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Good morning ladies and gentlemen , I'm 

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Dave Deptula , FAA . Is dean of the 

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Mitchell Institute for Aerospace 

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Studies and welcome to the next event 

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in our nuclear deterrent forum series . 

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We are extremely fortunate and pleased 

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to have you joining us today . Admiral 

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Charles chasse . Richard , Commander of 

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US Strategic Command Before taking the 

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helm at Stratcom in November 2019 . 

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Admiral Richard held a number of key 

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leadership roles . He was Commander of 

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submarine forces in Norfolk Virginia . 

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Deputy Commander of US Strategic 

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Command , Director of undersea warfare 

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at the pentagon and Deputy commander of 

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the joint functional component Command 

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for Global strike at U . S . Strategic 

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Command . He's also worked in the 

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offices of the Under Secretary of the 

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Navy and the undersecretary of Defense 

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for Policy . I think as most of you 

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recognize that stratcom . Admiral 

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Richard is responsible for overseeing 

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the global command and control of all U . 

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S . Strategic forces to meet our 

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national security objectives by 

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providing a broad range of capabilities 

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and options for the President and the 

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Secretary of Defense . So welcome 

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Admiral . It's really a pleasure to 

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have you with us today . I'd like to 

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start our session by giving you the 

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opportunity to make some opening 

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remarks on the current priorities and 

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issues that are confronting you at U . 

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S . Strategic Command . So with that 

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over to you . Admiral General thank you 

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sir . Good morning to you everyone else 

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on the net and thanks to the Mitchell 

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institute for providing me an 

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opportunity to have what I think is a 

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very important conversation here . The 

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I want to start off with an assertion . 

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Uh and then we'll , y'all keep oclock 

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on me , I may run a little bit long and 

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I don't want to take all the time . You 

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want the timing on this . Um but I 

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assert that the United States and the 

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Department of Defense have not had to 

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consider The full implications of 

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competition through possible crisis and 

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possible armed conflict with a nuclear 

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capable peer adversary in close to 30 

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years . And when you think about that , 

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the implications to every single thing 

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we do in the department are profound . 

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Uh and we are , we have a good strategy 

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to go address that situation . We have 

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fabulous leadership from the Secretary 

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of Defense Secretary esper and Chairman 

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Milley , they have made it quite clear 

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to us in the department how they want 

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us to go attack that . And we're moving 

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out at planks speed to go do that . But 

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it is important to recognize things 

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have changed . Um and part of that , 

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there's a couple of defining 

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characteristics , right ? You can write , 

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I am in great power competition six 

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times on your work college paper and 

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you're probably going to get a beat . 

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Right ? But you have to do the work in 

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terms of what does that mean ? One 

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thing it means is it all starts with 

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the threat , right ? We used to know 

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how to operate in a threat based world 

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that was the Cold War and we did 

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business very differently back then . 

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We're not in that again , but we're 

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coming out of a capabilities based 

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world . Right ? So we have to get back 

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to the idea that all domains are gonna 

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be challenged right ? That uh that 

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strategic deterrence which has always 

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been fundamental foundational to the 

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rest of the defense strategy and what 

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the department does is going to get 

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tested in ways that it hasn't been 

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tested before . We need to be ready to 

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answer that bell look , I'll run 

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through this pretty quickly . I think 

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we'll get into it some more in the Q . 

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And A . But the threat is significant . 

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I'm only going to highlight the 

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strategic forces a piece of this . 

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Remember strategic deterrence is more 

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than just nuclear deterrence 

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particularly now today it is non 

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kinetic space cyber , it is your 

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conventional piece of this . All of 

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this has to be integrated together . 

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It's not just a stratcom job , it is 

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all combatant commands and we have to 

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be able to rethink the way we do 

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business real quick Russia . Uh bottom 

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line is it's easier for me to tell you 

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what they're not modernizing Than to 

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tell you what they are . It's basically 

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everything they've been at it now . 

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Well over 15 years . Um they're all 

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there's 70% complete . It's every 

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element of their forces . But it's more 

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than that , right ? It is their 

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complete control . It is their warning , 

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it is their doctrine , it is their 

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exercises , it is their readiness . It 

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isn't across the board step change in 

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the ability of what they can their 

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capabilities and what they can threaten 

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us with . Um I wanna , let me talk 

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about china may be a little bit more 

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than I have in the past . Um with china 

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it is very important I think look at 

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what they do , not what they say . I 

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think Secretary Pompeo just said that 

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recently , I think he's spot on target . 

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We have come to the same conclusion and 

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again I'm going to talk strategic but 

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it starts with actually their 

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breathtaking expansion in all other 

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military capabilities . Right ? They It 

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has been near stunning . They always go 

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faster than we do . One of my favorite 

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kind of recent examples is they didn't 

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have a coast guard until like 2013 or 

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something right now . They're not 

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exactly like us . Um but they decided 

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in 2013 we need a coast guard Today . 

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They have 255 coast guard ships , right ? 

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It is just stunning what they did by 

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the way , that is a perfect instrument 

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when you're engaged in competition 

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below the threshold of armed conflicts 

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sometimes known as the gray zone . Uh 

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But now nuclear strategic is just the 

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next thing on china's to do list . 

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Right ? So they are about to finish 

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building out for the first time on 

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actual triad by adding a strategic 

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capability to their ehrlich . They too 

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have new road mobile new silo based um 

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much better capabilities that can go 

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into a lot of detail . They have new 

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command and control . They have new 

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warning . They have better readiness . 

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And while they espouse a minimum 

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deterrent strategy they have a number 

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of capabilities that seem inconsistent 

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with that . And in regards to what they 

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say they certainly have the capability 

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to uh huh execute any number of 

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strategic employment strategies not 

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just the minimum deterrence . So in the 

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face of that we're gonna have to change 

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the way we think about deterrence . 

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Right . The basic equation in 

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deterrence has not changed . Right go 

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back reader con readership concealing 

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the can I deny credibly deny benefit or 

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and impose a cost which is greater than 

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what the competitor's seeks to gain . 

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It's just how you apply . That has 

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changed . Uh and I'll just very quickly 

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um it's the dynamics associated with 

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the use or potential use of force . 

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Those are changing and we're working 

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very hard to understand that a good 

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example is um china is on a 

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trajectory to be a strategic period to 

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us by the end of the decade . So for 

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the first time ever the U . S . Is 

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going to face to peer capable nuclear 

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competitors who are different who you 

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have to deter differently . We have 

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never faced that situation before . We 

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are working very hard to strike home 

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along with the broader joint force uh 

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to understand that this is all couples 

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I guess would be my biggest point right . 

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What you're doing strategically is 

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influenced by what you're doing 

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conventionally and it walks all the way 

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down into the gray zone , the level 

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below the threshold of armed conflict , 

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it is not linear . Um , the idea that 

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there is a ladder here I think is 

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flawed . It is nonlinear . There are 

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discontinuities and there are points 

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where a competitors , decision calculus 

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may flip very rapidly on you based on 

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events , particularly inside a crisis . 

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We're working to understand that and be 

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able to have a shared vision of it 

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inside the joint force . Just a couple 

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more points sir and the rest of the 

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audience and we can get into some of 

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the questions . Um the uh , so what do 

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you do about that ? Once you're gonna 

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have a triad that I have to have a 

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triad , a number of the modest 

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supplemental capabilities that were 

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requested to give me the capability and 

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the flexibility to address the 

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situation that I just described . I 

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think you'd be proud of us that that 

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throughout covid 19 and all the impacts 

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of worldwide pandemic stratcom did not 

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miss a beat . We remained fully mission 

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capable throughout a real credit to 

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the General Ray . Uh Admiral Grady , 

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General car blur and others who saw the 

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threat executed and updated plans that 

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we had and able to operate straight 

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through . But I'll make one more point . 

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We move into some questions . We have a 

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triad and the capabilities that we have 

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in part because of the flexibility it 

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provides the ability to hedge inside of 

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it . Right ? So that for an issue in 

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one piece , we're able to compensate 

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with the others as part of the original 

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brilliance in the design . But what it 

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also enables you to do is address the 

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threat or the risk you didn't see 

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coming . We have to be very humble when 

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we look over a long term , in terms of 

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what we think we're gonna need to 

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defend ourselves , that we can 

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accurately predict every single 

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situation or contingency that we're 

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gonna be faced with . We always built 

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margin into our strategic forces to 

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make sure that we could account for the 

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unknown risks that may be out there on 

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alongside the risk that we could 

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reasonably see coming . I think 

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COVID-19 is a great example of where 

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things can manifest that you don't see 

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coming . And with this commission set 

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because of the consequences , it is 

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important to have margin ready to 

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handle that . My predecessors gave me 

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that margin that enabled me to work 

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through COVID-19 . I think we as a 

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nation , uh should learn from that wise 

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lesson in terms of our decisions going 

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forward . David got a lot more stuff to 

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talk about , but I'll just stop there 

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in the interest of time and we can 

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start getting into some questions . 

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Well , thanks very much , Admiral for 

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that great overview of where stratcom 

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is today and some of your concerns . So 

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let's jump right into these issues in a 

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bit more detail . Excuse me . Um You 

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laid out very nicely , very succinctly . 

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Um both Russia and china's efforts 

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in uh not efforts but accomplishments 

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in modernizing diversifying and 

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expanding both their conventional and 

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nuclear forces amongst those could you 

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share with us a bit ? Um what 

274
00:10:56,480 --> 00:10:59,310
aspects of their modernization programs 

275
00:10:59,320 --> 00:11:02,600
that you find most concerning ? Hey , 

276
00:11:02,600 --> 00:11:05,580
so what I would offer for both of them 

277
00:11:05,590 --> 00:11:08,170
is not any one aspect of it . It's the 

278
00:11:08,170 --> 00:11:11,010
comprehensive nature of what they're 

279
00:11:11,010 --> 00:11:14,080
doing . It is the totality of of what 

280
00:11:14,080 --> 00:11:16,990
they're doing . Um So when you add it 

281
00:11:16,990 --> 00:11:19,630
all up and then couple it with their 

282
00:11:19,640 --> 00:11:22,420
actions , right ? We we see aggressive 

283
00:11:22,430 --> 00:11:25,710
action around the world by both of them . 

284
00:11:25,720 --> 00:11:29,580
Um that that concerns me uh that that 

285
00:11:29,590 --> 00:11:32,740
we are not converging on a path that I 

286
00:11:32,740 --> 00:11:34,930
think is beneficial to the world . So 

287
00:11:34,930 --> 00:11:37,040
it is a combination . And I would go 

288
00:11:37,040 --> 00:11:39,530
back to , we have to broaden our 

289
00:11:39,530 --> 00:11:42,460
thinking between a simple weapons count , 

290
00:11:42,540 --> 00:11:45,060
right ? It is much more complicated in 

291
00:11:45,060 --> 00:11:48,920
that in terms of what someone can do . 

292
00:11:48,930 --> 00:11:52,390
And I think another key piece here is 

293
00:11:52,400 --> 00:11:55,430
that this with strategic , with the 

294
00:11:55,430 --> 00:11:57,374
weapons systems that we're talking 

295
00:11:57,374 --> 00:12:00,290
about , it is merely the threat of 

296
00:12:00,290 --> 00:12:02,123
their use that will accomplish a 

297
00:12:02,123 --> 00:12:04,290
political aim . It is a characteristic 

298
00:12:04,290 --> 00:12:06,500
that is really not matched by 

299
00:12:06,500 --> 00:12:08,722
conventional forces at least not to the 

300
00:12:08,722 --> 00:12:11,230
same magnitude and and I don't think we 

301
00:12:11,230 --> 00:12:14,880
we respect what um uh could be 

302
00:12:14,880 --> 00:12:17,990
done simply by merely threatening the 

303
00:12:17,990 --> 00:12:20,157
use of these weapons systems ? And are 

304
00:12:20,157 --> 00:12:22,268
we fluent in our ability to deter and 

305
00:12:22,268 --> 00:12:24,910
respond to that ? Very good . One of 

306
00:12:24,910 --> 00:12:27,130
the other points that you made that I 

307
00:12:27,130 --> 00:12:30,470
think was uh probably got a lot of 

308
00:12:30,470 --> 00:12:33,960
people's attention is sort of the 

309
00:12:34,440 --> 00:12:36,740
it's not the changing nature of 

310
00:12:36,740 --> 00:12:38,684
deterrence because it continues to 

311
00:12:38,684 --> 00:12:41,360
serve as a , as a bedrock of 

312
00:12:41,840 --> 00:12:44,750
our national security architecture . 

