1 00:00:00,240 --> 00:00:02,462 all right . Today , everyone and thanks 2 00:00:02,462 --> 00:00:04,630 for tuning into the defense . One tech 3 00:00:04,630 --> 00:00:06,519 summit on Marcus Weisgerber , the 4 00:00:06,519 --> 00:00:08,686 global business editor for defense one 5 00:00:08,686 --> 00:00:10,852 where I read about the intersection of 6 00:00:10,852 --> 00:00:12,963 business to national security . Thank 7 00:00:12,963 --> 00:00:15,074 you for joining us this afternoon . I 8 00:00:15,074 --> 00:00:17,019 want to thank my colleague Patrick 9 00:00:17,019 --> 00:00:19,074 Tucker for putting on this wonderful 10 00:00:19,074 --> 00:00:21,186 event and also for allowing me to put 11 00:00:21,186 --> 00:00:23,352 on a jacket and tie for the first time 12 00:00:23,352 --> 00:00:25,297 in three months , which I actually 13 00:00:25,297 --> 00:00:27,297 missed doing very much delighted to 14 00:00:27,297 --> 00:00:29,352 spend the next 30 or so minutes with 15 00:00:29,352 --> 00:00:31,074 you for our session . Entitled 16 00:00:31,074 --> 00:00:34,220 Technology , it's Peter Sound Hypersea 17 00:00:34,220 --> 00:00:36,442 independent An area of intense focus of 18 00:00:36,442 --> 00:00:38,664 the Pentagon right now , and it seems a 19 00:00:38,664 --> 00:00:40,720 critical technology at the center of 20 00:00:40,720 --> 00:00:42,776 great great power competition that's 21 00:00:42,776 --> 00:00:44,998 discussed about with Russia and China . 22 00:00:44,998 --> 00:00:47,109 Before we begin , I want to encourage 23 00:00:47,109 --> 00:00:49,164 you to submit your questions for our 24 00:00:49,164 --> 00:00:51,387 Panelists by tweeting using the hashtag 25 00:00:51,387 --> 00:00:53,770 d one . That's the number one D one 26 00:00:53,770 --> 00:00:57,010 Tech summit , and I will try to get to 27 00:00:57,010 --> 00:00:59,066 those as much as many questions as I 28 00:00:59,066 --> 00:01:01,150 can toward the end of our session . 29 00:01:02,310 --> 00:01:04,310 Since we don't have much time , I'm 30 00:01:04,310 --> 00:01:06,366 gonna make like a hypersonic missile 31 00:01:06,366 --> 00:01:08,366 and introduced our Panelists really 32 00:01:08,366 --> 00:01:10,366 quick . Uh , first , we had Dr Mark 33 00:01:10,366 --> 00:01:12,421 Lewis , the director of research and 34 00:01:12,421 --> 00:01:14,477 engineering for modernization at the 35 00:01:14,477 --> 00:01:14,130 Pentagon . Dr . Lewis . Thanks for 36 00:01:14,130 --> 00:01:16,500 joining us , Rebecca . Higher exceed 37 00:01:16,630 --> 00:01:18,463 your senior fellow at the Hudson 38 00:01:18,463 --> 00:01:21,520 Institute . And Tom Kericho , senior 39 00:01:21,530 --> 00:01:23,530 fellow for international security , 40 00:01:23,670 --> 00:01:25,614 senior fellow in the International 41 00:01:25,614 --> 00:01:27,670 Security program and director of the 42 00:01:27,670 --> 00:01:29,781 Missile Defense Project at the Center 43 00:01:29,781 --> 00:01:32,003 for Strategic and International Studies 44 00:01:32,003 --> 00:01:34,170 Time . Thank you . And a special thank 45 00:01:34,170 --> 00:01:36,281 you to our underwriter for sponsoring 46 00:01:36,281 --> 00:01:38,170 our panel . We're going to have a 47 00:01:38,170 --> 00:01:40,281 discussion now , as I said , and then 48 00:01:40,281 --> 00:01:42,337 we'll get to the questions I want to 49 00:01:42,337 --> 00:01:44,559 break our discussion down into four key 50 00:01:44,559 --> 00:01:46,670 areas . Hypersonic technology , hyper 51 00:01:46,670 --> 00:01:49,003 sonics , the funding or the budget . Ah , 52 00:01:49,003 --> 00:01:51,114 hyper Sonics , the competition . Visa 53 00:01:51,114 --> 00:01:53,003 view , China and Russia and hyper 54 00:01:53,003 --> 00:01:54,948 sonics , the industrial base . The 55 00:01:54,948 --> 00:01:57,114 doctor Lewis , we will start with with 56 00:01:57,114 --> 00:01:59,320 you . This is , ah , relation to the 57 00:01:59,320 --> 00:02:01,431 technology . And see the Pentagon has 58 00:02:01,431 --> 00:02:03,970 been spending . Uh , is on the sprint a 59 00:02:03,970 --> 00:02:06,390 zit , uh , tests and tries to field a 60 00:02:06,400 --> 00:02:08,567 number of different hypersonic weapons 61 00:02:08,567 --> 00:02:10,700 right now . Give us a little insight 62 00:02:10,700 --> 00:02:13,420 into the some . Some of the projects 63 00:02:13,420 --> 00:02:15,476 you're working on . How many of them 64 00:02:15,476 --> 00:02:17,698 are you working on ? How stable is this 65 00:02:17,698 --> 00:02:19,920 technology ? And when might we actually 66 00:02:19,920 --> 00:02:22,142 see one of these weapons actually being 67 00:02:22,142 --> 00:02:24,040 a part of the regular US military 68 00:02:24,040 --> 00:02:26,207 arsenal ? Sure . Well , thanks for the 69 00:02:26,207 --> 00:02:28,484 opportunity . Talking about hypersonic . 70 00:02:28,484 --> 00:02:31,790 So ? So I e uh he is a term 71 00:02:31,790 --> 00:02:34,810 spirit we actually called ever 72 00:02:34,810 --> 00:02:38,010 acceleration on which , of course , 73 00:02:38,010 --> 00:02:39,621 leads to the pond that we're 74 00:02:39,621 --> 00:02:41,732 accelerating threes within within the 75 00:02:41,732 --> 00:02:43,899 office of Secretary Defence . And it's 76 00:02:43,899 --> 00:02:46,232 one of the areas that I think we've had , 77 00:02:46,232 --> 00:02:48,343 Frank with most success in the past , 78 00:02:48,343 --> 00:02:50,399 uh , passable months , actually past 79 00:02:50,399 --> 00:02:54,130 year and 1/2 in building a unified plan . 80 00:02:55,160 --> 00:02:59,050 Ah , department . Um , 81 00:03:00,140 --> 00:03:01,270 well , when you 82 00:03:04,590 --> 00:03:07,250 you have underwater uh , 83 00:03:08,280 --> 00:03:10,510 I almost answered 84 00:03:11,200 --> 00:03:14,980 local . We have won . We have 85 00:03:14,980 --> 00:03:18,840 won many in a murder , which is a 86 00:03:18,850 --> 00:03:21,950 unified effort . Includes sister . 87 00:03:21,950 --> 00:03:25,010 Nervous is the agency's army a 88 00:03:25,530 --> 00:03:28,990 TV Eric for our , 89 00:03:29,000 --> 00:03:31,540 uh , missile Defense Agency's 90 00:03:31,660 --> 00:03:33,827 development agency . All the rooms are 91 00:03:33,827 --> 00:03:37,610 involved in what we're doing , and 92 00:03:37,640 --> 00:03:40,670 that's in part representation . That 93 00:03:40,670 --> 00:03:42,781 hyper sonics is really more than just 94 00:03:42,781 --> 00:03:44,850 one thing , right ? When I think 95 00:03:44,850 --> 00:03:48,550 hypersonic started , think of a Hominy 96 00:03:49,940 --> 00:03:53,240 of speed , maneuverability and also the 97 00:03:53,240 --> 00:03:56,390 other Teoh thes things operate that 98 00:03:56,390 --> 00:03:58,501 includes rocket Loosli system , which 99 00:03:58,501 --> 00:04:01,610 is a tactical scale boost glide , uh , 100 00:04:01,620 --> 00:04:03,731 missile program has several important 101 00:04:03,731 --> 00:04:05,953 program and everything . Cruise missile 102 00:04:05,953 --> 00:04:08,176 demonstrator , Uh , the Army and Navy . 103 00:04:08,176 --> 00:04:10,342 Both of very active programs as well , 104 00:04:10,342 --> 00:04:09,980 looking at ways to develop this 105 00:04:09,980 --> 00:04:13,920 technology in terms of when , um , we 106 00:04:13,930 --> 00:04:16,600 have a herd definite goal of the mid 20 107 00:04:16,600 --> 00:04:19,360 twenties and our he here is we want to 108 00:04:19,360 --> 00:04:21,527 deliver hyper sonics at scale . And by 109 00:04:21,527 --> 00:04:23,693 that I mean , we want to go beyond the 110 00:04:23,693 --> 00:04:25,638 prototypes . Right now , we have a 111 00:04:25,638 --> 00:04:28,710 number of prototypes on and in place . 112 00:04:28,910 --> 00:04:31,021 We want to go beyond those prototypes 113 00:04:31,021 --> 00:04:32,410 and actually delivered , 114 00:04:37,240 --> 00:04:41,010 right . I think way might have just 115 00:04:41,010 --> 00:04:43,232 dropped Dr Lewis for second . We'll get 116 00:04:43,232 --> 00:04:45,454 him back . Tom . Tom , let's shoot over 117 00:04:45,454 --> 00:04:48,290 to you real quick . Um , and , uh , he 118 00:04:48,290 --> 00:04:50,457 walk us through . Perhaps you know the 119 00:04:50,457 --> 00:04:53,530 purpose of , uh , hypersonic sonic 120 00:04:53,540 --> 00:04:55,596 weapons . And , you know , tell it . 