1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:02,400 Thanks . Hi . Patrick Tucker , 2 00:00:02,400 --> 00:00:04,400 technology editor for Defense One . 3 00:00:04,400 --> 00:00:06,456 Thank you all so much for joining us 4 00:00:06,456 --> 00:00:08,344 this morning . Being part of Tech 5 00:00:08,344 --> 00:00:11,170 Summit 2020 . Very excited this morning 6 00:00:11,170 --> 00:00:13,392 to welcome our guests to talk about the 7 00:00:13,392 --> 00:00:15,460 future of hyper Sonics hypersonic 8 00:00:15,470 --> 00:00:17,910 development in the U . S . Military and 9 00:00:18,130 --> 00:00:20,910 countering defending hyper sonics on 10 00:00:20,910 --> 00:00:23,021 missile defense for the United States 11 00:00:23,021 --> 00:00:25,920 Homeland . Very important . Obviously , 12 00:00:25,930 --> 00:00:28,470 uh , roles for the two gentlemen there 13 00:00:28,470 --> 00:00:30,637 joining me this morning . Vice Admiral 14 00:00:30,637 --> 00:00:32,637 John Hill , director of the Missile 15 00:00:32,637 --> 00:00:34,970 Defense Agency , on joining us by phone . 16 00:00:34,970 --> 00:00:37,192 Mike White , assistant director , hyper 17 00:00:37,192 --> 00:00:38,748 Sonics on the office of the 18 00:00:38,748 --> 00:00:40,914 Undersecretary of Defense for research 19 00:00:40,914 --> 00:00:43,081 and engineering on again , I'm Patrick 20 00:00:43,081 --> 00:00:45,026 Tucker . So this morning , talking 21 00:00:45,026 --> 00:00:47,248 about all of those different aspects of 22 00:00:47,248 --> 00:00:50,410 missile defense for the U . S . On with 23 00:00:50,410 --> 00:00:52,750 a special focus on the biggest 24 00:00:52,750 --> 00:00:56,020 challenge ahead for defending the US 25 00:00:56,020 --> 00:00:58,910 from 21st century threats , which is 26 00:00:59,310 --> 00:01:01,032 defending the U . S . From new 27 00:01:01,032 --> 00:01:03,970 hypersonic platforms that are under 28 00:01:03,970 --> 00:01:06,010 rapid development from competitive 29 00:01:06,010 --> 00:01:08,640 countries such as Russia and China . On 30 00:01:08,640 --> 00:01:12,040 also hypersonic development that is 31 00:01:12,040 --> 00:01:15,360 undergoing in the U . S . Military . Uh , 32 00:01:15,370 --> 00:01:17,370 of course , this refers to the 33 00:01:17,370 --> 00:01:19,426 development of new missile platforms 34 00:01:19,426 --> 00:01:21,648 that can travel five times the speed of 35 00:01:21,648 --> 00:01:23,592 sound . But unlike I see , the EMS 36 00:01:23,592 --> 00:01:26,160 highly maneuverable on , that presents 37 00:01:26,170 --> 00:01:29,130 a incredible challenge or the folks 38 00:01:29,130 --> 00:01:31,610 trying to defend really any place from 39 00:01:31,610 --> 00:01:34,350 these new types of weapons . Eso . 40 00:01:34,540 --> 00:01:37,820 That's why , in many ways Russia , 41 00:01:37,820 --> 00:01:39,820 China , the United States air , all 42 00:01:39,820 --> 00:01:42,600 rushing to develop them . So I want to 43 00:01:42,600 --> 00:01:44,656 remind all of you that you can't ask 44 00:01:44,656 --> 00:01:46,640 questions . I hope you do use that 45 00:01:46,640 --> 00:01:49,450 little tab to the side of the screen 46 00:01:49,450 --> 00:01:51,617 there . Send your questions in . As we 47 00:01:51,617 --> 00:01:53,800 get going , I typically find that we 48 00:01:53,800 --> 00:01:55,967 don't have at the end of the broadcast 49 00:01:55,967 --> 00:01:58,022 enough time for all of the questions 50 00:01:58,022 --> 00:02:00,078 that come in . That's very typically 51 00:02:00,078 --> 00:02:02,450 the case . Eso get yours and as soon as 52 00:02:02,450 --> 00:02:04,506 you can and I'll be able to see them 53 00:02:04,506 --> 00:02:06,672 and will present them with our panel . 54 00:02:06,672 --> 00:02:08,894 And if you're , uh , uh following along 55 00:02:08,894 --> 00:02:11,060 on Twitter , feel free to send me 56 00:02:11,060 --> 00:02:13,171 questions that way to at death . Tech 57 00:02:13,171 --> 00:02:15,700 Pat . That's may love to get those in . 58 00:02:16,240 --> 00:02:20,060 This is a incredibly complex area 59 00:02:20,070 --> 00:02:23,220 of activity , also incredibly important 60 00:02:23,350 --> 00:02:25,683 on , and it's also something that the U . 61 00:02:25,683 --> 00:02:28,017 S . Government spends a lot of money on . 62 00:02:28,017 --> 00:02:30,072 A swell of the Chinese government as 63 00:02:30,072 --> 00:02:32,072 well as the Russian government . So 64 00:02:32,072 --> 00:02:34,294 just a sense of how important that is . 65 00:02:34,294 --> 00:02:36,517 Went to hear your voices when they hear 66 00:02:36,517 --> 00:02:38,739 your questions . Eso with that . Let me 67 00:02:38,739 --> 00:02:40,906 kick it off to you , Mr White . Okay . 68 00:02:40,906 --> 00:02:43,072 Call you Mike . Yeah , OK . Mike White 69 00:02:43,072 --> 00:02:45,128 joining us on the phone , he's gonna 70 00:02:45,128 --> 00:02:47,239 have to head out a little bit early . 71 00:02:47,239 --> 00:02:49,461 So just for the folks viewing at home , 72 00:02:49,461 --> 00:02:51,461 just know that he doesn't mean t be 73 00:02:51,461 --> 00:02:53,628 rude to us . Has got to go . And we're 74 00:02:53,628 --> 00:02:55,850 very grateful Break and spend some time 75 00:02:55,850 --> 00:02:58,017 with us this morning that he can , but 76 00:02:58,017 --> 00:02:57,910 give us a sense of what's coming in the 77 00:02:57,910 --> 00:03:00,077 next 12 months in terms of testing and 78 00:03:00,077 --> 00:03:02,620 development of new hypersonic weapons 79 00:03:02,620 --> 00:03:05,760 in the U . S . Military . Thank you and 80 00:03:05,760 --> 00:03:07,790 good morning to everybody . It's an 81 00:03:07,790 --> 00:03:10,012 honor to be here and really an honor to 82 00:03:10,012 --> 00:03:12,012 have the role of assistant director 83 00:03:12,012 --> 00:03:14,280 hypersonic to try to help the the 84 00:03:14,280 --> 00:03:16,650 Department of Nation moved forward 85 00:03:16,650 --> 00:03:18,330 aggressively to realize the 86 00:03:18,330 --> 00:03:19,941 transformational warfighting 87 00:03:19,941 --> 00:03:22,130 capabilities of hypersonic systems and 88 00:03:22,130 --> 00:03:24,019 then to be able to defend against 89 00:03:24,019 --> 00:03:26,186 adversary hyper sonics working with my 90 00:03:26,186 --> 00:03:28,610 teammate Admiral Hill . Um , in 91 00:03:28,620 --> 00:03:30,890 accomplishing that mission over the 92 00:03:30,890 --> 00:03:33,001 next 12 months . Really , What ? What 93 00:03:33,001 --> 00:03:36,690 we will see is continued acceleration 94 00:03:36,700 --> 00:03:38,730 of the development of offensive 95 00:03:38,730 --> 00:03:41,920 hypersonic systems . We just completed 96 00:03:41,920 --> 00:03:45,350 a successful flight tests on March 19 97 00:03:45,950 --> 00:03:48,470 demonstrating the common hypersonic 98 00:03:48,470 --> 00:03:50,750 glider body and a cooperative activity 99 00:03:50,750 --> 00:03:53,710 between Office of Secretary Defence . 100 00:03:53,720 --> 00:03:55,664 You know our office here , missile 101 00:03:55,664 --> 00:03:57,950 Defense Agency , the Navy and the Army , 102 00:03:58,440 --> 00:04:00,890 um , fully successfully demonstrating 103 00:04:01,530 --> 00:04:04,730 the capability toe to form intermediate 104 00:04:04,730 --> 00:04:07,290 range hypersonic who's glide strike . 105 00:04:07,520 --> 00:04:11,080 And that that test really marked from 106 00:04:11,080 --> 00:04:14,030 the beginning of a very active flight 107 00:04:14,030 --> 00:04:17,370 test a season over the next 12 months 108 00:04:17,370 --> 00:04:19,648 and really over the next several years , 109 00:04:19,648 --> 00:04:21,759 where we're going to take many of our 110 00:04:21,759 --> 00:04:23,981 concepts that have been in work for the 111 00:04:23,981 --> 00:04:26,203 last several years and demonstrate them 112 00:04:26,203 --> 00:04:28,990 through a flight flight test campaign . 113 00:04:28,990 --> 00:04:31,380 So a number of our programs across the 114 00:04:31,380 --> 00:04:33,890 portfolio will realize flight test 115 00:04:33,900 --> 00:04:36,011 demonstration over the next 12 months 116 00:04:36,011 --> 00:04:38,150 and then start the transition from 117 00:04:38,150 --> 00:04:40,800 weapons system concept development , 118 00:04:40,800 --> 00:04:43,070 actual weapons system development . I'm 119 00:04:43,070 --> 00:04:45,237 moving forward . What's the difference 120 00:04:45,237 --> 00:04:47,459 between flight tests for glide body and 121 00:04:47,459 --> 00:04:50,020 slight test for something that actually 122 00:04:50,020 --> 00:04:52,370 performs the way we expect a real 123 00:04:52,370 --> 00:04:55,220 hypersonic missile to perform ? It's 124 00:04:55,230 --> 00:04:57,341 mainly the difference mainly revolves 125 00:04:57,341 --> 00:05:01,250 around the level of tactical realism 126 00:05:01,260 --> 00:05:05,030 for the the missile stack on bend 127 00:05:05,030 --> 00:05:07,600 the integration into a weapon system 128 00:05:07,600 --> 00:05:09,600 where you have the rest of the kill 129 00:05:09,600 --> 00:05:11,711 chain involved . So what we can to do 130 00:05:11,711 --> 00:05:13,322 is we tend to do ground test 131 00:05:13,322 --> 00:05:16,420 development for weapon weapon of 132 00:05:16,420 --> 00:05:18,900 vehicle concepts , glide body concepts , 133 00:05:18,900 --> 00:05:20,890 cruise missile concepts . We 134 00:05:20,890 --> 00:05:23,810 demonstrate those concepts in flight 135 00:05:24,740 --> 00:05:26,970 with usually off the shelf booster 136 00:05:26,970 --> 00:05:28,980 stacks to get to the representative 137 00:05:28,980 --> 00:05:32,490 speeds , um , and flight conditions for 138 00:05:32,490 --> 00:05:34,657 those glide bodies to demonstrate them 139 00:05:34,657 --> 00:05:37,800 in flight . And then we we validate and 140 00:05:37,800 --> 00:05:40,540 verify our design for the hypersonic 141 00:05:40,540 --> 00:05:42,910 vehicle itself . And then once we do 142 00:05:42,910 --> 00:05:44,966 that , like we've just done with the 143 00:05:44,966 --> 00:05:46,632 common person glide body , we 144 00:05:46,632 --> 00:05:48,410 transition that over to service 145 00:05:48,410 --> 00:05:50,632 acquisition programs and weapons system 146 00:05:50,632 --> 00:05:52,521 development programs , where they 147 00:05:52,521 --> 00:05:56,000 integrate a tactical rocket motor 148 00:05:56,280 --> 00:05:58,590 boost system with that glide body , a 149 00:05:58,590 --> 00:06:00,646 cruise missile , and they integrated 150 00:06:00,646 --> 00:06:02,812 with a launch platform . And then they 151 00:06:03,030 --> 00:06:04,808 integrated with a weapon system 152 00:06:05,080 --> 00:06:07,550 capability to close the kill chain . 