313
00:12:45,240 --> 00:12:48,470
However , in many respects , Nuclear 

314
00:12:48,470 --> 00:12:50,692
deterrence in the 21st century is a bit 

315
00:12:50,692 --> 00:12:52,803
different than it was in the previous 

316
00:12:52,803 --> 00:12:55,026
century . I mean , you highlighted with 

317
00:12:55,026 --> 00:12:56,914
the principal Challenges that the 

318
00:12:56,914 --> 00:12:59,026
Chinese are going to come up to speed 

319
00:12:59,026 --> 00:13:01,720
here real quickly and by 2030 we're 

320
00:13:01,720 --> 00:13:03,910
gonna be facing to pure competitors in 

321
00:13:03,910 --> 00:13:05,910
the nuclear regime . Are there some 

322
00:13:05,910 --> 00:13:09,550
other key differences out there that 

323
00:13:09,550 --> 00:13:11,606
that concern you and what should the 

324
00:13:11,606 --> 00:13:13,830
United States due to adapt to these 

325
00:13:13,830 --> 00:13:17,600
changing circumstances ? Well , you 

326
00:13:17,600 --> 00:13:21,540
hit on a big one , which is even in 

327
00:13:21,540 --> 00:13:23,930
my own explanation , sometimes it is 

328
00:13:23,940 --> 00:13:26,510
attempting to simplify this to a two 

329
00:13:26,510 --> 00:13:29,600
party problem and it is not , it is a 

330
00:13:29,610 --> 00:13:32,160
three and actually broader than that 

331
00:13:32,170 --> 00:13:34,710
piece . Another one that I'm under 

332
00:13:34,710 --> 00:13:36,990
emphasizing here a little bit is I'm 

333
00:13:36,990 --> 00:13:39,046
very proud of this nation's extended 

334
00:13:39,046 --> 00:13:41,101
deterrence and assurance commitments 

335
00:13:41,101 --> 00:13:43,268
that we have made , right ? And how we 

336
00:13:43,268 --> 00:13:46,130
will handle honoring those against this 

337
00:13:46,130 --> 00:13:48,930
type of future that we're in , I think 

338
00:13:48,930 --> 00:13:51,041
is something that we need to continue 

339
00:13:51,041 --> 00:13:55,010
to work the understanding uh 

340
00:13:55,020 --> 00:13:58,500
in great detail these the relationships 

341
00:13:58,510 --> 00:14:00,920
uh and how do you bring in space ? How 

342
00:14:00,920 --> 00:14:03,010
do you bring in cyber right . What 

343
00:14:03,010 --> 00:14:05,470
would constitute a strategic attack in 

344
00:14:05,470 --> 00:14:08,600
space or cyber thinking through all of 

345
00:14:08,600 --> 00:14:11,480
the dimensions of this ? Um how how 

346
00:14:11,480 --> 00:14:13,702
does this all couple back down into the 

347
00:14:13,702 --> 00:14:15,813
gray zone ? I'm giving you a bunch of 

348
00:14:15,813 --> 00:14:18,036
the theoretical pieces of this . That's 

349
00:14:18,036 --> 00:14:20,147
the foundation piece and then we move 

350
00:14:20,147 --> 00:14:23,260
on from there . Thank you . Now , 

351
00:14:23,840 --> 00:14:26,007
getting down in a little bit of detail 

352
00:14:26,007 --> 00:14:28,290
about some programs specifics , Both 

353
00:14:28,290 --> 00:14:30,512
the House and the Senate Armed Services 

354
00:14:30,512 --> 00:14:34,120
Committee markups of the 21 . Nd a 

355
00:14:34,120 --> 00:14:36,710
fully funded the ground based strategic 

356
00:14:36,710 --> 00:14:39,240
deterrent program which is intended to 

357
00:14:39,240 --> 00:14:41,710
replace the Minuteman three I C . B . M . 

358
00:14:41,710 --> 00:14:45,160
S . Um Why is this program critical 

359
00:14:45,540 --> 00:14:48,150
and what are the potential implications 

360
00:14:48,160 --> 00:14:51,230
of any further delays or even a 

361
00:14:51,240 --> 00:14:55,130
cancelation as some have advocated for 

362
00:14:55,140 --> 00:14:58,200
both in terms of cost and our overall 

363
00:14:58,210 --> 00:15:01,320
nuclear deterrent posture ? Well sir , 

364
00:15:01,330 --> 00:15:04,370
one I almost wish we didn't describe 

365
00:15:04,370 --> 00:15:06,990
the triad by the weapons systems that 

366
00:15:07,000 --> 00:15:09,960
it is made of . It is you we describe 

367
00:15:09,960 --> 00:15:12,182
it in terms of the attributes . Right ? 

368
00:15:12,182 --> 00:15:16,030
So if you um take away the I . C . Leg . 

369
00:15:16,030 --> 00:15:18,086
In fact , if you take away any leg , 

370
00:15:18,086 --> 00:15:20,086
I'd give you a different version of 

371
00:15:20,086 --> 00:15:22,980
this . You just took away a stack of 

372
00:15:22,990 --> 00:15:26,010
attributes that we have found useful in 

373
00:15:26,010 --> 00:15:28,066
the past and see being useful in the 

374
00:15:28,066 --> 00:15:30,420
future . Can I compensate in some 

375
00:15:30,420 --> 00:15:32,430
respects by coming across and using 

376
00:15:32,430 --> 00:15:35,020
other elements of the triad ? Yes but 

377
00:15:35,020 --> 00:15:37,240
not with those same attributes ? Which 

378
00:15:37,240 --> 00:15:39,990
means you just narrowed the range of 

379
00:15:40,000 --> 00:15:42,740
situations that were able to 

380
00:15:42,750 --> 00:15:45,340
effectively deter . You just took away 

381
00:15:45,350 --> 00:15:48,800
a future hedging capability . Um And on 

382
00:15:48,800 --> 00:15:51,133
top of you you were talking about the I . 

383
00:15:51,133 --> 00:15:54,010
C . Specifically um one of the best 

384
00:15:54,010 --> 00:15:56,232
things I think you could do if you want 

385
00:15:56,232 --> 00:15:58,232
to accelerate china becoming appear 

386
00:15:58,232 --> 00:16:00,343
with us strategically is to take away 

387
00:16:00,343 --> 00:16:02,399
the I see like because you just made 

388
00:16:02,399 --> 00:16:04,510
their problem a lot easier . So I can 

389
00:16:04,510 --> 00:16:06,940
kind of go piece by piece down the 

390
00:16:06,950 --> 00:16:10,120
triad and show you that that if you 

391
00:16:10,120 --> 00:16:12,220
take a piece of it away , that's a 

392
00:16:12,220 --> 00:16:14,330
stack of capabilities and attributes 

393
00:16:14,330 --> 00:16:16,660
that I have don't have . That's gonna 

394
00:16:16,660 --> 00:16:18,650
make it that much harder for me to 

395
00:16:18,650 --> 00:16:21,140
execute the policy of this nation is 

396
00:16:21,140 --> 00:16:23,570
documenting the nuclear posture review . 

397
00:16:23,580 --> 00:16:25,802
And if you go far enough I'm gonna have 

398
00:16:25,802 --> 00:16:27,360
to ask for a new policy . 

399
00:16:30,140 --> 00:16:33,610
Okay . Very good . Um It is a 

400
00:16:33,610 --> 00:16:36,220
complex subject on one hand . On the 

401
00:16:36,220 --> 00:16:39,120
other hand it's pretty simple . Uh And 

402
00:16:39,120 --> 00:16:42,900
they try at his citizen in in 

403
00:16:42,900 --> 00:16:46,210
good stead since it came into existence . 

404
00:16:47,040 --> 00:16:49,207
Um when I had the opportunity to speak 

405
00:16:49,207 --> 00:16:51,373
to General Ray on this series a couple 

406
00:16:51,373 --> 00:16:53,429
of weeks ago , he mentioned that the 

407
00:16:53,429 --> 00:16:55,920
long range standoff weapon or L . R . S . 

408
00:16:55,920 --> 00:16:58,690
O . For short is critical uh to 

409
00:16:58,690 --> 00:17:00,801
maintain tailored deterrence to reach 

410
00:17:00,801 --> 00:17:03,880
any target around the globe . Um And if 

411
00:17:03,880 --> 00:17:05,880
there's a point in time when legacy 

412
00:17:05,880 --> 00:17:08,710
weapons um simply won't be Survivable 

413
00:17:08,720 --> 00:17:10,680
bowl against modern air defenses . 

414
00:17:10,690 --> 00:17:12,412
What's your perspective on the 

415
00:17:12,412 --> 00:17:15,390
implications of any delays or trunk 

416
00:17:15,390 --> 00:17:18,680
ations of the LRS Oh program . And are 

417
00:17:18,680 --> 00:17:20,736
there any benefits from accelerating 

418
00:17:20,736 --> 00:17:24,300
the program ? So the is spot on target 

419
00:17:24,310 --> 00:17:27,690
in terms of the the implications of not 

420
00:17:27,690 --> 00:17:29,634
having that weapon system and then 

421
00:17:29,634 --> 00:17:31,801
fundamentally it will start to call in 

422
00:17:31,801 --> 00:17:34,460
uh , it will limit the flexibility and 

423
00:17:34,460 --> 00:17:36,970
the viability of your airlink right ? 

424
00:17:36,970 --> 00:17:39,180
Which is a key component inside the 

425
00:17:39,180 --> 00:17:41,710
triad . I think if you go back and and 

426
00:17:41,710 --> 00:17:44,970
we have repeatedly shown in history 

427
00:17:44,980 --> 00:17:46,758
that when you're in great power 

428
00:17:46,758 --> 00:17:49,580
competition , what you want our bombers 

429
00:17:49,590 --> 00:17:51,868
right that you want the range you want , 

430
00:17:51,868 --> 00:17:53,701
the payload . They're incredibly 

431
00:17:53,701 --> 00:17:55,868
flexible for you . Today's world is no 

432
00:17:55,868 --> 00:17:57,757
different . You have to honor the 

433
00:17:57,757 --> 00:18:00,390
threat . That's why you get into the 

434
00:18:00,400 --> 00:18:02,420
need for the LRS . So that specific 

435
00:18:02,420 --> 00:18:04,420
piece of technology , I mean if I I 

436
00:18:04,420 --> 00:18:08,350
don't have an LRS . So then the B 50 

437
00:18:08,350 --> 00:18:10,520
two's are just not very useful at that 

438
00:18:10,520 --> 00:18:12,687
point and we're counting on them for a 

439
00:18:12,687 --> 00:18:15,080
while now is the acceleration on LRS . 

440
00:18:15,080 --> 00:18:18,260
So look , I take it all tomorrow if you 

441
00:18:18,270 --> 00:18:20,360
if we could get it to me right and I 

442
00:18:20,360 --> 00:18:22,416
say that not really being flippantly 

443
00:18:22,416 --> 00:18:24,490
remember , I am responsible to the 

444
00:18:24,490 --> 00:18:26,980
people of this nation for their defense . 

445
00:18:26,990 --> 00:18:29,060
And I take that and my command takes 

446
00:18:29,060 --> 00:18:31,060
that very seriously , the better 

447
00:18:31,060 --> 00:18:33,004
capability I have to do that , the 

448
00:18:33,004 --> 00:18:35,580
better job I can do that . But I would 

449
00:18:35,590 --> 00:18:37,820
phrase that question in terms of at 

450
00:18:37,820 --> 00:18:39,764
what cost , Right ? If there was a 

451
00:18:39,764 --> 00:18:42,380
trade off that had to be made , I would 

452
00:18:42,380 --> 00:18:44,840
want to make sure I understood what 

453
00:18:44,840 --> 00:18:47,590
what I was given up for that . So LRS 

454
00:18:47,590 --> 00:18:50,160
so just keep it on time . Right . If we 

455
00:18:50,160 --> 00:18:52,800
just keep it on time , uh that will 

456
00:18:52,800 --> 00:18:56,710
work very good . Now , moving 

457
00:18:56,710 --> 00:19:00,650
on to the other leg , there are nuclear 

458
00:19:00,660 --> 00:19:03,280
capable submarine leg . SSB ends are 

459
00:19:03,280 --> 00:19:05,270
often perceived as invulnerable . 

460
00:19:05,840 --> 00:19:09,260
However , both china and Russia have 

461
00:19:09,430 --> 00:19:12,420
invested significant resources in 

462
00:19:12,420 --> 00:19:14,309
improving their submarine hunting 

463
00:19:14,309 --> 00:19:17,160
capabilities and someone say that the 

464
00:19:17,160 --> 00:19:19,160
submarine forest remains relatively 

465
00:19:19,160 --> 00:19:22,000
brittle meaning that since there's such 

466
00:19:22,000 --> 00:19:24,360
a large percentage of available weapons 

467
00:19:24,360 --> 00:19:27,100
housed in a single platform that tends 

468
00:19:27,100 --> 00:19:30,930
to provide a small number of nodes that 

469
00:19:30,930 --> 00:19:33,970
can be affected to great effect . Um So 

470
00:19:33,970 --> 00:19:35,970
how do these factors play into your 

471
00:19:35,970 --> 00:19:38,192
thinking about the requirements for our 

472
00:19:38,192 --> 00:19:41,400
SSB enforce ? Well , I'll start with um 

473
00:19:41,400 --> 00:19:43,880
and this is true of any stealth 

474
00:19:43,880 --> 00:19:46,047
platform , although the submarines are 

475
00:19:46,047 --> 00:19:48,380
probably the best example is that the , 

476
00:19:48,390 --> 00:19:51,690
when we say the submarine leg is 

477
00:19:51,690 --> 00:19:54,900
survivable , that's not based on just 

478
00:19:54,910 --> 00:19:57,077
individual platforms . Survivability , 

479
00:19:57,077 --> 00:19:59,530
Right ? Submarines are , are very 

480
00:19:59,540 --> 00:20:02,150
difficult to find . There's always a 

481
00:20:02,150 --> 00:20:04,430
classic Haider finder competition going 

482
00:20:04,430 --> 00:20:06,374
on , it's no different than in any 

483
00:20:06,374 --> 00:20:08,263
other domain and they told me I'm 

484
00:20:08,263 --> 00:20:10,486
trying to be very serious and formal if 

485
00:20:10,486 --> 00:20:12,319
they don't have romulan cloaking 

486
00:20:12,319 --> 00:20:14,430
devices on them , right . They're not 

487
00:20:14,430 --> 00:20:16,486
impossible to find . They have to be 

488
00:20:16,486 --> 00:20:18,430
operated correctly , just like any 

489
00:20:18,430 --> 00:20:20,500
spell platform . But you derive that 

490
00:20:20,500 --> 00:20:22,720
from by force Survivability , right . 