121 00:04:55,596 --> 00:04:57,929 Tell us kind of when you would envision , 122 00:04:57,929 --> 00:05:01,730 you know , us or even and someone like 123 00:05:01,740 --> 00:05:03,962 Russia or China actually using a weapon 124 00:05:03,962 --> 00:05:05,851 like this . Okay . Hey , Thanks , 125 00:05:05,851 --> 00:05:08,150 Marcus . Appreciate the update to be 126 00:05:08,150 --> 00:05:10,400 here . Always good to be with with 127 00:05:10,400 --> 00:05:12,610 defense one . I would first of all , 128 00:05:12,610 --> 00:05:16,120 like Teoh frankly , commends Mark Lewis 129 00:05:16,120 --> 00:05:18,310 for what he just said there . I think 130 00:05:18,310 --> 00:05:20,421 that's the first time I heard anybody 131 00:05:20,770 --> 00:05:22,570 put it that way and one effort 132 00:05:22,570 --> 00:05:24,626 intensive instead of six or seven or 133 00:05:24,626 --> 00:05:27,180 eight . And frankly , I say this all 134 00:05:27,180 --> 00:05:29,750 the time . But the you know there's 67 135 00:05:29,750 --> 00:05:31,750 different service and DARPA defense 136 00:05:31,750 --> 00:05:34,010 wide programs , and everybody looks at 137 00:05:34,010 --> 00:05:36,232 this and kinds of throws up , throws up 138 00:05:36,232 --> 00:05:38,343 their hands and says , Why do we have 139 00:05:38,343 --> 00:05:42,240 to do all ? And , uh , he 140 00:05:42,250 --> 00:05:45,200 said , In terms of the commonality , 141 00:05:45,210 --> 00:05:47,210 more commonality meets the That's a 142 00:05:47,210 --> 00:05:49,266 look . What's the mission here ? The 143 00:05:49,266 --> 00:05:51,432 mission is , is strength fundamentally 144 00:05:51,432 --> 00:05:53,599 to reach out and touch things , but to 145 00:05:53,599 --> 00:05:56,910 do so in a manner that combines not 146 00:05:56,910 --> 00:05:59,021 just the speed , Which is why calling 147 00:05:59,021 --> 00:06:01,520 them hypersonic things allies , the 148 00:06:01,520 --> 00:06:04,160 rial , the real utility indifference . 149 00:06:04,290 --> 00:06:07,360 But it's the combination of speed , uh , 150 00:06:07,370 --> 00:06:10,570 endgame on bid course maneuverability 151 00:06:10,580 --> 00:06:12,302 and , of course , some kind of 152 00:06:12,302 --> 00:06:14,469 different trajectory . The combination 153 00:06:14,469 --> 00:06:16,636 of those things gives them a different 154 00:06:16,636 --> 00:06:18,802 ability to conduct the strike missions 155 00:06:18,802 --> 00:06:21,024 on other missions , potentially as well 156 00:06:21,024 --> 00:06:23,358 as science by just getting there faster . 157 00:06:23,358 --> 00:06:25,890 But doing those better Having said that , 158 00:06:25,900 --> 00:06:28,011 could you do it with with really slow 159 00:06:28,011 --> 00:06:30,178 cruise missiles . Sure you could , but 160 00:06:30,178 --> 00:06:32,122 then you're gonna Mr Time critical 161 00:06:32,122 --> 00:06:34,178 targets . And then could you do with 162 00:06:34,178 --> 00:06:36,344 ballistic missiles ? Well , possibly . 163 00:06:36,344 --> 00:06:38,122 But with less maneuverability , 164 00:06:38,122 --> 00:06:40,720 especially terminal accuracy . Perhaps 165 00:06:41,050 --> 00:06:44,210 you may you may suffer there . And 166 00:06:44,210 --> 00:06:46,377 frankly , we just don't have that many 167 00:06:46,377 --> 00:06:48,543 medium or intermediate range ballistic 168 00:06:48,543 --> 00:06:50,821 missiles . That may change . Of course . 169 00:06:50,821 --> 00:06:52,932 Ballistic missiles of a certain range 170 00:06:52,932 --> 00:06:54,932 are themselves hypersonic and speed 171 00:06:54,932 --> 00:06:57,043 when they re enter . So fundamentally 172 00:06:57,043 --> 00:06:58,932 is the strike mission . But don't 173 00:06:58,932 --> 00:07:00,932 underestimate . And I think I would 174 00:07:00,932 --> 00:07:03,043 just urge you not to fall for the for 175 00:07:03,043 --> 00:07:05,266 the siren song that well , just because 176 00:07:05,266 --> 00:07:07,488 we could have a tomahawk that reach out 177 00:07:07,488 --> 00:07:09,432 some distance that this is somehow 178 00:07:09,432 --> 00:07:11,599 redundant . It's the prospect of using 179 00:07:11,599 --> 00:07:13,420 this particular combination of 180 00:07:13,420 --> 00:07:17,110 characteristics to create structured 181 00:07:17,120 --> 00:07:19,300 and integrated attack against them and 182 00:07:19,300 --> 00:07:23,270 against us , Right . Ah , Dr 183 00:07:23,270 --> 00:07:25,270 Lewis wanted just shoot back to you 184 00:07:25,270 --> 00:07:27,437 real quick . I had I did have a follow 185 00:07:27,437 --> 00:07:30,580 up in there . You know how you bought 186 00:07:30,590 --> 00:07:32,534 all these research and development 187 00:07:32,534 --> 00:07:34,701 programs right now ? How do you ensure 188 00:07:34,701 --> 00:07:36,868 that they actually become , you know , 189 00:07:36,868 --> 00:07:38,868 military service , back programs of 190 00:07:38,868 --> 00:07:41,034 record ? I you know what talkto Former 191 00:07:41,034 --> 00:07:43,034 Deputy Defense Secretary Bob work a 192 00:07:43,034 --> 00:07:45,201 number of times that he refers to this 193 00:07:45,201 --> 00:07:47,312 quote unquote Valley of Death where , 194 00:07:47,312 --> 00:07:49,479 ah , you know , it's very difficult to 195 00:07:49,479 --> 00:07:51,534 transition . Uh , you know , R and D 196 00:07:51,534 --> 00:07:54,550 program into an actual , uh , service 197 00:07:54,550 --> 00:07:56,717 back of procurement . Thank you . Talk 198 00:07:56,717 --> 00:07:58,828 about that . Maybe a little bit about 199 00:07:58,828 --> 00:08:00,939 your hypersonic acceleration plan and 200 00:08:00,939 --> 00:08:00,250 how that might play it through it . 201 00:08:00,940 --> 00:08:02,940 Sure . Well , first , I'll start by 202 00:08:02,940 --> 00:08:05,107 saying not every program will become a 203 00:08:05,107 --> 00:08:07,162 program record . All right , some of 204 00:08:07,162 --> 00:08:06,790 things that we're doing experimental 205 00:08:06,790 --> 00:08:08,960 their prototypes will kick the 206 00:08:08,960 --> 00:08:11,071 proverbial tires and some of our some 207 00:08:11,071 --> 00:08:13,350 of our efforts . Um , indeed , I say , 208 00:08:13,360 --> 00:08:15,304 if everything we're working on now 209 00:08:15,304 --> 00:08:17,249 became a program of record , we're 210 00:08:17,249 --> 00:08:19,193 probably not taking enough risks . 211 00:08:19,193 --> 00:08:21,527 Having said that , you're exactly right . 212 00:08:21,527 --> 00:08:23,249 We need we need to bridge that 213 00:08:23,249 --> 00:08:25,471 proverbial valley of death that we need 214 00:08:25,471 --> 00:08:25,300 to eliminate the Valley of Death . The 215 00:08:25,300 --> 00:08:27,411 way we're doing is we're working hand 216 00:08:27,411 --> 00:08:29,078 in glove with the services on 217 00:08:29,078 --> 00:08:31,300 everything that we're doing . Um , so , 218 00:08:31,300 --> 00:08:33,522 for example , I mentioned the Air Force 219 00:08:33,522 --> 00:08:35,800 Arrow program or Arrow bills directly 220 00:08:35,810 --> 00:08:37,977 on the work that's being done at DARPA 221 00:08:38,070 --> 00:08:40,237 on the tactical boost fly . That means 222 00:08:40,237 --> 00:08:42,348 we've got the Air Force folks work an 223 00:08:42,348 --> 00:08:44,514 arrow , working directly with the dark 224 00:08:44,514 --> 00:08:46,681 folks of dark books , working directly 225 00:08:46,681 --> 00:08:48,903 with the Arrow Arrow program , figuring 226 00:08:48,903 --> 00:08:51,070 out how we do experiments as part of T 227 00:08:51,070 --> 00:08:53,126 B G . That's affable boost flight of 228 00:08:53,126 --> 00:08:55,181 DARPA that will factor directly into 229 00:08:55,181 --> 00:08:57,348 the success of Arrow . And that's just 230 00:08:57,348 --> 00:08:59,570 one of many examples . Um , we all have 231 00:08:59,570 --> 00:09:01,514 this firm fixed goal of delivering 232 00:09:01,514 --> 00:09:03,403 capability , right ? These air no 233 00:09:03,403 --> 00:09:03,200 longer science projects on a lot of 234 00:09:03,200 --> 00:09:05,367 things that are being under the left . 235 00:09:05,367 --> 00:09:07,580 And so with that mindset across the 236 00:09:07,580 --> 00:09:09,580 range range of activities that were 237 00:09:09,580 --> 00:09:11,580 involved in , I think I think we're 238 00:09:11,580 --> 00:09:13,691 making headway and bridging that that 239 00:09:13,691 --> 00:09:17,180 valley . What were you in the past year ? 