1 00:00:00,400 --> 00:00:02,456 anything in front of us , and that's 2 00:00:02,456 --> 00:00:04,622 what we're all about in our business . 3 00:00:04,622 --> 00:00:06,733 I do want to thank Mayor Tommy battle 4 00:00:06,733 --> 00:00:08,900 for being an ally in missile defense . 5 00:00:08,900 --> 00:00:11,067 And , of course , thanks to Lieutenant 6 00:00:11,067 --> 00:00:12,900 General Dick Formica , Mr Ronnie 7 00:00:12,900 --> 00:00:15,067 Chronis , Ter and the entire symposium 8 00:00:15,067 --> 00:00:17,233 Committee for inviting me to speak and 9 00:00:17,233 --> 00:00:19,067 putting together this event . So 10 00:00:19,067 --> 00:00:21,289 there's one thing I love . It's telling 11 00:00:21,289 --> 00:00:23,456 See stories so severe with me here for 12 00:00:23,456 --> 00:00:25,511 a quick one . So you should know . I 13 00:00:25,520 --> 00:00:27,710 bristle when I hear the Department of 14 00:00:27,710 --> 00:00:30,140 Defense being accused of being stuck in 15 00:00:30,140 --> 00:00:32,570 a Cold War . And that happens , right ? 16 00:00:32,570 --> 00:00:35,170 Tickling my mission sets . There's 17 00:00:35,170 --> 00:00:37,460 probably only a few 100 of us left on 18 00:00:37,460 --> 00:00:39,560 active duty , even served during the 19 00:00:39,560 --> 00:00:42,220 Cold War . I was one of them . One of 20 00:00:42,220 --> 00:00:43,998 you I got tell you , as a young 21 00:00:43,998 --> 00:00:46,050 lieutenant , I can assure you , my 22 00:00:46,050 --> 00:00:48,190 focus was on getting qualified , 23 00:00:48,190 --> 00:00:50,910 getting my dolphins . And I'm pretty 24 00:00:50,910 --> 00:00:53,750 sure I didn't begin to grasp the up geo 25 00:00:53,750 --> 00:00:56,150 strategic implications of that struggle 26 00:00:56,150 --> 00:00:58,400 at the time , right ? A grass . One 27 00:00:58,400 --> 00:01:01,310 thing we did business very differently . 28 00:01:01,310 --> 00:01:03,590 Back then . We knew it each and every 29 00:01:03,590 --> 00:01:05,257 time we went underway . I'm a 30 00:01:05,257 --> 00:01:07,720 submariner , and we knew we did that it 31 00:01:07,720 --> 00:01:10,030 could happen . It could go down . And 32 00:01:10,030 --> 00:01:12,560 it could be for all the marbles . War 33 00:01:12,560 --> 00:01:14,671 could break out with little warning , 34 00:01:14,740 --> 00:01:17,140 and it could easily go nuclear . So we 35 00:01:17,140 --> 00:01:20,470 trained every day for that fight . We 36 00:01:20,470 --> 00:01:22,803 had the enemy order of battle memorized , 37 00:01:22,880 --> 00:01:25,047 and everything started with a threat . 38 00:01:25,220 --> 00:01:27,560 Dual the emitters , all the sonars , 39 00:01:27,570 --> 00:01:30,020 all the weapons systems . M . Khan was 40 00:01:30,020 --> 00:01:32,131 the norm . I didn't know my submarine 41 00:01:32,131 --> 00:01:34,076 had a radar for a year , so it has 42 00:01:34,076 --> 00:01:36,750 never turned it on . Opsec was the norm . 43 00:01:37,240 --> 00:01:39,129 Every time I turned over his duty 44 00:01:39,129 --> 00:01:41,073 officer , officer of the deck , it 45 00:01:41,073 --> 00:01:43,129 included a review of what our shifts 46 00:01:43,129 --> 00:01:45,351 assignment was gonna be if the war went 47 00:01:45,351 --> 00:01:47,980 down on that watch , like in the next 48 00:01:47,980 --> 00:01:50,270 six hours . And I assert , I submit 49 00:01:50,740 --> 00:01:53,770 this nation in our military has not had 50 00:01:53,770 --> 00:01:56,580 to seriously consider competition 51 00:01:56,830 --> 00:01:58,790 through crisis and possible armed 52 00:01:58,790 --> 00:02:02,160 conflict with a nuclear capable peer in , 53 00:02:02,160 --> 00:02:05,290 like , nearly 30 years . Look , I know , 54 00:02:05,570 --> 00:02:07,570 and I certainly know this isn't the 55 00:02:07,570 --> 00:02:09,681 Cold War all over again . I tell that 56 00:02:09,681 --> 00:02:11,848 story to explain why we need to return 57 00:02:11,848 --> 00:02:14,170 to a mindset where it all starts with a 58 00:02:14,170 --> 00:02:17,020 threat . Coal is over and we're having 59 00:02:17,020 --> 00:02:18,909 a sustainment