:51,630 --> 00:20:54,550 sway , our competitors who have their 483 00:20:54,560 --> 00:20:58,010 own global navigation satellite systems 484 00:20:58,410 --> 00:21:00,800 will be arguing . Why , since the 485 00:21:00,800 --> 00:21:02,700 United States has damaged its own 486 00:21:02,700 --> 00:21:04,644 system , why shouldn't we buy from 487 00:21:04,644 --> 00:21:07,330 China or Russia ? That's not an 488 00:21:07,330 --> 00:21:09,820 argument I wanna have . Moreover , 489 00:21:09,820 --> 00:21:13,120 today , GPS is the world standard for 490 00:21:13,120 --> 00:21:16,460 satellite navigation . If we damage our 491 00:21:16,470 --> 00:21:18,570 own world standard earned through 492 00:21:18,570 --> 00:21:20,760 decades of investment and hard work . 493 00:21:22,170 --> 00:21:24,150 We should only expect that users 494 00:21:24,150 --> 00:21:26,030 worldwide will will find other 495 00:21:26,030 --> 00:21:27,980 standards that will not be to our 496 00:21:27,980 --> 00:21:31,750 benefit . It's very difficult to give 497 00:21:31,750 --> 00:21:34,550 you an accurate technical comparison of 498 00:21:34,560 --> 00:21:37,400 just how loud the llegado signal is in 499 00:21:37,400 --> 00:21:40,300 comparison to GPS . But on the lower 500 00:21:40,300 --> 00:21:44,020 right , I've tried . So 501 00:21:44,350 --> 00:21:46,690 the decibel scale is what we use to 502 00:21:46,690 --> 00:21:49,120 measure loudness , if you will , 503 00:21:49,120 --> 00:21:51,950 whether radio noise or acoustic noise . 504 00:21:52,700 --> 00:21:56,420 So the quietest possible sound that can 505 00:21:56,420 --> 00:21:58,253 be heard might be represented by 506 00:21:58,253 --> 00:22:01,490 rustling leaves , which are quoted at 0 507 00:22:01,490 --> 00:22:04,620 to 10 db in the literature . On the 508 00:22:04,620 --> 00:22:07,730 other hand , a jet taking off , um , 509 00:22:08,030 --> 00:22:11,340 will create a sound 140 to 150 510 00:22:11,340 --> 00:22:13,340 decibels . If you're standing right 511 00:22:13,340 --> 00:22:15,507 next to it , it will blow out your ear 512 00:22:15,507 --> 00:22:19,230 drums . So if zero decibels is 513 00:22:19,230 --> 00:22:22,550 barely audible and 140 or 50 decibels 514 00:22:22,560 --> 00:22:25,560 is a jet take off , then what we're 515 00:22:25,560 --> 00:22:28,110 trying to do with GPS is to hear the 516 00:22:28,110 --> 00:22:30,600 sound of leaves rustling through the 517 00:22:30,600 --> 00:22:34,590 noise of ah 100 jets taking off all at 518 00:22:34,590 --> 00:22:37,770 once . And that is a comparison which 519 00:22:37,770 --> 00:22:40,250 is actually favorable to Lo Gatto . I 520 00:22:40,250 --> 00:22:42,980 couldn't put more than 100 jets on my 521 00:22:42,980 --> 00:22:46,350 chart . That's what we're trying to do 522 00:22:46,350 --> 00:22:49,580 here . Finally , in the 523 00:22:50,720 --> 00:22:52,942 lower left quadrant of the chart moving 524 00:22:52,942 --> 00:22:55,800 clockwise , there are a number of myths 525 00:22:56,340 --> 00:22:58,800 that have been promulgated in the media 526 00:22:58,920 --> 00:23:01,730 about the llegado proposal . I chose 527 00:23:01,730 --> 00:23:04,970 three of them to debunk , the first of 528 00:23:04,970 --> 00:23:07,380 which is the claim that llegado a 529 00:23:07,380 --> 00:23:09,491 recent claim is critical to the build 530 00:23:09,491 --> 00:23:12,690 out of us five G . In fact , my number 531 00:23:12,690 --> 00:23:14,690 here is not quite right . In fact , 532 00:23:14,690 --> 00:23:17,780 llegado has about 3.5% 533 00:23:18,340 --> 00:23:21,150 of the sub six gigahertz spectrum in 534 00:23:21,150 --> 00:23:23,950 use today . If we count that portion of 535 00:23:23,950 --> 00:23:26,420 the spectrum allocated to the Citizens 536 00:23:26,420 --> 00:23:28,690 Broadband radio service , CBR S 537 00:23:30,450 --> 00:23:34,410 A five G is about capacity , Layton , 538 00:23:34,410 --> 00:23:38,070 See and scale . The llegado proposal 539 00:23:38,070 --> 00:23:39,959 has absolutely nothing to do with 540 00:23:39,959 --> 00:23:41,903 Leighton . See and scale . And its 541 00:23:41,903 --> 00:23:44,850 capacity is on the order of 3.5% 542 00:23:45,710 --> 00:23:48,760 of the total spectrum capacity . Lo 543 00:23:48,760 --> 00:23:52,120 Gatto's existence , plus or minus makes 544 00:23:52,130 --> 00:23:56,090 absolutely no no difference to the 545 00:23:56,090 --> 00:23:59,420 involvement of us in the five G so 546 00:23:59,420 --> 00:24:03,160 called five g race . Second , the 547 00:24:03,160 --> 00:24:04,882 myth is that the Department of 548 00:24:04,882 --> 00:24:06,771 Transportation testing , which is 549 00:24:06,771 --> 00:24:09,360 quoted in in our I think all of our 550 00:24:09,600 --> 00:24:12,110 testimonies myth is that that testing 551 00:24:12,110 --> 00:24:14,110 was flawed , that it did not assess 552 00:24:14,110 --> 00:24:15,943 receiver performance against the 553 00:24:15,943 --> 00:24:18,410 llegado transmitter . That's true , but 554 00:24:18,410 --> 00:24:21,100 that's not the right test . The right 555 00:24:21,100 --> 00:24:23,680 test is the test to determine whether 556 00:24:23,680 --> 00:24:26,360 the band for satellite navigation has 557 00:24:26,360 --> 00:24:28,580 been protected , and the D . O . D . 558 00:24:28,590 --> 00:24:32,370 The D . O T testing addressed 559 00:24:32,380 --> 00:24:35,310 protection of the assigned GPS ban in 560 00:24:35,310 --> 00:24:37,430 the most thorough manner I could have 561 00:24:37,430 --> 00:24:39,690 imagined . We'll talk more about that 562 00:24:39,690 --> 00:24:42,520 later , but it protects the entire band 563 00:24:42,530 --> 00:24:44,586 and not just one transmitter and one 564 00:24:44,586 --> 00:24:46,680 receiver in an artificial scenario . 565 00:24:48,040 --> 00:24:51,030 1/3 myth that has been bandied about is 566 00:24:51,030 --> 00:24:53,030 that llegado stations are like a 10 567 00:24:53,030 --> 00:24:55,252 watt light bulb . How can they possibly 568 00:24:55,252 --> 00:24:58,810 interfere with GPS ? Well , in case 569 00:24:59,400 --> 00:25:02,980 my jet noise analogy didn't get across , 570 00:25:04,000 --> 00:25:06,167 let me talk to you about something for 571 00:25:06,167 --> 00:25:08,222 which I used to be responsible . The 572 00:25:08,222 --> 00:25:10,222 Hubble Space Telescope , the Hubble 573 00:25:10,222 --> 00:25:12,111 Space Telescope , was designed to 574 00:25:12,111 --> 00:25:16,100 detect extraordinarily dim objects so 575 00:25:16,100 --> 00:25:19,410 dim that on my decibel scale , a 10 576 00:25:19,410 --> 00:25:22,590 watt bulb is 350 decibels brighter . 577 00:25:23,760 --> 00:25:26,150 If you shined a 10 watt bulb down the 578 00:25:26,150 --> 00:25:28,317 barrel of the Hubble Space Telescope , 579 00:25:28,317 --> 00:25:30,261 it would see nothing . It would be 580 00:25:30,261 --> 00:25:32,680 completely blinded . That's exactly the 581 00:25:32,680 --> 00:25:34,920 situation that we have with the GPS 582 00:25:34,920 --> 00:25:37,510 receiver trying to listen to GPS 583 00:25:37,510 --> 00:25:40,550 signals that are 100 and 70 decibels 584 00:25:40,550 --> 00:25:43,850 weaker than this 10 watt bulb . 585 00:25:45,740 --> 00:25:47,890 That's not a game that we can win in 586 00:25:47,890 --> 00:25:50,620 GPS . We will have to redesign and 587 00:25:50,620 --> 00:25:53,200 redeploy equipment and and the cost 588 00:25:53,200 --> 00:25:55,480 will be hundreds of billions of dollars 589 00:25:55,630 --> 00:25:58,430 and decades of deployment time . Thank 590 00:25:58,430 --> 00:26:02,200 you , German 591 00:26:02,200 --> 00:26:04,380 off ranking member read and members of 592 00:26:04,380 --> 00:26:06,324 the committee . It's a pleasure to 593 00:26:06,324 --> 00:26:08,269 speak before you today on him on a 594 00:26:08,269 --> 00:26:10,269 matter of national importance . The 595 00:26:10,269 --> 00:26:12,436 protection of the GPS signal for use , 596 00:26:12,436 --> 00:26:14,960 fire , joint and coalition forces and 597 00:26:14,970 --> 00:26:17,330 the whole nation as both the chief of 598 00:26:17,330 --> 00:26:19,497 space operations for the United States 599 00:26:19,497 --> 00:26:21,719 Space Force and is the commander of the 600 00:26:21,719 --> 00:26:23,830 United States Space Command . I other 601 00:26:23,830 --> 00:26:25,997 responsibility to the secretary of the 602 00:26:25,997 --> 00:26:28,219 Air Force for organized in training and 603 00:26:28,219 --> 00:26:30,441 equipping forces to provide GPS for the 604 00:26:30,441 --> 00:26:32,552 world and to the secretary of defense 605 00:26:32,552 --> 00:26:34,330 for operating , integrating and 606 00:26:34,330 --> 00:26:37,390 protecting GPS for our nation . I am 607 00:26:37,390 --> 00:26:39,500 proud to represent the airman , 608 00:26:39,510 --> 00:26:41,677 soldiers , sailors , Marines and space 609 00:26:41,677 --> 00:26:43,454 professionals who conduct these 610 00:26:43,454 --> 00:26:46,150 missions with Seth such expertise . The 611 00:26:46,150 --> 00:26:48,261 very first GPS satellite was launched 612 00:26:48,261 --> 00:26:51,240 in 1978 and it was integrated into 613 00:26:51,240 --> 00:26:53,462 warfare for the first time in Operation 614 00:26:53,462 --> 00:26:55,690 Desert Storm . We all remember in 1990 615 00:26:55,690 --> 00:26:58,200 early nineties 1991 the left hook that 616 00:26:58,200 --> 00:27:00,422 was enabled by a GPS constellation that 617 00:27:00,422 --> 00:27:02,644 wasn't even fully open operating at the 618 00:27:02,644 --> 00:27:04,756 time . How do you How do you navigate 619 00:27:04,756 --> 00:27:06,922 through a featureless terrain at night 620 00:27:06,922 --> 00:27:08,867 in the desert ? You do it with GPS 621 00:27:09,990 --> 00:27:13,120 today . 25 years ago last week it 622 00:27:13,120 --> 00:27:15,287 received it became fully operational , 623 00:27:15,540 --> 00:27:17,207 and today it represents . The 624 00:27:17,207 --> 00:27:19,040 Department of Defense is largest 625 00:27:19,130 --> 00:27:21,370 constellation , where 31 satellites 626 00:27:21,510 --> 00:27:24,070 operating over 12,000 miles above the 627 00:27:24,070 --> 00:27:26,370 Earth's surface , provide precision 628 00:27:26,790 --> 00:27:29,010 purses in positioning navigation and 629 00:27:29,010 --> 00:27:33,010 timing services to 4.5 billion users 630 00:27:33,320 --> 00:27:35,430 in warfighters globally . And it's 631 00:27:35,430 --> 00:27:37,541 three times more accurate than it was 632 00:27:37,541 --> 00:27:39,720 when it was first lost in nine in the 633 00:27:39,730 --> 00:27:42,640 late seventies . However , this 634 00:27:42,640 --> 00:27:46,120 critical capability is irrelevant if 635 00:27:46,120 --> 00:27:48,176 the signals coming off the satellite 636 00:27:48,176 --> 00:27:50,287 can't be processed by the receiver on 637 00:27:50,287 --> 00:27:52,370 the ground . The's signals , after 638 00:27:52,370 --> 00:27:55,800 traveling 12,000 miles from Earth from 639 00:27:55,800 --> 00:27:58,133 space to reach earth , arrive very weak , 640 00:27:58,830 --> 00:28:01,200 less than a millionth of a billionth of 641 00:28:01,200 --> 00:28:03,311 a watt . Hard to get your head around 642 00:28:03,311 --> 00:28:05,650 that small number for receivers to be 643 00:28:05,650 --> 00:28:07,706 able to pick up such faint signals , 644 00:28:07,706 --> 00:28:10,180 these signals have to operate in annoys 645 00:28:10,180 --> 00:28:13,090 pristine environment . And it's in that 646 00:28:13,100 --> 00:28:15,230 part of the spectrum for those that 647 00:28:15,230 --> 00:28:17,470 ride . The Amtrak train had the springs 648 00:28:17,470 --> 00:28:20,100 this last year . Uh , it's the quiet 649 00:28:20,110 --> 00:28:23,570 car . It's where people don't talk . 650 00:28:23,660 --> 00:28:25,827 It's where emitters don't make noise . 651 00:28:25,827 --> 00:28:27,882 Because that signal is so faint it's 652 00:28:27,882 --> 00:28:30,220 recognized globally as his own reserve 653 00:28:30,220 --> 00:28:32,553 for satellite signals coming from space , 654 00:28:32,553 --> 00:28:34,442 not for emitters operating on the 655 00:28:34,442 --> 00:28:36,498 ground approximately a 1,000,000,000 656 00:28:36,498 --> 00:28:38,550 times more powerful than the GPS 657 00:28:38,550 --> 00:28:41,470 received signal . The's grounded meters 658 00:28:41,480 --> 00:28:44,140 will interrupt produced theocracy of or 659 00:28:44,140 --> 00:28:47,490 jam the GPS signal . We must preserve 660 00:28:47,490 --> 00:28:49,500 this spectrum for space to ground 661 00:28:49,500 --> 00:28:51,556 signals . It's the global standard , 662 00:28:51,556 --> 00:28:53,611 and it puts our space capabilities , 663 00:28:53,611 --> 00:28:55,770 which are the gold standard . His 664 00:28:55,770 --> 00:28:58,103 doctor , Griffin , talked about at risk . 665 00:28:58,180 --> 00:29:00,291 As we compete with China and Russia , 666 00:29:00,291 --> 00:29:02,720 we student sheet , we should not cede 667 00:29:02,730 --> 00:29:05,060 our operational advantage because of 668 00:29:05,060 --> 00:29:07,227 the magnitude of the power overmatched 669 00:29:07,227 --> 00:29:09,393 between the ground antenna and the GPS 670 00:29:09,393 --> 00:29:11,504 signal . The mitigation steps the FCC 671 00:29:11,504 --> 00:29:13,616 has required will not retire . All of 672 00:29:13,616 --> 00:29:15,449 the risk . Specifically , the 23 673 00:29:15,449 --> 00:29:17,560 megahertz buffer zone will not made a 674 00:29:17,560 --> 00:29:19,282 great mitigate all the risk of 675 00:29:19,282 --> 00:29:21,449 interference . We have a buffer zone . 676 00:29:21,449 --> 00:29:23,227 Today , it's the Mobile Satcoms 677 00:29:23,227 --> 00:29:25,282 Services band , of which this ground 678 00:29:25,282 --> 00:29:27,393 and admit er is being placed and what 679 00:29:27,393 --> 00:29:30,170 this 23 megahertz buffer zone really 680 00:29:30,170 --> 00:29:32,337 implies . It's about 1/2 of the buffer 681 00:29:32,337 --> 00:29:36,010 zone that we have today . I have spent 682 00:29:36,070 --> 00:29:38,490 most of my military career integrating 683 00:29:38,500 --> 00:29:40,611 GPS and other space capabilities into 684 00:29:40,611 --> 00:29:42,889 everything that we do is a joint force . 685 00:29:42,940 --> 00:29:44,996 And today there's absolutely nothing 686 00:29:44,996 --> 00:29:46,996 that we do is a joint force that it 687 00:29:46,996 --> 00:29:49,218 isn't enabled by space and specifically 688 00:29:49,218 --> 00:29:51,440 GPS . In the department alone , we have 689 00:29:51,440 --> 00:29:53,273 over a 1,000,000 GPS receivers . 690 00:29:53,273 --> 00:29:55,162 They're integrated into our space 691 00:29:55,162 --> 00:29:57,218 launch vehicles . They're integrated 692 00:29:57,218 --> 00:29:59,329 into our aircraft or tanks on ships , 693 00:29:59,329 --> 00:30:01,384 on communication networks and on our 694 00:30:01,384 --> 00:30:03,718 most important weapon system are people . 695 00:30:03,718 --> 00:30:05,650 GPS allows us to shoot , move and 696 00:30:05,650 --> 00:30:08,270 communicate with speed , precision and 697 00:30:08,270 --> 00:30:09,937 over great distances . It has 698 00:30:09,937 --> 00:30:12,290 revolutionised military operations , 699 00:30:12,290 --> 00:30:14,512 and it is employed in every step of the 700 00:30:14,512 --> 00:30:16,679 kill chain to defeat our adversaries . 701 00:30:17,280 --> 00:30:19,391 Some might ask , what's the impact on 702 00:30:19,391 --> 00:30:21,336 the force of the emitters are only 703 00:30:21,336 --> 00:30:21,210 located in the continental United 704 00:30:21,210 --> 00:30:23,520 States ? In my opinion , the impact is 705 00:30:23,520 --> 00:30:26,330 significant and it's unacceptable . Do 706 00:30:26,330 --> 00:30:28,274 the missionaries that operate that 707 00:30:28,274 --> 00:30:30,219 would operate under increased risk 708 00:30:30,219 --> 00:30:32,163 include our most important missing 709 00:30:32,163 --> 00:30:34,580 homeland defense assured GFF . GPS is 710 00:30:34,580 --> 00:30:37,470 critical to homeland defense . It would 711 00:30:37,470 --> 00:30:39,581 impact military could impact military 712 00:30:39,581 --> 00:30:41,692 and commercial long spaceflights . We 713 00:30:41,692 --> 00:30:44,240 use GPS to safely lost those rockets , 714 00:30:44,250 --> 00:30:46,361 and if they go astray , we blow those 715 00:30:46,361 --> 00:30:48,472 rockets up to protect public safety . 