491
00:20:22,720 --> 00:20:25,380
It is the combination of the number and 

492
00:20:25,380 --> 00:20:27,491
location and the way you're operating 

493
00:20:27,491 --> 00:20:30,270
the force is what gives you that very 

494
00:20:30,270 --> 00:20:33,170
high confidence uh that that that leg 

495
00:20:33,170 --> 00:20:35,850
is going to survive . So I'm very 

496
00:20:35,850 --> 00:20:37,961
confident that the navy has taken the 

497
00:20:37,961 --> 00:20:40,750
right steps to ensure that we're able 

498
00:20:40,750 --> 00:20:43,320
to maintain for survivability general . 

499
00:20:43,320 --> 00:20:45,380
You are quite correct . I think it's 

500
00:20:45,380 --> 00:20:47,560
important that when we set the 

501
00:20:48,140 --> 00:20:50,362
requirements , particularly the numbers 

502
00:20:50,362 --> 00:20:52,529
for the platforms that we were talking 

503
00:20:52,529 --> 00:20:54,473
about that was based on a specific 

504
00:20:54,473 --> 00:20:56,910
threat . If you change the threat on me 

505
00:20:56,910 --> 00:20:59,160
then we have to come back and then 

506
00:20:59,160 --> 00:21:02,020
rethink what the right number is and 

507
00:21:02,020 --> 00:21:04,400
that's that's going up . I think it's 

508
00:21:04,400 --> 00:21:06,233
also important to understand the 

509
00:21:06,233 --> 00:21:08,567
submarines are just the easiest example . 

510
00:21:08,567 --> 00:21:10,567
This is true in all the rest of the 

511
00:21:10,567 --> 00:21:12,678
legs Going down . You start to , it's 

512
00:21:12,678 --> 00:21:14,789
not just what the threat looks like , 

513
00:21:14,789 --> 00:21:17,011
but it's what it takes to maintain that 

514
00:21:17,011 --> 00:21:19,122
that attribute of the leg , there's a 

515
00:21:19,122 --> 00:21:21,178
minimum number of submarines you can 

516
00:21:21,178 --> 00:21:23,233
get to that . It doesn't matter what 

517
00:21:23,233 --> 00:21:25,500
their um a number of weapons or 

518
00:21:25,500 --> 00:21:27,611
missiles on them . It's the number of 

519
00:21:27,611 --> 00:21:29,722
platforms . I have to have to make my 

520
00:21:29,722 --> 00:21:31,333
statement remain true on for 

521
00:21:31,333 --> 00:21:34,580
survivability . Um but that is why the 

522
00:21:34,590 --> 00:21:36,930
Navy and intercom will say right at 

523
00:21:36,930 --> 00:21:39,130
least 12 , we need to see what the 

524
00:21:39,140 --> 00:21:42,770
threat looks like . Well let's turn to 

525
00:21:42,770 --> 00:21:44,881
the final leg of the triad , although 

526
00:21:44,881 --> 00:21:47,100
you've already mentioned it . Um and 

527
00:21:47,100 --> 00:21:50,000
that's your breathing segment Until the 

528
00:21:50,000 --> 00:21:52,460
first B- 21 has become operationally 

529
00:21:52,460 --> 00:21:55,030
available . Um the current airborne leg 

530
00:21:55,030 --> 00:21:57,640
is dependent on fewer than 100 b 52 s 

531
00:21:57,640 --> 00:22:00,010
by the way , the youngest being 58 

532
00:22:00,020 --> 00:22:03,450
years old . Uh and the B-2 aircraft of 

533
00:22:03,450 --> 00:22:07,160
which we only have 20 that are capable 

534
00:22:07,160 --> 00:22:09,550
of penetrating modern air defenses . So 

535
00:22:10,040 --> 00:22:11,929
I think I know the answer to this 

536
00:22:11,929 --> 00:22:14,040
question , but how important is it to 

537
00:22:14,040 --> 00:22:16,096
keep this leg operationally viable ? 

538
00:22:16,096 --> 00:22:17,873
Well , it is , it is absolutely 

539
00:22:17,873 --> 00:22:19,910
important and and because of the 

540
00:22:19,920 --> 00:22:22,740
signaling flexibility that you see in 

541
00:22:22,740 --> 00:22:25,050
the air leg , you get an almost daily 

542
00:22:25,050 --> 00:22:28,200
demonstration right of what the air leg 

543
00:22:28,200 --> 00:22:30,790
can do for you . I would point back to 

544
00:22:30,800 --> 00:22:32,720
the way we're executing and talk 

545
00:22:32,720 --> 00:22:34,720
General Ray about this because he's 

546
00:22:34,720 --> 00:22:36,664
responsible for it . The way we're 

547
00:22:36,664 --> 00:22:38,831
executing a bomber task force missions 

548
00:22:38,831 --> 00:22:41,040
is probably the iconic example of what 

549
00:22:41,040 --> 00:22:44,260
dynamic force employment looks like and 

550
00:22:44,260 --> 00:22:47,360
I really gotta . And so I am proud and 

551
00:22:47,360 --> 00:22:49,582
thankful for the effort , the air force 

552
00:22:49,582 --> 00:22:51,749
is going through to sustain this leg , 

553
00:22:51,749 --> 00:22:54,082
right ? I've had sorties now and B 52 S . 

554
00:22:54,082 --> 00:22:56,370
B Tuesday , I just threw a KC 10 to hit 

555
00:22:56,370 --> 00:22:58,259
the first A are for a B . T . F . 

556
00:22:58,259 --> 00:23:00,426
Mission . So the professionalism , the 

557
00:23:00,426 --> 00:23:02,426
commitment of the service , they're 

558
00:23:02,426 --> 00:23:04,426
doing the right things to make sure 

559
00:23:04,426 --> 00:23:07,090
that those um platforms make it to 

560
00:23:07,090 --> 00:23:09,820
their recapitalization points . Um but 

561
00:23:09,820 --> 00:23:13,720
and I need that . Oh , very good . Um I 

562
00:23:13,720 --> 00:23:15,887
was gonna ask you if they gave you the 

563
00:23:15,887 --> 00:23:18,109
opportunity when you're flying a B52 to 

564
00:23:18,109 --> 00:23:20,220
attempt to refuel it because I've had 

565
00:23:20,220 --> 00:23:22,553
the good fortune of flying uh the B one , 

566
00:23:22,553 --> 00:23:25,500
the B two and the B 52 refueling each 

567
00:23:25,500 --> 00:23:27,850
of them . And that's a bear trying to , 

568
00:23:28,240 --> 00:23:30,590
Trying to refuel behind that tanker and 

569
00:23:30,590 --> 00:23:33,100
a B 52 Mr later , I'll tell you , I 

570
00:23:33,100 --> 00:23:35,100
just tried to do a heading change . 

571
00:23:35,100 --> 00:23:38,680
That's a I did turn me over in the B 

572
00:23:38,680 --> 00:23:42,170
two stem on the boom in the stem 

573
00:23:42,180 --> 00:23:44,820
and six seconds . Um That's all I 

574
00:23:44,820 --> 00:23:48,170
lasted , right . It was much 

575
00:23:48,170 --> 00:23:50,480
respect to the airmen that know how to 

576
00:23:50,490 --> 00:23:53,760
do that . Um Admiral , you've referred 

577
00:23:53,760 --> 00:23:57,340
to uh strap calm as the parent of space 

578
00:23:57,340 --> 00:24:00,770
com , which it is . How is that process 

579
00:24:00,770 --> 00:24:03,030
of transitioning responsibilities and 

580
00:24:03,030 --> 00:24:06,320
the personnel over to uh space com gone ? 

581
00:24:06,330 --> 00:24:08,600
What's worked well and what remains to 

582
00:24:08,600 --> 00:24:11,100
be done and how do you envision the two 

583
00:24:11,110 --> 00:24:13,166
unified commands working together in 

584
00:24:13,166 --> 00:24:16,290
the future ? Hey , sir ? Um It just , 

585
00:24:16,300 --> 00:24:18,467
it probably just couldn't be going any 

586
00:24:18,467 --> 00:24:20,633
better . General Raymond was here just 

587
00:24:20,633 --> 00:24:22,578
yesterday . Uh and in fact we were 

588
00:24:22,578 --> 00:24:24,689
having the first stratcom Space . Com 

589
00:24:24,689 --> 00:24:26,460
warfighter talks so I probably 

590
00:24:26,460 --> 00:24:28,516
shouldn't characterize it anymore as 

591
00:24:28,516 --> 00:24:30,870
the proud parent . It's more you just , 

592
00:24:30,880 --> 00:24:34,840
you just went to visit um the family 

593
00:24:34,840 --> 00:24:37,360
business that you had turned over to 

594
00:24:37,370 --> 00:24:39,537
one of your kids , right ? So they are 

595
00:24:39,537 --> 00:24:41,950
up fully operational . You know , we 

596
00:24:41,950 --> 00:24:44,330
have a pure relationship now , I think 

597
00:24:44,330 --> 00:24:47,470
that's a key piece . Um We're still 

598
00:24:47,470 --> 00:24:49,637
supporting them in a couple of areas , 

599
00:24:49,637 --> 00:24:51,637
you know the bureaucracy has a long 

600
00:24:51,637 --> 00:24:53,803
tail in some cases . Um but we see the 

601
00:24:53,803 --> 00:24:55,803
world the same way . I would really 

602
00:24:55,803 --> 00:24:58,830
compliment General Raymond in Spaceman 

603
00:24:58,840 --> 00:25:01,010
for some very good work in terms of 

604
00:25:01,010 --> 00:25:04,030
thinking about architecture strategies . 

605
00:25:04,040 --> 00:25:07,330
We had a good back and forth , a number 

606
00:25:07,330 --> 00:25:09,500
of things that they're doing in a in a 

607
00:25:09,500 --> 00:25:11,556
space architecture I think have very 

608
00:25:11,556 --> 00:25:13,722
direct applicability to the future N . 

609
00:25:13,722 --> 00:25:15,500
C . Three architecture that I'm 

610
00:25:15,500 --> 00:25:18,000
responsible for in uh my Nuclear 

611
00:25:18,000 --> 00:25:20,167
Enterprise or N . C . Three Enterprise 

612
00:25:20,167 --> 00:25:23,660
Center hat uh and so uh that it was 

613
00:25:23,660 --> 00:25:27,320
a very good meeting and that idea that 

614
00:25:27,320 --> 00:25:29,820
that we are so closely coupled is 

615
00:25:29,820 --> 00:25:32,480
something that we share with all of the 

616
00:25:32,480 --> 00:25:34,536
other combatant commands , right ? I 

617
00:25:34,536 --> 00:25:36,647
can go through and give you a similar 

618
00:25:36,647 --> 00:25:38,702
story with every other one of them . 

619
00:25:38,702 --> 00:25:40,869
And that's a key thing that we have to 

620
00:25:40,869 --> 00:25:42,869
do in the future in terms of global 

621
00:25:42,869 --> 00:25:45,036
integration . The ability for us as 11 

622
00:25:45,036 --> 00:25:47,258
combatant commands under the leadership 

623
00:25:47,258 --> 00:25:49,313
of the chairman and the secretary to 

624
00:25:49,313 --> 00:25:51,610
have a shared understanding right of 

625
00:25:51,610 --> 00:25:54,090
what the nation expects us to do and 

626
00:25:54,090 --> 00:25:56,910
then globally integrating fires . Ops 

627
00:25:56,920 --> 00:25:58,753
messaging , integrated strategic 

628
00:25:58,753 --> 00:26:01,130
deterrence planning so that we all 

629
00:26:01,130 --> 00:26:03,290
function as one that's going to be a 

630
00:26:03,300 --> 00:26:06,650
key advantage that we need to see is 

631
00:26:06,650 --> 00:26:10,460
moving into the future . Outstanding . 

632
00:26:10,840 --> 00:26:13,690
Um , let's turn to the subject of arms 

633
00:26:13,690 --> 00:26:17,290
race dynamics . Just as you 

634
00:26:17,670 --> 00:26:20,540
summarized Russia and china currently 

635
00:26:20,540 --> 00:26:23,770
modernizing their nuclear forces uh in 

636
00:26:23,770 --> 00:26:25,770
the United States is in the initial 

637
00:26:25,770 --> 00:26:27,659
stages of a long deferred nuclear 

638
00:26:27,659 --> 00:26:30,200
modernization program beyond the price 

639
00:26:30,200 --> 00:26:32,750
tag . Critics of the nuclear 

640
00:26:32,750 --> 00:26:35,550
modernization effort claim that the US 

641
00:26:35,550 --> 00:26:38,740
is spurring a renewed nuclear arms race . 