153 00:06:09,040 --> 00:06:12,240 Okay . Ah , and the services , all of 154 00:06:12,240 --> 00:06:15,270 them have some hypersonic activity 155 00:06:15,270 --> 00:06:17,492 that's that's going forward . It's kind 156 00:06:17,492 --> 00:06:19,810 of a key aspect of the future of multi 157 00:06:19,810 --> 00:06:21,977 domain operations is that everybody be 158 00:06:21,977 --> 00:06:25,410 able to , you know , hit both the 159 00:06:25,420 --> 00:06:28,850 army , the Navy , the Air Force . Uh uh , 160 00:06:29,140 --> 00:06:31,084 that's what the Marines with hyper 161 00:06:31,084 --> 00:06:34,480 sonics , but , uh , that every part of 162 00:06:34,480 --> 00:06:36,650 the U . S . Military be able to hit 163 00:06:36,660 --> 00:06:38,716 almost any target so that commanders 164 00:06:38,716 --> 00:06:40,882 can select among a variety of tools to 165 00:06:40,882 --> 00:06:44,080 do different things . Eso I wonder if 166 00:06:44,080 --> 00:06:46,191 you could talk a little bit about the 167 00:06:46,191 --> 00:06:48,469 unique challenge , though , that the U . 168 00:06:48,469 --> 00:06:50,524 S military bases compared to , say , 169 00:06:50,524 --> 00:06:53,220 Russia and China , because the our 170 00:06:53,230 --> 00:06:55,220 competitors , they're developing 171 00:06:55,220 --> 00:06:57,700 hypersonic weapons . Ah , little bit 172 00:06:57,710 --> 00:07:00,370 ahead of schedule than us in many ways . 173 00:07:00,740 --> 00:07:02,629 But what they're looking to do is 174 00:07:02,629 --> 00:07:04,796 outfit thes with nuclear weapons , and 175 00:07:04,796 --> 00:07:07,670 that relieves them of the burden of of 176 00:07:07,670 --> 00:07:10,350 precision . Because you can aim that in , 177 00:07:10,360 --> 00:07:12,710 uh , a lot of different ways and have a 178 00:07:12,710 --> 00:07:15,150 huge impact because it's armed with a 179 00:07:15,160 --> 00:07:17,520 nuclear weapon . Us is developing hyper 180 00:07:17,520 --> 00:07:19,520 sonics that have to be more precise 181 00:07:19,520 --> 00:07:21,660 that are intended to , uh , carry 182 00:07:21,660 --> 00:07:25,410 conventional payloads so they can carry , 183 00:07:26,060 --> 00:07:28,570 uh , nuclear weapons if we decide to . 184 00:07:28,570 --> 00:07:30,348 But they're being designed or a 185 00:07:30,348 --> 00:07:32,459 precision strike . Eso Can you talk a 186 00:07:32,459 --> 00:07:34,570 little bit about that ? The burden of 187 00:07:34,570 --> 00:07:36,990 that challenge of trying to on the one 188 00:07:36,990 --> 00:07:39,290 hand race against China and Russia and 189 00:07:39,290 --> 00:07:41,234 developing these things , but also 190 00:07:41,330 --> 00:07:43,441 trying to do so with a special burden 191 00:07:43,441 --> 00:07:45,552 of making them much more precise than 192 00:07:45,552 --> 00:07:48,440 what our competitors are doing . Um , 193 00:07:48,450 --> 00:07:50,730 boy , there's a lot there . Uh , so let 194 00:07:50,730 --> 00:07:52,730 me start off was saying , I haven't 195 00:07:52,730 --> 00:07:55,008 given up on the Marines yet . You know , 196 00:07:55,008 --> 00:07:57,119 the Army , the Navy and the air Force 197 00:07:57,119 --> 00:07:56,860 air moving out aggressively with 198 00:07:56,860 --> 00:07:58,916 hypersonic systems . But we are . We 199 00:07:58,916 --> 00:08:00,971 are . So oh , we are also talking to 200 00:08:00,971 --> 00:08:03,193 the Marines about possible applications 201 00:08:03,193 --> 00:08:05,138 of ground launched high percentage 202 00:08:05,138 --> 00:08:07,430 capabilities . That's one area you 203 00:08:07,430 --> 00:08:09,640 discussed relative of the technical 204 00:08:09,640 --> 00:08:11,640 challenges . Really , the technical 205 00:08:11,640 --> 00:08:13,640 challenges are driven mainly by the 206 00:08:13,640 --> 00:08:15,751 physics , and so we all have the same 207 00:08:15,751 --> 00:08:17,584 technical challenges to overcome 208 00:08:17,584 --> 00:08:19,696 primarily associated with the thermal 209 00:08:19,696 --> 00:08:21,918 protection . When you fly fast , do the 210 00:08:21,918 --> 00:08:23,973 friction of the air against the body 211 00:08:23,973 --> 00:08:26,196 surface , things get very hot , and the 212 00:08:26,196 --> 00:08:28,307 faster you apply , How did they get ? 213 00:08:28,307 --> 00:08:30,290 And so we're designing systems to 214 00:08:30,290 --> 00:08:32,401 comply anywhere between Mark five and 215 00:08:32,401 --> 00:08:35,410 not 20 and there's various systems , 216 00:08:35,410 --> 00:08:37,632 have different challenges and different 217 00:08:37,640 --> 00:08:39,862 magnitudes of challenges associate with 218 00:08:39,862 --> 00:08:41,918 thermal protection and the other key 219 00:08:41,918 --> 00:08:44,440 element of of technical challenges for 220 00:08:44,440 --> 00:08:46,218 the cruise missiles designing a 221 00:08:46,218 --> 00:08:48,390 propulsion system that is thermally 222 00:08:48,390 --> 00:08:50,240 balanced has the proper thermal 223 00:08:50,240 --> 00:08:53,690 protection and can accelerate and power 224 00:08:53,700 --> 00:08:56,390 hypersonic cruise missiles . So those 225 00:08:56,390 --> 00:08:59,220 technical challenges are are there for 226 00:08:59,220 --> 00:09:01,990 what us as well as they are for others 227 00:09:01,990 --> 00:09:04,340 who potentially would be developing 228 00:09:04,340 --> 00:09:07,880 hypersonic weapons . I think you know , 229 00:09:07,890 --> 00:09:10,110 our adversaries are developing 230 00:09:10,110 --> 00:09:12,332 capabilities that are that are intended 231 00:09:12,332 --> 00:09:14,443 to be both conventional and nuclear . 232 00:09:14,443 --> 00:09:16,610 So they have similar kinds of accuracy 233 00:09:16,610 --> 00:09:18,610 requirements for their conventional 234 00:09:18,840 --> 00:09:22,420 strength weapon applications . And we 235 00:09:22,420 --> 00:09:24,253 are only looking at conventional 236 00:09:24,253 --> 00:09:26,480 systems and looking at the tactical 237 00:09:26,490 --> 00:09:29,040 tactical fight , trying to bring 238 00:09:29,340 --> 00:09:32,480 advanced capabilities to the fight for 239 00:09:32,480 --> 00:09:35,400 a conventional exchange . So four of 240 00:09:35,400 --> 00:09:37,456 the conventional weapons again , the 241 00:09:37,510 --> 00:09:40,760 requirements are the same we're looking 242 00:09:40,760 --> 00:09:43,540 to develop as you mention a family of 243 00:09:43,540 --> 00:09:46,290 weapons that integrate with multiple 244 00:09:46,290 --> 00:09:49,610 platforms sea bass platforms both under 245 00:09:49,620 --> 00:09:52,900 underwater and and on the sea surface , 246 00:09:52,910 --> 00:09:54,854 laying based platforms and airbase 247 00:09:54,854 --> 00:09:57,021 platforms because we want diversity in 248 00:09:57,021 --> 00:09:59,243 our ability to deliver capability , and 249 00:09:59,243 --> 00:10:01,840 we're looking at a portfolio that that 250 00:10:01,850 --> 00:10:04,460 that addresses a wide range of targets 251 00:10:04,460 --> 00:10:06,420 and really the accuracy and the 252 00:10:06,420 --> 00:10:08,420 guidance in control in the terminal 253 00:10:08,420 --> 00:10:11,000 sensor requirements , I'm are all 254 00:10:11,000 --> 00:10:13,570 driven by the target type , so if 255 00:10:13,570 --> 00:10:15,681 you're going after a relatively small 256 00:10:15,681 --> 00:10:17,848 target , but it's fixed , you know you 257 00:10:17,848 --> 00:10:20,250 have high precision necessary . If it's 258 00:10:20,250 --> 00:10:22,417 moving , you have to be able to handle 259 00:10:22,417 --> 00:10:24,528 a moving target in the end game , and 260 00:10:24,528 --> 00:10:26,750 that drives you more towards the secret 261 00:10:26,750 --> 00:10:28,917 kind of capability . So , really , the 262 00:10:28,917 --> 00:10:31,250 requirements are driven by target tight , 263 00:10:31,250 --> 00:10:33,472 Um , and the missile type that you that 264 00:10:33,472 --> 00:10:35,361 you decide to field . And I think 265 00:10:35,361 --> 00:10:37,083 that's requirements are pretty 266 00:10:37,083 --> 00:10:39,250 consistent whether it's us doing it or 267 00:10:39,250 --> 00:10:41,306 somebody else , Right ? Uh , I spoke 268 00:10:41,306 --> 00:10:43,417 earlier , but when , Um if Russia and 269 00:10:43,417 --> 00:10:45,639 China are developing a missile that can 270 00:10:45,639 --> 00:10:47,750 be outfitted both of the conventional 271 00:10:47,750 --> 00:10:49,806 warhead and nuclear warhead that you 272 00:10:49,806 --> 00:10:49,480 just outfitted with a nuclear warhead 273 00:10:49,480 --> 00:10:51,480 and it turns out that your guidance 274 00:10:51,480 --> 00:10:54,750 work was not particularly good , no one 275 00:10:54,750 --> 00:10:56,930 notices the faulty guidance work is 276 00:10:56,930 --> 00:10:59,152 much . When you have created a weapon , 277 00:10:59,152 --> 00:11:01,310 they will work . How do you say close 278 00:11:01,310 --> 00:11:03,421 is only good enough in horseshoes and 279 00:11:03,421 --> 00:11:05,754 nuclear nuclear weapon warheads ? Right . 