716 00:30:48,472 --> 00:30:50,690 We do all of our training most of our 717 00:30:50,690 --> 00:30:53,240 training and building of our readiness 718 00:30:53,490 --> 00:30:55,657 in Conus to be able to fight the fight 719 00:30:55,657 --> 00:30:59,650 overseas and most specifically in our 720 00:30:59,650 --> 00:31:01,761 defense support for civil authorities 721 00:31:01,980 --> 00:31:04,091 like we're doing today with Kobe , or 722 00:31:04,091 --> 00:31:06,780 like with wire wildfire suppression or 723 00:31:06,790 --> 00:31:09,240 hurricane relief or earthquake relief . 724 00:31:09,440 --> 00:31:12,980 Our forces rely on GPS to accomplish 725 00:31:12,980 --> 00:31:15,036 that critical mission . These ground 726 00:31:15,036 --> 00:31:16,869 emitters could have multi motile 727 00:31:16,869 --> 00:31:18,758 impacts the transportation hubs , 728 00:31:18,758 --> 00:31:20,702 airfield , seaports and airports . 729 00:31:20,702 --> 00:31:22,813 Finally , these emitters could impact 730 00:31:22,813 --> 00:31:22,520 overlapping defense , critical 731 00:31:22,520 --> 00:31:24,742 infrastructure and key resource sectors 732 00:31:24,742 --> 00:31:26,798 like the defense , industrial base , 733 00:31:26,798 --> 00:31:28,909 transportation , emergency services , 734 00:31:28,909 --> 00:31:30,964 energy and communications . The best 735 00:31:30,964 --> 00:31:32,909 advice I could give is to strongly 736 00:31:32,909 --> 00:31:35,020 oppose the use of this spectrum for , 737 00:31:35,020 --> 00:31:37,187 uh , that's reserved for space signals 738 00:31:37,187 --> 00:31:39,464 for terrestrial emitters . In doing so , 739 00:31:39,464 --> 00:31:41,576 if we don't , we increase the risk to 740 00:31:41,576 --> 00:31:43,576 our ability to conduct our critical 741 00:31:43,576 --> 00:31:45,631 Homeland defense missions . We erode 742 00:31:45,631 --> 00:31:47,353 the gold standard of our space 743 00:31:47,353 --> 00:31:49,242 capabilities seating advantage to 744 00:31:49,242 --> 00:31:51,353 Russia and China . We set a dangerous 745 00:31:51,353 --> 00:31:53,520 precedent re person repurpose ing this 746 00:31:53,520 --> 00:31:55,631 spectrum reserved for space signals . 747 00:31:55,631 --> 00:31:57,464 And we go against the volumes of 748 00:31:57,464 --> 00:31:59,298 testing that's been done , which 749 00:31:59,298 --> 00:32:01,131 indicate that these ground based 750 00:32:01,131 --> 00:32:03,242 emitters will impact the GPS signal . 751 00:32:03,242 --> 00:32:05,298 I'm not turned it over to Mr D . C . 752 00:32:05,298 --> 00:32:07,760 Have talked about Spectrum to start . 753 00:32:09,440 --> 00:32:12,340 I'm gonna start by saying that duty 754 00:32:12,340 --> 00:32:14,890 fully supports us , Need to be leaders 755 00:32:15,000 --> 00:32:17,270 in five G and there's the right way we 756 00:32:17,270 --> 00:32:19,437 can go about it . And there is a wrong 757 00:32:19,437 --> 00:32:22,080 way . Llegado does not provide a five d 758 00:32:22,080 --> 00:32:24,620 solution . Is not offering a solution 759 00:32:24,630 --> 00:32:27,580 to be a five g leader in America . The 760 00:32:27,580 --> 00:32:29,680 ban in which Llegado operates is not 761 00:32:29,680 --> 00:32:32,350 even part of the FCC five g fast plan , 762 00:32:32,840 --> 00:32:35,062 which is the commission's blueprint for 763 00:32:35,062 --> 00:32:37,350 advancing U . S interest and five G . 764 00:32:38,210 --> 00:32:40,750 The non continuous bands that llegado 765 00:32:40,750 --> 00:32:42,530 could bring the market are both 766 00:32:42,530 --> 00:32:45,490 fragmented and impaired . D o . D 767 00:32:45,490 --> 00:32:47,546 clearly recognizes the huge value of 768 00:32:47,546 --> 00:32:49,950 five G now only for commercial use , 769 00:32:50,340 --> 00:32:52,850 but across the U . S . Military as well 770 00:32:53,840 --> 00:32:56,050 as you'll see up here on this chart , 771 00:32:56,540 --> 00:32:58,484 we're getting ready to undertake a 772 00:32:58,484 --> 00:33:00,707 number of experiments to learn how best 773 00:33:00,707 --> 00:33:03,200 to utilize this technology . If you 774 00:33:03,200 --> 00:33:05,367 start in the far right of this slide , 775 00:33:05,367 --> 00:33:07,367 I point out some of the experiments 776 00:33:07,367 --> 00:33:09,144 were getting ready to work with 777 00:33:09,144 --> 00:33:11,367 augmented virtual reality , distributed 778 00:33:11,367 --> 00:33:13,200 training , smart warehousing and 779 00:33:13,200 --> 00:33:15,580 logistics . And eventually , in the 780 00:33:15,580 --> 00:33:17,802 future phase , we'll even start looking 781 00:33:17,802 --> 00:33:20,270 at how to make smart ports and bases . 782 00:33:21,340 --> 00:33:23,340 Part of this chart I really want to 783 00:33:23,340 --> 00:33:25,673 draw your attention to is in the middle . 784 00:33:25,673 --> 00:33:27,840 We have established a dynamic spectrum 785 00:33:27,840 --> 00:33:30,007 sharing pilot and examining methods to 786 00:33:30,007 --> 00:33:32,900 facilitate sharing between five G and d 787 00:33:32,900 --> 00:33:34,830 o d airborne radars in mid band 788 00:33:34,830 --> 00:33:37,450 spectrum . Let me simplify this for you . 789 00:33:38,220 --> 00:33:40,442 What we need to be able to do in five G 790 00:33:41,030 --> 00:33:43,740 is to ensure that when civilians are 791 00:33:43,740 --> 00:33:45,970 using their car for five G are in their 792 00:33:45,970 --> 00:33:48,520 home . We're using it in a factory or 793 00:33:48,520 --> 00:33:50,409 an individual persons carrying it 794 00:33:50,409 --> 00:33:52,930 around that the work we do in the 795 00:33:52,930 --> 00:33:55,152 operations we running and military will 796 00:33:55,152 --> 00:33:58,510 not interfere and vice versa . So 797 00:33:58,510 --> 00:34:00,732 that's what the five G experimentations 798 00:34:00,732 --> 00:34:02,732 are all about . Will be doing these 799 00:34:02,732 --> 00:34:04,788 experimentations in conjunction with 800 00:34:04,788 --> 00:34:06,732 the National Spectrum Consortium , 801 00:34:06,732 --> 00:34:08,788 which is partnered with government , 802 00:34:08,788 --> 00:34:12,220 industry and academia . Finally , the 803 00:34:12,220 --> 00:34:14,387 last most important thing is one . The 804 00:34:14,387 --> 00:34:17,200 most important areas of five G is what 805 00:34:17,200 --> 00:34:19,790 is called the mid band spectrum . It 806 00:34:19,790 --> 00:34:21,846 was important here for all of you to 807 00:34:21,846 --> 00:34:23,957 understand is how do we need to learn 808 00:34:23,957 --> 00:34:26,123 how to share that spectrum and make it 809 00:34:26,123 --> 00:34:28,610 available for both D . O . D use as 810 00:34:28,610 --> 00:34:32,200 well as commercial use next in front of 811 00:34:32,200 --> 00:34:34,820 you on your very last chart , you have 812 00:34:34,820 --> 00:34:36,931 what I like to call the key takeaways 813 00:34:36,931 --> 00:34:38,987 that there's the one chart today and 814 00:34:38,987 --> 00:34:41,090 just keep with you fully appreciate 815 00:34:41,230 --> 00:34:43,341 what we've all shared with you . It's 816 00:34:43,341 --> 00:34:46,090 this chart . First of all , Mr Chairman , 817 00:34:46,090 --> 00:34:48,460 is you stated . This is about risk . 818 00:34:48,940 --> 00:34:50,829 This is risk to the resource that 819 00:34:50,829 --> 00:34:53,870 America's economic engine and the vital 820 00:34:53,870 --> 00:34:55,926 nature of it for national security . 821 00:34:56,710 --> 00:34:59,930 The repurpose license is a classic case 822 00:34:59,940 --> 00:35:02,950 of bait and switch . FCC and llegado 823 00:35:02,950 --> 00:35:05,300 want to move the goalpost by following 824 00:35:05,300 --> 00:35:08,160 terrestrial transmitters in a space 825 00:35:08,160 --> 00:35:11,150 communications ban . Despite unanimous 826 00:35:11,280 --> 00:35:15,200 on unambiguous federal opposition , D . 827 00:35:15,200 --> 00:35:17,350 O . D and D o T both performed 828 00:35:17,350 --> 00:35:19,760 extensive testing and studies , 829 00:35:19,760 --> 00:35:22,680 evaluating the potential impact the 80 830 00:35:22,680 --> 00:35:25,390 military and commercial GPS receivers . 831 00:35:25,990 --> 00:35:27,934 Those studies concluded at llegada 832 00:35:27,934 --> 00:35:29,790 solution will cause harmful 833 00:35:29,800 --> 00:35:32,650 interference . The boat . The stringent 834 00:35:32,650 --> 00:35:35,770 conditions imposed by the FCC are an 835 00:35:35,780 --> 00:35:39,180 adequate to protect GPS , impractical 836 00:35:39,490 --> 00:35:42,160 and could never be employed in real 837 00:35:42,160 --> 00:35:45,350 practice . The required guard ban and 838 00:35:45,350 --> 00:35:46,990 reduced power levels do not 839 00:35:46,990 --> 00:35:49,900 sufficiently protect GPS receivers that 840 00:35:49,900 --> 00:35:52,011 you've heard today from Dr Griffin in 841 00:35:52,011 --> 00:35:53,733 General Raymond . Coordination 842 00:35:53,733 --> 00:35:55,844 requirements are simply impractical . 843 00:35:56,220 --> 00:35:58,650 There are millions of mobile GPS 844 00:35:58,650 --> 00:36:00,960 receivers in use , and there's no way 845 00:36:00,960 --> 00:36:02,904 to protect those from their mobile 846 00:36:02,904 --> 00:36:06,000 operations . Notification in the event 847 00:36:06,000 --> 00:36:08,240 of interference simply doesn't work . 848 00:36:08,730 --> 00:36:10,730 None of you would even know in this 849 00:36:10,730 --> 00:36:13,480 room today if llegado disrupted your 850 00:36:13,490 --> 00:36:16,430 individual GPS device . Nor would you 851 00:36:16,430 --> 00:36:19,760 know what to do if they did . FCC 852 00:36:19,760 --> 00:36:22,360 expectation for llegado to repair or 853 00:36:22,360 --> 00:36:24,530 replace affected receivers is 854 00:36:24,530 --> 00:36:26,770 unreasonable and could never be 855 00:36:26,870 --> 00:36:29,730 employed in practice . The American 856 00:36:29,730 --> 00:36:32,710 public in military rely on GPS to 857 00:36:32,710 --> 00:36:35,040 support a wide range of critical 858 00:36:35,040 --> 00:36:37,110 applications and missions from 859 00:36:37,110 --> 00:36:39,580 protecting our national security tour . 860 00:36:39,590 --> 00:36:42,730 Economic prosperity . We have always 861 00:36:42,730 --> 00:36:45,540 been world leaders and GPS , and we 862 00:36:45,540 --> 00:36:47,762 never want to see our country be forced 863 00:36:47,762 --> 00:36:51,460 to turn to foreign GPS providers . Is 864 00:36:51,460 --> 00:36:53,571 General Raymond clearly articulated ? 865 00:36:53,790 --> 00:36:56,130 The SEC decision will impact warfighter 866 00:36:56,250 --> 00:36:59,890 exercises , testing , training and 867 00:36:59,890 --> 00:37:03,840 homeland defense . GPS must remain a 868 00:37:03,840 --> 00:37:06,500 reliable service and always be 869 00:37:06,500 --> 00:37:08,920 available when you need it most . A 870 00:37:08,920 --> 00:37:11,087 simple example . We can all appreciate 871 00:37:11,460 --> 00:37:14,450 emergency services for 911 call 872 00:37:15,410 --> 00:37:17,870 llegado and five g simply don't go 873 00:37:17,870 --> 00:37:20,190 together . They portrayed her solution 874 00:37:20,190 --> 00:37:23,960 to be five G . This is not how the U . 875 00:37:23,960 --> 00:37:27,130 S . Will lead in five G . They only 876 00:37:27,130 --> 00:37:30,110 target a small subset of the giant five 877 00:37:30,110 --> 00:37:32,890 G specifications . The next several 878 00:37:32,890 --> 00:37:35,001 months , D o . D will begin executing 879 00:37:35,330 --> 00:37:37,386 on important five G experiments with 880 00:37:37,386 --> 00:37:39,840 government and industry . I'll close by 881 00:37:39,840 --> 00:37:42,810 simply Sam . It is clear to the D o d 882 00:37:43,110 --> 00:37:45,630 that the risk GPS far outweighs the 883 00:37:45,640 --> 00:37:49,560 benefits of this FCC decision . And the 884 00:37:49,560 --> 00:37:52,340 FCC needs to reverse their decision . 885 00:37:53,230 --> 00:37:55,119 Thank you for your time . We look 886 00:37:55,119 --> 00:37:57,930 forward to your questions . Thank you 887 00:37:57,930 --> 00:38:01,390 very much , Mr 888 00:38:01,390 --> 00:38:05,270 DZ . We now recognise uh , 889 00:38:05,280 --> 00:38:07,330 ever Allen for any comments . 890 00:38:14,260 --> 00:38:17,650 Chairman . You turn your mic on if you 891 00:38:17,650 --> 00:38:21,640 would . Please , Mr Chairman , 892 00:38:23,850 --> 00:38:26,072 can you hear me now ? We hear you . Let 893 00:38:26,072 --> 00:38:28,360 him think . Mr Chairman , Ranking 894 00:38:28,360 --> 00:38:30,082 member read and members of the 895 00:38:30,082 --> 00:38:32,304 committee thank you for the opportunity 896 00:38:32,304 --> 00:38:34,249 to provide testimony today with my 897 00:38:34,249 --> 00:38:36,138 distinguished colleagues from the 898 00:38:36,138 --> 00:38:37,916 Department of defense . My full 899 00:38:37,916 --> 00:38:40,027 testimony is submitted for the record 900 00:38:40,027 --> 00:38:41,971 and testifying today in my private 901 00:38:41,971 --> 00:38:44,082 capacity is a citizen , and the views 902 00:38:44,082 --> 00:38:45,916 expressed our mind . They're not 903 00:38:45,916 --> 00:38:48,138 intended to representative , government 904 00:38:48,138 --> 00:38:50,249 agency or private firm . My testimony 905 00:38:50,249 --> 00:38:51,971 is based on publicly available 906 00:38:51,971 --> 00:38:53,971 information . My views represent my 907 00:38:53,971 --> 00:38:56,490 concerns and those of GPS civil users . 908 00:38:57,120 --> 00:38:58,842 We'll try not to repeat points 909 00:38:58,842 --> 00:39:01,350 previously made . I have been involved 910 00:39:01,350 --> 00:39:03,660 in radio , navigation and operations 911 00:39:03,660 --> 00:39:06,840 and policy for more than 50 years . 45 912 00:39:06,840 --> 00:39:09,118 years ago , I was a commanding officer . 913 00:39:09,118 --> 00:39:11,830 Laronde STATION Lampang , Thailand As 914 00:39:11,830 --> 00:39:14,400 the war in Vietnam ended 10 years ago 915 00:39:14,400 --> 00:39:16,567 as the commandant of the Coast Guard , 916 00:39:16,567 --> 00:39:18,567 I personally turned the switch that 917 00:39:18,567 --> 00:39:20,456 decommissioned the final Iran see 918 00:39:20,456 --> 00:39:22,622 operating chain in the United States . 919 00:39:22,622 --> 00:39:24,678 My fellow Panelists have presented a 920 00:39:24,678 --> 00:39:26,844 unified testimony regarding the impact 921 00:39:26,844 --> 00:39:29,067 of the SC FCC order an authorization to 922 00:39:29,067 --> 00:39:31,233 allow llegado networks to deploy a low 923 00:39:31,233 --> 00:39:33,289 power terrestrial nationwide network 924 00:39:33,300 --> 00:39:35,189 and the associated impacts on the 925 00:39:35,189 --> 00:39:37,133 Department of Defense and national 926 00:39:37,133 --> 00:39:38,633 security . I endorse their 927 00:39:38,633 --> 00:39:40,980 recommendations . My purpose here today 928 00:39:40,980 --> 00:39:43,091 is to speak on behalf of the hundreds 929 00:39:43,091 --> 00:39:45,091 of millions of civil users of GPS , 930 00:39:45,620 --> 00:39:47,231 from the timing of financial 931 00:39:47,231 --> 00:39:49,064 transactions to power generation 932 00:39:49,220 --> 00:39:51,442 synchronization of telecommunications , 933 00:39:51,820 --> 00:39:53,431 high precision agriculture , 934 00:39:53,530 --> 00:39:55,697 intelligent transportation systems and 935 00:39:55,697 --> 00:39:57,974 air navigation and airspace management . 936 00:39:57,974 --> 00:40:00,030 GPS has become vital to the nation's 937 00:40:00,030 --> 00:40:02,150 general welfare and common defense . 