240 00:09:17,180 --> 00:09:19,458 What do you attribute the slow pace of , 241 00:09:19,458 --> 00:09:22,050 ah , transition over the past ? Is it 242 00:09:22,050 --> 00:09:24,180 just kind of , you know , the the 243 00:09:24,180 --> 00:09:26,180 leadership aspect of it , or is it 244 00:09:26,180 --> 00:09:29,600 something else ? So I have ah , very 245 00:09:29,600 --> 00:09:31,767 dear friend . An aviation story by the 246 00:09:31,767 --> 00:09:33,933 name of decal , Ian likes to say , and 247 00:09:33,933 --> 00:09:35,933 old history is personal . It really 248 00:09:35,933 --> 00:09:37,989 comes down to personalities , and it 249 00:09:37,989 --> 00:09:40,156 comes down to people driving , driving 250 00:09:40,156 --> 00:09:40,130 purchase . Certain goal , I think , 251 00:09:40,130 --> 00:09:42,186 frankly , has been one of the issues 252 00:09:42,186 --> 00:09:44,463 that we've had with hyper sonnets . Um , 253 00:09:44,463 --> 00:09:46,463 you know , if I look at some of our 254 00:09:46,463 --> 00:09:48,630 past successes , So the one that jumps 255 00:09:48,630 --> 00:09:48,630 out at me was the Air Force's X 51 256 00:09:48,630 --> 00:09:50,297 program . Extra fee . One was 257 00:09:50,297 --> 00:09:52,297 incredibly successful program . The 258 00:09:52,297 --> 00:09:54,490 last time we flew , it was in 2013 and 259 00:09:54,490 --> 00:09:56,570 the reason that we only we haven't 260 00:09:56,570 --> 00:09:58,681 flown since then was that they were , 261 00:09:58,681 --> 00:10:00,903 frankly , some decisions that were made 262 00:10:00,903 --> 00:10:02,737 at the time not to invest in the 263 00:10:02,737 --> 00:10:04,792 technology . And I think now we have 264 00:10:04,792 --> 00:10:04,670 leadership at all levels of the 265 00:10:04,670 --> 00:10:06,726 Pentagon . But coming from the front 266 00:10:06,726 --> 00:10:08,892 office , recognizing the importance of 267 00:10:08,892 --> 00:10:11,003 this technology and realizing we need 268 00:10:11,003 --> 00:10:13,226 to put our foot on the proverbial Yes , 269 00:10:13,480 --> 00:10:15,480 so that's that . Certainly . What's 270 00:10:15,480 --> 00:10:18,690 driving this , Rebecca . I want a 271 00:10:18,750 --> 00:10:20,694 transition to you . I want to talk 272 00:10:20,694 --> 00:10:22,806 about hyper Sonics . The funding Last 273 00:10:22,806 --> 00:10:24,583 week that Senate Armed Services 274 00:10:24,583 --> 00:10:26,930 Committee is mark above the fiscal 21 275 00:10:26,930 --> 00:10:30,220 nd a quote encouraged , Todt allocates 276 00:10:30,220 --> 00:10:33,650 to fishing resources and prioritize the 277 00:10:34,130 --> 00:10:36,190 supersonic missiles , specifically 278 00:10:36,190 --> 00:10:38,357 China . I know that's that's basically 279 00:10:38,357 --> 00:10:41,080 from counter hypersonic , but how do 280 00:10:41,080 --> 00:10:41,350 you 281 00:10:44,940 --> 00:10:48,620 see , uh , hypersonic spare in the 282 00:10:48,620 --> 00:10:50,842 budget battles that are expected in the 283 00:10:50,940 --> 00:10:53,107 months and years ahead ? As you know , 284 00:10:53,107 --> 00:10:54,884 the defense Pleasure largely is 285 00:10:54,884 --> 00:10:57,400 expected to flatten regardless of the 286 00:10:57,400 --> 00:10:59,550 election . It's in November . 287 00:11:01,800 --> 00:11:05,790 Be here , Thank you . All of my fellow 288 00:11:05,790 --> 00:11:09,690 Panelists . For part of the discussion , 289 00:11:10,070 --> 00:11:12,980 I would just say a on the budget piece 290 00:11:12,980 --> 00:11:14,770 in Congress . I have been very 291 00:11:14,770 --> 00:11:16,881 encouraged that some of the movements 292 00:11:16,881 --> 00:11:19,200 here there is , ah , strong bipartisan 293 00:11:19,200 --> 00:11:22,410 support for her shifting to great power 294 00:11:22,410 --> 00:11:24,521 competition . Specifically looking at 295 00:11:24,521 --> 00:11:26,354 some of the the kinds of weapons 296 00:11:26,354 --> 00:11:29,200 systems BG to deter Chinese aggression 297 00:11:29,200 --> 00:11:31,590 and hypersonic offense and defense were 298 00:11:31,590 --> 00:11:34,290 certainly part of that , um , heart , 299 00:11:34,290 --> 00:11:37,780 part of the solution there . You just 300 00:11:37,780 --> 00:11:39,780 mentioned that the part of the bill 301 00:11:39,780 --> 00:11:41,891 that just passed out of the committee 302 00:11:42,690 --> 00:11:45,250 But I would just note that Chairman in 303 00:11:45,250 --> 00:11:47,530 Half and Breaking Men are remember 304 00:11:47,540 --> 00:11:49,620 Senator Reid have been working very 305 00:11:49,620 --> 00:11:52,140 closely on the Pacific Deterrence 306 00:11:52,140 --> 00:11:54,310 Initiative to try to make sure that 307 00:11:54,310 --> 00:11:57,790 there is a way in which Congress and 308 00:11:57,790 --> 00:12:00,030 the department in particular can focus 309 00:12:00,040 --> 00:12:03,300 on the end up a con , a challenge and 310 00:12:03,300 --> 00:12:05,300 making sure that we're prioritizing 311 00:12:05,300 --> 00:12:07,356 that region . And so things like I'm 312 00:12:07,356 --> 00:12:09,300 hyper sonics hypersonic depends or 313 00:12:09,300 --> 00:12:11,300 certainly part of that . So if I've 314 00:12:11,300 --> 00:12:13,467 been encouraged , especially on the on 315 00:12:13,467 --> 00:12:15,750 the on the best piece you've actually 316 00:12:15,750 --> 00:12:17,820 seen Congress step in there when the 317 00:12:17,820 --> 00:12:21,350 department hasn't put but specific 318 00:12:21,350 --> 00:12:23,710 money into priorities . So there's been 319 00:12:23,710 --> 00:12:26,130 a mismatch , I think , especially on 320 00:12:26,130 --> 00:12:28,710 the hypersonic defense side of things , 321 00:12:28,710 --> 00:12:30,654 on what is a priority , especially 322 00:12:30,654 --> 00:12:33,320 coming from Under Secretary Griffin 323 00:12:33,320 --> 00:12:35,930 saying that the defense peace is also 324 00:12:35,930 --> 00:12:38,097 very important . And then there's been 325 00:12:38,097 --> 00:12:40,208 a lack of funding there in the budget 326 00:12:40,208 --> 00:12:42,486 request . It's been Congress , in fact , 327 00:12:42,486 --> 00:12:44,486 that has gone in and put more money 328 00:12:44,486 --> 00:12:46,486 into certain things like HP TSS for 329 00:12:46,486 --> 00:12:48,541 that space center layer , which is a 330 00:12:48,541 --> 00:12:51,810 necessary part of hypersonic . So , um , 331 00:12:52,340 --> 00:12:54,229 I'm just first time just for some 332 00:12:54,229 --> 00:12:57,470 comparisons . Uh , over last year , the 333 00:12:57,470 --> 00:13:01,360 F y 2120 budget request from D . O . 334 00:13:01,360 --> 00:13:05,160 D . With $2.6 billion for the offensive 335 00:13:05,160 --> 00:13:08,620 part and 206.8 million for 336 00:13:08,620 --> 00:13:10,676 hypersonic defense , you can see the 337 00:13:10,676 --> 00:13:12,842 mismatch there , and then this year it 338 00:13:12,842 --> 00:13:16,060 was , um , bumped up to $3.2 billion . 339 00:13:16,060 --> 00:13:18,620 So significant increase and we have 340 00:13:18,620 --> 00:13:21,430 seen Congress really respond positively 341 00:13:21,430 --> 00:13:23,450 to that . And in my hope is that a 342 00:13:23,450 --> 00:13:25,250 artistic consensus continues . 343 00:13:32,040 --> 00:13:34,096 I have so much of this open source , 344 00:13:34,096 --> 00:13:36,207 you know , documentation enter that . 345 00:13:36,207 --> 00:13:38,410 It's there's a grasping for a sort of 346 00:13:38,410 --> 00:13:40,299 requirements and what things were 347 00:13:40,299 --> 00:13:42,410 necessary to determine how much money 348 00:13:42,410 --> 00:13:44,354 should be allocated for this . But 349 00:13:44,620 --> 00:13:48,100 Congress did man days in in the f Y 350 00:13:48,490 --> 00:13:51,620 2019 a bill for a lot of this 351 00:13:51,620 --> 00:13:53,676 information that would help Congress 352 00:13:53,676 --> 00:13:55,453 decide how much money should be 353 00:13:55,453 --> 00:13:57,342 allocated for these particular up 354 00:13:57,342 --> 00:13:57,300 assistance versus others . And that is , 355 00:13:57,310 --> 00:14:00,300 is in classified form . Um , and and 356 00:14:00,300 --> 00:14:02,411 since there that is helping to inform 357 00:14:02,411 --> 00:14:06,350 Congress , maybe we can actually 358 00:14:06,350 --> 00:14:08,294 pivot to the counter . Hyper hyper 359 00:14:08,294 --> 00:14:10,517 sonics . Ah , discussion For a moment , 360 00:14:10,517 --> 00:14:13,370 Dr Lewis will shoot over to you way 361 00:14:13,370 --> 00:14:15,690 here . We here . You know , this is 362 00:14:15,690 --> 00:14:17,920 coming up a lot on earnings calls with 363 00:14:18,100 --> 00:14:20,770 CEOs , cos they're talking about the 364 00:14:21,160 --> 00:14:23,271 increased effort efforts . Remember , 365 00:14:23,271 --> 00:14:25,438 during a number of my discussions with 366 00:14:25,438 --> 00:14:27,382 Tom Kennedy , former CEO , right ? 367 00:14:27,382 --> 00:14:29,438 Right . Right down before its merger 368 00:14:29,438 --> 00:14:31,660 with UTC . You know , he was constantly 369 00:14:31,660 --> 00:14:33,771 touting this . Well , can you talk to 370 00:14:33,771 --> 00:14:35,716 us kind of about maybe the counter 371 00:14:35,716 --> 00:14:37,771 hypersonic strategy strategy And you 372 00:14:37,771 --> 00:14:40,270 know what ? What's involved in that and 373 00:14:40,380 --> 00:14:44,150 in stuff like patriot or are fat or GMD , 374 00:14:44,540 --> 00:14:47,560 um can that be modified to actually 375 00:14:47,920 --> 00:14:51,450 address the hypersonic read or ah , Is 376 00:14:51,450 --> 00:14:54,140 this going to require completely new 377 00:14:54,140 --> 00:14:56,450 build types of technology and systems ? 378 00:14:57,080 --> 00:14:59,191 Sure . So let me let me first address 379 00:14:59,191 --> 00:15:01,524 the overall issue The hypersonic spread . 