280 00:11:05,754 --> 00:11:09,370 But before we get to admiral Hell talk , 281 00:11:09,590 --> 00:11:11,590 because this was something I hadn't 282 00:11:11,590 --> 00:11:13,812 heard talk a little bit more about that 283 00:11:13,812 --> 00:11:15,923 development or that conversation that 284 00:11:15,923 --> 00:11:18,146 you're having with the Marines in terms 285 00:11:18,146 --> 00:11:20,257 of how they would feel the hypersonic 286 00:11:20,257 --> 00:11:22,479 weapon because , uh , it seems like one 287 00:11:22,479 --> 00:11:24,201 of the big advantages of these 288 00:11:24,201 --> 00:11:26,201 platforms is that if it's traveling 289 00:11:26,201 --> 00:11:29,650 that fast , you can launch them from , 290 00:11:29,660 --> 00:11:32,010 ah , wide variety of places . But you 291 00:11:32,010 --> 00:11:34,460 need not necessarily be that close to 292 00:11:35,130 --> 00:11:37,400 the area that you're looking to get 293 00:11:37,400 --> 00:11:40,040 into . And , you know , the point of 294 00:11:40,040 --> 00:11:42,262 the Marines is that they're supposed to 295 00:11:42,262 --> 00:11:44,373 be the first through that , into that 296 00:11:44,373 --> 00:11:46,790 area and onto that beach . So tell us a 297 00:11:46,790 --> 00:11:48,720 little bit about how they're what 298 00:11:48,720 --> 00:11:50,940 you're talking about with the Marines 299 00:11:51,140 --> 00:11:53,084 on what sort of special hypersonic 300 00:11:53,084 --> 00:11:55,350 ability they might need . Well , the 301 00:11:55,350 --> 00:11:57,420 Marines bring agility to the to the 302 00:11:57,420 --> 00:12:00,240 land campaign , right ? So they are a 303 00:12:00,240 --> 00:12:02,660 natural force . They can . They can be 304 00:12:02,660 --> 00:12:04,660 in certain places with a relatively 305 00:12:04,660 --> 00:12:06,716 small footprint relatively quickly , 306 00:12:06,716 --> 00:12:10,060 and so that agility and flexibility 307 00:12:10,060 --> 00:12:11,893 allows for a number of different 308 00:12:12,690 --> 00:12:14,523 advantages . And so there's some 309 00:12:14,523 --> 00:12:17,960 conversations happening between DARPA 310 00:12:17,960 --> 00:12:20,182 and the Marines in particular , to talk 311 00:12:20,182 --> 00:12:22,016 about , you know , the potential 312 00:12:22,016 --> 00:12:25,630 transition of ah , land based , um , 313 00:12:25,630 --> 00:12:28,190 hypersonic capability to the Marines 314 00:12:28,190 --> 00:12:30,246 and and it's just being discussed is 315 00:12:30,246 --> 00:12:32,840 part of the opportunity space for 316 00:12:32,850 --> 00:12:34,683 future application of hypersonic 317 00:12:34,840 --> 00:12:38,010 weapons . All right . Uh , well , thank 318 00:12:38,010 --> 00:12:40,232 you very much . And we come back to you 319 00:12:40,232 --> 00:12:42,288 in a second , is Ah , we get in some 320 00:12:42,288 --> 00:12:44,343 questions , but let me turn to you . 321 00:12:44,343 --> 00:12:46,343 Admiral Hill can call you John . Is 322 00:12:46,343 --> 00:12:48,399 that okay ? Absolutely . That's just 323 00:12:48,399 --> 00:12:50,621 fine . Okay , Uh , I just asked because 324 00:12:50,621 --> 00:12:50,360 so far have been calling . I've been 325 00:12:50,370 --> 00:12:52,592 asking every officer if I could address 326 00:12:52,592 --> 00:12:54,814 them by their civilian name . So I want 327 00:12:54,814 --> 00:12:56,814 to make sure that were consistent , 328 00:12:56,814 --> 00:12:58,981 because that's the best way to do it . 329 00:12:58,981 --> 00:13:01,037 I think the administration is asking 330 00:13:01,037 --> 00:13:04,530 for , ah , 20 billion for missile 331 00:13:04,530 --> 00:13:07,570 defense programs in fiscal 2021 which 332 00:13:07,570 --> 00:13:09,792 is actually down a little bit from from 333 00:13:09,792 --> 00:13:12,590 last year on . And a zai understand it . 334 00:13:12,590 --> 00:13:15,450 The amount that is being asked for 335 00:13:15,690 --> 00:13:17,970 specifically for the development of 336 00:13:17,970 --> 00:13:21,130 future hypersonic defenses 337 00:13:21,460 --> 00:13:23,750 About is that about three billion ? 338 00:13:25,540 --> 00:13:27,860 Yeah . I , uh , first all Patrick , 339 00:13:27,860 --> 00:13:30,138 thanks for having me here this morning . 340 00:13:30,138 --> 00:13:32,360 And I do love death tech , Pat . Pretty 341 00:13:32,360 --> 00:13:34,416 awesome . My name there , but , uh , 342 00:13:34,416 --> 00:13:36,471 yeah , when it comes to the budget , 343 00:13:36,471 --> 00:13:38,693 I'm glad you brought it up because it's 344 00:13:38,693 --> 00:13:40,749 it's a holistic of you . So when you 345 00:13:40,749 --> 00:13:42,860 when you quote the $20 billion figure 346 00:13:42,860 --> 00:13:45,082 or you picked a $3 billion figure . You 347 00:13:45,082 --> 00:13:47,193 know , that's not all Missile Defense 348 00:13:47,193 --> 00:13:49,360 Agency funding , because is my quite , 349 00:13:49,360 --> 00:13:52,150 uh and for a long time kind of laid out 350 00:13:52,150 --> 00:13:54,261 for you . You know , it's it's an all 351 00:13:54,261 --> 00:13:57,050 service campaign , gets its multiple 352 00:13:57,050 --> 00:13:59,217 different strategies . You know , from 353 00:13:59,217 --> 00:14:01,217 a defensive perspective , from from 354 00:14:01,217 --> 00:14:03,410 where I work , you know , it's it's 355 00:14:03,410 --> 00:14:05,521 under the assumption that we're not a 356 00:14:05,521 --> 00:14:07,632 first strike country , so you need to 357 00:14:07,632 --> 00:14:09,632 have a defensive cable bility . And 358 00:14:09,632 --> 00:14:12,110 those defenses can emerge from whether 359 00:14:12,110 --> 00:14:14,332 it's a sea based platform like a ship . 360 00:14:14,332 --> 00:14:16,770 Or it's a battery protecting some 361 00:14:16,770 --> 00:14:18,992 critical acid , those sorts of things . 362 00:14:18,992 --> 00:14:20,937 So investment streams are a lot of 363 00:14:20,937 --> 00:14:22,770 different areas when it comes to 364 00:14:22,770 --> 00:14:24,881 missile defense . You know , my bread 365 00:14:24,881 --> 00:14:26,770 and butter is a ballistic missile 366 00:14:26,770 --> 00:14:28,659 defense . We've been named as the 367 00:14:28,659 --> 00:14:30,826 executive agent for hypersonic missile 368 00:14:30,826 --> 00:14:32,992 defense . We're also doing work up for 369 00:14:32,992 --> 00:14:35,048 Northern Command in a cruise missile 370 00:14:35,048 --> 00:14:37,214 too fast world , You know the day when 371 00:14:37,214 --> 00:14:39,381 you when you're on the receiving end , 372 00:14:39,381 --> 00:14:39,340 right , they all start to look the same , 373 00:14:39,350 --> 00:14:41,572 right ? So we're not yours to defending 374 00:14:41,572 --> 00:14:43,683 against the hypersonic speeds because 375 00:14:43,683 --> 00:14:45,683 ballistic missiles air coming in at 376 00:14:45,683 --> 00:14:47,628 hypersonic speeds and I grew up on 377 00:14:47,628 --> 00:14:49,850 destroyers where cruise missiles coming 378 00:14:49,850 --> 00:14:52,072 on the deck were at hypersonic speeds . 379 00:14:52,072 --> 00:14:51,900 We know how to go defend . We just have 380 00:14:51,900 --> 00:14:54,122 to pick most vulnerable pyre . I'm most 381 00:14:54,122 --> 00:14:55,956 wonderful portion of that flight 382 00:14:55,956 --> 00:14:58,350 profile , right ? Eso India's budget of 383 00:14:58,350 --> 00:15:00,461 that 20 billion is specifically about 384 00:15:00,461 --> 00:15:02,406 9.2 billion Aziz . The request ? I 385 00:15:02,406 --> 00:15:04,572 think so . It is significantly smaller 386 00:15:04,572 --> 00:15:06,406 than the entirety of the missile 387 00:15:06,406 --> 00:15:10,250 defense request . So in living 388 00:15:10,250 --> 00:15:13,980 Teoh Mike White and talking 389 00:15:13,980 --> 00:15:17,110 about these new platforms , uh , tell 390 00:15:17,110 --> 00:15:20,830 us a little bit about , uh , how you 391 00:15:20,830 --> 00:15:22,900 have to now create an entire new 392 00:15:22,900 --> 00:15:26,670 architecture to try encounter these 393 00:15:26,670 --> 00:15:29,070 incredibly useful and terrifying new 394 00:15:29,070 --> 00:15:31,830 weapons and that new architecture folks 395 00:15:31,830 --> 00:15:34,052 that follow the space are very familiar 396 00:15:34,052 --> 00:15:36,219 with some aspects of it , Like the new 397 00:15:36,219 --> 00:15:38,386 space sensor layer that we're fielding 398 00:15:38,386 --> 00:15:40,497 low earth orbit satellites that can , 399 00:15:40,497 --> 00:15:42,570 uh , identify and track . Hypersonic 400 00:15:42,570 --> 00:15:44,737 says they're moving into the space and 401 00:15:44,737 --> 00:15:46,792 also new interceptors . So tell us a 402 00:15:46,792 --> 00:15:48,848 little bit about that architecture , 403 00:15:48,848 --> 00:15:50,903 what you needed to do , and over the 404 00:15:50,903 --> 00:15:53,014 next few years , couple big milestone 405 00:15:53,014 --> 00:15:55,070 timelines that you're shooting for . 406 00:15:55,070 --> 00:15:57,292 Yeah , a great great things thinks that 407 00:15:57,292 --> 00:15:59,459 dream . And I'm glad you mentioned are 408 00:15:59,459 --> 00:15:58,880 electrical because that's really what 409 00:15:58,880 --> 00:16:00,930 it is all about . We can certainly 410 00:16:00,930 --> 00:16:02,930 leverage a lot of what we have or a 411 00:16:02,930 --> 00:16:05,097 ballistic missile capability . What we 412 00:16:05,097 --> 00:16:07,152 have for cruise missile capability , 413 00:16:07,152 --> 00:16:09,152 what the services have deployed and 414 00:16:09,152 --> 00:16:11,263 four deployed . So it does start with 415 00:16:11,263 --> 00:16:13,208 the sensing , so we haven't talked 416 00:16:13,208 --> 00:16:15,263 specifics about the threat yet , but 417 00:16:15,263 --> 00:16:17,486 I'll kind of walk you through kind of a 418 00:16:17,486 --> 00:16:19,486 very simple way to think of it . So 419 00:16:19,486 --> 00:16:21,374 these could be land launched silo 420 00:16:21,374 --> 00:16:23,597 launched . They can be air launched and 421 00:16:23,597 --> 00:16:25,097 they can certainly just be 422 00:16:25,097 --> 00:16:27,319 ballistically watched . So all three of 423 00:16:27,319 --> 00:16:29,208 those cases challenge our current 424 00:16:29,208 --> 00:16:31,208 sensor architecture , right ? So we 425 00:16:31,208 --> 00:16:33,208 have to work on the sensor and then 426 00:16:33,208 --> 00:16:35,319 because they do maneuver and they are 427 00:16:35,319 --> 00:16:37,430 global , you have to be able to track 428 00:16:37,430 --> 00:16:39,430 them worldwide and globally . So it 429 00:16:39,430 --> 00:16:41,152 does drive you towards a space 430 00:16:41,152 --> 00:16:43,152 architecture , which is where we're 431 00:16:43,152 --> 00:16:45,263 going . We're working a sensor system 432 00:16:45,263 --> 00:16:47,263 called the Hypersonic and Ballistic 433 00:16:47,263 --> 00:16:49,486 Missile Tracking System . And what that 434 00:16:49,486 --> 00:16:51,652 is is as ballistic missiles increasing 435 00:16:51,652 --> 00:16:53,652 their complexity typically like dem 436 00:16:53,652 --> 00:16:55,874 targets , very hard to see very hard to 437 00:16:55,874 --> 00:16:58,097 track from a terrestrial based sensor , 438 00:16:58,097 --> 00:17:00,263 you're gonna be able to look down from 439 00:17:00,263 --> 00:17:02,263 cold space under that warmer and be 440 00:17:02,263 --> 00:17:04,263 able to see those and then as hyper 441 00:17:04,263 --> 00:17:06,152 sonics come up and look ballistic 442 00:17:06,152 --> 00:17:07,930 initially have been turned into 443 00:17:07,930 --> 00:17:07,570 something else , you have to be able to 444 00:17:07,570 --> 00:17:09,840 track that maintain track In order for 445 00:17:09,840 --> 00:17:11,896 us to transition from indications of 446 00:17:11,896 --> 00:17:14,118 mourning into a fire control solution , 447 00:17:14,118 --> 00:17:16,173 we have to have a firm track and you 448 00:17:16,173 --> 00:17:18,396 really can't handle the global maneuver 449 00:17:18,396 --> 00:17:20,900 problem without space . So RHB TSS 450 00:17:20,900 --> 00:17:23,110 system working within the space that 451 00:17:23,110 --> 00:17:25,166 development agency SDA , also within 452 00:17:25,166 --> 00:17:27,166 the undersecretary for research and 453 00:17:27,166 --> 00:17:28,943 Engineering , were were sync up 454 00:17:28,943 --> 00:17:31,690 together . We're going Teoh Timelines 455 00:17:31,700 --> 00:17:34,330 for that is Teoh in the early 27 will 456 00:17:34,330 --> 00:17:37,350 be putting up a couple of demo , uh , 457 00:17:37,550 --> 00:17:39,890 birds t demonstrate our tracking . 