phase on the war on 60 00:02:18,909 --> 00:02:21,080 terror . But we're now in an era of 61 00:02:21,080 --> 00:02:23,302 great competition , and I'll tell you , 62 00:02:23,302 --> 00:02:25,524 that's our national security strategy , 63 00:02:25,524 --> 00:02:27,636 sells us that , and we are engaged in 64 00:02:27,636 --> 00:02:30,530 great power competition . So we , as a 65 00:02:30,530 --> 00:02:33,410 nation of military need to focus on the 66 00:02:33,420 --> 00:02:35,400 threats in front of us . And those 67 00:02:35,400 --> 00:02:37,622 threats go all the way down to the gray 68 00:02:37,622 --> 00:02:39,456 zone that area below traditional 69 00:02:39,456 --> 00:02:42,550 conventional armed conflict . We cannot 70 00:02:42,550 --> 00:02:44,772 wait for conventional conflict to break 71 00:02:44,772 --> 00:02:46,828 out . Before we start thinking about 72 00:02:46,828 --> 00:02:48,994 nuclear deterrence , we have to go all 73 00:02:48,994 --> 00:02:50,994 the way into the gray zone to deter 74 00:02:50,994 --> 00:02:52,939 actions and compete . Make sure an 75 00:02:52,939 --> 00:02:54,994 adversary doesn't miscalculate where 76 00:02:54,994 --> 00:02:57,106 they believe they can win with a jump 77 00:02:57,106 --> 00:02:59,320 in escalation . This is like us 78 00:02:59,320 --> 00:03:01,980 strategic command exists . We are here 79 00:03:01,980 --> 00:03:04,620 to deter great power war in this year 80 00:03:04,620 --> 00:03:07,100 of great power competition . At the end 81 00:03:07,100 --> 00:03:09,640 of my tours , Commander of Stratcom , I 82 00:03:09,640 --> 00:03:11,362 want to be able to say what my 83 00:03:11,362 --> 00:03:13,418 predecessor , General Heighten , and 84 00:03:13,418 --> 00:03:15,473 his predecessor , Admiral Haney , in 85 00:03:15,473 --> 00:03:17,696 back to general paler , want to be able 86 00:03:17,696 --> 00:03:19,850 to say we deterred strategic attack . 87 00:03:20,540 --> 00:03:22,262 So my three priorities for the 88 00:03:22,262 --> 00:03:24,429 Commander straightforward and have not 89 00:03:24,429 --> 00:03:26,300 changed about all else . We will 90 00:03:26,300 --> 00:03:28,680 provide strategic deterrence . And if 91 00:03:28,680 --> 00:03:30,736 deterrence fails , we're prepared to 92 00:03:30,736 --> 00:03:32,580 deliver a decisive response . Is 93 00:03:32,580 --> 00:03:34,636 general heightened ? Used to say , I 94 00:03:34,636 --> 00:03:36,890 mean decisive in every possible way . 95 00:03:37,280 --> 00:03:39,613 We're going to do this with a resilient , 96 00:03:39,613 --> 00:03:41,800 equipped , trained and combat ready 97 00:03:41,800 --> 00:03:44,160 force . This is what it's all about . 98 00:03:44,220 --> 00:03:46,387 The Nuclear Posture Review states that 99 00:03:46,387 --> 00:03:48,340 the highest US nuclear policy and 100 00:03:48,340 --> 00:03:51,240 strategy priority is to deter potential 101 00:03:51,240 --> 00:03:53,740 adversaries from nuclear attack of any 102 00:03:53,740 --> 00:03:56,700 scale , are always ready to execute our 103 00:03:56,700 --> 00:03:58,960 mission on a moment's notice . We can 104 00:03:58,960 --> 00:04:01,127 Onley accomplish both of those because 105 00:04:01,127 --> 00:04:03,450 of the 150,000 soldiers , sailors , 106 00:04:03,460 --> 00:04:05,830 airmen , Marines and civilians across 107 00:04:05,830 --> 00:04:08,320 the globe performing our mission each 108 00:04:08,320 --> 00:04:10,570 and every day . I also have three 109 00:04:10,570 --> 00:04:12,348 tenants for the command to help 110 00:04:12,348 --> 00:04:14,403 accomplish my priorities , these air 111 00:04:14,403 --> 00:04:16,514 more time dimensional , if you will , 112 00:04:16,680 --> 00:04:18,840 the person to be ready to man battle 113 00:04:18,840 --> 00:04:20,660 stations and I forgive the Navy 114 00:04:20,660 --> 00:04:22,771 reference there . But what that means 115 00:04:22,771 --> 00:04:25,100 is we all need to do whatever it takes 116 00:04:25,100 --> 00:04:27,510 to ensure that we , as individuals , 117 00:04:27,740 --> 00:04:30,100 can execute our mission with NASCAR . 