1 00:00:00,140 --> 00:00:02,473 Hello and welcome to this virtual event . 2 00:00:02,473 --> 00:00:04,362 That's the institute . My name is 3 00:00:04,362 --> 00:00:06,529 Rebecca . Higher if some senior fellow 4 00:00:06,529 --> 00:00:08,473 at Hudson and I am joined today by 5 00:00:08,473 --> 00:00:10,418 Doctor Marc J . Lewis , who is the 6 00:00:10,418 --> 00:00:12,251 director of defense research and 7 00:00:12,251 --> 00:00:14,084 engineering for modernization in 8 00:00:14,084 --> 00:00:16,196 Houston . For being here with us . We 9 00:00:16,196 --> 00:00:18,550 are going to talk about your 11 10 00:00:18,550 --> 00:00:20,870 priorities in your portfolio . We are 11 00:00:20,870 --> 00:00:23,550 going to focus on the top three , I 12 00:00:23,550 --> 00:00:25,494 believe , and you can feel free to 13 00:00:25,494 --> 00:00:27,661 correct me if I'm wrong there . Uh , I 14 00:00:27,661 --> 00:00:29,606 like to start off by talking about 15 00:00:29,606 --> 00:00:31,606 microelectronics , and then we will 16 00:00:31,606 --> 00:00:33,661 move into five G and the night My my 17 00:00:33,661 --> 00:00:35,960 intense , is to camp out a longer on 18 00:00:35,960 --> 00:00:38,670 the subject of hypersonic weapons of 19 00:00:38,670 --> 00:00:41,070 both offense and defense . So on 20 00:00:41,070 --> 00:00:43,660 microelectronics , you have said that 21 00:00:43,660 --> 00:00:45,850 we need to operate and develop trusted 22 00:00:45,850 --> 00:00:48,750 components in zero trust environments . 23 00:00:49,340 --> 00:00:51,618 Can you explain for us what that means ? 24 00:00:51,690 --> 00:00:53,912 Sure . So ? So , to be specific , we're 25 00:00:53,912 --> 00:00:55,920 not really looking at making the 26 00:00:55,920 --> 00:00:58,660 components themselves trusted . All 27 00:00:58,660 --> 00:01:01,130 right , What we're looking at doing is 28 00:01:01,130 --> 00:01:03,740 establishing the infrastructure and 29 00:01:03,740 --> 00:01:06,230 standards so that we can trust what 30 00:01:06,230 --> 00:01:08,341 comes out of whatever microelectronic 31 00:01:08,341 --> 00:01:10,397 components were using . So by way of 32 00:01:10,397 --> 00:01:12,397 explanation , Let me Let me kind of 33 00:01:12,397 --> 00:01:14,619 explain where we are now and then where 34 00:01:14,619 --> 00:01:17,990 we want to go . So today , um , we buy 35 00:01:18,020 --> 00:01:21,130 trusted electronic components from from 36 00:01:21,130 --> 00:01:23,352 what we think are of as trusted sources 37 00:01:23,352 --> 00:01:25,570 the trusted foundries and a trusted 38 00:01:25,580 --> 00:01:27,747 foundry . A foundry is a facility that 39 00:01:27,747 --> 00:01:30,950 manufacturers microelectronics . Um , 40 00:01:31,540 --> 00:01:33,596 they're very expensive facilities to 41 00:01:33,596 --> 00:01:35,429 build , take significant capital 42 00:01:35,429 --> 00:01:37,651 investment . Uh , not not only to build 43 00:01:37,651 --> 00:01:39,873 them , but to maintain them and to keep 44 00:01:39,873 --> 00:01:39,360 them state of the art . 45 00:01:39,370 --> 00:01:41,314 Microelectronics is an industry is 46 00:01:41,314 --> 00:01:43,203 always advancing . They're always 47 00:01:43,203 --> 00:01:45,092 looking at at ways to upgrade and 48 00:01:45,092 --> 00:01:47,314 update the products that they produce . 49 00:01:47,314 --> 00:01:50,050 In the trusted foundry model , you 50 00:01:50,340 --> 00:01:52,790 essentially establish one or several 51 00:01:52,790 --> 00:01:55,190 foundries where you have total control 52 00:01:55,190 --> 00:01:57,468 of the manufacturing process . That is , 53 00:01:57,520 --> 00:01:59,409 you control everything going in , 54 00:01:59,409 --> 00:02:01,353 everything going out , you control 55 00:02:01,353 --> 00:02:03,464 everything . Everyone who touches the 56 00:02:03,464 --> 00:02:05,520 microelectronics , you do background 57 00:02:05,520 --> 00:02:07,576 checks on everyone . You have fences 58 00:02:07,576 --> 00:02:07,300 and guards and gates surrounding your 59 00:02:07,300 --> 00:02:10,110 foundry . Um , it's a model that the 60 00:02:10,110 --> 00:02:11,943 United States Department defense 61 00:02:11,943 --> 00:02:15,250 embraced , uh , in the nineties and 62 00:02:15,740 --> 00:02:18,480 in large measure , Um , I think we can 63 00:02:18,480 --> 00:02:20,536 say it hasn't worked out very well , 64 00:02:20,536 --> 00:02:24,020 and I'll explain why so First , um , 65 00:02:24,030 --> 00:02:26,260 the department offense is a relatively 66 00:02:26,260 --> 00:02:28,340 small purchaser of electron ICS 67 00:02:28,340 --> 00:02:30,890 compared to the global market . Unlike 68 00:02:30,970 --> 00:02:33,248 aircraft carriers were the only buyers , 69 00:02:33,540 --> 00:02:35,580 Um , and you know much , many other 70 00:02:35,580 --> 00:02:38,450 technologies directed energy and ah , 71 00:02:38,600 --> 00:02:41,170 and parts of space . The department 72 00:02:41,170 --> 00:02:43,337 defense is just a couple of percentage 73 00:02:43,337 --> 00:02:46,670 of the total microelectronics by , and 74 00:02:46,680 --> 00:02:48,680 the result is that it's it's really 75 00:02:48,680 --> 00:02:50,791 hard for industry to build a business 76 00:02:50,791 --> 00:02:52,902 case solely based on the needs of the 77 00:02:52,902 --> 00:02:55,150 department defense . So what we've 78 00:02:55,150 --> 00:02:57,261 tended to see happen is the companies 79 00:02:57,261 --> 00:02:59,428 that have have have gone down the path 80 00:02:59,428 --> 00:03:01,761 of establishing these trusted foundries . 81 00:03:01,761 --> 00:03:03,761 I found it . It's very difficult to 82 00:03:03,761 --> 00:03:05,928 make the case toe , continue to update 83 00:03:05,928 --> 00:03:08,094 and upgrade and make sure that they're 84 00:03:08,094 --> 00:03:10,317 at the state of the art . So the result 85 00:03:10,317 --> 00:03:10,200 has been that at the department , 86 00:03:10,200 --> 00:03:12,089 defense is not buying parts , not 87 00:03:12,089 --> 00:03:14,311 buying components that are state of the 88 00:03:14,311 --> 00:03:16,422 art . Some cases they're a generation 89 00:03:16,422 --> 00:03:18,422 or two behind , so that's a problem 90 00:03:18,422 --> 00:03:20,644 right there . The other problem is that 91 00:03:20,644 --> 00:03:22,533 it creates a vulnerability in the 92 00:03:22,533 --> 00:03:24,756 supply chain because if you've only got 93 00:03:24,756 --> 00:03:26,644 one or two trusted sources , then 94 00:03:26,644 --> 00:03:28,811 suddenly if those sources disappears , 95 00:03:28,811 --> 00:03:30,756 thought manufacturing for whatever 96 00:03:30,756 --> 00:03:32,644 reason , well , obviously it into 97 00:03:32,644 --> 00:03:34,644 interferes with the supply of those 98 00:03:34,644 --> 00:03:36,922 components into the department offense . 99 00:03:36,922 --> 00:03:39,089 But there's 1/3 part of this that that 100 00:03:39,089 --> 00:03:38,450 we're very concerned about as well . 101 00:03:39,240 --> 00:03:41,670 And that is it . The whole philosophy 102 00:03:41,670 --> 00:03:44,360 trusted foundries can lead to a false 103 00:03:44,360 --> 00:03:46,638 sense of security . I think we've seen , 104 00:03:46,790 --> 00:03:50,110 um , unfortunately had several examples 105 00:03:50,110 --> 00:03:52,054 where we realize that our greatest 106 00:03:52,054 --> 00:03:54,470 intelligence vulnerabilities sometimes 107 00:03:54,470 --> 00:03:56,526 coming from the insider threat , you 108 00:03:56,526 --> 00:03:58,581 know , think about the Snowden is of 109 00:03:58,581 --> 00:04:00,581 the world who are inside . We think 110 00:04:00,581 --> 00:04:02,414 they're trusted . We've done the 111 00:04:02,414 --> 00:04:01,750 background checks , we've done the 112 00:04:01,750 --> 00:04:03,972 background searches . Then we found out 113 00:04:03,972 --> 00:04:05,806 No , actually , they represented 114 00:04:05,806 --> 00:04:08,028 vulnerability . And so when you go down 115 00:04:08,028 --> 00:04:09,861 the path of a of a fully trusted 116 00:04:09,861 --> 00:04:12,180 facility , you run the risk of frankly 117 00:04:12,180 --> 00:04:14,291 fooling yourself into thinking you've 118 00:04:14,291 --> 00:04:17,430 got You've got secure capabilities when 119 00:04:17,430 --> 00:04:19,541 in fact you don't . You could often , 120 00:04:19,541 --> 00:04:21,097 you know , miss the biggest 121 00:04:21,097 --> 00:04:23,319 vulnerability . So the approach that we 122 00:04:23,319 --> 00:04:25,208 are pursuing , the one that we're 123 00:04:25,208 --> 00:04:27,374 interested in in our office is what we 124 00:04:27,374 --> 00:04:29,430 call the zero trust approach , where 125 00:04:29,430 --> 00:04:31,374 you no longer depend on guards and 126 00:04:31,374 --> 00:04:31,040 fences and gates and guns and 127 00:04:31,040 --> 00:04:34,410 background checks . Instead , you first 128 00:04:34,420 --> 00:04:36,820 by commercial components that you're 129 00:04:36,830 --> 00:04:38,774 always at state of the art so that 130 00:04:38,774 --> 00:04:40,941 you're leveraging the investments that 131 00:04:40,941 --> 00:04:43,052 are being made in the commercial side 132 00:04:43,052 --> 00:04:45,274 and then use various techniques again , 133 00:04:45,274 --> 00:04:48,050 standards the protocols that you build 134 00:04:48,050 --> 00:04:49,939 in the way you handle the data to 135 00:04:49,939 --> 00:04:53,060 ensure yourself that the parts that 136 00:04:53,060 --> 00:04:55,227 you're buying that you're putting into 137 00:04:55,227 --> 00:04:57,338 your into your your systems , they're 138 00:04:57,338 --> 00:04:59,504 doing what you think they're doing and 139 00:04:59,504 --> 00:05:01,227 you're protecting the data and 140 00:05:01,227 --> 00:05:03,560 protecting the information in many ways . 141 00:05:03,560 --> 00:05:06,500 Old Ron analogy to To the cyber defense 142 00:05:06,500 --> 00:05:08,860 world You know , early cyber efforts 143 00:05:08,860 --> 00:05:11,410 were focused in large measure toe kind 144 00:05:11,410 --> 00:05:13,521 of building cyber fences , you know , 145 00:05:13,521 --> 00:05:15,743 establishing a if you will , ah , cyber 146 00:05:15,743 --> 00:05:17,854 firewall and then convincing yourself 147 00:05:17,854 --> 00:05:19,910 that everything inside the fence was 148 00:05:19,910 --> 00:05:22,077 safe and secure and everything outside 149 00:05:22,077 --> 00:05:24,243 the fence was was questionable . We've 150 00:05:24,243 --> 00:05:23,850 realized that doesn't work very well , 151 00:05:24,240 --> 00:05:26,890 And and so just as the cybersecurity 152 00:05:26,890 --> 00:05:29,057 world has moved on , we think that the 153 00:05:29,057 --> 00:05:31,168 microelectronics world has to move on 154 00:05:31,168 --> 00:05:33,410 as well . That's great . Thank you for 155 00:05:33,410 --> 00:05:35,940 that . Um , let's let's talk a little 156 00:05:35,940 --> 00:05:39,380 bit about five G again if we could If 157 00:05:39,380 --> 00:05:43,150 you could explain on five G uh , 158 00:05:44,090 --> 00:05:46,034 why this is so important . I think 159 00:05:46,034 --> 00:05:48,146 sometimes we can assume your audience 160 00:05:48,146 --> 00:05:47,980 knows that we're talking about here . 