380 00:15:01,524 --> 00:15:03,691 So , you know , I think there has been 381 00:15:03,691 --> 00:15:06,290 a There's been a a keen recognition 382 00:15:06,430 --> 00:15:08,486 that we are indeed in a race in this 383 00:15:08,486 --> 00:15:11,270 technology area and , you know , as I 384 00:15:11,270 --> 00:15:12,881 somewhat a Zeiss a with some 385 00:15:12,881 --> 00:15:14,714 frustration , we kind of did the 386 00:15:14,714 --> 00:15:16,659 homework for the rest of the world 387 00:15:16,659 --> 00:15:18,881 hypersonic scenario that we essentially 388 00:15:18,881 --> 00:15:20,770 invented . We did the fundamental 389 00:15:20,770 --> 00:15:22,881 research . We did the development and 390 00:15:22,881 --> 00:15:22,870 then because we kind of took our foot 391 00:15:22,870 --> 00:15:24,926 off the gas , um , other people were 392 00:15:24,926 --> 00:15:27,148 able to pick up on what we had dio have 393 00:15:27,148 --> 00:15:29,380 done build on our success is and and 394 00:15:29,380 --> 00:15:31,213 recognize the importance of this 395 00:15:31,213 --> 00:15:34,030 technology . And so , uh , defensive 396 00:15:34,030 --> 00:15:36,500 part is is absolutely critical as we go 397 00:15:36,500 --> 00:15:38,444 forward with the offense apart , I 398 00:15:38,444 --> 00:15:40,667 think we've got a general recognition . 399 00:15:40,667 --> 00:15:42,833 If I'm gonna defend against hypersonic 400 00:15:42,833 --> 00:15:42,790 systems , there are a couple of key 401 00:15:42,790 --> 00:15:44,846 things that I need to dio . The very 402 00:15:44,846 --> 00:15:47,012 first thing I need to do is to be able 403 00:15:47,012 --> 00:15:49,234 to detect a hypersonic weapon flying at 404 00:15:49,240 --> 00:15:51,351 and respond quickly enough . So we've 405 00:15:51,351 --> 00:15:53,950 put a significant investment on the 406 00:15:53,990 --> 00:15:56,760 tech side that that's one of the major 407 00:15:57,090 --> 00:15:58,923 efforts underway under the Space 408 00:15:58,923 --> 00:16:01,146 Development Agency . Right ? Be able to 409 00:16:01,146 --> 00:16:03,423 detect that . Ah ah , hypersonic lunch . 410 00:16:03,423 --> 00:16:05,590 Um , then responding . So you've asked 411 00:16:05,590 --> 00:16:07,757 about technological solutions . So let 412 00:16:07,757 --> 00:16:09,979 me let me not get into specific weapons 413 00:16:09,979 --> 00:16:09,730 systems . But I can't depending on the 414 00:16:09,730 --> 00:16:11,897 hypersonic weapon . And there are many 415 00:16:11,897 --> 00:16:13,897 different varieties high percentage 416 00:16:13,897 --> 00:16:15,897 systems area rocket Who supplies or 417 00:16:15,897 --> 00:16:18,119 cruise missiles . Ladies have their own 418 00:16:18,119 --> 00:16:20,341 own responses . It is very difficult to 419 00:16:20,341 --> 00:16:22,570 stop a hypersonic weapon . That's why 420 00:16:22,570 --> 00:16:24,792 we want to pursue them . That's why are 421 00:16:24,792 --> 00:16:27,014 your competitors air percent ? But it's 422 00:16:27,014 --> 00:16:29,181 not impossible . There are . There are 423 00:16:29,181 --> 00:16:31,292 ways to do it . Uh , some of existing 424 00:16:31,292 --> 00:16:33,292 technologies , some of technologies 425 00:16:33,292 --> 00:16:35,237 that that we're building . Um , so 426 00:16:35,237 --> 00:16:37,640 there are answers . There are solutions , 427 00:16:38,150 --> 00:16:40,372 but it's definitely an area that we see 428 00:16:40,372 --> 00:16:42,039 a need for increased effort . 429 00:16:44,340 --> 00:16:46,562 Tom , you have any thoughts ? I'm hot . 430 00:16:46,562 --> 00:16:48,507 I know you have props encounter on 431 00:16:48,507 --> 00:16:51,530 counter hypersonic defense . Um , with 432 00:16:51,530 --> 00:16:54,010 their expertise in a missile defense , 433 00:16:54,090 --> 00:16:56,460 you know what ? How do you foresee ? Ah , 434 00:16:57,040 --> 00:16:59,380 you know what ? Because we made a large 435 00:16:59,380 --> 00:17:01,491 focus on hyper sonics right now . How 436 00:17:01,491 --> 00:17:03,380 do you see the counter hypersonic 437 00:17:03,380 --> 00:17:05,658 development ? Very well . First of all , 438 00:17:05,658 --> 00:17:07,713 I think Mark's right that they think 439 00:17:07,713 --> 00:17:09,769 should go hand in hand . Having said 440 00:17:09,769 --> 00:17:12,060 that , certainly from a budgetary 441 00:17:12,060 --> 00:17:14,370 perspective , there's a big mismatch . 442 00:17:14,450 --> 00:17:16,283 I'm really between the strike of 443 00:17:16,283 --> 00:17:18,450 defense . But also between the I would 444 00:17:18,450 --> 00:17:20,590 say , the attention and the kind of 445 00:17:20,590 --> 00:17:22,760 buying on the defense side Broadway . 446 00:17:23,240 --> 00:17:25,407 And so what ? I'm you know , if you go 447 00:17:25,407 --> 00:17:27,760 back and read , uh , the N s study from 448 00:17:27,760 --> 00:17:31,100 2016 that Mark chaired , there's the 449 00:17:31,100 --> 00:17:33,880 nice comment in there , that kind of 450 00:17:33,880 --> 00:17:36,940 lax the department lacks in 2016 451 00:17:37,610 --> 00:17:41,070 the D . O . D . Wide coordination and 452 00:17:41,080 --> 00:17:43,080 really motivation . In terms of the 453 00:17:43,080 --> 00:17:45,390 defense side , I would be a little bit 454 00:17:45,390 --> 00:17:48,270 less sanguine than Rebecca Waas in 455 00:17:48,270 --> 00:17:50,440 terms of this overall set , which is , 456 00:17:50,450 --> 00:17:52,260 I don't see the deal , the wide 457 00:17:52,640 --> 00:17:54,920 leadership on the defense , that that's 458 00:17:54,920 --> 00:17:57,150 laddie , and that where you've seen 459 00:17:57,150 --> 00:17:59,260 Congress come in and say to the 460 00:17:59,260 --> 00:18:01,593 department , Hey , what's going on here ? 461 00:18:01,640 --> 00:18:03,820 You know , how are you gonna even keep 462 00:18:03,820 --> 00:18:06,460 going on HB TSS if you cut it , you 463 00:18:06,460 --> 00:18:08,700 know , from 10% from last year's you 464 00:18:08,700 --> 00:18:11,030 saw in March of this year , so I'm a 465 00:18:11,030 --> 00:18:13,086 little more concerned on the defense 466 00:18:13,086 --> 00:18:15,141 side that we're not proceeding as we 467 00:18:15,141 --> 00:18:17,030 are in Congress on a bipartisan , 468 00:18:17,030 --> 00:18:18,974 bicameral basis is I think they're 469 00:18:18,974 --> 00:18:21,320 holding the Pentagon's feet to the fire 470 00:18:21,320 --> 00:18:23,431 there as they should . And so I think 471 00:18:23,431 --> 00:18:25,542 what you need . There is a little bit 472 00:18:25,542 --> 00:18:28,080 of high level shape to actually 473 00:18:28,080 --> 00:18:30,900 articulate and more than has been done 474 00:18:30,910 --> 00:18:33,910 so far . How the offense and defense or 475 00:18:33,920 --> 00:18:36,060 how it all makes sense . And then you 476 00:18:36,060 --> 00:18:38,060 go back to your original question . 477 00:18:38,060 --> 00:18:39,893 Marcus , you know , today's four 478 00:18:39,893 --> 00:18:42,550 families of of Defense of things . 479 00:18:43,940 --> 00:18:46,280 Perhaps they could be adapted . They're 480 00:18:46,280 --> 00:18:48,336 probably not gonna be sufficient off 481 00:18:48,336 --> 00:18:51,030 the shelf today . But where's the 482 00:18:51,030 --> 00:18:53,197 standard missile with a fad or or pack 483 00:18:53,197 --> 00:18:55,419 three , something like that . So you're 484 00:18:55,419 --> 00:18:57,697 gonna have to have at least adaptation . 485 00:18:57,697 --> 00:18:59,808 But back to the institutional thing . 486 00:18:59,808 --> 00:19:02,150 You know that HB TSS sensor ? We have 487 00:19:02,160 --> 00:19:04,850 have to have a department wide vision 488 00:19:05,240 --> 00:19:07,407 on who's going to do this . And what's 489 00:19:07,407 --> 00:19:09,684 the relationship between SDA and M . D . 490 00:19:09,684 --> 00:19:11,740 A . And I'm a little concerned about 491 00:19:11,740 --> 00:19:14,410 the lack of of one message . There was 492 00:19:14,410 --> 00:19:18,400 policy . I want to Rebecca . I want 493 00:19:18,400 --> 00:19:20,622 to pivot to you and talk about actually 494 00:19:20,622 --> 00:19:22,844 the competition , which we have alluded 495 00:19:22,844 --> 00:19:24,844 to , uh , throughout the discussion 496 00:19:24,844 --> 00:19:26,980 thus far , Um , where are Russia and 497 00:19:26,980 --> 00:19:29,120 China in terms of their of their 498 00:19:29,120 --> 00:19:31,650 hypersonic weapon development ? Um , 499 00:19:31,660 --> 00:19:34,780 you know , it's it's been stated for a 500 00:19:34,780 --> 00:19:38,520 number of years now that that , uh , 501 00:19:38,530 --> 00:19:41,110 that they were head , um And what will 502 00:19:41,110 --> 00:19:43,221 it , uh , why're they head ? And what 503 00:19:43,221 --> 00:19:45,360 will it take for the U . S . To gain 504 00:19:45,360 --> 00:19:47,760 ground back there ? Yeah , things . The 505 00:19:47,760 --> 00:19:49,871 question . I just if I could just CAG 506 00:19:49,871 --> 00:19:52,038 onto the last comment I said about how 507 00:19:52,038 --> 00:19:54,204 Congress has been the one that has put 508 00:19:54,204 --> 00:19:56,204 money into some of these programs . 