938 00:40:03,180 --> 00:40:05,402 The risk to military systems so clearly 939 00:40:05,402 --> 00:40:07,624 stated by this panel has also shared by 940 00:40:07,624 --> 00:40:10,180 civil GPS users . However , unlike our 941 00:40:10,180 --> 00:40:12,347 military forces , who have the ability 942 00:40:12,347 --> 00:40:14,458 to reduce risk through encryption and 943 00:40:14,458 --> 00:40:16,236 other tools , civil users are a 944 00:40:16,236 --> 00:40:18,180 separate user segment with greater 945 00:40:18,180 --> 00:40:20,069 receiver diversity and fewer risk 946 00:40:20,069 --> 00:40:22,620 reduction options . A single point in 947 00:40:22,620 --> 00:40:24,842 government , where the interests of the 948 00:40:24,842 --> 00:40:27,064 Civil GPS users are integrated with the 949 00:40:27,064 --> 00:40:29,231 Department of Fence and brought into a 950 00:40:29,231 --> 00:40:31,176 consensus process , is through the 951 00:40:31,176 --> 00:40:33,398 position Navigation in Timing , P and T 952 00:40:33,398 --> 00:40:35,564 Executive Committee and its supporting 953 00:40:35,564 --> 00:40:38,050 PMT Advisory board . The PMT Advisory 954 00:40:38,050 --> 00:40:40,106 board approach for reducing wrist to 955 00:40:40,106 --> 00:40:41,939 the civil users has been a three 956 00:40:41,939 --> 00:40:44,450 pronged strategy . Protect the signal 957 00:40:45,160 --> 00:40:47,550 Tough on the receiver . Augment GPS 958 00:40:47,550 --> 00:40:49,439 with backup are complementary PMT 959 00:40:49,439 --> 00:40:52,700 services . The impact of disruption or 960 00:40:52,700 --> 00:40:54,700 loss of GPS signals varies with the 961 00:40:54,700 --> 00:40:57,290 type of receiver . This could manifest 962 00:40:57,290 --> 00:40:58,957 itself anything from an A T M 963 00:40:58,957 --> 00:41:01,068 malfunction to the loss of navigation 964 00:41:01,068 --> 00:41:03,012 and an intelligence transportation 965 00:41:03,012 --> 00:41:05,470 system , interference with an unmanned 966 00:41:05,470 --> 00:41:07,192 aerial system or disruption of 967 00:41:07,192 --> 00:41:10,110 electrical power distribution uses of 968 00:41:10,110 --> 00:41:13,360 GPS rains from a simple Fitbit . The 969 00:41:13,360 --> 00:41:15,304 provision , of course , timing for 970 00:41:15,304 --> 00:41:17,471 highly refined parts . Timing services 971 00:41:17,471 --> 00:41:19,750 for financial transactions while their 972 00:41:19,750 --> 00:41:22,800 host of issues raised by the FCC . Oh a 973 00:41:22,800 --> 00:41:24,800 my written testimony addresses them 974 00:41:24,800 --> 00:41:26,800 specifically , I wanted to hit five 975 00:41:26,800 --> 00:41:29,180 things here today . The administrative 976 00:41:29,180 --> 00:41:31,180 process for this decision has never 977 00:41:31,180 --> 00:41:34,240 been made public to again . Comment on 978 00:41:34,240 --> 00:41:36,073 the allocation of spectrum , the 979 00:41:36,073 --> 00:41:38,240 ancillary terrestrial component of the 980 00:41:38,240 --> 00:41:40,573 service or the Earth based transmitters . 981 00:41:41,730 --> 00:41:44,340 Lack of transparent process . Look at 982 00:41:44,340 --> 00:41:46,173 the competing criteria as how to 983 00:41:46,173 --> 00:41:48,650 measure disruptions in the GPS adjacent 984 00:41:48,650 --> 00:41:51,970 band . Third , the density of 985 00:41:51,970 --> 00:41:54,137 terrestrial antennas and the impact on 986 00:41:54,137 --> 00:41:56,137 mobile devices moving through those 987 00:41:56,137 --> 00:42:00,070 fields . For the oei 988 00:42:00,070 --> 00:42:02,237 shifts , the performance burden to the 989 00:42:02,237 --> 00:42:04,348 receiver , rather than protecting the 990 00:42:04,348 --> 00:42:06,626 spectrum has been stated . And finally , 991 00:42:06,626 --> 00:42:08,626 the assertion that the llegado plan 992 00:42:08,626 --> 00:42:10,459 will significantly accelerate or 993 00:42:10,459 --> 00:42:12,292 enhance the deployment of five G 994 00:42:12,292 --> 00:42:14,126 technology . There are no five G 995 00:42:14,126 --> 00:42:16,348 standards for the spectrum , as has not 996 00:42:16,348 --> 00:42:18,459 been used for five G anywhere else in 997 00:42:18,459 --> 00:42:20,760 the world . The concept contained in 998 00:42:20,760 --> 00:42:23,780 the oei that impact that the impacts of 999 00:42:23,780 --> 00:42:25,613 a Jason band interference can be 1000 00:42:25,613 --> 00:42:27,613 measured , identified by llegado as 1001 00:42:27,613 --> 00:42:29,502 they occur , and then mitigated a 1002 00:42:29,502 --> 00:42:31,502 timely and effective manner without 1003 00:42:31,502 --> 00:42:33,520 prior testing . Strains credibility 1004 00:42:34,600 --> 00:42:37,230 test there were utilized by the FCC . 1005 00:42:38,000 --> 00:42:39,833 We're funded by llegado were not 1006 00:42:39,833 --> 00:42:42,000 conducted in a transparent fashion and 1007 00:42:42,000 --> 00:42:44,270 not widely supported . Further the 1008 00:42:44,270 --> 00:42:46,103 failure of the FCC to accept the 1009 00:42:46,103 --> 00:42:48,510 standard floor for tolerance of noise 1010 00:42:49,000 --> 00:42:50,944 that was used by the Department of 1011 00:42:50,944 --> 00:42:53,000 Transportation and the adjacent Band 1012 00:42:53,000 --> 00:42:54,833 Compelled Compatibility Study is 1013 00:42:54,833 --> 00:42:56,722 equally quizzical , and a summary 1014 00:42:56,722 --> 00:43:00,250 dismissal is troubling . This is a 1015 00:43:00,250 --> 00:43:02,450 neutral guard rail for the spectrum . 1016 00:43:03,460 --> 00:43:05,516 This approach rejects the concept of 1017 00:43:05,516 --> 00:43:07,940 first do no harm and places it with 1018 00:43:07,940 --> 00:43:10,107 consequence management after the event 1019 00:43:10,107 --> 00:43:13,340 has occurred . In closing , I would 1020 00:43:13,340 --> 00:43:15,562 like to use the words of those close to 1021 00:43:15,562 --> 00:43:18,440 this issue in the air and on the ground . 1022 00:43:20,200 --> 00:43:21,922 My good friend , Captain Sully 1023 00:43:21,922 --> 00:43:24,033 Sullenberger and I spoke this morning 1024 00:43:24,250 --> 00:43:26,194 about the concerns of the aviation 1025 00:43:26,194 --> 00:43:28,850 community . He said Putting the narrow 1026 00:43:28,850 --> 00:43:30,850 commercial interests of one company 1027 00:43:30,850 --> 00:43:33,017 ahead of our national security and the 1028 00:43:33,017 --> 00:43:35,239 needs of the country is wrongheaded and 1029 00:43:35,239 --> 00:43:37,461 dangerous . Wishful thinking and hoping 1030 00:43:37,461 --> 00:43:39,461 that things will work out is not an 1031 00:43:39,461 --> 00:43:41,517 effective strategy and cannot repeal 1032 00:43:41,517 --> 00:43:43,780 the law of physics closer to Earth . 1033 00:43:43,780 --> 00:43:46,002 Last year , during a visit to my wife's 1034 00:43:46,002 --> 00:43:48,169 family in Illinois . I spent some time 1035 00:43:48,169 --> 00:43:50,391 talking to corn and soybean farmers who 1036 00:43:50,391 --> 00:43:52,447 depend on GPS services for precision 1037 00:43:52,447 --> 00:43:54,980 navigation . I asked what happens when 1038 00:43:54,980 --> 00:43:57,850 you lose GPS ? I got a two word 1039 00:43:57,850 --> 00:44:01,440 response . We quit . Well , you can 1040 00:44:01,440 --> 00:44:03,850 reboot and begin planning again . If 1041 00:44:03,850 --> 00:44:05,794 you're flying a medevac helicopter 1042 00:44:06,340 --> 00:44:08,507 responding to a wildfire . It's a much 1043 00:44:08,507 --> 00:44:10,920 different problem . Spectrum is a 1044 00:44:10,920 --> 00:44:14,290 national asset , a precious asset , and 1045 00:44:14,290 --> 00:44:16,560 it should be protected , not subject to 1046 00:44:16,560 --> 00:44:19,720 arbitrary and capricious decisions . I 1047 00:44:19,720 --> 00:44:22,840 look forward to the questions . Thank 1048 00:44:22,840 --> 00:44:25,370 you very much . Animal . We're gonna 1049 00:44:25,370 --> 00:44:28,600 have Ah , five minute round are also 1050 00:44:29,420 --> 00:44:32,190 Senator Reid and I are going to 1051 00:44:32,190 --> 00:44:34,412 recommend a second round of questioning 1052 00:44:34,790 --> 00:44:37,012 because there's a lot of stuff to cover 1053 00:44:37,012 --> 00:44:40,640 here . Um and I'm gonna take my 1st 5 1054 00:44:40,640 --> 00:44:44,160 minutes with Director DZ 1055 00:44:44,380 --> 00:44:47,520 and General Raymond every Ellen and 1056 00:44:47,520 --> 00:44:50,560 then save my set . My other question 1057 00:44:50,570 --> 00:44:54,200 for Dr Griffin for the second room now . 1058 00:44:55,400 --> 00:44:57,622 And Director Deasy , the reason I bring 1059 00:44:57,622 --> 00:44:59,678 this up this is the one thing that's 1060 00:44:59,678 --> 00:45:01,844 mentioned more than anything else when 1061 00:45:01,844 --> 00:45:04,122 they're trying to defend what happened , 1062 00:45:04,122 --> 00:45:06,950 uh , in the action of the FCC . So I 1063 00:45:06,950 --> 00:45:09,061 would ask you , even though it's been 1064 00:45:09,061 --> 00:45:11,510 touched on , can you describe the 1065 00:45:11,510 --> 00:45:13,510 interagency process that caused the 1066 00:45:13,510 --> 00:45:15,840 Department of Defense to conclude that 1067 00:45:15,850 --> 00:45:19,150 the God does proposed proposal was 1068 00:45:19,150 --> 00:45:22,670 likely to interfere with GPS , And did 1069 00:45:22,670 --> 00:45:26,110 the FCC consult you ? Or and did 1070 00:45:26,120 --> 00:45:28,530 they take your concerns seriously ? 1071 00:45:31,390 --> 00:45:34,210 So , sir , the way I'd start that is 1072 00:45:34,690 --> 00:45:37,500 when a company in this case , Lo Gatto , 1073 00:45:37,940 --> 00:45:41,530 wants to repurpose the spectrum . They 1074 00:45:41,530 --> 00:45:45,080 smith that request to the FCC . The SEC , 1075 00:45:45,080 --> 00:45:47,550 in turn , turns it over to the NT I . A . 1076 00:45:48,430 --> 00:45:50,319 Sometimes those go through what's 1077 00:45:50,319 --> 00:45:52,430 called the Independent Radio Advisory 1078 00:45:52,430 --> 00:45:54,430 Committee , the Iraq , which has 19 1079 00:45:54,430 --> 00:45:56,652 members . In the case of evaluating the 1080 00:45:56,652 --> 00:45:58,597 goddess request for repurpose into 1081 00:45:58,597 --> 00:46:00,930 spectrum , it was turned over to the P 1082 00:46:00,930 --> 00:46:03,820 and T X com , which is made up of nine 1083 00:46:03,820 --> 00:46:06,670 federal agencies . I co chair that 1084 00:46:06,680 --> 00:46:09,200 along with Department of Transportation , 1085 00:46:10,060 --> 00:46:13,330 the X com . What they did was They , in 1086 00:46:13,330 --> 00:46:16,330 turn asked the Air Force to conduct a 1087 00:46:16,330 --> 00:46:18,900 series of independent studies and 1088 00:46:18,900 --> 00:46:21,470 testing to determine whether or not the 1089 00:46:21,470 --> 00:46:24,150 request that Llegado had put forth was 1090 00:46:24,150 --> 00:46:28,060 reasonable and could be accepted . The 1091 00:46:28,060 --> 00:46:31,520 testing took place and was completed in 1092 00:46:31,520 --> 00:46:34,980 about April 2016 . As I had mentioned 1093 00:46:34,980 --> 00:46:36,900 in my opening remarks , what that 1094 00:46:36,900 --> 00:46:39,740 testing did was take a number of 1095 00:46:39,750 --> 00:46:41,790 commercial and military receivers 1096 00:46:41,790 --> 00:46:44,530 approximately 80 and they test them 1097 00:46:44,530 --> 00:46:47,200 over a long distance , a period of time . 1098 00:46:47,960 --> 00:46:50,360 And they tested them to determine the 1099 00:46:50,360 --> 00:46:53,380 levels of noise in which they would see 1100 00:46:53,380 --> 00:46:55,720 interference . They use the 1101 00:46:55,720 --> 00:46:57,553 requirements of what llegado was 1102 00:46:57,553 --> 00:47:00,310 specifying as acceptable . And in 1103 00:47:00,310 --> 00:47:02,470 running those tests , they clearly 1104 00:47:02,480 --> 00:47:05,750 indicated that the results of the test 1105 00:47:06,040 --> 00:47:09,460 cause interference in all cases . So 1106 00:47:09,460 --> 00:47:11,571 what was done with that information ? 1107 00:47:11,780 --> 00:47:15,490 An insurance that then is turned back 1108 00:47:15,970 --> 00:47:18,140 over in the form of a letter that I co 1109 00:47:18,140 --> 00:47:21,600 signed with department transportation 1110 00:47:21,600 --> 00:47:24,970 in December of 2018 . That letter 1111 00:47:24,970 --> 00:47:27,360 clearly cited the testing that was done 1112 00:47:27,360 --> 00:47:30,640 by the Air Force . In that letter , we 1113 00:47:30,640 --> 00:47:33,400 say that it was unambiguous and 1114 00:47:33,400 --> 00:47:36,350 unanimously agreed Across 59 excuse me , 1115 00:47:36,350 --> 00:47:40,140 nine federal agents , um , federal 1116 00:47:40,140 --> 00:47:42,710 agencies , that this could not move 1117 00:47:42,710 --> 00:47:45,640 forward . Given that there was still 1118 00:47:45,640 --> 00:47:48,600 concern raised and the fact that our 1119 00:47:48,600 --> 00:47:50,767 letter was not being acknowledged , we 1120 00:47:50,767 --> 00:47:53,620 felt compelled to follow up with four 1121 00:47:53,630 --> 00:47:57,230 additional communications . One was 1122 00:47:57,360 --> 00:48:00,680 back in June of 2019 from then Deputy 1123 00:48:00,680 --> 00:48:04,340 Secretary Shanahan to the F cease 1124 00:48:04,660 --> 00:48:06,890 see stating the opposition 1125 00:48:08,150 --> 00:48:11,310 secretary expert in November of 2019 1126 00:48:11,870 --> 00:48:13,840 for the letter , also stating our 1127 00:48:13,840 --> 00:48:17,300 concerns in opposition the Iraq sent to 1128 00:48:17,300 --> 00:48:21,000 the NT I A February 20th and letter 1129 00:48:21,000 --> 00:48:23,110 from 12 agencies that were signed 1130 00:48:23,320 --> 00:48:26,350 expressing concerns . Dr Griffin and 1131 00:48:26,350 --> 00:48:28,650 MYSELF furthermore , sent an additional 1132 00:48:28,650 --> 00:48:32,600 letter to NT i in March of 2020 and 1133 00:48:32,600 --> 00:48:35,780 finally , Secretary Norquist sent a 1134 00:48:35,780 --> 00:48:39,450 letter in March of 2020 of which the 1135 00:48:39,450 --> 00:48:42,290 final letter went from NT I A . To the 1136 00:48:42,290 --> 00:48:45,470 FCC on April 2020 . Each of those 1137 00:48:45,470 --> 00:48:47,540 letters made clear inside of the 1138 00:48:47,540 --> 00:48:49,818 testing that was done by the Air Force , 1139 00:48:50,140 --> 00:48:52,251 that this could not be accepted , nor 1140 00:48:52,251 --> 00:48:54,084 should it be recommended to move 1141 00:48:54,084 --> 00:48:55,973 forward . Sir , were you in ? The 1142 00:48:55,973 --> 00:48:58,196 second part of that question was , were 1143 00:48:58,196 --> 00:49:01,920 you consulted , uh , by the 1144 00:49:02,670 --> 00:49:06,610 or S by the FCC for your opinions ? And 1145 00:49:06,620 --> 00:49:09,270 did they take them seriously ? So I 1146 00:49:09,270 --> 00:49:11,540 will tell you that historic we've had a 1147 00:49:11,540 --> 00:49:13,762 very good working relationship with the 1148 00:49:13,762 --> 00:49:15,980 FCC when it comes to collaboratively 1149 00:49:15,980 --> 00:49:18,780 studying requests like this in the case 1150 00:49:18,780 --> 00:49:21,600 of this particular request . No , sir , 1151 00:49:22,230 --> 00:49:25,650 there was not a give and take back and 1152 00:49:25,650 --> 00:49:27,594 forth that we nitpick typically go 1153 00:49:27,594 --> 00:49:30,160 through . And at the end of the day , 1154 00:49:30,530 --> 00:49:32,530 we were completely caught off guard 1155 00:49:32,900 --> 00:49:35,660 went over that weekend . In April , the 1156 00:49:35,670 --> 00:49:38,250 decision was taken by the FCC to go 1157 00:49:38,250 --> 00:49:41,030 ahead and move forward . Thank you , 1158 00:49:41,040 --> 00:49:43,130 Director . And then lastly , General 1159 00:49:43,140 --> 00:49:45,700 Raymond , you did touch upon this in 1160 00:49:45,700 --> 00:49:47,589 your opening statement . Is there 1161 00:49:47,589 --> 00:49:49,756 anything you wanted to add in terms of 1162 00:49:49,756 --> 00:49:52,660 the , uh , the impacts on the 1163 00:49:52,660 --> 00:49:55,370 warfighter ? Thanks . Thank you very 1164 00:49:55,370 --> 00:49:59,060 much . Uh , the way I catched 1165 00:49:59,430 --> 00:50:02,490 GPS , it's the DNA of our way of war . 1166 00:50:02,780 --> 00:50:05,113 It's systemic and everything that we do . 1167 00:50:05,460 --> 00:50:08,740 And it is clear without without 1168 00:50:08,750 --> 00:50:11,780 question that putting a ground emitter 1169 00:50:11,810 --> 00:50:14,032 in with the space signals will cause an 1170 00:50:14,032 --> 00:50:16,143 eruption . I think that will increase 1171 00:50:16,143 --> 00:50:18,199 risk of force and risk the mission . 