642
00:26:38,920 --> 00:26:40,642
How would you respond to those 

643
00:26:40,642 --> 00:26:43,530
criticisms ? Sure . I'll tell you . Um , 

644
00:26:43,700 --> 00:26:47,170
they we have been working to 

645
00:26:47,180 --> 00:26:50,630
reignite a debate 

646
00:26:50,640 --> 00:26:52,770
uh and better understanding this 

647
00:26:52,780 --> 00:26:54,724
meeting is a great example of that 

648
00:26:54,724 --> 00:26:57,050
about strategic deterrence . And part 

649
00:26:57,050 --> 00:26:58,994
of that is a social media campaign 

650
00:26:58,994 --> 00:27:02,350
where we're addressing uh this kind of 

651
00:27:02,350 --> 00:27:04,570
pervasive myths that are out there and 

652
00:27:04,570 --> 00:27:06,737
now we love the conversation , right ? 

653
00:27:06,737 --> 00:27:10,620
We look very hard at every comment that 

654
00:27:10,620 --> 00:27:13,140
we get back asking ourselves did we 

655
00:27:13,140 --> 00:27:15,307
miss something , is there something in 

656
00:27:15,307 --> 00:27:17,473
here that we need to seize on and take 

657
00:27:17,473 --> 00:27:19,980
advantage of . But the guy just 

658
00:27:19,980 --> 00:27:21,924
confessed , I don't understand the 

659
00:27:21,924 --> 00:27:23,924
criticism that was starting an arms 

660
00:27:23,924 --> 00:27:27,240
race . I just went through that that 15 

661
00:27:27,240 --> 00:27:31,000
years ago Russia unilaterally starts to 

662
00:27:31,000 --> 00:27:34,870
modernize her entire , Arsenal 

663
00:27:34,870 --> 00:27:37,200
70% complete China is not too far 

664
00:27:37,200 --> 00:27:40,050
behind our response to that at the time 

665
00:27:40,340 --> 00:27:42,960
is to do nothing , right ? We don't do 

666
00:27:42,970 --> 00:27:46,690
anything right . The no one has lowered 

667
00:27:46,690 --> 00:27:48,746
the role of nuclear weapons in their 

668
00:27:48,746 --> 00:27:50,912
strategy more than the United States . 

669
00:27:50,912 --> 00:27:53,134
Having my staff check on this , I think 

670
00:27:53,134 --> 00:27:54,880
we are the only nation ever do 

671
00:27:54,880 --> 00:27:58,000
unilateral um nuclear reductions . I 

672
00:27:58,000 --> 00:28:00,056
think you can go back in history and 

673
00:28:00,056 --> 00:28:02,610
see where we did that . Um ask yourself 

674
00:28:02,610 --> 00:28:05,440
what we got in return for them . Um we 

675
00:28:05,440 --> 00:28:07,950
have extended these systems that B 50 

676
00:28:07,950 --> 00:28:10,180
two's you're talking about 100 years , 

677
00:28:10,180 --> 00:28:12,760
right ? We're gonna take Ohio's 

678
00:28:12,760 --> 00:28:14,927
designed for 30 years . We're going to 

679
00:28:14,927 --> 00:28:17,570
get them to 42 . A whole class going 

680
00:28:17,570 --> 00:28:19,350
longer than we've ever had any 

681
00:28:19,360 --> 00:28:22,670
individual submarine go . Um Minuteman 

682
00:28:22,670 --> 00:28:24,730
was a 10 year lifetime missile we're 

683
00:28:24,730 --> 00:28:27,020
going to take for 60 . And then at the 

684
00:28:27,020 --> 00:28:29,940
last possible moment to avoid the 

685
00:28:29,940 --> 00:28:32,710
beginnings of unilateral disarmament in 

686
00:28:32,710 --> 00:28:34,654
the face of the greatest threat we 

687
00:28:34,654 --> 00:28:37,250
faced in 30 years . I'm accused of 

688
00:28:37,250 --> 00:28:39,480
starting an arms race . I just don't 

689
00:28:39,480 --> 00:28:42,940
understand that . Well , said Admiral . 

690
00:28:42,950 --> 00:28:46,500
Well said , um now with respect to 

691
00:28:46,500 --> 00:28:48,667
allies and the nonproliferation , I've 

692
00:28:48,667 --> 00:28:50,722
heard you say that the United States 

693
00:28:50,722 --> 00:28:52,611
policy of extended deterrence and 

694
00:28:52,611 --> 00:28:55,040
assurance has played a pivotal role in 

695
00:28:55,050 --> 00:28:57,460
promoting non proliferation . Could you 

696
00:28:57,460 --> 00:28:59,682
elaborate a bit on that point ? And how 

697
00:28:59,682 --> 00:29:01,793
does our nuclear modernization factor 

698
00:29:01,793 --> 00:29:04,690
into that equation ? Well , the bottom 

699
00:29:04,690 --> 00:29:07,530
line is , and I am very proud of this 

700
00:29:07,530 --> 00:29:09,530
nation and the decision makers that 

701
00:29:09,530 --> 00:29:12,140
established that policy , uh I think 

702
00:29:12,140 --> 00:29:13,640
that has done more for non 

703
00:29:13,640 --> 00:29:15,862
proliferation than any other single act 

704
00:29:15,870 --> 00:29:19,670
in history . I think it has been good 

705
00:29:19,680 --> 00:29:23,430
for a free and open world . But to 

706
00:29:23,430 --> 00:29:26,280
do that , you have to have capabilities 

707
00:29:26,380 --> 00:29:29,150
such that you give your ally confidence 

708
00:29:29,260 --> 00:29:31,520
that you're able to follow through on 

709
00:29:31,520 --> 00:29:33,464
the commitment . And again , we're 

710
00:29:33,464 --> 00:29:35,480
going to get tested in ways that we 

711
00:29:35,480 --> 00:29:37,900
haven't been tested before . And so 

712
00:29:37,900 --> 00:29:40,470
absent these capabilities , it is going 

713
00:29:40,470 --> 00:29:43,550
to be harder uh , to give the allies 

714
00:29:43,550 --> 00:29:46,430
the confidence in us that we have the 

715
00:29:46,440 --> 00:29:48,630
capability to follow through on the 

716
00:29:48,640 --> 00:29:50,696
very valuable commitments that we've 

717
00:29:50,696 --> 00:29:53,680
made . Um , one of the 

718
00:29:53,690 --> 00:29:57,490
options that is sometimes discussed 

719
00:29:57,490 --> 00:30:01,310
is this issue of a no first use policy . 

720
00:30:01,740 --> 00:30:04,790
Um , I presume that you're not in favor 

721
00:30:04,790 --> 00:30:06,910
of a no first use policy . But could 

722
00:30:06,910 --> 00:30:09,840
you explain to our audience what impact 

723
00:30:09,840 --> 00:30:11,620
such a policy would have on our 

724
00:30:11,620 --> 00:30:15,330
commitments to our allies . So , um , 

725
00:30:15,340 --> 00:30:18,180
my best military advice remains 

726
00:30:18,180 --> 00:30:21,420
strongly that a we should not have a no 

727
00:30:21,420 --> 00:30:23,660
first use policy . Uh , and there's 

728
00:30:23,670 --> 00:30:27,320
many reasons for that uh , assurance 

729
00:30:27,320 --> 00:30:29,460
to allies and others that we have 

730
00:30:29,460 --> 00:30:31,571
extended that commitment to is at the 

731
00:30:31,571 --> 00:30:34,050
top of the list . Right . Second is I 

732
00:30:34,050 --> 00:30:36,100
just don't think it has much 

733
00:30:36,110 --> 00:30:39,450
credibility . Um , I , the soviet union 

734
00:30:39,450 --> 00:30:41,561
had a no first use policy and I don't 

735
00:30:41,561 --> 00:30:43,728
think that the general amazed , Okay , 

736
00:30:43,728 --> 00:30:45,900
we're we're good . Uh , and uh , if I 

737
00:30:45,900 --> 00:30:48,067
could , but the problem with having me 

738
00:30:48,067 --> 00:30:50,233
and I am , you know , a navy guy loved 

739
00:30:50,233 --> 00:30:52,560
telling see stories , um , the , uh , 

740
00:30:52,570 --> 00:30:54,403
if you go back far enough in our 

741
00:30:54,403 --> 00:30:56,930
history , this nation used to have a 

742
00:30:56,940 --> 00:30:59,170
policy that said , we would not execute 

743
00:30:59,180 --> 00:31:01,810
unrestricted submarine warfare . If you 

744
00:31:01,810 --> 00:31:03,710
go back in the early part of the 

745
00:31:03,710 --> 00:31:05,990
century , unrestricted submarine 

746
00:31:05,990 --> 00:31:09,220
warfare was held with it's not the same , 

747
00:31:09,220 --> 00:31:11,560
but at the time it was considered 

748
00:31:12,040 --> 00:31:15,400
barbaric that a civilized nation would 

749
00:31:15,400 --> 00:31:17,456
consider doing that . And there were 

750
00:31:17,456 --> 00:31:19,678
these very long debates between nations 

751
00:31:19,678 --> 00:31:21,567
whether you should , you should , 

752
00:31:21,567 --> 00:31:23,940
etcetera , and our policy for decades 

753
00:31:23,950 --> 00:31:25,740
was that we would not execute 

754
00:31:25,740 --> 00:31:28,430
unrestricted submarine warfare until 

755
00:31:28,430 --> 00:31:30,597
that policy changed in an afternoon on 

756
00:31:30,597 --> 00:31:32,486
december 7th 1941 . And in fact , 

757
00:31:32,486 --> 00:31:34,319
there's a historical debate if a 

758
00:31:34,319 --> 00:31:36,430
subordinate commander didn't do it on 

759
00:31:36,430 --> 00:31:38,541
his own before the president told him 

760
00:31:38,541 --> 00:31:40,486
to do , it's a question of daytime 

761
00:31:40,486 --> 00:31:42,708
groups . And so I I think we have to be 

762
00:31:42,708 --> 00:31:44,430
very humble uh in terms of the 

763
00:31:44,430 --> 00:31:46,430
credibility of policies like that , 

764
00:31:46,430 --> 00:31:50,280
particularly when um um so just be 

765
00:31:50,280 --> 00:31:54,250
humble . Um speaking of 

766
00:31:54,250 --> 00:31:57,050
limited use in different varying 

767
00:31:57,050 --> 00:32:00,520
applications , Russia maintains a 

768
00:32:00,530 --> 00:32:02,641
significant arsenal and small nuclear 

769
00:32:02,641 --> 00:32:06,060
weapons . Um I know some people 

770
00:32:06,060 --> 00:32:08,282
referring to tactical nuclear weapons . 

771
00:32:08,282 --> 00:32:10,060
I just , I just there's nothing 

772
00:32:10,060 --> 00:32:12,171
tactical about a nuclear weapon , but 

773
00:32:12,171 --> 00:32:13,838
be that as it may , it's been 

774
00:32:13,838 --> 00:32:15,838
postulated that Russia might pursue 

775
00:32:15,838 --> 00:32:18,280
early and limited first use of nuclear 

776
00:32:18,280 --> 00:32:21,210
weapons in a conflict in europe , to 

777
00:32:21,220 --> 00:32:23,450
end it on terms favorable to Russia . 

778
00:32:24,040 --> 00:32:25,818
This is an approach that's been 

779
00:32:25,818 --> 00:32:27,984
described as escalate to deescalate er 

780
00:32:28,050 --> 00:32:30,328
which a predecessor general heightened , 

781
00:32:30,328 --> 00:32:32,439
referred to as escalate the wind . Um 

782
00:32:32,439 --> 00:32:34,494
is that an accurate portrayal of how 

783
00:32:34,494 --> 00:32:36,439
Russia envisions the role of small 

784
00:32:36,439 --> 00:32:38,661
nuclear weapons in its nuclear strategy 

785
00:32:38,661 --> 00:32:40,828
and doctrine . And what kind of impact 

786
00:32:40,828 --> 00:32:42,994
does this have on our requirements for 

787
00:32:42,994 --> 00:32:46,080
deterrence ? Well sir , one uh they 

788
00:32:46,080 --> 00:32:48,120
certainly are capable of doing 

789
00:32:48,120 --> 00:32:50,490
precisely the strategy that you just 

790
00:32:50,490 --> 00:32:54,150
described right and uh that is a type 

791
00:32:54,150 --> 00:32:57,670
of discontinuity or non linearity in 

792
00:32:57,670 --> 00:33:01,190
terms of deterrence theory . I I agree 

793
00:33:01,190 --> 00:33:03,357
with you by the way , there is no such 

794
00:33:03,357 --> 00:33:05,720
thing as a non strategic use of a 

795
00:33:05,720 --> 00:33:08,050
nuclear weapon . And in fact I think 

796
00:33:08,050 --> 00:33:10,161
this distinction that we have between 

797
00:33:10,161 --> 00:33:12,640
these are strategic and these are not 

798
00:33:12,650 --> 00:33:16,190
is actually very artificial is at best 

799
00:33:16,190 --> 00:33:18,357
dated and may have always been wrong . 