509 00:19:56,204 --> 00:19:58,427 Even whatever the budget request hasn't 510 00:19:58,427 --> 00:20:00,593 come in from department . I would also 511 00:20:00,593 --> 00:20:02,760 ask you just for my conversations with 512 00:20:02,760 --> 00:20:04,927 people on the hill that there is a bit 513 00:20:04,927 --> 00:20:04,800 of it , even though there is , there is 514 00:20:04,800 --> 00:20:07,022 great bipartisan support for moving out 515 00:20:07,022 --> 00:20:08,967 on this . There is I wouldn't call 516 00:20:08,967 --> 00:20:10,911 necessarily fatigue . But there is 517 00:20:10,911 --> 00:20:14,300 frustration . That does seem Teoh seem 518 00:20:14,300 --> 00:20:16,244 to be the case that the department 519 00:20:16,244 --> 00:20:18,467 doesn't have isn't making the arguments 520 00:20:18,467 --> 00:20:20,467 for themselves when it comes to the 521 00:20:20,467 --> 00:20:22,467 actual budget numbers . And so this 522 00:20:22,467 --> 00:20:24,522 Congress continuing to come back and 523 00:20:24,522 --> 00:20:26,578 put more money into these into these 524 00:20:26,578 --> 00:20:28,689 pots . Whatever replaces and there is 525 00:20:28,740 --> 00:20:30,907 is becoming a problem in a frustration 526 00:20:30,907 --> 00:20:33,073 for for for some members of Congress , 527 00:20:33,440 --> 00:20:37,100 uh , t to your question , I just ate . 528 00:20:37,240 --> 00:20:39,810 I think Mark answered this well , a 529 00:20:39,810 --> 00:20:41,977 little bit touched on it , that really 530 00:20:41,977 --> 00:20:45,010 the Russians have a taken event , and 531 00:20:45,010 --> 00:20:47,232 the Chinese have taken a lot of our own 532 00:20:47,232 --> 00:20:49,066 technology . We've done a lot of 533 00:20:49,066 --> 00:20:51,121 homework for them , and the Russians 534 00:20:51,121 --> 00:20:54,080 are the most advanced on . And then it 535 00:20:54,090 --> 00:20:56,010 begun point testing some of these 536 00:20:56,010 --> 00:20:57,899 things bragging about some of the 537 00:20:57,899 --> 00:20:59,954 capabilities that they have . And in 538 00:20:59,954 --> 00:21:03,910 the Chinese , Um , hence it looks like 539 00:21:03,910 --> 00:21:06,077 they are . They are using a lot of the 540 00:21:06,077 --> 00:21:08,021 same kinds of technologies , and I 541 00:21:08,021 --> 00:21:10,077 would even argue something that I've 542 00:21:10,077 --> 00:21:12,132 noticed over the years . The Chinese 543 00:21:12,132 --> 00:21:14,299 tend to use some of the same arguments 544 00:21:14,299 --> 00:21:14,220 that the Russians use for why they're 545 00:21:14,220 --> 00:21:16,109 developing in per student certain 546 00:21:16,109 --> 00:21:18,331 technologies to , regardless of whether 547 00:21:18,331 --> 00:21:20,498 or not they're those His arguments are 548 00:21:20,498 --> 00:21:22,740 true . They do going to carry a lot . 549 00:21:23,260 --> 00:21:26,490 Wait . And I think this point is is 550 00:21:26,650 --> 00:21:28,850 beautiful because I see it in a lot of 551 00:21:28,850 --> 00:21:31,017 American literature for explaining why 552 00:21:31,017 --> 00:21:32,906 the Russians and the Chinese were 553 00:21:32,906 --> 00:21:35,072 pursuing these technologies , and it's 554 00:21:35,072 --> 00:21:37,239 almost kind of taken us just gospel is 555 00:21:37,239 --> 00:21:39,017 true , and that is that it's in 556 00:21:39,017 --> 00:21:41,128 response to what the United States is 557 00:21:41,128 --> 00:21:43,350 doing . So it's , you know , the United 558 00:21:43,350 --> 00:21:45,572 States is acting provocatively . You're 559 00:21:45,572 --> 00:21:47,794 acting aggressively or it's in response 560 00:21:47,794 --> 00:21:49,961 to American missile defense distance . 561 00:21:49,961 --> 00:21:49,640 And so if it wasn't for American 562 00:21:49,640 --> 00:21:51,862 missile defense distance , the Russians 563 00:21:51,862 --> 00:21:54,029 and the Chinese wouldn't have to build 564 00:21:54,029 --> 00:21:56,360 these new kinds of systems . I think 565 00:21:56,360 --> 00:21:58,527 Tom Tom does a great job of explaining 566 00:21:58,527 --> 00:22:00,471 why those diseases where they have 567 00:22:00,471 --> 00:22:02,804 different characteristics , they're not . 568 00:22:03,580 --> 00:22:06,010 They're not so different in some ways a 569 00:22:06,010 --> 00:22:07,843 certain as some of the ballistic 570 00:22:07,843 --> 00:22:10,066 missiles , especially in terms of seats 571 00:22:10,066 --> 00:22:09,890 that are . But they do have unique 572 00:22:09,890 --> 00:22:11,612 characteristics that make them 573 00:22:11,612 --> 00:22:14,020 challenging to see , um and have some 574 00:22:14,020 --> 00:22:16,187 heads up that they're coming , so that 575 00:22:16,187 --> 00:22:19,300 makes them particularly useful . But I 576 00:22:19,300 --> 00:22:21,356 think it's important to push back on 577 00:22:21,356 --> 00:22:23,411 this idea that it's American missile 578 00:22:23,411 --> 00:22:25,356 defense systems or what the United 579 00:22:25,356 --> 00:22:27,680 States is doing in response . None of 580 00:22:27,680 --> 00:22:29,847 America's missile defense systems that 581 00:22:29,847 --> 00:22:31,736 we have deployed and that they're 582 00:22:31,736 --> 00:22:34,570 developing our men's to Teoh , actually , 583 00:22:34,580 --> 00:22:38,380 uh , counter what Russians have in the 584 00:22:38,380 --> 00:22:41,180 Chinese have And so these really are , 585 00:22:41,240 --> 00:22:43,407 you know , the Russians decent utility 586 00:22:43,490 --> 00:22:45,712 in having these advanced capabilities . 587 00:22:45,712 --> 00:22:48,250 And so the United States is moving out , 588 00:22:48,250 --> 00:22:51,740 shifting towards competing There is 589 00:22:52,170 --> 00:22:54,670 this great sense of urgency now , to 590 00:22:54,670 --> 00:22:57,360 not only defends lives seem that the 591 00:22:57,420 --> 00:22:59,580 section there provided by Congress , 592 00:22:59,820 --> 00:23:02,042 that's what we see is very vulnerable . 593 00:23:02,042 --> 00:23:04,110 Um , it regionally , especially with 594 00:23:04,110 --> 00:23:06,166 the Chinese because of these weapons 595 00:23:06,166 --> 00:23:08,388 distance , but also having an inability 596 00:23:08,388 --> 00:23:11,180 to counter into responds . Um And so 597 00:23:11,180 --> 00:23:13,347 that's where our motivation comes from 598 00:23:13,347 --> 00:23:15,513 this year , the ones actually that are 599 00:23:15,513 --> 00:23:17,680 kind of caught responding to what what 600 00:23:17,680 --> 00:23:19,680 these two countries have been . I'm 601 00:23:19,680 --> 00:23:23,010 really pursuing with some with a lot of 602 00:23:23,010 --> 00:23:25,232 resources and time and energy and focus 603 00:23:25,290 --> 00:23:27,401 in a way the United States simply has 604 00:23:27,401 --> 00:23:29,512 not . And so I did . You want to kind 605 00:23:29,512 --> 00:23:31,457 perspective ? Because you see that 606 00:23:31,457 --> 00:23:31,270 across all kinds of literature , that 607 00:23:31,270 --> 00:23:33,492 that's why the Russians and the Chinese 608 00:23:33,492 --> 00:23:35,826 are you , Um , but it's simply not true . 609 00:23:35,880 --> 00:23:37,936 Now , maybe work can comment on this 610 00:23:37,936 --> 00:23:40,158 because of the pasting . What I've seen 611 00:23:40,158 --> 00:23:42,380 is that I'm not so discouraged that the 612 00:23:42,380 --> 00:23:44,713 United States is just so just so behind . 613 00:23:44,713 --> 00:23:46,880 Ridge's just pointless at this time to 614 00:23:46,880 --> 00:23:48,880 catch up . You know , it takes some 615 00:23:48,880 --> 00:23:51,102 motivation for the United States toe in 616 00:23:51,102 --> 00:23:53,324 some political leadership at the top to 617 00:23:53,324 --> 00:23:55,547 get to get back to this . But I've been 618 00:23:55,547 --> 00:23:57,824 very encouraged by what I've seen . Um , 619 00:23:57,824 --> 00:24:00,047 and we should in the next few years and 620 00:24:00,047 --> 00:24:02,102 work and you can correct me get give 621 00:24:02,102 --> 00:24:03,880 actual point where we do have a 622 00:24:03,880 --> 00:24:05,936 strategic advantage in some of these 623 00:24:05,936 --> 00:24:05,870 ways , but it does take political 624 00:24:06,160 --> 00:24:08,550 leadership from the top . It does take 625 00:24:08,560 --> 00:24:10,560 working hard at making sure that we 626 00:24:10,560 --> 00:24:12,727 maintain this bipartisan consensus and 627 00:24:12,727 --> 00:24:14,949 there are things that would be useful . 