458 00:17:40,110 --> 00:17:41,943 We've had a prototyping and demo 459 00:17:41,943 --> 00:17:44,270 version of those satellites in space 460 00:17:44,270 --> 00:17:46,603 for a while . Now we're collecting data , 461 00:17:46,603 --> 00:17:48,826 and the most important thing you should 462 00:17:48,826 --> 00:17:50,770 build after architecture is really 463 00:17:50,770 --> 00:17:52,937 understanding the threat . And we have 464 00:17:52,937 --> 00:17:55,140 leveraged our current sensors that are 465 00:17:55,150 --> 00:17:57,150 sea based or terrestrial along with 466 00:17:57,150 --> 00:17:59,590 space sensors we have today and we know 467 00:17:59,590 --> 00:18:01,646 how to travel . So the question is , 468 00:18:01,646 --> 00:18:03,479 can you proliferate that Leo arc 469 00:18:03,479 --> 00:18:05,701 texture ? Get those specific sensors in 470 00:18:05,701 --> 00:18:07,701 the air to do that . So I think the 471 00:18:07,701 --> 00:18:09,590 battle problem only has always as 472 00:18:09,590 --> 00:18:11,646 detect control . Engage . Right . So 473 00:18:11,646 --> 00:18:13,760 centres are one thing , then there is 474 00:18:13,760 --> 00:18:15,871 getting to that fire control solution 475 00:18:15,940 --> 00:18:17,996 and then finally to that interceptor 476 00:18:17,996 --> 00:18:20,920 world . So where we're at today is we 477 00:18:20,920 --> 00:18:23,230 do have a deployed terminal capability 478 00:18:23,560 --> 00:18:25,616 that we're continuing to evolve . We 479 00:18:25,616 --> 00:18:27,616 started off . Really ? It was about 480 00:18:27,616 --> 00:18:29,838 protecting the aircraft carrier against 481 00:18:29,838 --> 00:18:31,782 that . What you've seen as carrier 482 00:18:31,782 --> 00:18:34,004 killers in the news . Those air holding 483 00:18:34,004 --> 00:18:36,660 maneuver Hi G very fast at threats , 484 00:18:36,660 --> 00:18:38,771 they look and smell like a hypersonic 485 00:18:38,771 --> 00:18:41,300 missile because they are eso right now , 486 00:18:41,300 --> 00:18:43,522 we have a fleet equipped to protect the 487 00:18:43,522 --> 00:18:45,633 aircraft carrier against that kind of 488 00:18:45,633 --> 00:18:47,689 threat . But you don't want to limit 489 00:18:47,689 --> 00:18:49,800 yourself to that terminal part of the 490 00:18:49,800 --> 00:18:51,689 engagement . So if you back up to 491 00:18:51,689 --> 00:18:51,630 terminal , where most of maneuver that 492 00:18:51,630 --> 00:18:53,797 happening in the atmosphere and you go 493 00:18:53,797 --> 00:18:55,630 to the glide phase where they're 494 00:18:55,630 --> 00:18:57,852 skipping along the atmosphere , that is 495 00:18:57,852 --> 00:19:00,019 probably the most vulnerable space for 496 00:19:00,019 --> 00:19:02,352 a hypersonic inbound missile to operate . 497 00:19:02,352 --> 00:19:04,860 And that is sweet spot to engage . And 498 00:19:04,860 --> 00:19:06,971 so right now we're coming through our 499 00:19:06,971 --> 00:19:09,138 technology programs and gonna leverage 500 00:19:09,138 --> 00:19:11,360 are the evolution of systems we have to 501 00:19:11,360 --> 00:19:13,471 go after that black . That's the next 502 00:19:13,471 --> 00:19:16,620 step for us . About 2023 is what I've 503 00:19:16,620 --> 00:19:18,564 been reading recently is kind of a 504 00:19:18,564 --> 00:19:20,564 timeline for space based hypersonic 505 00:19:20,564 --> 00:19:22,800 tracking eyes . That sound we're on 506 00:19:22,800 --> 00:19:25,260 target to you were part of the national 507 00:19:25,260 --> 00:19:27,316 less space architecture working with 508 00:19:27,316 --> 00:19:29,093 SDA and that that is our target 509 00:19:29,093 --> 00:19:30,927 timeline to get the first set of 510 00:19:30,927 --> 00:19:34,580 capabilities . Okay , uh , and want to 511 00:19:34,580 --> 00:19:36,890 stick with us for just a second in 512 00:19:36,890 --> 00:19:39,550 terms of what these new satellites were 513 00:19:39,560 --> 00:19:42,100 would look at . Like I spent a lot of 514 00:19:42,100 --> 00:19:44,044 time talking to satellite makers , 515 00:19:44,044 --> 00:19:46,267 commercial satellite makers , which the 516 00:19:46,267 --> 00:19:48,433 U . S military has been spending a lot 517 00:19:48,433 --> 00:19:50,378 more time engaging with mostly for 518 00:19:50,378 --> 00:19:52,600 calms and band , with reasons they want 519 00:19:52,600 --> 00:19:54,711 to make sure that there's band within 520 00:19:54,711 --> 00:19:56,822 all of the places where , uh , the US 521 00:19:56,822 --> 00:19:58,767 might have to operate in the years 522 00:19:58,767 --> 00:20:00,711 ahead . These satellites , they're 523 00:20:00,711 --> 00:20:02,933 going to be charged with tracking hyper 524 00:20:02,933 --> 00:20:04,878 sonics . There's no possibility of 525 00:20:04,878 --> 00:20:08,050 using something like a small mini sets 526 00:20:08,050 --> 00:20:10,680 that of the sort that looked like 527 00:20:10,680 --> 00:20:12,902 starling satellites or other satellites 528 00:20:12,902 --> 00:20:14,990 that might have a dual commercial 529 00:20:14,990 --> 00:20:17,157 purpose . You have to build these from 530 00:20:17,157 --> 00:20:19,101 scratch very specifically for this 531 00:20:19,101 --> 00:20:21,750 purpose is that right ? There is 532 00:20:21,750 --> 00:20:24,410 potential for smaller satellites , a 533 00:20:24,410 --> 00:20:26,632 part of the overall constellation , but 534 00:20:26,632 --> 00:20:28,632 yes , there there are some specific 535 00:20:28,632 --> 00:20:30,743 requirements . And again , it's about 536 00:20:30,743 --> 00:20:32,799 going from indications and morning . 537 00:20:32,799 --> 00:20:34,910 You're just seeing a flash just isn't 538 00:20:34,910 --> 00:20:37,132 good enough . We have to actually build 539 00:20:37,132 --> 00:20:39,188 a track . So there are some specific 540 00:20:39,188 --> 00:20:39,180 requirements in terms of labeling in 541 00:20:39,180 --> 00:20:41,236 the amount of the radiance that that 542 00:20:41,236 --> 00:20:43,347 she'd be able to pick up and remember 543 00:20:43,347 --> 00:20:45,680 this things moving really , really fast . 544 00:20:45,680 --> 00:20:47,736 So if you look at our radars today , 545 00:20:47,736 --> 00:20:49,791 just the way they filter information 546 00:20:49,791 --> 00:20:52,013 that coming through because they assume 547 00:20:52,013 --> 00:20:51,900 that the track is moving at a certain 548 00:20:51,900 --> 00:20:54,067 speed , ballistic missiles tender move 549 00:20:54,067 --> 00:20:56,067 slow , so constant hits and you can 550 00:20:56,067 --> 00:20:58,178 build the track . But something moves 551 00:20:58,178 --> 00:21:00,178 very quickly . Point A to point B . 552 00:21:00,178 --> 00:21:02,067 It's viewed as clutter , and it's 553 00:21:02,067 --> 00:21:04,067 dropped . So one of the things that 554 00:21:04,067 --> 00:21:03,400 we're doing today is we're 555 00:21:03,400 --> 00:21:05,344 incorporating , too filter changes 556 00:21:05,344 --> 00:21:07,233 within our radars that we have to 557 00:21:07,233 --> 00:21:09,456 pulling today so that they can maintain 558 00:21:09,456 --> 00:21:11,678 and holding process hypersonic tracks . 559 00:21:11,900 --> 00:21:14,122 So that's that's That's just part about 560 00:21:14,122 --> 00:21:16,289 what we're doing . And so yeah , there 561 00:21:16,289 --> 00:21:18,122 there there are uses for smaller 562 00:21:18,122 --> 00:21:20,178 satellites and those sorts of things 563 00:21:20,178 --> 00:21:22,289 But you do have stamp a purpose built 564 00:21:22,289 --> 00:21:24,067 capabilities to go after that . 565 00:21:24,067 --> 00:21:25,900 Specific A radiance when it's ah 566 00:21:25,900 --> 00:21:27,956 globally deployed . Okay , I want to 567 00:21:27,956 --> 00:21:29,900 turn back for a second in a minute 568 00:21:29,900 --> 00:21:31,900 because I want to get a sense in my 569 00:21:31,900 --> 00:21:33,956 head . Uh , what radiance looks like 570 00:21:33,956 --> 00:21:35,844 depending on different missiles , 571 00:21:35,844 --> 00:21:37,956 there's probably that in time you can 572 00:21:37,956 --> 00:21:40,067 tell me maybe just a little bit . But 573 00:21:40,067 --> 00:21:42,178 before my quite has to go and do what 574 00:21:42,178 --> 00:21:44,400 he needs to dio , I wanted to bring him 575 00:21:44,400 --> 00:21:46,990 a question about the supply chain or 576 00:21:47,000 --> 00:21:49,860 hyper Sonics . There's been port up 577 00:21:49,860 --> 00:21:52,082 from JV any recently , talking a little 578 00:21:52,082 --> 00:21:54,193 bit about that supply chain . And you 579 00:21:54,193 --> 00:21:56,304 know , of course , we live in a world 580 00:21:56,304 --> 00:21:58,360 of globalised supply chains . It's a 581 00:21:58,360 --> 00:22:00,582 issue that we're gonna be talking about 582 00:22:00,582 --> 00:21:59,780 for years . There's a lot of benefits 583 00:21:59,780 --> 00:22:02,100 to that . In terms of costs . There are 584 00:22:02,100 --> 00:22:04,211 some risks inherent in that , uh , is 585 00:22:04,211 --> 00:22:06,044 convening report talks about the 586 00:22:06,044 --> 00:22:07,933 possibility that , uh , different 587 00:22:07,933 --> 00:22:10,156 elements of the hypersonic supply chain 588 00:22:10,156 --> 00:22:12,950 for the U . S . Have vulnerability to 589 00:22:12,950 --> 00:22:15,820 the Chinese . Um , how first of all , 590 00:22:15,820 --> 00:22:18,042 can you comment on that directly on the 591 00:22:18,042 --> 00:22:20,900 possibility that the Chinese government 592 00:22:20,900 --> 00:22:23,800 may have some portion of the supply 593 00:22:23,800 --> 00:22:27,580 chain for U . S hypersonic development . 