1172 00:50:18,199 --> 00:50:20,366 And I outlined in my opening statement 1173 00:50:20,366 --> 00:50:22,532 that mission areas of homeland defense 1174 00:50:22,532 --> 00:50:24,532 are most critical . Mission defense 1175 00:50:24,532 --> 00:50:26,940 supports about civil authorities and 1176 00:50:26,950 --> 00:50:29,172 building the force that training in the 1177 00:50:29,172 --> 00:50:31,394 ratings that we need . And I think it's 1178 00:50:31,394 --> 00:50:33,617 a risk that we shouldn't accept . Thank 1179 00:50:33,617 --> 00:50:35,800 you , General Senator Reid . Well , 1180 00:50:35,800 --> 00:50:37,911 thanks very much . This German let me 1181 00:50:37,911 --> 00:50:40,078 first command all the Panelists with a 1182 00:50:40,078 --> 00:50:42,300 very cogent and coherent and compelling 1183 00:50:42,300 --> 00:50:45,250 testimony . Thank you all , Mrs Easy . 1184 00:50:45,260 --> 00:50:48,410 Um , falling on a thread that Admiral 1185 00:50:48,570 --> 00:50:50,230 Cochran introduced under the 1186 00:50:50,230 --> 00:50:52,230 Administrative Procedure Act . As I 1187 00:50:52,230 --> 00:50:54,452 understand it , a significant action by 1188 00:50:54,452 --> 00:50:56,470 the government agency must be 1189 00:50:56,470 --> 00:50:58,526 accompanied by a public rulemaking , 1190 00:50:58,526 --> 00:51:00,692 which includes public comment , period 1191 00:51:00,820 --> 00:51:03,360 response to those comments and ah , 1192 00:51:03,360 --> 00:51:05,471 publication of an order which is then 1193 00:51:05,471 --> 00:51:08,990 subject to judicial review . Uh , and I 1194 00:51:08,990 --> 00:51:11,212 consider the repurposing of a satellite 1195 00:51:11,212 --> 00:51:13,212 programme . Initially , Life's is a 1196 00:51:13,212 --> 00:51:15,830 light square for ah satellite spectrum 1197 00:51:15,840 --> 00:51:18,080 and then changed to , ah , land based 1198 00:51:18,080 --> 00:51:20,247 system to be a very significant public 1199 00:51:20,247 --> 00:51:22,130 action . Was there any kind of 1200 00:51:22,130 --> 00:51:24,241 rulemaking proceeding ? Freidel got a 1201 00:51:24,241 --> 00:51:26,640 license of Onley , a land based network ? 1202 00:51:33,000 --> 00:51:35,090 No , sir , as I stated earlier . 1203 00:51:36,180 --> 00:51:37,902 Typically , as you point out , 1204 00:51:37,902 --> 00:51:39,958 something of this nature there was a 1205 00:51:39,958 --> 00:51:42,260 very formal process that the FCC goes 1206 00:51:42,260 --> 00:51:44,316 through . It's a very good process , 1207 00:51:44,316 --> 00:51:46,482 and they've used it for years . And in 1208 00:51:46,482 --> 00:51:49,410 this particular case , um , we did not 1209 00:51:49,410 --> 00:51:51,540 see that process being followed . A 1210 00:51:51,540 --> 00:51:53,540 matter of fact , I go so far to say 1211 00:51:53,540 --> 00:51:55,762 that to the best of our knowledge , and 1212 00:51:55,762 --> 00:51:57,984 I've talked to many people inside the d 1213 00:51:57,984 --> 00:52:00,207 o d . About this , we think this is the 1214 00:52:00,207 --> 00:52:02,429 first time ever for the F . C . C . C . 1215 00:52:02,429 --> 00:52:04,540 Has taken an arbitrary an independent 1216 00:52:04,540 --> 00:52:07,120 decision where it was unanimously and 1217 00:52:07,130 --> 00:52:10,140 unambiguously opposed by multiple 1218 00:52:10,140 --> 00:52:12,660 federal agencies . Well , thank you . 1219 00:52:12,660 --> 00:52:14,716 And , uh , I think it you've pointed 1220 00:52:14,716 --> 00:52:16,771 out the National Technol Information 1221 00:52:16,771 --> 00:52:20,400 Administration . The NT I a objected 1222 00:52:20,400 --> 00:52:24,200 numerous times to the decision Three 1223 00:52:24,200 --> 00:52:26,580 secretaries of Defense Secretary Carter 1224 00:52:26,580 --> 00:52:28,750 Sector Shanahan and Sector s for all 1225 00:52:28,750 --> 00:52:31,640 written about their opposition of using 1226 00:52:31,640 --> 00:52:34,810 the spectrum . Aziz , the order directs . 1227 00:52:35,250 --> 00:52:37,472 So , Mr you see , you would say this is 1228 00:52:37,472 --> 00:52:38,861 a very unusual process . 1229 00:52:42,020 --> 00:52:44,242 I would go as far as this say that it's 1230 00:52:44,242 --> 00:52:46,353 an unheard of and the first president 1231 00:52:46,353 --> 00:52:48,680 of its kind , making AMR Allen , you 1232 00:52:48,950 --> 00:52:51,172 know , live civilian sector very well . 1233 00:52:51,172 --> 00:52:53,510 From your perspective , you would also 1234 00:52:53,510 --> 00:52:56,430 describe this is highly unusual or it 1235 00:52:56,430 --> 00:52:59,160 misdeeds that unheard of . I would 1236 00:52:59,160 --> 00:53:01,340 concur with his remarks . The original 1237 00:53:01,420 --> 00:53:04,220 process should have been the allocation 1238 00:53:05,150 --> 00:53:06,983 for the mobile satellite service 1239 00:53:06,983 --> 00:53:08,928 spectrum . It was re allocated toe 1240 00:53:09,340 --> 00:53:11,410 terrestrial antennas for rebroadcast 1241 00:53:11,700 --> 00:53:13,644 that should have been subject to a 1242 00:53:13,644 --> 00:53:15,533 notice of proposed rulemaking and 1243 00:53:15,533 --> 00:53:17,700 public comment . Thank you very much . 1244 00:53:18,250 --> 00:53:21,120 One of the concerns that I have because 1245 00:53:21,130 --> 00:53:23,352 the spectrum is always in play , if you 1246 00:53:23,352 --> 00:53:25,620 will , is that this will set a very 1247 00:53:25,630 --> 00:53:29,000 dangerous precedent . He as we look at 1248 00:53:29,000 --> 00:53:31,700 five g in the mid range spectrum . If 1249 00:53:31,700 --> 00:53:34,180 the SEC operates in the same way FCC 1250 00:53:34,180 --> 00:53:35,740 operates in the same way by 1251 00:53:35,750 --> 00:53:38,360 disregarding expertise within the 1252 00:53:38,360 --> 00:53:40,416 federal government , we could have a 1253 00:53:40,416 --> 00:53:42,582 situation where , instead of trying to 1254 00:53:42,582 --> 00:53:45,260 reach a consensus , we have the FCC 1255 00:53:45,720 --> 00:53:47,860 basically assuming and determining 1256 00:53:47,870 --> 00:53:51,210 everything according to their own in 1257 00:53:51,220 --> 00:53:54,380 intuitions amorality . Could you give 1258 00:53:54,380 --> 00:53:56,570 up a comment on this disc process , 1259 00:53:56,570 --> 00:53:58,626 this consensus process which up into 1260 00:53:58,626 --> 00:54:00,737 now work it seems to be breaking down 1261 00:54:01,940 --> 00:54:03,884 well , the current relationship is 1262 00:54:03,884 --> 00:54:06,051 based on an MOU between the FCC and NT 1263 00:54:06,051 --> 00:54:08,273 I . A . I would just I would just offer 1264 00:54:08,273 --> 00:54:10,329 this comment . The SEC was created . 1265 00:54:10,329 --> 00:54:12,440 Their remit goes back to the twenties 1266 00:54:12,440 --> 00:54:14,273 and thirties regarding radio and 1267 00:54:14,273 --> 00:54:16,384 television spectrum . We moved into , 1268 00:54:16,384 --> 00:54:18,470 ah , vast new era technology and now 1269 00:54:18,470 --> 00:54:20,750 their decisions being made that impact 1270 00:54:20,750 --> 00:54:22,972 on spectrum and space operations and so 1271 00:54:22,972 --> 00:54:25,083 forth . Independent regulatory agents 1272 00:54:25,083 --> 00:54:27,670 agencies were created to create an 1273 00:54:27,670 --> 00:54:29,690 unbiased representation and make 1274 00:54:29,690 --> 00:54:32,840 decisions in the public interest . The 1275 00:54:32,850 --> 00:54:34,961 process we have right now is a guided 1276 00:54:34,961 --> 00:54:36,850 by national security presidential 1277 00:54:36,850 --> 00:54:38,850 Directive 39 that requires that the 1278 00:54:38,850 --> 00:54:40,794 equivalent of a deputy's meeting , 1279 00:54:40,794 --> 00:54:42,961 which the X kami is to be subordinated 1280 00:54:42,961 --> 00:54:45,128 to the Department of Commerce and NT I 1281 00:54:45,128 --> 00:54:47,350 A . For transmission to the FCC , and I 1282 00:54:47,350 --> 00:54:49,517 would submit to you that process needs 1283 00:54:49,517 --> 00:54:51,683 to be looked at . Thank you . And just 1284 00:54:51,683 --> 00:54:54,290 finally , general , a scientist sandal . 1285 00:54:54,290 --> 00:54:57,760 The FCC order llegado Most provided 800 1286 00:54:57,760 --> 00:55:00,350 number to call and have a stop button 1287 00:55:00,350 --> 00:55:02,330 once severe damages are detected . 1288 00:55:02,330 --> 00:55:05,140 That's the remedy . So what is a war 1289 00:55:05,140 --> 00:55:07,820 fire in the middle of a war zone ? Do 1290 00:55:07,820 --> 00:55:09,931 when he discovers his system is going 1291 00:55:09,931 --> 00:55:11,931 down ? Does he get on the phone and 1292 00:55:11,931 --> 00:55:15,690 dial 8 800 number and make a complaint 1293 00:55:15,700 --> 00:55:18,710 is after the war Fighter is the 800 1294 00:55:18,710 --> 00:55:20,877 number that the nation calls for us to 1295 00:55:20,877 --> 00:55:22,877 do our nation's business . We don't 1296 00:55:22,877 --> 00:55:25,099 want the war fighter to have to call an 1297 00:55:25,099 --> 00:55:27,350 800 number that report interference . 1298 00:55:27,360 --> 00:55:29,350 Is there doing our nation's work ? 1299 00:55:31,120 --> 00:55:33,780 E . I concur entirely , but it 1300 00:55:34,240 --> 00:55:37,620 I think this might have underscored the 1301 00:55:37,620 --> 00:55:39,740 absurdity of retractable more than 1302 00:55:39,740 --> 00:55:41,629 anything else . If if this is the 1303 00:55:41,629 --> 00:55:44,740 remedy that the FCC is proposing for 1304 00:55:44,890 --> 00:55:47,990 interference , which would impact 1305 00:55:47,990 --> 00:55:49,934 thousands and thousands of men and 1306 00:55:49,934 --> 00:55:53,830 women deployed overseas , this is Will 1307 00:55:53,830 --> 00:55:55,663 you just stop it ? It's a highly 1308 00:55:55,663 --> 00:55:57,608 unusual and probably ineffectual . 1309 00:55:57,608 --> 00:56:00,690 Agree , sir ? Thank you . Thank you , 1310 00:56:00,690 --> 00:56:04,150 Senator Reid , Consider Fisher . 1311 00:56:04,700 --> 00:56:06,811 Thank you , Mr Chairman . And I would 1312 00:56:06,811 --> 00:56:09,033 like to thank you in the ranking member 1313 00:56:09,033 --> 00:56:11,200 for having this hearing today and also 1314 00:56:11,200 --> 00:56:13,380 complement both of you on keeping this 1315 00:56:13,380 --> 00:56:16,580 committee informed and active during 1316 00:56:16,580 --> 00:56:18,691 the past several weeks . So thank you 1317 00:56:18,691 --> 00:56:21,200 very much , Mr D . C . 1318 00:56:23,310 --> 00:56:26,050 There's there's a number of , um , 1319 00:56:26,500 --> 00:56:28,740 mitigation proposals that are included 1320 00:56:28,740 --> 00:56:31,270 in the FCC order , and it's my 1321 00:56:31,270 --> 00:56:33,820 understanding that the department has 1322 00:56:33,820 --> 00:56:37,200 expressed quite a few reservations on 1323 00:56:37,200 --> 00:56:40,820 them . There's a process that's being , 1324 00:56:40,830 --> 00:56:43,270 I think , contemplated where llegado is 1325 00:56:43,270 --> 00:56:45,950 going to work with agencies to identify 1326 00:56:46,200 --> 00:56:48,320 potentially affected devices for 1327 00:56:48,330 --> 00:56:51,430 upgrade , repair or replacement . Um , 1328 00:56:51,440 --> 00:56:53,440 can you walk us through some of the 1329 00:56:53,440 --> 00:56:55,662 practical steps of how this is going to 1330 00:56:55,662 --> 00:56:58,240 work ? And I'd also ask a Secretary 1331 00:56:58,240 --> 00:57:02,150 Griffin and General Raymond to jump on 1332 00:57:02,160 --> 00:57:04,790 in on this question to to get it 1333 00:57:04,790 --> 00:57:07,390 started a little bit . If you could 1334 00:57:08,060 --> 00:57:10,040 maybe address what sort of time 1335 00:57:10,100 --> 00:57:12,500 resource is personnel we're gonna be 1336 00:57:12,500 --> 00:57:15,710 needed . Carry it out . Do you see any 1337 00:57:15,720 --> 00:57:19,330 classification restrictions or limits 1338 00:57:19,330 --> 00:57:23,120 on proprietary data being an issue 1339 00:57:23,520 --> 00:57:27,390 and our GPS devices easily 1340 00:57:27,390 --> 00:57:31,010 removed or replaced ? And are these 1341 00:57:31,010 --> 00:57:33,310 integrated systems . I'm asking you to 1342 00:57:33,320 --> 00:57:36,480 generalize on these , but if you could , 1343 00:57:36,480 --> 00:57:39,930 uh , maybe walk us through some of this 1344 00:57:39,930 --> 00:57:43,560 and how you see it working or the 1345 00:57:43,560 --> 00:57:46,570 challenges that it would face , I'll be 1346 00:57:46,570 --> 00:57:48,750 happy to start . Then I think Dr 1347 00:57:48,750 --> 00:57:51,530 Griffin is well placed to carry on this 1348 00:57:51,530 --> 00:57:54,020 conversation . I think the easiest way 1349 00:57:54,020 --> 00:57:55,687 to break this down is to look 1350 00:57:55,687 --> 00:57:58,250 specifically at the order that SCC 1351 00:57:58,260 --> 00:58:00,060 issued in quote the stringent 1352 00:58:00,420 --> 00:58:02,890 requirements they put in place . And 1353 00:58:02,890 --> 00:58:04,946 there's really four that I'd like to 1354 00:58:04,946 --> 00:58:07,090 call out anything . Um , Senator , 1355 00:58:07,090 --> 00:58:09,146 these touch upon what I think you're 1356 00:58:09,146 --> 00:58:11,257 trying to get after the 1st 1 is what 1357 00:58:11,257 --> 00:58:13,312 they call the guard ban . It says 23 1358 00:58:13,312 --> 00:58:16,470 megahertz . And the idea is so llegado 1359 00:58:16,470 --> 00:58:18,900 has always recognized that they know 1360 00:58:18,900 --> 00:58:20,622 that their solution does cause 1361 00:58:20,622 --> 00:58:22,344 interference . I mean , that's 1362 00:58:22,344 --> 00:58:24,567 something I think we can't lose in this 1363 00:58:24,567 --> 00:58:26,678 conversation , which is why they have 1364 00:58:26,678 --> 00:58:28,733 continued to figure out how to lower 1365 00:58:28,733 --> 00:58:30,733 their power and why they've created 1366 00:58:30,733 --> 00:58:32,733 what's called this guard ban . They 1367 00:58:32,733 --> 00:58:34,956 state because their 23 megahertz away , 1368 00:58:34,956 --> 00:58:37,067 that that in itself clearly should be 1369 00:58:37,067 --> 00:58:39,870 sufficient to allow them to operate . I 1370 00:58:39,870 --> 00:58:41,981 think Dr Griffin gave some compelling 1371 00:58:42,710 --> 00:58:45,270 testimony today that clearly showed 1372 00:58:45,400 --> 00:58:47,456 that simply won't work and the noise 1373 00:58:47,456 --> 00:58:50,160 that will be created . The second thing 1374 00:58:50,160 --> 00:58:52,271 they talk about is that glowering the 1375 00:58:52,271 --> 00:58:54,590 power . If you go back to the original 1376 00:58:55,190 --> 00:58:57,220 light square to the early days of 1377 00:58:57,220 --> 00:59:00,140 llegado , they have continued to lower 1378 00:59:00,140 --> 00:59:02,084 the power . And they're doing that 1379 00:59:02,084 --> 00:59:04,196 because they know that their solution 1380 00:59:04,196 --> 00:59:06,580 will cause interference to GPS . They 1381 00:59:06,580 --> 00:59:09,690 try to make this quote 10 watt light 1382 00:59:09,700 --> 00:59:12,320 bulb sounds so insignificant . But I 1383 00:59:12,320 --> 00:59:14,530 think Dr Griffin's common about Hubble 1384 00:59:15,030 --> 00:59:17,410 telescope was really quite compelling . 1385 00:59:17,810 --> 00:59:20,520 So it's unrealistic to think that 1386 00:59:20,520 --> 00:59:22,576 they're ever going to get to a power 1387 00:59:22,576 --> 00:59:24,520 level that would make ground based 1388 00:59:24,520 --> 00:59:26,631 terrestrial communications acceptable 1389 00:59:26,660 --> 00:59:29,490 when they talk about coordination . Now , 1390 00:59:29,490 --> 00:59:31,590 what they're really saying there is 1391 00:59:31,590 --> 00:59:33,930 that as they stand up , they're 1392 00:59:33,930 --> 00:59:35,986 terrestrial based solution . They're 1393 00:59:35,986 --> 00:59:38,340 gonna quote , coordinate , and that if 1394 00:59:38,340 --> 00:59:40,690 we say there is a problem , they will 1395 00:59:40,690 --> 00:59:42,801 address that . Well , this is how you 1396 00:59:42,801 --> 00:59:45,023 tell there's a problem . They install a 1397 00:59:45,023 --> 00:59:47,023 terrestrial ground based solution . 