628 00:24:14,949 --> 00:24:17,060 I know from industry who are eager to 629 00:24:17,060 --> 00:24:19,060 to provide the department what they 630 00:24:19,060 --> 00:24:21,060 want and wants to provide what they 631 00:24:21,060 --> 00:24:23,282 want at scale , like my Mark said , and 632 00:24:23,282 --> 00:24:25,449 some of those things that would be and 633 00:24:25,449 --> 00:24:27,671 that that are the most cost effective . 634 00:24:27,671 --> 00:24:29,560 And that means that some of these 635 00:24:29,560 --> 00:24:31,782 having more granularity on requirements 636 00:24:31,782 --> 00:24:33,949 and what it is specifically that we're 637 00:24:33,949 --> 00:24:33,890 going to use before and how we're going 638 00:24:33,890 --> 00:24:36,001 to use them operational . It would be 639 00:24:36,001 --> 00:24:38,223 very , very helpful for some people who 640 00:24:38,223 --> 00:24:40,390 were trying to get the department what 641 00:24:40,390 --> 00:24:42,557 they want . But I very much appreciate 642 00:24:42,557 --> 00:24:44,501 and I can't say this enough , Uh , 643 00:24:44,501 --> 00:24:46,668 marks willingness to say that you know 644 00:24:46,668 --> 00:24:48,890 some of these programs rocking programs 645 00:24:48,890 --> 00:24:48,780 or record because we are being a little 646 00:24:48,780 --> 00:24:50,891 risky here . And sometimes the United 647 00:24:50,891 --> 00:24:53,058 States can be too risk averse , and we 648 00:24:53,058 --> 00:24:55,990 tire hands and explodes down our 649 00:24:55,990 --> 00:24:58,620 ability to get something . Field it . 650 00:24:58,800 --> 00:25:00,967 And I think it's really important from 651 00:25:00,967 --> 00:25:03,290 set hyper Sonics and competition that 652 00:25:03,290 --> 00:25:05,280 we make the point that seed is so 653 00:25:05,280 --> 00:25:07,336 important here . We're trying to get 654 00:25:07,336 --> 00:25:09,502 something fielded as quickly as we can 655 00:25:09,502 --> 00:25:11,558 because we're trying to deter . They 656 00:25:11,558 --> 00:25:13,780 need to actually use these things . And 657 00:25:13,780 --> 00:25:15,836 so we're making up for a lack that's 658 00:25:15,836 --> 00:25:17,669 there . And that's why there's a 659 00:25:17,669 --> 00:25:19,891 There's this great pressure coming down 660 00:25:19,891 --> 00:25:21,947 on getting something fielded quickly 661 00:25:21,947 --> 00:25:24,113 that's going to close that deterrent . 662 00:25:24,113 --> 00:25:26,220 Yeah , I think that exists , right ? 663 00:25:28,140 --> 00:25:30,307 Mark , Did you want Did you want toe ? 664 00:25:30,880 --> 00:25:34,410 I would do what she said . Was that 665 00:25:34,410 --> 00:25:38,280 some for me ? So I love I love the 666 00:25:38,290 --> 00:25:41,180 The correction that that were that that 667 00:25:41,180 --> 00:25:43,291 China and Russia are not are not just 668 00:25:43,291 --> 00:25:45,513 responding to us , I'd also point out , 669 00:25:45,513 --> 00:25:47,736 by the way we would be I think we would 670 00:25:47,736 --> 00:25:49,902 be pursuing this technology regardless 671 00:25:49,902 --> 00:25:52,236 of whether anyone else were pursuing it . 672 00:25:52,236 --> 00:25:54,458 Although obviously we have a sensible , 673 00:25:54,458 --> 00:25:56,347 alas , pretty . Because we do see 674 00:25:56,347 --> 00:25:56,260 ourselves in a bit of a competition . 675 00:25:56,740 --> 00:25:59,440 Um , I do agree . I do believe now 676 00:25:59,440 --> 00:26:01,900 we're on a path to not only field 677 00:26:01,900 --> 00:26:05,480 weapons successfully , but to to seize 678 00:26:05,480 --> 00:26:07,730 the lead in this technology area . Um , 679 00:26:07,950 --> 00:26:10,061 I will say this throughout threat All 680 00:26:10,061 --> 00:26:12,006 all the discussions about where we 681 00:26:12,006 --> 00:26:14,180 stand versus , uh , potential . You 682 00:26:14,180 --> 00:26:16,180 know , potential adversaries , peer 683 00:26:16,180 --> 00:26:18,291 competitors . Um , one thing that the 684 00:26:18,291 --> 00:26:20,513 United States has never lost lead on is 685 00:26:20,513 --> 00:26:22,624 that is the innovation in this area . 686 00:26:22,624 --> 00:26:24,791 Frankly , if you look at every concept 687 00:26:24,791 --> 00:26:26,791 that we've seen in hypersonic every 688 00:26:26,791 --> 00:26:28,736 every every weapons system , every 689 00:26:28,736 --> 00:26:31,220 application , uh , they all come from 690 00:26:31,220 --> 00:26:33,331 the United States . So I'll come from 691 00:26:33,331 --> 00:26:35,387 our research community , and that is 692 00:26:35,387 --> 00:26:37,553 our tremendous advantage and continues 693 00:26:37,553 --> 00:26:37,210 to here will continue to be . Our 694 00:26:37,210 --> 00:26:40,100 banner doesn't move forward markets 695 00:26:40,100 --> 00:26:42,044 fighter jumping on that , too , in 696 00:26:42,044 --> 00:26:44,156 terms of you know , why Russian China 697 00:26:44,156 --> 00:26:46,211 want these things and forget all the 698 00:26:46,211 --> 00:26:48,378 mirror imaging stuff . Um , you know , 699 00:26:48,378 --> 00:26:50,489 I think fundamentally what's at stake 700 00:26:50,489 --> 00:26:52,711 here is the fact that we're differently 701 00:26:52,711 --> 00:26:54,878 situated on the United States , puts a 702 00:26:54,878 --> 00:26:56,878 lot of emphasis on power projection 703 00:26:56,878 --> 00:26:59,130 over there and these sort of things 704 00:26:59,130 --> 00:27:02,140 that air again in terms of structuring 705 00:27:02,140 --> 00:27:04,720 and a complex attack on our bases and 706 00:27:04,720 --> 00:27:07,110 four forces , you know that it's about 707 00:27:07,110 --> 00:27:09,166 the place of the US from the world . 708 00:27:09,166 --> 00:27:12,390 And this and other things pose a 709 00:27:12,390 --> 00:27:14,170 particular problem to our power 710 00:27:14,170 --> 00:27:15,660 projection . Full stop . 711 00:27:17,940 --> 00:27:19,884 I want to remind our audience real 712 00:27:19,884 --> 00:27:22,330 quick . You can ask a question on 713 00:27:22,330 --> 00:27:24,520 Twitter using the hashtag d one tech 714 00:27:24,520 --> 00:27:26,500 summit . I want to discuss the 715 00:27:26,500 --> 00:27:29,120 industrial base and ah , Dr Lewis , I 716 00:27:29,120 --> 00:27:31,287 know A few months ago you launched the 717 00:27:31,287 --> 00:27:34,100 study of the industrial base and on , 718 00:27:34,110 --> 00:27:36,840 and I created a so called a hypersonic 719 00:27:36,850 --> 00:27:39,290 war room . Um , I presume there's no 720 00:27:39,290 --> 00:27:43,030 fighting in there to determine Dr 721 00:27:43,030 --> 00:27:44,580 Strangelove , Joe . Yeah , 722 00:27:44,590 --> 00:27:46,257 determinative chokepoints and 723 00:27:46,257 --> 00:27:48,368 vulnerabilities in the U . S . Supply 724 00:27:48,368 --> 00:27:50,146 chain . Can you share any early 725 00:27:50,146 --> 00:27:52,368 findings ? And last week , the data and 726 00:27:52,368 --> 00:27:54,534 analysis firm Savini , they released a 727 00:27:54,534 --> 00:27:56,520 report that highlighted that did 728 00:27:56,520 --> 00:27:58,464 highlight a number of supply chain 729 00:27:58,464 --> 00:28:00,370 vulnerabilities within hypersonic 730 00:28:00,370 --> 00:28:02,481 industrial base . How do you mitigate 731 00:28:02,481 --> 00:28:04,037 or get rid of some of those 732 00:28:04,037 --> 00:28:06,320 vulnerabilities ? Right , So as you're 733 00:28:06,320 --> 00:28:08,542 exactly right , So under Secretary Lord 734 00:28:08,542 --> 00:28:10,542 Ellen Lord , our undersecretary for 735 00:28:10,542 --> 00:28:12,709 acquisition sustainment kicked off the 736 00:28:12,709 --> 00:28:14,709 war room in her organization . I've 737 00:28:14,709 --> 00:28:16,931 been code sharing it with the assistant 738 00:28:16,931 --> 00:28:18,987 secretary defense given pay heed and 739 00:28:18,987 --> 00:28:21,042 and , um , you know , there are many 740 00:28:21,042 --> 00:28:23,153 aspects to it , so so industrial base 741 00:28:23,153 --> 00:28:25,487 has has obviously lots of nuances to it . 742 00:28:25,487 --> 00:28:27,709 It's not just the primes , but also the 743 00:28:27,709 --> 00:28:29,820 teething , or that you're to the Tier 744 00:28:29,820 --> 00:28:31,820 three , the lower tier spires . And 745 00:28:31,820 --> 00:28:30,950 those are the ones that were 746 00:28:30,950 --> 00:28:33,172 particularly worried about . And also I 747 00:28:33,172 --> 00:28:35,339 will mention that with the response to 748 00:28:35,339 --> 00:28:37,506 the covert pandemic , or even a little 749 00:28:37,506 --> 00:28:39,980 bit more concerned about the help and 750 00:28:39,990 --> 00:28:42,680 and and , uh , and resilience of of 751 00:28:42,680 --> 00:28:44,736 some of our suppliers . So I'll tell 752 00:28:44,736 --> 00:28:46,680 you right now it's still a work in 753 00:28:46,680 --> 00:28:48,680 progress . I can't give you any any 754 00:28:48,680 --> 00:28:50,791 final conclusions of where we are , I 755 00:28:50,791 --> 00:28:52,902 can tell you we are looking across my 756 00:28:52,902 --> 00:28:55,480 chain . Ah , the Tier One suppliers 757 00:28:55,480 --> 00:28:57,850 have been extremely helpful in 758 00:28:57,860 --> 00:29:00,027 identifying what their vulnerabilities 759 00:29:00,027 --> 00:29:02,670 were , um , where they thought we 760 00:29:02,670 --> 00:29:04,940 should be focusing our our emphasis . 