800
00:33:18,357 --> 00:33:20,579
So I caution us from trying to put them 

801
00:33:20,579 --> 00:33:22,468
in in these two buckets . I can't 

802
00:33:22,468 --> 00:33:24,690
imagine that you would look up and go , 

803
00:33:24,690 --> 00:33:27,023
oh that's a non strategic , that's okay . 

804
00:33:27,023 --> 00:33:29,650
Um so we've got to be very humble about 

805
00:33:29,650 --> 00:33:33,140
that . Uh my job is to make sure that 

806
00:33:33,150 --> 00:33:35,470
given what they can do and any 

807
00:33:35,470 --> 00:33:38,740
postulated use of this with the example 

808
00:33:38,740 --> 00:33:40,851
we're talking about here being a very 

809
00:33:40,851 --> 00:33:43,540
good one . How do I ensure in crisis ? 

810
00:33:43,540 --> 00:33:46,530
Probably that the equation still holds 

811
00:33:46,530 --> 00:33:48,970
that when they think about that , I can 

812
00:33:48,970 --> 00:33:51,050
either deny the benefit or impose a 

813
00:33:51,050 --> 00:33:53,920
cost credibly such that I deter the use 

814
00:33:54,110 --> 00:33:56,166
think the nuclear posture review was 

815
00:33:56,166 --> 00:33:58,277
wise in the supplemental capabilities 

816
00:33:58,277 --> 00:34:00,443
that were added to the ones we already 

817
00:34:00,443 --> 00:34:03,170
have ? I think it's important . Um the 

818
00:34:03,170 --> 00:34:05,990
ones we have are very capable but they 

819
00:34:05,990 --> 00:34:08,340
certainly didn't deter Russia from 

820
00:34:08,340 --> 00:34:11,000
developing the very capability that 

821
00:34:11,000 --> 00:34:13,111
you're talking about . Hence the need 

822
00:34:13,111 --> 00:34:15,222
for a more comprehensive approach . I 

823
00:34:15,222 --> 00:34:17,389
want to add on just one other point in 

824
00:34:17,389 --> 00:34:20,480
terms of the the fact that they have 

825
00:34:20,480 --> 00:34:23,180
several 1000 non treaty accountable 

826
00:34:23,180 --> 00:34:26,360
weapons actually concerns me in terms 

827
00:34:26,360 --> 00:34:29,840
of why do you have those ? Um I'm 

828
00:34:29,850 --> 00:34:32,210
somewhat surprised sometimes that in 

829
00:34:32,210 --> 00:34:34,650
our conversations there's not more 

830
00:34:34,650 --> 00:34:37,440
about why do you have those things ? 

831
00:34:37,440 --> 00:34:40,950
Right uh that that wasn't free . Um 

832
00:34:40,960 --> 00:34:44,720
And uh my deputy commander , I I'm 

833
00:34:44,720 --> 00:34:46,498
glad we're having the new start 

834
00:34:46,498 --> 00:34:48,664
discussions . This is a place where we 

835
00:34:48,664 --> 00:34:50,942
can get into that type of conversation . 

836
00:34:50,942 --> 00:34:53,164
I applaud um both the United States and 

837
00:34:53,164 --> 00:34:55,220
Russia or at least being able to sit 

838
00:34:55,220 --> 00:34:58,050
down at the table um and let's discuss 

839
00:34:58,050 --> 00:35:00,120
what we have to do to improve 

840
00:35:00,130 --> 00:35:02,352
confidence , safety , security and head 

841
00:35:02,352 --> 00:35:05,010
to a mutually beneficial world . I sure 

842
00:35:05,010 --> 00:35:07,710
wish china would sit down a responsible 

843
00:35:07,710 --> 00:35:10,810
power has those conversations . But 

844
00:35:10,810 --> 00:35:12,921
that's so important to me that I have 

845
00:35:12,921 --> 00:35:15,390
dedicated my deputy commander as a part 

846
00:35:15,390 --> 00:35:17,970
of that team . Right ? So that I have 

847
00:35:18,140 --> 00:35:20,090
Gerald bustier as a part of those 

848
00:35:20,090 --> 00:35:22,300
conversations to go after . And and 

849
00:35:22,300 --> 00:35:25,580
really bring that piece into um into 

850
00:35:25,580 --> 00:35:28,520
the conversation of what is the purpose 

851
00:35:28,520 --> 00:35:31,730
of those . Uh and how can we account 

852
00:35:31,730 --> 00:35:34,750
for that . It's very insightful . Thank 

853
00:35:34,750 --> 00:35:37,960
you . It's a bit of a follow up is the 

854
00:35:37,970 --> 00:35:41,830
W . 76-2 low yield trident submarine 

855
00:35:41,830 --> 00:35:43,774
warheads sufficient to counter the 

856
00:35:43,774 --> 00:35:46,890
perception of an exploitable gap in U . 

857
00:35:46,890 --> 00:35:49,057
S . Regional deterrence capabilities . 

858
00:35:49,057 --> 00:35:51,168
And are there other options out there 

859
00:35:51,168 --> 00:35:54,370
that you're considering ? Well sir it 

860
00:35:54,380 --> 00:35:56,810
is a very welcome addition . It is 

861
00:35:56,810 --> 00:35:58,921
doing exactly what it was designed to 

862
00:35:58,921 --> 00:36:00,977
do but it's important to remember it 

863
00:36:00,977 --> 00:36:03,143
already added into an already existing 

864
00:36:03,143 --> 00:36:05,420
stack of capabilities . Right ? That is 

865
00:36:05,420 --> 00:36:07,810
designed to also address that uh 

866
00:36:07,820 --> 00:36:11,040
including low yield Malcolm the dual 

867
00:36:11,040 --> 00:36:13,151
capable aircraft capabilities that we 

868
00:36:13,151 --> 00:36:15,670
have . I need those to complement your 

869
00:36:15,680 --> 00:36:19,080
W- 76 to use just a part of that um 

870
00:36:19,090 --> 00:36:22,270
stack of capabilities . And then the 

871
00:36:22,280 --> 00:36:24,740
NPR also wisely talked about the need 

872
00:36:24,740 --> 00:36:26,796
for us sea launched cruise missile . 

873
00:36:26,796 --> 00:36:28,796
Right and again that has utility in 

874
00:36:28,796 --> 00:36:32,390
that area that I'm responsible for as 

875
00:36:32,390 --> 00:36:34,820
well as a very good beginning to offset 

876
00:36:34,820 --> 00:36:36,931
the numbers of non treaty accountable 

877
00:36:36,931 --> 00:36:38,987
weapons and has great benefit in the 

878
00:36:38,987 --> 00:36:42,480
assurance of our allies . Okay , one 

879
00:36:42,480 --> 00:36:44,600
more sort of broad question before we 

880
00:36:44,600 --> 00:36:47,250
open it up to our audience um in your 

881
00:36:47,250 --> 00:36:49,220
view what are the most serious 

882
00:36:49,220 --> 00:36:52,930
misunderstandings among nuclear critics 

883
00:36:52,940 --> 00:36:55,760
out there ? Especially members of 

884
00:36:55,770 --> 00:36:58,260
Congress general . I'm gonna answer 

885
00:36:58,260 --> 00:37:00,427
that question but I if I could get two 

886
00:37:00,427 --> 00:37:02,760
more minutes I want to talk about N . C . 

887
00:37:02,760 --> 00:37:04,871
Three for a second as well . I have a 

888
00:37:04,871 --> 00:37:07,880
bit of a touch of good news in that 

889
00:37:07,880 --> 00:37:11,050
area . You know my my the biggest 

890
00:37:11,050 --> 00:37:13,350
misconception I think and I will call 

891
00:37:13,350 --> 00:37:15,350
it a misconception . It's almost an 

892
00:37:15,350 --> 00:37:17,017
absence is , we never seem to 

893
00:37:17,017 --> 00:37:19,128
acknowledge that there's a threat out 

894
00:37:19,128 --> 00:37:21,294
there that most of these conversations 

895
00:37:21,294 --> 00:37:23,406
are almost on this frictionless plane 

896
00:37:23,406 --> 00:37:25,461
and we're only talking about us . Um 

897
00:37:25,461 --> 00:37:27,350
when in fact everything that this 

898
00:37:27,350 --> 00:37:29,350
nation does is in , in an effort to 

899
00:37:29,350 --> 00:37:31,406
defend itself , it's in an effort to 

900
00:37:31,406 --> 00:37:34,300
address um threats that we have out 

901
00:37:34,300 --> 00:37:37,210
there . And the , and I'll tell you , I 

902
00:37:37,210 --> 00:37:40,420
think a sign of that is um look , 

903
00:37:40,430 --> 00:37:42,880
I'm , you know , an old cold war God , 

904
00:37:42,880 --> 00:37:45,047
when I was younger , I actually done a 

905
00:37:45,047 --> 00:37:46,880
duck and cover drill . Right . I 

906
00:37:46,880 --> 00:37:48,713
suspect you have a piece of your 

907
00:37:48,713 --> 00:37:50,824
audience that actually knows what I'm 

908
00:37:50,824 --> 00:37:52,991
talking about . And then there's a ton 

909
00:37:52,991 --> 00:37:55,213
of them that , that have no idea what I 

910
00:37:55,213 --> 00:37:57,158
just said . Um I was in elementary 

911
00:37:57,158 --> 00:37:59,269
school by the way , not high school , 

912
00:37:59,269 --> 00:38:01,820
but the point being here is we Palpably 

913
00:38:01,820 --> 00:38:04,430
could feel the threat back then . We 

914
00:38:04,430 --> 00:38:06,597
knew it was something we had to defend 

915
00:38:06,597 --> 00:38:08,763
ourselves against . And this is what I 

916
00:38:08,763 --> 00:38:10,819
think is the great accomplishment of 

917
00:38:10,819 --> 00:38:13,041
the United States . Not only did it not 

918
00:38:13,041 --> 00:38:15,097
happen , right ? We have 70 years of 

919
00:38:15,097 --> 00:38:18,240
nuclear non use . Um , we don't worry 

920
00:38:18,240 --> 00:38:20,351
about it anymore . Right . The threat 

921
00:38:20,351 --> 00:38:22,880
is still there . Right . My kids have 

922
00:38:22,880 --> 00:38:25,850
not spent one moment worried about the 

923
00:38:25,850 --> 00:38:28,140
fact that there could be a nuclear use , 

924
00:38:28,620 --> 00:38:31,360
that's victory . That is victory and 

925
00:38:31,360 --> 00:38:33,360
strategic deterrence , but not only 

926
00:38:33,360 --> 00:38:36,080
prevented or deter it , but take it out 

927
00:38:36,080 --> 00:38:38,560
of the american psyche . So I worry we 

928
00:38:38,560 --> 00:38:41,080
forgot how we got here , right . That 

929
00:38:41,080 --> 00:38:43,800
wasn't free . That required wise 

930
00:38:43,800 --> 00:38:46,880
investments in the capabilities needed . 

931
00:38:46,890 --> 00:38:49,770
That is hundreds of thousands of men 

932
00:38:49,770 --> 00:38:51,510
and women who dedicated their 

933
00:38:51,510 --> 00:38:54,830
professional lives in this mission . 

934
00:38:54,840 --> 00:38:57,060
You're never gonna know their names , 

935
00:38:57,060 --> 00:39:00,380
right ? Um but they took the fear out 

936
00:39:00,390 --> 00:39:02,390
and and realizing that this was not 

937
00:39:02,390 --> 00:39:04,557
free . I'm gonna , the future is going 

938
00:39:04,557 --> 00:39:06,723
to require these capabilities . You're 

939
00:39:06,723 --> 00:39:06,230
gonna have to have men and women who 

940
00:39:06,230 --> 00:39:08,590
are also willing to go do that such 

941
00:39:08,590 --> 00:39:10,910
that that we don't have to to live 

942
00:39:10,910 --> 00:39:13,021
inside that world . That's my biggest 

943
00:39:13,021 --> 00:39:15,670
fear . And the second thing I wanted to 

944
00:39:15,670 --> 00:39:18,620
mention on n . c . three . Um because I 

945
00:39:18,620 --> 00:39:20,750
am proud to say of course that the 

946
00:39:20,760 --> 00:39:23,120
great leadership by the department 

947
00:39:23,130 --> 00:39:24,574
Congress , you know , the 

948
00:39:24,574 --> 00:39:26,519
recapitalization systems are fully 

949
00:39:26,519 --> 00:39:29,540
funded including N . C . Three . Uh and 

950
00:39:29,540 --> 00:39:31,540
this is the first time you may have 

951
00:39:31,540 --> 00:39:33,762
heard us start talking about it . Yes , 

952
00:39:33,762 --> 00:39:33,660
there's some cats and dogs inside the 

953
00:39:33,660 --> 00:39:36,280
normal pentagon budget process , right 

954
00:39:36,280 --> 00:39:39,040
that we have to get through . But the 

955
00:39:39,040 --> 00:39:41,207
NC three . Enterprise center , right ? 