161 00:05:48,110 --> 00:05:50,221 Why is so important as we look at the 162 00:05:50,221 --> 00:05:52,332 national defense strategy for back to 163 00:05:52,332 --> 00:05:54,499 major power competition ? We're really 164 00:05:54,499 --> 00:05:56,666 concerned about the Chinese and five G 165 00:05:56,666 --> 00:05:58,777 networks in particular , and why it's 166 00:05:58,777 --> 00:06:00,832 so important to the United States to 167 00:06:00,832 --> 00:06:02,999 have that right . So So you're right . 168 00:06:02,999 --> 00:06:02,870 We consider five you to be absolutely 169 00:06:02,870 --> 00:06:06,020 critical . And , you know , for your 170 00:06:06,020 --> 00:06:08,131 viewers who are maybe not as familiar 171 00:06:08,131 --> 00:06:10,353 with five g I'm the way I like to think 172 00:06:10,353 --> 00:06:13,120 about it is it's much more than just a 173 00:06:13,120 --> 00:06:16,130 slightly faster Internet , all right , 174 00:06:16,140 --> 00:06:19,150 it's It's much more data . It's much 175 00:06:19,150 --> 00:06:21,350 smaller . Layton , see , So it allows 176 00:06:21,350 --> 00:06:23,461 you to do so many more things than we 177 00:06:23,461 --> 00:06:25,461 can currently do with is the way we 178 00:06:25,461 --> 00:06:28,580 handle our data . Um , the way we 179 00:06:28,580 --> 00:06:30,802 interact , interconnect our systems the 180 00:06:30,802 --> 00:06:33,024 way we reconnect our various fighters , 181 00:06:33,024 --> 00:06:35,200 For example , um , are people in the 182 00:06:35,200 --> 00:06:37,422 field the sorts of capabilities that we 183 00:06:37,422 --> 00:06:40,940 can bring for training ? Um , the whole 184 00:06:40,950 --> 00:06:42,783 Internet of things where we have 185 00:06:42,783 --> 00:06:45,200 various components are linked , Ah , 186 00:06:45,210 --> 00:06:47,266 through information sharing that all 187 00:06:47,266 --> 00:06:49,266 starts become possible as we pursue 188 00:06:49,266 --> 00:06:51,043 these five G capabilities , and 189 00:06:51,043 --> 00:06:53,043 probably at this point , give me to 190 00:06:53,043 --> 00:06:55,210 point out we don't see five g is being 191 00:06:55,210 --> 00:06:57,266 a single goal post so we don't think 192 00:06:57,266 --> 00:06:59,099 you get some point . You declare 193 00:06:59,099 --> 00:07:01,321 victory . We've got five g . We won the 194 00:07:01,321 --> 00:07:03,432 race . Let's let's stop here We see a 195 00:07:03,432 --> 00:07:05,654 continue evolution . We talk about five 196 00:07:05,654 --> 00:07:07,877 g two next G because we see a continual 197 00:07:07,877 --> 00:07:10,043 development of increased data handling 198 00:07:10,043 --> 00:07:12,210 reduced late and see more kick bowling 199 00:07:12,210 --> 00:07:11,530 assistant . Alright , So why is this 200 00:07:11,530 --> 00:07:15,220 important ? Well , we dont want to be 201 00:07:15,220 --> 00:07:17,442 able to operate in any environment . We 202 00:07:17,442 --> 00:07:19,331 want to be able to do information 203 00:07:19,331 --> 00:07:21,164 exchange in either a friendly or 204 00:07:21,164 --> 00:07:23,250 hostile information environment and 205 00:07:23,250 --> 00:07:25,361 five G is gonna be critical to that . 206 00:07:25,361 --> 00:07:27,880 Um , we need to have robust systems . 207 00:07:27,890 --> 00:07:29,890 We need to have systems that are in 208 00:07:29,890 --> 00:07:31,834 some cases , self healing that are 209 00:07:31,834 --> 00:07:33,779 interconnected because we see that 210 00:07:33,779 --> 00:07:33,720 information exchange is really at the 211 00:07:33,720 --> 00:07:35,720 heart of the battle of the future . 212 00:07:35,720 --> 00:07:37,776 It's that full conductivity , making 213 00:07:37,776 --> 00:07:39,831 sure our various weapons systems are 214 00:07:39,831 --> 00:07:41,998 connected . Make sure our services air 215 00:07:41,998 --> 00:07:44,109 connected , um , make best use of you 216 00:07:44,109 --> 00:07:46,164 know , our the sense is that we have 217 00:07:46,164 --> 00:07:48,276 available on the options that we have 218 00:07:48,276 --> 00:07:48,090 available to bring bring to the fight 219 00:07:48,340 --> 00:07:51,130 as we see five years being one of those 220 00:07:51,130 --> 00:07:53,352 enabling capabilities that factors into 221 00:07:53,352 --> 00:07:55,408 a lot of the work that we're talking 222 00:07:55,408 --> 00:07:57,463 about doing in fully network command 223 00:07:57,463 --> 00:07:59,686 control Communications is as one of our 224 00:07:59,686 --> 00:08:01,741 future modernization goals . Um , we 225 00:08:01,741 --> 00:08:03,852 think the United States has to lead , 226 00:08:03,852 --> 00:08:06,019 and by lead the United States needs to 227 00:08:06,019 --> 00:08:08,130 set the international standards . And 228 00:08:08,130 --> 00:08:09,963 we're taking the lesson from the 229 00:08:09,963 --> 00:08:11,908 previous generation for G . So the 230 00:08:11,908 --> 00:08:13,963 United States that an amazing job of 231 00:08:13,963 --> 00:08:16,130 leading the international's efforts in 232 00:08:16,130 --> 00:08:18,241 establishing the standards for four G 233 00:08:18,241 --> 00:08:20,352 and that put us and by us I mean none 234 00:08:20,352 --> 00:08:22,408 of the government but industry and a 235 00:08:22,408 --> 00:08:24,408 key in a key place for deciding the 236 00:08:24,408 --> 00:08:26,463 future of that technology will . Now 237 00:08:26,463 --> 00:08:28,686 we're seeing the same thing with five , 238 00:08:28,686 --> 00:08:30,852 and and frankly , we're seeing some of 239 00:08:30,852 --> 00:08:33,130 our pure competitors trying to step up . 240 00:08:33,130 --> 00:08:32,760 You mentioned China . So China , 241 00:08:32,760 --> 00:08:34,927 obviously is , is making a big play on 242 00:08:34,927 --> 00:08:37,093 the hardware side , but also in trying 243 00:08:37,093 --> 00:08:39,260 to set those international standards . 244 00:08:39,260 --> 00:08:41,371 And he who set so standards basically 245 00:08:41,371 --> 00:08:43,704 gets to decide what this all looks like . 246 00:08:43,704 --> 00:08:46,960 So we have ah , very robust program in 247 00:08:46,970 --> 00:08:49,026 five G . We're doing , for example , 248 00:08:49,026 --> 00:08:50,950 Siris of experiments at various 249 00:08:50,950 --> 00:08:53,330 military installations . I've got a 250 00:08:53,340 --> 00:08:55,562 technical director for five g . My Name 251 00:08:55,562 --> 00:08:57,896 of Joe Evans . Joe joined us from DARPA , 252 00:08:57,896 --> 00:09:00,007 and he's overseeing these experiments 253 00:09:00,007 --> 00:09:02,173 and one of the things about department 254 00:09:02,173 --> 00:09:02,010 defenses . It's It's easy first , to do 255 00:09:02,010 --> 00:09:03,677 these sort of laboratory type 256 00:09:03,677 --> 00:09:05,732 experiments . No military facilities 257 00:09:05,732 --> 00:09:07,843 are in some cases , the perfect Petri 258 00:09:07,843 --> 00:09:10,066 dish for doing these sorts of tests and 259 00:09:10,066 --> 00:09:12,121 experiments were doing . We're doing 260 00:09:12,121 --> 00:09:13,899 experiments it'll look at using 261 00:09:13,899 --> 00:09:16,010 resemble virtual reality for training 262 00:09:16,030 --> 00:09:18,086 enabled by five G . We're looking at 263 00:09:18,086 --> 00:09:20,141 spectrum sharing . That's one of our 264 00:09:20,141 --> 00:09:22,010 other key issues . Ah , as we go 265 00:09:22,010 --> 00:09:24,380 forward in five and we hope that the 266 00:09:24,380 --> 00:09:26,102 department fence can therefore 267 00:09:26,102 --> 00:09:28,047 essentially lead in these national 268 00:09:28,047 --> 00:09:30,269 efforts and help enable industry to not 269 00:09:30,269 --> 00:09:32,158 only meet the needs of department 270 00:09:32,158 --> 00:09:34,269 events , but but but the country as a 271 00:09:34,269 --> 00:09:38,050 whole . Great . I could 272 00:09:38,170 --> 00:09:40,420 I could to ask about three more follow 273 00:09:40,420 --> 00:09:42,309 ups on five G , but in the insert 274 00:09:42,309 --> 00:09:44,253 interest of time . Because I am so 275 00:09:44,253 --> 00:09:47,110 interested in talking a little bit 276 00:09:47,110 --> 00:09:49,000 hypersonic , both offensive and 277 00:09:49,000 --> 00:09:52,220 defensive plans for that , Then I'm 278 00:09:52,220 --> 00:09:54,164 gonna go ahead and just leave that 279 00:09:54,164 --> 00:09:57,150 there and turned now to hyper sonics . 280 00:09:57,820 --> 00:10:00,550 Um , you , I think , have been , um , 281 00:10:01,140 --> 00:10:03,840 very eloquent on explaining that what 282 00:10:03,840 --> 00:10:05,618 we want right now . If you want 283 00:10:05,618 --> 00:10:07,770 battlefield dominance when we're 284 00:10:07,770 --> 00:10:09,881 talking about major power competition 285 00:10:10,140 --> 00:10:13,920 and we've we lost that and some , 286 00:10:13,930 --> 00:10:17,090 uh , some domains in some areas on 287 00:10:17,100 --> 00:10:19,211 others , it's it's closed or it's too 288 00:10:19,211 --> 00:10:22,040 close for comfort , right ? Can you Can 289 00:10:22,040 --> 00:10:25,270 you talk about hypersonic ? Why ? Why 290 00:10:25,270 --> 00:10:27,050 do we care so much about these 291 00:10:27,050 --> 00:10:29,106 particular weapons systems ? And why 292 00:10:29,106 --> 00:10:32,180 the Russians and the Chinese again 293 00:10:32,180 --> 00:10:34,513 going back the natural defense strategy ? 294 00:10:34,513 --> 00:10:36,569 What ? Why ? Why is it so concerning 295 00:10:36,569 --> 00:10:38,570 that those that those two countries 296 00:10:38,570 --> 00:10:40,910 have invested so heavily in this 297 00:10:40,910 --> 00:10:43,021 particular kind of weapons system and 298 00:10:43,021 --> 00:10:45,132 why it matters that the United States 299 00:10:45,132 --> 00:10:47,250 hasn't and why it matters , that we 300 00:10:47,250 --> 00:10:49,472 needed me to move pretty quickly out on 301 00:10:49,472 --> 00:10:51,194 this particular capabilities ? 302 00:10:51,194 --> 00:10:53,250 Absolutely . So So , our interest in 303 00:10:53,250 --> 00:10:55,472 hyper Sonics really comes about because 304 00:10:55,472 --> 00:10:57,480 we're interested in penetrating for 305 00:10:57,480 --> 00:10:59,750 long range is with 306 00:11:00,740 --> 00:11:04,650 with tremendous resiliency , right way 307 00:11:04,650 --> 00:11:06,928 want to be able to reach out and touch , 308 00:11:07,140 --> 00:11:11,090 um , potential adversaries . Um , um , 309 00:11:11,100 --> 00:11:14,650 be able to survive , uh , in doing that . 310 00:11:15,240 --> 00:11:17,480 And so So we think hypersonic gives us 311 00:11:17,490 --> 00:11:19,601 gives us that capability , you know , 312 00:11:19,601 --> 00:11:21,768 is that sometimes we joke in my office 313 00:11:21,768 --> 00:11:23,934 if we thought jellyfish would allow us 314 00:11:23,934 --> 00:11:25,990 to travel , you know , 1000 nautical 315 00:11:25,990 --> 00:11:28,046 miles Ah , and and and and and be be 316 00:11:28,046 --> 00:11:29,768 unstoppable . We'd be pursuing 317 00:11:29,768 --> 00:11:31,934 jellyfish , but we don't We think it's 318 00:11:31,934 --> 00:11:31,690 hyper sonics . And what is it about 319 00:11:31,690 --> 00:11:33,912 hypersonic settle ? Let's let's just do 320 00:11:33,912 --> 00:11:36,079 that . Well , hyper Sonics actually is 321 00:11:36,079 --> 00:11:38,301 often , ah , thought of only as speed . 