594 00:22:27,850 --> 00:22:29,794 Um , and can you talk a little bit 595 00:22:29,794 --> 00:22:31,950 about the supply chain in general for 596 00:22:31,950 --> 00:22:33,894 these ? Because they're incredibly 597 00:22:33,894 --> 00:22:37,220 complex pieces of equipment , and that 598 00:22:37,220 --> 00:22:39,220 means bringing it alive , different 599 00:22:39,220 --> 00:22:41,331 players , And increasingly , bringing 600 00:22:41,331 --> 00:22:43,220 in more players means potentially 601 00:22:43,220 --> 00:22:45,498 drawing from a globalised supply chain . 602 00:22:45,498 --> 00:22:45,330 So , first , can you talk to that 603 00:22:45,330 --> 00:22:49,050 specific point of , uh , uh , Chinese 604 00:22:49,430 --> 00:22:52,020 industry being in any way involved in 605 00:22:52,190 --> 00:22:54,412 the supply chain for U . S hypersonic ? 606 00:22:55,740 --> 00:22:58,990 I did see that report on Duh . 607 00:22:59,030 --> 00:23:02,060 Basically , that's always a concern . 608 00:23:02,070 --> 00:23:04,070 And , you know , any of our weapons 609 00:23:04,070 --> 00:23:06,650 systems . The integrity of the supply 610 00:23:06,720 --> 00:23:10,230 chain is a critical a critical concern 611 00:23:10,240 --> 00:23:12,770 of , uh , what we do across the 612 00:23:12,770 --> 00:23:16,240 department . So I will say that we are 613 00:23:16,240 --> 00:23:18,690 looking at supply chain pretty actively . 614 00:23:18,700 --> 00:23:20,867 You know , we are right now in a state 615 00:23:20,867 --> 00:23:23,270 of development and maturity where we're 616 00:23:23,270 --> 00:23:26,050 building of these systems and 617 00:23:26,050 --> 00:23:28,106 relatively small numbers . But we're 618 00:23:28,106 --> 00:23:29,900 looking to accelerate our our 619 00:23:29,900 --> 00:23:33,540 production rate very , very quickly and 620 00:23:33,550 --> 00:23:35,717 to significant production numbers over 621 00:23:35,717 --> 00:23:38,510 the next couple of years . Um , and 622 00:23:38,520 --> 00:23:41,570 we've established a war room between 623 00:23:42,380 --> 00:23:44,500 research and engineering side of LSD 624 00:23:44,500 --> 00:23:46,722 and the acquisition sustainment side of 625 00:23:46,722 --> 00:23:49,510 USD as we transition from a research 626 00:23:49,510 --> 00:23:51,500 environment to an acquisition 627 00:23:51,500 --> 00:23:53,920 environment . Aan dat War Room is 628 00:23:53,920 --> 00:23:57,670 designed to assess the help of the US 629 00:23:57,670 --> 00:24:01,270 supply chain for the key tears 630 00:24:01,280 --> 00:24:05,260 of acquisition within within 631 00:24:05,270 --> 00:24:09,070 three acquisition industrial base , and 632 00:24:09,070 --> 00:24:11,160 part of that assessment will be the 633 00:24:12,040 --> 00:24:14,330 integrity of that of that supply chain . 634 00:24:14,340 --> 00:24:17,510 So we're looking both that capacity and 635 00:24:17,510 --> 00:24:19,990 capability as well as integrity of that 636 00:24:19,990 --> 00:24:21,934 supply chain through this war room 637 00:24:21,934 --> 00:24:24,490 process . And based on that assessment , 638 00:24:24,490 --> 00:24:27,370 will be making the necessary 639 00:24:27,370 --> 00:24:29,592 investments , too , to ensure that it's 640 00:24:29,592 --> 00:24:31,710 a robust , secure supply chain moving 641 00:24:31,710 --> 00:24:33,790 forward in particular as we get into 642 00:24:33,790 --> 00:24:36,400 the acquisition side of the strategy . 643 00:24:37,340 --> 00:24:39,660 So it sounds like right now it's ah , 644 00:24:39,920 --> 00:24:42,142 it's a valid concern . But when you get 645 00:24:42,142 --> 00:24:44,253 to acquisition , we get time . Teoh , 646 00:24:44,253 --> 00:24:46,253 start scaling up these efforts . By 647 00:24:46,253 --> 00:24:48,420 then , you think that you'll have this 648 00:24:48,420 --> 00:24:50,587 this issue solved , and so it won't be 649 00:24:50,587 --> 00:24:52,753 part of the acquisition and production 650 00:24:52,753 --> 00:24:54,809 cycle went kind of really counts . I 651 00:24:54,809 --> 00:24:56,976 don't know the validity of the concern 652 00:24:56,976 --> 00:24:59,198 because I haven't seen the data and the 653 00:24:59,198 --> 00:25:01,531 specifics of what the concern addresses . 654 00:25:01,531 --> 00:25:03,698 I've just read the report , so I don't 655 00:25:03,698 --> 00:25:05,587 know the validity of the specific 656 00:25:05,587 --> 00:25:07,809 concern with respect the hyper Sonics . 657 00:25:07,809 --> 00:25:09,642 I just can say that it's a valid 658 00:25:09,642 --> 00:25:11,753 concern and all that we do in weapons 659 00:25:11,753 --> 00:25:13,753 system development . So whenever we 660 00:25:13,753 --> 00:25:15,970 develop a weapon in general , we spend 661 00:25:15,970 --> 00:25:18,192 a lot of time ensuring the integrity of 662 00:25:18,192 --> 00:25:20,192 the supply chain and and that , you 663 00:25:20,192 --> 00:25:22,359 know , sometimes you just are you have 664 00:25:22,359 --> 00:25:24,600 no choice but to buy foreign source 665 00:25:24,610 --> 00:25:28,090 parts from . And when we do that for 666 00:25:28,090 --> 00:25:29,923 critical weapons systems , we go 667 00:25:29,923 --> 00:25:32,240 through a process to tear down those 668 00:25:32,240 --> 00:25:34,351 parts and assess integrity . And make 669 00:25:34,351 --> 00:25:36,800 sure that that supply chain is is , ah , 670 00:25:36,810 --> 00:25:39,060 reasonable supply chain for the 671 00:25:39,060 --> 00:25:42,040 application . And we drive down the 672 00:25:42,040 --> 00:25:44,610 risk of that supply chain being 673 00:25:44,610 --> 00:25:46,554 compromised . So that won't be any 674 00:25:46,554 --> 00:25:48,666 different for hyper Sonics as we move 675 00:25:48,666 --> 00:25:51,260 forward a swell . So okay , don't know 676 00:25:51,260 --> 00:25:53,427 the ability , The report . I just know 677 00:25:53,427 --> 00:25:55,482 what the report said . I know it's a 678 00:25:55,482 --> 00:25:57,704 general concern . OK , great . Uh , and 679 00:25:57,704 --> 00:25:59,649 one more before you go , this is a 680 00:25:59,649 --> 00:26:01,760 concern that has been brought to me a 681 00:26:01,760 --> 00:26:03,927 couple of different venues , mostly by 682 00:26:03,927 --> 00:26:05,816 military research and development 683 00:26:05,816 --> 00:26:05,520 leaders , something that they bring up 684 00:26:05,520 --> 00:26:07,520 in Congress and something that they 685 00:26:07,520 --> 00:26:09,576 bring up the American people uh , in 686 00:26:09,576 --> 00:26:12,340 one of the big challenges in developing 687 00:26:12,340 --> 00:26:14,500 these hyper sonics in the past . And 688 00:26:14,500 --> 00:26:16,278 maybe it's something that we're 689 00:26:16,278 --> 00:26:18,500 beginning to get on top of now has been 690 00:26:18,500 --> 00:26:21,290 inadequate ranges eso test ranges . 691 00:26:21,290 --> 00:26:23,346 This is something that we had a long 692 00:26:23,346 --> 00:26:25,700 time ago . We had adequate ranges to 693 00:26:25,710 --> 00:26:27,821 test new types of missiles and things 694 00:26:27,821 --> 00:26:30,500 like that during the Cold War they fell 695 00:26:30,500 --> 00:26:33,330 out of utility is we , uh , arguably 696 00:26:33,330 --> 00:26:36,620 prevailed in the Cold War . And now 697 00:26:36,630 --> 00:26:40,310 between China and Russia . We , 698 00:26:40,320 --> 00:26:42,431 uh , weren't having this sort of test 699 00:26:42,431 --> 00:26:45,710 ranges that we needed . Teoh speed up 700 00:26:45,710 --> 00:26:47,710 our development . There's been some 701 00:26:47,710 --> 00:26:49,821 movement to increase capacity of test 702 00:26:49,821 --> 00:26:51,932 rangers . Uh , think at the time , we 703 00:26:51,932 --> 00:26:54,154 just have , uh , when we were beginning 704 00:26:54,154 --> 00:26:56,377 this conversation about hypersonic test 705 00:26:56,377 --> 00:26:58,654 in 2017 I think there's only one asked , 706 00:26:58,654 --> 00:27:01,800 uh , one aims . I think there's been 707 00:27:01,800 --> 00:27:03,856 some movement to build a couple more 708 00:27:03,856 --> 00:27:05,967 test ranges in Texas , for instance . 709 00:27:06,140 --> 00:27:09,080 Where are we on this issue of test 710 00:27:09,080 --> 00:27:12,190 rangers ? Are we adequately up to the 711 00:27:12,190 --> 00:27:14,357 challenge now ? And what is the future 712 00:27:14,357 --> 00:27:16,740 of that look like ? Yeah , So I in the 713 00:27:16,740 --> 00:27:19,310 way You just asked that question ? I'm 714 00:27:19,310 --> 00:27:21,700 assuming you mean ranges in terms of 715 00:27:21,700 --> 00:27:24,780 ground and flight tests . Yeah , um , 716 00:27:24,910 --> 00:27:27,990 so the infrastructure And so we have a 717 00:27:28,000 --> 00:27:30,111 key element of our strategy we have . 718 00:27:30,111 --> 00:27:32,111 You know , our strategy is multiple 719 00:27:32,111 --> 00:27:34,680 elements that span across workforce and 720 00:27:34,690 --> 00:27:38,290 university Consorcio on . And , 721 00:27:38,420 --> 00:27:40,850 uh , testing evaluation is a big 722 00:27:40,850 --> 00:27:44,200 element of that strategy . We have been 723 00:27:44,200 --> 00:27:46,367 making significant investment over the 724 00:27:46,367 --> 00:27:48,089 last several years to increase 725 00:27:48,089 --> 00:27:50,430 hypersonic test infrastructure . And in 726 00:27:50,430 --> 00:27:53,410 fact , an example of that is the the 727 00:27:53,420 --> 00:27:55,450 high pressure are mid mid pressure 728 00:27:55,450 --> 00:27:57,394 Arquette at Arnold Engineering and 729 00:27:57,394 --> 00:27:59,561 Development Center in Tennessee . That 730 00:27:59,561 --> 00:28:01,672 is a very , very high demand facility 731 00:28:01,672 --> 00:28:03,728 protesting our temperature materials 732 00:28:03,728 --> 00:28:06,006 for applications to hypersonic systems . 