118 00:04:30,110 --> 00:04:32,580 Hits stopped like efficiency . That's 119 00:04:32,580 --> 00:04:35,730 what we focus on today . Next , we need 120 00:04:35,730 --> 00:04:38,320 to follow the shot basketball reference 121 00:04:38,570 --> 00:04:40,459 on programs and initiatives we've 122 00:04:40,459 --> 00:04:42,514 started . It doesn't matter how many 123 00:04:42,514 --> 00:04:44,626 things we start . It matters how many 124 00:04:44,626 --> 00:04:47,100 things we complete . And finally we 125 00:04:47,100 --> 00:04:49,290 need to forge 21st century strategic 126 00:04:49,290 --> 00:04:51,760 deterrence . The strategic environment 127 00:04:51,760 --> 00:04:54,020 has changed from the Cold War , through 128 00:04:54,020 --> 00:04:56,180 the war on tower and now into great 129 00:04:56,180 --> 00:04:58,670 power competition . We need to ensure 130 00:04:58,670 --> 00:05:01,190 our strategies , plans , capabilities 131 00:05:01,190 --> 00:05:03,700 and operations are integrated across 132 00:05:03,710 --> 00:05:05,910 all domains . On the full spectrum of 133 00:05:05,910 --> 00:05:08,550 conflict , we must home in our 134 00:05:08,550 --> 00:05:10,606 capabilities based on the threats we 135 00:05:10,606 --> 00:05:12,800 face or frankly , we run . The risk of 136 00:05:12,800 --> 00:05:14,856 developing and fielding capabilities 137 00:05:14,856 --> 00:05:17,400 will just never use risk not using 138 00:05:17,400 --> 00:05:19,400 advanced capabilities , because our 139 00:05:19,400 --> 00:05:21,400 adversary may escalate the conflict 140 00:05:21,400 --> 00:05:23,567 with nucular used before we even get a 141 00:05:23,567 --> 00:05:25,960 chance . We may think escalation is 142 00:05:25,960 --> 00:05:28,030 linear , but I tell you , it is not 143 00:05:28,350 --> 00:05:30,072 particularly in a room full of 144 00:05:30,072 --> 00:05:32,183 engineers and scientists . You know , 145 00:05:32,183 --> 00:05:34,128 when you have opposing forces in a 146 00:05:34,128 --> 00:05:36,183 closed system is anything but linear 147 00:05:36,860 --> 00:05:38,971 with discontinuities . And we have to 148 00:05:38,971 --> 00:05:40,916 be prepared for our adversaries to 149 00:05:40,916 --> 00:05:43,027 think that maybe a jump in escalation 150 00:05:43,027 --> 00:05:45,138 is the only way to win . So just like 151 00:05:45,138 --> 00:05:47,138 my predecessors , Admiral Haney and 152 00:05:47,138 --> 00:05:49,304 General heightened stress the security 153 00:05:49,304 --> 00:05:51,027 environment we live in is very 154 00:05:51,027 --> 00:05:53,360 different than the security environment , 155 00:05:53,360 --> 00:05:55,310 our strategic concepts originally 156 00:05:55,310 --> 00:05:57,780 designed for when they were originally 157 00:05:57,780 --> 00:05:59,800 designed . It was for a bipolar 158 00:05:59,800 --> 00:06:01,760 environment . We must tailor our 159 00:06:01,760 --> 00:06:03,982 strategies , plans and capabilities for 160 00:06:03,982 --> 00:06:06,240 the full spectrum of conflict in a 161 00:06:06,240 --> 00:06:08,190 world with more than one nuclear 162 00:06:08,190 --> 00:06:10,830 capable Pierre , make no mistake , the 163 00:06:10,830 --> 00:06:13,052 Triad and his capabilities are robust , 164 00:06:13,052 --> 00:06:14,997 have been useful in ways that they 165 00:06:14,997 --> 00:06:17,163 weren't necessarily designed for . The 166 00:06:17,163 --> 00:06:19,330 fact that our Triad still provides the 167 00:06:19,330 --> 00:06:21,552 flexibility to address changing threats 168 00:06:21,552 --> 00:06:23,663 in this new era is a testament to its 169 00:06:23,663 --> 00:06:25,886 original designers and everyone who has 170 00:06:25,886 --> 00:06:28,430 maintained , operated and sustained it . 171 00:06:28,430 --> 00:06:30,486 Over the lifetime of these systems , 172 00:06:30,730 --> 00:06:32,930 we're in a different world . Russia , 173 00:06:32,940 --> 00:06:35,107 for example , has been modernizing its 174 00:06:35,107 --> 00:06:37,540 strategic forces for almost 20 years 175 00:06:37,740 --> 00:06:40,210 and is about 70% complete . They're 176 00:06:40,220 --> 00:06:41,776 modernizing their try it of 177 00:06:41,776 --> 00:06:43,887 intercontinental ballistic missiles , 178 00:06:43,887 --> 00:06:45,887 nuclear missile submarines and long 179 00:06:45,887 --> 00:06:47,887 range bombers , and the command and 180 00:06:47,887 --> 00:06:49,442 control for those systems . 