1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:00,000 2 00:00:07,200 --> 00:00:08,650 great weight , you know . 3 00:00:13,700 --> 00:00:15,700 Thank you , Commander . Very much . 4 00:00:15,800 --> 00:00:19,290 Good afternoon . From the moment that I 5 00:00:19,290 --> 00:00:21,450 began serving as the secretary of the 6 00:00:21,450 --> 00:00:24,360 Navy three weeks ago , I have been 7 00:00:24,360 --> 00:00:26,082 committed to ensuring that the 8 00:00:26,082 --> 00:00:28,150 investigation into the USS Theodore 9 00:00:28,150 --> 00:00:31,050 Roosevelt's Cove in response was an 10 00:00:31,050 --> 00:00:32,970 unflinching examination of what 11 00:00:32,970 --> 00:00:36,120 happened and how it happened . Has a 12 00:00:36,120 --> 00:00:38,760 career naval officer . I recognize the 13 00:00:38,760 --> 00:00:42,220 Navy must follow the fax in order to 14 00:00:42,220 --> 00:00:44,553 learn from this unprecedented challenge . 15 00:00:45,470 --> 00:00:47,950 That investigation is concluded , and 16 00:00:47,950 --> 00:00:49,450 today we are releasing the 17 00:00:49,450 --> 00:00:52,140 investigation report publicly . I am 18 00:00:52,140 --> 00:00:54,820 satisfied that it was conducted in an 19 00:00:54,820 --> 00:00:57,150 extremely thorough and fair manner . 20 00:00:57,740 --> 00:01:00,870 Moreover , I fully support its findings 21 00:01:00,880 --> 00:01:03,280 recommendations . And I'd like to take 22 00:01:03,280 --> 00:01:05,650 this time to commend the investigation 23 00:01:05,650 --> 00:01:08,390 team led by Admiral Burke under the 24 00:01:08,390 --> 00:01:11,770 direction of our CNO Admiral Gil Day on 25 00:01:11,770 --> 00:01:14,040 the work that they did under very 26 00:01:14,040 --> 00:01:16,450 demanding conditions . But before I 27 00:01:16,450 --> 00:01:19,140 turn over the podium to our chief of 28 00:01:19,140 --> 00:01:21,440 naval operations , Advil Gil Day , to 29 00:01:21,440 --> 00:01:22,996 discuss the findings of the 30 00:01:22,996 --> 00:01:25,180 investigation in detail , there are a 31 00:01:25,180 --> 00:01:26,958 few people that I would like to 32 00:01:26,958 --> 00:01:29,069 recognize . First , I'd like to thank 33 00:01:29,069 --> 00:01:32,450 Governor Liu Guero of Guam for her 34 00:01:32,450 --> 00:01:34,560 tremendous support that she and the 35 00:01:34,560 --> 00:01:37,190 people of Guam provided the crew of 36 00:01:37,190 --> 00:01:40,320 Theodore Roosevelt and the Navy . Her 37 00:01:40,320 --> 00:01:42,209 leadership throughout this entire 38 00:01:42,209 --> 00:01:45,260 episode really stands out and is an 39 00:01:45,260 --> 00:01:47,880 inspiring example of patriotism , 40 00:01:48,020 --> 00:01:51,250 partnership and service . As such , the 41 00:01:51,250 --> 00:01:53,020 department has awarded her the 42 00:01:53,020 --> 00:01:55,076 Distinguished Public Service Medal . 43 00:01:55,540 --> 00:01:57,651 I'd also like to commend rare Admiral 44 00:01:57,651 --> 00:02:00,570 John Minani , the commander of Joint 45 00:02:00,580 --> 00:02:03,220 Region Marianas , as well as Captain 46 00:02:03,230 --> 00:02:05,810 Jeffrey Grimes , the commanding officer 47 00:02:05,820 --> 00:02:08,570 of Naval Base Guam . Their outstanding 48 00:02:08,570 --> 00:02:10,630 efforts greatly contributed to the 49 00:02:10,630 --> 00:02:13,170 health , safety and recovery of the 50 00:02:13,170 --> 00:02:15,980 crew of USS Theodore Roosevelt . I am 51 00:02:15,980 --> 00:02:18,750 authorizing each of them to be awarded 52 00:02:18,760 --> 00:02:20,700 the Legion of Merit for their 53 00:02:20,700 --> 00:02:23,960 meritorious actions . Finally , today 54 00:02:23,960 --> 00:02:25,904 I'd like to remember Chief Charles 55 00:02:25,904 --> 00:02:29,770 Robert Thacker alone tr sailor who died 56 00:02:29,870 --> 00:02:32,460 of the disease in April . I just 57 00:02:32,460 --> 00:02:34,790 yesterday sent his widow AO one 58 00:02:34,790 --> 00:02:38,080 Samantha Thacker a note toe offer my 59 00:02:38,080 --> 00:02:41,390 personal condolences . Our entire Navy 60 00:02:41,580 --> 00:02:44,670 mourns with her and her family , and 61 00:02:44,670 --> 00:02:47,840 with Chief Thacker's shipmates , I now 62 00:02:47,840 --> 00:02:49,930 like to turn it over to our chief of 63 00:02:49,930 --> 00:02:52,380 naval operations , Admiral Michael Gill . 64 00:02:52,380 --> 00:02:54,102 Day , Admiral . Thank you , Mr 65 00:02:54,102 --> 00:02:56,269 Secretary . Ladies and gentlemen , get 66 00:02:56,269 --> 00:02:58,550 afternoon . Over the course of the past 67 00:02:58,550 --> 00:03:00,661 two months , the Navy has conducted a 68 00:03:00,661 --> 00:03:02,772 command investigation into the events 69 00:03:02,772 --> 00:03:05,580 surrounding the Cove in 19 outbreak on 70 00:03:05,580 --> 00:03:07,790 the USS Theodore Roosevelt . That 71 00:03:07,790 --> 00:03:09,846 investigation was led by vice by the 72 00:03:09,846 --> 00:03:11,679 vice chief of naval operations , 73 00:03:11,679 --> 00:03:14,710 Admiral Bob Burke . Today , after 74 00:03:14,710 --> 00:03:16,488 carefully reviewing the command 75 00:03:16,488 --> 00:03:18,710 investigation , we're here to brief you 76 00:03:18,710 --> 00:03:21,220 on its findings . In my review , I 77 00:03:21,220 --> 00:03:23,890 consider the following key tenets and 78 00:03:23,890 --> 00:03:25,779 grounded my conclusions in them . 79 00:03:26,480 --> 00:03:29,550 Number one , the responsibility of 80 00:03:29,550 --> 00:03:32,800 commanded see number two , the 81 00:03:32,800 --> 00:03:35,330 primacy of the chain of command and , 82 00:03:35,330 --> 00:03:38,390 lastly , the standards of performance 83 00:03:38,400 --> 00:03:42,150 in command , our nation's laws and U . 84 00:03:42,150 --> 00:03:44,094 S . Navy regulations from form the 85 00:03:44,094 --> 00:03:46,950 basis for commanded see , without which 86 00:03:47,240 --> 00:03:49,720 our Navy could not perform its most 87 00:03:49,720 --> 00:03:53,230 critical functions . These both clearly 88 00:03:53,230 --> 00:03:55,740 state that every commanding officer has 89 00:03:55,740 --> 00:03:58,620 the responsibility and the authority to 90 00:03:58,620 --> 00:04:01,260 make decisions and then to communicate 91 00:04:01,580 --> 00:04:04,200 up the chain of command . The 92 00:04:04,200 --> 00:04:06,510 responsibility of command is absolute , 93 00:04:07,240 --> 00:04:09,930 and we take our CEO's performance very 94 00:04:09,930 --> 00:04:12,820 seriously . We place a great amount of 95 00:04:12,830 --> 00:04:14,774 trust and confidence or commanding 96 00:04:14,774 --> 00:04:17,530 officers and rely on them to manage 97 00:04:17,530 --> 00:04:19,460 risk and to make decisions and to 98 00:04:19,460 --> 00:04:22,080 communicate openly and honestly with 99 00:04:22,080 --> 00:04:24,260 their chain of command , especially in 100 00:04:24,260 --> 00:04:28,100 crisis . Forthright , fearless 101 00:04:28,110 --> 00:04:30,710 and clear communications up and down 102 00:04:30,710 --> 00:04:33,480 the chain of command is essential to 103 00:04:33,480 --> 00:04:35,258 effective military operations , 104 00:04:35,400 --> 00:04:37,233 particularly when faced with the 105 00:04:37,233 --> 00:04:39,710 dynamic and novel threat such as Cove 106 00:04:39,710 --> 00:04:43,340 in 19 . I am keenly aware 107 00:04:43,600 --> 00:04:45,822 that the actions of those involved must 108 00:04:45,822 --> 00:04:47,400 be judged understanding the 109 00:04:47,400 --> 00:04:50,150 unprecedented nature of this challenge , 110 00:04:50,580 --> 00:04:52,802 the difficulties involved with evolving 111 00:04:52,802 --> 00:04:54,691 guidance and the fast pace of the 112 00:04:54,691 --> 00:04:58,450 crisis . However , after a thorough 113 00:04:58,450 --> 00:05:00,640 review , I have determined to take the 114 00:05:00,640 --> 00:05:04,530 following actions First , the promotion 115 00:05:04,540 --> 00:05:06,540 for the strike group Commander Rear 116 00:05:06,540 --> 00:05:08,484 Admiral Baker to two stars will be 117 00:05:08,484 --> 00:05:11,650 delayed pending further review . Second , 118 00:05:12,090 --> 00:05:13,980 I will not reassign Captain Bread 119 00:05:13,980 --> 00:05:16,190 Crozier as the commanding officer of 120 00:05:16,190 --> 00:05:18,800 the USS Theodore Roosevelt , nor will 121 00:05:18,800 --> 00:05:21,050 he be eligible for future command . 122 00:05:21,940 --> 00:05:24,160 Captain Crozier will be reassigned . 123 00:05:25,640 --> 00:05:27,900 While I previously believe the Captain 124 00:05:27,900 --> 00:05:30,490 Crozier should be reinstated following 125 00:05:30,490 --> 00:05:33,060 his relief in April after conducting an 126 00:05:33,060 --> 00:05:36,630 initial investigation , The much 127 00:05:36,630 --> 00:05:38,710 broader deeper investigation that we 128 00:05:38,720 --> 00:05:41,050 conducted in the weeks following that 129 00:05:42,410 --> 00:05:45,090 had a much deeper scope . And it is my 130 00:05:45,090 --> 00:05:47,170 belief that both Admiral Baker and 131 00:05:47,170 --> 00:05:49,392 Captain Crozier fell well short of what 132 00:05:49,392 --> 00:05:52,730 we expect of those in command . Had I 133 00:05:52,730 --> 00:05:55,770 known then what I know today , I would 134 00:05:55,770 --> 00:05:57,826 have not made that recommendation to 135 00:05:57,826 --> 00:05:59,992 reinstate Captain Crozier . Moreover , 136 00:06:00,370 --> 00:06:02,203 if Captain Crozier were still in 137 00:06:02,203 --> 00:06:04,259 command today , I would be relieving 138 00:06:04,259 --> 00:06:07,720 him . Captain Kroger's primary 139 00:06:07,720 --> 00:06:10,800 responsibility was the safety and the 140 00:06:10,800 --> 00:06:13,060 well being of the crew said that the 141 00:06:13,060 --> 00:06:15,450 ship could remain as operationally 142 00:06:15,450 --> 00:06:19,360 ready as possible in reviewing both 143 00:06:19,360 --> 00:06:21,304 Admiral Baker and Captain Kroger's 144 00:06:21,304 --> 00:06:24,660 actions , they did not do enough soon 145 00:06:24,660 --> 00:06:27,810 enough t fulfill their primary 146 00:06:27,810 --> 00:06:30,300 obligation , and they did not 147 00:06:30,310 --> 00:06:32,532 effectively carry out our guidelines to 148 00:06:32,532 --> 00:06:34,880 prevent spread of the virus . They were 149 00:06:34,880 --> 00:06:37,350 slow egress ing sailors off the ship , 150 00:06:37,740 --> 00:06:39,684 and they failed to move sailors to 151 00:06:39,684 --> 00:06:42,310 available safer environments quickly . 152 00:06:43,620 --> 00:06:46,530 Additionally , Captain Crozier exercise 153 00:06:46,530 --> 00:06:48,890 questionable judgment when he released 154 00:06:48,890 --> 00:06:51,800 sailors from Quarante from quarantine 155 00:06:51,800 --> 00:06:54,490 on the ship , which put his crew at 156 00:06:54,500 --> 00:06:56,900 higher risk and may have increased the 157 00:06:56,900 --> 00:06:59,100 spread of the virus of or the Theodore 158 00:06:59,100 --> 00:07:02,870 Roosevelt . When obstacles arose . 