733 00:28:06,006 --> 00:28:08,530 And so the keeper goes have been put in 734 00:28:08,530 --> 00:28:10,419 place . I can tell you the demand 735 00:28:10,419 --> 00:28:12,530 signal is pretty steep for those 736 00:28:12,540 --> 00:28:14,318 capabilities because they apply 737 00:28:14,318 --> 00:28:16,429 hypersonic systems as well as systems 738 00:28:16,429 --> 00:28:17,984 being developed for nuclear 739 00:28:17,984 --> 00:28:20,207 modernization and missile defense . And 740 00:28:20,207 --> 00:28:22,560 so round test facilities are 741 00:28:22,570 --> 00:28:24,459 continually assessed . The demand 742 00:28:24,459 --> 00:28:26,681 signals continually assessed that we've 743 00:28:26,681 --> 00:28:28,792 got significant investment going into 744 00:28:28,792 --> 00:28:30,848 enhancing our ground test facilities 745 00:28:30,848 --> 00:28:32,570 primarily for high temperature 746 00:28:32,570 --> 00:28:34,403 materials testing , and were air 747 00:28:34,403 --> 00:28:36,570 breathing , propulsion testing for the 748 00:28:36,570 --> 00:28:38,403 cruise missiles . As I mentioned 749 00:28:38,403 --> 00:28:40,403 earlier , we have a very aggressive 750 00:28:40,403 --> 00:28:42,403 flight test campaign that we're I'm 751 00:28:42,403 --> 00:28:44,570 about to embark on or have embarked on 752 00:28:44,790 --> 00:28:46,846 and that will that will place demand 753 00:28:46,846 --> 00:28:48,957 signal on our flight test ranges . We 754 00:28:48,957 --> 00:28:51,179 have a number of flight test ranges now 755 00:28:51,179 --> 00:28:54,040 that we use Point Magoo and the 756 00:28:54,050 --> 00:28:56,910 California ranges , um , the Pacific 757 00:28:56,910 --> 00:28:59,021 Missile Range facility out in Kauai , 758 00:28:59,021 --> 00:29:02,950 Hawaii , and those ranges are 759 00:29:02,950 --> 00:29:05,117 useful for our applications . And then 760 00:29:05,117 --> 00:29:07,440 we look at all the Senate ranges as 761 00:29:07,440 --> 00:29:10,040 well . There's , Ah , there's a range 762 00:29:10,040 --> 00:29:12,460 in rumor and Australia . That's a very 763 00:29:12,500 --> 00:29:14,556 attractive range . Riper Sonics . We 764 00:29:14,556 --> 00:29:16,940 have done a flight test range study to 765 00:29:16,940 --> 00:29:19,490 assess what our demand signal is . I'm 766 00:29:19,490 --> 00:29:21,490 looking at , you know , in Atlantic 767 00:29:21,490 --> 00:29:23,700 Range going off while it's island off 768 00:29:23,710 --> 00:29:26,010 cape . Um , And look , look , we're 769 00:29:26,010 --> 00:29:28,121 looking at other options for overland 770 00:29:28,121 --> 00:29:30,288 ranged as well . So we've got a pretty 771 00:29:30,288 --> 00:29:32,510 comprehensive look that that we've made 772 00:29:32,510 --> 00:29:34,621 at the are taken at the at the flight 773 00:29:34,621 --> 00:29:36,788 test range , capacity and capability . 774 00:29:36,788 --> 00:29:38,566 And we're working at investment 775 00:29:38,566 --> 00:29:40,930 strategy for for this upcoming 776 00:29:41,270 --> 00:29:43,603 accelerate flight test campaign as well . 777 00:29:43,700 --> 00:29:45,910 Okay . Right . Thank you , sir . Was 778 00:29:45,910 --> 00:29:48,077 that something to talk ? Thank you for 779 00:29:48,077 --> 00:29:50,132 the invitation has been a has been a 780 00:29:50,132 --> 00:29:53,030 pleasure interacting . And I'll leave 781 00:29:53,030 --> 00:29:56,200 you to the good services of Admiral 782 00:29:56,200 --> 00:29:59,190 Hill to close out the discussion . Okay . 783 00:29:59,410 --> 00:30:01,577 Thank you , Mr White . Appreciate it , 784 00:30:01,577 --> 00:30:05,540 Mike . So , uh , want 785 00:30:05,540 --> 00:30:08,570 to turn back ? If I can Teoh this 786 00:30:08,580 --> 00:30:10,691 question of the future architect that 787 00:30:10,691 --> 00:30:13,900 you just described John looking at 788 00:30:13,900 --> 00:30:17,400 future interceptors , it's something 789 00:30:17,400 --> 00:30:20,150 that no covering the space . For a long 790 00:30:20,150 --> 00:30:23,510 time , there have been some successes . 791 00:30:23,510 --> 00:30:26,510 And , um , with the new redesigned kill 792 00:30:26,510 --> 00:30:28,621 vehicle , there have been some , uh , 793 00:30:28,621 --> 00:30:31,280 some backward steps , very hard to make , 794 00:30:31,360 --> 00:30:33,582 something that can , like a bullet that 795 00:30:33,582 --> 00:30:35,693 can hit a bullet in a low earth orbit 796 00:30:35,693 --> 00:30:37,749 or anywhere else , tell us about the 797 00:30:37,749 --> 00:30:39,471 current progress of developing 798 00:30:39,471 --> 00:30:43,060 interceptors that can potentially take 799 00:30:43,060 --> 00:30:45,160 out a hypersonic weapon because it 800 00:30:45,160 --> 00:30:46,771 seems like it's destroying a 801 00:30:46,771 --> 00:30:48,950 conventional warhead is already pretty 802 00:30:48,950 --> 00:30:51,110 hard than the very nature of these 803 00:30:51,110 --> 00:30:53,330 weapons is , of course , to defy 804 00:30:53,340 --> 00:30:56,600 interception . Sure . Absolutely . Let 805 00:30:56,600 --> 00:30:59,340 me I'll walk up from that terminal to 806 00:30:59,340 --> 00:31:01,380 the client base again . So in the 807 00:31:01,380 --> 00:31:03,436 terminal , military operating in the 808 00:31:03,436 --> 00:31:05,930 atmosphere . Right . So you you'll be 809 00:31:05,930 --> 00:31:08,097 the incoming threats gonna have patrol 810 00:31:08,097 --> 00:31:10,263 surfaces . It's gonna be maneuvering . 811 00:31:10,263 --> 00:31:12,263 It's gonna be pointing towards more 812 00:31:12,263 --> 00:31:13,930 than likely even there may be 813 00:31:13,930 --> 00:31:15,819 corkscrewing toward some intended 814 00:31:15,819 --> 00:31:17,986 targets so that that in itself is it's 815 00:31:17,986 --> 00:31:20,208 own problems were you can't do . That , 816 00:31:20,208 --> 00:31:19,530 of course , is with a highly 817 00:31:19,530 --> 00:31:21,586 maneuverable missile that has , ah , 818 00:31:21,840 --> 00:31:24,640 delete it to do high G's . And , you 819 00:31:24,640 --> 00:31:26,862 know , Nana maneuvering world like that 820 00:31:26,862 --> 00:31:28,640 that were it to kill may not be 821 00:31:28,640 --> 00:31:31,040 necessary . You might be just fine just 822 00:31:31,040 --> 00:31:33,190 to throw it off course with someone's 823 00:31:33,200 --> 00:31:36,280 explosive type of warhead eso so that 824 00:31:36,290 --> 00:31:38,346 that's the one problem a zoo walk up 825 00:31:38,346 --> 00:31:40,650 into the glide days again , where it's 826 00:31:40,650 --> 00:31:42,990 not maneuvering as much . It may be , 827 00:31:43,150 --> 00:31:44,983 you know , doing turns and maybe 828 00:31:45,040 --> 00:31:47,040 leading off heat and those sorts of 829 00:31:47,040 --> 00:31:49,151 things so it's inspected , vulnerable 830 00:31:49,151 --> 00:31:51,318 in that , you know , skipping over the 831 00:31:51,318 --> 00:31:53,484 atmosphere faces display . So really , 832 00:31:53,484 --> 00:31:55,651 what it comes down to is getting up to 833 00:31:55,651 --> 00:31:58,780 that that range and then being able to 834 00:31:58,780 --> 00:32:00,590 divert over . So some of the 835 00:32:00,590 --> 00:32:03,170 technologies that we've been investing 836 00:32:03,170 --> 00:32:05,281 in over the last couple of years , as 837 00:32:05,281 --> 00:32:07,448 since being decimated as the executive 838 00:32:07,448 --> 00:32:09,614 Asian for defense , has been on in the 839 00:32:09,614 --> 00:32:11,600 Seeker area secret windows and 840 00:32:11,600 --> 00:32:13,489 materials . It's been on the high 841 00:32:13,489 --> 00:32:15,600 divert capability and Gilbert knees , 842 00:32:15,600 --> 00:32:17,378 you know , to be able to course 843 00:32:17,378 --> 00:32:19,489 corrections at the 11th hour for that 844 00:32:19,489 --> 00:32:21,544 sort of hit to kill we've had last . 845 00:32:21,544 --> 00:32:23,767 The base internally over is hit to kill 846 00:32:23,767 --> 00:32:25,878 necessary . There's a lot of benefits 847 00:32:25,878 --> 00:32:27,767 on imparting kinetic energy on an 848 00:32:27,767 --> 00:32:29,989 incoming missile . When it's eventually 849 00:32:29,989 --> 00:32:32,156 nuclear , you tend to have just a mess 850 00:32:32,156 --> 00:32:34,156 destruction that you get it if they 851 00:32:34,156 --> 00:32:36,433 know that that force that imparts step , 852 00:32:36,433 --> 00:32:38,544 that momentum and kinetic energy into 853 00:32:38,544 --> 00:32:40,656 it . But if trying to just get it off 854 00:32:40,656 --> 00:32:42,711 of that blank face , um , you know , 855 00:32:42,711 --> 00:32:44,822 you could probably get away with less 856 00:32:44,822 --> 00:32:46,656 than kids kill . So we were into 857 00:32:46,656 --> 00:32:48,711 precision guidance because we always 858 00:32:48,711 --> 00:32:50,933 want to assume that's where we're going 859 00:32:50,933 --> 00:32:53,156 to go , and we'll continue to work with 860 00:32:53,156 --> 00:32:55,156 precision guidance aspects of glide 861 00:32:55,156 --> 00:32:57,267 phase . But there will be some relief 862 00:32:57,267 --> 00:32:59,378 in that era budget if we decide to go 863 00:32:59,378 --> 00:33:01,378 with some sort of conventional type 864 00:33:01,378 --> 00:33:03,489 warhead as opposed to a hit to kill . 865 00:33:04,980 --> 00:33:08,010 Okay , so this space to sense earlier 866 00:33:08,010 --> 00:33:10,010 that you're making these satellites 867 00:33:10,010 --> 00:33:12,570 does this new interceptor ? Is it 868 00:33:12,570 --> 00:33:15,100 necessary that it be able to collect 869 00:33:15,100 --> 00:33:17,267 targeting data from those satellites ? 870 00:33:17,267 --> 00:33:19,700 Because this is a new thing for 871 00:33:19,700 --> 00:33:21,756 interceptors they don't usually keep 872 00:33:21,756 --> 00:33:23,756 big data from satellites never been 873 00:33:23,756 --> 00:33:25,644 done before . Is that a necessary 874 00:33:25,644 --> 00:33:27,589 requirement for this interceptor . 875 00:33:27,589 --> 00:33:29,700 There is just a desired requirement . 