956
00:39:41,207 --> 00:39:43,040
I think great leadership by then 

957
00:39:43,040 --> 00:39:44,950
Secretary Mattis successors have 

958
00:39:44,950 --> 00:39:48,230
followed it . We now have uh 

959
00:39:48,240 --> 00:39:50,950
responsible commander me , our 

960
00:39:50,960 --> 00:39:54,230
organization . We understand this in a 

961
00:39:54,230 --> 00:39:56,510
way we haven't in a long time . It's 

962
00:39:56,510 --> 00:39:58,677
always been good . Right ? I would not 

963
00:39:58,677 --> 00:40:00,788
want to imply that we've ever had any 

964
00:40:00,788 --> 00:40:02,899
issue in the confidence of NC three . 

965
00:40:02,899 --> 00:40:05,121
But I can put it all down on a piece of 

966
00:40:05,121 --> 00:40:07,343
paper . I can show you how it all inter 

967
00:40:07,343 --> 00:40:09,232
relates . I can show you how it's 

968
00:40:09,232 --> 00:40:11,343
funding statuses . I can show you the 

969
00:40:11,343 --> 00:40:13,566
operational implications of that that's 

970
00:40:13,566 --> 00:40:15,788
in the future . I can do the same thing 

971
00:40:15,788 --> 00:40:17,954
day today and I'll stop because it's a 

972
00:40:17,954 --> 00:40:20,010
much longer conversation but we have 

973
00:40:20,010 --> 00:40:22,090
come a long way in just one year in 

974
00:40:22,090 --> 00:40:25,730
terms of uh understanding and 

975
00:40:25,730 --> 00:40:27,730
strengthening our nuclear community 

976
00:40:27,730 --> 00:40:30,720
control capabilities . Well Admiral 

977
00:40:30,730 --> 00:40:33,190
thanks very much for those really 

978
00:40:33,190 --> 00:40:36,400
insightful comments on the subject of N . 

979
00:40:36,400 --> 00:40:39,540
C . 31 of the concerns that Mitchell 

980
00:40:39,540 --> 00:40:41,651
institute for a while . It's been the 

981
00:40:41,651 --> 00:40:43,651
fact that as you mentioned early on 

982
00:40:43,651 --> 00:40:45,651
people tend to focus on the weapons 

983
00:40:45,651 --> 00:40:47,707
systems themselves uh and they don't 

984
00:40:47,707 --> 00:40:49,929
think about the glue that puts that all 

985
00:40:49,929 --> 00:40:53,420
together . Um So about a year ago um we 

986
00:40:53,420 --> 00:40:56,010
put out a study on modernizing us 

987
00:40:56,010 --> 00:40:57,566
nuclear command control and 

988
00:40:57,566 --> 00:40:59,980
communications uh and I'll send your 

989
00:40:59,980 --> 00:41:02,730
staff and copy afterwards . But just to 

990
00:41:02,730 --> 00:41:06,200
highlight the points that you made . Uh 

991
00:41:06,210 --> 00:41:08,432
Now obviously it's a difficult topic to 

992
00:41:08,432 --> 00:41:10,250
follow because it's so highly 

993
00:41:10,260 --> 00:41:12,460
classified but that's one of the 

994
00:41:12,460 --> 00:41:14,516
reasons that we did it was to try to 

995
00:41:14,516 --> 00:41:17,160
make people aware of the significance 

996
00:41:17,610 --> 00:41:20,490
of it's not just the weapons themselves 

997
00:41:20,490 --> 00:41:22,880
that need to be modernized But it's the 

998
00:41:22,880 --> 00:41:25,490
command and control process to um you 

999
00:41:25,490 --> 00:41:27,434
know there are a lot of people out 

1000
00:41:27,434 --> 00:41:29,546
there that don't even know that there 

1001
00:41:29,546 --> 00:41:31,657
is such a such a thing as an as an 8" 

1002
00:41:31,657 --> 00:41:34,460
floppy disk . Um I think I don't know 

1003
00:41:34,460 --> 00:41:36,682
whether all those are gone yet or not , 

1004
00:41:36,682 --> 00:41:38,700
but it's something that needs to be 

1005
00:41:38,700 --> 00:41:41,320
paid attention to . So again on behalf 

1006
00:41:41,320 --> 00:41:43,431
of the Mitchell Institute , we really 

1007
00:41:43,431 --> 00:41:45,487
wish you the very best in these ever 

1008
00:41:45,487 --> 00:41:47,653
increasing challenges . And a reminder 

1009
00:41:47,653 --> 00:41:49,598
to our listeners our next event is 

1010
00:41:49,598 --> 00:41:51,860
gonna be with members of the Air Force 

1011
00:41:51,860 --> 00:41:53,804
Warfighting Integration Capability 

1012
00:41:53,804 --> 00:41:57,200
Group Um next Wednesday August five as 

1013
00:41:57,200 --> 00:41:59,311
we take a deeper look at their recent 

1014
00:41:59,311 --> 00:42:01,950
global futures report . Now we're gonna 

1015
00:42:01,960 --> 00:42:04,140
open up the session to our audience . 

1016
00:42:04,140 --> 00:42:06,570
Those of you who I have been on . 

1017
00:42:06,570 --> 00:42:08,890
Please use the raise hand feature and 

1018
00:42:08,890 --> 00:42:12,060
when I call on you please identify who 

1019
00:42:12,060 --> 00:42:14,290
you are and your organization . So 

1020
00:42:14,290 --> 00:42:17,620
let's start um with 

1021
00:42:18,000 --> 00:42:21,030
Teresa Hitchings . Hi sir , this is 

1022
00:42:21,030 --> 00:42:23,308
Theresa Hitchens from Breaking Defense . 

1023
00:42:23,308 --> 00:42:25,210
Thank you for doing this . Um my 

1024
00:42:25,210 --> 00:42:27,910
question is with regard to how stratcom 

1025
00:42:27,920 --> 00:42:30,220
is integrating with the efforts to 

1026
00:42:30,220 --> 00:42:33,290
create a joint all domain command and 

1027
00:42:33,290 --> 00:42:35,900
control system . Given that the 

1028
00:42:35,900 --> 00:42:37,860
networks that are used for N . C . 

1029
00:42:37,860 --> 00:42:40,230
Three for example , but also for 

1030
00:42:40,500 --> 00:42:42,970
providing commanders with Mr warne et 

1031
00:42:42,980 --> 00:42:45,650
cetera tend to be enclosed , highly 

1032
00:42:45,650 --> 00:42:49,430
classified networks and that makes it 

1033
00:42:49,430 --> 00:42:52,430
difficult to integrate that information 

1034
00:42:52,430 --> 00:42:56,210
with networks that provide tactical 

1035
00:42:56,220 --> 00:42:59,010
um for example information to soldiers 

1036
00:42:59,010 --> 00:43:01,121
on the ground and yet that's the goal 

1037
00:43:01,121 --> 00:43:03,177
of Jazzy too . So I was wondering if 

1038
00:43:03,177 --> 00:43:05,288
you could talk a little bit about how 

1039
00:43:05,288 --> 00:43:07,700
strapped calm seas itself and those 

1040
00:43:07,700 --> 00:43:10,130
networks being integrated with Jazzy 

1041
00:43:10,130 --> 00:43:13,690
too . Thank you . Yes , ma'am . And uh , 

1042
00:43:13,700 --> 00:43:17,680
so so one uh , and and the bottom 

1043
00:43:17,680 --> 00:43:19,736
line is a high degree of integration 

1044
00:43:19,736 --> 00:43:21,791
between jet C two and C three Next . 

1045
00:43:21,791 --> 00:43:23,820
Not 100% right . The consequence of 

1046
00:43:23,830 --> 00:43:25,941
failure in the NC three mission is so 

1047
00:43:25,941 --> 00:43:28,720
high that it warrants its own dedicated 

1048
00:43:28,720 --> 00:43:31,070
stack of capabilities to guard against 

1049
00:43:31,070 --> 00:43:33,930
the example I like using is Most ships 

1050
00:43:33,930 --> 00:43:36,710
in the Navy are multi mission , multi 

1051
00:43:36,710 --> 00:43:38,840
role . The strategic deterrence is so 

1052
00:43:38,840 --> 00:43:41,180
important . We dedicate 14 solely to 

1053
00:43:41,180 --> 00:43:43,402
that function . Right ? You're going to 

1054
00:43:43,402 --> 00:43:45,291
see a similar degree of overlap . 

1055
00:43:45,291 --> 00:43:48,370
Strategic platforms are still platforms . 

1056
00:43:48,380 --> 00:43:50,491
They're part of the joint force and I 

1057
00:43:50,491 --> 00:43:54,100
need them integrated into the broader 

1058
00:43:54,100 --> 00:43:55,989
departments , command and control 

1059
00:43:55,989 --> 00:43:58,060
system . You will see us doing 

1060
00:43:58,210 --> 00:44:00,321
conventional nuclear integration in a 

1061
00:44:00,321 --> 00:44:02,432
way that we have never done before is 

1062
00:44:02,432 --> 00:44:04,377
just what is required for us to do 

1063
00:44:04,377 --> 00:44:06,599
complementary effects inside the battle 

1064
00:44:06,599 --> 00:44:09,480
space . There are new ways to get after 

1065
00:44:09,480 --> 00:44:11,369
the classification differences in 

1066
00:44:11,369 --> 00:44:13,480
handling differences As opposed to 

1067
00:44:13,480 --> 00:44:15,313
building out completely separate 

1068
00:44:15,313 --> 00:44:17,369
circuits . So there's an operational 

1069
00:44:17,369 --> 00:44:19,313
imperative to go do this . And the 

1070
00:44:19,313 --> 00:44:21,536
second thing , it just makes sense from 

1071
00:44:21,536 --> 00:44:24,560
a wise use of resources standpoint to 

1072
00:44:24,560 --> 00:44:26,880
have a high degree of overlap between 

1073
00:44:26,880 --> 00:44:29,720
the two . Just not 100 over . 

1074
00:44:32,390 --> 00:44:34,446
Okay , thank you . How about Michael 

1075
00:44:34,446 --> 00:44:38,020
Gordon ? Yes , Admiral Michael Gordon ? 

1076
00:44:38,020 --> 00:44:40,076
From the Wall Street Journal , sir . 

1077
00:44:40,076 --> 00:44:43,650
You spoke about the Russian 

1078
00:44:43,650 --> 00:44:46,090
nuclear forces and their extensive 

1079
00:44:46,100 --> 00:44:49,000
modernization efforts . Uh , the 

1080
00:44:49,000 --> 00:44:52,470
question I have is um right now we have 

1081
00:44:52,480 --> 00:44:56,310
um verification means 

1082
00:44:56,690 --> 00:44:58,746
through on site inspection and other 

1083
00:44:58,746 --> 00:45:01,320
provisions under New Start to keep tabs 

1084
00:45:01,320 --> 00:45:04,410
on what the Russians are doing . Um , 

1085
00:45:04,410 --> 00:45:07,320
but there is the prospect New Start may 

1086
00:45:07,340 --> 00:45:10,610
expire in february and not be extended 

1087
00:45:11,290 --> 00:45:13,012
and that there may be no other 

1088
00:45:13,012 --> 00:45:15,012
agreement to take its place at that 

1089
00:45:15,012 --> 00:45:18,000
juncture . Anyway , My question is not 

1090
00:45:18,000 --> 00:45:20,111
about the politics of New Start , but 

1091
00:45:20,111 --> 00:45:23,830
how important are these verification 

1092
00:45:23,830 --> 00:45:27,100
and monitoring provisions for your 

1093
00:45:27,100 --> 00:45:30,610
efforts to keep tabs on what the 

1094
00:45:30,610 --> 00:45:33,370
Russians are doing and also to maintain 

1095
00:45:33,370 --> 00:45:36,040
stability in the US Russian nuclear 

1096
00:45:36,040 --> 00:45:39,520
relationship . Uh , so one 

1097
00:45:39,520 --> 00:45:43,100
started in the end , any treaty between 

1098
00:45:43,100 --> 00:45:44,822
two nations is fundamentally a 

1099
00:45:44,822 --> 00:45:47,990
political agreement and so and so in 

1100
00:45:47,990 --> 00:45:50,260
the end this is a Department of State 

1101
00:45:50,260 --> 00:45:53,190
led effort . Um , I certainly support 

1102
00:45:53,190 --> 00:45:54,968
any agreement that enhances the 

1103
00:45:54,968 --> 00:45:57,023
security of this nation and it looks 

1104
00:45:57,023 --> 00:45:59,430
like ample opportunity um to enhance 

1105
00:45:59,430 --> 00:46:03,420
the security of both the US Russia in 

1106
00:46:03,430 --> 00:46:06,680
china by this mechanism . Hey , those 

1107
00:46:06,680 --> 00:46:08,791
verification mechanisms that you talk 

1108
00:46:08,791 --> 00:46:10,902
about . Yes , they are very important 

1109
00:46:10,902 --> 00:46:13,124
on their prized attribute . I would say 

1110
00:46:13,124 --> 00:46:15,236
from my standpoint in terms of what's 

1111
00:46:15,236 --> 00:46:17,402
in New Start , I'd be cautious , We're 

1112
00:46:17,402 --> 00:46:19,569
only actually verifying less than half 

1113
00:46:19,569 --> 00:46:21,736
of the total number of nuclear weapons 

1114
00:46:21,736 --> 00:46:23,902
that they have , but we do not have an 

1115
00:46:23,902 --> 00:46:25,958
equivalent verification mechanism on 

1116
00:46:25,958 --> 00:46:28,630
the non treaty accountable weapons and 

1117
00:46:28,630 --> 00:46:30,797
I think it is , we have to be cautious 

1118
00:46:30,797 --> 00:46:33,010
not to just dismiss that . Um And so 

1119
00:46:33,010 --> 00:46:35,010
it's not like we are operating in a 

1120
00:46:35,010 --> 00:46:36,954
world where we have a thorough for 

1121
00:46:36,954 --> 00:46:39,010
everything that they can threaten us 

1122
00:46:39,010 --> 00:46:41,066
with verification mechanism but I do 

1123
00:46:41,066 --> 00:46:43,232
prize that . I would like to see us go 

1124
00:46:43,232 --> 00:46:46,620
have that more broadly . Uh and uh that 

1125
00:46:46,620 --> 00:46:48,900
is a part of my advice that I I provide 

1126
00:46:48,900 --> 00:46:52,090
to my department's leadership . Thank 

1127
00:46:52,090 --> 00:46:54,500
you Amy McCullough . 