159 00:07:03,440 --> 00:07:05,940 Both failed to tackle the problem head 160 00:07:05,940 --> 00:07:09,060 on and to take charge , and in a number 161 00:07:09,060 --> 00:07:11,950 of instances , they placed crew comfort 162 00:07:12,620 --> 00:07:16,230 in front of crew safety . Ultimately , 163 00:07:16,590 --> 00:07:19,060 they were driven by the problem instead 164 00:07:19,060 --> 00:07:22,790 of driving decisions has captured , 165 00:07:22,790 --> 00:07:25,760 Crozier stated in his email . He should 166 00:07:25,760 --> 00:07:27,871 have been more decisive when the ship 167 00:07:27,871 --> 00:07:30,570 pulled into Guam . He also said that he 168 00:07:30,570 --> 00:07:33,200 was ultimately responsible for his ship 169 00:07:33,390 --> 00:07:37,370 and his crew and I agree . In the 170 00:07:37,370 --> 00:07:40,300 end , the email and the letters sent by 171 00:07:40,300 --> 00:07:42,580 Captain Crozier were unnecessary . 172 00:07:43,510 --> 00:07:45,650 Actions were already underway to 173 00:07:45,650 --> 00:07:48,230 acquire CDC compliant off base hotel 174 00:07:48,230 --> 00:07:50,870 rooms for the crew before he sent that 175 00:07:50,870 --> 00:07:54,680 email . While it is rare for the 176 00:07:54,680 --> 00:07:57,670 CEO of any ship to directly communicate 177 00:07:57,670 --> 00:07:59,892 three levels above them in the chain of 178 00:07:59,892 --> 00:08:02,530 command , if they do , they must ensure 179 00:08:02,530 --> 00:08:04,697 that all of the means of communication 180 00:08:04,697 --> 00:08:06,808 within the chain of command have been 181 00:08:06,808 --> 00:08:08,808 thoroughly exhausted . And I have a 182 00:08:08,808 --> 00:08:11,030 full understanding of all the facts and 183 00:08:11,030 --> 00:08:13,086 that they include all members of the 184 00:08:13,086 --> 00:08:15,363 chain of command in that communication . 185 00:08:15,700 --> 00:08:17,811 Before I take your questions , I like 186 00:08:17,811 --> 00:08:21,460 to speak directly to a few groups as 187 00:08:21,460 --> 00:08:23,850 the secretary mentioned much help when 188 00:08:23,850 --> 00:08:26,017 it's a supporting TR and I can't thank 189 00:08:26,017 --> 00:08:28,183 enough . I can't thank everyone enough 190 00:08:28,183 --> 00:08:30,183 for their efforts . The governor of 191 00:08:30,183 --> 00:08:32,072 Guam certainly helped obtain safe 192 00:08:32,072 --> 00:08:34,128 lodging for the crew Naval base Guam 193 00:08:34,128 --> 00:08:36,350 help accommodate more than 2000 sailors 194 00:08:36,350 --> 00:08:37,961 ashore in less than a week . 195 00:08:37,961 --> 00:08:40,128 Expeditionary medal medical teams from 196 00:08:40,128 --> 00:08:42,128 Okinawa help care for and treat the 197 00:08:42,128 --> 00:08:44,230 crew and the Republic of Korea 198 00:08:44,230 --> 00:08:46,580 dedicated support to help us test 199 00:08:46,580 --> 00:08:50,470 samples from the crew at scale to our 200 00:08:50,470 --> 00:08:52,780 commanding officers . Let me be very 201 00:08:52,780 --> 00:08:55,750 clear . We expect you to fire a red 202 00:08:55,750 --> 00:08:57,694 Flaherty , a chain of command when 203 00:08:57,694 --> 00:08:59,760 necessary . We also expect you to be 204 00:08:59,760 --> 00:09:02,810 men and women of decisive action . You 205 00:09:02,810 --> 00:09:04,921 must adapt in the face of adversity . 206 00:09:04,990 --> 00:09:07,520 You must exercise ingenuity and crisis 207 00:09:07,530 --> 00:09:10,090 and communicate effectively up and down 208 00:09:10,090 --> 00:09:12,700 the chain of command . After all , it's 209 00:09:12,700 --> 00:09:16,530 your ship and it's your crew to the 210 00:09:16,530 --> 00:09:18,650 crew of the USS Theodore Roosevelt . 211 00:09:19,130 --> 00:09:20,741 You're underway today in the 212 00:09:20,741 --> 00:09:22,963 Philippines . See executing the mission 213 00:09:22,963 --> 00:09:24,797 of which you are assigned and we 214 00:09:24,797 --> 00:09:26,580 support you . While you rightly 215 00:09:26,580 --> 00:09:28,469 supported Captain Crozier is your 216 00:09:28,469 --> 00:09:30,580 commanding officer . It is because of 217 00:09:30,580 --> 00:09:32,747 what he didn't do , that I have chosen 218 00:09:32,747 --> 00:09:34,636 him . Not that I've chosen not to 219 00:09:34,636 --> 00:09:37,550 reinstate him is your CEO . And to the 220 00:09:37,550 --> 00:09:39,820 secretary's point , I also offer my 221 00:09:39,820 --> 00:09:41,860 deepest sympathies . Chief Akers , 222 00:09:41,860 --> 00:09:44,530 family , friends and shipmates . We 223 00:09:44,530 --> 00:09:46,697 mourn his loss and stand alongside you 224 00:09:46,697 --> 00:09:48,840 as you continue to grieve . And with 225 00:09:48,840 --> 00:09:50,618 that , we're ready to take your 226 00:09:50,618 --> 00:09:54,210 questions . Questions for Animal Gil 227 00:09:54,210 --> 00:09:58,070 Day . In your description off what you 228 00:09:58,070 --> 00:10:01,180 found the flaws you found in captain 229 00:10:01,180 --> 00:10:03,291 closures , actions and inactions . As 230 00:10:03,291 --> 00:10:07,240 you put it , I wonder why it is 231 00:10:07,240 --> 00:10:09,129 that you were unable to see those 232 00:10:09,129 --> 00:10:11,351 problems when you review that the first 233 00:10:11,351 --> 00:10:13,407 time and where you were you actually 234 00:10:13,407 --> 00:10:15,740 wrong and what you saw or what happened . 235 00:10:15,740 --> 00:10:17,573 So let me let me talk about that 236 00:10:17,573 --> 00:10:19,796 initial investigation . Let me be clear 237 00:10:19,796 --> 00:10:21,962 up front the determination that I just 238 00:10:21,962 --> 00:10:24,129 mentioned about his not being restated 239 00:10:24,129 --> 00:10:26,351 command and the action that holding the 240 00:10:26,351 --> 00:10:28,462 strike group commanders promotion and 241 00:10:28,462 --> 00:10:30,600 advance . That's not about the email 242 00:10:30,600 --> 00:10:32,711 that he sent . And it's certainly not 243 00:10:32,711 --> 00:10:35,480 about the fact that it leaked the 244 00:10:35,480 --> 00:10:37,591 initial investigation . Took a narrow 245 00:10:37,591 --> 00:10:40,400 look at why he sent that email and we 246 00:10:40,400 --> 00:10:42,622 took . We took the fax , and I followed 247 00:10:42,622 --> 00:10:44,622 the facts from that narrowly scoped 248 00:10:44,622 --> 00:10:46,960 investigation , and I was tasked to 249 00:10:46,960 --> 00:10:50,210 take a look at those facts against then 250 00:10:50,260 --> 00:10:52,520 acting Secretary Modi's justification 251 00:10:52,520 --> 00:10:54,970 for relieving him . And I did not feel 252 00:10:54,970 --> 00:10:57,040 that the Fort fax supported the 253 00:10:57,040 --> 00:10:59,770 justification . Justification included 254 00:10:59,770 --> 00:11:02,870 the fact that included , uh , state 255 00:11:02,880 --> 00:11:06,730 assertions that Captain Crozier went 256 00:11:06,730 --> 00:11:08,841 outside the chain of command . In the 257 00:11:08,841 --> 00:11:10,841 email . He said that he went to the 258 00:11:10,841 --> 00:11:12,786 median , the median email . At one 259 00:11:12,786 --> 00:11:14,619 point he said that the media was 260 00:11:14,619 --> 00:11:16,730 included in the chain of command . He 261 00:11:16,730 --> 00:11:19,640 ah , he a pine that the email was 262 00:11:19,650 --> 00:11:22,050 handled recklessly , and that's why it 263 00:11:22,050 --> 00:11:24,860 leak . Captain Crozier hit Send once in 264 00:11:24,860 --> 00:11:27,030 that email , Captain Crozier did not 265 00:11:27,030 --> 00:11:29,290 leak that email or intend for it to be 266 00:11:29,430 --> 00:11:33,040 be leaked . So at that time , I 267 00:11:33,040 --> 00:11:35,290 felt that the fax did not justify 268 00:11:35,290 --> 00:11:37,234 relieved based in the narrow scope 269 00:11:39,040 --> 00:11:41,400 again , Had I known then what I know 270 00:11:41,400 --> 00:11:43,344 today , I'd be really I would have 271 00:11:43,344 --> 00:11:45,400 relieved him back then . That time , 272 00:11:45,400 --> 00:11:47,400 the acting secretary of the A . B . 273 00:11:47,400 --> 00:11:49,567 MacPherson felt that the investigation 274 00:11:49,567 --> 00:11:51,844 should be broader , increased in scope , 275 00:11:51,844 --> 00:11:54,011 go all the way back to the decision to 276 00:11:54,011 --> 00:11:56,122 pull a ship in the Vietnam , the time 277 00:11:56,122 --> 00:11:58,233 in Port Vietnam , the transit back to 278 00:11:58,233 --> 00:12:00,690 Guam and the time in Port Guam . And so 279 00:12:00,800 --> 00:12:04,080 that gave us a much a much clearer view 280 00:12:04,390 --> 00:12:06,800 of Captain Croce's performance in 281 00:12:06,800 --> 00:12:08,970 command . As I mentioned earlier , I 282 00:12:08,970 --> 00:12:11,760 mentioned three kind of primary lenses 283 00:12:11,760 --> 00:12:13,927 through which I view the investigation 284 00:12:13,970 --> 00:12:16,130 in the last one and really the most 285 00:12:16,130 --> 00:12:18,352 critical right now with respect to this 286 00:12:18,352 --> 00:12:20,519 broader investigation , with standards 287 00:12:20,519 --> 00:12:22,741 of performance and command and decision 288 00:12:22,741 --> 00:12:26,280 making in crisis example , 289 00:12:28,360 --> 00:12:31,780 so are we now understand that 290 00:12:31,800 --> 00:12:35,260 basically , that cove it would not have 291 00:12:35,260 --> 00:12:38,430 spread on board the TR as quickly as it 292 00:12:38,430 --> 00:12:40,880 did . If Captain Crozier had taken 293 00:12:40,880 --> 00:12:43,047 certain measures , Are you blaming him 294 00:12:43,050 --> 00:12:45,161 for the spread of covert ? Because he 295 00:12:45,161 --> 00:12:47,328 was slow to react . And do you believe 296 00:12:47,328 --> 00:12:49,950 that this letter was some sort of , uh , 297 00:12:49,960 --> 00:12:52,071 covering himself from those actions ? 298 00:12:52,071 --> 00:12:53,930 So let me let me take the second 299 00:12:53,930 --> 00:12:56,150 question for so in terms of the email 300 00:12:56,150 --> 00:12:58,170 in the letter that you sent when he 301 00:12:58,170 --> 00:13:00,226 said had sending that letter when he 302 00:13:00,226 --> 00:13:02,440 hit , send on that email six hours 303 00:13:02,440 --> 00:13:04,662 before the governor of Guam had already 304 00:13:04,662 --> 00:13:06,884 agreed to allow us to use hotel rooms . 305 00:13:06,884 --> 00:13:08,940 The only requirement that she had at 306 00:13:08,940 --> 00:13:10,996 that point and it is that this issue 307 00:13:10,996 --> 00:13:13,273 had been worked . This was on a Monday . 308 00:13:13,273 --> 00:13:15,107 So on the proceedings Sunday and 309 00:13:15,107 --> 00:13:17,107 Saturday , there were conversations 310 00:13:17,107 --> 00:13:19,218 between the regional commander in the 311 00:13:19,218 --> 00:13:21,329 governor And then on Sunday the hotel 312 00:13:21,329 --> 00:13:23,162 association was brought into the 313 00:13:23,162 --> 00:13:25,329 discussion . By Monday , she agreed to 314 00:13:25,329 --> 00:13:27,051 open up the hotels . The hotel 315 00:13:27,051 --> 00:13:29,162 association was supportive . The only 316 00:13:29,162 --> 00:13:31,329 thing that she require was a call from 317 00:13:31,329 --> 00:13:33,460 a four star . So within that day , 318 00:13:33,530 --> 00:13:35,697 there was a call from Admiral actually 319 00:13:35,697 --> 00:13:37,808 know that then opened up the hotels . 