876 00:33:29,860 --> 00:33:32,630 It's so , so well , most sensors or 877 00:33:32,630 --> 00:33:34,852 most interceptors are gonna be agnostic 878 00:33:34,852 --> 00:33:36,963 is to where the data cover . So I can 879 00:33:36,963 --> 00:33:39,186 tell you it will depend on where you're 880 00:33:39,186 --> 00:33:41,297 at . In some areas of the globe , you 881 00:33:41,297 --> 00:33:43,574 know , we have lots of sensor coverage , 882 00:33:43,574 --> 00:33:45,741 and we'll be speeding that sensor data 883 00:33:45,741 --> 00:33:47,852 into the combat system that will then 884 00:33:47,852 --> 00:33:50,019 drive intercept where it goes . Enough 885 00:33:50,019 --> 00:33:52,241 places , large expanses , say , like in 886 00:33:52,241 --> 00:33:54,352 the Pacific right , that that's where 887 00:33:54,352 --> 00:33:56,408 space becomes very , very useful and 888 00:33:56,408 --> 00:33:58,630 that the concept of the architecture of 889 00:33:58,630 --> 00:34:00,797 that is to fuse that data and bring it 890 00:34:00,797 --> 00:34:02,797 to the firing unit , whether it's a 891 00:34:02,797 --> 00:34:04,852 ship or land based battery on , then 892 00:34:04,852 --> 00:34:07,019 that allows that to to use that as the 893 00:34:07,019 --> 00:34:08,908 fire control solution , so really 894 00:34:08,908 --> 00:34:11,074 agnostic to it . You want to take what 895 00:34:11,074 --> 00:34:13,241 data have I mentioned earlier that for 896 00:34:13,241 --> 00:34:15,352 indications Morning today we're using 897 00:34:15,352 --> 00:34:17,297 existence based sensors , existing 898 00:34:17,297 --> 00:34:19,630 terrestrial based and sea based sensors , 899 00:34:19,630 --> 00:34:21,686 and we can corn tracks , Uh , in the 900 00:34:21,686 --> 00:34:23,797 future . I think it's and oh , by the 901 00:34:23,797 --> 00:34:25,797 way , just a little correction . We 902 00:34:25,797 --> 00:34:27,908 have done launched and engage on data 903 00:34:27,908 --> 00:34:29,963 from space assets already so we know 904 00:34:29,963 --> 00:34:31,963 how to . Okay , uh , it sounds like 905 00:34:31,963 --> 00:34:34,074 it's something that you would want if 906 00:34:34,074 --> 00:34:36,000 there was a era of proliferated 907 00:34:36,000 --> 00:34:38,111 potential hypersonic weapons . But if 908 00:34:38,111 --> 00:34:40,056 we're talking about something on a 909 00:34:40,056 --> 00:34:42,910 single now track from the ground , an 910 00:34:42,910 --> 00:34:45,077 intercept from the ground that it is a 911 00:34:45,077 --> 00:34:47,530 possibility and show yes , absolutely 912 00:34:47,540 --> 00:34:49,990 way take . And in fact , every flight 913 00:34:49,990 --> 00:34:52,560 tests we do . We have space sensor data 914 00:34:52,560 --> 00:34:54,970 that we bring down and form fire 915 00:34:54,970 --> 00:34:57,930 partial solutions . And sometimes we'll 916 00:34:57,940 --> 00:35:00,620 use that for the test . Or sometimes 917 00:35:00,620 --> 00:35:02,453 we'll take it offline and run it 918 00:35:02,453 --> 00:35:04,950 against different scenarios . Ensure 919 00:35:04,950 --> 00:35:07,006 that we can close our Children . You 920 00:35:07,006 --> 00:35:09,061 know one important things , though . 921 00:35:09,061 --> 00:35:08,980 Patrick , I just want to get out here 922 00:35:08,980 --> 00:35:12,120 as a defense time . Um , our biggest 923 00:35:12,120 --> 00:35:14,030 challenge is not only developing 924 00:35:14,040 --> 00:35:16,760 systems to defend , but we also have to 925 00:35:16,760 --> 00:35:18,649 develop the targets that we shoot 926 00:35:18,649 --> 00:35:21,760 against . And so when we go in and 927 00:35:21,760 --> 00:35:24,650 build a threat represented target shoot 928 00:35:24,650 --> 00:35:26,872 against , you know that that's that's a 929 00:35:26,872 --> 00:35:29,100 challenge , because you want to get it 930 00:35:29,100 --> 00:35:31,156 right on . And that's one of reasons 931 00:35:31,156 --> 00:35:33,100 why were part of the memorandum of 932 00:35:33,100 --> 00:35:35,211 understanding with services and their 933 00:35:35,211 --> 00:35:37,211 hypersonic development , because as 934 00:35:37,211 --> 00:35:39,544 they develop crawl offensive capability . 935 00:35:39,544 --> 00:35:41,322 Uh , we're looking at that same 936 00:35:41,322 --> 00:35:43,350 production line for targets . So it 937 00:35:43,350 --> 00:35:45,183 just all Mary's together . We're 938 00:35:45,183 --> 00:35:47,294 leveraging what we're doing on that . 939 00:35:47,294 --> 00:35:49,072 That's aside a lot of the range 940 00:35:49,072 --> 00:35:51,294 capacity that we have such brought that 941 00:35:51,294 --> 00:35:50,580 up earlier . Particularly might cuss 942 00:35:50,580 --> 00:35:53,370 range sensors , data collection , 943 00:35:53,380 --> 00:35:55,450 telemetry collection were leveraging 944 00:35:55,450 --> 00:35:57,617 that in the offensive world today . So 945 00:35:57,617 --> 00:36:00,020 it is team ball on both the offensive . 946 00:36:00,020 --> 00:36:03,780 Indecent . Okay , um , so just a 947 00:36:03,790 --> 00:36:05,901 couple more here and I want to remind 948 00:36:05,901 --> 00:36:08,068 everybody there's a little bit of time 949 00:36:08,068 --> 00:36:10,234 for questions . I'm getting one or two 950 00:36:10,234 --> 00:36:12,401 in from Twitter when I ask you one got 951 00:36:12,401 --> 00:36:14,512 from Kingston Reef . Ah , good friend 952 00:36:14,512 --> 00:36:16,846 of mine . Over Arms control center . Uh , 953 00:36:16,846 --> 00:36:18,846 big fan of your work . What is your 954 00:36:18,846 --> 00:36:21,012 reaction to Japan's decision announced 955 00:36:21,012 --> 00:36:23,234 this week ? To suspend fielding of to a 956 00:36:23,234 --> 00:36:25,290 genius Assure systems . What are the 957 00:36:25,290 --> 00:36:27,457 implications for co development of the 958 00:36:27,457 --> 00:36:30,230 sm Three to a . So that's certainly a 959 00:36:30,230 --> 00:36:32,286 big been a big surprise for a lot of 960 00:36:32,286 --> 00:36:34,563 folks in the missile defense community . 961 00:36:34,640 --> 00:36:37,140 Japan's decision to spend fielding to a 962 00:36:37,140 --> 00:36:38,973 genius , a short systems Is that 963 00:36:38,973 --> 00:36:41,307 something that's gonna be a big problem ? 964 00:36:41,307 --> 00:36:43,584 Where what do you what's your reaction ? 965 00:36:43,584 --> 00:36:45,807 Well , so might my reaction is it's not 966 00:36:45,807 --> 00:36:47,973 related . I present defense that right 967 00:36:47,973 --> 00:36:50,140 now I would say that the government of 968 00:36:50,140 --> 00:36:52,307 Japan issue today . We're working very 969 00:36:52,307 --> 00:36:54,418 closely with them to resolve concerns 970 00:36:54,418 --> 00:36:56,640 and issues . It's really suffering this 971 00:36:56,640 --> 00:36:58,807 stain from the S and three cooperative 972 00:36:58,807 --> 00:36:58,740 development . That's a separate foreign 973 00:36:58,740 --> 00:37:00,907 military sales case . That development 974 00:37:00,907 --> 00:37:03,240 is complete . We're going to production . 975 00:37:03,240 --> 00:37:05,184 Yes , and three black to a missile 976 00:37:05,184 --> 00:37:05,050 separate , distinct . It would be 977 00:37:05,050 --> 00:37:07,217 leveraged . Buy aegis ashore . We just 978 00:37:07,217 --> 00:37:10,030 have some work to do with Japan . Teoh 979 00:37:10,040 --> 00:37:12,096 live this suspension subsidy . But I 980 00:37:12,096 --> 00:37:14,429 would defer questions to the government . 981 00:37:14,429 --> 00:37:16,651 Japan's That is a very recent session . 982 00:37:16,651 --> 00:37:18,710 Yeah , in terms of the intercept 983 00:37:18,720 --> 00:37:22,510 capability that provides are your 984 00:37:22,510 --> 00:37:24,840 level of concern or worry about that on 985 00:37:24,840 --> 00:37:27,490 a scale of 1 to 5 , because I too , I'm 986 00:37:27,490 --> 00:37:29,657 curious about it . Five Very concerned 987 00:37:29,657 --> 00:37:31,930 about it . One being I sleep fine and 988 00:37:31,930 --> 00:37:34,750 I'm not worried at all . I think that 989 00:37:34,750 --> 00:37:36,940 there are other options in the near 990 00:37:36,940 --> 00:37:38,996 term for the government of Japan for 991 00:37:38,996 --> 00:37:40,940 the national missile defense , and 992 00:37:40,940 --> 00:37:43,230 again it's a suspension . So obviously 993 00:37:43,240 --> 00:37:45,351 some concerns and some work that will 994 00:37:45,351 --> 00:37:47,573 do which a panda to bring those systems 995 00:37:47,573 --> 00:37:49,760 that bear okay , US protection 996 00:37:49,760 --> 00:37:51,816 perspective . Hey , like I said , it 997 00:37:51,816 --> 00:37:53,982 really well , leverage every sensor on 998 00:37:53,982 --> 00:37:55,982 every weapon out there . So whether 999 00:37:55,982 --> 00:37:57,927 they build those or not , if there 1000 00:37:57,927 --> 00:37:59,927 there were using it or not , and we 1001 00:37:59,927 --> 00:38:02,500 have other options . Okay , Uh , that 1002 00:38:02,500 --> 00:38:05,300 city , what is your sense of the effect 1003 00:38:05,300 --> 00:38:07,300 of hypersonic technology on nuclear 1004 00:38:07,300 --> 00:38:09,780 deterrence ? We'll have a great effect 1005 00:38:09,780 --> 00:38:11,836 or a little effect . So someone of a 1006 00:38:11,836 --> 00:38:14,058 philosophical question , but your sense 1007 00:38:14,058 --> 00:38:15,836 of hyper sonics and the rolling 1008 00:38:15,836 --> 00:38:18,840 deterrence . Yeah , I am . I I sort of , 1009 00:38:18,840 --> 00:38:20,880 ah , group defense as part of the 1010 00:38:20,880 --> 00:38:23,690 trance . So if you don't have the 1011 00:38:23,690 --> 00:38:26,600 ability to defend , then you're really 1012 00:38:26,610 --> 00:38:28,554 dependent on other options . And I 1013 00:38:28,554 --> 00:38:30,610 think it's , ah , it's gonna be very 1014 00:38:30,610 --> 00:38:32,888 country dependent on the threat . Okay , 1015 00:38:32,888 --> 00:38:36,300 um , a question that I have after 1016 00:38:36,310 --> 00:38:38,310 listening to this and that . I know 1017 00:38:38,310 --> 00:38:40,310 that shows to talk about for a long 1018 00:38:40,310 --> 00:38:42,477 time based on what you're describing . 1019 00:38:42,477 --> 00:38:44,699 The challenges , the primary challenges 1020 00:38:44,699 --> 00:38:47,070 and hypersonic missile defense are kind 1021 00:38:47,070 --> 00:38:49,640 of just more much more complex and 1022 00:38:49,640 --> 00:38:51,362 difficult versions of the same 1023 00:38:51,362 --> 00:38:53,362 challenges that are in conventional 1024 00:38:53,362 --> 00:38:55,473 missile defense . The closer it is to 1025 00:38:55,473 --> 00:38:57,696 the target , that's where things become 1026 00:38:57,696 --> 00:38:59,807 tricky . But just let lifting off the 1027 00:38:59,807 --> 00:39:01,973 launch pad . That boost phase , That's 1028 00:39:01,973 --> 00:39:04,180 the area where you know targeting and 1029 00:39:04,180 --> 00:39:06,260 destruction is gonna be easiest and 1030 00:39:06,780 --> 00:39:09,240 potentially have the most of the least 1031 00:39:09,240 --> 00:39:11,260 amount of risk . Uh , based on what 1032 00:39:11,260 --> 00:39:13,371 you're talking about , it sounds like 1033 00:39:13,371 --> 00:39:15,750 the best way to do that remains a some 1034 00:39:15,750 --> 00:39:19,500 point hitting that boost phase portion 1035 00:39:19,510 --> 00:39:22,760 of that of that lunch . You need to be 1036 00:39:22,760 --> 00:39:25,090 able to do that either with a plane 1037 00:39:25,090 --> 00:39:27,680 that is within the airspace already , 1038 00:39:28,060 --> 00:39:30,050 which seems very difficult or from 1039 00:39:30,050 --> 00:39:33,450 space . So does this mean that the 1040 00:39:33,460 --> 00:39:35,571 course you're not in charge of policy 1041 00:39:35,571 --> 00:39:37,793 for whether or not we should have space 1042 00:39:37,793 --> 00:39:39,904 based kinetic weapons but in terms of 1043 00:39:39,904 --> 00:39:41,627 how useful they would be where 1044 00:39:41,627 --> 00:39:43,682 hypersonic defense is that the place 1045 00:39:43,682 --> 00:39:45,738 where , uh , defending against these 1046 00:39:45,738 --> 00:39:47,849 missiles is going to be ? We will get 1047 00:39:47,849 --> 00:39:50,520 the most bang for our buck . Yet for as 1048 00:39:50,530 --> 00:39:52,530 long as I've been in the job , I've 1049 00:39:52,530 --> 00:39:54,586 been director for a year now , and I 1050 00:39:54,586 --> 00:39:54,530 was the deputy for a couple years . 