322 00:11:38,301 --> 00:11:40,134 But it's actually combination of 323 00:11:40,134 --> 00:11:41,857 several things its speed , its 324 00:11:41,857 --> 00:11:43,857 maneuverability . And then it's the 325 00:11:43,857 --> 00:11:45,968 altitude . So trajectories with which 326 00:11:45,968 --> 00:11:47,968 these systems operate , so speed is 327 00:11:47,968 --> 00:11:50,079 important . Speed gives you Ah , pity 328 00:11:50,079 --> 00:11:52,246 of action gives you a quick response . 329 00:11:52,246 --> 00:11:54,412 It also challenges your adversary . It 330 00:11:54,412 --> 00:11:56,023 allows you to get inside the 331 00:11:56,023 --> 00:11:58,190 adversaries . You dilute the observe , 332 00:11:58,190 --> 00:12:00,246 Orient , decide and act loop that we 333 00:12:00,246 --> 00:12:02,579 talked about frequently in the Pentagon . 334 00:12:02,579 --> 00:12:04,746 Right . As we're flying at Mach five , 335 00:12:04,746 --> 00:12:06,857 you're traveling at hypersonic speeds 336 00:12:06,857 --> 00:12:06,470 Mach five . You're covering about a 337 00:12:06,470 --> 00:12:09,400 mile of second , so that doesn't give 338 00:12:09,400 --> 00:12:11,570 your potential adversary a lot of time 339 00:12:11,570 --> 00:12:13,570 to figure out what you are beside . 340 00:12:13,570 --> 00:12:15,681 That you're coming and then take some 341 00:12:15,681 --> 00:12:17,903 action , decide what you're planning on 342 00:12:17,903 --> 00:12:17,350 doing and take some corrective action . 343 00:12:18,610 --> 00:12:20,832 So speed is essential . Maneuverability 344 00:12:20,832 --> 00:12:22,999 is also really important . So we build 345 00:12:22,999 --> 00:12:25,730 hypersonic systems today , every I C B 346 00:12:25,730 --> 00:12:27,810 m that's reentering for space is 347 00:12:27,810 --> 00:12:29,977 traveling at hypersonic speeds . Every 348 00:12:29,977 --> 00:12:31,866 spacecraft , you know , the space 349 00:12:31,866 --> 00:12:34,088 shuttle came in hypersonic speeds , but 350 00:12:34,088 --> 00:12:33,910 we talk about hyper sciences . It's 351 00:12:33,910 --> 00:12:35,799 really a shorthand for hypersonic 352 00:12:35,880 --> 00:12:38,460 inside the atmosphere . So systems that 353 00:12:38,460 --> 00:12:40,627 would use aerodynamics for maneuvering 354 00:12:40,627 --> 00:12:42,627 so that the trajectory becomes less 355 00:12:42,627 --> 00:12:44,849 predictable . All right , So it again , 356 00:12:44,849 --> 00:12:47,071 harder to stop . And then finally , the 357 00:12:47,071 --> 00:12:46,990 trajectory . So hypersonic systems , 358 00:12:46,990 --> 00:12:49,212 because during the atmosphere they wind 359 00:12:49,212 --> 00:12:51,101 up being in a sweet spot at their 360 00:12:51,101 --> 00:12:53,046 relatively hard to detect from the 361 00:12:53,046 --> 00:12:55,268 ground . But they can also be difficult 362 00:12:55,268 --> 00:12:57,546 detect from higher altitude from space . 363 00:12:57,546 --> 00:12:59,712 Not impossible , by the way , but more 364 00:12:59,712 --> 00:13:01,879 difficult . So those attributes coming 365 00:13:01,879 --> 00:13:03,823 together , we believe , produced a 366 00:13:03,823 --> 00:13:06,157 category a class of weapons system that , 367 00:13:06,157 --> 00:13:10,050 um is , uh , frankly , um , heart 368 00:13:10,050 --> 00:13:12,217 hard to counter . And that's why we're 369 00:13:12,217 --> 00:13:14,217 interested in also , that's why our 370 00:13:14,217 --> 00:13:16,106 potential adversaries AARP , your 371 00:13:16,106 --> 00:13:18,328 competitors are interested in as well . 372 00:13:18,328 --> 00:13:21,600 So why is this so important ? Um , I'll 373 00:13:21,600 --> 00:13:23,860 argue that ah , hypersonic tactical 374 00:13:23,860 --> 00:13:26,470 system suddenly has strategic 375 00:13:26,480 --> 00:13:28,530 implications . So if someone could 376 00:13:28,530 --> 00:13:31,380 build a tactical hypersonic weapon that 377 00:13:31,380 --> 00:13:33,720 could say , hold one of our carrier 378 00:13:33,720 --> 00:13:36,510 test forces at risk , then suddenly , 379 00:13:36,520 --> 00:13:38,687 suddenly they've got a tactical system 380 00:13:38,687 --> 00:13:40,853 which will , which can match our first 381 00:13:40,853 --> 00:13:43,400 class Navy without there having a first 382 00:13:43,400 --> 00:13:45,344 class . Think if they can hold our 383 00:13:45,344 --> 00:13:47,400 airfields at risk . If they can take 384 00:13:47,400 --> 00:13:49,567 out our aircraft before they ever take 385 00:13:49,567 --> 00:13:51,622 to the air , then they can with this 386 00:13:51,622 --> 00:13:54,110 tactical system applies strategic level 387 00:13:54,110 --> 00:13:56,332 capabilities against our first rate air 388 00:13:56,332 --> 00:13:58,554 force . So we we really do think it's a 389 00:13:58,554 --> 00:14:00,610 game changer . Um , there's another 390 00:14:00,610 --> 00:14:02,499 element of this , and that is for 391 00:14:02,499 --> 00:14:04,721 obviously for many decades , the United 392 00:14:04,721 --> 00:14:06,443 States has invested in stealth 393 00:14:06,443 --> 00:14:08,499 technology as being are leading edge 394 00:14:08,499 --> 00:14:10,554 defining technology . And there's no 395 00:14:10,554 --> 00:14:10,500 question that the stealth revolution 396 00:14:10,500 --> 00:14:12,722 was absolutely phenomenal . Book of the 397 00:14:12,722 --> 00:14:14,778 impact that self had and some of the 398 00:14:14,778 --> 00:14:16,667 conflict that we were involved in 399 00:14:16,667 --> 00:14:18,722 starting in the in the nineties with 400 00:14:18,722 --> 00:14:20,944 the first Gulf War , Um , Stealth lived 401 00:14:20,944 --> 00:14:23,278 up to all of its promises and then some . 402 00:14:23,278 --> 00:14:25,700 Well , entire world has now had three 403 00:14:25,700 --> 00:14:27,700 decades to see how we use stealth . 404 00:14:28,140 --> 00:14:30,140 They've been able develop their own 405 00:14:30,140 --> 00:14:32,140 stealth capabilities . They've been 406 00:14:32,140 --> 00:14:32,010 ableto think through how they would 407 00:14:32,010 --> 00:14:34,177 counter are our stealth capabilities , 408 00:14:34,177 --> 00:14:36,232 and so we no longer have that avenge 409 00:14:36,232 --> 00:14:39,590 that we once had . Um , so what's next ? 410 00:14:39,590 --> 00:14:41,760 Well , on a very simple level stealth 411 00:14:41,760 --> 00:14:45,400 means they can't see me . Um , if they 412 00:14:45,400 --> 00:14:47,400 conceive me anyway that I think the 413 00:14:47,400 --> 00:14:49,344 next step is the hypersonic step , 414 00:14:49,344 --> 00:14:51,511 which means they may be conceived me . 415 00:14:51,511 --> 00:14:53,511 But they'll see me a little bit too 416 00:14:53,511 --> 00:14:53,260 late to do anything . And if they try 417 00:14:53,260 --> 00:14:55,538 to do something , it will be extremely , 418 00:14:55,538 --> 00:14:57,450 extremely difficult . Something 419 00:14:57,460 --> 00:14:59,627 sometimes been accused of saying Speed 420 00:14:59,627 --> 00:15:02,460 is a new stealth Like , uh um , it's 421 00:15:02,460 --> 00:15:04,238 bit of a bit of a bit of a glib 422 00:15:04,238 --> 00:15:06,238 catchphrase , but I think there's a 423 00:15:06,238 --> 00:15:08,404 truth , the truth to that and that its 424 00:15:08,404 --> 00:15:11,120 next trend , I believe in in in weapons 425 00:15:11,120 --> 00:15:14,160 technology , Um , in terms of kind of a 426 00:15:14,160 --> 00:15:16,160 troubling aspect of this . So , you 427 00:15:16,160 --> 00:15:18,271 know , as as as your question alludes 428 00:15:18,271 --> 00:15:20,650 to , we've seen our competitors invest 429 00:15:20,650 --> 00:15:22,650 very , very heavily in hypersonic . 430 00:15:22,650 --> 00:15:24,910 It's , um , I I've been quoted on 431 00:15:24,910 --> 00:15:27,077 occasions saying we did their homework 432 00:15:27,077 --> 00:15:29,077 for them . I mean , this is a field 433 00:15:29,077 --> 00:15:31,021 that we invented . Um , we did the 434 00:15:31,021 --> 00:15:32,854 fundamental work . I'm at the 19 435 00:15:32,854 --> 00:15:34,688 fifties . We did the fundamental 436 00:15:34,688 --> 00:15:36,799 research . We developed concepts . We 437 00:15:36,799 --> 00:15:39,021 did the experiments , we did the ground 438 00:15:39,021 --> 00:15:41,021 test . We did the first significant 439 00:15:41,021 --> 00:15:43,188 flight test , and then we kind of took 440 00:15:43,188 --> 00:15:45,077 our foot off the gas . We weren't 441 00:15:45,077 --> 00:15:47,188 moving at a sufficient pace , and and 442 00:15:47,188 --> 00:15:49,410 we did even worse because we produced a 443 00:15:49,410 --> 00:15:51,466 number of policy documents that that 444 00:15:51,466 --> 00:15:53,688 describe the attributes of hyper sonics 445 00:15:53,688 --> 00:15:53,420 and why I was so valuable to the future 446 00:15:53,420 --> 00:15:55,476 fight . And then we didn't listen to 447 00:15:55,476 --> 00:15:57,309 our own advice . And it gave our 448 00:15:57,309 --> 00:15:59,390 potential competitors a significant 449 00:15:59,390 --> 00:16:01,600 opportunity with with big investments 450 00:16:01,870 --> 00:16:03,981 to play , catch up and build build on 451 00:16:03,981 --> 00:16:05,981 our work . And so now we're in this 452 00:16:05,981 --> 00:16:08,320 situation where we are truly in a three 453 00:16:08,320 --> 00:16:11,220 way race and we feel that sense of like 454 00:16:11,270 --> 00:16:14,670 alacrity , right ? And on that point to , 455 00:16:14,900 --> 00:16:17,011 you know , it's not . Not because the 456 00:16:17,011 --> 00:16:19,122 United States has done something that 457 00:16:19,122 --> 00:16:20,733 has incited these other pure 458 00:16:20,733 --> 00:16:22,622 competitors toe , then go ahead , 459 00:16:22,622 --> 00:16:24,789 invest in these technologies . They're 460 00:16:24,789 --> 00:16:24,180 investing in these technologies because 461 00:16:24,180 --> 00:16:26,513 they see it in their national interests , 462 00:16:26,513 --> 00:16:28,940 and we're the ones that are behind . I 463 00:16:28,950 --> 00:16:31,006 thought this was interesting , too . 