1398 00:59:47,023 --> 00:59:49,690 They turn it on and then we have to 1399 00:59:49,690 --> 00:59:51,800 report back to them what that 1400 00:59:51,800 --> 00:59:54,022 interferences . Where that interference 1401 00:59:54,022 --> 00:59:56,450 is causing problems and think about the 1402 00:59:56,450 --> 00:59:58,440 civil side of that . How will that 1403 00:59:58,440 --> 01:00:01,100 coordination actually take place on the 1404 01:00:01,100 --> 01:00:03,320 military side . We will have a 1405 01:00:03,320 --> 01:00:05,310 difficult enough time given the 1406 01:00:05,310 --> 01:00:07,980 millions and millions of GPS receivers 1407 01:00:08,410 --> 01:00:10,410 into your point . When you start to 1408 01:00:10,410 --> 01:00:14,050 talk about indebted receivers in assets 1409 01:00:14,050 --> 01:00:16,660 that we have inside the military , it's 1410 01:00:16,660 --> 01:00:20,170 not like you can pull that asset out 1411 01:00:20,560 --> 01:00:22,910 and simply install a new one that won't 1412 01:00:22,910 --> 01:00:25,140 cause interference . This will cost . I 1413 01:00:25,140 --> 01:00:27,180 can't tell you specifically , ma'am 1414 01:00:27,180 --> 01:00:29,400 what the dollars or the people 1415 01:00:29,400 --> 01:00:31,622 requirements would be , because we have 1416 01:00:31,622 --> 01:00:33,678 to look at that on an asset by asset 1417 01:00:33,678 --> 01:00:35,970 basis and then finally re mediation . 1418 01:00:36,580 --> 01:00:38,524 Simply put , if you read the order 1419 01:00:38,524 --> 01:00:41,110 carefully , the burden is actually on 1420 01:00:41,270 --> 01:00:43,930 the Department of Defense . We have to 1421 01:00:43,930 --> 01:00:46,660 call out what the problem is and then 1422 01:00:46,660 --> 01:00:49,470 quote Once we clearly identify the 1423 01:00:49,480 --> 01:00:51,536 problems , they'll re mediate , will 1424 01:00:51,536 --> 01:00:53,424 remember . Many of our assets are 1425 01:00:53,424 --> 01:00:55,640 highly classified . And so the very 1426 01:00:55,640 --> 01:00:57,473 point of being able to go in and 1427 01:00:57,473 --> 01:00:59,920 articulate what those problems are and 1428 01:00:59,920 --> 01:01:02,031 how they should go about re mediate . 1429 01:01:02,031 --> 01:01:05,510 Um , it's simply not practical , Mr 1430 01:01:05,510 --> 01:01:07,677 Secretary , do you or the general have 1431 01:01:07,677 --> 01:01:08,677 anything ? Dad , 1432 01:01:11,700 --> 01:01:14,370 I'll be brief . What's not being 1433 01:01:14,420 --> 01:01:16,910 addressed when one talks about repair 1434 01:01:16,910 --> 01:01:20,890 and replace even among the federal 1435 01:01:20,890 --> 01:01:23,150 receivers , which llegado promises to 1436 01:01:23,160 --> 01:01:26,740 to replace is the expense and the 1437 01:01:26,740 --> 01:01:30,550 downtime of doing so . Um , let me give 1438 01:01:30,550 --> 01:01:34,090 you a comparison . Aviation grade 1439 01:01:34,090 --> 01:01:36,410 receivers are designed because of the 1440 01:01:36,410 --> 01:01:38,410 crew she ality of those and Senator 1441 01:01:38,410 --> 01:01:40,930 Inhofe like like you . I'm a pilot . 1442 01:01:41,610 --> 01:01:43,660 The aviation grade receivers in my 1443 01:01:43,660 --> 01:01:46,860 airplane costs 10 or so $1000 apiece . 1444 01:01:47,510 --> 01:01:49,566 They're much more cumbersome , their 1445 01:01:49,566 --> 01:01:51,566 larger . They consume more power in 1446 01:01:51,566 --> 01:01:54,840 order to produce a hardened design to 1447 01:01:54,840 --> 01:01:57,790 just this type of interference . Three 1448 01:01:57,790 --> 01:02:00,000 GPS receivers that go on someone's 1449 01:02:00,000 --> 01:02:03,390 tractor or first response vehicle or in 1450 01:02:03,390 --> 01:02:05,390 the automotive navigation system in 1451 01:02:05,390 --> 01:02:08,670 your car or in a routine piece of 1452 01:02:08,670 --> 01:02:11,100 military hardware are not hardened like 1453 01:02:11,100 --> 01:02:13,680 that . And the expense of introducing 1454 01:02:13,680 --> 01:02:17,460 new designs to make them so is not even 1455 01:02:17,460 --> 01:02:20,220 being discussed . It should be . And 1456 01:02:20,220 --> 01:02:22,510 also we're talking about disruption . 1457 01:02:22,520 --> 01:02:24,631 But we're also talking about national 1458 01:02:24,631 --> 01:02:26,464 security , which is a definite , 1459 01:02:26,464 --> 01:02:28,576 definite threat that there isn't time 1460 01:02:28,576 --> 01:02:30,631 to address . Thank you , sir . Thank 1461 01:02:30,631 --> 01:02:32,576 you , sir . You're Fisher Stitcher 1462 01:02:32,576 --> 01:02:34,798 Shaheen . Thank you , Mr Chairman , And 1463 01:02:34,798 --> 01:02:36,909 thank you to you and Senator Reid for 1464 01:02:36,909 --> 01:02:38,909 holding this timely hearing . And I 1465 01:02:38,909 --> 01:02:41,076 appreciate the testimony of all of our 1466 01:02:41,350 --> 01:02:44,410 experts today . I guess this question 1467 01:02:44,410 --> 01:02:46,850 is for you . Mr . Deasy was d o d . 1468 01:02:46,850 --> 01:02:49,350 Surprised by the FCC decision . 1469 01:02:51,910 --> 01:02:55,180 The simple answer is yes . We have been 1470 01:02:55,180 --> 01:02:57,800 in communications with FCC back and 1471 01:02:57,800 --> 01:02:59,911 forth for this manner for some time , 1472 01:03:00,010 --> 01:03:03,940 including the NT I A and we , you know , 1473 01:03:04,360 --> 01:03:06,527 along this whole journey . If you kind 1474 01:03:06,527 --> 01:03:08,582 of go through that timeline and gave 1475 01:03:08,582 --> 01:03:10,693 earlier Ah , work clearly of a belief 1476 01:03:10,900 --> 01:03:13,540 that they understood they had received 1477 01:03:13,540 --> 01:03:15,707 our letters . They had received the NT 1478 01:03:15,707 --> 01:03:18,900 I letters and clearly knew that there 1479 01:03:18,900 --> 01:03:21,050 was a unanimous view across federal 1480 01:03:21,050 --> 01:03:23,110 agencies not to move forward . So I 1481 01:03:23,110 --> 01:03:25,410 have to admit , when I first read and 1482 01:03:25,410 --> 01:03:28,060 heard about this , I was very surprised . 1483 01:03:28,170 --> 01:03:30,392 And as I talked to other senior leaders 1484 01:03:30,392 --> 01:03:32,480 across the duty , likewise they have 1485 01:03:32,480 --> 01:03:36,190 been is just a surprised . So reports 1486 01:03:36,190 --> 01:03:38,570 had suggested that the FCC was actually 1487 01:03:38,570 --> 01:03:40,737 moving in a different direction . That 1488 01:03:40,737 --> 01:03:42,880 they weren't going to deny Lagha does 1489 01:03:42,910 --> 01:03:46,280 request . Was that your expectation 1490 01:03:46,280 --> 01:03:49,250 before the turnaround ? Yes . The head 1491 01:03:49,250 --> 01:03:52,390 of C three inside of my organization , 1492 01:03:52,410 --> 01:03:54,466 joined by the name of Mr Fred More . 1493 01:03:54,466 --> 01:03:56,170 Field has been in constant 1494 01:03:56,170 --> 01:03:58,448 communications over a number of months , 1495 01:03:58,448 --> 01:04:00,670 actually years on this with both the NT 1496 01:04:00,670 --> 01:04:03,450 I and FCC . One of his responsibility 1497 01:04:03,450 --> 01:04:06,320 was to give me weekly updates as to how 1498 01:04:06,320 --> 01:04:08,620 the conversations were progressing with 1499 01:04:08,620 --> 01:04:11,830 SEC and NT I A . And every time we have 1500 01:04:11,830 --> 01:04:14,160 the conversation was all FCC and anti . 1501 01:04:14,160 --> 01:04:16,820 I clearly understand our position and 1502 01:04:16,820 --> 01:04:19,530 at no time that he suggests that he had 1503 01:04:19,560 --> 01:04:21,560 an indication or belief that it was 1504 01:04:21,560 --> 01:04:23,920 going to move forward . And the 1505 01:04:23,920 --> 01:04:26,190 decision , as you've described and as 1506 01:04:26,190 --> 01:04:30,060 I've read , was made very unexpectedly , 1507 01:04:30,070 --> 01:04:33,300 very hurriedly , Um , without the kind 1508 01:04:33,300 --> 01:04:35,640 of process that Senator Reid raised 1509 01:04:35,650 --> 01:04:38,350 that issues usually expected , is that 1510 01:04:38,350 --> 01:04:42,250 correct ? Yes . So , what do you think 1511 01:04:42,250 --> 01:04:45,240 the motivation of the FCC is in making 1512 01:04:45,240 --> 01:04:47,910 this decision ? You must have some 1513 01:04:48,420 --> 01:04:51,460 speculation about that . Actually , I 1514 01:04:51,460 --> 01:04:55,210 don't . I would not have been surprised 1515 01:04:55,210 --> 01:04:57,610 if I had felt I clearly understood what 1516 01:04:57,610 --> 01:04:59,777 the motivation for , because I frankly 1517 01:04:59,777 --> 01:05:03,580 did not see this coming . Um , Admiral , 1518 01:05:03,660 --> 01:05:06,790 do you have any thoughts about why the 1519 01:05:06,790 --> 01:05:08,940 FCC would have made this decision so 1520 01:05:09,640 --> 01:05:13,480 unexpectedly ? It's quizzical 1521 01:05:14,250 --> 01:05:17,940 if you look at the order that was 1522 01:05:17,940 --> 01:05:21,580 issued its I think 74 pages long . You 1523 01:05:21,580 --> 01:05:24,590 don't write that overnight that had to 1524 01:05:24,590 --> 01:05:26,701 be in preparation for quite a while . 1525 01:05:26,701 --> 01:05:28,812 The footnotes are expensive . You can 1526 01:05:28,812 --> 01:05:31,090 agree or not not agree with the report . 1527 01:05:31,090 --> 01:05:33,312 What astounded me was that had to be in 1528 01:05:33,312 --> 01:05:35,368 the works for quite a while . And it 1529 01:05:35,368 --> 01:05:37,534 happened suddenly . And my view , that 1530 01:05:37,534 --> 01:05:39,646 was a breakdown of communications and 1531 01:05:39,646 --> 01:05:41,590 building a consensus around proper 1532 01:05:41,590 --> 01:05:44,680 rulemaking . A regulatory agency . So 1533 01:05:44,690 --> 01:05:46,770 how does a decision like this happen 1534 01:05:46,830 --> 01:05:49,740 when you've got virtually every other 1535 01:05:49,740 --> 01:05:53,270 federal agency that is concerned about 1536 01:05:53,270 --> 01:05:55,940 this issue saying this is the wrong 1537 01:05:55,940 --> 01:05:59,180 direction to take How , then does one 1538 01:05:59,180 --> 01:06:03,120 agency and I appreciate it . It bills 1539 01:06:03,120 --> 01:06:06,080 itself as independent , and there are 1540 01:06:06,080 --> 01:06:08,191 certain agencies that we want to view 1541 01:06:08,191 --> 01:06:11,070 as independent within government . But 1542 01:06:11,080 --> 01:06:13,024 one would also hope that we're all 1543 01:06:13,024 --> 01:06:15,880 trying to move in the same direction as 1544 01:06:15,880 --> 01:06:18,770 part of government . So can anybody 1545 01:06:18,770 --> 01:06:22,570 speculate on how this happened and 1546 01:06:22,570 --> 01:06:25,350 why this agency would have taken this 1547 01:06:25,780 --> 01:06:28,480 position ? Given that , according to 1548 01:06:28,480 --> 01:06:30,480 all of the research , you all cited 1549 01:06:30,480 --> 01:06:33,750 that they aren't a significant part of 1550 01:06:34,200 --> 01:06:36,380 an effort in this country to move to 1551 01:06:36,380 --> 01:06:37,200 five G , 1552 01:06:42,620 --> 01:06:44,020 Nobody has any ideas . 1553 01:06:49,200 --> 01:06:51,367 It would appear to be a good topic for 1554 01:06:51,367 --> 01:06:53,644 the committee of original jurisdiction . 1555 01:06:53,680 --> 01:06:55,958 Um , I would certainly agree with that . 1556 01:06:56,180 --> 01:06:58,540 Um , So the question the next question 1557 01:06:58,540 --> 01:07:00,850 is , then what would you like to see 1558 01:07:00,850 --> 01:07:02,850 happen ? What would you like to see 1559 01:07:02,850 --> 01:07:05,017 this committee do ? And what would you 1560 01:07:05,017 --> 01:07:07,890 like to see Congress do to address this 1561 01:07:07,890 --> 01:07:11,280 decision which seems clearly against 1562 01:07:11,280 --> 01:07:13,058 the interests , not just of the 1563 01:07:13,058 --> 01:07:15,169 Department of Defense , but if all of 1564 01:07:15,169 --> 01:07:17,058 the commercial interests that are 1565 01:07:17,058 --> 01:07:20,800 involved here I'll start by simply 1566 01:07:20,800 --> 01:07:23,133 saying that's on my key take away chart ? 1567 01:07:23,140 --> 01:07:25,140 Um , it's the last bullet that said 1568 01:07:25,830 --> 01:07:28,910 that FCC needs to reverse their 1569 01:07:28,910 --> 01:07:32,270 decision . But But how has that 1570 01:07:32,270 --> 01:07:34,500 happened before ? And how realistic do 1571 01:07:34,500 --> 01:07:37,480 you think that is ? That the FCC , on 1572 01:07:37,480 --> 01:07:39,770 their own motivation , will reverse 1573 01:07:39,770 --> 01:07:42,740 their decision . There is a , um , 1574 01:07:42,980 --> 01:07:45,140 petition that NT i A can file 1575 01:07:46,990 --> 01:07:50,280 requesting that the FCC go back , 1576 01:07:50,300 --> 01:07:52,770 revisit that decision . We would need 1577 01:07:52,770 --> 01:07:55,160 to obviously present for the NT i a . 1578 01:07:55,170 --> 01:07:57,114 The necessary information for that 1579 01:07:57,114 --> 01:07:59,226 petition to be filed . But there is a 1580 01:07:59,226 --> 01:08:01,440 process that one can go through for 1581 01:08:01,440 --> 01:08:03,662 them to reconsider their decision . And 1582 01:08:03,662 --> 01:08:05,884 I believe we do need to go through that 1583 01:08:05,884 --> 01:08:08,051 process . Yeah , well , thank you , Mr 1584 01:08:08,051 --> 01:08:09,996 Chairman and Senator Reid , I look 1585 01:08:09,996 --> 01:08:12,218 forward to joining you on your letter . 1586 01:08:12,860 --> 01:08:14,804 they Thank you , Senator Shaheen , 1587 01:08:14,804 --> 01:08:17,290 Senator rounds . Thank you , Mr 1588 01:08:17,290 --> 01:08:19,500 Chairman . And let me also add my 1589 01:08:19,500 --> 01:08:21,556 thanks to you and the ranking member 1590 01:08:21,556 --> 01:08:23,970 for organizing and allowing us to stay 1591 01:08:23,970 --> 01:08:26,026 informed during the time in which we 1592 01:08:26,026 --> 01:08:28,700 were in our work periods at home . And 1593 01:08:28,700 --> 01:08:31,810 thank you also for organizing this full 1594 01:08:31,810 --> 01:08:33,866 committee discussion on the issue of 1595 01:08:33,866 --> 01:08:35,866 spectrum and in particular issue in 1596 01:08:35,866 --> 01:08:38,088 front of us today concerning the little 1597 01:08:38,088 --> 01:08:41,820 Delgado application . Uh , Mr D . C . 1598 01:08:41,820 --> 01:08:43,764 I'd like to spend my time with you 1599 01:08:43,764 --> 01:08:46,000 today focusing on the the other 1600 01:08:46,000 --> 01:08:48,840 spectrum issues that we've got last 1601 01:08:48,840 --> 01:08:50,451 year in the National Defense 1602 01:08:50,451 --> 01:08:52,618 Authorization Act . This committee had 1603 01:08:52,618 --> 01:08:55,200 proposed a section to 14 which has 1604 01:08:55,200 --> 01:08:57,630 become popular all by itself in terms 1605 01:08:57,630 --> 01:09:01,160 of fact that it was not operational by 1606 01:09:01,160 --> 01:09:03,780 the time we got done and had to do with 1607 01:09:03,880 --> 01:09:06,970 allowing for spectrum sharing . And we 1608 01:09:06,970 --> 01:09:09,150 recognize that D o . D has a critical 1609 01:09:09,150 --> 01:09:12,680 need for spectrum and that only on an 1610 01:09:12,690 --> 01:09:15,030 organized effort can we allow for 1611 01:09:15,030 --> 01:09:17,680 sharing of that middle level of the 1612 01:09:18,000 --> 01:09:21,030 spectrum . This brings to light an area 1613 01:09:21,040 --> 01:09:24,160 in the lower spectrum , but most 1614 01:09:24,160 --> 01:09:26,271 certainly the rest of the spectrum is 1615 01:09:26,271 --> 01:09:29,240 also at risk as well We had proposed 1616 01:09:29,240 --> 01:09:32,600 creating a tool last year , and we did 1617 01:09:32,600 --> 01:09:34,711 not realize the type of opposition we 1618 01:09:34,711 --> 01:09:37,200 would would find creating a tool so 1619 01:09:37,200 --> 01:09:39,520 that we could fairly share spectrum , 1620 01:09:39,520 --> 01:09:41,464 which was critical in our national 1621 01:09:41,464 --> 01:09:43,940 defense . Can you discuss a little bit 1622 01:09:43,940 --> 01:09:45,940 with the committee ? The need for a 1623 01:09:45,940 --> 01:09:47,520 tool that would allow us to 1624 01:09:47,740 --> 01:09:49,860 appropriately share and at the same 1625 01:09:49,860 --> 01:09:52,640 time safeguard extremely critical 1626 01:09:52,840 --> 01:09:55,600 portions in geographic locations as 1627 01:09:55,600 --> 01:09:57,940 well , but basically an opportunity to 1628 01:09:57,940 --> 01:09:59,996 share what is a very , very valuable 1629 01:09:59,996 --> 01:10:02,107 resource ? And that is that mid level 1630 01:10:02,107 --> 01:10:05,960 spectrum . So I would start . I'll 1631 01:10:05,970 --> 01:10:08,730 be happy to comment on Section 2 14 and 1632 01:10:08,730 --> 01:10:11,700 then possibly Dr Griffin to talk about 1633 01:10:11,700 --> 01:10:13,790 what it is we are doing this far is 1634 01:10:13,790 --> 01:10:15,720 moving forward with five G from 1635 01:10:15,720 --> 01:10:17,831 experimentations . You know , you may 1636 01:10:17,831 --> 01:10:20,920 get very good point on section 2 14 We 1637 01:10:20,920 --> 01:10:24,150 go back . The Communications Act was 1638 01:10:24,150 --> 01:10:26,317 passed back in 1934 . There's been all 1639 01:10:26,317 --> 01:10:29,120 kinds of ident ums to that act . And 1640 01:10:29,120 --> 01:10:31,176 yet throughout this , if you look at 1641 01:10:31,176 --> 01:10:33,120 the policies , the processes , the 1642 01:10:33,120 --> 01:10:35,720 tools that have been used , where we go 1643 01:10:35,720 --> 01:10:38,120 through in government to look at 1644 01:10:38,130 --> 01:10:40,030 repurpose ing spectrum , they're 1645 01:10:40,030 --> 01:10:42,530 antiquated . One of the reasons I was 1646 01:10:42,530 --> 01:10:44,250 so excited about 2 14 was the 1647 01:10:44,250 --> 01:10:47,150 opportunity for these processes , these 1648 01:10:47,150 --> 01:10:49,680 procedures and the tools to be updated . 