181 00:06:49,442 --> 00:06:51,331 Additionally , they're developing 182 00:06:51,331 --> 00:06:53,553 hypersonic glide vehicles . They vote , 183 00:06:53,553 --> 00:06:55,776 reported open press . They have them on 184 00:06:55,776 --> 00:06:55,720 alert . They have nuclear armed and 185 00:06:55,720 --> 00:06:57,664 nuclear power torpedoes and cruise 186 00:06:57,664 --> 00:06:59,664 missiles , and all of these weapons 187 00:06:59,664 --> 00:07:01,664 systems upgrades are in addition to 188 00:07:01,664 --> 00:07:03,720 their non treaty accountable nuclear 189 00:07:03,720 --> 00:07:05,664 weapons stockpile numbering in the 190 00:07:05,664 --> 00:07:07,664 thousands . Obviously , it would be 191 00:07:07,664 --> 00:07:09,553 easier for me to list the systems 192 00:07:09,553 --> 00:07:11,609 Russia is not modernizing instead of 193 00:07:11,609 --> 00:07:13,850 the ones they are now with China . You 194 00:07:13,850 --> 00:07:15,961 have to watch what they do , not what 195 00:07:15,961 --> 00:07:18,128 they say and look at what they've done 196 00:07:18,128 --> 00:07:20,183 with their conventional arsenal . If 197 00:07:20,183 --> 00:07:22,128 you go back to 2010 they've almost 198 00:07:22,128 --> 00:07:24,294 doubled the number of I C B . M's from 199 00:07:24,294 --> 00:07:26,510 50 to 90 . By our highest estimates , 200 00:07:26,510 --> 00:07:28,399 they have more than tripled their 201 00:07:28,399 --> 00:07:30,177 number of short range ballistic 202 00:07:30,177 --> 00:07:32,010 missiles from 400 to 1500 . They 203 00:07:32,010 --> 00:07:33,810 designed and built two aircraft 204 00:07:33,810 --> 00:07:35,866 carriers for the first time in their 205 00:07:35,866 --> 00:07:38,088 history . This is one of my favorites . 206 00:07:38,088 --> 00:07:40,310 They created from scratch a Coast Guard 207 00:07:40,310 --> 00:07:43,050 in 2013 and they already have 208 00:07:43,050 --> 00:07:46,820 255 Coast Guard ships . Crime 209 00:07:46,820 --> 00:07:49,450 example of China's Gray's own actions , 210 00:07:49,710 --> 00:07:51,821 where they're using this new fleet to 211 00:07:51,821 --> 00:07:53,821 enforce contested maritime claims . 212 00:07:53,821 --> 00:07:56,240 Beneath the level of open conflict in 213 00:07:56,240 --> 00:07:58,990 the South and east China seas , they're 214 00:07:58,990 --> 00:08:00,934 also taking significant strides to 215 00:08:00,934 --> 00:08:02,879 expand and modernize their nuclear 216 00:08:02,879 --> 00:08:05,101 capability . They're expected to double 217 00:08:05,101 --> 00:08:07,212 in size of their nuclear stockpile of 218 00:08:07,212 --> 00:08:09,212 next decade , there soon gonna have 219 00:08:09,212 --> 00:08:11,157 their version of a triad when they 220 00:08:11,157 --> 00:08:13,157 complete their long range strategic 221 00:08:13,157 --> 00:08:15,379 bomber . They're improving Their silo , 222 00:08:15,379 --> 00:08:17,268 based on Road Mobile I C B M . Is 223 00:08:17,268 --> 00:08:19,434 working . Increased the range of their 224 00:08:19,434 --> 00:08:21,546 slbm , his command and control . It's 225 00:08:21,546 --> 00:08:23,601 the whole thing . If you look at the 226 00:08:23,601 --> 00:08:25,712 writing on the wall , nuclear is just 227 00:08:25,712 --> 00:08:27,712 the next thing on the Chinese to do 228 00:08:27,712 --> 00:08:29,823 list , and it is likely to follow the 229 00:08:29,823 --> 00:08:29,700 same pattern as their conventional 230 00:08:29,700 --> 00:08:32,960 forces . And just like Russia , China 231 00:08:32,960 --> 00:08:34,960 spending significant resource is on 232 00:08:34,960 --> 00:08:37,182 advanced capabilities like hyper sonics 233 00:08:37,200 --> 00:08:40,180 space and cyber capabilities is a 234 00:08:40,180 --> 00:08:42,600 mistake to consider China as some 235 00:08:42,600 --> 