464 00:16:31,006 --> 00:16:33,228 You've been working on these issues and 465 00:16:33,228 --> 00:16:33,200 focusing on them . You're very familiar 466 00:16:33,200 --> 00:16:36,430 with the history of them . Um , what is 467 00:16:36,430 --> 00:16:38,541 different ? You have mentioned in the 468 00:16:38,541 --> 00:16:41,160 past that we have failed way we've 469 00:16:41,160 --> 00:16:43,382 invested in or we look that examine and 470 00:16:43,382 --> 00:16:44,938 done a lot of work on these 471 00:16:44,938 --> 00:16:47,104 technologies in the past , But then we 472 00:16:47,104 --> 00:16:49,271 failed to transition from research and 473 00:16:49,271 --> 00:16:51,850 development or from snt over two 474 00:16:51,860 --> 00:16:53,749 applications , weapons systems to 475 00:16:53,749 --> 00:16:55,971 actually get them . Field it . And then 476 00:16:55,971 --> 00:16:58,082 you said that really , that's changed 477 00:16:58,082 --> 00:17:00,320 today is different , and we really are 478 00:17:00,510 --> 00:17:02,750 serious this time about getting these 479 00:17:02,750 --> 00:17:04,861 things to the warfighter and to do it 480 00:17:04,861 --> 00:17:08,680 quickly . What has changed and how , 481 00:17:08,690 --> 00:17:10,912 practically speaking , is this going to 482 00:17:10,912 --> 00:17:12,801 be different ? So I think there's 483 00:17:12,801 --> 00:17:14,968 several things have changed the versus 484 00:17:15,020 --> 00:17:17,890 the personalities involved . Um uh , we 485 00:17:17,890 --> 00:17:19,946 have leadership now that understands 486 00:17:19,946 --> 00:17:21,779 the value and the impact of this 487 00:17:21,779 --> 00:17:24,490 technology . And although we had in the 488 00:17:24,490 --> 00:17:26,490 past some leaders who did recognise 489 00:17:26,490 --> 00:17:28,546 this , I think the consensus now the 490 00:17:28,546 --> 00:17:30,550 strong consensus is overwhelmingly 491 00:17:30,550 --> 00:17:32,661 supportive and understanding why this 492 00:17:32,661 --> 00:17:34,717 is an important technology . So that 493 00:17:34,717 --> 00:17:36,828 has changed . I think the other thing 494 00:17:36,828 --> 00:17:38,828 that has changed is our recognition 495 00:17:38,828 --> 00:17:40,994 that we are in a race . I , you know , 496 00:17:40,994 --> 00:17:43,161 report that reporting that came out of 497 00:17:43,161 --> 00:17:45,161 the intelligence community starting 498 00:17:45,161 --> 00:17:47,200 really in the early 20 tens , but 499 00:17:47,400 --> 00:17:49,960 peaking in the mid 2010 . Um , let us 500 00:17:49,960 --> 00:17:52,071 all to realize that we were , in some 501 00:17:52,071 --> 00:17:54,127 cases , resting on our laurels while 502 00:17:54,127 --> 00:17:56,390 other people were not , um , there was 503 00:17:56,390 --> 00:17:58,334 an element of humors to it that we 504 00:17:58,334 --> 00:18:00,446 thought we were so far ahead . And we 505 00:18:00,446 --> 00:18:02,557 were We were the ones developing this 506 00:18:02,557 --> 00:18:02,390 technology that no one could possibly 507 00:18:02,390 --> 00:18:04,930 hope to catch up to us . And I think , 508 00:18:04,940 --> 00:18:06,829 um , when when this story started 509 00:18:06,829 --> 00:18:08,551 getting getting out , we start 510 00:18:08,551 --> 00:18:10,730 understanding the level of investments 511 00:18:10,730 --> 00:18:12,841 overseas , especially in China . They 512 00:18:12,841 --> 00:18:14,952 haven't . They haven't been shy about 513 00:18:14,952 --> 00:18:17,008 it . You can go online . You can see 514 00:18:17,008 --> 00:18:19,174 YouTube videos out of China where they 515 00:18:19,174 --> 00:18:21,008 will show up the facilities that 516 00:18:21,008 --> 00:18:20,780 they've been building . You know , they 517 00:18:20,960 --> 00:18:23,071 did their their military parade where 518 00:18:23,071 --> 00:18:25,349 they're showing off their capabilities . 519 00:18:25,349 --> 00:18:27,349 So so that , I think , has been eye 520 00:18:27,349 --> 00:18:29,571 opening . And it has really changed the 521 00:18:29,571 --> 00:18:32,280 conversation . Yeah , um and , um and I 522 00:18:32,280 --> 00:18:34,502 would say to their , you know , there's 523 00:18:34,502 --> 00:18:36,502 a I think there's been a sea change 524 00:18:36,502 --> 00:18:38,613 politically . And how would you , the 525 00:18:38,613 --> 00:18:40,502 China , our relationship with the 526 00:18:40,502 --> 00:18:42,613 Chinese , how it's it's really been a 527 00:18:42,613 --> 00:18:44,280 policy of engagement now were 528 00:18:44,280 --> 00:18:46,336 understanding that , um , it is more 529 00:18:46,336 --> 00:18:48,502 perhaps adversarial than would be ? It 530 00:18:48,502 --> 00:18:50,558 wanted it to be over the many , many 531 00:18:50,558 --> 00:18:52,502 years , and so these these weapons 532 00:18:52,502 --> 00:18:54,502 systems are very problematic . I do 533 00:18:54,502 --> 00:18:56,336 want such I'm just a another , a 534 00:18:56,336 --> 00:18:58,447 different , more technical . He's , I 535 00:18:58,447 --> 00:19:00,780 think , would be useful for our viewers . 536 00:19:00,780 --> 00:19:02,724 The benefit for the United because 537 00:19:02,724 --> 00:19:04,780 we're still looking at what kinds of 538 00:19:04,780 --> 00:19:06,836 systems we're going t to develop and 539 00:19:06,836 --> 00:19:08,836 invest in . Um might have plenty of 540 00:19:08,836 --> 00:19:10,947 prototypes that don't never grow into 541 00:19:10,947 --> 00:19:13,058 more mature systems than that . We're 542 00:19:13,058 --> 00:19:12,580 trying to figure out what works best . 543 00:19:12,870 --> 00:19:14,481 Which ones fulfill different 544 00:19:14,481 --> 00:19:16,814 requirements that we that we still have . 545 00:19:17,060 --> 00:19:19,227 What is the difference between for the 546 00:19:19,227 --> 00:19:21,227 United States purposes ? What's the 547 00:19:21,227 --> 00:19:23,393 benefit of a hypersonic cruise missile 548 00:19:23,393 --> 00:19:25,282 versus a hypersonic boost ? Glide 549 00:19:25,282 --> 00:19:27,393 system , Right , So So you're exactly 550 00:19:27,393 --> 00:19:29,616 right that right now we've got a number 551 00:19:29,616 --> 00:19:31,671 of prototype programs and and I'd be 552 00:19:31,671 --> 00:19:31,650 surprised if each and every one of 553 00:19:31,650 --> 00:19:33,650 those prototype programs manifested 554 00:19:33,650 --> 00:19:35,539 itself finally , in a program , a 555 00:19:35,539 --> 00:19:38,640 record . Um , but I do generally 556 00:19:38,640 --> 00:19:40,751 categorised hyper sonics in those two 557 00:19:40,751 --> 00:19:42,973 systems . There the boost glide systems 558 00:19:42,973 --> 00:19:45,029 where you have a rocket based system 559 00:19:45,029 --> 00:19:47,251 that accelerates up to speed , and then 560 00:19:47,251 --> 00:19:49,418 what we call the air breathing systems 561 00:19:49,418 --> 00:19:51,529 where there is ah , essentially a jet 562 00:19:51,529 --> 00:19:53,696 engine , um , and and the way to think 563 00:19:53,696 --> 00:19:53,210 about is the following . All right , So , 564 00:19:53,640 --> 00:19:56,910 um , a a rocket is a divisive carries 565 00:19:57,040 --> 00:19:59,610 both its fuel and it's oxidizer on 566 00:19:59,610 --> 00:20:01,721 board , right ? So in order to make a 567 00:20:01,721 --> 00:20:03,721 rocket work , you combined fuel and 568 00:20:03,721 --> 00:20:05,832 oxidizer . They combust , they burn , 569 00:20:05,832 --> 00:20:07,999 they release energy . That energy goes 570 00:20:07,999 --> 00:20:10,166 into the exhaust products . That gives 571 00:20:10,166 --> 00:20:09,570 you an exhaust . Yet that gives you 572 00:20:09,570 --> 00:20:12,020 thrust that makes you go forward . A 573 00:20:12,020 --> 00:20:15,360 jet engine only has fuel on board . And 574 00:20:15,360 --> 00:20:18,550 then for the oxidizer it swallows air 575 00:20:18,760 --> 00:20:20,760 uses oxygen in the air to burn with 576 00:20:20,760 --> 00:20:23,090 fuel . So if I can swallow air , if I 577 00:20:23,300 --> 00:20:25,522 have an inlet hole in the front where I 578 00:20:25,522 --> 00:20:27,356 bring Aaron , that means I'm not 579 00:20:27,356 --> 00:20:29,300 carrying the oxygen with me . So I 580 00:20:29,300 --> 00:20:31,356 don't need the way to the few of the 581 00:20:31,356 --> 00:20:33,522 oxidizer . I don't need the way to the 582 00:20:33,522 --> 00:20:35,467 tanks to carry the oxidizer . That 583 00:20:35,467 --> 00:20:34,850 leads to a much more efficient 584 00:20:34,850 --> 00:20:36,739 propulsion system . It's just one 585 00:20:36,739 --> 00:20:38,906 example , you know . Ah , conventional 586 00:20:38,906 --> 00:20:41,072 airliners are obviously powered by jet 587 00:20:41,072 --> 00:20:43,294 engines . Jet engines have big inlets , 588 00:20:43,294 --> 00:20:45,406 air comes in , and the option of that 589 00:20:45,406 --> 00:20:47,572 air burns with the jet fuel inside the 590 00:20:47,572 --> 00:20:49,739 combust er as opposed to a rocket like 591 00:20:49,739 --> 00:20:52,300 on the space shuttle or ah , an Atlas 592 00:20:52,300 --> 00:20:54,467 five . We're all both the fuel and the 593 00:20:54,467 --> 00:20:56,800 oxidizer is stored in tanks . All right , 594 00:20:56,800 --> 00:20:58,633 so I think about the differences 595 00:20:58,633 --> 00:21:00,633 between those two systems . Rockets 596 00:21:00,633 --> 00:21:02,800 produce lots of thrust compared to the 597 00:21:02,800 --> 00:21:04,689 weight of the engine itself . Jet 598 00:21:04,689 --> 00:21:06,911 engines ? Not so much . But jet engines 599 00:21:06,911 --> 00:21:09,133 produced lots of thrust compared to the 600 00:21:09,133 --> 00:21:09,120 amount of weight of fuel they're 601 00:21:09,120 --> 00:21:11,730 consuming because they're not carrying 602 00:21:11,730 --> 00:21:13,841 that option with him . And that means 603 00:21:13,841 --> 00:21:16,008 you have no less . You're not carrying 604 00:21:16,008 --> 00:21:15,570 the way to the oxygen . You're not 605 00:21:15,570 --> 00:21:17,792 caring . Wayto thanks so it can lead to 606 00:21:17,792 --> 00:21:19,903 a more efficient design . If you want 607 00:21:19,903 --> 00:21:21,737 to travel a long distance in the 608 00:21:21,737 --> 00:21:23,681 atmosphere , you're obviously much 609 00:21:23,681 --> 00:21:25,792 better off with a jet engine . You're 610 00:21:25,792 --> 00:21:25,330 better off not trying to carry that 611 00:21:25,330 --> 00:21:27,441 option with you . You want to swallow 612 00:21:27,441 --> 00:21:29,663 it through an inlet . If you want to go 613 00:21:29,663 --> 00:21:31,552 into space , you obviously want a 614 00:21:31,552 --> 00:21:33,552 rocket because there's no oxygen in 615 00:21:33,552 --> 00:21:35,719 space , Right ? So those of the trades 616 00:21:35,719 --> 00:21:37,941 in the hypersonic realm we wind up kind 617 00:21:37,941 --> 00:21:39,997 of being on the boundary between air 618 00:21:39,997 --> 00:21:42,108 and space , and that's why we look at 619 00:21:42,108 --> 00:21:43,997 both systems . In the case of the 620 00:21:43,997 --> 00:21:46,052 rocket boost glide , we're investing 621 00:21:46,052 --> 00:21:48,219 all the energy in front . So we've got 622 00:21:48,219 --> 00:21:50,330 a rocket that burns fuel and oxidizer 623 00:21:50,330 --> 00:21:52,219 gets the system up to really fast 624 00:21:52,219 --> 00:21:54,386 speeds very quickly . And then a glide 625 00:21:54,386 --> 00:21:56,274 body weapon or some other systems 626 00:21:56,274 --> 00:21:58,219 separates and glides at hypersonic 627 00:21:58,219 --> 00:22:00,330 speed to the target , usually without 628 00:22:00,330 --> 00:22:02,552 any additional propulsion system . On a 629 00:22:02,552 --> 00:22:04,710 cruise missile side , we often get up 630 00:22:04,710 --> 00:22:06,766 to speed with a smaller rocket . But 631 00:22:06,766 --> 00:22:08,821 once it gets up the hypersonic speed 632 00:22:08,821 --> 00:22:10,932 the jet engine takes over and so it's 633 00:22:10,932 --> 00:22:13,154 continuing to provide thrust . Continue 634 00:22:13,154 --> 00:22:12,990 to power all through the atmosphere . 635 00:22:13,230 --> 00:22:15,452 Alright , what ? The difference is that 636 00:22:15,452 --> 00:22:17,452 in those technologies , well on the 637 00:22:17,452 --> 00:22:19,286 rocket boost glide , the biggest 638 00:22:19,286 --> 00:22:21,286 challenges I have toe overspeed the 639 00:22:21,286 --> 00:22:21,080 system , because I have to get up to a 640 00:22:21,080 --> 00:22:22,858 much higher speed , is I'm then 641 00:22:22,858 --> 00:22:25,080 bleeding off energy because I'm gliding 642 00:22:25,080 --> 00:22:27,247 the rest away . Down Haier speed means 643 00:22:27,247 --> 00:22:29,469 more heating . It means more stress for 644 00:22:29,469 --> 00:22:31,802 the materials on the air breathing site . 