320 00:13:37,808 --> 00:13:40,820 The following day . So my points about 321 00:13:40,820 --> 00:13:42,876 checking the facts before you before 322 00:13:42,876 --> 00:13:45,153 you fire flare of the chain of command . 323 00:13:45,153 --> 00:13:47,209 Captain Crozier was aware that those 324 00:13:47,209 --> 00:13:49,780 negotiations were ongoing . It was only 325 00:13:49,780 --> 00:13:53,470 the day before on Sunday that he levied 326 00:13:53,470 --> 00:13:56,150 the requirement for not just 4000 beds , 327 00:13:56,620 --> 00:14:00,620 but for 4000 hotel rooms . And so when 328 00:14:00,620 --> 00:14:04,120 he hit went when the , uh , commander 329 00:14:04,120 --> 00:14:06,176 of U S . Pacific Fleet received that 330 00:14:06,176 --> 00:14:08,190 email , he reached out immediately 331 00:14:08,190 --> 00:14:10,190 talked to Admiral Baker and Captain 332 00:14:10,190 --> 00:14:12,470 Crozier and his question waas , what 333 00:14:12,470 --> 00:14:14,526 else do you need me to do that we're 334 00:14:14,526 --> 00:14:17,960 not doing now ? And the response was to 335 00:14:17,960 --> 00:14:21,090 move faster on the hotels . Actually , 336 00:14:21,090 --> 00:14:24,030 no said , Look , we're making up to 337 00:14:24,030 --> 00:14:26,880 2000 beds available off the ship so 338 00:14:26,880 --> 00:14:28,936 that you can release those . You can 339 00:14:28,936 --> 00:14:31,047 release people off the ship , get him 340 00:14:31,047 --> 00:14:33,213 in a safer place , we can begin to get 341 00:14:33,213 --> 00:14:35,269 them healthy . We can begin to clean 342 00:14:35,269 --> 00:14:37,436 the ship more thoroughly , and then we 343 00:14:37,436 --> 00:14:39,491 can restore the normal operations as 344 00:14:39,491 --> 00:14:42,760 quickly as possible . And so that the 345 00:14:42,760 --> 00:14:45,370 reason why Crozier sent the email was 346 00:14:45,390 --> 00:14:47,723 because he felt when he when he sent it , 347 00:14:47,900 --> 00:14:50,011 that we weren't moving fast enough on 348 00:14:50,011 --> 00:14:52,011 the hotels But based on what I just 349 00:14:52,011 --> 00:14:54,344 said , those wheels were well in motion . 350 00:14:54,440 --> 00:14:57,720 The outside support from other echelons 351 00:14:57,720 --> 00:14:59,942 of the chain of command besides working 352 00:14:59,942 --> 00:15:03,140 the hotel issue included commanders 353 00:15:03,140 --> 00:15:05,251 reaching out to the Republic of Korea 354 00:15:05,251 --> 00:15:08,300 so that we could then , uh , uh , 355 00:15:08,310 --> 00:15:11,130 process testing samples at scale up to 356 00:15:11,220 --> 00:15:14,200 1000 a day military airlift being 357 00:15:14,200 --> 00:15:16,670 stationed in Guam with the sole purpose 358 00:15:16,670 --> 00:15:18,980 of that aircraft in the air crew to run 359 00:15:18,980 --> 00:15:21,070 those samples back and forth to the 360 00:15:21,070 --> 00:15:23,300 Peninsula of Korea so that we could 361 00:15:23,310 --> 00:15:25,390 turn 3 to 500 samples a day . 362 00:15:26,940 --> 00:15:29,107 Bringing in bringing a medical team of 363 00:15:29,107 --> 00:15:31,650 50 plus people from Okinawa to support 364 00:15:31,650 --> 00:15:34,650 to augment the small medical team on on 365 00:15:34,650 --> 00:15:36,840 T are examples of other activity that 366 00:15:36,840 --> 00:15:39,990 were going on . I really felt 367 00:15:40,540 --> 00:15:43,260 that , uh , there were There were a few 368 00:15:43,260 --> 00:15:45,940 key issues here with respect to what I 369 00:15:45,940 --> 00:15:48,000 believe to be an almost paralysis of 370 00:15:48,000 --> 00:15:50,700 that command team From the time they 371 00:15:50,700 --> 00:15:52,940 pulled in port until the time that we 372 00:15:52,940 --> 00:15:55,330 were able to get the hotels during the 373 00:15:55,330 --> 00:15:57,430 transit itself , I didn't feel like 374 00:15:57,430 --> 00:15:59,430 they followed all the guidelines of 375 00:15:59,430 --> 00:16:01,541 store Ilias . They should . There was 376 00:16:01,541 --> 00:16:03,597 some things that they absolutely did 377 00:16:03,597 --> 00:16:05,819 right . We found that our determination 378 00:16:05,819 --> 00:16:07,986 is that the cod flakes , for example , 379 00:16:07,986 --> 00:16:09,986 that came out of the Philippines of 380 00:16:09,986 --> 00:16:12,041 five flights , that they weren't the 381 00:16:12,041 --> 00:16:14,260 vector of infection on the ship . We 382 00:16:14,260 --> 00:16:16,482 ruled that out based on testing that we 383 00:16:16,482 --> 00:16:18,593 did and symptoms tracing that we were 384 00:16:18,593 --> 00:16:20,704 doing on those air crews . After they 385 00:16:20,704 --> 00:16:23,140 arrived on t . R . I thought that they 386 00:16:23,140 --> 00:16:25,196 could have done a much better job of 387 00:16:25,196 --> 00:16:27,940 physical distancing . I think you saw 388 00:16:27,940 --> 00:16:30,162 indications of that . When Crozier left 389 00:16:30,162 --> 00:16:32,384 the ship and the crew packed together , 390 00:16:32,384 --> 00:16:34,960 there was not . That was not a primary , 391 00:16:35,610 --> 00:16:39,040 um , measure that was credit that we 392 00:16:39,040 --> 00:16:41,096 viewed is critically important . And 393 00:16:41,096 --> 00:16:43,373 again , he did a bunch of things right . 394 00:16:43,373 --> 00:16:45,596 I think he could have did better than I 395 00:16:45,596 --> 00:16:47,651 am not grounding the relief based on 396 00:16:47,651 --> 00:16:49,873 the fact that I think social distancing 397 00:16:49,873 --> 00:16:51,873 could have been better . I do think 398 00:16:51,873 --> 00:16:53,929 that the naval bit that naval base , 399 00:16:53,980 --> 00:16:55,869 Guam moved mountains to make beds 400 00:16:55,869 --> 00:16:58,850 available , and so those beds , in 401 00:16:58,850 --> 00:17:00,961 terms of the specifications that were 402 00:17:00,961 --> 00:17:03,239 placed six feet apart , 72 square feet , 403 00:17:03,239 --> 00:17:05,770 were allotted for each sailor . And so 404 00:17:05,770 --> 00:17:07,930 although it wasn't individual rooms , 405 00:17:08,240 --> 00:17:10,407 it was the best that we had now . They 406 00:17:10,407 --> 00:17:12,573 were also hotel rooms in the base that 407 00:17:12,573 --> 00:17:14,573 were made available . It was vacant 408 00:17:14,573 --> 00:17:16,796 housing that was made available . There 409 00:17:16,796 --> 00:17:19,073 were barracks that were made available . 410 00:17:19,073 --> 00:17:18,900 There were ships that had excess 411 00:17:18,900 --> 00:17:21,011 birthing . That we were going to make 412 00:17:21,011 --> 00:17:23,067 available is well . And so the naval 413 00:17:23,067 --> 00:17:25,490 base was working at speed to make beds 414 00:17:25,490 --> 00:17:27,601 available every day . On the day that 415 00:17:27,601 --> 00:17:30,360 Crozier had sent in the email that 24 416 00:17:30,360 --> 00:17:32,510 hours in that period there were 700 417 00:17:32,510 --> 00:17:34,580 beds unfilled . There were 500 a day 418 00:17:34,580 --> 00:17:36,913 before There were 300 a day before that . 419 00:17:36,913 --> 00:17:39,610 So if I go back to the primary , 420 00:17:39,610 --> 00:17:42,380 responsibility of CEO is itself was the 421 00:17:42,380 --> 00:17:44,500 safety and well being of the crew so 422 00:17:44,500 --> 00:17:46,500 that we could move them to a better 423 00:17:46,500 --> 00:17:48,722 place and get the ship back to its full 424 00:17:48,722 --> 00:17:50,611 operational capability as soon as 425 00:17:50,611 --> 00:17:52,722 possible . I was not impressed by the 426 00:17:52,722 --> 00:17:54,910 slow egress off the ship . The lack of 427 00:17:54,910 --> 00:17:57,040 a plan to do so . The seventh Fleet 428 00:17:57,040 --> 00:17:59,230 commanders demand for a plan that he 429 00:17:59,230 --> 00:18:01,470 didn't receive until the day Crozier 430 00:18:01,470 --> 00:18:04,160 got relieved . That was 67 days into 431 00:18:04,160 --> 00:18:07,540 the port visit , so I found both from 432 00:18:07,550 --> 00:18:09,606 both . From a standpoint of planning 433 00:18:09,606 --> 00:18:12,260 and execution that they fell well short . 434 00:18:12,910 --> 00:18:15,021 They also made the decision on Sunday 435 00:18:15,430 --> 00:18:17,597 toe lift quarantine in the app portion 436 00:18:17,597 --> 00:18:19,708 of the ship . So there 1000 people in 437 00:18:19,708 --> 00:18:21,930 the aft portion of the ship they lifted 438 00:18:21,930 --> 00:18:23,874 quarantine . And so they co mingle 439 00:18:23,874 --> 00:18:25,930 those members in the ship again . It 440 00:18:25,930 --> 00:18:27,930 would have made sense to me that if 441 00:18:27,930 --> 00:18:27,360 you're going to do that , if you need 442 00:18:27,360 --> 00:18:29,471 to relieve some of that pressure that 443 00:18:29,471 --> 00:18:31,582 they were to fill those seven some of 444 00:18:31,582 --> 00:18:33,804 those 700 beds ashore . That decision , 445 00:18:33,804 --> 00:18:36,090 in my view , was one of comfort over 446 00:18:36,090 --> 00:18:38,470 safety . And again , safety was thing 447 00:18:38,470 --> 00:18:40,414 one . And I think there were other 448 00:18:40,414 --> 00:18:42,637 decisions that were made , some of them 449 00:18:42,637 --> 00:18:44,526 self limiting in terms of getting 450 00:18:44,526 --> 00:18:46,748 people ashore that had everything to do 451 00:18:46,748 --> 00:18:48,248 with comfort over safety . 452 00:18:50,910 --> 00:18:53,260 You're letting out a number of things 453 00:18:53,260 --> 00:18:56,700 that you saw at the time that concerned 454 00:18:56,700 --> 00:18:59,550 you , uh , paralysis of command , 455 00:19:00,640 --> 00:19:03,970 just things lining up one after another 456 00:19:03,970 --> 00:19:06,790 that you observed as this process is 457 00:19:06,790 --> 00:19:10,330 going on . So what I don't understand 458 00:19:10,330 --> 00:19:14,270 is why did the Navy then simply 459 00:19:14,280 --> 00:19:17,800 inquire into the email ? Why 460 00:19:18,080 --> 00:19:20,940 did if you knew it at Milberg knew it . 461 00:19:21,310 --> 00:19:24,840 So my question is how 462 00:19:24,850 --> 00:19:28,730 it How is it not a conclusion 463 00:19:28,750 --> 00:19:31,380 that the Navy was basically 464 00:19:31,510 --> 00:19:35,430 investigating the wrong not 465 00:19:35,430 --> 00:19:38,310 the full problem . And Mr Secretary 466 00:19:38,310 --> 00:19:40,310 after Admiral Gildeyev , if I could 467 00:19:40,310 --> 00:19:42,199 just ask you a swell it's . And I 468 00:19:42,199 --> 00:19:44,254 realized you came after this , sir . 469 00:19:44,254 --> 00:19:47,230 But it seems the Navy knew all along 470 00:19:47,930 --> 00:19:50,097 that there were a series of problems . 