1128
00:46:55,580 --> 00:46:57,802
Thank you sir . Amy McCullough with Air 

1129
00:46:57,802 --> 00:47:00,470
Force magazine , you mentioned china's 

1130
00:47:00,470 --> 00:47:03,910
growing capabilities and the Air Force 

1131
00:47:03,910 --> 00:47:05,688
just recently put out an arctic 

1132
00:47:05,688 --> 00:47:08,210
strategy other than icebreaker missions 

1133
00:47:08,210 --> 00:47:10,099
in that region . I'm wondering if 

1134
00:47:10,099 --> 00:47:12,560
you've seen any other type of flights 

1135
00:47:12,560 --> 00:47:14,671
like bomb or flights or anything like 

1136
00:47:14,671 --> 00:47:17,220
that where they're trying to exert 

1137
00:47:17,220 --> 00:47:21,190
influence there , you know from memory 

1138
00:47:21,200 --> 00:47:23,250
I can , I'm not sure you know where 

1139
00:47:23,250 --> 00:47:25,361
there wasn't anything that completely 

1140
00:47:25,361 --> 00:47:27,361
got my intention . That question is 

1141
00:47:27,361 --> 00:47:29,570
better directed into opaque com . Um 

1142
00:47:29,580 --> 00:47:31,913
and it's not like we don't talk to them . 

1143
00:47:31,913 --> 00:47:35,350
Um but uh you're right , china has made 

1144
00:47:35,350 --> 00:47:38,720
it clear that they intend to be an 

1145
00:47:38,730 --> 00:47:41,840
arctic um nation and 

1146
00:47:41,850 --> 00:47:44,410
whether I have seen it or not , I am 

1147
00:47:44,410 --> 00:47:47,260
certainly watching for their 

1148
00:47:47,260 --> 00:47:49,427
developments in that direction to make 

1149
00:47:49,427 --> 00:47:51,649
sure that I properly factored them into 

1150
00:47:51,649 --> 00:47:53,593
our strategic deterrence efforts . 

1151
00:47:54,680 --> 00:47:57,800
Thank you sir . Bowen . Ballard 

1152
00:48:09,670 --> 00:48:12,870
Bowen , I don't see you coming off your 

1153
00:48:12,870 --> 00:48:14,290
mic . You need to 

1154
00:48:16,670 --> 00:48:18,230
activate your mic please . 

1155
00:48:22,470 --> 00:48:24,581
Okay , we'll come back to Bowen . How 

1156
00:48:24,581 --> 00:48:25,637
about Pat tucker . 

1157
00:48:32,070 --> 00:48:32,580
Mm hmm 

1158
00:48:36,070 --> 00:48:37,780
pat , pat tucker you up . 

1159
00:48:41,470 --> 00:48:43,526
Alright , well , we sound like there 

1160
00:48:43,526 --> 00:48:45,748
are some issues with Mix . Let me go to 

1161
00:48:45,748 --> 00:48:49,740
uh uh the chat room . Uh here's a 

1162
00:48:49,750 --> 00:48:52,290
Pat tucker question for you . Are you 

1163
00:48:52,290 --> 00:48:54,012
in discussion with D . O . D . 

1164
00:48:54,012 --> 00:48:55,734
Leadership on delaying nuclear 

1165
00:48:55,734 --> 00:48:57,570
modernization efforts due to the 

1166
00:48:57,570 --> 00:48:59,830
potential budget constraints of 

1167
00:48:59,830 --> 00:49:03,290
responding to the Covid 19 situation ? 

1168
00:49:04,270 --> 00:49:07,570
The answer is no . Uh and in fact , uh 

1169
00:49:07,580 --> 00:49:09,747
I think it's an important point for us 

1170
00:49:09,747 --> 00:49:13,340
to consider is just because one threat 

1171
00:49:13,340 --> 00:49:15,620
manifested itself didn't mean that any 

1172
00:49:15,620 --> 00:49:18,280
of the others went away . Russia did 

1173
00:49:18,280 --> 00:49:20,330
not give up a single nuclear weapon 

1174
00:49:20,330 --> 00:49:22,840
because of COVID-19 China did not do 

1175
00:49:22,840 --> 00:49:24,840
any . In fact , their their actions 

1176
00:49:24,840 --> 00:49:26,951
have been exactly the opposite . So I 

1177
00:49:26,951 --> 00:49:29,100
have a responsibility to defend us 

1178
00:49:29,110 --> 00:49:31,420
irregardless of whether or not we have 

1179
00:49:31,420 --> 00:49:35,380
a worldwide pandemic or not . And I 

1180
00:49:35,380 --> 00:49:37,560
would offer is I don't think that 

1181
00:49:37,570 --> 00:49:39,820
there's a choice that it's also a false 

1182
00:49:39,820 --> 00:49:41,431
choice to say I can't afford 

1183
00:49:41,431 --> 00:49:43,376
modernization because I have to do 

1184
00:49:43,376 --> 00:49:47,030
Covid . Um this nation has um many 

1185
00:49:47,030 --> 00:49:50,160
resources . We know our priorities , we 

1186
00:49:50,160 --> 00:49:52,560
can afford survival uh where the 

1187
00:49:52,570 --> 00:49:54,737
department is focused on assisting the 

1188
00:49:54,737 --> 00:49:56,903
nation in this great challenge . We do 

1189
00:49:56,903 --> 00:49:58,848
have to think our way through it . 

1190
00:49:58,848 --> 00:50:01,014
There will be implications . Uh but we 

1191
00:50:01,014 --> 00:50:03,181
still have to defend ourselves because 

1192
00:50:03,181 --> 00:50:05,126
the threat is still there . Yeah . 

1193
00:50:05,126 --> 00:50:08,070
Admiral . If I may um I like to remind 

1194
00:50:08,070 --> 00:50:11,970
people that I know folks argue about 

1195
00:50:11,980 --> 00:50:14,258
the balance between guns versus butter , 

1196
00:50:14,258 --> 00:50:16,313
but if you go to the preamble of the 

1197
00:50:16,313 --> 00:50:18,202
constitution and I dare say there 

1198
00:50:18,202 --> 00:50:20,369
aren't too many people that will argue 

1199
00:50:20,369 --> 00:50:22,591
with that , although there are some out 

1200
00:50:22,591 --> 00:50:24,313
there , but it states that the 

1201
00:50:24,313 --> 00:50:24,200
fundamental reason or one of the 

1202
00:50:24,200 --> 00:50:26,340
fundamental reasons we stood up with 

1203
00:50:26,340 --> 00:50:29,020
this this nation was to quote , provide 

1204
00:50:29,020 --> 00:50:31,880
for the common defense comma 

1205
00:50:32,700 --> 00:50:36,410
promote the general welfare , not the 

1206
00:50:36,410 --> 00:50:39,490
other way around . Anyway , let's go 

1207
00:50:39,490 --> 00:50:42,430
back . And to the point on that if I go 

1208
00:50:42,430 --> 00:50:45,560
ahead is um so we we have a debate 

1209
00:50:45,560 --> 00:50:48,800
sometimes over Covid 19 versus um 

1210
00:50:48,810 --> 00:50:51,310
modernization . There's a cousin to 

1211
00:50:51,310 --> 00:50:53,380
that inside the department , right ? 

1212
00:50:53,390 --> 00:50:55,580
And I go back to the strategic 

1213
00:50:55,580 --> 00:50:58,600
deterrent is foundational and we can't 

1214
00:50:58,600 --> 00:51:01,830
take that for granted . And so if the 

1215
00:51:01,830 --> 00:51:04,720
Foundation doesn't have what it needs , 

1216
00:51:04,730 --> 00:51:07,000
then the viability of every other 

1217
00:51:07,000 --> 00:51:08,889
capability of the department gets 

1218
00:51:08,889 --> 00:51:11,010
called into question . Something as 

1219
00:51:11,010 --> 00:51:12,954
simple as the other guy could just 

1220
00:51:12,954 --> 00:51:15,390
escalate right past you . Uh and so 

1221
00:51:15,460 --> 00:51:18,190
it's not only relative to Covid but 

1222
00:51:18,260 --> 00:51:20,710
that we have really thought through 

1223
00:51:20,710 --> 00:51:23,680
hard as a nation to put the minimum 

1224
00:51:23,680 --> 00:51:26,430
amount of resources against our most 

1225
00:51:26,430 --> 00:51:29,910
important mission . It's optimized any 

1226
00:51:29,910 --> 00:51:32,077
other thing that we do to that carries 

1227
00:51:32,077 --> 00:51:34,132
consequences in terms of assumptions 

1228
00:51:34,132 --> 00:51:36,132
that we make across the rest of the 

1229
00:51:36,132 --> 00:51:39,430
department and nation very good . 

1230
00:51:39,430 --> 00:51:41,541
Here's one from paul Bernstein , from 

1231
00:51:41,541 --> 00:51:43,790
the National Defense University , could 

1232
00:51:43,790 --> 00:51:46,050
you please discuss the work the command 

1233
00:51:46,050 --> 00:51:47,980
is doing with regional combatant 

1234
00:51:47,980 --> 00:51:50,620
commands to help them prepare for the 

1235
00:51:50,620 --> 00:51:53,660
possibility of limited nuclear attacks 

1236
00:51:53,670 --> 00:51:56,850
in their areas of operations . So the 

1237
00:51:56,850 --> 00:51:59,072
number of things that we're doing , but 

1238
00:51:59,072 --> 00:52:01,183
the one that I'll probably start with 

1239
00:52:01,183 --> 00:52:03,406
here is is that um we have initiated in 

1240
00:52:03,406 --> 00:52:05,680
the last six months a new type of 

1241
00:52:05,680 --> 00:52:07,690
analysis called risk of strategic 

1242
00:52:07,690 --> 00:52:10,930
deterrence failure . Uh and so we are 

1243
00:52:10,940 --> 00:52:13,530
taking pieces of what's been inside 

1244
00:52:13,540 --> 00:52:15,640
stratcom and the Joint force more 

1245
00:52:15,640 --> 00:52:17,584
broadly , that's where these other 

1246
00:52:17,584 --> 00:52:19,807
combatant commands come in . So then on 

1247
00:52:19,807 --> 00:52:22,510
a daily basis we are coming up with a 

1248
00:52:22,510 --> 00:52:24,700
formal estimate of the risk that 

1249
00:52:24,700 --> 00:52:27,460
deterrence is gonna fail . So I 

1250
00:52:27,460 --> 00:52:29,940
acknowledge this is an analytic process 

1251
00:52:29,940 --> 00:52:31,718
getting after something that is 

1252
00:52:31,718 --> 00:52:33,930
fundamentally subjective . But the 

1253
00:52:33,930 --> 00:52:37,010
assertion here is this risk carries so 

1254
00:52:37,010 --> 00:52:39,490
much consequence that I need to be able 

1255
00:52:39,490 --> 00:52:41,546
to describe to the secretary and the 

1256
00:52:41,546 --> 00:52:44,450
chairman at all times under all 

1257
00:52:44,450 --> 00:52:47,700
conditions what risk we're taking with 

1258
00:52:47,700 --> 00:52:49,867
regard to the deterrence failing . And 

1259
00:52:49,867 --> 00:52:51,867
then inside that nuclear deterrence 

1260
00:52:51,867 --> 00:52:53,978
failing , that's a key way that we're 

1261
00:52:53,978 --> 00:52:56,200
working with . Not only the regionals , 

1262
00:52:56,200 --> 00:52:58,670
a big chunk of that analysis requires 

1263
00:52:58,670 --> 00:53:00,781
you to understand what's happening in 

1264
00:53:00,781 --> 00:53:02,948
space , what's happening in cyberspace 

1265
00:53:02,948 --> 00:53:05,114
in some other areas . And we have some 

1266
00:53:05,114 --> 00:53:07,170
great formal mechanisms with all the 

1267
00:53:07,170 --> 00:53:09,840
combatant commands to pull in what they 

1268
00:53:09,840 --> 00:53:12,130
see and what they're doing , put it 

1269
00:53:12,130 --> 00:53:14,750
into my best possible emulation of the 

1270
00:53:14,760 --> 00:53:17,370
other guys decision calculus and then 

1271
00:53:17,370 --> 00:53:19,390
be able to provide the department . 