645 00:22:31,802 --> 00:22:33,469 For the jet engine side , the 646 00:22:33,469 --> 00:22:35,580 challenges are well , I need to build 647 00:22:35,580 --> 00:22:34,870 an engine . I need to build an engine 648 00:22:34,870 --> 00:22:37,148 which can swallow air through an inlet . 649 00:22:37,148 --> 00:22:39,259 I need to be able to inject fuel into 650 00:22:39,259 --> 00:22:41,481 that airstream , mixed it efficiently , 651 00:22:41,481 --> 00:22:43,648 burning quickly and produce thrust out 652 00:22:43,648 --> 00:22:45,814 the back , and that's that's also very 653 00:22:45,814 --> 00:22:47,537 difficult to dio . But the air 654 00:22:47,537 --> 00:22:49,703 breathing system applies that energy , 655 00:22:49,703 --> 00:22:51,926 if you will . It's constantly releasing 656 00:22:51,926 --> 00:22:51,650 that , and it's a more gradual release 657 00:22:51,650 --> 00:22:53,870 the energy . So if you look at the way 658 00:22:53,870 --> 00:22:55,703 those systems package , what you 659 00:22:55,703 --> 00:22:57,703 generally find is the air breathing 660 00:22:57,730 --> 00:22:59,508 systems , the everything cruise 661 00:22:59,508 --> 00:23:01,563 missiles package smaller . Are there 662 00:23:01,563 --> 00:23:03,786 more compact cause they're not carrying 663 00:23:03,786 --> 00:23:06,008 the option with that produces a smaller 664 00:23:06,008 --> 00:23:07,952 missile , so I get more of them on 665 00:23:07,952 --> 00:23:10,119 board , right ? They maybe don't go as 666 00:23:10,119 --> 00:23:12,230 far , but they've got these packaging 667 00:23:12,230 --> 00:23:14,230 advantages . The rocket boost glide 668 00:23:14,230 --> 00:23:16,286 systems . They go further , but they 669 00:23:16,286 --> 00:23:18,452 stress materials . They tend to stress 670 00:23:18,452 --> 00:23:20,619 the limits of our knowledge of how toe 671 00:23:20,619 --> 00:23:22,508 to construct these designs . Um , 672 00:23:22,508 --> 00:23:24,563 everything systems a little bit less 673 00:23:24,563 --> 00:23:26,786 maneuverable because I'm worrying about 674 00:23:26,786 --> 00:23:26,640 the way the errors behaving as it goes 675 00:23:26,640 --> 00:23:28,640 in the front of the engine that the 676 00:23:28,640 --> 00:23:30,696 rocket boost system . Once it starts 677 00:23:30,696 --> 00:23:33,029 gliding , I can bank and dive and glide . 678 00:23:33,029 --> 00:23:32,920 I don't care about the state of the air 679 00:23:32,920 --> 00:23:35,050 coming in front . So as I like to 680 00:23:35,050 --> 00:23:37,217 emphasize , these systems really don't 681 00:23:37,217 --> 00:23:39,494 compete there , actually complimentary . 682 00:23:39,640 --> 00:23:41,640 We want both of these . We want the 683 00:23:41,640 --> 00:23:43,696 everything cruise missiles . But you 684 00:23:43,696 --> 00:23:45,584 also want the boost glide systems 685 00:23:45,584 --> 00:23:47,418 because they each have their own 686 00:23:47,418 --> 00:23:49,640 benefits , their own drawbacks and used 687 00:23:49,640 --> 00:23:51,862 in combination . I think of them really 688 00:23:51,862 --> 00:23:53,973 is a high low mix , very much like we 689 00:23:53,973 --> 00:23:53,720 have the high low mix and fighters . He 690 00:23:53,720 --> 00:23:56,400 had 15 in the F 16 . So I think we need 691 00:23:56,400 --> 00:23:58,289 the high , low mix and hypersonic 692 00:23:58,289 --> 00:24:00,400 between the boost gliders and the air 693 00:24:00,400 --> 00:24:03,350 breathers . That's great . Um , I 694 00:24:03,740 --> 00:24:07,030 you you talked to you about the need . 695 00:24:07,170 --> 00:24:09,392 This has been a theme from the Pentagon 696 00:24:09,392 --> 00:24:11,503 as we moved forward Spectra Esper has 697 00:24:11,503 --> 00:24:13,503 made these made this point over and 698 00:24:13,503 --> 00:24:13,220 over and over again that they need to 699 00:24:13,220 --> 00:24:16,990 go fast . And , um and 700 00:24:17,000 --> 00:24:19,222 you just said that we need to embrace , 701 00:24:19,222 --> 00:24:21,930 uh , paraphrasing a higher degree of 702 00:24:21,940 --> 00:24:24,162 risk that there certainly rest . Forget 703 00:24:24,162 --> 00:24:26,218 it . We're not going to get it right 704 00:24:26,218 --> 00:24:28,273 right away , and we're going to have 705 00:24:28,273 --> 00:24:30,384 some kind of failures . But there's a 706 00:24:30,384 --> 00:24:30,190 difference . Doing good , there's good 707 00:24:30,190 --> 00:24:32,301 failures , and there's bad failures . 708 00:24:32,301 --> 00:24:34,301 And you didn't need to embrace this 709 00:24:34,301 --> 00:24:34,210 idea of having some good failures 710 00:24:34,210 --> 00:24:36,830 because we learn from them . Um , I 711 00:24:36,830 --> 00:24:39,110 want you to touch on that , and I also 712 00:24:39,110 --> 00:24:41,280 though it would be great then if you 713 00:24:41,280 --> 00:24:45,270 could think about going to that how How 714 00:24:45,270 --> 00:24:47,437 industry should be thinking about this 715 00:24:47,437 --> 00:24:49,603 Because you've talked about we need to 716 00:24:49,603 --> 00:24:51,548 go to scale . We need be producing 717 00:24:51,548 --> 00:24:51,320 these things that scale . But right now , 718 00:24:51,330 --> 00:24:53,274 we still don't really know exactly 719 00:24:53,274 --> 00:24:55,497 where we're gonna You know what ? Which 720 00:24:55,497 --> 00:24:57,552 some of these systems we're gonna go 721 00:24:57,552 --> 00:24:57,450 with that becomes very difficult , 722 00:24:57,450 --> 00:24:59,506 Especially as you think about supply 723 00:24:59,506 --> 00:25:01,506 chains and making sure that we have 724 00:25:01,506 --> 00:25:03,506 supply chains prepared to be ableto 725 00:25:03,506 --> 00:25:06,040 ramp up and produce that feel . So , uh , 726 00:25:06,050 --> 00:25:08,900 so testing and embracing failure . And 727 00:25:08,900 --> 00:25:11,011 then how can we be preparing for this 728 00:25:11,011 --> 00:25:13,067 and how you're thinking about supply 729 00:25:13,067 --> 00:25:15,011 chains , right ? So you're exactly 730 00:25:15,011 --> 00:25:16,956 right that we need to be less risk 731 00:25:16,956 --> 00:25:19,178 averse , and that doesn't mean way seek 732 00:25:19,178 --> 00:25:21,233 to maximise risk . But it also means 733 00:25:21,233 --> 00:25:23,400 we're not afraid to take risks . We're 734 00:25:23,400 --> 00:25:25,511 not afraid to fail as long as they're 735 00:25:25,511 --> 00:25:27,567 what I term noble failures . Right ? 736 00:25:27,567 --> 00:25:26,750 There are dumb failures and noble 737 00:25:26,750 --> 00:25:28,694 failures . Noble failures are when 738 00:25:28,694 --> 00:25:30,694 something didn't work . But but you 739 00:25:30,694 --> 00:25:32,806 learned a lot , and it was an unknown 740 00:25:32,806 --> 00:25:34,806 that you've now . You've now , uh , 741 00:25:34,806 --> 00:25:36,806 added information . You've got data 742 00:25:36,806 --> 00:25:39,028 that allows you to understand what went 743 00:25:39,028 --> 00:25:38,860 wrong . Thumb failures are when 744 00:25:38,860 --> 00:25:40,860 something fails , it really have no 745 00:25:40,860 --> 00:25:42,860 business failing . So let me let me 746 00:25:42,860 --> 00:25:45,027 give you an example of one of the best 747 00:25:45,027 --> 00:25:47,249 explanation . Second half , um , in the 748 00:25:47,249 --> 00:25:49,360 20 tens , the United States Air Force 749 00:25:49,360 --> 00:25:51,471 had a program which which I think has 750 00:25:51,471 --> 00:25:51,270 been one of our most successful 751 00:25:51,270 --> 00:25:54,030 hypersonic programs was called X 51 and 752 00:25:54,030 --> 00:25:55,919 X 51 did four flights . The first 753 00:25:55,919 --> 00:25:58,680 flight was mostly successful . Towards 754 00:25:58,680 --> 00:26:00,680 the end of the flight , there was a 755 00:26:00,680 --> 00:26:02,680 little bit of a burn through in the 756 00:26:02,680 --> 00:26:04,791 nozzle . Second flight failed , third 757 00:26:04,791 --> 00:26:06,902 flight failed . Four flight was fully 758 00:26:06,902 --> 00:26:06,690 successful . Now let's talk about that 759 00:26:06,690 --> 00:26:08,634 program , not tell you what we did 760 00:26:08,634 --> 00:26:10,746 right , but also tell you what we did 761 00:26:10,746 --> 00:26:12,801 wrong , all right , after that first 762 00:26:12,801 --> 00:26:14,801 flight or where mostly worked , the 763 00:26:14,801 --> 00:26:16,857 engine worked . We power the vehicle 764 00:26:16,857 --> 00:26:19,079 for most of its trajectory , but we had 765 00:26:19,079 --> 00:26:20,968 that failure in the end , to burn 766 00:26:20,968 --> 00:26:23,190 through , um , people front , frankly , 767 00:26:23,190 --> 00:26:25,134 in a panic because we had set that 768 00:26:25,134 --> 00:26:27,790 program up with on Lee four plates . So 769 00:26:27,790 --> 00:26:29,734 we at first we just used the first 770 00:26:29,734 --> 00:26:31,790 flight up . All right . We had three 771 00:26:31,790 --> 00:26:33,901 left and there was a sense of Oh , my 772 00:26:33,901 --> 00:26:36,068 gosh , we need to know everything that 773 00:26:36,068 --> 00:26:38,179 went wrong because that second flight 774 00:26:38,179 --> 00:26:40,401 can't fail because then we'll only have 775 00:26:40,401 --> 00:26:42,457 two left . So we spent a really long 776 00:26:42,457 --> 00:26:42,220 time trying to figure out what went 777 00:26:42,220 --> 00:26:45,030 wrong . And Flight One side note , we 778 00:26:45,030 --> 00:26:47,252 kind of knew what went wrong and Flight 779 00:26:47,252 --> 00:26:49,252 one on the first day . I mean , you 780 00:26:49,252 --> 00:26:48,320 could look at the data . You could see 781 00:26:48,320 --> 00:26:50,153 exactly what would happen , what 782 00:26:50,153 --> 00:26:52,209 happened . But because we had so few 783 00:26:52,209 --> 00:26:54,431 flights in the program , we spent a lot 784 00:26:54,431 --> 00:26:56,653 of time figuring that we went to flight 785 00:26:56,653 --> 00:26:58,431 to Flight two . We took so long 786 00:26:58,431 --> 00:27:00,598 figuring out what went wrong and fight 787 00:27:00,598 --> 00:27:02,764 one . By the time we got the flight to 788 00:27:02,764 --> 00:27:04,764 the pilot , who'd flown the carrier 789 00:27:04,764 --> 00:27:06,820 aircraft that dropped the first x 51 790 00:27:06,820 --> 00:27:08,987 had retired out of the Air Force , the 791 00:27:08,987 --> 00:27:10,931 co pilot , how to be recalled from 792 00:27:10,931 --> 00:27:13,153 another duty station owner to fly the B 793 00:27:13,153 --> 00:27:12,970 52 mother craft that carried airplane 794 00:27:12,970 --> 00:27:15,650 so we had allows loss of expertise . Um , 795 00:27:15,810 --> 00:27:17,720 about 70% of the ground crew that 796 00:27:17,720 --> 00:27:19,776 worked on the first flight of its 51 797 00:27:19,776 --> 00:27:21,720 was no longer there for the second 798 00:27:21,720 --> 00:27:23,831 flight . So now the second fight . We 799 00:27:23,831 --> 00:27:25,887 had a failure , and it was frankly , 800 00:27:25,887 --> 00:27:25,500 was a noble failure . Something went 801 00:27:25,500 --> 00:27:27,722 wrong with publishing system that we we 802 00:27:27,722 --> 00:27:29,833 it's time . Didn't understand what we 803 00:27:29,833 --> 00:27:31,889 click Me quickly learned what went , 804 00:27:31,889 --> 00:27:33,833 what went wrong . We geared up for 805 00:27:33,833 --> 00:27:36,000 Flight three . Took us a lot of time , 806 00:27:36,000 --> 00:27:38,167 though , to study that we get to fight 807 00:27:38,167 --> 00:27:39,778 three . Flight three is a an 808 00:27:39,778 --> 00:27:41,889 embarrassing failure . Ah , Finn fell 809 00:27:41,889 --> 00:27:44,111 off the vehicle . That happens a lot in 810 00:27:44,111 --> 00:27:43,950 hypersonic testing . All right now , we 811 00:27:43,950 --> 00:27:46,800 had one flight left , and by gosh , we 812 00:27:46,800 --> 00:27:49,022 had people in the program saying What ? 