471 00:19:50,440 --> 00:19:52,450 Did nobody tell you ? But you seem 472 00:19:52,920 --> 00:19:55,710 tohave some awareness of it . And what 473 00:19:55,710 --> 00:19:58,043 did the navy here from Captain Croshere ? 474 00:19:58,043 --> 00:20:00,210 Did they Did they interview him ? What 475 00:20:00,210 --> 00:20:02,880 did explanation did he have ? So my 476 00:20:02,880 --> 00:20:05,220 awareness aval Berks awareness aval 477 00:20:05,230 --> 00:20:07,440 actually knows awareness of those 478 00:20:07,440 --> 00:20:09,662 problems with decision making and rapid 479 00:20:09,662 --> 00:20:11,990 egress . Those were never visible to us 480 00:20:11,990 --> 00:20:14,212 until we did the deeper investigation . 481 00:20:15,740 --> 00:20:16,320 So 482 00:20:19,620 --> 00:20:23,480 at my So if I go back to , uh , this 483 00:20:23,660 --> 00:20:26,400 at echelon one in the Navy , my 484 00:20:26,400 --> 00:20:28,430 questions are to the to the Pacific 485 00:20:28,430 --> 00:20:31,020 Fleet Commander , what do you need as 486 00:20:31,020 --> 00:20:33,131 an example , he needs authority to be 487 00:20:33,131 --> 00:20:35,076 able to use mill air to take those 488 00:20:35,076 --> 00:20:37,409 samples to Korea . We took care of that . 489 00:20:37,409 --> 00:20:39,870 We needed toe order people from Okinawa 490 00:20:39,880 --> 00:20:42,240 to Guam . We took care of that . Things 491 00:20:42,240 --> 00:20:44,407 that things that Averil actually and I 492 00:20:44,407 --> 00:20:46,573 was doing at his level and the seventh 493 00:20:46,573 --> 00:20:48,851 Fleet commander was doing at his level . 494 00:20:48,851 --> 00:20:51,018 We're all in support of closure . I go 495 00:20:51,018 --> 00:20:53,129 back to Crozes email weren't where he 496 00:20:53,129 --> 00:20:55,500 says command is absolute . It's my ship 497 00:20:55,510 --> 00:20:57,750 and it's my crew . And I believe it 498 00:20:57,750 --> 00:20:59,861 should have also been his plan in his 499 00:20:59,861 --> 00:21:02,340 plan execute and all other echelons air 500 00:21:02,340 --> 00:21:04,562 in support of that command based on all 501 00:21:04,562 --> 00:21:06,673 the examples I gave you , the testing 502 00:21:06,673 --> 00:21:08,451 in Korea , the spaces that were 503 00:21:08,451 --> 00:21:10,618 becoming available enable based Guam . 504 00:21:10,618 --> 00:21:12,618 The negotiations in the hotel , the 505 00:21:12,618 --> 00:21:16,300 medical teams from Okinawa So quickly 506 00:21:16,300 --> 00:21:18,522 No , have no one more than he did . How 507 00:21:18,522 --> 00:21:20,880 I guess I don't understand . How is it 508 00:21:20,890 --> 00:21:23,400 up and down ? Nobody knew . And what 509 00:21:23,400 --> 00:21:25,180 did Captain Crowe shirt Was he 510 00:21:25,190 --> 00:21:27,412 interviewed ? What did he have to say ? 511 00:21:27,720 --> 00:21:29,930 How does nobody know ? Captain Cruiser 512 00:21:29,930 --> 00:21:32,152 has never said in his email . You never 513 00:21:32,152 --> 00:21:34,750 saw the line . I am heinie . He 514 00:21:34,750 --> 00:21:36,830 certainly said I need these things . 515 00:21:36,950 --> 00:21:39,110 What he never said was , I am doing 516 00:21:39,110 --> 00:21:42,140 these things . This was all about what 517 00:21:42,140 --> 00:21:44,307 Crozier failed to do . Within his span 518 00:21:44,307 --> 00:21:46,362 of control , I looked at the span of 519 00:21:46,362 --> 00:21:48,362 control of the Commander of Pacific 520 00:21:48,362 --> 00:21:50,529 Leak . I looked at the span of control 521 00:21:50,529 --> 00:21:52,640 of the commanders . Seventh Fleet . I 522 00:21:52,640 --> 00:21:54,751 did not see those problems . We would 523 00:21:54,751 --> 00:21:56,720 necessarily see those those issues 524 00:21:56,720 --> 00:21:59,000 bubble up unless Crozier raised them . 525 00:21:59,230 --> 00:22:01,650 If he had a problem , let's say he 526 00:22:01,650 --> 00:22:03,817 thought that the accommodations in the 527 00:22:03,817 --> 00:22:06,190 gym with it , with the with the with 528 00:22:06,190 --> 00:22:08,290 the bed , six feet apart . He didn't 529 00:22:08,290 --> 00:22:10,840 like that . That's one of the reasons 530 00:22:10,840 --> 00:22:12,840 he didn't send people assured speed 531 00:22:12,840 --> 00:22:15,007 because he wanted the hotel rooms . We 532 00:22:15,007 --> 00:22:17,173 didn't have the hotel rooms . The best 533 00:22:17,173 --> 00:22:19,062 we had were the facilities that I 534 00:22:19,062 --> 00:22:21,284 mentioned a few minutes ago . Used them 535 00:22:21,284 --> 00:22:23,173 as best you can back to thing one 536 00:22:23,173 --> 00:22:26,100 safety of the crew . Baker and Crow 537 00:22:26,100 --> 00:22:28,100 jher . We're talking to the Seventh 538 00:22:28,100 --> 00:22:30,540 Fleet Commander every day . If they had 539 00:22:30,540 --> 00:22:33,000 issues , they should have raised them . 540 00:22:33,740 --> 00:22:36,450 If he fearlessly communicated with that 541 00:22:36,450 --> 00:22:39,220 and with that email that he sent that 542 00:22:39,220 --> 00:22:40,887 I've never disagreed with his 543 00:22:40,887 --> 00:22:42,960 fearlessly sending the email then he 544 00:22:42,960 --> 00:22:44,960 certainly should have just just the 545 00:22:44,960 --> 00:22:47,080 same free Leslie communicated issues 546 00:22:47,090 --> 00:22:49,090 every day during those video 547 00:22:49,090 --> 00:22:51,470 teleconferences . All right , thank God . 548 00:22:51,490 --> 00:22:53,657 Impressions from the phone . We've got 549 00:22:53,657 --> 00:22:54,990 a busy Ryan from post . 550 00:22:58,940 --> 00:23:01,107 Hey , Sorry . It falls from the person 551 00:23:01,107 --> 00:23:03,270 stepping intimacy nearly 552 00:23:07,100 --> 00:23:07,430 how 553 00:23:12,180 --> 00:23:14,990 I know . I just wanted to ask whether I 554 00:23:14,990 --> 00:23:17,750 think the impression will probably be 555 00:23:17,950 --> 00:23:21,250 from a lot of people on the tr that 556 00:23:21,260 --> 00:23:24,180 essentially , this is blaming the 557 00:23:24,180 --> 00:23:26,190 captain and the admiral for the 558 00:23:26,200 --> 00:23:29,350 failings of wider Navy leadership 559 00:23:29,870 --> 00:23:32,092 that that should have been more attuned 560 00:23:32,092 --> 00:23:34,314 in prepared for what was going on . And 561 00:23:34,314 --> 00:23:36,426 I was wondering if you could speak it 562 00:23:36,426 --> 00:23:38,610 out your will . So , um , when the 563 00:23:38,610 --> 00:23:41,210 seventh , after Captain Crozes relieved , 564 00:23:41,210 --> 00:23:43,321 the seventh Fleet commander flew from 565 00:23:43,321 --> 00:23:45,660 his command ship , the blue Ridge , um , 566 00:23:45,670 --> 00:23:48,240 onto Guam and he spent an hour and 1/2 567 00:23:48,250 --> 00:23:50,820 answering questions for the crew until 568 00:23:50,820 --> 00:23:53,620 they ran out of questions to ask . He 569 00:23:53,620 --> 00:23:57,220 was clear to them that the reason that 570 00:23:57,370 --> 00:24:00,150 he was putting pressure on crow jher to 571 00:24:00,150 --> 00:24:02,261 put people in those gyms and in those 572 00:24:02,261 --> 00:24:04,940 rooms assure was because he was putting 573 00:24:04,940 --> 00:24:07,940 safety over comfort . That's the first 574 00:24:07,940 --> 00:24:10,051 time anybody and explain that to that 575 00:24:10,051 --> 00:24:12,600 crew . And he told me when I spoke to 576 00:24:12,600 --> 00:24:14,656 the Seventh Fleet Commander and that 577 00:24:14,656 --> 00:24:16,822 was an eye opener for him , and it was 578 00:24:16,822 --> 00:24:19,200 an eye open for the crew . One of the 579 00:24:19,200 --> 00:24:21,422 last calls I made this afternoon was to 580 00:24:21,422 --> 00:24:23,533 the current strike group commander in 581 00:24:23,533 --> 00:24:25,256 the currency over the theory a 582 00:24:25,256 --> 00:24:27,478 Roosevelt to prepare them for when they 583 00:24:27,478 --> 00:24:29,478 wake up tomorrow morning . And this 584 00:24:29,478 --> 00:24:31,422 news hits the streets whether they 585 00:24:31,422 --> 00:24:33,644 first learned about it , they both feel 586 00:24:33,644 --> 00:24:35,589 that the crew is gonna accept this 587 00:24:35,589 --> 00:24:37,644 except the rationale that we lay out 588 00:24:37,644 --> 00:24:39,756 that they have a better understanding 589 00:24:39,756 --> 00:24:42,120 now than they did back then of why 590 00:24:42,120 --> 00:24:44,231 things happened the way they happen . 591 00:24:44,940 --> 00:24:46,940 All right , Nancy , use up from the 592 00:24:46,940 --> 00:24:50,490 journal . Thank you . Um , you know 593 00:24:50,500 --> 00:24:53,930 now , patient zero waas on the funeral . 594 00:24:53,930 --> 00:24:56,310 Roosevelt very indication that it came 595 00:24:56,310 --> 00:24:58,560 onto the ship more than one way . And 596 00:24:58,920 --> 00:25:01,142 who did you communicate with outside of 597 00:25:01,142 --> 00:25:03,087 the military , that is , or any of 598 00:25:03,087 --> 00:25:05,031 these decisions or recommendations 599 00:25:05,031 --> 00:25:06,920 communicated with the White House 600 00:25:06,920 --> 00:25:09,142 beforehand . Thank you . So let me take 601 00:25:09,142 --> 00:25:11,420 your first question . If it's OK , sir , 602 00:25:11,420 --> 00:25:13,309 I'll turn the question The second 603 00:25:13,309 --> 00:25:15,309 question over to you . Um , so your 604 00:25:15,309 --> 00:25:17,531 first question again , I'm sorry . Miss 605 00:25:17,531 --> 00:25:21,000 Yussef was , uh um it was about it was 606 00:25:21,000 --> 00:25:23,980 about Thea , uh , vector for infection 607 00:25:23,980 --> 00:25:26,091 on the ship . And so , no , we've not 608 00:25:26,091 --> 00:25:28,850 been able Teoh specifically 609 00:25:29,400 --> 00:25:32,360 understand who patient zero was on t r 610 00:25:32,640 --> 00:25:35,160 and I think part of that is because of 611 00:25:35,160 --> 00:25:37,382 the aseptic nature of eight symptomatic 612 00:25:37,382 --> 00:25:39,870 nature of cove it and so it incubates 613 00:25:39,870 --> 00:25:42,203 at different paces for different people . 614 00:25:42,203 --> 00:25:44,148 And so we don't have a good enough 615 00:25:44,148 --> 00:25:45,648 understanding based in the 616 00:25:45,648 --> 00:25:47,814 investigation . We think that likely , 617 00:25:47,814 --> 00:25:49,981 Uh , it happened during the port visit 618 00:25:49,981 --> 00:25:52,230 to Vietnam , but And when you read the 619 00:25:52,230 --> 00:25:54,320 report , we spent an extensive . We 620 00:25:54,320 --> 00:25:56,487 took an extensive look at the decision 621 00:25:56,487 --> 00:25:58,709 making before we would interview before 622 00:25:58,709 --> 00:26:00,653 the ship pulled into Vietnam . The 623 00:26:00,653 --> 00:26:02,820 actions that the ship took in terms of 624 00:26:02,820 --> 00:26:04,931 precautions , as they were in Vietnam 625 00:26:04,931 --> 00:26:07,042 and then what they did transiting out 626 00:26:07,042 --> 00:26:09,264 of Vietnam . And I'm certainly happy to 627 00:26:09,264 --> 00:26:11,542 cover some of that for you . But , man , 628 00:26:11,542 --> 00:26:13,709 we don't have a clear understanding of 629 00:26:13,709 --> 00:26:15,764 patient zero . So the second part of 630 00:26:15,764 --> 00:26:17,987 the question I first like to go back to 631 00:26:17,987 --> 00:26:21,360 what Barbara had had stated . I think 632 00:26:21,500 --> 00:26:25,340 that this is truly illustrates the 633 00:26:25,340 --> 00:26:27,618 importance of a thorough investigation . 