761 00:29:05,010 --> 00:29:07,121 I'll also point out that that some of 762 00:29:07,121 --> 00:29:09,288 the primes have been doing a great job 763 00:29:09,288 --> 00:29:11,177 of all strength , their their spy 764 00:29:11,177 --> 00:29:11,060 change . So looking down their supply 765 00:29:11,060 --> 00:29:13,010 chain and on their own independent 766 00:29:13,010 --> 00:29:15,121 government of the government on their 767 00:29:15,121 --> 00:29:17,550 own . The the crimes have been making 768 00:29:17,550 --> 00:29:20,670 sure that they have shored up the all 769 00:29:20,670 --> 00:29:22,670 theirs fires companies that they're 770 00:29:22,670 --> 00:29:24,670 working with . I mentioned What are 771 00:29:24,670 --> 00:29:26,892 other aspect is placing that we're very 772 00:29:26,892 --> 00:29:29,059 concerned about that is workforce . So 773 00:29:29,059 --> 00:29:31,170 we've got a really strong emphasis on 774 00:29:31,170 --> 00:29:30,360 workforce and that starts with the 775 00:29:30,360 --> 00:29:32,530 university's . So we've got a major 776 00:29:32,530 --> 00:29:34,641 effort underway . We've got the joint 777 00:29:34,641 --> 00:29:36,530 hypersonic technology up , joined 778 00:29:36,530 --> 00:29:38,641 hypersonic transition office um , and 779 00:29:38,641 --> 00:29:40,697 Wonder one of their activities is to 780 00:29:40,697 --> 00:29:43,040 set up a university consortium , which 781 00:29:43,040 --> 00:29:46,050 will be , ah , large academic effort 782 00:29:46,280 --> 00:29:48,169 that tries to pull in some of our 783 00:29:48,169 --> 00:29:50,280 leading universities , including some 784 00:29:50,280 --> 00:29:52,447 of the nontraditional players of hyper 785 00:29:52,447 --> 00:29:51,570 sonics . You know , the folks that 786 00:29:51,570 --> 00:29:53,292 maybe did have worked the high 787 00:29:53,292 --> 00:29:55,181 temperature materials but haven't 788 00:29:55,181 --> 00:29:57,403 really played at the hypersonic working 789 00:29:57,403 --> 00:29:59,403 systems engineering but have Nestle 790 00:29:59,403 --> 00:30:01,348 hypersonic to bring their skills , 791 00:30:01,348 --> 00:30:03,403 bring their students to Teoh bearing 792 00:30:03,403 --> 00:30:05,570 the problems that we're pursuing . Tom 793 00:30:05,570 --> 00:30:07,792 Perhaps , do you have any insights here 794 00:30:07,792 --> 00:30:10,014 in the in the industrial base ? I don't 795 00:30:10,014 --> 00:30:12,070 want to read something from the From 796 00:30:12,070 --> 00:30:14,292 the Grazzini report from last week , it 797 00:30:14,292 --> 00:30:16,514 said . Overall , Chinese suppliers make 798 00:30:16,514 --> 00:30:16,200 up a low share of a low share of 799 00:30:16,200 --> 00:30:19,080 suppliers in the course sectors that 800 00:30:19,140 --> 00:30:21,620 supply the type top hypersonic 801 00:30:21,620 --> 00:30:23,842 contractors . And Tom , maybe Rebecca , 802 00:30:23,842 --> 00:30:26,770 too . How can , uh , you know , this ? 803 00:30:26,770 --> 00:30:28,770 This certainly seems like it's it's 804 00:30:28,770 --> 00:30:30,992 concerning , Um how does you know one . 805 00:30:30,992 --> 00:30:33,103 How do you mitigate into how does how 806 00:30:33,103 --> 00:30:35,940 maybe Congress are , uh , you know , 807 00:30:35,950 --> 00:30:37,950 Pentagon , in your opinion , way in 808 00:30:37,970 --> 00:30:40,550 Teoh address this ? Yeah , Well , look , 809 00:30:40,550 --> 00:30:42,980 I look forward to reading Marx study 810 00:30:42,980 --> 00:30:45,940 when it comes out like a rug . 811 00:30:46,740 --> 00:30:48,462 First of all , you know what's 812 00:30:48,462 --> 00:30:50,518 different about these thankful front 813 00:30:50,518 --> 00:30:52,407 and center . Is there kind of the 814 00:30:52,407 --> 00:30:54,240 environment that they're they're 815 00:30:54,240 --> 00:30:56,240 operating in thermal otherwise . So 816 00:30:56,240 --> 00:30:58,462 obviously the China thing is is part of 817 00:30:58,462 --> 00:31:00,629 that making you have the folks here in 818 00:31:00,629 --> 00:31:02,851 the U . S . They're capable of material 819 00:31:02,950 --> 00:31:06,600 to do that kind of thermal work . The 820 00:31:06,610 --> 00:31:08,777 second thing would be , you know , the 821 00:31:08,777 --> 00:31:10,777 command control so that whenever it 822 00:31:10,777 --> 00:31:13,010 gets over there that you are able to 823 00:31:13,270 --> 00:31:15,490 communicate if you need to re target 824 00:31:15,500 --> 00:31:17,722 and all that sort of stuff , especially 825 00:31:17,722 --> 00:31:19,722 in a denied bar . So that's a piece 826 00:31:19,722 --> 00:31:21,722 that sometimes gets overlooked with 827 00:31:21,722 --> 00:31:23,889 long range this that now that and then 828 00:31:23,889 --> 00:31:25,722 the third thing would be testing 829 00:31:25,722 --> 00:31:27,778 facilities , including windows . You 830 00:31:27,778 --> 00:31:29,889 know , we actually used to have a lot 831 00:31:29,889 --> 00:31:32,111 more hypersonic wind tunnels then we do 832 00:31:32,111 --> 00:31:34,630 today on and having , as it turns out , 833 00:31:34,640 --> 00:31:37,330 the ability to recreate the the 834 00:31:37,380 --> 00:31:40,030 environment at the pressure and speed 835 00:31:40,200 --> 00:31:43,080 on making sure it's clean , clean , hot 836 00:31:43,080 --> 00:31:45,191 air . What have you and doing that on 837 00:31:45,191 --> 00:31:47,469 the ground ? That's gonna be important . 838 00:31:47,469 --> 00:31:49,480 Having the facilities to have all 839 00:31:49,790 --> 00:31:51,940 Wilson defense wide programs come in 840 00:31:51,940 --> 00:31:53,829 there . There's gonna be a line . 841 00:31:54,120 --> 00:31:56,350 People taking a number two test there . 842 00:31:56,640 --> 00:31:58,640 Uh , they're gliding , uh , body or 843 00:31:58,640 --> 00:32:00,700 what have you ? So you know the test 844 00:32:00,700 --> 00:32:02,700 facilities . Easy to overlook . You 845 00:32:02,700 --> 00:32:04,780 gotta flying too . But it's a lot 846 00:32:04,780 --> 00:32:07,230 cheaper on . It's important to be able 847 00:32:07,230 --> 00:32:09,119 to watch the ground testing too . 848 00:32:13,640 --> 00:32:15,862 Mark , can we Can we go back to you for 849 00:32:15,862 --> 00:32:18,084 a second on the terms of your testing ? 850 00:32:18,084 --> 00:32:21,940 Yeah . You know , he clearly need 851 00:32:21,950 --> 00:32:24,006 overland . At least you need I would 852 00:32:24,006 --> 00:32:26,750 presume a ton of space Teoh to test 11 853 00:32:26,750 --> 00:32:28,806 of these weapons weapons . And , you 854 00:32:28,806 --> 00:32:31,020 know , within minutes , I presume just 855 00:32:31,020 --> 00:32:33,170 from thinking of , you know , test 856 00:32:33,170 --> 00:32:36,920 ranges , be it in Nevada , 857 00:32:36,930 --> 00:32:40,210 Florida , Mexico . You didn't get would 858 00:32:40,210 --> 00:32:43,850 very quickly seemly get over Ah , 859 00:32:44,440 --> 00:32:46,440 populated areas . So how do you go 860 00:32:46,440 --> 00:32:49,830 about you ? How is has the duty looking 861 00:32:49,830 --> 00:32:53,620 at testing and how wear on 862 00:32:53,620 --> 00:32:55,710 and types of Ah , maybe censors and 863 00:32:55,710 --> 00:32:57,766 what ? Not that you would need to do 864 00:32:57,766 --> 00:32:59,877 this , so , you know , you're exactly 865 00:32:59,877 --> 00:33:02,099 right . So what ? One of the advantages 866 00:33:02,099 --> 00:33:04,154 that some some other nations have is 867 00:33:04,154 --> 00:33:06,266 that they have an easier time testing 868 00:33:06,266 --> 00:33:08,321 overland . Um , we're doing most are 869 00:33:08,321 --> 00:33:10,599 long are long scale testing over water , 870 00:33:10,599 --> 00:33:12,766 especially in the Pacific range . Um , 871 00:33:12,940 --> 00:33:14,996 you know , we recently did a test in 872 00:33:14,996 --> 00:33:17,107 March over the Pacific . That's where 873 00:33:17,107 --> 00:33:19,218 we tested x 51 . That's where we plan 874 00:33:19,218 --> 00:33:19,160 to do most of our upcoming flight tests . 