1051 00:39:54,900 --> 00:39:56,900 There's been a lot of discussion on 1052 00:39:56,900 --> 00:39:59,650 boost days . It's really difficult , Um , 1053 00:39:59,650 --> 00:40:01,820 and you talk about maybe being lower 1054 00:40:01,820 --> 00:40:04,080 risk . I viewed his high risk , and in 1055 00:40:04,080 --> 00:40:06,080 the reason I say this is you know , 1056 00:40:06,080 --> 00:40:07,913 just the way a typical ballistic 1057 00:40:07,913 --> 00:40:09,969 missile attack works is you will see 1058 00:40:09,969 --> 00:40:12,500 the flash protections from space that 1059 00:40:12,500 --> 00:40:14,667 missile flag through the field of view 1060 00:40:14,667 --> 00:40:16,833 multiple radar as we develop the track 1061 00:40:16,833 --> 00:40:19,060 and way shoot the interceptor . So if 1062 00:40:19,060 --> 00:40:21,430 you want to move from terminal to mid 1063 00:40:21,430 --> 00:40:23,486 course into the Bruce face looking , 1064 00:40:23,486 --> 00:40:25,263 you have to have very exquisite 1065 00:40:25,263 --> 00:40:27,374 indications of morning and be able to 1066 00:40:27,374 --> 00:40:29,597 form a track . And you have to be there 1067 00:40:29,597 --> 00:40:31,874 with a weapon and the aircraft , right ? 1068 00:40:31,874 --> 00:40:31,810 So if you look at where most of the 1069 00:40:31,810 --> 00:40:33,810 trajectories fly , you know , for a 1070 00:40:33,810 --> 00:40:35,643 boost facing , let's just pick a 1071 00:40:35,643 --> 00:40:37,643 country like like North Korea , you 1072 00:40:37,643 --> 00:40:39,588 know , ask yourself based on those 1073 00:40:39,588 --> 00:40:41,699 trajectories to the U . S . Where the 1074 00:40:41,699 --> 00:40:44,230 aircraft need to be the constable 1075 00:40:44,230 --> 00:40:47,600 operations on that or not really so 1076 00:40:47,610 --> 00:40:49,499 eventually that takes you to that 1077 00:40:49,499 --> 00:40:51,499 discussion about whether or not you 1078 00:40:51,499 --> 00:40:53,388 should be in space . I personally 1079 00:40:53,388 --> 00:40:55,554 believe that if the country decides to 1080 00:40:55,554 --> 00:40:57,610 make that decision and go to space , 1081 00:40:57,610 --> 00:40:59,777 that's probably the most effective way 1082 00:40:59,777 --> 00:41:02,660 todo Bruce phase . The problem is , 1083 00:41:02,670 --> 00:41:04,337 it's gonna be policy rules of 1084 00:41:04,337 --> 00:41:06,337 engagement and other issues because 1085 00:41:06,337 --> 00:41:08,392 you're right on the edge of a strike 1086 00:41:08,392 --> 00:41:10,614 mission if you're doing space , right . 1087 00:41:10,614 --> 00:41:12,503 So I don't believe that that is a 1088 00:41:12,503 --> 00:41:15,020 ballot defensive move for first strike . 1089 00:41:15,410 --> 00:41:17,577 You know , it's in Texas after the war 1090 00:41:17,577 --> 00:41:19,854 has begun . If you're gonna go do that , 1091 00:41:19,854 --> 00:41:19,750 cause now you're flying over the 1092 00:41:19,750 --> 00:41:21,972 country , you're over other countries . 1093 00:41:21,972 --> 00:41:24,083 You're okay , miss out , like there . 1094 00:41:24,083 --> 00:41:26,250 There's gonna be a rules of engagement 1095 00:41:26,250 --> 00:41:28,472 and philosophical discussion about with 1096 00:41:28,472 --> 00:41:30,472 Yeah , I wonder if you could in the 1097 00:41:30,472 --> 00:41:32,694 little time we have left . This is , um 1098 00:41:32,694 --> 00:41:32,280 you were talking about contrast the 1099 00:41:32,280 --> 00:41:34,280 rules of engagement for traditional 1100 00:41:34,280 --> 00:41:36,447 intercept versus something space based 1101 00:41:36,447 --> 00:41:38,613 because with traditional intercept , I 1102 00:41:38,613 --> 00:41:40,558 read about this all the time . You 1103 00:41:40,558 --> 00:41:42,669 potentially have to blow up something 1104 00:41:42,669 --> 00:41:42,630 coming out of North Korea over Russia , 1105 00:41:43,410 --> 00:41:45,500 which is potentially problematic . 1106 00:41:45,510 --> 00:41:47,788 Whereas if you're operating from space , 1107 00:41:47,788 --> 00:41:49,843 contrast the rules of engagement for 1108 00:41:49,843 --> 00:41:52,066 those two different interests and which 1109 00:41:52,066 --> 00:41:54,010 was easier . Right ? Says so . I'm 1110 00:41:54,010 --> 00:41:56,066 probably not the right guy to answer 1111 00:41:56,066 --> 00:41:58,121 that question because it really is a 1112 00:41:58,121 --> 00:42:00,288 policy issue . It is something for the 1113 00:42:00,288 --> 00:42:02,566 command commands to debate . We be war , 1114 00:42:02,566 --> 00:42:04,621 game it with our command commands on 1115 00:42:04,621 --> 00:42:06,843 regular basis . And I would tell you it 1116 00:42:06,843 --> 00:42:08,788 is a high tempo conversation cause 1117 00:42:08,788 --> 00:42:11,380 there's so many pluses and minuses to 1118 00:42:11,380 --> 00:42:13,290 that question . It's a difficult 1119 00:42:13,290 --> 00:42:15,234 question . I'm really not . It's a 1120 00:42:15,234 --> 00:42:17,179 little bit out of my wheel . House 1121 00:42:17,179 --> 00:42:18,901 Patrick as a defender . Okay . 1122 00:42:18,901 --> 00:42:21,123 Understood . Uh , but if you're talking 1123 00:42:21,123 --> 00:42:23,346 about space based interceptors , well , 1124 00:42:23,346 --> 00:42:25,401 I mean , how many combatant commands 1125 00:42:25,401 --> 00:42:27,457 would be involved in figuring out if 1126 00:42:27,457 --> 00:42:29,679 you should do boost phase , space based 1127 00:42:29,679 --> 00:42:32,012 intercept ? That would just be like one , 1128 00:42:32,012 --> 00:42:34,179 right ? Well , e , I would assume it's 1129 00:42:34,179 --> 00:42:36,401 the same model we operate under today . 1130 00:42:36,401 --> 00:42:38,623 Strategic Command is when I say support 1131 00:42:38,623 --> 00:42:40,457 the war fire that is the primary 1132 00:42:40,457 --> 00:42:42,401 warfighter because they provide me 1133 00:42:42,401 --> 00:42:45,040 requirements . OK , account north North 1134 00:42:45,040 --> 00:42:47,790 com for Conus protection into pay com 1135 00:42:47,790 --> 00:42:50,460 from civic . And so , But generally I 1136 00:42:50,460 --> 00:42:52,404 believe , you know , unless things 1137 00:42:52,404 --> 00:42:54,404 change . You know , when you get to 1138 00:42:54,404 --> 00:42:56,182 that world of rocks space based 1139 00:42:56,182 --> 00:42:58,349 intercept , which again is not program 1140 00:42:58,349 --> 00:42:58,320 a record not funded , not not something 1141 00:42:58,320 --> 00:43:00,370 we're working on actively today . I 1142 00:43:00,380 --> 00:43:02,380 assume the same sort of structure , 1143 00:43:02,380 --> 00:43:04,380 which is a very effective structure 1144 00:43:04,380 --> 00:43:07,110 today on one of the 1145 00:43:07,840 --> 00:43:09,951 challenges and fielding and funding . 1146 00:43:09,951 --> 00:43:11,951 That sort of thing someone has been 1147 00:43:11,951 --> 00:43:14,062 watching this for several years is of 1148 00:43:14,062 --> 00:43:16,284 course , technical challenge of putting 1149 00:43:16,284 --> 00:43:15,970 something in space that can do that 1150 00:43:15,970 --> 00:43:18,690 sort of thing . Uh , the Undersecretary 1151 00:43:18,690 --> 00:43:21,023 of defense for research and engineering , 1152 00:43:21,023 --> 00:43:23,023 Mike Griffin , has said that before 1153 00:43:23,023 --> 00:43:22,960 anything like that becomes even 1154 00:43:22,960 --> 00:43:24,849 feasible . They're not looking at 1155 00:43:24,849 --> 00:43:27,127 QinetiQ intercept . I don't think , Uh , 1156 00:43:27,127 --> 00:43:29,293 so you're looking at directed energy , 1157 00:43:29,293 --> 00:43:32,420 uh , on an onboard space platform . 1158 00:43:33,600 --> 00:43:36,350 He's for test that you know you about a 1159 00:43:36,350 --> 00:43:38,850 megawatt , which seems like a lot to 1160 00:43:38,860 --> 00:43:41,680 lunch put into space . Uh , what's your 1161 00:43:41,690 --> 00:43:43,690 You have a rough estimate . Kind of 1162 00:43:43,690 --> 00:43:45,801 back of envelope for when it might be 1163 00:43:45,801 --> 00:43:48,023 possible to put a megawatt in space for 1164 00:43:48,023 --> 00:43:50,400 a potential space based intercept . And 1165 00:43:50,400 --> 00:43:52,622 first of all , the yeah , I work for Dr 1166 00:43:52,622 --> 00:43:54,789 Griffin . He I are total saint kind of 1167 00:43:54,789 --> 00:43:56,678 slow . They're just ton of policy 1168 00:43:56,678 --> 00:43:58,733 issues , but mostly tackle issues to 1169 00:43:58,733 --> 00:44:00,770 get two megawatt level power . We 1170 00:44:00,770 --> 00:44:02,826 couldn't do that . And I think , you 1171 00:44:02,826 --> 00:44:04,881 know , industry is showing that they 1172 00:44:04,881 --> 00:44:06,937 can the government feel activities . 1173 00:44:06,937 --> 00:44:09,103 Labs have road maps to get there , but 1174 00:44:09,103 --> 00:44:11,270 to get into in scale . And I'm talking 1175 00:44:11,270 --> 00:44:13,381 waiting power , which is much tougher 1176 00:44:13,381 --> 00:44:15,603 than it is today , is gonna take a long 1177 00:44:15,603 --> 00:44:17,770 time . So whether rides on an aircraft 1178 00:44:17,770 --> 00:44:19,714 Oh , our satellite . I think we're 1179 00:44:19,714 --> 00:44:21,603 years away from But we do have an 1180 00:44:21,603 --> 00:44:21,210 investment stream to get to this power 1181 00:44:21,210 --> 00:44:23,321 levels , and it is important to be at 1182 00:44:23,321 --> 00:44:25,377 this power levels . I would say , if 1183 00:44:25,377 --> 00:44:27,599 you are an aircraft operating above the 1184 00:44:27,599 --> 00:44:29,710 atmosphere , uh , you're gonna need a 1185 00:44:29,710 --> 00:44:29,470 megawatt of power if you're gonna burn 1186 00:44:29,470 --> 00:44:31,690 through a , uh , ballistic missiles up 1187 00:44:31,890 --> 00:44:35,510 case . I think we round time 1188 00:44:36,420 --> 00:44:36,720 because