813 00:27:49,022 --> 00:27:51,189 We can't fly that vehicle because what 814 00:27:51,189 --> 00:27:53,300 if it fails ? I've never had needs to 815 00:27:53,300 --> 00:27:55,522 realize the conversations like , Well , 816 00:27:55,522 --> 00:27:57,467 if we don't , we pay for it . It's 817 00:27:57,467 --> 00:27:57,100 sitting in the hangar . Why wouldn't we 818 00:27:57,100 --> 00:27:59,211 fly it ? Well , but if we fly it , if 819 00:27:59,211 --> 00:28:01,489 it doesn't work , then we're done . Um , 820 00:28:01,740 --> 00:28:03,851 we did finally fly it , but there was 821 00:28:03,851 --> 00:28:06,073 so much hand wringing there was so much 822 00:28:06,073 --> 00:28:07,962 worry about this about what would 823 00:28:07,962 --> 00:28:10,220 happen if and that kind of all 824 00:28:10,230 --> 00:28:12,397 illustrates the situation we've gotten 825 00:28:12,397 --> 00:28:14,508 ourselves into . No . Let me give the 826 00:28:14,508 --> 00:28:16,619 contrast . The 19 sixties NASA in the 827 00:28:16,619 --> 00:28:18,674 Air Force and the Navy had a program 828 00:28:18,674 --> 00:28:20,619 called X 15 . The X 15 resulted in 829 00:28:20,619 --> 00:28:22,841 three vehicles being built to are still 830 00:28:22,841 --> 00:28:25,063 around . One . Is the National Airspace 831 00:28:25,063 --> 00:28:27,008 Museum down in the mall ? Ah , the 832 00:28:27,008 --> 00:28:26,910 other is of the Air Force Museum in 833 00:28:26,910 --> 00:28:29,420 Dayton , Ohio . That's 15 program flew 834 00:28:29,430 --> 00:28:33,300 199 flights , roughly 835 00:28:33,300 --> 00:28:35,570 once every two weeks . When things went 836 00:28:35,570 --> 00:28:37,626 wrong , they figured out immediately 837 00:28:37,626 --> 00:28:39,681 what went wrong , and they got those 838 00:28:39,681 --> 00:28:41,903 vehicles back in the air . They had one 839 00:28:41,903 --> 00:28:41,710 case where a vehicle landed hard , 840 00:28:41,710 --> 00:28:43,654 broken , half . That's a great who 841 00:28:43,654 --> 00:28:45,710 wanted to make one little bit longer 842 00:28:45,710 --> 00:28:47,599 anyway , all right , they weren't 843 00:28:47,599 --> 00:28:49,599 afraid of failure . They even had a 844 00:28:49,599 --> 00:28:51,710 tragedy tragedy in the program . They 845 00:28:51,710 --> 00:28:50,990 lost one of the vehicles . They lost 846 00:28:50,990 --> 00:28:53,390 the pilot . It didn't end the program , 847 00:28:53,600 --> 00:28:55,711 right ? So that's kind of the mindset 848 00:28:55,711 --> 00:28:57,711 that we're trying to get into , all 849 00:28:57,711 --> 00:28:59,878 right . And part of that comes down to 850 00:28:59,878 --> 00:29:01,767 doing things , often flying often 851 00:29:01,767 --> 00:29:03,822 building programs so that when we're 852 00:29:03,822 --> 00:29:05,933 testing , we're not testing onesies . 853 00:29:05,933 --> 00:29:07,822 Twosies . We've got a robust test 854 00:29:07,822 --> 00:29:09,989 program , so we learn as we're doing , 855 00:29:09,989 --> 00:29:11,989 we're not . We're not constantly re 856 00:29:11,989 --> 00:29:14,211 learning how to do what we used to know 857 00:29:14,211 --> 00:29:14,160 how to Dio , and that that , I think is 858 00:29:14,160 --> 00:29:16,271 is the secret , I think , is the path 859 00:29:16,271 --> 00:29:18,327 we're trying to get ourselves on . I 860 00:29:18,327 --> 00:29:20,438 would just have to somebody I used to 861 00:29:20,438 --> 00:29:22,604 work in the Congress for a congressman 862 00:29:22,604 --> 00:29:24,827 on the House Armed Services Committee , 863 00:29:24,827 --> 00:29:26,993 and then the political environment has 864 00:29:26,993 --> 00:29:26,960 to be conducive for that kind of 865 00:29:26,960 --> 00:29:29,180 testing to we can't The Congress needs 866 00:29:29,180 --> 00:29:31,402 to kind of settle in and be patient and 867 00:29:31,402 --> 00:29:33,513 understand that there's testing . And 868 00:29:33,513 --> 00:29:35,791 there are some , uh , testing failures . 869 00:29:35,791 --> 00:29:37,902 They might be noble failures , and it 870 00:29:37,902 --> 00:29:40,069 doesn't mean that it's time to end the 871 00:29:40,069 --> 00:29:39,810 program or switch the program , or no 872 00:29:39,810 --> 00:29:42,410 longer where the idea that there's 873 00:29:42,410 --> 00:29:44,577 going to be , we're gonna have to have 874 00:29:44,577 --> 00:29:46,521 a higher tolerance , my bipartisan 875 00:29:46,690 --> 00:29:49,023 perspective , congressional perspective , 876 00:29:49,023 --> 00:29:50,968 because there has to be a national 877 00:29:50,968 --> 00:29:52,968 commitment to making sure that this 878 00:29:52,968 --> 00:29:54,968 technology , um , is successful and 879 00:29:54,968 --> 00:29:57,190 then , you know , winds up in the hands 880 00:29:57,190 --> 00:30:00,780 of those out in the field , right ? You 881 00:30:00,780 --> 00:30:02,891 talk about the supply chain issued to 882 00:30:02,891 --> 00:30:04,780 and how we can be , how we can be 883 00:30:04,780 --> 00:30:06,891 preparing and thinking about this . I 884 00:30:06,891 --> 00:30:08,724 know it's It's a little bit of a 885 00:30:08,724 --> 00:30:10,891 dilemma right now because some of this 886 00:30:10,891 --> 00:30:10,720 stuff is still classified . We don't 887 00:30:10,720 --> 00:30:12,831 wanna give timelines because we don't 888 00:30:12,831 --> 00:30:14,887 want the adversary to Notre ones are 889 00:30:14,887 --> 00:30:17,053 What ? Do you know what we're favoring 890 00:30:17,053 --> 00:30:19,220 at this point ? But at the same time , 891 00:30:19,220 --> 00:30:21,220 we can get costs down , too , if we 892 00:30:21,220 --> 00:30:23,442 have a long enough , the times a plan , 893 00:30:23,442 --> 00:30:25,553 especially as he wants to ramp up and 894 00:30:25,553 --> 00:30:27,664 produced that scale as well . We have 895 00:30:27,664 --> 00:30:29,553 to have a robust industrial . I'm 896 00:30:29,553 --> 00:30:31,498 capability to be able to do that , 897 00:30:31,498 --> 00:30:33,664 right ? So So I really appreciate your 898 00:30:33,664 --> 00:30:35,831 talking about industrial base and also 899 00:30:35,831 --> 00:30:35,010 about costs , cause I think you've hit 900 00:30:35,010 --> 00:30:37,232 about one of one of the key issues also 901 00:30:37,232 --> 00:30:39,566 in this technology area . Um , you know , 902 00:30:39,566 --> 00:30:41,650 when When people ask me , why do we 903 00:30:41,650 --> 00:30:43,650 want hypersonic systems ? I tend to 904 00:30:43,650 --> 00:30:46,050 counter with the question Why wouldn't 905 00:30:46,050 --> 00:30:48,161 we want hypersonic systems ? And I'll 906 00:30:48,161 --> 00:30:50,328 start with the thought experiment if I 907 00:30:50,328 --> 00:30:52,550 could take an existing cruise missile . 908 00:30:52,550 --> 00:30:54,494 And if I could replace that cruise 909 00:30:54,494 --> 00:30:54,290 missile with a hypersonic system , so 910 00:30:54,290 --> 00:30:56,346 does everything the existence system 911 00:30:56,346 --> 00:30:58,810 does . But does it seven times faster . 912 00:30:59,340 --> 00:31:01,780 Well , why wouldn't I want that ? The 913 00:31:01,780 --> 00:31:03,724 answer is I might no want it if it 914 00:31:03,724 --> 00:31:05,780 doesn't completely replicate all the 915 00:31:05,780 --> 00:31:08,002 capabilities . For example , if I don't 916 00:31:08,002 --> 00:31:09,947 get the same range or there's some 917 00:31:09,947 --> 00:31:12,113 vulnerabilities , but I also might not 918 00:31:12,113 --> 00:31:14,280 want it if it's extremely expensive so 919 00:31:14,280 --> 00:31:16,447 that I can afford the weapon . So cost 920 00:31:16,447 --> 00:31:16,250 is a very important aspect of this . 921 00:31:16,250 --> 00:31:18,361 And I'm happy to say that a couple of 922 00:31:18,361 --> 00:31:20,361 our prototype efforts have a really 923 00:31:20,361 --> 00:31:22,528 strong focus on what the systems costs 924 00:31:22,528 --> 00:31:24,750 will be . Especially the DARPA programs 925 00:31:24,750 --> 00:31:26,750 right now have have costs as one of 926 00:31:26,750 --> 00:31:28,861 their metrics , right ? So So we have 927 00:31:28,861 --> 00:31:30,972 to pay attention that I personally is 928 00:31:30,972 --> 00:31:33,083 inside . By the way , I think it is a 929 00:31:33,083 --> 00:31:35,250 miss number . That hyper son existence 930 00:31:35,250 --> 00:31:37,306 immediately translate into expensive 931 00:31:37,306 --> 00:31:37,040 systems . Take the example of a 932 00:31:37,040 --> 00:31:38,873 scramjet powered , air breathing 933 00:31:38,873 --> 00:31:40,984 hypersonic cruise missile . Well , is 934 00:31:40,984 --> 00:31:43,318 pushing state of the art in development . 935 00:31:43,318 --> 00:31:45,429 But ah , hypersonic jet engine . What 936 00:31:45,429 --> 00:31:47,484 we call a scramjet engine supersonic 937 00:31:47,484 --> 00:31:49,484 combusting ramjet is in principle a 938 00:31:49,484 --> 00:31:51,540 very simple engine . It doesn't have 939 00:31:51,540 --> 00:31:53,540 very many moving parts . It doesn't 940 00:31:53,540 --> 00:31:52,930 have turbines , it doesn't have 941 00:31:52,930 --> 00:31:54,490 compressors . So the actual 942 00:31:54,490 --> 00:31:56,730 manufacturing shouldn't be that much 943 00:31:56,730 --> 00:31:58,730 more expensive . That could be less 944 00:31:58,730 --> 00:32:00,341 expensive than a lower speed 945 00:32:00,341 --> 00:32:02,174 alternative . So , yeah , you're 946 00:32:02,174 --> 00:32:04,341 investing a front in the development . 947 00:32:04,341 --> 00:32:06,341 But the per unit cost should not be 948 00:32:06,341 --> 00:32:08,563 astronomical , as as some folks I think 949 00:32:08,563 --> 00:32:10,841 mistakenly believes would be necessary . 950 00:32:10,841 --> 00:32:12,897 Be true for hypersonic systems . All 951 00:32:12,897 --> 00:32:14,841 right , so with that focus on cost 952 00:32:14,841 --> 00:32:17,008 exactly right , we need to be focusing 953 00:32:17,008 --> 00:32:16,190 on supply chain . There's several 954 00:32:16,190 --> 00:32:18,301 elements of that . One is . Make sure 955 00:32:18,301 --> 00:32:20,301 we've got the supply chain that can 956 00:32:20,301 --> 00:32:22,860 produce at scale and at at at 957 00:32:22,870 --> 00:32:26,080 reasonable cost , but also to make sure 958 00:32:26,080 --> 00:32:28,191 that we don't have vulnerabilities in 959 00:32:28,191 --> 00:32:30,358 that supply chain that we don't have . 