634 00:26:27,680 --> 00:26:29,730 I think is Admiral Guild A has 635 00:26:29,740 --> 00:26:33,270 indicated , um , if we had done the due 636 00:26:33,270 --> 00:26:35,492 diligence from the beginning , we would 637 00:26:35,492 --> 00:26:37,548 have come up with the total fax that 638 00:26:37,548 --> 00:26:39,548 would have led us to make the right 639 00:26:39,548 --> 00:26:42,650 conclusion much earlier than today . 640 00:26:42,890 --> 00:26:45,168 Unfortunately , emotion got in the way , 641 00:26:45,168 --> 00:26:48,480 and a rush to judgment perhaps became 642 00:26:48,480 --> 00:26:50,800 part of the equation . I think the 643 00:26:50,800 --> 00:26:52,790 entire country has learned a lot 644 00:26:53,040 --> 00:26:55,770 through this cove . It experience , and 645 00:26:55,770 --> 00:26:57,992 it's always easy to play Monday morning 646 00:26:57,992 --> 00:27:00,103 quarterback and go back and guess the 647 00:27:00,103 --> 00:27:03,080 actions of those who acted the way they 648 00:27:03,080 --> 00:27:05,940 did . I am very proud of the way that 649 00:27:05,940 --> 00:27:08,300 the United States Navy has reacted to 650 00:27:08,300 --> 00:27:10,078 this . When you think about the 651 00:27:10,078 --> 00:27:12,078 totality of this virus and how it's 652 00:27:12,078 --> 00:27:14,830 affected America , you will see that we 653 00:27:14,830 --> 00:27:16,910 really only had two ships that were 654 00:27:17,050 --> 00:27:19,590 significantly affected . Um , and out 655 00:27:19,590 --> 00:27:21,590 of that , both those ships are back 656 00:27:21,670 --> 00:27:25,270 underway and fully mission capable . As 657 00:27:25,270 --> 00:27:29,040 far as my responsibility again , I am 658 00:27:29,040 --> 00:27:31,207 a former military officer who believes 659 00:27:31,207 --> 00:27:33,040 in the chain of command . I have 660 00:27:33,040 --> 00:27:35,151 discussed the findings of this report 661 00:27:35,151 --> 00:27:37,484 with my boss , the secretary of Defense , 662 00:27:37,484 --> 00:27:41,180 Dr Mark Esper , who also upholds 663 00:27:41,430 --> 00:27:45,010 our conclusions farther than that . 664 00:27:45,130 --> 00:27:48,510 Uh , that is up to Dr Esper to 665 00:27:48,510 --> 00:27:50,399 determine , and I would refer any 666 00:27:50,399 --> 00:27:52,510 follow on questions you would have to 667 00:27:52,510 --> 00:27:54,677 him . All right , we'll come back from 668 00:27:54,677 --> 00:27:56,680 here , David , with this deep 669 00:27:58,350 --> 00:28:02,200 ever that had not 670 00:28:02,270 --> 00:28:04,510 approach written that letter . 671 00:28:06,040 --> 00:28:08,560 Um , I can't said it definitively , but 672 00:28:08,570 --> 00:28:11,660 certainly the email in the leak was the 673 00:28:11,660 --> 00:28:12,882 genesis of all this . 674 00:28:15,840 --> 00:28:19,800 Hey , he's not being relieve for the 675 00:28:19,800 --> 00:28:22,022 letter , but it's because of the letter 676 00:28:22,022 --> 00:28:23,911 that you have the investigation . 677 00:28:23,940 --> 00:28:27,910 Correct . So as I as I said earlier , 678 00:28:27,920 --> 00:28:30,031 this isn't about the email , and it's 679 00:28:30,031 --> 00:28:32,142 not about the leak . And I go back to 680 00:28:32,142 --> 00:28:33,642 my comments about fearless 681 00:28:33,642 --> 00:28:35,809 communications up the chain of command 682 00:28:35,809 --> 00:28:37,476 I need . We need commanders t 683 00:28:37,476 --> 00:28:40,190 communicate up the chain of command . 684 00:28:40,190 --> 00:28:42,412 But yes , that's what that's what led . 685 00:28:42,412 --> 00:28:44,840 That's what led to Crozes firing . And 686 00:28:44,850 --> 00:28:47,540 if you remember back at that time , I 687 00:28:47,540 --> 00:28:49,762 had recommended an investigation before 688 00:28:49,762 --> 00:28:51,984 we made a determination on whether fire 689 00:28:51,984 --> 00:28:55,910 and uh and so the investigation , Uh , 690 00:28:56,050 --> 00:28:58,580 the investigation happened out after 691 00:28:58,580 --> 00:29:01,940 his relief . Does it bother you that if 692 00:29:01,940 --> 00:29:03,980 he hadn't written that letter and 693 00:29:04,300 --> 00:29:06,970 you're just going through the normal 694 00:29:06,970 --> 00:29:09,026 course of business , you never would 695 00:29:09,026 --> 00:29:11,026 have surfaced these problems , it's 696 00:29:11,026 --> 00:29:13,026 good to get after these issues . We 697 00:29:13,026 --> 00:29:16,700 learned a lot from TR the issue here . 698 00:29:16,700 --> 00:29:19,210 Really , David is about standards of 699 00:29:19,210 --> 00:29:21,488 performance and particularly in crisis . 700 00:29:21,488 --> 00:29:24,410 And so when you read the report , I 701 00:29:24,410 --> 00:29:26,410 think you probably come to the same 702 00:29:26,410 --> 00:29:28,560 conclusion that I did . As bad as I 703 00:29:28,560 --> 00:29:30,880 feel for Captain Crozier and Admiral 704 00:29:30,880 --> 00:29:33,510 Baker in their families , I've got a 705 00:29:33,510 --> 00:29:35,621 responsibility to put the best people 706 00:29:35,621 --> 00:29:37,590 possible in a ship that is now 707 00:29:37,590 --> 00:29:39,701 operating the Philippine Sea with two 708 00:29:39,701 --> 00:29:41,812 other strike groups . You've seen the 709 00:29:41,812 --> 00:29:43,757 Chinese reactions to our ships out 710 00:29:43,757 --> 00:29:45,868 there . I can't have anybody . I need 711 00:29:45,868 --> 00:29:48,034 people gripping problems . I need them 712 00:29:48,034 --> 00:29:49,812 driving solutions . I need them 713 00:29:49,812 --> 00:29:51,812 communicating fearlessly . This put 714 00:29:51,812 --> 00:29:53,812 enough doubt in my mind . As I said 715 00:29:53,812 --> 00:29:55,868 before , had I know then what I know 716 00:29:55,868 --> 00:29:59,760 now , I would have relieved him . Write 717 00:29:59,760 --> 00:30:02,320 Kourtney a couple of things . Emerald . 718 00:30:02,320 --> 00:30:04,264 Gilda . I'm still having hard time 719 00:30:04,264 --> 00:30:06,320 understanding how your assessment of 720 00:30:06,320 --> 00:30:08,510 the paralysis of the command team and 721 00:30:08,510 --> 00:30:10,760 then the urgency of the email that he 722 00:30:10,760 --> 00:30:12,816 sent . How do you square those ? And 723 00:30:12,816 --> 00:30:15,038 then you just explain a little bit more 724 00:30:15,038 --> 00:30:17,149 about Rianna Baker . You said that it 725 00:30:17,149 --> 00:30:19,316 would be his promotion she start would 726 00:30:19,316 --> 00:30:21,482 be delayed pending further review . Is 727 00:30:21,482 --> 00:30:21,150 that a great determination ? Border ? 728 00:30:21,160 --> 00:30:23,870 Who does that review ? Take that one . 729 00:30:23,880 --> 00:30:26,213 I'll take that one first , if you would . 730 00:30:26,213 --> 00:30:29,750 And so we made . I made the decision 731 00:30:30,030 --> 00:30:32,100 through a normal course of events to 732 00:30:32,100 --> 00:30:34,322 have a normal turnover the strike group 733 00:30:34,322 --> 00:30:36,489 strike group commander before they get 734 00:30:36,489 --> 00:30:38,489 underway . The reason I did that is 735 00:30:38,489 --> 00:30:40,711 because I knew that pending the results 736 00:30:40,711 --> 00:30:42,767 of the investigation , I could still 737 00:30:42,767 --> 00:30:44,933 hold Baker accountable . I didn't want 738 00:30:44,933 --> 00:30:44,780 to do a turnover in the South China Sea 739 00:30:44,780 --> 00:30:46,780 when they were operating two of the 740 00:30:46,780 --> 00:30:48,891 strike zone , one of that operational 741 00:30:48,891 --> 00:30:50,891 continuity . So I discussed it with 742 00:30:50,891 --> 00:30:50,400 operational commanders and that's the 743 00:30:50,400 --> 00:30:52,460 decision that we made . And so with 744 00:30:52,460 --> 00:30:54,710 respect to his promotion being held in 745 00:30:54,710 --> 00:30:56,970 advance so as part of the 746 00:30:56,970 --> 00:30:58,803 recommendations and report their 747 00:30:58,803 --> 00:31:00,914 administrative actions that that will 748 00:31:00,914 --> 00:31:04,820 be taken against against Amel Baker so 749 00:31:04,820 --> 00:31:07,042 that would be in the form of a letter . 750 00:31:07,042 --> 00:31:09,209 And that determination will be made by 751 00:31:09,209 --> 00:31:11,264 and Malacca Lino , the Pacific Fleet 752 00:31:11,264 --> 00:31:13,320 commander . That'll lead , then lead 753 00:31:13,320 --> 00:31:15,487 through an administrative process that 754 00:31:15,487 --> 00:31:17,598 will finally come to the secretary of 755 00:31:17,598 --> 00:31:19,764 the Navy to make a decision on whether 756 00:31:19,764 --> 00:31:21,764 or not he should be promoted . He's 757 00:31:21,764 --> 00:31:23,931 already Senate confirmed . I'm sorry , 758 00:31:23,931 --> 00:31:26,098 your proceeding questions . If you can 759 00:31:26,098 --> 00:31:28,320 explain that the difference between the 760 00:31:28,320 --> 00:31:30,431 analysis that he was that there was a 761 00:31:30,431 --> 00:31:32,598 paralysis of the command and then this 762 00:31:32,598 --> 00:31:34,487 urgency in the email that Captain 763 00:31:34,487 --> 00:31:36,880 Crozier sent e . I just don't 764 00:31:36,880 --> 00:31:39,102 understand . I think that was the thing 765 00:31:39,102 --> 00:31:41,269 that got so much attention about as it 766 00:31:41,269 --> 00:31:40,890 seemed like such a desperate plea for 767 00:31:40,890 --> 00:31:44,040 help . Correct . So how do you explain 768 00:31:44,080 --> 00:31:46,380 that ? It seems as if you're saying 769 00:31:46,380 --> 00:31:48,380 that he wasn't actually helping his 770 00:31:48,380 --> 00:31:51,380 sailors , That's why . So my point is 771 00:31:51,380 --> 00:31:53,269 that I feel he was placing them a 772 00:31:53,269 --> 00:31:55,158 greater risk again . I go back to 773 00:31:55,158 --> 00:31:57,380 comfort in front of safety as I look at 774 00:31:57,380 --> 00:31:59,602 the facts . That's what stood out to me 775 00:31:59,840 --> 00:32:02,790 and again I talked about , you know , 776 00:32:02,790 --> 00:32:04,980 his primary responsibility was safety 777 00:32:04,980 --> 00:32:07,091 and well being of the crew so that we 778 00:32:07,091 --> 00:32:09,202 could get back to maximum operational 779 00:32:09,202 --> 00:32:11,091 readiness . We knew that we could 780 00:32:11,091 --> 00:32:13,258 always get that chip underway with six 781 00:32:13,258 --> 00:32:15,091 sailors if we had to , if if the 782 00:32:15,091 --> 00:32:17,202 operational environment crisis , uh , 783 00:32:17,360 --> 00:32:19,860 drove us to that . But what we wanted 784 00:32:19,860 --> 00:32:22,380 to do was move people aboard off off 785 00:32:22,380 --> 00:32:24,269 the ship as quickly as we could . 