875 00:33:19,640 --> 00:33:21,640 Um , we're looking opening up other 876 00:33:21,640 --> 00:33:23,862 Carter's looking at other solutions for 877 00:33:23,862 --> 00:33:26,280 overland testing as well . Um , one of 878 00:33:26,280 --> 00:33:28,280 things that we're really focused on 879 00:33:28,280 --> 00:33:30,280 right now is we are ramping up in a 880 00:33:30,280 --> 00:33:32,447 major way to do more flight testing so 881 00:33:32,447 --> 00:33:34,669 that over the next four years we have a 882 00:33:34,669 --> 00:33:36,836 40 new flight tests plan . Um , that's 883 00:33:36,836 --> 00:33:38,780 one of the things that were that's 884 00:33:38,780 --> 00:33:38,550 that's part of our acceleration plan . 885 00:33:38,940 --> 00:33:41,051 We need to fly early . We need to fly 886 00:33:41,051 --> 00:33:43,107 often . We need to get back into the 887 00:33:43,107 --> 00:33:45,940 air . And , um so So you're precisely 888 00:33:45,940 --> 00:33:47,996 right highlighting that I want to go 889 00:33:47,996 --> 00:33:49,996 back to the point it was made about 890 00:33:49,996 --> 00:33:52,051 Brown test facilities , actually , a 891 00:33:52,051 --> 00:33:54,162 critical issue . I resonate with that 892 00:33:54,162 --> 00:33:57,330 completely . Um , we we did spend many 893 00:33:57,330 --> 00:34:00,500 years Decommissioning hypersonic Hess 894 00:34:00,500 --> 00:34:03,120 facilities . And I used to point point 895 00:34:03,120 --> 00:34:06,450 out that if you if you plot , we were 896 00:34:06,460 --> 00:34:08,516 Decommissioning cuddles . And if you 897 00:34:08,516 --> 00:34:10,516 plotted the rate at which China was 898 00:34:10,516 --> 00:34:12,682 building tunnels , the ones they would 899 00:34:12,682 --> 00:34:14,960 tell us about the slopes were the same , 900 00:34:14,960 --> 00:34:17,071 but the signs were opposite . So they 901 00:34:17,071 --> 00:34:16,910 were building tunnels at about the same 902 00:34:16,910 --> 00:34:19,188 rate that we were decommissioned girls . 903 00:34:19,188 --> 00:34:21,250 Um , and today we see our various 904 00:34:21,250 --> 00:34:23,250 programs Air France , like climbing 905 00:34:23,250 --> 00:34:25,361 over each other to try to get time in 906 00:34:25,361 --> 00:34:25,070 our window . So that's something that 907 00:34:25,070 --> 00:34:27,126 we're also addressing looking at new 908 00:34:27,126 --> 00:34:29,181 testing , evaluation , investments . 909 00:34:29,181 --> 00:34:31,348 We've got some investments underway at 910 00:34:31,348 --> 00:34:33,292 Arnold Injury Development Center . 911 00:34:33,292 --> 00:34:32,940 We're looking at other facilities 912 00:34:32,940 --> 00:34:35,051 around the country . It's also one of 913 00:34:35,051 --> 00:34:36,884 the reasons we're looking to our 914 00:34:36,884 --> 00:34:38,884 universities . So , you know , it's 915 00:34:38,884 --> 00:34:40,996 just one example one of the ways that 916 00:34:40,996 --> 00:34:42,996 we would study flow over hypersonic 917 00:34:42,996 --> 00:34:42,650 vehicles . Look the state of the 918 00:34:42,660 --> 00:34:44,882 boundary layer the flow is right on the 919 00:34:44,882 --> 00:34:46,938 surface of the vehicle and are right 920 00:34:46,938 --> 00:34:49,049 now our premier state of the art wind 921 00:34:49,049 --> 00:34:48,840 tunnel . To do that is located at 922 00:34:48,840 --> 00:34:50,990 Purdue University on the , uh , on 923 00:34:50,990 --> 00:34:53,046 their campus . So that's part of our 924 00:34:53,046 --> 00:34:55,157 outreach to our university partners . 925 00:34:55,340 --> 00:34:58,120 Has coat has Corona virus . And , uh , 926 00:34:58,130 --> 00:35:00,074 you know , closure of universities 927 00:35:00,074 --> 00:35:02,920 around the country and such Is that is 928 00:35:02,920 --> 00:35:06,380 that had any type of major impact yet 929 00:35:06,560 --> 00:35:10,460 on testing Is research that *** ? So , 930 00:35:10,470 --> 00:35:12,660 um , I wouldn't say major impact . It 931 00:35:12,660 --> 00:35:14,771 has had an impact . We've already had 932 00:35:14,771 --> 00:35:16,882 some other efforts where , because of 933 00:35:16,882 --> 00:35:19,216 various aspects related to the pandemic , 934 00:35:19,216 --> 00:35:18,970 we've had to slow down . I'm in one 935 00:35:18,970 --> 00:35:21,192 case , we had a team that , um but they 936 00:35:21,192 --> 00:35:23,192 had exposure and had a stand down . 937 00:35:23,192 --> 00:35:25,248 Although fortunately turned out that 938 00:35:25,248 --> 00:35:27,303 that was a false alarm . Um , as you 939 00:35:27,303 --> 00:35:27,280 know , the university so mostly closed 940 00:35:27,280 --> 00:35:30,240 up their campuses . Um , most of the 941 00:35:30,240 --> 00:35:32,550 universities have , in fact , had shut 942 00:35:32,550 --> 00:35:34,717 down all but they're critical research 943 00:35:34,717 --> 00:35:36,606 activities . Um , so , yes , it's 944 00:35:36,606 --> 00:35:38,661 obviously had an impact . But in our 945 00:35:38,661 --> 00:35:40,828 major programs , we've still been able 946 00:35:40,828 --> 00:35:43,670 to maintain over Mitt , just jump in 947 00:35:43,670 --> 00:35:45,837 here real quick markets on the rest in 948 00:35:45,837 --> 00:35:48,003 peace that I think it is so critical . 949 00:35:48,003 --> 00:35:50,170 You get three other reason that flight 950 00:35:50,170 --> 00:35:52,281 testing is so important , obviously , 951 00:35:52,281 --> 00:35:54,170 just to improve these systems and 952 00:35:54,170 --> 00:35:56,226 figure out what works best and , you 953 00:35:56,226 --> 00:35:58,337 know , move past mistakes and improve 954 00:35:58,337 --> 00:36:00,337 it all that's crippling form . It's 955 00:36:00,337 --> 00:36:02,559 also important for the adversary to see 956 00:36:02,559 --> 00:36:04,781 that we're doing it . And so this thats 957 00:36:04,781 --> 00:36:06,837 the testing is important to actually 958 00:36:06,837 --> 00:36:09,114 bolster our credibility for deterrence . 959 00:36:09,114 --> 00:36:11,337 Animal Davidson has made this point , I 960 00:36:11,337 --> 00:36:13,337 think , very eloquently as he as he 961 00:36:13,337 --> 00:36:15,559 talks about trying to make sure that we 962 00:36:15,559 --> 00:36:17,670 are bolstering to turns in the in the 963 00:36:17,670 --> 00:36:19,837 Pacific , in particular the deterrence 964 00:36:19,837 --> 00:36:21,892 by denial . We're frying to to , you 965 00:36:21,892 --> 00:36:23,781 know , complicate the adversaries 966 00:36:23,781 --> 00:36:25,948 calculus that that they're able to get 967 00:36:25,948 --> 00:36:28,059 off on active aggression , you know , 968 00:36:28,059 --> 00:36:30,170 at a political causalities worth it . 969 00:36:30,170 --> 00:36:31,948 But then is the part of that is 970 00:36:31,948 --> 00:36:34,003 obviously developing capabilities so 971 00:36:34,003 --> 00:36:36,059 that we have been fielded . But it's 972 00:36:36,059 --> 00:36:36,030 showing them that we are competing , 973 00:36:36,040 --> 00:36:38,207 that we are contesting your ability to 974 00:36:38,207 --> 00:36:40,262 do this , creating multiple dilemmas 975 00:36:40,262 --> 00:36:42,262 and so that that the testing pieces 976 00:36:42,262 --> 00:36:44,262 just so critical , I think , or for 977 00:36:44,262 --> 00:36:46,207 shoring that up even before we get 978 00:36:46,207 --> 00:36:48,207 stuff like where we're making these 979 00:36:48,207 --> 00:36:48,140 things . I'm , you know , operational 980 00:36:48,140 --> 00:36:51,830 good times . All right , 981 00:36:51,830 --> 00:36:53,886 Rebecca , you're gonna end up having 982 00:36:53,886 --> 00:36:56,052 the last word today because we have we 983 00:36:56,052 --> 00:36:57,997 have wrong , under the time , very 984 00:36:57,997 --> 00:37:00,219 disappointed in our viewers that we did 985 00:37:00,219 --> 00:37:02,441 not get any questions on Twitter . Ah , 986 00:37:02,441 --> 00:37:04,274 and probably suspect that that's 987 00:37:04,274 --> 00:37:06,330 because ah , ah , lot of our viewers 988 00:37:06,330 --> 00:37:08,441 aren't on Twitter , and , uh , you're 989 00:37:08,441 --> 00:37:07,970 you're better off , and you're probably 990 00:37:08,090 --> 00:37:11,490 happier . Uh , anyways , I want to 991 00:37:11,500 --> 00:37:13,690 thank all of our Panelists for joining 992 00:37:13,690 --> 00:37:15,634 us today . I very much enjoyed the 993 00:37:15,634 --> 00:37:17,523 conversation , and I want to turn 994 00:37:17,523 --> 00:37:19,634 things over right now to my colleague 995 00:37:19,634 --> 00:37:21,579 Sam Jacks . Hey , thanks so much , 996 00:37:21,579 --> 00:37:23,634 Marcus . And thanks for leading that 997 00:37:23,634 --> 00:37:25,634 excellent conversation . And thanks 998 00:37:25,634 --> 00:37:27,857 again to the Panelists . Now , I'd like 999 00:37:27,857 --> 00:37:27,710 to welcome Dr Timothy Barton from our 1000 00:37:27,710 --> 00:37:29,766 strategic underwrite Applied owes to 1001 00:37:29,766 --> 00:37:31,099 the virtual stick Ege . 1002 00:37:34,030 --> 00:37:36,450 Thanks , Sam . Uh , trying to share my 1003 00:37:36,450 --> 00:37:38,340 screen here . Can everybody see that