960 00:32:30,358 --> 00:32:32,580 Pure competitors who are looking at key 961 00:32:32,580 --> 00:32:34,747 aspects of that supply chain trying to 962 00:32:34,747 --> 00:32:36,636 get into that supply chain may be 963 00:32:36,636 --> 00:32:38,913 tapping into , ah , advanced materials , 964 00:32:38,913 --> 00:32:40,913 high temperature materials that are 965 00:32:40,913 --> 00:32:43,136 essential to the creation of hypersonic 966 00:32:43,136 --> 00:32:45,302 systems . One of the things that we're 967 00:32:45,302 --> 00:32:47,191 trying to do in our office is the 968 00:32:47,191 --> 00:32:49,330 single to industry that that , uh , 969 00:32:49,340 --> 00:32:51,340 that we need them to step up to the 970 00:32:51,340 --> 00:32:53,451 plate that this Israel that is coming 971 00:32:53,451 --> 00:32:55,284 from the secretary on down , the 972 00:32:55,284 --> 00:32:57,229 secretary that deputy the chairman 973 00:32:57,229 --> 00:32:59,229 really the deal . The leadership is 974 00:32:59,229 --> 00:33:01,229 saying this is a technology that we 975 00:33:01,229 --> 00:33:03,340 understand is essential to the modern 976 00:33:03,340 --> 00:33:06,300 battlefield , and we're communicating 977 00:33:06,300 --> 00:33:10,000 that in basically various ways . But 978 00:33:10,010 --> 00:33:12,177 my my boss Mike Griffin has been , has 979 00:33:12,177 --> 00:33:14,510 been pretty public and telling industry , 980 00:33:14,510 --> 00:33:16,510 We need you to understand that this 981 00:33:16,510 --> 00:33:18,621 Israel we need you to to to plan your 982 00:33:18,621 --> 00:33:20,788 investments accordingly . And it's not 983 00:33:20,788 --> 00:33:22,732 just the primes , but it's looking 984 00:33:22,732 --> 00:33:24,899 further down in the supply chain , and 985 00:33:24,899 --> 00:33:27,121 I'm actually happy to report that we've 986 00:33:27,121 --> 00:33:29,399 seen the primes really step up to that . 987 00:33:29,399 --> 00:33:31,566 Several of the major aerospace defence 988 00:33:31,566 --> 00:33:33,677 companies have have been looking down 989 00:33:33,677 --> 00:33:35,843 their supply chain looking at how they 990 00:33:35,843 --> 00:33:35,340 make the supply chain more robust . 991 00:33:35,510 --> 00:33:37,566 Have been working with their various 992 00:33:37,566 --> 00:33:40,240 suppliers to make sure that when when 993 00:33:40,240 --> 00:33:43,220 we give that call that that that we'll 994 00:33:43,220 --> 00:33:46,520 have the supply chain available in our 995 00:33:46,520 --> 00:33:48,631 remaining time , I want to talk about 996 00:33:48,631 --> 00:33:51,700 hypersonic defense . Um , if you if you 997 00:33:51,700 --> 00:33:54,930 could answer the question of how we're 998 00:33:54,930 --> 00:33:57,770 prioritizing offense versus defense and 999 00:33:57,770 --> 00:33:59,992 for me , for my perspective , I've been 1000 00:33:59,992 --> 00:34:02,214 making the argument for a long time now 1001 00:34:02,214 --> 00:34:04,214 that we have to have defense . That 1002 00:34:04,214 --> 00:34:06,381 offense is not defense audiences often 1003 00:34:06,381 --> 00:34:08,548 defense's defense , and it's important 1004 00:34:08,548 --> 00:34:10,780 that we do have active defences against 1005 00:34:10,780 --> 00:34:13,002 what are your competitors have in these 1006 00:34:13,002 --> 00:34:16,510 highly contested height , height areas . 1007 00:34:16,510 --> 00:34:19,640 I like contested areas and in what 1008 00:34:19,640 --> 00:34:23,100 we're doing as a department to to 1009 00:34:23,100 --> 00:34:26,700 invest in things like H BTS says the 1010 00:34:27,710 --> 00:34:30,070 hypersonic and ballistic track ings 1011 00:34:30,120 --> 00:34:33,210 stay sense sensor program . Why we have 1012 00:34:33,210 --> 00:34:35,488 to have that . And you touched on that . 1013 00:34:35,488 --> 00:34:37,710 You talked about how there these things 1014 00:34:37,710 --> 00:34:39,932 are hard to see , um , in their hard to 1015 00:34:39,932 --> 00:34:39,420 see and in the heart of track . And if 1016 00:34:39,420 --> 00:34:41,364 you can't see him in track and you 1017 00:34:41,364 --> 00:34:43,476 can't hit him , there's also value in 1018 00:34:43,476 --> 00:34:45,587 being able to Steve them attractive , 1019 00:34:45,587 --> 00:34:47,642 even if you can't get them . But you 1020 00:34:47,642 --> 00:34:49,753 are able to see them and track them , 1021 00:34:49,753 --> 00:34:51,698 at least initially . So talk to us 1022 00:34:51,698 --> 00:34:53,531 about the importance of having a 1023 00:34:53,531 --> 00:34:55,698 defense of capability , why it is so , 1024 00:34:55,698 --> 00:34:58,110 so important and what we're doing to 1025 00:34:58,110 --> 00:35:00,830 invest in the kinds of of invest of 1026 00:35:00,840 --> 00:35:03,062 technologies that we need to be able to 1027 00:35:03,062 --> 00:35:05,340 have some kind of active defense . Yes , 1028 00:35:05,340 --> 00:35:07,229 that we don't need to have a 100% 1029 00:35:07,229 --> 00:35:09,340 defense . We're not trying to be able 1030 00:35:09,340 --> 00:35:11,396 to intercept every single hypersonic 1031 00:35:11,396 --> 00:35:13,562 weapons system that exists , but we do 1032 00:35:13,562 --> 00:35:15,451 need to have have some incredible 1033 00:35:15,451 --> 00:35:17,507 defense against these things for our 1034 00:35:17,507 --> 00:35:19,229 most critical , uh , bases and 1035 00:35:19,229 --> 00:35:21,396 strategic interests in these regions , 1036 00:35:21,396 --> 00:35:23,173 right or so Rebecca , Your your 1037 00:35:23,173 --> 00:35:25,396 question actually said it better than I 1038 00:35:25,396 --> 00:35:27,618 think I could in any answer that I give 1039 00:35:27,618 --> 00:35:29,562 you . Um , so So , um , you know , 1040 00:35:29,562 --> 00:35:31,673 hypersonic . I said hyper . Sonics is 1041 00:35:31,673 --> 00:35:33,562 very difficult to stop . It's not 1042 00:35:33,562 --> 00:35:33,450 impossible stuff . We know there are 1043 00:35:33,450 --> 00:35:35,617 various technologies , various options 1044 00:35:35,617 --> 00:35:37,783 that are available Teoh interfere with 1045 00:35:37,783 --> 00:35:39,950 the operation of a hypersonic system . 1046 00:35:39,950 --> 00:35:41,950 Um , and we've got efforts underway 1047 00:35:41,950 --> 00:35:44,890 examining that . But as you correctly 1048 00:35:44,890 --> 00:35:47,220 point out , the first step in stopping 1049 00:35:47,220 --> 00:35:49,400 it is detecting it . And you mentioned 1050 00:35:49,410 --> 00:35:51,260 the efforts underway with Space 1051 00:35:51,260 --> 00:35:53,204 Development Agency Missile Defense 1052 00:35:53,204 --> 00:35:55,820 Agency were convinced that the best way 1053 00:35:55,820 --> 00:35:58,160 to do that is from is from space , and 1054 00:35:58,160 --> 00:35:59,880 it requires a proliferated 1055 00:35:59,880 --> 00:36:01,880 constellation system that allows to 1056 00:36:01,880 --> 00:36:03,991 detect these things . Um , you know , 1057 00:36:03,991 --> 00:36:06,910 defense will be 100% . Um , we do 1058 00:36:06,910 --> 00:36:08,743 believe that eventually the best 1059 00:36:08,743 --> 00:36:10,799 defense will be , ah , layer defense 1060 00:36:10,799 --> 00:36:12,521 with with multiple aspects and 1061 00:36:12,730 --> 00:36:14,952 hypersonic says many things . It's it's 1062 00:36:14,960 --> 00:36:16,627 it's long range systems , its 1063 00:36:16,627 --> 00:36:18,849 intermediate range systems , its rocket 1064 00:36:18,849 --> 00:36:21,071 boost , fly systems , its air breathing 1065 00:36:21,071 --> 00:36:23,182 systems . Each of those would require 1066 00:36:23,182 --> 00:36:24,960 ah , particular pick particular 1067 00:36:24,960 --> 00:36:26,960 response . But But in the end , you 1068 00:36:26,960 --> 00:36:28,738 know , I draw an analogy to the 1069 00:36:28,738 --> 00:36:30,849 kamikaze waves that we faced in World 1070 00:36:30,849 --> 00:36:32,627 War Two , the way we eventually 1071 00:36:32,627 --> 00:36:34,849 defeated them , I was with with a layer 1072 00:36:34,849 --> 00:36:37,071 defense . And what started out is as an 1073 00:36:37,071 --> 00:36:39,182 unstoppable problem became a tragical 1074 00:36:39,182 --> 00:36:41,460 problem . When once we understood that , 1075 00:36:41,460 --> 00:36:43,682 um , if you look at the portfolio right 1076 00:36:43,682 --> 00:36:45,516 now , the balance is clearly tip 1077 00:36:45,516 --> 00:36:47,849 towards offensive investments right now . 1078 00:36:47,849 --> 00:36:49,960 And we're pushing very , very hard in 1079 00:36:49,960 --> 00:36:52,127 our office to emphasize the importance 1080 00:36:52,127 --> 00:36:54,293 of of defense . I do think offense and 1081 00:36:54,293 --> 00:36:56,293 defense go hand in hand and that in 1082 00:36:56,293 --> 00:36:58,460 order to in order to understand how to 1083 00:36:58,460 --> 00:36:58,040 defend against these systems , you have 1084 00:36:58,040 --> 00:37:00,207 to understand what goes into designing 1085 00:37:00,207 --> 00:37:02,151 them if you need to understand the 1086 00:37:02,151 --> 00:37:04,318 offensive technology in order to get a 1087 00:37:04,318 --> 00:37:06,484 handle on the ways that you would stop 1088 00:37:06,484 --> 00:37:08,596 them and defend against them , I also 1089 00:37:08,596 --> 00:37:08,250 think that there is a deterrent element 1090 00:37:08,250 --> 00:37:10,417 to it . You know , you may not be able 1091 00:37:10,417 --> 00:37:12,528 to stop it , but if you know where it 1092 00:37:12,528 --> 00:37:14,750 came from and if you can respond on the 1093 00:37:14,750 --> 00:37:16,639 time scales that they're using to 1094 00:37:16,639 --> 00:37:18,861 attack you , then it gives you , ah , a 1095 00:37:18,861 --> 00:37:20,806 turn capability . They may get the 1096 00:37:20,806 --> 00:37:22,806 first shot in , but if you can make 1097 00:37:22,806 --> 00:37:24,750 sure they don't get the 2nd 3rd or 1098 00:37:24,750 --> 00:37:26,694 fourth shot in then then that that 1099 00:37:26,694 --> 00:37:28,680 could be a powerful defensive 1100 00:37:28,680 --> 00:37:32,400 capability in and of itself . Um , you 1101 00:37:32,400 --> 00:37:35,470 know , I I think I can tell you that 1102 00:37:35,470 --> 00:37:37,414 we're seeing a significant ramp up 1103 00:37:37,414 --> 00:37:39,581 right now in our in our efforts on the 1104 00:37:39,581 --> 00:37:41,692 defensive side that the folks who are 1105 00:37:41,692 --> 00:37:43,914 working on defense are working hand and 1106 00:37:43,914 --> 00:37:46,137 glove with . The people were developing 1107 00:37:46,137 --> 00:37:48,248 the offensive capabilities . And , um 1108 00:37:48,248 --> 00:37:50,414 and it's an area , though , that we're 1109 00:37:50,414 --> 00:37:50,200 continuing to focus on and investing . 1110 00:37:52,350 --> 00:37:54,870 How are our shooters ? How are our 1111 00:37:54,870 --> 00:37:56,703 current interceptors that we are 1112 00:37:56,703 --> 00:37:59,190 current systems that we have today ? Um , 1113 00:37:59,200 --> 00:38:02,280 how are they as being able to interest 1114 00:38:02,280 --> 00:38:04,340 at some of these more sophisticated 1115 00:38:04,340 --> 00:38:06,118 threats that are no longer just 1116 00:38:06,118 --> 00:38:07,896 predictably ballistic and their 1117 00:38:07,896 --> 00:38:10,030 trajectories ? Because there's done , 1118 00:38:10,040 --> 00:38:12,240 we're some people try to make the case 1119 00:38:12,240 --> 00:38:14,407 that you have . Some of these regional 1120 00:38:14,407 --> 00:38:16,573 systems were have it . If they if they 1121 00:38:16,573 --> 00:38:18,684 simply had their network better , and 1122 00:38:18,684 --> 00:38:18,390 if they were able to cooperate better 1123 00:38:18,390 --> 00:38:20,612 that they would actually have some kind 1124 00:38:20,612 --> 00:38:22,779 of defense against hypersonic threat . 