1272
00:53:19,400 --> 00:53:21,567
Alright , here's where we sit , here's 

1273
00:53:21,567 --> 00:53:23,344
the risk , here's the margin is 

1274
00:53:23,344 --> 00:53:25,511
currently low I think you would expect 

1275
00:53:25,511 --> 00:53:27,733
that . Um but we're ready to go do that 

1276
00:53:27,733 --> 00:53:29,789
in crisis . We're looking at it long 

1277
00:53:29,789 --> 00:53:31,733
term , really focusing ourselves . 

1278
00:53:31,733 --> 00:53:33,900
Given the consequential nature of what 

1279
00:53:33,900 --> 00:53:37,040
we're talking about . Here's that 

1280
00:53:37,040 --> 00:53:39,850
question from Bowen Ballard . Uh Would 

1281
00:53:39,850 --> 00:53:42,072
you please give a current update on the 

1282
00:53:42,072 --> 00:53:45,540
status of H . F . Availability in the 

1283
00:53:45,540 --> 00:53:48,990
event of satellite denial ? The 

1284
00:53:49,000 --> 00:53:52,440
one is that it has an early conclusion 

1285
00:53:52,440 --> 00:53:55,340
that we have come to us when we think 

1286
00:53:55,340 --> 00:53:58,030
about what N . C . Three next is gonna 

1287
00:53:58,030 --> 00:54:00,252
look like . In fact it's probably worth 

1288
00:54:00,252 --> 00:54:03,830
it a moment . Here is the difference 

1289
00:54:03,830 --> 00:54:06,010
between N . C . Three Beyond what you 

1290
00:54:06,010 --> 00:54:08,232
just talked about . So in terms of it's 

1291
00:54:08,232 --> 00:54:10,550
very hard to visualize like it's 204 

1292
00:54:10,550 --> 00:54:12,420
systems that all have to operate 

1293
00:54:12,420 --> 00:54:14,476
together to go accomplish this . You 

1294
00:54:14,476 --> 00:54:16,698
know , we talked about recapitalization 

1295
00:54:16,698 --> 00:54:18,753
the triad . That's actually a pretty 

1296
00:54:18,753 --> 00:54:20,531
straightforward thing to visual 

1297
00:54:20,531 --> 00:54:22,698
actually have boomers bombers , cruise 

1298
00:54:22,698 --> 00:54:24,809
missiles , intercontinental ballistic 

1299
00:54:24,809 --> 00:54:26,976
missiles and when you're done you have 

1300
00:54:26,976 --> 00:54:26,660
boomers bombers , intercontinental and 

1301
00:54:26,660 --> 00:54:28,827
some supplemental capabilities and you 

1302
00:54:28,827 --> 00:54:30,938
will have them for a long time . They 

1303
00:54:30,938 --> 00:54:32,938
get modernized N . C . Three is not 

1304
00:54:32,938 --> 00:54:34,938
like that , right ? You will see it 

1305
00:54:34,938 --> 00:54:37,560
iterate going into the future as we 

1306
00:54:37,560 --> 00:54:39,770
improve it incrementally . That's the 

1307
00:54:39,770 --> 00:54:41,937
way that technology works , that's the 

1308
00:54:41,937 --> 00:54:44,730
way that threat evolves but we know now 

1309
00:54:44,740 --> 00:54:48,420
that um H . F . Will be a component to 

1310
00:54:48,420 --> 00:54:51,950
that . Um My HF availability is 

1311
00:54:51,950 --> 00:54:54,250
good right now . I have just placed 

1312
00:54:54,250 --> 00:54:56,870
renewed emphasis on basically everybody 

1313
00:54:56,870 --> 00:54:59,700
comes up on every circuit all the time . 

1314
00:54:59,700 --> 00:55:02,060
If you're a tactical situation permits 

1315
00:55:02,240 --> 00:55:04,170
To make sure that we're taking 

1316
00:55:04,170 --> 00:55:07,650
advantage of that . And I see a great 

1317
00:55:07,650 --> 00:55:10,600
role for relatively small cost to bias 

1318
00:55:10,610 --> 00:55:13,270
relatively less dependent on 

1319
00:55:13,280 --> 00:55:15,640
infrastructure path that complements 

1320
00:55:15,640 --> 00:55:17,807
the other work we're doing in NC three 

1321
00:55:17,807 --> 00:55:20,390
quite well . Very good . Let's go see 

1322
00:55:20,390 --> 00:55:22,390
if the mics are working again . How 

1323
00:55:22,390 --> 00:55:26,080
about Sarah Serotta ? Hi , 

1324
00:55:26,080 --> 00:55:28,247
thank you for doing this . Um I have a 

1325
00:55:28,247 --> 00:55:30,840
question about the LRS . So program um 

1326
00:55:30,850 --> 00:55:33,760
if the the urgency for this weapon is 

1327
00:55:33,760 --> 00:55:37,290
so um strong , I'm curious if you think 

1328
00:55:37,300 --> 00:55:40,820
that N N . S . A . Is taking too risky 

1329
00:55:40,830 --> 00:55:44,570
of a schedule for the program uh 

1330
00:55:44,580 --> 00:55:46,940
for delivering the production units . 

1331
00:55:46,950 --> 00:55:50,220
Um and if you have concerns that that 

1332
00:55:50,220 --> 00:55:53,030
could lead to delays for other warhead 

1333
00:55:53,030 --> 00:55:55,030
modernization programs that they're 

1334
00:55:55,030 --> 00:55:57,930
overseeing . And also um if you think 

1335
00:55:57,930 --> 00:56:00,920
that the Air Force's decision to uh and 

1336
00:56:00,920 --> 00:56:03,680
the competition early could lead to 

1337
00:56:03,680 --> 00:56:05,960
risks in terms of the design for the 

1338
00:56:05,970 --> 00:56:09,270
final LRS . So weapon . Okay , so a 

1339
00:56:09,270 --> 00:56:11,520
couple of points . Right . Yes , there 

1340
00:56:11,520 --> 00:56:13,900
is urgency in LRS . So just like there 

1341
00:56:13,900 --> 00:56:16,590
is urgency in every other piece of the 

1342
00:56:16,600 --> 00:56:18,711
triad , I wouldn't want to single out 

1343
00:56:18,711 --> 00:56:22,580
LRS . So as uh being uh special I 

1344
00:56:22,580 --> 00:56:25,230
need them all moving with urgency , 

1345
00:56:25,230 --> 00:56:27,890
like like with uh what we're going to 

1346
00:56:27,890 --> 00:56:30,112
have to have with L . S . Wrote to pace 

1347
00:56:30,112 --> 00:56:32,380
the threat um look , we have a very 

1348
00:56:32,380 --> 00:56:34,713
good working relationship with in N . S . 

1349
00:56:34,713 --> 00:56:36,824
A . Via the Nuclear Weapons Council . 

1350
00:56:36,824 --> 00:56:39,630
That has been very productive for both 

1351
00:56:39,630 --> 00:56:41,408
departments in terms of staying 

1352
00:56:41,408 --> 00:56:44,050
synchronized . Um The while the 

1353
00:56:44,050 --> 00:56:45,772
fundamental responsibility for 

1354
00:56:45,772 --> 00:56:47,994
assessing the risk that you just talked 

1355
00:56:47,994 --> 00:56:50,217
about really belongs on the service and 

1356
00:56:50,217 --> 00:56:52,161
acquisition side of the house . We 

1357
00:56:52,161 --> 00:56:54,217
watch it very closely . No , I don't 

1358
00:56:54,217 --> 00:56:56,328
have any concerns . Uh And in fact to 

1359
00:56:56,328 --> 00:56:57,939
your broader question of the 

1360
00:56:57,939 --> 00:56:59,883
acquisition strategy , I have full 

1361
00:56:59,883 --> 00:57:02,630
confidence that the Air Force has a 

1362
00:57:02,640 --> 00:57:04,473
good acquisition strategy . They 

1363
00:57:04,473 --> 00:57:06,390
understand the risks uh and that 

1364
00:57:06,390 --> 00:57:08,390
they're going to be able to deliver 

1365
00:57:08,390 --> 00:57:12,100
that program on time . Okay . 

1366
00:57:12,100 --> 00:57:15,900
Here's one from frank gallegos keeping 

1367
00:57:15,900 --> 00:57:17,790
to the theme of the breathtaking 

1368
00:57:17,790 --> 00:57:19,901
expansion of the threat from our near 

1369
00:57:19,901 --> 00:57:22,950
peers . What could we an industry do to 

1370
00:57:22,950 --> 00:57:25,510
help you the most ? Where would you 

1371
00:57:25,510 --> 00:57:28,160
have us mass our intellectual resources 

1372
00:57:28,530 --> 00:57:31,350
to help improve our strategic deterrent , 

1373
00:57:32,630 --> 00:57:36,540
go faster . Whatever we have to do 

1374
00:57:36,540 --> 00:57:39,740
to sit down together to go faster . 

1375
00:57:40,130 --> 00:57:43,350
It is . And I think general 

1376
00:57:43,350 --> 00:57:46,940
heighten has said this very eloquently 

1377
00:57:46,940 --> 00:57:49,940
in a number of cases . Um This is when 

1378
00:57:49,950 --> 00:57:53,100
operational risk gets back on par with 

1379
00:57:53,100 --> 00:57:55,433
programmatic and technical risk . Right ? 

1380
00:57:55,433 --> 00:57:57,800
You change the way that you run your 

1381
00:57:57,800 --> 00:58:00,840
processes . Um You know , I love the 

1382
00:58:00,840 --> 00:58:04,700
story about how we we go from Tuli 

1383
00:58:04,700 --> 00:58:08,210
Greenland being a shack with a dirt 

1384
00:58:08,210 --> 00:58:11,250
runway and we go in something like 

1385
00:58:11,250 --> 00:58:14,790
three months to a 10,000 ft 

1386
00:58:14,800 --> 00:58:18,070
reinforced concrete runway capable of 

1387
00:58:18,070 --> 00:58:20,130
handling strategically loaded B 50 

1388
00:58:20,130 --> 00:58:22,740
two's two hangars and accommodations 

1389
00:58:22,740 --> 00:58:26,540
for 4000 airmen . Um All right . When 

1390
00:58:26,540 --> 00:58:28,800
the nation had never built big runways 

1391
00:58:28,800 --> 00:58:31,130
on tundra before . Right . Because the 

1392
00:58:31,140 --> 00:58:33,290
operational risk of not having that 

1393
00:58:33,300 --> 00:58:36,050
base outweigh the risks that we were 

1394
00:58:36,050 --> 00:58:38,272
gonna take sort of programmatically And 

1395
00:58:38,272 --> 00:58:40,494
technically , so , whatever the barrier 

1396
00:58:40,494 --> 00:58:42,940
is , let's let's talk about that And 

1397
00:58:42,940 --> 00:58:45,107
figure out what we're going to have to 

1398
00:58:45,107 --> 00:58:47,329
go do . I'll point to going back to n . 

1399
00:58:47,329 --> 00:58:48,940
c . three . Um , we're we're 

1400
00:58:48,940 --> 00:58:51,490
establishing a reach center , right ? 

1401
00:58:51,490 --> 00:58:53,712
And that is a building . But more so it 

1402
00:58:53,712 --> 00:58:57,340
is a idea that to move faster in N . C . 

1403
00:58:57,340 --> 00:58:59,396
Three , I have to break down some of 

1404
00:58:59,396 --> 00:59:01,173
the barriers in terms of having 

1405
00:59:01,173 --> 00:59:03,173
communication with private industry 

1406
00:59:03,173 --> 00:59:05,062
with the government . Right ? The 

1407
00:59:05,062 --> 00:59:07,173
process is something as simple as I'm 

1408
00:59:07,173 --> 00:59:09,173
putting it outside the fence line , 

1409
00:59:09,173 --> 00:59:11,340
just so that you don't even have to go 

1410
00:59:11,340 --> 00:59:13,451
through the here's how you get on the 

1411
00:59:13,451 --> 00:59:15,451
access list to get on the base type 

1412
00:59:15,451 --> 00:59:17,451
stuff . So , so knocking down these 

1413
00:59:17,451 --> 00:59:19,507
barriers while respecting , uh , you 

1414
00:59:19,507 --> 00:59:21,396
know , security and uh government 

1415
00:59:21,396 --> 00:59:23,507
obligations . That's where we need to 

1416
00:59:23,507 --> 00:59:25,610
go uh if we're going to keep up with 

1417
00:59:25,610 --> 00:59:29,610
this threat . Well , we've come 

1418
00:59:29,610 --> 00:59:32,470
to the end of our time and thank you 

1419
00:59:32,470 --> 00:59:34,880
again , Admiral , uh , for your 

1420
00:59:34,880 --> 00:59:37,330
insightful and candid remarks and 

1421
00:59:37,330 --> 00:59:40,140
thanks everyone for joining us today . 

1422
00:59:40,520 --> 00:59:44,030
So I wish you all a wonderful and uh , 

1423
00:59:44,040 --> 00:59:46,940
prosperous aerospace Power kind of day