1649 01:10:50,660 --> 01:10:53,120 We need these tools because not only 1650 01:10:53,120 --> 01:10:55,342 does it help us to look at , how do you 1651 01:10:55,342 --> 01:10:59,200 respect repurpose spectrum that allows 1652 01:10:59,200 --> 01:11:01,250 us to manage , incorporate and 1653 01:11:01,250 --> 01:11:03,306 incorporate how you actually have to 1654 01:11:03,306 --> 01:11:06,620 operate the spectrum for us to get to 1655 01:11:06,620 --> 01:11:09,810 faster spectrum repurpose ING decisions 1656 01:11:10,000 --> 01:11:12,590 and the key word there is faster . We 1657 01:11:12,590 --> 01:11:15,560 cannot do that without moving towards 1658 01:11:15,560 --> 01:11:18,700 dynamics spectrum sharing . To do that 1659 01:11:19,060 --> 01:11:22,380 to 14 provided us the opportunity to 1660 01:11:22,380 --> 01:11:24,436 modernize the tools to modernize the 1661 01:11:24,436 --> 01:11:26,650 processes on how we go about doing the 1662 01:11:26,650 --> 01:11:26,970 surf 1663 01:11:30,960 --> 01:11:33,410 in terms of national defense . Would 1664 01:11:33,410 --> 01:11:36,230 you say that , uh , this particular 1665 01:11:36,230 --> 01:11:38,480 discussion concerning the llegado 1666 01:11:38,480 --> 01:11:41,970 application his perhaps just a shot 1667 01:11:41,970 --> 01:11:44,026 over the bow as to how serious these 1668 01:11:44,026 --> 01:11:46,730 issues are and the need to revisit what 1669 01:11:46,730 --> 01:11:49,070 we were trying to do in 2 14 last year , 1670 01:11:50,910 --> 01:11:53,132 I would say when it comes to discussion 1671 01:11:53,132 --> 01:11:55,299 of national defense , I would defer to 1672 01:11:55,299 --> 01:11:57,521 General Raymond to discuss the views on 1673 01:11:57,521 --> 01:12:01,080 that General Raymond , I am not an 1674 01:12:01,080 --> 01:12:03,970 expert to 14 but I will tell you the 1675 01:12:03,970 --> 01:12:06,248 use of spectrum is critical door force . 1676 01:12:06,248 --> 01:12:08,470 It's our maneuver space . It provides a 1677 01:12:08,470 --> 01:12:10,414 strategic operational and tactical 1678 01:12:10,414 --> 01:12:12,581 advantage . When you look at what kind 1679 01:12:12,581 --> 01:12:14,803 of capabilities we have , we have to be 1680 01:12:14,803 --> 01:12:16,914 able to operate in that spectrum . We 1681 01:12:16,914 --> 01:12:16,380 have to be able to detect , 1682 01:12:16,590 --> 01:12:18,830 characterize and geo locate 1683 01:12:18,830 --> 01:12:20,886 interference . We have to be able to 1684 01:12:20,886 --> 01:12:23,108 operate in that spectrum how we trained 1685 01:12:23,108 --> 01:12:24,774 to do so every day . And it's 1686 01:12:24,774 --> 01:12:27,052 absolutely critical to our joint force . 1687 01:12:27,052 --> 01:12:29,052 Thank you . Uh , General , one more 1688 01:12:29,052 --> 01:12:30,997 question , uh , with regard to the 1689 01:12:30,997 --> 01:12:33,052 amount of data that we're collecting 1690 01:12:33,052 --> 01:12:35,108 right now with the platforms that we 1691 01:12:35,108 --> 01:12:38,830 already have , uh , within our system 1692 01:12:38,830 --> 01:12:41,670 today , um , we're collecting huge 1693 01:12:41,670 --> 01:12:43,892 amounts of data , and the need for five 1694 01:12:43,892 --> 01:12:46,770 G is critical . Uh , it wouldn't be 1695 01:12:46,770 --> 01:12:48,714 fair to say that the Department of 1696 01:12:48,714 --> 01:12:52,230 Defense is looking at five G as a way 1697 01:12:52,230 --> 01:12:54,550 to collect and to make our platforms 1698 01:12:54,920 --> 01:12:56,976 even more capable than what they are 1699 01:12:56,976 --> 01:12:58,920 today , and that the Department of 1700 01:12:58,920 --> 01:13:00,809 Defense is very interested in the 1701 01:13:00,809 --> 01:13:02,976 deployment of five G and not trying to 1702 01:13:02,976 --> 01:13:05,031 stop it , but rather it is necessary 1703 01:13:05,031 --> 01:13:06,753 and just simply has to be done 1704 01:13:06,753 --> 01:13:09,610 correctly . I agree wholeheartedly . We , 1705 01:13:09,620 --> 01:13:11,731 you know , I go to work every day and 1706 01:13:11,731 --> 01:13:13,953 the folks that I'm purposely go to work 1707 01:13:13,953 --> 01:13:15,953 every day and try and implement the 1708 01:13:15,953 --> 01:13:15,490 national defense strategy that says 1709 01:13:15,490 --> 01:13:17,379 we're gonna compete to turn win . 1710 01:13:18,140 --> 01:13:20,362 That's what we do in five G is gonna be 1711 01:13:20,362 --> 01:13:22,473 critical to us . But I will also tell 1712 01:13:22,473 --> 01:13:24,580 you GPS is also critical to us and 1713 01:13:24,590 --> 01:13:27,000 being able to be determined . Yes , sir . 1714 01:13:27,260 --> 01:13:29,371 Thank you . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 1715 01:13:29,371 --> 01:13:31,990 Thank you , Senator . Around Senator 1716 01:13:32,000 --> 01:13:32,760 Hirono . 1717 01:13:43,050 --> 01:13:46,870 Sorry . Whatever . I think you can hear 1718 01:13:46,870 --> 01:13:50,470 me . I'd like to ask a 1719 01:13:50,540 --> 01:13:53,340 very big , brief , non llegado question 1720 01:13:53,340 --> 01:13:55,451 because we do have the duties . Chief 1721 01:13:55,451 --> 01:13:57,760 of Information Office here . So duty 1722 01:13:57,760 --> 01:14:01,080 has seen a significant spike in cyber 1723 01:14:01,080 --> 01:14:03,550 attacks and misinformation directed at 1724 01:14:03,550 --> 01:14:05,820 service members and personnel as a 1725 01:14:05,820 --> 01:14:08,010 Pentagon shifts toward till the work 1726 01:14:08,020 --> 01:14:10,560 during this pandemic , Mr D . C . What 1727 01:14:10,570 --> 01:14:12,500 additional measures are being 1728 01:14:12,500 --> 01:14:14,667 instituted in the department to combat 1729 01:14:14,930 --> 01:14:17,330 the increased fishing and hacking that 1730 01:14:17,330 --> 01:14:19,163 has occurred during this current 1731 01:14:19,163 --> 01:14:22,670 Corbett 19 pandemic ? So a couple 1732 01:14:22,670 --> 01:14:24,892 things on that , you know , we actually 1733 01:14:24,892 --> 01:14:28,390 measure how often our network 1734 01:14:28,400 --> 01:14:32,040 is probed . How many's spams we get , 1735 01:14:32,370 --> 01:14:34,481 how many types of interference we get 1736 01:14:34,580 --> 01:14:37,370 on our network . We clearly seen on 1737 01:14:37,370 --> 01:14:39,537 Uptick one of the upticks . We've seen 1738 01:14:39,537 --> 01:14:41,910 most spearfishing , and that is 1739 01:14:41,910 --> 01:14:44,450 specific Cove . It related emails that 1740 01:14:44,450 --> 01:14:47,120 are coming in where the adversary is 1741 01:14:47,120 --> 01:14:49,231 trying to take the opportunity to use 1742 01:14:49,231 --> 01:14:51,500 Kobe as a topic to get people to 1743 01:14:51,510 --> 01:14:54,510 actively engage on . However , with 1744 01:14:54,510 --> 01:14:57,040 that said , when we look at other types 1745 01:14:57,180 --> 01:14:59,420 of activities that U S cyber command 1746 01:14:59,800 --> 01:15:01,870 sees , I have a task force where we 1747 01:15:01,870 --> 01:15:04,050 meet every week . And in that task 1748 01:15:04,050 --> 01:15:06,106 force , we discussed the very things 1749 01:15:06,106 --> 01:15:08,161 that you're bringing up . We are not 1750 01:15:08,161 --> 01:15:10,106 seeing an abnormal amount of other 1751 01:15:10,106 --> 01:15:12,870 types of activities that our metrics 1752 01:15:12,870 --> 01:15:15,037 would suggest go above and beyond what 1753 01:15:15,037 --> 01:15:17,350 we normally see other than specifically 1754 01:15:17,360 --> 01:15:20,060 in the spear fishing area . We are 1755 01:15:20,060 --> 01:15:22,560 seeing an uptick specifically related 1756 01:15:22,690 --> 01:15:24,950 to Cove it . So what we've been doing 1757 01:15:25,440 --> 01:15:27,107 because now we have moved the 1758 01:15:27,107 --> 01:15:29,440 teleworking and we're using technology 1759 01:15:29,440 --> 01:15:32,490 known as VPN and other types of tools 1760 01:15:32,490 --> 01:15:34,601 that allow people to communicate from 1761 01:15:34,601 --> 01:15:36,601 home . I'd say a couple things have 1762 01:15:36,601 --> 01:15:38,823 been really important here . Within the 1763 01:15:38,823 --> 01:15:40,934 first week after we started moving to 1764 01:15:40,934 --> 01:15:44,150 teleworking , my office issued , um , a 1765 01:15:44,150 --> 01:15:46,800 letter , a memo that went out to all 1766 01:15:46,800 --> 01:15:49,900 employees and included a small card . I 1767 01:15:49,900 --> 01:15:52,011 don't have it with me here today that 1768 01:15:52,011 --> 01:15:54,067 actually clearly listed the do's and 1769 01:15:54,067 --> 01:15:56,178 don't of what you should do from your 1770 01:15:56,178 --> 01:15:58,400 home when you're teleworking . And what 1771 01:15:58,400 --> 01:16:00,233 were the additional things to be 1772 01:16:00,233 --> 01:16:02,400 thoughtful and mindful of now that you 1773 01:16:02,400 --> 01:16:04,622 were working from home ? Additionally , 1774 01:16:04,750 --> 01:16:07,130 U S Cyber Command did stand up 1775 01:16:07,240 --> 01:16:09,280 additional task force teams to 1776 01:16:09,280 --> 01:16:12,180 specifically look at the network in 1777 01:16:12,180 --> 01:16:14,780 traffic activity that was occurring 1778 01:16:14,810 --> 01:16:18,770 because of teleworking . So have 1779 01:16:18,770 --> 01:16:20,881 you been able to identify whether the 1780 01:16:20,881 --> 01:16:22,992 spear fishing and some of these other 1781 01:16:22,992 --> 01:16:24,992 cyberattacks are emanating from any 1782 01:16:24,992 --> 01:16:28,430 particular country ? All I would say is 1783 01:16:28,520 --> 01:16:31,020 to get into specifics of where those 1784 01:16:31,020 --> 01:16:33,076 attacks are coming from and what the 1785 01:16:33,076 --> 01:16:35,242 motivations are probably go beyond the 1786 01:16:35,242 --> 01:16:37,353 classic . That's right . I understand 1787 01:16:37,353 --> 01:16:39,570 this discussion today . So this move 1788 01:16:39,570 --> 01:16:43,510 onto some of the questions that are 1789 01:16:43,510 --> 01:16:46,470 relevant to this hearing of the 1790 01:16:46,470 --> 01:16:48,081 national events Spectrum and 1791 01:16:48,081 --> 01:16:50,740 communications Tests Network any s . 1792 01:16:50,740 --> 01:16:53,400 CTN , a multi agency charter 1793 01:16:53,400 --> 01:16:55,400 partnership that seeks to provide a 1794 01:16:55,400 --> 01:16:57,456 neutral forum for testing , modeling 1795 01:16:57,456 --> 01:16:59,511 and announces , performed a study to 1796 01:16:59,511 --> 01:17:01,511 determine the impact of the goddess 1797 01:17:01,511 --> 01:17:03,456 proposed networks on GPS , the FCC 1798 01:17:03,456 --> 01:17:05,622 relied on the results of the study and 1799 01:17:05,622 --> 01:17:07,733 approving the goddess application . I 1800 01:17:07,733 --> 01:17:10,420 understand that you're d o d takes 1801 01:17:10,420 --> 01:17:14,340 issue with the n icis inhe SCT 1802 01:17:14,340 --> 01:17:17,420 and study as an initial matter of the 1803 01:17:17,420 --> 01:17:19,531 God who claimed in a filing made with 1804 01:17:19,531 --> 01:17:22,770 FCC that the tested commissioned at the 1805 01:17:22,780 --> 01:17:25,700 A S ctn were done at the request of the 1806 01:17:25,700 --> 01:17:28,550 D o d chief Information Officers office . 1807 01:17:28,870 --> 01:17:32,540 Is that true ? There was a test 1808 01:17:32,850 --> 01:17:35,570 in a request made from my predecessor 1809 01:17:36,170 --> 01:17:39,860 that asked to look at what 1810 01:17:39,860 --> 01:17:43,070 Llegado was proposing at the time . At 1811 01:17:43,070 --> 01:17:45,340 the time , that testing was based on 1812 01:17:45,920 --> 01:17:48,031 the assumption that llegada was still 1813 01:17:48,031 --> 01:17:49,520 gonna use satellite based 1814 01:17:49,670 --> 01:17:52,630 communications towards the Earth and 1815 01:17:52,640 --> 01:17:54,830 only on exception would they use 1816 01:17:54,830 --> 01:17:57,820 terrestrial based . So when we agreed 1817 01:17:57,820 --> 01:17:59,876 to that it was agreed on the premise 1818 01:17:59,876 --> 01:18:02,042 that their solution was still gonna be 1819 01:18:02,042 --> 01:18:04,098 primary , a satellite based solution 1820 01:18:04,098 --> 01:18:06,098 and not a terrestrial ground . Very 1821 01:18:06,098 --> 01:18:08,260 solution . Afterwards , you know 1822 01:18:08,270 --> 01:18:10,437 expression . We'd be used today's they 1823 01:18:10,437 --> 01:18:12,548 changed the goalpost . They said they 1824 01:18:12,548 --> 01:18:14,881 now wanted to go to a terrestrial based . 1825 01:18:14,881 --> 01:18:17,300 So basically , the rules changed in the 1826 01:18:17,300 --> 01:18:19,670 process of how that test was originally 1827 01:18:19,680 --> 01:18:22,100 conducted . Toe what llegado wanted to 1828 01:18:22,100 --> 01:18:24,211 do . Going forward , man . So in your 1829 01:18:24,211 --> 01:18:26,433 view , with the gold boys being changed 1830 01:18:26,433 --> 01:18:28,810 that the test and SCT ended we're 1831 01:18:28,810 --> 01:18:31,790 really not on point to the 1832 01:18:32,980 --> 01:18:34,980 giving of the license . I guess you 1833 01:18:34,980 --> 01:18:37,091 would say they were on point for what 1834 01:18:37,091 --> 01:18:39,313 was assumed the time , but where we are 1835 01:18:39,313 --> 01:18:41,424 today was no longer on point . So you 1836 01:18:41,424 --> 01:18:43,536 see that the FCC needs to reverse its 1837 01:18:43,536 --> 01:18:45,536 decision and there is a process for 1838 01:18:45,536 --> 01:18:47,840 asking for reconsideration . A reversal 1839 01:18:47,850 --> 01:18:50,640 has that process begun . So what we've 1840 01:18:50,640 --> 01:18:52,862 done from the d o d standpoint is we've 1841 01:18:52,862 --> 01:18:54,973 had communications on a regular basis 1842 01:18:54,973 --> 01:18:57,080 with the NT I A I'm actively getting 1843 01:18:57,080 --> 01:18:59,590 invaded the NT I A making a formal 1844 01:18:59,590 --> 01:19:02,380 request for them to do a file for re 1845 01:19:02,380 --> 01:19:04,930 agree petition . What is the time frame 1846 01:19:04,930 --> 01:19:08,260 for reconsideration or reversal by FCC ? 1847 01:19:08,620 --> 01:19:10,676 I man would have to get back to your 1848 01:19:10,676 --> 01:19:12,620 specific dates . I don't know what 1849 01:19:12,620 --> 01:19:14,620 those dates are . Not sure , Mike . 1850 01:19:14,620 --> 01:19:16,842 Anyway , you're not gonna let that time 1851 01:19:16,842 --> 01:19:18,898 misfire . Are you taking ? I believe 1852 01:19:18,898 --> 01:19:18,770 it's somewhere towards the end of May 1853 01:19:19,150 --> 01:19:21,470 that we have to have communicated that 1854 01:19:21,480 --> 01:19:23,702 repetition . Thank you . Thank you , Mr 1855 01:19:23,702 --> 01:19:25,813 Chairman . Thank you . Said Cherono . 1856 01:19:25,813 --> 01:19:29,740 Senator Kramer . Thank you . 1857 01:19:32,080 --> 01:19:33,969 Thank you , Mr Chairman . Again . 1858 01:19:33,969 --> 01:19:36,340 Senator Reid as well . Just echo 1859 01:19:36,340 --> 01:19:38,451 everyone Sentiment about what a great 1860 01:19:38,451 --> 01:19:40,618 job you've done keeping us engaged and 1861 01:19:40,618 --> 01:19:43,290 involved and communicates thoroughly . 