786 00:32:24,269 --> 00:32:26,324 That's why we had people . The Naval 787 00:32:26,324 --> 00:32:28,380 Station , working 24 7 open up . The 788 00:32:28,380 --> 00:32:30,720 initial requirement was 1000 beds , and 789 00:32:30,720 --> 00:32:34,360 so they exceeded expectations with more 790 00:32:34,360 --> 00:32:38,170 than 2400 beds within a week I 791 00:32:38,170 --> 00:32:40,170 haven't been able to come to , Ah , 792 00:32:40,170 --> 00:32:42,230 great understanding of why the email 793 00:32:42,230 --> 00:32:44,452 either . And so there were really three 794 00:32:44,452 --> 00:32:47,530 courses of action that were that were 795 00:32:47,530 --> 00:32:50,190 either in planning or an execution . So 796 00:32:50,190 --> 00:32:52,023 the course of action that was an 797 00:32:52,023 --> 00:32:53,968 execution again , safety being the 798 00:32:53,968 --> 00:32:56,130 primary issue here was to get people 799 00:32:56,130 --> 00:32:58,360 off the ship to Naval Base Guam into 800 00:32:58,360 --> 00:33:01,050 available accommodations , right ? The 801 00:33:01,050 --> 00:33:03,510 second KOA , which was more constrained , 802 00:33:04,000 --> 00:33:06,290 was to augment the first co . With 803 00:33:06,290 --> 00:33:10,080 hotels from hotel rooms from from Guam 804 00:33:10,080 --> 00:33:12,024 and again , ship pulls on Friday . 805 00:33:12,024 --> 00:33:14,720 Negotiation Saturday , Sunday agreement 806 00:33:14,720 --> 00:33:17,860 on Monday , the third KOA , which was 807 00:33:17,870 --> 00:33:20,260 which was contingency planning , was 808 00:33:20,270 --> 00:33:22,548 toe look at space available in Okinawa . 809 00:33:23,110 --> 00:33:25,720 That was a bigger lift . So if we need 810 00:33:25,720 --> 00:33:28,530 it for 1000 beds at Naval Base , Guam , 811 00:33:28,540 --> 00:33:30,710 and it became physically impossible to 812 00:33:30,710 --> 00:33:33,920 do that , could we take a small segment 813 00:33:33,920 --> 00:33:36,330 of the crew and move them to Okinawa 814 00:33:36,330 --> 00:33:38,680 into three Mets accommodations ? Right , 815 00:33:38,890 --> 00:33:40,557 That's an eight hour flight . 816 00:33:40,557 --> 00:33:42,890 Operationally , it's not what we wanted , 817 00:33:42,890 --> 00:33:44,890 but again , if safeties thing one , 818 00:33:44,890 --> 00:33:47,001 that's what we would have looked at . 819 00:33:47,001 --> 00:33:49,001 So that was 1/3 KOA and to be quite 820 00:33:49,001 --> 00:33:51,168 honest with you , Ah , Captain Crozier 821 00:33:51,168 --> 00:33:54,120 was very frustrated that the ship was 822 00:33:54,120 --> 00:33:56,287 spending time working that contingency 823 00:33:56,287 --> 00:33:59,760 koa . And so my response to that is 824 00:33:59,760 --> 00:34:03,590 that if you're planning for the for the 825 00:34:03,590 --> 00:34:06,090 Okinawa Co . Of the Airlift Cola , if 826 00:34:06,090 --> 00:34:08,257 that was taken away from the resources 827 00:34:08,257 --> 00:34:10,479 and focus , you had a place on the code 828 00:34:10,479 --> 00:34:12,423 that was an execution , and you're 829 00:34:12,423 --> 00:34:14,590 talking to the Seventh Fleet commander 830 00:34:14,590 --> 00:34:16,646 every day . There's your opportunity 831 00:34:16,646 --> 00:34:18,646 for fearless communications . Say , 832 00:34:18,646 --> 00:34:20,757 Look , I need to reorder priorities . 833 00:34:20,757 --> 00:34:22,868 Or if there was confusion , as you'll 834 00:34:22,868 --> 00:34:25,034 see in the report about whether people 835 00:34:25,034 --> 00:34:24,590 should be tested before they moved to 836 00:34:24,590 --> 00:34:26,590 accommodations . The seventh Fleet 837 00:34:26,590 --> 00:34:29,260 commander cleared that up within hours 838 00:34:29,270 --> 00:34:31,381 because that's conflicting guidance . 839 00:34:31,381 --> 00:34:33,492 Get him off quickly . Was the primary 840 00:34:33,492 --> 00:34:36,040 thing tests before getting off was with 841 00:34:36,040 --> 00:34:38,096 limited testing capability that time 842 00:34:38,096 --> 00:34:40,151 would have conflicted with that . So 843 00:34:40,151 --> 00:34:41,818 this is all about if you have 844 00:34:41,818 --> 00:34:43,929 constraints or barriers and you can't 845 00:34:43,929 --> 00:34:46,040 break immature level . Yeah , you got 846 00:34:46,040 --> 00:34:48,040 to shoot a flare because I can't do 847 00:34:48,040 --> 00:34:50,151 what you told me to dio . That wasn't 848 00:34:50,151 --> 00:34:52,262 happening . That's part of the That's 849 00:34:52,262 --> 00:34:54,373 the part of the piece that I spoke to 850 00:34:54,373 --> 00:34:57,570 Miss Star about that I did not see that 851 00:34:57,570 --> 00:34:59,459 gripping the problem that driving 852 00:34:59,459 --> 00:35:02,120 solutions , getting after it . And it 853 00:35:02,120 --> 00:35:03,731 was , quite frankly , it was 854 00:35:03,731 --> 00:35:05,787 disappointing . All right , we'll go 855 00:35:05,787 --> 00:35:08,064 back . The phones . Idris from Reuters . 856 00:35:08,690 --> 00:35:11,260 Thanks . Just a quick question . Other 857 00:35:11,260 --> 00:35:13,260 than Captain Crozier and the strike 858 00:35:13,260 --> 00:35:15,316 Group , commander , they're going to 859 00:35:15,316 --> 00:35:17,371 any other punishment up and down the 860 00:35:17,371 --> 00:35:19,482 chain or on the ship . And secondly , 861 00:35:19,482 --> 00:35:21,260 at any point just going back 90 862 00:35:21,260 --> 00:35:23,371 questions at any point . Did you hear 863 00:35:23,371 --> 00:35:25,149 from the White House during the 864 00:35:25,149 --> 00:35:26,871 investigation about what their 865 00:35:26,871 --> 00:35:28,927 preferences were ? Any communication 866 00:35:28,927 --> 00:35:30,816 from the White House about by the 867 00:35:30,816 --> 00:35:32,649 investigation ? Answer the first 868 00:35:32,649 --> 00:35:35,580 question . Um , no , Admiral , 869 00:35:36,700 --> 00:35:38,811 It's like this is said , this is with 870 00:35:38,811 --> 00:35:40,922 respect to the to the White House . I 871 00:35:40,922 --> 00:35:43,144 know the answer . The question from the 872 00:35:43,144 --> 00:35:44,700 White House . I received no 873 00:35:44,700 --> 00:35:46,811 communication whatsoever with anybody 874 00:35:46,811 --> 00:35:46,810 at the White House . I've only 875 00:35:46,810 --> 00:35:49,032 communicated up the chain of command to 876 00:35:49,032 --> 00:35:50,921 the secretary of Defense . Second 877 00:35:50,921 --> 00:35:52,866 question had to do with additional 878 00:35:52,866 --> 00:35:54,866 personnel on the ship for potential 879 00:35:54,866 --> 00:35:57,310 administrative or punitive action . So 880 00:35:57,310 --> 00:36:00,380 the recommendation made in the report 881 00:36:00,390 --> 00:36:02,970 that I endorsed is for administrative 882 00:36:02,970 --> 00:36:06,130 action to be taken against the CEO of 883 00:36:06,130 --> 00:36:09,950 Theodore Roosevelt . Um , the uh , the 884 00:36:09,950 --> 00:36:12,990 carrier Air Wing commander um embarked 885 00:36:12,990 --> 00:36:15,830 aboard the ship's medical officer who's 886 00:36:15,830 --> 00:36:19,350 part of the cruise company . And so I 887 00:36:19,350 --> 00:36:21,406 have . I will be giving direction to 888 00:36:21,406 --> 00:36:24,180 the commander of Pacific Fleet that he 889 00:36:24,180 --> 00:36:26,291 will take care of that administrative 890 00:36:26,291 --> 00:36:28,458 action . The reason I'm not doing that 891 00:36:28,458 --> 00:36:30,402 from the Pentagon is because those 892 00:36:30,402 --> 00:36:32,236 types of letters as an example , 893 00:36:32,236 --> 00:36:34,013 whether they're punitive or non 894 00:36:34,013 --> 00:36:36,250 punitive letters of reprimand that's 895 00:36:36,250 --> 00:36:38,230 correspondents directly between a 896 00:36:38,230 --> 00:36:40,890 senior and a subordinate . Not not the 897 00:36:40,890 --> 00:36:43,001 scene , you know . And so I'm putting 898 00:36:43,001 --> 00:36:45,168 this back in the chain of command when 899 00:36:45,168 --> 00:36:47,001 it belongs . Ah , and there's no 900 00:36:47,001 --> 00:36:49,168 hesitation by Admiral actually know to 901 00:36:49,168 --> 00:36:51,390 do that . So he will take a look at the 902 00:36:51,390 --> 00:36:53,612 report , and then he will determine the 903 00:36:53,612 --> 00:36:56,680 tone , the substance , the level of of 904 00:36:56,680 --> 00:36:58,847 administrative action that needs to be 905 00:36:58,847 --> 00:37:01,069 taken . All right , we'll come back for 906 00:37:01,069 --> 00:37:03,520 your care . Thank you So in your 907 00:37:03,520 --> 00:37:05,409 investigation determined that the 908 00:37:05,409 --> 00:37:07,620 conflicts were not a likely factor , 909 00:37:07,630 --> 00:37:09,630 and it would most likely would have 910 00:37:09,630 --> 00:37:11,519 been the port visit Vietnam , who 911 00:37:11,519 --> 00:37:13,630 authorized the port visit and is that 912 00:37:13,630 --> 00:37:15,797 person being held accountable and then 913 00:37:16,430 --> 00:37:18,652 thinking back to that port visit at the 914 00:37:18,652 --> 00:37:20,597 time when we were asking questions 915 00:37:20,597 --> 00:37:22,541 about it , the answers were of the 916 00:37:22,541 --> 00:37:24,510 tenor . What we didn't know that 917 00:37:24,510 --> 00:37:26,732 Vietnam , you know , there's only a few 918 00:37:26,732 --> 00:37:28,899 cases Didn't really know the extent of 919 00:37:28,899 --> 00:37:30,677 this at the same time , getting 920 00:37:30,677 --> 00:37:33,260 briefings of everyone else . Plans were 921 00:37:33,260 --> 00:37:35,520 in development of how toe handle cove 922 00:37:35,520 --> 00:37:37,464 it even his own building was still 923 00:37:37,464 --> 00:37:39,576 dealing with have a socially distance 924 00:37:39,576 --> 00:37:41,620 at the time . So how do you hold 925 00:37:41,630 --> 00:37:43,610 captain closure to a standard that 926 00:37:43,870 --> 00:37:46,120 people were still figuring out as this 927 00:37:46,120 --> 00:37:48,890 was unfolding on his ship ? So that 928 00:37:48,890 --> 00:37:51,112 will be part of the investigation . You 929 00:37:51,112 --> 00:37:53,168 can read , but But part of that s so 930 00:37:53,168 --> 00:37:55,334 let me let me speak to that for just a 931 00:37:55,334 --> 00:37:57,390 moment . So determinations were made 932 00:37:57,520 --> 00:37:59,687 during the planning phase is for weeks 933 00:37:59,687 --> 00:38:01,853 and then the days leading up that port 934 00:38:01,853 --> 00:38:03,909 visit with their communications with 935 00:38:03,909 --> 00:38:07,670 the CDC director in Vietnam , the W H . 