00:08:44,740 smaller , lesser included case of 236 00:08:44,740 --> 00:08:48,170 Russia . The list goes on . North Korea 237 00:08:48,170 --> 00:08:50,003 continues his illicit pursuit of 238 00:08:50,003 --> 00:08:52,003 nuclear weapons are advancing their 239 00:08:52,003 --> 00:08:54,380 missile systems as you more than most , 240 00:08:54,380 --> 00:08:56,840 are acutely aware these capabilities 241 00:08:56,840 --> 00:08:58,951 threaten our forces and allies in the 242 00:08:58,951 --> 00:09:00,896 region . And beyond that , you are 243 00:09:01,360 --> 00:09:03,670 where the most . There I CVM test in 244 00:09:03,670 --> 00:09:05,614 the last few years and even pose a 245 00:09:05,614 --> 00:09:07,790 threat to our homeland . It was 246 00:09:07,890 --> 00:09:10,001 developed and fielded a large arsenal 247 00:09:10,001 --> 00:09:12,223 ballistic missiles in the Middle East . 248 00:09:12,223 --> 00:09:13,890 The systems construct targets 249 00:09:13,890 --> 00:09:16,057 throughout the region and threaten our 250 00:09:16,057 --> 00:09:17,946 interests there and our unlearned 251 00:09:17,946 --> 00:09:19,946 lesson that I'm borrowing this from 252 00:09:19,946 --> 00:09:22,001 General Raymond hashtag space . It's 253 00:09:22,001 --> 00:09:24,057 hard when they attempted to launch a 254 00:09:24,057 --> 00:09:26,168 space vehicle earlier this year . Now 255 00:09:26,168 --> 00:09:28,168 they weren't fully successful . But 256 00:09:28,168 --> 00:09:30,112 they are trying to enter the space 257 00:09:30,112 --> 00:09:32,223 domain and increased the area they're 258 00:09:32,223 --> 00:09:34,112 trying to influence . So why am I 259 00:09:34,112 --> 00:09:36,057 summarizing the threats our nation 260 00:09:36,057 --> 00:09:38,223 faces ? You're all very aware of these 261 00:09:38,223 --> 00:09:40,520 threats . I just reiterated the threats 262 00:09:40,520 --> 00:09:43,050 to you because they're the why when we 263 00:09:43,050 --> 00:09:44,828 talk about the capabilities and 264 00:09:44,828 --> 00:09:46,994 integration we need in our warfighting 265 00:09:46,994 --> 00:09:49,550 strategies , plans and operations that 266 00:09:49,550 --> 00:09:51,606 was the commander of U . S Strategic 267 00:09:51,606 --> 00:09:53,510 Command . I am laser focused on 268 00:09:53,510 --> 00:09:55,340 modernizing our triad and its 269 00:09:55,340 --> 00:09:57,507 supporting infrastructure like nuclear 270 00:09:57,507 --> 00:09:59,673 command , control and communications . 271 00:09:59,673 --> 00:10:01,618 I also have an important role is a 272 00:10:01,618 --> 00:10:03,507 coordinating authority for global 273 00:10:03,507 --> 00:10:05,340 missile defense . Each region is 274 00:10:05,340 --> 00:10:07,284 focused on protecting their assets 275 00:10:07,284 --> 00:10:09,284 through a combination of active and 276 00:10:09,284 --> 00:10:11,340 passive defensive measures . And you 277 00:10:11,340 --> 00:10:13,451 are the best in the world at what you 278 00:10:13,451 --> 00:10:15,340 do . I'm here to increase missile 279 00:10:15,340 --> 00:10:17,062 depends integration and enable 280 00:10:17,062 --> 00:10:19,540 protection not just within a Naor , but 281 00:10:19,540 --> 00:10:23,290 across a Lars as well . I d c s is worn 282 00:10:23,290 --> 00:10:25,401 white . The missile defense community 283 00:10:25,401 --> 00:10:26,957 is working to integrate our 284 00:10:26,957 --> 00:10:29,068 capabilities when testing is complete 285 00:10:29,068 --> 00:10:31,179 and I BCS can link all of our missile 286 00:10:31,179 --> 00:10:33,401 defense systems together , that's gonna 287 00:10:33,401 --> 00:10:35,623 be an enormous step forward in the Jazz 288 00:10:35,623 --> 00:10:37,880 C two arena . In order to deter our 289 00:10:37,890 --> 00:10:40,440 adversaries in the 21st century , we 290 00:10:40,440 --> 00:10:42,420 need toe affect and alter their 291 00:10:42,420 --> 00:10:44,970 decision calculus . We need them to 292 00:10:44,970 --> 00:10:46,914 know that any attack on the United 293 00:10:46,914 --> 00:10:48,970 States , our allies will have little 294 00:10:48,970 --> 00:10:52,550 margin probability of success and that 295 00:10:52,550 --> 00:10:54,840 our response will result in a very bad 296 00:10:54,850 --> 00:10:58,330 day for them . We as a nation had 297 00:10:58,330 --> 00:11:00,550 become very comfortable operating in a 298 00:11:00,550 --> 00:11:02,660 permissive environment . We don't 299 00:11:02,660 --> 00:11:04,882 necessarily exercise their practice for 300 00:11:04,882 --> 00:11:06,549 conflict in a truly contested 301 00:11:06,549 --> 00:11:08,604 environment , and we need to prepare 302 00:11:08,604 --> 00:11:10,600 for that . We need to make sure 303 00:11:10,610 --> 00:11:12,721 capabilities provide adequate command 304 00:11:12,721 --> 00:11:14,888 and control for the times . We need it 305 00:11:14,888 --> 00:11:17,010 the most . So I understand the high 306 00:11:17,010 --> 00:11:18,954 altitude experts at Army Space and 307 00:11:18,954 --> 00:11:21,177 Missile Defense Center of Excellence is 308 00:11:21,177 --> 00:11:23,399 looking into technologies to supplement 309 00:11:23,399 --> 00:11:25,343 our existing capabilities . If our 310 00:11:25,343 --> 00:11:26,910 space assets are jammed or 311 00:11:26,910 --> 00:11:29,077 incapacitated for any period of time , 312 00:11:29,310 --> 00:11:31,477 I altitude assets can help provide the 313 00:11:31,477 --> 00:11:33,754 coverage on short notice and low costs , 314 00:11:34,280 --> 00:11:36,630 part of a concept called space in Depth . 315 00:11:37,410 --> 00:11:39,410 We need to follow the shot , ensure 316 00:11:39,410 --> 00:11:41,466 these high altitude capabilities air 317 00:11:41,466 --> 00:11:43,720 fully developed available , fielded and 318 00:11:43,720 --> 00:11:46,380 you wives . Our adversaries , as you 319 00:11:46,380 --> 00:11:48,547 know , are developing hypersonic glide 320 00:11:48,547 --> 00:11:50,547 vehicles and nuclear powered cruise 321 00:11:50,547 --> 00:11:52,500 missiles . We need ways to defend 322 00:11:52,500 --> 00:11:54,810 against these and normal technologies . 323 00:11:54,820 --> 00:11:56,987 We can't find our way to purse aid our 324 00:11:56,987 --> 00:11:58,987 emissaries to adjust their decision 325 00:11:58,987 --> 00:12:01,153 calculus . We may not be able to deter 326 00:12:01,153 --> 00:12:03,098 an attack . Have a serious develop 327 00:12:03,098 --> 00:12:05,264 these advanced weapons systems we need 328 00:12:05,264 --> 00:12:07,320 to develop in fuel capabilities . To 329 00:12:07,320 --> 00:12:09,209 counter these threats . I want to 330 00:12:09,209 --> 00:12:11,376 return to integration as I think it is 331 00:12:11,376 --> 00:12:13,598 one of the most important pieces of our 332 00:12:13,598 --> 00:12:15,764 strategies , plans and ops . While the 333 00:12:15,764 --> 00:12:17,500 phrase any sensor best shooter 334 00:12:17,500 --> 00:12:19,556 typically applies toe active missile 335 00:12:19,556 --> 00:12:21,790 defense , perhaps we should consider it 336 00:12:21,790 --> 00:12:24,012 as we endeavoured implement the missile 337 00:12:24,012 --> 00:12:26,123 defence reviews comprehensive missile 338 00:12:26,123 --> 00:12:28,179 defense strategy . We go to plan our 339 00:12:28,179 --> 00:12:30,512 options . We know what we're up against . 340 00:12:30,840 --> 00:12:33,062 We need to understand the effectiveness 341 00:12:33,062 --> 00:12:35,284 of offensive and defensive capabilities 342 00:12:35,284 --> 00:12:37,210 against an adversary before the 343 00:12:37,220 --> 00:12:39,610 conflict . That understanding enables 344 00:12:39,610 --> 00:12:41,443 commanders to make risk informed 345 00:12:41,443 --> 00:12:43,666 Decisions related to active and passive 346 00:12:43,666 --> 00:12:45,832 defense and offensive prelaunch attack 347 00:12:45,832 --> 00:12:48,480 operations are strategies , plans , 348 00:12:48,480 --> 00:12:50,702 policies and office will be affected by 349 00:12:50,702 --> 00:12:52,424 our ability to integrate these 350 00:12:52,424 --> 00:12:55,300 capabilities we failed to pursue . The 351 00:12:55,300 --> 00:12:57,220 MDR is recommended comprehensive 352 00:12:57,220 --> 00:12:58,776 approach to missile defense 353 00:12:58,776 --> 00:13:01,030 capabilities , which integrates offense 354 00:13:01,030 --> 00:13:03,086 and defense , I think is going to be 355 00:13:03,086 --> 00:13:05,141 next to impossible to keep up with a 356 00:13:05,141 --> 00:13:07,308 threat . Sweet Face is just relatively 357 00:13:07,308 --> 00:13:09,530 cheap for an adversary to shoot it us . 