1862 01:19:43,530 --> 01:19:45,920 And thanks to each of you sitting here 1863 01:19:45,920 --> 01:19:49,720 a little bit , I'm curious . It's a 1864 01:19:49,720 --> 01:19:51,831 good place to sit when you're curious 1865 01:19:51,831 --> 01:19:53,998 when you have four really smart people 1866 01:19:53,998 --> 01:19:55,942 I ask questions of but some of the 1867 01:19:55,942 --> 01:19:58,164 questions I have I'm gonna you're gonna 1868 01:19:58,164 --> 01:20:00,164 have to speculate about , because I 1869 01:20:00,164 --> 01:20:02,164 want to ask you about what , people 1870 01:20:02,164 --> 01:20:04,331 that won't support this . Why they why 1871 01:20:04,331 --> 01:20:06,553 they would have supported it . And that 1872 01:20:06,553 --> 01:20:05,880 may seem a little bit unfair . But 1873 01:20:05,890 --> 01:20:09,570 you're all I have , um , 11 thing I 1874 01:20:09,570 --> 01:20:11,626 want to get straightened out because 1875 01:20:11,626 --> 01:20:13,900 I've heard I've heard it said that the 1876 01:20:13,900 --> 01:20:17,590 NT I a objected but have also read that 1877 01:20:17,590 --> 01:20:20,470 the NT I A did not recommend or could 1878 01:20:20,470 --> 01:20:22,470 not recommend is there . Is there a 1879 01:20:22,470 --> 01:20:24,137 distinction there between not 1880 01:20:24,137 --> 01:20:26,303 recommending and objecting , given the 1881 01:20:26,303 --> 01:20:28,470 anti eyes authorities and I don't know 1882 01:20:28,470 --> 01:20:30,470 which one of you , maybe Mr D . C , 1883 01:20:30,470 --> 01:20:32,637 you'd know the answer to that . I used 1884 01:20:32,637 --> 01:20:34,803 to be on Energy and Commerce Committee 1885 01:20:34,803 --> 01:20:36,914 in the house . I was a communications 1886 01:20:36,914 --> 01:20:39,081 telecoms regulator for 10 years , So I 1887 01:20:39,081 --> 01:20:38,770 think there's a distinction that I just 1888 01:20:38,770 --> 01:20:41,830 want to be sure . Yeah , I'm not sure I 1889 01:20:41,830 --> 01:20:43,730 could legally tell you what those 1890 01:20:43,730 --> 01:20:45,910 distinctions are , but I will say that 1891 01:20:46,170 --> 01:20:49,320 clearly what NT eyes role is is to 1892 01:20:49,320 --> 01:20:51,460 represent back the agency's view on 1893 01:20:51,460 --> 01:20:53,460 this . So in this case , you have a 1894 01:20:53,460 --> 01:20:55,738 position , navigation , timing , X com , 1895 01:20:55,810 --> 01:20:57,930 which is made up of nine federal 1896 01:20:57,930 --> 01:21:01,550 agencies . Their job was to take our 1897 01:21:01,550 --> 01:21:04,400 view , put that in a formal letter and 1898 01:21:04,400 --> 01:21:07,660 then submit that view back to the FCC . 1899 01:21:08,150 --> 01:21:10,150 So I can tell you that their job in 1900 01:21:10,150 --> 01:21:13,320 that case was to submit the view of the 1901 01:21:13,330 --> 01:21:17,180 PMT . Does the NT I A ever , 1902 01:21:17,370 --> 01:21:20,620 um , I recommend a year in aid to the 1903 01:21:20,620 --> 01:21:24,470 FCC . I have to ask other call it , you 1904 01:21:24,470 --> 01:21:26,550 know , you know , all right , we'll 1905 01:21:26,550 --> 01:21:28,383 find that I'm just curious about 1906 01:21:28,383 --> 01:21:30,439 because it does seem to me here that 1907 01:21:30,439 --> 01:21:32,740 process matters . You're all too smart 1908 01:21:32,750 --> 01:21:34,917 for me to ask technical questions . So 1909 01:21:34,917 --> 01:21:37,250 I'm gonna focus on process a little bit . 1910 01:21:37,250 --> 01:21:39,990 Um , because the other thing that the 1911 01:21:39,990 --> 01:21:42,212 other thing that sort of perplexes me a 1912 01:21:42,212 --> 01:21:44,101 little bit is that first of all , 1913 01:21:44,101 --> 01:21:47,300 somehow five commissioners I came to 1914 01:21:47,300 --> 01:21:49,180 this some version of the same 1915 01:21:49,180 --> 01:21:51,347 conclusion that that's another thing , 1916 01:21:51,347 --> 01:21:53,569 that just because they either voted yes 1917 01:21:53,569 --> 01:21:55,624 or didn't object Doesn't necessarily 1918 01:21:55,624 --> 01:21:57,513 mean they have the same degree of 1919 01:21:57,513 --> 01:21:59,291 enthusiasm for a decision . But 1920 01:21:59,291 --> 01:22:01,630 nonetheless , it was 5 to 0 . And I do 1921 01:22:01,640 --> 01:22:05,030 My my reading tells me nt I A did not 1922 01:22:05,120 --> 01:22:08,480 object . Nor did they recommend I think 1923 01:22:08,480 --> 01:22:12,220 they can recommend . Um , But there are 1924 01:22:12,220 --> 01:22:13,820 some other fairly important 1925 01:22:14,260 --> 01:22:16,490 administration folks , and they're 1926 01:22:16,490 --> 01:22:18,657 concerned about national security that 1927 01:22:18,657 --> 01:22:20,712 seemed have supported the decision . 1928 01:22:20,712 --> 01:22:20,510 Unless they've changed their minds , 1929 01:22:20,510 --> 01:22:22,510 that would be course . Secretary of 1930 01:22:22,510 --> 01:22:24,788 State Pompeo and Attorney General Barr . 1931 01:22:24,788 --> 01:22:26,843 Does anybody know if they've changed 1932 01:22:26,843 --> 01:22:29,430 their minds or why they feel 1933 01:22:29,430 --> 01:22:33,180 differently there ? Yeah . Okay , 1934 01:22:33,190 --> 01:22:35,246 I'm I'll ask them , I guess . Be the 1935 01:22:35,246 --> 01:22:37,100 best thing to do . The one other 1936 01:22:37,100 --> 01:22:40,830 process question I have , um is 1937 01:22:41,590 --> 01:22:43,646 how How long was this application in 1938 01:22:44,300 --> 01:22:46,411 anybody know when the application was 1939 01:22:46,411 --> 01:22:50,280 made ? Because my sense is that there's 1940 01:22:51,200 --> 01:22:53,422 there's volumes and volumes and volumes 1941 01:22:53,422 --> 01:22:55,644 and hours and hours and hours dedicated 1942 01:22:55,644 --> 01:22:57,922 this and we know about yours obviously . 1943 01:22:57,922 --> 01:23:00,570 And I would just be interested , kind 1944 01:23:00,570 --> 01:23:02,514 of in some some or the street just 1945 01:23:02,514 --> 01:23:06,240 helps me Teoh satisfy my curiosity . I 1946 01:23:06,240 --> 01:23:08,296 have no doubt that everything you've 1947 01:23:08,296 --> 01:23:10,351 said is absolutely 100% accurate and 1948 01:23:10,351 --> 01:23:12,462 true . Don't don't get me wrong , but 1949 01:23:12,462 --> 01:23:14,462 it does help me balance my thinking 1950 01:23:14,462 --> 01:23:16,629 when I here a little more from someone 1951 01:23:16,629 --> 01:23:18,851 else . But that's not your That's not . 1952 01:23:18,851 --> 01:23:21,880 I know that's not your , um , objective , 1953 01:23:21,880 --> 01:23:24,590 but it just it's just kind of so what ? 1954 01:23:24,590 --> 01:23:27,120 That Mr Chairman else , I'll ask some 1955 01:23:27,120 --> 01:23:29,231 questions . Other places . Thanks for 1956 01:23:29,231 --> 01:23:31,453 doing this really important information 1957 01:23:31,453 --> 01:23:33,509 and really important is other people 1958 01:23:33,509 --> 01:23:35,731 hear it . Let me shed a little light on 1959 01:23:35,731 --> 01:23:37,731 that . They took over that bankrupt 1960 01:23:37,731 --> 01:23:41,660 company in the year 2015 and I have 1961 01:23:41,670 --> 01:23:44,490 reason for Heavy . Looked at this quite 1962 01:23:44,490 --> 01:23:46,830 a bit to believe that they have been 1963 01:23:46,840 --> 01:23:50,830 working on there licensing for 1964 01:23:50,830 --> 01:23:53,720 quite some time . And while they've 1965 01:23:53,720 --> 01:23:56,300 been looking at it , none of us that I 1966 01:23:56,300 --> 01:23:58,820 know of were aware that that was going 1967 01:23:58,820 --> 01:24:01,920 on . So I just think there's a level of 1968 01:24:01,920 --> 01:24:04,670 security that they had among themselves . 1969 01:24:04,670 --> 01:24:06,614 I'm saying that as nice as I can . 1970 01:24:08,530 --> 01:24:10,474 Yes , thank you , Senator Kramer , 1971 01:24:10,474 --> 01:24:13,310 Senator Kate said 1972 01:24:15,350 --> 01:24:17,760 your chair . And again I echo my 1973 01:24:17,880 --> 01:24:20,047 comments that I said to you personally 1974 01:24:20,047 --> 01:24:22,269 yesterday . This was the only committee 1975 01:24:22,269 --> 01:24:24,436 that I serve on . I serve on four that 1976 01:24:24,436 --> 01:24:26,658 had weekly telephone conferences during 1977 01:24:26,658 --> 01:24:28,658 the time we were away and they were 1978 01:24:28,658 --> 01:24:30,436 really valuable and we had some 1979 01:24:30,436 --> 01:24:32,547 spirited debate , and sometimes I got 1980 01:24:32,547 --> 01:24:34,658 an answer to a question I liked , and 1981 01:24:34,658 --> 01:24:33,940 sometimes I didn't . But this was the 1982 01:24:33,940 --> 01:24:35,884 only committee that was doing that 1983 01:24:35,884 --> 01:24:37,773 every week , and I really applaud 1984 01:24:37,773 --> 01:24:39,662 taking leadership , the chair and 1985 01:24:39,662 --> 01:24:41,662 ranking for that . You've made some 1986 01:24:41,662 --> 01:24:41,470 really persuasive points , but you 1987 01:24:41,470 --> 01:24:43,810 haven't persuaded me . Um , and the 1988 01:24:43,810 --> 01:24:45,977 reason you haven't is we've only heard 1989 01:24:45,977 --> 01:24:48,600 one side of the case . I tried a lot of 1990 01:24:48,600 --> 01:24:51,350 cases in my day before I got into this 1991 01:24:51,350 --> 01:24:53,572 line of work , and I would never make a 1992 01:24:53,572 --> 01:24:55,572 decision and agree . Yeah , the FCC 1993 01:24:55,572 --> 01:24:57,628 needs to reverse their decision when 1994 01:24:57,628 --> 01:24:59,794 the FCC's right in town and could have 1995 01:24:59,794 --> 01:25:01,739 been at this hearing or llegado if 1996 01:25:01,739 --> 01:25:04,230 llegado I knew that we were concerned 1997 01:25:04,230 --> 01:25:06,563 they'd want to come and make their case . 1998 01:25:06,563 --> 01:25:08,674 All of the questions and concerns and 1999 01:25:08,674 --> 01:25:10,341 the speculation is completely 2000 01:25:10,341 --> 01:25:12,397 unnecessary . There are two sides to 2001 01:25:12,397 --> 01:25:14,490 this . The FCC reached a unanimous 2002 01:25:14,490 --> 01:25:17,040 decision , which is not that common for 2003 01:25:17,040 --> 01:25:20,030 that body . One matters of controversy , 2004 01:25:20,490 --> 01:25:22,601 Um , and they would have something to 2005 01:25:22,601 --> 01:25:24,490 say about all these questions and 2006 01:25:24,490 --> 01:25:26,601 because of your testimony , which has 2007 01:25:26,601 --> 01:25:26,270 been great testimony . I would have 2008 01:25:26,270 --> 01:25:28,740 really tough questions for them . But 2009 01:25:28,740 --> 01:25:31,090 it's hard to convince an Armed Services 2010 01:25:31,360 --> 01:25:34,970 Committee member to reverse a decision 2011 01:25:34,970 --> 01:25:37,137 based upon the presentation . One side 2012 01:25:37,137 --> 01:25:39,310 of the case . Let me ask you a couple 2013 01:25:39,310 --> 01:25:41,366 of questions . My understanding from 2014 01:25:41,366 --> 01:25:45,240 the timeline is that the the X com is 2015 01:25:45,240 --> 01:25:49,010 at the PMT X com . Uh looked at 2016 01:25:49,010 --> 01:25:51,232 testing that had been done beginning in 2017 01:25:51,232 --> 01:25:53,610 2016 and made a recommendation in March 2018 01:25:53,920 --> 01:25:57,470 of 2018 to oppose the llegado proposal . 2019 01:25:57,470 --> 01:26:00,810 Is that basically right that the PMT X 2020 01:26:00,810 --> 01:26:02,754 com unanimous decision opposed the 2021 01:26:02,754 --> 01:26:04,810 proposal was made in March of 2018 ? 2022 01:26:05,530 --> 01:26:08,670 Sir , I am personally not familiar with 2023 01:26:08,680 --> 01:26:10,680 that particular date . I'm familiar 2024 01:26:10,680 --> 01:26:14,000 with the date of December of 2018 in 2025 01:26:14,000 --> 01:26:17,740 which we formally documented to NT i a 2026 01:26:17,850 --> 01:26:20,560 view a pmt . I am reading from 2027 01:26:20,560 --> 01:26:22,616 materials that have been provided by 2028 01:26:22,616 --> 01:26:24,504 the D . O . D . But it looks like 2029 01:26:24,504 --> 01:26:26,504 testing was earlier . The PMT X com 2030 01:26:26,504 --> 01:26:28,727 reached a unanimous decision in March , 2031 01:26:28,727 --> 01:26:30,727 and then it was communicated . Mr . 2032 01:26:30,727 --> 01:26:33,360 DC's , you say in December was the 2033 01:26:33,360 --> 01:26:37,060 information the proposal as tested and 2034 01:26:37,060 --> 01:26:40,110 as opposed in March of 2018 and then 2035 01:26:40,110 --> 01:26:42,670 communicated in December 2018 . Was 2036 01:26:42,670 --> 01:26:44,940 that exactly the same proposal that the 2037 01:26:44,940 --> 01:26:47,110 FCC ruled upon on April 20th ? 2038 01:26:49,430 --> 01:26:52,860 Throughout this process , there have 2039 01:26:52,860 --> 01:26:55,830 been multiple amendments to what 2040 01:26:55,830 --> 01:26:57,997 Llegado is had to propose . So and you 2041 01:26:57,997 --> 01:27:00,052 mentioned a couple you mentioned the 2042 01:27:00,052 --> 01:27:01,886 idea of the the buffer that they 2043 01:27:01,886 --> 01:27:04,052 created in that lowering power . So my 2044 01:27:04,052 --> 01:27:06,920 my surmises that the objection that was 2045 01:27:07,130 --> 01:27:10,580 done in 2018 was based upon a version 2046 01:27:10,580 --> 01:27:13,780 of llegado proposal . But the FCC 2047 01:27:13,790 --> 01:27:17,130 approval in April of 2020 was based 2048 01:27:17,130 --> 01:27:19,600 upon a proposal that had changed in 2049 01:27:19,600 --> 01:27:22,110 some ways . Is that correct ? But the 2050 01:27:22,110 --> 01:27:25,240 proposal , far as I know in Dr Griffin , 2051 01:27:25,240 --> 01:27:28,100 maybe you can speak to specific testing 2052 01:27:28,100 --> 01:27:31,300 was done . Um waas 2053 01:27:33,270 --> 01:27:35,214 the proposal in 2020 that was just 2054 01:27:35,214 --> 01:27:36,826 recently approved with those 2055 01:27:36,826 --> 01:27:39,048 restrictions . When we go back and look 2056 01:27:39,048 --> 01:27:41,620 at what was done on the testing against 2057 01:27:41,700 --> 01:27:43,730 those restrictions , nothing has 2058 01:27:43,730 --> 01:27:45,760 changed well , but that's not my 2059 01:27:45,760 --> 01:27:47,950 question . My question is a real 2060 01:27:47,950 --> 01:27:50,640 precise one , Which is is the proposal 2061 01:27:50,640 --> 01:27:53,740 that the FCC ruled on the same proposal 2062 01:27:53,740 --> 01:27:55,940 that the PMT exact calm unanimously , 2063 01:27:55,940 --> 01:27:58,190 decided to approve and disapprove in 2064 01:27:58,190 --> 01:28:00,780 March of 2018 or were there changes you 2065 01:28:00,780 --> 01:28:02,891 were suggesting to me that there were 2066 01:28:02,891 --> 01:28:05,058 changes along the way . There has been 2067 01:28:05,058 --> 01:28:07,224 changes along the way of which we have 2068 01:28:07,224 --> 01:28:09,336 continued to communicate and evaluate 2069 01:28:09,336 --> 01:28:11,970 those the letter of 2018 that I have to 2070 01:28:11,970 --> 01:28:13,970 go back . Okay , let me ask this 2071 01:28:13,980 --> 01:28:16,870 through April 2020 . Ruling of the FCC 2072 01:28:17,050 --> 01:28:19,250 had some conditions in it . Now , that 2073 01:28:19,250 --> 01:28:21,670 was 16 days ago that they that they 2074 01:28:21,680 --> 01:28:24,220 reached that conclusion have you , with 2075 01:28:24,220 --> 01:28:26,700 the significant testing capacity at 2076 01:28:26,710 --> 01:28:29,600 your disposal , have you gone back and 2077 01:28:29,600 --> 01:28:33,070 re run tests against the version of the 2078 01:28:33,070 --> 01:28:36,770 FCC that the FCC approved with the with 2079 01:28:36,770 --> 01:28:39,440 the requirements , the quote , 2080 01:28:39,440 --> 01:28:41,662 stringent requirements they put on it . 2081 01:28:41,662 --> 01:28:43,884 So have you done any more testing since 2082 01:28:43,884 --> 01:28:47,220 April 20th ? I'm not aware of any 2083 01:28:47,220 --> 01:28:50,600 specific test that have been done , and 2084 01:28:50,600 --> 01:28:52,810 I think the reason is those particular 2085 01:28:53,180 --> 01:28:55,580 guard bands , power levels , 2086 01:28:55,720 --> 01:28:58,860 coordination and re mediations were all 2087 01:28:58,860 --> 01:29:00,582 the same that we had looked at 2088 01:29:00,582 --> 01:29:03,250 previously . Okay , I want to get that 2089 01:29:03,300 --> 01:29:05,467 in writing , cause I want to make sure 2090 01:29:05,467 --> 01:29:08,550 that the opposition in March of 2018 in 2091 01:29:08,550 --> 01:29:10,770 fact applied to the proposal as it 2092 01:29:10,770 --> 01:29:13,660 existed and was approved in April 2020 . 