936 00:38:07,670 --> 00:38:10,100 O . At that time . And still , I think 937 00:38:10,110 --> 00:38:13,110 to this day Vietnam has been as 938 00:38:13,110 --> 00:38:15,166 received among the highest grades of 939 00:38:15,166 --> 00:38:17,860 any country in the world , consistently , 940 00:38:18,050 --> 00:38:20,550 with respect to preventative actions 941 00:38:20,550 --> 00:38:22,606 and containment actions that they've 942 00:38:22,606 --> 00:38:24,772 taken at the time , the questions that 943 00:38:24,772 --> 00:38:27,090 we had who , whether or not the 60 944 00:38:27,090 --> 00:38:29,750 known cases in the vicinity of Hanoi , 945 00:38:30,000 --> 00:38:32,600 which was 450 miles from the port 946 00:38:32,600 --> 00:38:34,810 Danang , whether or not those were 947 00:38:34,810 --> 00:38:37,600 considered to be accurate . And the CDC 948 00:38:37,690 --> 00:38:40,530 director through the CDC in Washington 949 00:38:40,810 --> 00:38:43,430 told us that there is a high degree of 950 00:38:43,430 --> 00:38:45,374 confidence that that reporting was 951 00:38:45,374 --> 00:38:47,541 accurate and the Vietnamese were being 952 00:38:47,541 --> 00:38:50,790 transparent . So based on 953 00:38:50,890 --> 00:38:52,834 indications like that , as well as 954 00:38:52,834 --> 00:38:55,001 precautions that we put in place as an 955 00:38:55,001 --> 00:38:57,210 example , the theater Roosevelt was 956 00:38:57,210 --> 00:38:59,430 among our first shifts . And I would 957 00:38:59,440 --> 00:39:02,400 say , among the first military units to 958 00:39:02,400 --> 00:39:04,511 have a testing capability for Cove it 959 00:39:04,580 --> 00:39:06,910 we had we had tested capability for 960 00:39:06,980 --> 00:39:10,020 influence alike , like illnesses , and 961 00:39:10,020 --> 00:39:12,460 that and that same equipment could 962 00:39:12,560 --> 00:39:14,500 could test for covert . So we had 963 00:39:14,500 --> 00:39:16,600 covert testing . We brought on a 964 00:39:16,600 --> 00:39:18,650 preventive medical team that has an 965 00:39:18,650 --> 00:39:20,872 understanding of viruses like Cove it . 966 00:39:20,880 --> 00:39:23,920 We brought them onto TR . Everybody in 967 00:39:23,920 --> 00:39:26,142 the crew is brief . Their symptoms were 968 00:39:26,142 --> 00:39:28,142 checked before they left the ship . 969 00:39:28,142 --> 00:39:30,360 When they came back to the ship , any 970 00:39:30,360 --> 00:39:32,416 location that they went to had to be 971 00:39:32,416 --> 00:39:34,416 approved by the Department of State 972 00:39:34,416 --> 00:39:38,190 Hotels clubs . The crews of both the 973 00:39:38,190 --> 00:39:40,134 bunker hill it was pierced side in 974 00:39:40,134 --> 00:39:42,190 Roosevelt that was anchored were not 975 00:39:42,190 --> 00:39:45,350 allowed to buy food import . There were 976 00:39:45,350 --> 00:39:47,960 39 members of the crew that we 977 00:39:47,960 --> 00:39:50,090 discovered had , uh , had been in a 978 00:39:50,090 --> 00:39:53,080 hotel where they were to , uh , there 979 00:39:53,080 --> 00:39:55,080 were there were two covert possible 980 00:39:55,080 --> 00:39:57,860 code cases . When we learned that we 981 00:39:57,860 --> 00:39:59,971 brought everybody assure from liberty 982 00:40:00,130 --> 00:40:02,297 ship got underway the next day , those 983 00:40:02,297 --> 00:40:04,352 39 people were testing quarantined . 984 00:40:04,620 --> 00:40:06,564 None of the initial positives were 985 00:40:06,564 --> 00:40:10,290 among those 39 . So based on both 986 00:40:10,290 --> 00:40:12,457 planning and the precautions that went 987 00:40:12,457 --> 00:40:14,568 into that , we think that at the time 988 00:40:14,568 --> 00:40:16,623 that those that that those judgments 989 00:40:16,623 --> 00:40:19,380 were sound And so that determination 990 00:40:19,380 --> 00:40:22,710 was made by the Pac Fleet Commander who 991 00:40:22,710 --> 00:40:24,543 ah , who briefed up and received 992 00:40:24,543 --> 00:40:27,250 concurrence from from the Indo Pacific 993 00:40:27,250 --> 00:40:29,480 Command Commander so just developed the 994 00:40:29,480 --> 00:40:31,702 PAC Fleet commander authorized the port 995 00:40:31,702 --> 00:40:34,700 visit . Ultimately , uh , the Indo paid 996 00:40:34,700 --> 00:40:37,033 come commander authorized support visit . 997 00:40:37,280 --> 00:40:39,910 Also following on that , um , you know , 998 00:40:40,110 --> 00:40:43,270 decisions sound at the time . Did you 999 00:40:43,270 --> 00:40:45,381 end up interviewing captain Closure ? 1000 00:40:45,381 --> 00:40:47,492 Did he ever explain that he was using 1001 00:40:47,492 --> 00:40:49,492 his own best sound decisions at the 1002 00:40:49,492 --> 00:40:51,603 time to do X y Z ? That that's a good 1003 00:40:51,603 --> 00:40:53,770 question . So I think , uh , don't put 1004 00:40:53,770 --> 00:40:55,992 your dream up , but I think what you're 1005 00:40:55,992 --> 00:40:58,159 really getting at is looking at this , 1006 00:40:58,159 --> 00:40:59,992 looking at the facts through the 1007 00:40:59,992 --> 00:41:01,992 context of what was going on at the 1008 00:41:01,992 --> 00:41:04,214 time . Are we holding two commanders to 1009 00:41:04,214 --> 00:41:06,300 different standards ? So it's a good 1010 00:41:06,300 --> 00:41:08,500 question . I don't think so . So if I 1011 00:41:08,500 --> 00:41:10,722 take a look at what Crozier was dealing 1012 00:41:10,722 --> 00:41:12,500 with and yeah , we had a lot of 1013 00:41:12,500 --> 00:41:14,333 questions at that time about the 1014 00:41:14,333 --> 00:41:16,278 transmission of asymptomatic cases 1015 00:41:16,278 --> 00:41:18,500 would be a good example in highly Viers 1016 00:41:18,500 --> 00:41:20,667 behaved . But what we surely knew , we 1017 00:41:20,667 --> 00:41:22,940 surely knew that anybody that tested 1018 00:41:22,940 --> 00:41:24,996 positive had to be isolated . And we 1019 00:41:24,996 --> 00:41:27,051 were doing that . And we surely knew 1020 00:41:27,051 --> 00:41:29,051 that anybody that came in contact , 1021 00:41:29,051 --> 00:41:31,162 that anybody would positive had to be 1022 00:41:31,162 --> 00:41:33,162 quarantined and that we surely knew 1023 00:41:33,162 --> 00:41:33,120 that we're in a better place getting 1024 00:41:33,120 --> 00:41:35,120 those people off the ship . So even 1025 00:41:35,120 --> 00:41:37,231 given what we didn't understand about 1026 00:41:37,231 --> 00:41:39,820 Cove it , we understood that . And so , 1027 00:41:40,040 --> 00:41:43,850 you know , commanders , uh , had have 1028 00:41:43,850 --> 00:41:46,072 been another commander , whether it was 1029 00:41:46,072 --> 00:41:47,850 a strike commander or or ship's 1030 00:41:47,850 --> 00:41:49,961 commander , I think we wouldn't be in 1031 00:41:49,961 --> 00:41:52,750 this position right now . Next question 1032 00:41:52,750 --> 00:41:54,806 is for the secretary . So one of the 1033 00:41:54,806 --> 00:41:57,028 biggest pieces of fallout from all this 1034 00:41:57,028 --> 00:41:58,861 waas , of course , former acting 1035 00:41:58,861 --> 00:42:01,028 secretary , movies , behavior and sort 1036 00:42:01,028 --> 00:42:03,028 of attention that that created with 1037 00:42:03,028 --> 00:42:02,550 sailors throughout the Navy , but 1038 00:42:02,560 --> 00:42:04,616 particularly on the TR . So now that 1039 00:42:04,616 --> 00:42:06,671 you're in this position in your it's 1040 00:42:06,671 --> 00:42:08,782 time to smooth that over what kind of 1041 00:42:08,782 --> 00:42:10,727 plan do you have to get out to the 1042 00:42:10,727 --> 00:42:10,350 fleet and kind of heal that 1043 00:42:10,360 --> 00:42:12,527 relationship between sailors and their 1044 00:42:12,527 --> 00:42:14,940 civilian secretary ? Thank you for that 1045 00:42:14,940 --> 00:42:17,162 question . I've been in the job . Now , 1046 00:42:17,162 --> 00:42:19,496 this is the conclusion of my third week . 1047 00:42:19,750 --> 00:42:21,861 I've already had the opportunity Teoh 1048 00:42:21,861 --> 00:42:24,280 visit Ah , with our sailors and Marines 1049 00:42:24,280 --> 00:42:26,860 twice . Um , this week I didn't get out 1050 00:42:26,870 --> 00:42:29,092 because we're in the midst of some deep 1051 00:42:29,092 --> 00:42:31,810 budget discussions . But I don't think 1052 00:42:31,810 --> 00:42:34,300 there is any more important role as a 1053 00:42:34,300 --> 00:42:37,750 secretary then assuring the men and 1054 00:42:37,750 --> 00:42:40,020 women of the Navy that there is a 1055 00:42:40,030 --> 00:42:42,300 steady and firm leadership of their 1056 00:42:42,300 --> 00:42:45,340 department . I've really enjoyed thes 1057 00:42:45,340 --> 00:42:47,396 visits . I flew aboard the Harry S . 1058 00:42:47,396 --> 00:42:49,451 Truman on my fourth day in the job , 1059 00:42:49,520 --> 00:42:51,576 and last week I went down aboard the 1060 00:42:51,576 --> 00:42:54,060 Ford as well as over to any Assoc Anna 1061 00:42:54,510 --> 00:42:57,040 to visit our sailors . And I can tell 1062 00:42:57,040 --> 00:42:58,984 you that the morale of the men and 1063 00:42:58,984 --> 00:43:01,770 women is very good , and I think we can 1064 00:43:01,770 --> 00:43:03,992 put some of these incidents behind us , 1065 00:43:03,992 --> 00:43:05,992 especially now that we've concluded 1066 00:43:05,992 --> 00:43:08,640 this , we can move on , um , and focus 1067 00:43:08,640 --> 00:43:10,810 on what we need to focus on , and 1068 00:43:10,810 --> 00:43:13,150 that's readiness and being able , Teoh 1069 00:43:13,460 --> 00:43:15,738 appropriately defend the United States . 1070 00:43:16,310 --> 00:43:18,590 You've been sharing with them ? Yes . 1071 00:43:18,590 --> 00:43:20,757 So I talked a lot about culture . I've 1072 00:43:20,757 --> 00:43:24,380 talked a lot about our duty to those 1073 00:43:24,380 --> 00:43:27,190 that we serve with left and right . A 1074 00:43:27,190 --> 00:43:29,468 swell as those who have gone before us , 1075 00:43:29,468 --> 00:43:31,690 as well as that being reflective on who 1076 00:43:31,690 --> 00:43:33,579 we are to attract the sailors and 1077 00:43:33,579 --> 00:43:36,120 marines of the future . Um , I've also 1078 00:43:36,120 --> 00:43:38,700 reassured him of my intent to look out 1079 00:43:38,700 --> 00:43:40,644 for their best interests . Whether 1080 00:43:40,644 --> 00:43:42,756 that's to ensure they get the right , 1081 00:43:42,756 --> 00:43:45,680 um , resource is to do their jobs 1082 00:43:45,690 --> 00:43:47,960 appropriately , Aziz . Well is to 1083 00:43:47,960 --> 00:43:50,340 support them with the right type of 1084 00:43:50,340 --> 00:43:52,420 benefits and other things that we 1085 00:43:52,420 --> 00:43:55,710 provide them . Um , And then finally , 1086 00:43:55,910 --> 00:43:58,400 again , just reassuring them that we 1087 00:43:58,400 --> 00:44:01,850 understand . Ah , how demanding and 1088 00:44:01,850 --> 00:44:03,900 challenging role that they have , 1089 00:44:04,010 --> 00:44:06,390 whether they're at sea or assure , um , 1090 00:44:06,400 --> 00:44:08,400 it can be a very demanding thing to 1091 00:44:08,400 --> 00:44:10,456 serve in the uniform of our nation . 