358 00:13:09,710 --> 00:13:11,766 But it is expensive and difficult to 359 00:13:11,766 --> 00:13:14,099 stop every single missile during flight . 360 00:13:14,450 --> 00:13:16,700 Simply put off initiative form defense 361 00:13:16,810 --> 00:13:19,340 vice versa . If we're confident , for 362 00:13:19,340 --> 00:13:21,340 example , that are active , missile 363 00:13:21,340 --> 00:13:23,451 defenses can shoot down adversaries . 364 00:13:23,451 --> 00:13:25,451 Missile A but not necessarily their 365 00:13:25,451 --> 00:13:27,618 missile . See , we know we must make . 366 00:13:27,618 --> 00:13:29,618 This will see a higher priority for 367 00:13:29,618 --> 00:13:31,840 offensive prelaunch attack operations . 368 00:13:31,840 --> 00:13:33,673 Achieving this level situational 369 00:13:33,673 --> 00:13:35,840 awareness is not easy , but we must be 370 00:13:35,840 --> 00:13:37,729 able to integrate our offense and 371 00:13:37,729 --> 00:13:39,951 defense capabilities to fully realize a 372 00:13:39,951 --> 00:13:42,530 comprehensive view of any sensor . Best 373 00:13:42,530 --> 00:13:44,620 shooter in the increasingly lethal 374 00:13:44,620 --> 00:13:47,300 missile defensive armour . In some 375 00:13:47,300 --> 00:13:49,411 respects , Missile Defense Command in 376 00:13:49,411 --> 00:13:51,522 control is the Pathfinder , where the 377 00:13:51,522 --> 00:13:53,744 department needs to go more broadly and 378 00:13:53,744 --> 00:13:55,911 command and control is showing the way 379 00:13:55,911 --> 00:13:57,967 ahead for Jazz C two . So keep doing 380 00:13:57,967 --> 00:14:00,810 what you're doing . So in the 21st 381 00:14:00,810 --> 00:14:03,032 century , deterrence is more a lot more 382 00:14:03,032 --> 00:14:04,977 than just nuclear . It's deterring 383 00:14:04,977 --> 00:14:07,088 multiple adversaries at all domains . 384 00:14:07,310 --> 00:14:09,310 Strategic deterrence is the highest 385 00:14:09,310 --> 00:14:11,421 priority mission in the Department of 386 00:14:11,421 --> 00:14:13,820 Defense is foundational to our national 387 00:14:13,820 --> 00:14:16,690 defense and underpins every US military 388 00:14:16,690 --> 00:14:19,370 operation around the wall . But this is 389 00:14:19,370 --> 00:14:21,037 based on the most fundamental 390 00:14:21,037 --> 00:14:23,259 assumption of all of our strategies and 391 00:14:23,259 --> 00:14:25,259 plans the assumption that strategic 392 00:14:25,259 --> 00:14:27,630 deterrence will hold . We like to think 393 00:14:27,630 --> 00:14:30,050 deterrence will hold , but will it hold 394 00:14:30,050 --> 00:14:32,700 in ways we haven't tested it in before ? 395 00:14:33,120 --> 00:14:35,231 This assumption is going to be tested 396 00:14:35,231 --> 00:14:37,650 in new ways , but I know a minimum for 397 00:14:37,650 --> 00:14:40,160 it to hold . We're gonna need that try 398 00:14:40,160 --> 00:14:42,780 at a recapitalized triad . We're gonna 399 00:14:42,780 --> 00:14:45,700 need combat ready forces and we're 400 00:14:45,700 --> 00:14:48,280 gonna need missile defense . Missile 401 00:14:48,280 --> 00:14:49,947 defense capabilities give our 402 00:14:49,947 --> 00:14:51,891 adversaries pause to rethink their 403 00:14:51,891 --> 00:14:54,280 decision Calculus . Effective missile 404 00:14:54,280 --> 00:14:56,058 defense deters adversaries from 405 00:14:56,058 --> 00:14:58,169 attacking because they know they have 406 00:14:58,169 --> 00:15:00,540 little chance for success and any 407 00:15:00,540 --> 00:15:02,818 potential response could be devastated . 