2093 01:29:14,040 --> 01:29:16,207 Center Cramer indicated that he thinks 2094 01:29:16,207 --> 01:29:18,318 the attorney general and Secretary of 2095 01:29:18,318 --> 01:29:20,980 state are now in support of the llegado 2096 01:29:20,980 --> 01:29:22,869 proposal before the FCC . Is that 2097 01:29:22,869 --> 01:29:26,750 correct ? That's what I have heard in 2098 01:29:26,760 --> 01:29:29,720 the public . Have you ? Have you then 2099 01:29:29,720 --> 01:29:31,776 sought to find out why that would be 2100 01:29:31,776 --> 01:29:33,998 the case . I have not personally . No , 2101 01:29:33,998 --> 01:29:36,053 sir . Are either of those members of 2102 01:29:36,053 --> 01:29:38,240 this nine member anti exact calmer 2103 01:29:38,350 --> 01:29:41,250 state and DOJ or they not members of 2104 01:29:41,250 --> 01:29:43,660 that nine member test scores ? They are . 2105 01:29:43,660 --> 01:29:46,830 The Department of State is a member of 2106 01:29:46,830 --> 01:29:48,774 that . And how about Department of 2107 01:29:48,774 --> 01:29:51,810 Justice ? The Department of Justice is 2108 01:29:52,520 --> 01:29:55,050 not a member of that . All right , I'm 2109 01:29:55,050 --> 01:29:57,328 I've exceeded my time . Thank you , Mr . 2110 01:29:58,870 --> 01:30:02,530 Thank you . Senator McCain . 2111 01:30:02,540 --> 01:30:04,970 Senator . Cut . 2112 01:30:06,530 --> 01:30:08,586 Thank you , Mr Chairman and center . 2113 01:30:08,586 --> 01:30:10,641 Rita , I want toe at my voice . What 2114 01:30:10,641 --> 01:30:12,641 center came said thank you for your 2115 01:30:12,641 --> 01:30:15,130 commitment during our long break from 2116 01:30:15,140 --> 01:30:17,520 Washington during this pandemic for 2117 01:30:17,520 --> 01:30:19,742 holding regular weekly conference calls 2118 01:30:19,742 --> 01:30:21,853 and thank you for putting together is 2119 01:30:21,853 --> 01:30:23,798 very important hearing . Associate 2120 01:30:23,798 --> 01:30:25,909 myself with Sarah Cain's Mark remarks 2121 01:30:25,909 --> 01:30:28,076 again second time and that I think you 2122 01:30:28,076 --> 01:30:30,131 make a pretty compelling case . I've 2123 01:30:30,131 --> 01:30:32,242 read through all these materials that 2124 01:30:32,242 --> 01:30:34,298 we've had for the hearing . But it's 2125 01:30:34,298 --> 01:30:33,820 really important that we hear from the 2126 01:30:33,820 --> 01:30:37,590 unanimous FCC and from Lo Gatto as well 2127 01:30:37,620 --> 01:30:40,800 for us to make a reason conclusion . Um , 2128 01:30:41,530 --> 01:30:43,697 I associate myself center . Can't came 2129 01:30:43,697 --> 01:30:45,863 for 1/3 time . He's probably beginning 2130 01:30:45,863 --> 01:30:48,740 to get anxious about this . Um , about 2131 01:30:48,740 --> 01:30:50,962 the attorney general . The Secretary of 2132 01:30:50,962 --> 01:30:53,650 State Senator Cramer's asked this . 2133 01:30:53,960 --> 01:30:56,290 Sarah Cain's asked this limits s Mr D . 2134 01:30:56,290 --> 01:30:58,860 C . And Dr Griffin directly . What do 2135 01:30:58,860 --> 01:31:01,190 you see ? That Attorney General Barr 2136 01:31:01,200 --> 01:31:03,980 and Secretary Pompeo don't see you 2137 01:31:03,980 --> 01:31:05,980 opposes proposal . They support the 2138 01:31:05,980 --> 01:31:08,091 proposal . So what is it that you see 2139 01:31:08,091 --> 01:31:11,870 that they don't see ? Sir , I've 2140 01:31:12,910 --> 01:31:15,700 you know , is a technologist for almost 2141 01:31:15,700 --> 01:31:18,560 40 years . Now I see the science . I 2142 01:31:18,560 --> 01:31:21,030 see the studies . I see the results of 2143 01:31:21,040 --> 01:31:24,340 what has been done in the science 2144 01:31:24,340 --> 01:31:26,580 clearly shows everything we've talked 2145 01:31:26,580 --> 01:31:28,136 about today in terms of the 2146 01:31:28,136 --> 01:31:30,358 interference . So that's what I see . I 2147 01:31:30,358 --> 01:31:32,820 have I can't speculate on what , um , 2148 01:31:32,920 --> 01:31:35,890 Secretary Pomp Hill or Secretary Bar 2149 01:31:35,890 --> 01:31:39,850 Siem . So Senator Kaine raised this as 2150 01:31:39,850 --> 01:31:42,640 well about the testing . I mean , has 2151 01:31:42,640 --> 01:31:46,070 there been specific realistic 2152 01:31:46,720 --> 01:31:49,310 testing done under the conditions 2153 01:31:49,310 --> 01:31:53,290 proposed by the FCC in last month's 2154 01:31:53,290 --> 01:31:55,430 order ? I've read a lot of the 2155 01:31:55,430 --> 01:31:57,720 materials here . I've got Secretary s 2156 01:31:57,720 --> 01:31:59,831 Spurs letter here , and there's a lot 2157 01:31:59,831 --> 01:32:02,070 of conditional verbs in that letter . 2158 01:32:02,080 --> 01:32:04,247 There's a lot of conditional verbs and 2159 01:32:04,247 --> 01:32:06,247 the other material I've read here , 2160 01:32:06,247 --> 01:32:06,130 things like may jeopardize the 2161 01:32:06,130 --> 01:32:08,750 effectiveness and reliability GPS . It 2162 01:32:08,750 --> 01:32:11,370 has the potential to disrupt commercial 2163 01:32:11,370 --> 01:32:15,190 GPS receivers . Um , has there 2164 01:32:15,190 --> 01:32:17,830 been testing on specific relist it 2165 01:32:17,830 --> 01:32:21,160 conditions of the FCC's order 2166 01:32:22,290 --> 01:32:25,590 that we can say yes , it will interfere ? 2167 01:32:30,730 --> 01:32:32,952 There hasn't been any testing since the 2168 01:32:32,952 --> 01:32:36,160 order was issued 16 days ago . The 2169 01:32:36,160 --> 01:32:39,160 testing that was done was done not by 2170 01:32:39,160 --> 01:32:41,216 the Department of Defense but by the 2171 01:32:41,216 --> 01:32:43,720 Department of Transportation . And it 2172 01:32:43,730 --> 01:32:46,700 is as exquisitely well done as anything 2173 01:32:46,700 --> 01:32:49,240 that I think I have ever seen . They 2174 01:32:49,240 --> 01:32:52,590 tested 80 receivers . They tested them 2175 01:32:52,600 --> 01:32:55,340 against the power levels that llegado 2176 01:32:55,420 --> 01:32:58,840 is claiming today to use . And an 2177 01:32:58,840 --> 01:33:01,062 answer to Senator Keynes . Question The 2178 01:33:01,062 --> 01:33:03,118 power level was the most significant 2179 01:33:03,550 --> 01:33:06,510 single attributes against which one 2180 01:33:06,510 --> 01:33:09,460 would test the D O T . Tests , As I 2181 01:33:09,460 --> 01:33:12,410 said in my earlier testimony , were 2182 01:33:12,950 --> 01:33:16,820 designed to elucidate what 2183 01:33:16,820 --> 01:33:20,120 was necessary to protect the GPS band , 2184 01:33:21,050 --> 01:33:24,640 the issue of testing one transmitter 2185 01:33:24,650 --> 01:33:27,340 against one receiver and substituting 2186 01:33:27,340 --> 01:33:29,910 one receiver after another in specific 2187 01:33:29,910 --> 01:33:33,330 scenarios is , frankly , a fool's 2188 01:33:33,330 --> 01:33:36,040 errand . I can always put together a 2189 01:33:36,040 --> 01:33:38,560 different geometry . Ah , different 2190 01:33:38,960 --> 01:33:42,640 scenario , um , and then ask the 2191 01:33:42,640 --> 01:33:44,362 question again . Would llegado 2192 01:33:44,362 --> 01:33:47,050 interfere with that ? That is not the 2193 01:33:47,050 --> 01:33:49,161 way to go about it . The way that the 2194 01:33:49,161 --> 01:33:51,383 Department of Transportation did in its 2195 01:33:51,383 --> 01:33:53,606 adjacent band compatibility test is the 2196 01:33:53,606 --> 01:33:55,880 way to go about it . Those results were 2197 01:33:55,890 --> 01:33:58,930 unambiguous . They were compelling at 2198 01:33:58,930 --> 01:34:01,370 the power levels that llegado chooses 2199 01:34:01,370 --> 01:34:03,900 to put forward for its ground based 2200 01:34:03,900 --> 01:34:07,320 transmissions . GPS receivers , broadly 2201 01:34:07,320 --> 01:34:09,480 speaking , will be compromised . 2202 01:34:11,130 --> 01:34:12,852 Okay , I have one final set of 2203 01:34:12,852 --> 01:34:15,810 questions here on Dr Griffin . All 2204 01:34:15,810 --> 01:34:17,754 directors towards you there . On a 2205 01:34:17,754 --> 01:34:19,921 related matter . In January , numerous 2206 01:34:19,921 --> 01:34:22,143 media outlets to include The Washington 2207 01:34:22,143 --> 01:34:23,977 Post and The Wall Street Journal 2208 01:34:23,977 --> 01:34:26,199 reported that the Pentagon was going to 2209 01:34:26,199 --> 01:34:25,610 block instead of roles that would have 2210 01:34:25,610 --> 01:34:27,777 limited the export of semiconductors , 2211 01:34:27,777 --> 01:34:29,666 computer chips and other kinds of 2212 01:34:29,666 --> 01:34:31,666 advance microelectronic drawn extra 2213 01:34:31,666 --> 01:34:34,010 wall way . Is it correct that the 2214 01:34:34,010 --> 01:34:36,270 Department of Defense initially non 2215 01:34:36,270 --> 01:34:38,450 concurred to use the technical term 2216 01:34:38,460 --> 01:34:41,890 with these rule changes ? I don't know 2217 01:34:41,890 --> 01:34:43,723 if the Department of Defense non 2218 01:34:43,723 --> 01:34:45,334 concurred . The Research and 2219 01:34:45,334 --> 01:34:47,223 Engineering Undersecretariat , my 2220 01:34:47,223 --> 01:34:50,010 organization , not concurred . We don't 2221 01:34:50,010 --> 01:34:53,020 believe that that those particular 2222 01:34:53,020 --> 01:34:54,687 restrictions were going to be 2223 01:34:54,687 --> 01:34:56,930 beneficial and that they we believe 2224 01:34:56,940 --> 01:34:58,773 that they would hurt the U . S . 2225 01:34:58,773 --> 01:35:00,884 Semiconductor industry more than they 2226 01:35:00,884 --> 01:35:02,940 would hurt China . If the goal is to 2227 01:35:02,940 --> 01:35:05,051 damage China , that's not the tool to 2228 01:35:05,051 --> 01:35:08,360 use . And but Secretary expert did not 2229 01:35:08,370 --> 01:35:11,470 agree with that . That's correct . So 2230 01:35:11,480 --> 01:35:13,480 this is just another concern that I 2231 01:35:13,480 --> 01:35:15,647 have is that the Department of Defense 2232 01:35:15,647 --> 01:35:17,591 could have an exaggerated sense of 2233 01:35:17,591 --> 01:35:19,869 scientific and technological certitude . 2234 01:35:20,240 --> 01:35:22,480 Um , that is not appropriately 2235 01:35:22,480 --> 01:35:25,460 balancing the strategic imperatives or 2236 01:35:25,460 --> 01:35:27,571 the geopolitical challenges we face . 2237 01:35:27,640 --> 01:35:29,740 Not saying that is the case . But in 2238 01:35:29,740 --> 01:35:32,130 light of that decision on in light of 2239 01:35:32,130 --> 01:35:34,186 the case I see here in front of me , 2240 01:35:34,186 --> 01:35:36,297 much of which is contingent , I think 2241 01:35:36,297 --> 01:35:38,519 we at least need to continue to explore 2242 01:35:38,519 --> 01:35:40,797 that . Thank you . Thank you , Senator . 2243 01:35:40,797 --> 01:35:44,690 Cotton Surgery King . Thank you , Mr 2244 01:35:44,690 --> 01:35:46,801 Chairman . And again , thanks for the 2245 01:35:46,801 --> 01:35:48,801 work during the break . In the time 2246 01:35:48,801 --> 01:35:51,360 that we had , uh , talking about the 2247 01:35:51,910 --> 01:35:53,743 the Corona virus response at the 2248 01:35:53,743 --> 01:35:57,220 department , what was the power level 2249 01:35:57,220 --> 01:35:59,442 that was used for the D . O t testing , 2250 01:35:59,442 --> 01:36:02,950 please . D o t provided 2251 01:36:02,950 --> 01:36:05,670 results for the original llegado power 2252 01:36:05,670 --> 01:36:08,100 level , I believe of 1500 watts and 2253 01:36:08,100 --> 01:36:10,400 specifically to the present case and 2254 01:36:10,400 --> 01:36:12,780 the president . FCC order 10 watts . 2255 01:36:12,910 --> 01:36:16,220 Can you put that in terms of D B W D B 2256 01:36:16,220 --> 01:36:19,670 W would be 10 10 db w for the 10 or 2257 01:36:19,670 --> 01:36:22,160 what . Transit and transportation . So 2258 01:36:22,160 --> 01:36:25,500 the study did include the 9.8 d VW 2259 01:36:25,560 --> 01:36:29,110 analysis . Correct , and that did find 2260 01:36:29,290 --> 01:36:31,350 clear evidence of interference . 2261 01:36:32,090 --> 01:36:34,860 Exactly So , sir , in fact , they 2262 01:36:34,860 --> 01:36:37,670 published . They published carefully 2263 01:36:38,190 --> 01:36:42,110 the power levels required to cause the 2264 01:36:42,110 --> 01:36:44,277 suite of receivers that were tested to 2265 01:36:44,277 --> 01:36:47,990 lock up . Could you supply that data to 2266 01:36:47,990 --> 01:36:50,410 this committee ? Absolutely . I 2267 01:36:50,420 --> 01:36:53,050 appreciate that . I share my some of 2268 01:36:53,050 --> 01:36:55,272 the concerns that have been raised that 2269 01:36:55,272 --> 01:36:57,494 the FCC is . They're capable people . I 2270 01:36:57,494 --> 01:36:59,494 don't know . He's always agree with 2271 01:36:59,494 --> 01:37:01,550 them . It's one of the few unanimous 2272 01:37:01,550 --> 01:37:03,717 orders I've seen them undertake . It's 2273 01:37:03,717 --> 01:37:05,939 a 74 page order with 444 footnotes . It 2274 01:37:05,939 --> 01:37:07,994 strikes me that some serious thought 2275 01:37:07,994 --> 01:37:11,820 went into it , Uh , and one of their 2276 01:37:11,830 --> 01:37:13,497 they have two concerns . As I 2277 01:37:13,497 --> 01:37:15,910 understand the order , one is the 2278 01:37:15,920 --> 01:37:18,210 development of the Internet of things , 2279 01:37:18,630 --> 01:37:20,710 and that's an important part of the 2280 01:37:20,790 --> 01:37:23,123 future development of five G technology , 2281 01:37:23,123 --> 01:37:24,970 and indeed the technology of the 2282 01:37:24,980 --> 01:37:27,440 country . The second is efficient use 2283 01:37:27,450 --> 01:37:31,410 of of spectrum . What is 2284 01:37:31,420 --> 01:37:34,790 the shadow cast by the GPS banned ? In 2285 01:37:34,790 --> 01:37:37,550 other words , how much spectrum are you 2286 01:37:38,730 --> 01:37:41,590 way questioning your version of what 2287 01:37:41,590 --> 01:37:44,140 happened here ? I was just thinking 2288 01:37:44,680 --> 01:37:47,620 that it sounds like a court challenge 2289 01:37:47,620 --> 01:37:51,440 waiting to happen . And , uh , I guess 2290 01:37:51,440 --> 01:37:53,607 it's on us to try to ask some of these 2291 01:37:53,607 --> 01:37:55,773 questions of the private parties . And 2292 01:37:55,773 --> 01:37:57,551 then that was the reason for my 2293 01:37:57,551 --> 01:37:59,607 question . That's a very fair , very 2294 01:37:59,607 --> 01:38:02,120 fair . All right , Anything else for 2295 01:38:02,120 --> 01:38:04,287 you ? Nothing else . We're adjourned . 2296 01:38:06,030 --> 01:38:08,500 Let me . I want to go ahead and get 2297 01:38:08,500 --> 01:38:10,778 adjourned before somebody else came in . 2298 01:38:10,778 --> 01:38:14,210 But let me just say to you folks and 2299 01:38:14,220 --> 01:38:15,942 make sure that I assume it was 2300 01:38:15,942 --> 01:38:18,109 considered beyond the record . I thank 2301 01:38:18,109 --> 01:38:20,220 you very much . All all four of you , 2302 01:38:20,220 --> 01:38:22,380 you offered in expertise , level of 2303 01:38:22,380 --> 01:38:25,200 expertise that I don't think many of us 2304 01:38:25,200 --> 01:38:27,256 really understand . I know I don't , 2305 01:38:27,256 --> 01:38:29,478 but I do know that when you get so many 2306 01:38:29,478 --> 01:38:31,790 people in opposition to something with 2307 01:38:31,800 --> 01:38:34,800 the veracity of that opposition , it's 2308 01:38:34,800 --> 01:38:36,870 something that does concern me . 2309 01:38:37,010 --> 01:38:39,232 There's nothing more important going on 2310 01:38:39,232 --> 01:38:41,480 than a threat to this country . and , 2311 01:38:41,480 --> 01:38:44,020 uh , you know , I've got 20 kids and 2312 01:38:44,020 --> 01:38:46,242 grandkids . They're gonna be here a lot 2313 01:38:46,242 --> 01:38:48,490 longer than I am that are equally 2314 01:38:48,490 --> 01:38:50,546 concerned . So thank you so much for 2315 01:38:50,546 --> 01:38:53,630 the time that you've taken . And , uh , 2316 01:38:53,640 --> 01:38:56,140 we thank you for being here . Thank you .