1092 00:44:10,456 --> 00:44:12,511 All right , mammogram will come next 1093 00:44:12,511 --> 00:44:14,511 high . Oh , just a follow up by the 1094 00:44:14,511 --> 00:44:16,400 idea of scope of command . So you 1095 00:44:16,400 --> 00:44:18,622 talked about Captain Crozier . Scope of 1096 00:44:18,622 --> 00:44:20,622 command . Can you talk a little bit 1097 00:44:20,622 --> 00:44:22,844 more about what the scope of commitment 1098 00:44:22,844 --> 00:44:25,200 of responsibilities were for Admiral 1099 00:44:25,200 --> 00:44:27,422 Baker ? And then beyond that , it seems 1100 00:44:27,422 --> 00:44:29,644 like you're drawing a pretty thick line 1101 00:44:29,644 --> 00:44:31,533 around the strike group in and of 1102 00:44:31,533 --> 00:44:33,367 itself . What about the CTF 70 ? 1103 00:44:33,367 --> 00:44:35,533 Commander ? What findings did you have 1104 00:44:35,533 --> 00:44:38,020 that seven Fleet Commander may have I 1105 00:44:38,090 --> 00:44:40,540 had a responsibility or things that 1106 00:44:40,540 --> 00:44:42,651 they could have done differently . Or 1107 00:44:42,651 --> 00:44:44,596 did that stop inside the striper ? 1108 00:44:44,596 --> 00:44:48,590 Thank you . So I go , I go back to San . 1109 00:44:48,590 --> 00:44:51,300 Thanks . The question I go back to , uh , 1110 00:44:51,690 --> 00:44:55,020 his ship , his crew , his plan , his 1111 00:44:55,020 --> 00:44:57,550 plan to drive and execute all the other 1112 00:44:57,550 --> 00:45:01,100 echelons , their job to support . And I 1113 00:45:01,100 --> 00:45:03,211 gave examples of the things that were 1114 00:45:03,211 --> 00:45:05,378 going on across the theater to support 1115 00:45:05,378 --> 00:45:07,370 TR . And so , within the span of 1116 00:45:07,370 --> 00:45:09,481 control of those other commanders , I 1117 00:45:09,481 --> 00:45:11,910 saw positive action . I saw I saw a 1118 00:45:11,910 --> 00:45:14,021 great initiative . I saw great follow 1119 00:45:14,021 --> 00:45:17,160 up . We didn't necessarily . When When , 1120 00:45:17,160 --> 00:45:19,327 for example , Kroger's captain Crozier 1121 00:45:19,327 --> 00:45:23,000 sent that email tackle aka Lino . Um 1122 00:45:23,020 --> 00:45:25,380 he called them because he said , I 1123 00:45:25,380 --> 00:45:27,380 don't understand what else you need 1124 00:45:27,380 --> 00:45:30,050 that we're not providing at one or two 1125 00:45:30,050 --> 00:45:32,328 echelons or three echelons up from you . 1126 00:45:32,900 --> 00:45:35,067 And the response was to go faster with 1127 00:45:35,067 --> 00:45:37,178 the hotels again . I go back to never 1128 00:45:37,178 --> 00:45:39,440 check the fax . The hotel deal was done 1129 00:45:39,440 --> 00:45:42,570 six hours prior . Um , it was 1130 00:45:42,580 --> 00:45:46,280 I don't have a good good answer 1131 00:45:46,280 --> 00:45:49,210 for the exact why he sent that email . 1132 00:45:49,220 --> 00:45:52,090 We've never received a good answer with 1133 00:45:52,090 --> 00:45:54,840 respect to that . But I do think that I 1134 00:45:54,840 --> 00:45:57,880 have enough evidence within Croshere 1135 00:45:57,880 --> 00:46:00,070 Baker's span of control . A question , 1136 00:46:00,070 --> 00:46:02,280 their decision making get settled . 1137 00:46:02,860 --> 00:46:05,193 Thank you . Question for a Memorial Day . 1138 00:46:05,470 --> 00:46:08,420 If Adam Davidson ultimately made the 1139 00:46:08,430 --> 00:46:11,790 decision to allow or 1140 00:46:11,800 --> 00:46:14,280 bury it to tell the fear of Roosevelt , 1141 00:46:14,290 --> 00:46:17,210 have the poor call Vietnam . Why is he 1142 00:46:17,210 --> 00:46:21,110 not being disciplined ? Because we 1143 00:46:21,110 --> 00:46:24,320 found no fault with the rationale to 1144 00:46:24,320 --> 00:46:26,860 make the decision to go in a port . The 1145 00:46:26,870 --> 00:46:29,010 earlier you had mentioned something 1146 00:46:29,010 --> 00:46:31,560 about going to Vietnam during this Kobe 1147 00:46:31,570 --> 00:46:33,870 pandemic , some a little unclear on 1148 00:46:33,870 --> 00:46:36,092 that , but the same time you're holding 1149 00:46:36,092 --> 00:46:38,203 the captain to a higher standard than 1150 00:46:38,203 --> 00:46:40,130 the person who sent his ship into 1151 00:46:40,140 --> 00:46:43,210 Vietnam . Why ? I disagree . So the 1152 00:46:43,210 --> 00:46:45,840 decision the decision on the port visit 1153 00:46:45,840 --> 00:46:49,310 was made a week before the wh . Joe 1154 00:46:49,310 --> 00:46:51,960 declared covert a pandemic . At the 1155 00:46:51,960 --> 00:46:54,670 time they made the port visit the 1156 00:46:54,670 --> 00:46:56,781 Department of State . Travel advisory 1157 00:46:56,781 --> 00:46:59,320 level is level one . No prick ought . 1158 00:46:59,320 --> 00:47:01,820 No additional precautions required . We 1159 00:47:01,820 --> 00:47:04,620 took a look at several . We did not 1160 00:47:04,620 --> 00:47:06,842 make a decision to make that port visit 1161 00:47:06,842 --> 00:47:08,731 until the day before We exhausted 1162 00:47:08,731 --> 00:47:11,010 several means . Andi . Sources of 1163 00:47:11,010 --> 00:47:13,170 information before he made it 1164 00:47:13,170 --> 00:47:15,392 termination . Put that ship in a port . 1165 00:47:15,392 --> 00:47:17,614 We had no positive cases in Danang . As 1166 00:47:17,614 --> 00:47:19,920 a good example . The Bunker hill was 1167 00:47:19,920 --> 00:47:22,010 pure side . We've had zero positive 1168 00:47:22,010 --> 00:47:24,830 cases on that cruiser . Well , one last 1169 00:47:24,830 --> 00:47:27,320 one cruciate bearing with me . Adam 1170 00:47:27,350 --> 00:47:30,350 Davidson made the decision to send the 1171 00:47:30,360 --> 00:47:32,249 Gerald the theater , Roosevelt to 1172 00:47:32,249 --> 00:47:34,910 Vietnam and the sailor died . How is 1173 00:47:34,910 --> 00:47:37,132 this not a case of difference banks for 1174 00:47:37,132 --> 00:47:39,700 different ranks ? I So we took a look 1175 00:47:39,700 --> 00:47:41,922 at that decision and going to go in the 1176 00:47:41,922 --> 00:47:44,090 port . We found that that decision is 1177 00:47:44,090 --> 00:47:46,410 sound . We lay all this out , all the 1178 00:47:46,410 --> 00:47:48,570 evidence that I just , uh I've just 1179 00:47:48,570 --> 00:47:50,459 provided off the top of my head . 1180 00:47:50,459 --> 00:47:52,900 There's additional information that led 1181 00:47:52,900 --> 00:47:54,956 us to conclude that that was a sound 1182 00:47:54,956 --> 00:47:57,230 decision that risk was adequately 1183 00:47:57,690 --> 00:48:00,190 considered and mitigated by a lot of 1184 00:48:00,190 --> 00:48:02,134 precautions that we that we put in 1185 00:48:02,134 --> 00:48:04,200 place testing equipment , medical 1186 00:48:04,200 --> 00:48:07,020 experts , testing symptoms of the crew 1187 00:48:07,020 --> 00:48:09,070 on and off the ship immediately 1188 00:48:09,070 --> 00:48:11,126 securing liberty . When we did found 1189 00:48:11,126 --> 00:48:12,959 out that they could have been in 1190 00:48:12,959 --> 00:48:14,792 contact with somebody in a hotel 1191 00:48:14,792 --> 00:48:17,130 getting underway within 24 hours . So 1192 00:48:17,250 --> 00:48:19,361 there's a number of things that Advil 1193 00:48:19,361 --> 00:48:21,472 Davis , who was winning off that were 1194 00:48:21,472 --> 00:48:24,610 that were that were justified . I think 1195 00:48:24,880 --> 00:48:27,158 that that will be the test of scrutiny . 1196 00:48:27,370 --> 00:48:29,259 All right , well , take two final 1197 00:48:29,259 --> 00:48:31,148 questions from the phones Tonique 1198 00:48:31,148 --> 00:48:33,370 Apache or your first high end looking . 1199 00:48:33,370 --> 00:48:36,410 You hear me , Admiral ? I want to check 1200 00:48:36,410 --> 00:48:38,577 one thing . Is it fair to say that had 1201 00:48:38,577 --> 00:48:40,632 not Secretary esperan pushed back on 1202 00:48:40,632 --> 00:48:42,854 your original investigation , you would 1203 00:48:42,854 --> 00:48:45,380 not have done the deeper dive ? I can't 1204 00:48:45,380 --> 00:48:48,990 say that . And so my discussions after 1205 00:48:48,990 --> 00:48:50,940 I made I made my recommendation to 1206 00:48:50,940 --> 00:48:53,160 Secretary make fear acting secretary 1207 00:48:53,160 --> 00:48:55,980 McPherson and the only communications I 1208 00:48:55,980 --> 00:48:58,147 had after making my recommendation , I 1209 00:48:58,147 --> 00:49:00,970 I did present my findings to Secretary 1210 00:49:00,970 --> 00:49:03,460 Esper . At the time , he did not agree 1211 00:49:03,460 --> 00:49:05,890 or disagree with my presentation . It 1212 00:49:05,890 --> 00:49:08,810 was the following ah week when I met 1213 00:49:08,820 --> 00:49:11,880 with Acting Secretary McPherson when he 1214 00:49:11,880 --> 00:49:13,658 directed me to conduct a deeper 1215 00:49:13,660 --> 00:49:16,070 investigation because he thought that 1216 00:49:16,070 --> 00:49:18,181 there might be more to the story than 1217 00:49:18,181 --> 00:49:20,403 the narrowly focused investigation that 1218 00:49:20,403 --> 00:49:22,750 were originally directed to do a time 1219 00:49:22,760 --> 00:49:25,200 secretary . McPherson thought that my 1220 00:49:25,920 --> 00:49:27,990 that my recommendations were sound 1221 00:49:27,990 --> 00:49:30,440 based on the facts and the facts that I 1222 00:49:30,640 --> 00:49:32,530 the case that I the case that I 1223 00:49:32,530 --> 00:49:34,990 presented the determination that I made 1224 00:49:35,080 --> 00:49:37,750 off the facts that I reviewed in both 1225 00:49:37,750 --> 00:49:39,917 of these investigations . I've come to 1226 00:49:39,917 --> 00:49:41,917 my conclusions based on the facts . 1227 00:49:43,670 --> 00:49:45,781 Was the original investigation rushed 1228 00:49:45,781 --> 00:49:48,270 those in retrospection ? She just have 1229 00:49:48,270 --> 00:49:51,630 waited course , given a 1230 00:49:51,860 --> 00:49:54,310 secretary , Braithwaite captured very 1231 00:49:54,310 --> 00:49:56,430 well given a choice . Yes , we should 1232 00:49:56,430 --> 00:49:58,263 have been a We should have did a 1233 00:49:58,263 --> 00:50:00,486 broader investigation . Um , you know , 1234 00:50:00,486 --> 00:50:02,708 with the time we were looking at a very 1235 00:50:02,708 --> 00:50:04,763 narrowly focused investigation , the 1236 00:50:04,763 --> 00:50:06,763 Navy was served better by a broader 1237 00:50:06,763 --> 00:50:08,819 investigation . I did not . Ah , and 1238 00:50:08,819 --> 00:50:10,986 nobody in the Navy pushed back in that 1239 00:50:10,986 --> 00:50:13,097 direction to look more deeply at this 1240 00:50:13,097 --> 00:50:15,097 issue . All right , last question . 1241 00:50:15,097 --> 00:50:17,041 Paul McLeary from breaking fence . 1242 00:50:22,230 --> 00:50:24,452 All right . My claim will come to you , 1243 00:50:24,452 --> 00:50:26,674 then . Here . All right . Thank you all 1244 00:50:26,674 --> 00:50:28,786 very much for your time today . Thank 1245 00:50:28,786 --> 00:50:27,870 you .