1125 00:38:22,779 --> 00:38:24,810 What was your sense of that ? So so 1126 00:38:24,810 --> 00:38:26,977 some of our existing systems have have 1127 00:38:26,977 --> 00:38:29,199 some some capabilities that could bring 1128 00:38:29,199 --> 00:38:31,310 that you could bring to bear , but it 1129 00:38:31,310 --> 00:38:31,300 really depends on what you're going 1130 00:38:31,300 --> 00:38:34,330 against , right ? So as just one 1131 00:38:34,330 --> 00:38:36,497 measure , here's a good technical rule 1132 00:38:36,497 --> 00:38:38,870 of thumb . If you're trying to stop an 1133 00:38:38,880 --> 00:38:41,380 incoming weapons , then you're 1134 00:38:41,380 --> 00:38:43,480 maneuverability has to have roughly 1135 00:38:43,480 --> 00:38:45,720 three times the acceleration capability 1136 00:38:46,080 --> 00:38:48,920 as the thing you're trying to stop . So 1137 00:38:48,930 --> 00:38:50,930 if the incoming weapon can maneuver 1138 00:38:50,930 --> 00:38:53,100 with 15 G's , then you have to be able 1139 00:38:53,100 --> 00:38:55,960 to maneuver at 45 G's . That's really 1140 00:38:55,960 --> 00:38:58,127 tough . It's not impossible , but it's 1141 00:38:58,127 --> 00:39:00,349 tough . So that's one of the challenges 1142 00:39:00,349 --> 00:39:02,680 that we've that we have in addressing 1143 00:39:02,680 --> 00:39:05,260 this threat . There are other systems 1144 00:39:05,260 --> 00:39:07,371 that you might bring about . Directed 1145 00:39:07,371 --> 00:39:09,538 energy , for example , is a technology 1146 00:39:09,538 --> 00:39:11,704 that could have important applications 1147 00:39:11,704 --> 00:39:13,871 in defending against hypersonic . Um , 1148 00:39:13,871 --> 00:39:15,982 still capability is being developed . 1149 00:39:15,982 --> 00:39:17,871 We've seen tremendous advances in 1150 00:39:17,871 --> 00:39:20,690 recent years . Um , um , we're looking 1151 00:39:20,690 --> 00:39:22,912 at systems that , if not existing today 1152 00:39:22,912 --> 00:39:24,968 will be will be in place very soon . 1153 00:39:24,968 --> 00:39:27,190 That may have some capabilities against 1154 00:39:27,190 --> 00:39:29,246 these threats , but , you know , I I 1155 00:39:29,246 --> 00:39:31,357 guess I put it in the category , work 1156 00:39:31,357 --> 00:39:33,610 in progress and and and and and limited 1157 00:39:33,620 --> 00:39:35,842 in details that I can offer limited and 1158 00:39:35,842 --> 00:39:37,842 exactly what I can say no . I think 1159 00:39:37,842 --> 00:39:40,064 that's great . I think it's important . 1160 00:39:40,064 --> 00:39:42,120 Just a foot stomp the point that you 1161 00:39:42,120 --> 00:39:41,840 just made previously , though , that 1162 00:39:41,850 --> 00:39:43,961 even having the ability to have birth 1163 00:39:43,961 --> 00:39:46,017 to death tracking , which is what HB 1164 00:39:46,017 --> 00:39:48,430 TSS would give us in the context of the 1165 00:39:48,430 --> 00:39:50,500 hypersonic threat and that in and of 1166 00:39:50,500 --> 00:39:52,920 itself would be a dramatic advantage 1167 00:39:52,920 --> 00:39:55,300 for the United States and would bolster 1168 00:39:55,300 --> 00:39:57,880 our deterrent effect . Because all of 1169 00:39:57,880 --> 00:40:00,102 this is meant not toe hopefully fight a 1170 00:40:00,102 --> 00:40:03,290 war with China , but to deter one . And 1171 00:40:03,290 --> 00:40:05,560 so we're trying to have trying to 1172 00:40:05,560 --> 00:40:07,449 present multiple dilemmas for the 1173 00:40:07,449 --> 00:40:10,130 adversary . Impose costs on them is 1174 00:40:10,130 --> 00:40:12,297 that they're busy trying to figure out 1175 00:40:12,297 --> 00:40:15,720 better ways to , um to gain the 1176 00:40:15,730 --> 00:40:17,619 dominant position over the United 1177 00:40:17,619 --> 00:40:19,286 States in the Indo Pacific in 1178 00:40:19,286 --> 00:40:21,508 particular . Well , if I could just , I 1179 00:40:21,508 --> 00:40:23,730 want it just end with the last point of 1180 00:40:23,730 --> 00:40:25,674 Giger thoughts on You know , Advil 1181 00:40:25,674 --> 00:40:27,341 Davidson , I think , has been 1182 00:40:27,341 --> 00:40:29,508 incredibly articulate and staying back 1183 00:40:29,508 --> 00:40:31,619 to your theme about the importance of 1184 00:40:31,619 --> 00:40:33,674 testing , and you gave that that the 1185 00:40:33,674 --> 00:40:35,730 example of the testing program where 1186 00:40:35,730 --> 00:40:37,952 there's hundreds of tests that also has 1187 00:40:37,952 --> 00:40:39,508 deterrent effect because it 1188 00:40:39,508 --> 00:40:41,619 communicates to our adversaries . The 1189 00:40:41,619 --> 00:40:41,190 political will we have to get this 1190 00:40:41,190 --> 00:40:43,301 right . And so sometimes , you know , 1191 00:40:43,301 --> 00:40:45,170 we've been , you know , kind of 1192 00:40:45,170 --> 00:40:47,490 secretive and afraid that if we test 1193 00:40:47,500 --> 00:40:49,722 and there is a failure , that that will 1194 00:40:49,722 --> 00:40:51,778 make us look bad or it will show the 1195 00:40:51,778 --> 00:40:53,444 enemy that we don't have this 1196 00:40:53,444 --> 00:40:55,444 capability . But in fact , if we're 1197 00:40:55,444 --> 00:40:57,667 going fast and demonstrating that we do 1198 00:40:57,667 --> 00:40:59,722 have the will to get this done , you 1199 00:40:59,722 --> 00:41:01,889 can actually have a positive effect in 1200 00:41:01,889 --> 00:41:03,833 bolstering the credibility of your 1201 00:41:03,833 --> 00:41:05,833 deterrence . They were going to get 1202 00:41:05,833 --> 00:41:05,500 this right . And if you could comment 1203 00:41:05,500 --> 00:41:07,722 on that and then just give us some sort 1204 00:41:07,722 --> 00:41:09,833 of timeline . Where do you expect the 1205 00:41:09,833 --> 00:41:11,778 United States to pull ahead ? Um , 1206 00:41:11,778 --> 00:41:13,944 against are your competitors in this ? 1207 00:41:13,944 --> 00:41:16,670 So So you know , our competitors should 1208 00:41:16,670 --> 00:41:19,730 have no doubt that , um , 1209 00:41:20,310 --> 00:41:22,680 we are moving out on a very big way in 1210 00:41:22,680 --> 00:41:24,736 this technology area . Um , and they 1211 00:41:24,736 --> 00:41:26,791 should not be mistaken to think that 1212 00:41:26,791 --> 00:41:29,013 they've got a technological advantage , 1213 00:41:29,013 --> 00:41:31,236 that we we we will be unable to counter 1214 00:41:31,236 --> 00:41:33,458 eso . So I appreciate your making those 1215 00:41:33,458 --> 00:41:35,569 points . Um , were so so We do have a 1216 00:41:35,569 --> 00:41:37,750 very , very aggressive program , and 1217 00:41:37,750 --> 00:41:40,110 it's it cuts across the services . So 1218 00:41:40,110 --> 00:41:42,110 you've got Army . You've got Navy . 1219 00:41:42,110 --> 00:41:44,380 You've got Air Force . Um , all moving 1220 00:41:44,380 --> 00:41:46,547 ever aggressively working very hand in 1221 00:41:46,547 --> 00:41:48,713 glove with Darboe . We've got multiple 1222 00:41:48,713 --> 00:41:50,658 programs at DARPA that are feeding 1223 00:41:50,658 --> 00:41:52,713 directly into those programs in ways 1224 00:41:52,713 --> 00:41:54,769 that that , frankly , it's it's it's 1225 00:41:54,769 --> 00:41:56,991 It's amazing how well , all those those 1226 00:41:56,991 --> 00:41:59,213 those programs were integrated , that's 1227 00:41:59,213 --> 00:42:01,269 across the rocket boost glide across 1228 00:42:01,269 --> 00:42:03,436 the air breeding . Um , our goal is to 1229 00:42:03,436 --> 00:42:05,547 deliver what we say deliver its scale 1230 00:42:05,547 --> 00:42:07,910 by the mid 2020 . And , um , you know , 1231 00:42:07,910 --> 00:42:10,077 obviously we're a little bit bigger on 1232 00:42:10,077 --> 00:42:12,410 our dates Are competitors could do math . 1233 00:42:12,410 --> 00:42:14,680 They can add up numbers . Um , but we 1234 00:42:14,690 --> 00:42:16,750 were looking at moving beyond beyond 1235 00:42:16,750 --> 00:42:19,290 the prototype stage . Certainly by the 1236 00:42:19,290 --> 00:42:22,420 second half of this decade , Um , 1237 00:42:23,000 --> 00:42:25,167 they're a couple elements that what is 1238 00:42:25,167 --> 00:42:27,580 well , we'll see a vastly increased 1239 00:42:27,580 --> 00:42:29,691 rate of testing , and that's just not 1240 00:42:29,691 --> 00:42:31,747 just we've been testing a lot of the 1241 00:42:31,747 --> 00:42:33,524 ground . You're gonna see a big 1242 00:42:33,524 --> 00:42:33,440 increase in the rate of flight testing , 1243 00:42:33,440 --> 00:42:35,607 getting back to the earlier point that 1244 00:42:35,607 --> 00:42:37,718 we need to fly early . We need to fly 1245 00:42:37,718 --> 00:42:39,940 often . We need to to become proficient 1246 00:42:39,940 --> 00:42:42,560 at that part of the technology . And so 1247 00:42:42,560 --> 00:42:44,727 we're looking in the next four years . 1248 00:42:44,727 --> 00:42:46,616 We're looking up the 40 different 1249 00:42:46,616 --> 00:42:48,838 flight tests of various systems to help 1250 00:42:48,838 --> 00:42:51,310 bring them to maturity . Um , same time 1251 00:42:51,310 --> 00:42:53,532 were , you know , reinvesting in ground 1252 00:42:53,532 --> 00:42:55,754 test facilities . You see , significant 1253 00:42:55,754 --> 00:42:57,810 testing , evaluation facility , uh , 1254 00:42:57,810 --> 00:42:59,754 capabilities are ramping up in the 1255 00:42:59,754 --> 00:43:01,810 United States . You know , it's it's 1256 00:43:01,990 --> 00:43:04,212 it's really across the board across the 1257 00:43:04,212 --> 00:43:06,157 department . Um , are are ever his 1258 00:43:06,157 --> 00:43:08,268 adversaries and potential competitors 1259 00:43:08,268 --> 00:43:10,870 should be under No , no mistake . That 1260 00:43:10,880 --> 00:43:12,970 that were We're we're meeting the 1261 00:43:12,970 --> 00:43:15,810 challenge in this area , and I think 1262 00:43:15,810 --> 00:43:18,580 that that also just , you know , makes 1263 00:43:18,580 --> 00:43:20,691 the point very , very powerfully that 1264 00:43:20,691 --> 00:43:23,320 that we need to maintain a bipartisan 1265 00:43:23,320 --> 00:43:25,510 consensus from policymakers . This is 1266 00:43:25,510 --> 00:43:27,788 gonna go . This is gonna be , you know , 1267 00:43:27,788 --> 00:43:29,954 several years into the future . And we 1268 00:43:29,954 --> 00:43:32,066 need t carry on this momentum that we 1269 00:43:32,066 --> 00:43:34,177 have a country . So to make sure that 1270 00:43:34,177 --> 00:43:36,490 we're back and competing with major 1271 00:43:36,490 --> 00:43:38,601 power competition , that's that's the 1272 00:43:38,601 --> 00:43:40,601 challenge of our day . Thank you so 1273 00:43:40,601 --> 00:43:42,630 much . Talk to Lewis for your your 1274 00:43:42,770 --> 00:43:45,160 expertise . Your service weapon . Thank 1275 00:43:45,160 --> 00:43:47,104 you so much . I really enjoyed the 1276 00:43:47,104 --> 00:43:47,920 conversation . Thanks .