408 00:15:03,230 --> 00:15:05,008 So we have to rethink how we do 409 00:15:05,008 --> 00:15:07,008 business in this era of great power 410 00:15:07,008 --> 00:15:08,952 competition . Fundamentals haven't 411 00:15:08,952 --> 00:15:11,063 changed incredibly denied benefit and 412 00:15:11,063 --> 00:15:13,840 impose costs . But we must change how 413 00:15:13,840 --> 00:15:16,730 we pursue these objectives and our 414 00:15:16,740 --> 00:15:18,740 current plans have about as much in 415 00:15:18,740 --> 00:15:20,740 common with the old Cold War Single 416 00:15:20,740 --> 00:15:22,740 integrated operational plan is your 417 00:15:22,740 --> 00:15:24,684 smartphone does with an old rotary 418 00:15:24,684 --> 00:15:27,520 telephone , but it isn't enough . We 419 00:15:27,520 --> 00:15:29,631 need to continue improving our Taylor 420 00:15:29,631 --> 00:15:31,687 to integrated approach to deterrence 421 00:15:31,850 --> 00:15:33,906 and missile defense capabilities are 422 00:15:33,906 --> 00:15:36,128 vital to deterrence strategy , and they 423 00:15:36,128 --> 00:15:38,183 must be integrated and tailor to the 424 00:15:38,183 --> 00:15:40,294 threats ahead of us . And you have to 425 00:15:40,294 --> 00:15:42,294 measure it . It's or how to measure 426 00:15:42,294 --> 00:15:44,517 that . Stratcom has developed a risk of 427 00:15:44,517 --> 00:15:46,739 strategic deterrence failure analysis . 428 00:15:46,739 --> 00:15:48,830 It's based on the idea of the many 429 00:15:48,840 --> 00:15:51,540 risks Commander must consider . You are 430 00:15:51,540 --> 00:15:54,550 so consequential they must be called 431 00:15:54,550 --> 00:15:56,730 out , specifically measured and acted 432 00:15:56,730 --> 00:15:59,070 upon it all times the risk of a 433 00:15:59,070 --> 00:16:01,580 strategic deterrence failure and inside 434 00:16:01,580 --> 00:16:03,469 that the bright line of a nuclear 435 00:16:03,469 --> 00:16:05,524 deterrence failure and the risk of a 436 00:16:05,524 --> 00:16:07,730 strike on the homeland we just dropped 437 00:16:07,730 --> 00:16:10,150 Tom , have a lead on the first risk and 438 00:16:10,150 --> 00:16:12,317 we're working , integrate planning and 439 00:16:12,317 --> 00:16:14,650 execution processes through competition , 440 00:16:14,650 --> 00:16:16,820 crisis and conflict . We want everyone 441 00:16:16,820 --> 00:16:19,180 across the department to continuously 442 00:16:19,180 --> 00:16:20,902 consider the risk of strategic 443 00:16:20,902 --> 00:16:23,540 deterrence failure . The progress you 444 00:16:23,540 --> 00:16:25,429 are making and the relations just 445 00:16:25,429 --> 00:16:27,429 between government and industry are 446 00:16:27,429 --> 00:16:29,470 important or national defense and 447 00:16:29,470 --> 00:16:31,690 integrated strategic deterrence . An 448 00:16:31,690 --> 00:16:33,523 integrated approach will help us 449 00:16:33,523 --> 00:16:35,357 acquire the best capabilities to 450 00:16:35,357 --> 00:16:37,523 achieve the national security strategy 451 00:16:37,523 --> 00:16:39,412 and the national defense strategy 452 00:16:39,412 --> 00:16:41,579 objectives in order to be successful , 453 00:16:41,579 --> 00:16:43,690 we need to make sure we integrate our 454 00:16:43,690 --> 00:16:45,746 efforts not just in the department's 455 00:16:45,746 --> 00:16:47,634 planning and execution , but with 456 00:16:47,634 --> 00:16:49,690 industry and the whole government as 457 00:16:49,690 --> 00:16:51,746 well . We must look at the strategic 458 00:16:51,746 --> 00:16:53,746 environment as it is not is what we 459 00:16:53,746 --> 00:16:55,970 want it to be . And I ask each of you 460 00:16:55,970 --> 00:16:58,137 to work with their counterparts across 461 00:16:58,137 --> 00:17:00,026 the department , inter agency and 462 00:17:00,026 --> 00:17:02,510 industry to find the best solutions for 463 00:17:02,510 --> 00:17:04,621 the complicated strategic environment 464 00:17:04,621 --> 00:17:07,810 we face . The threats are riel , and 465 00:17:07,810 --> 00:17:09,699 because of everything you all are 466 00:17:09,699 --> 00:17:12,410 working on , will be ready if conflict 467 00:17:12,410 --> 00:17:14,620 begins on our watch . Thank you , 468 00:17:24,510 --> 00:17:26,732 Atmel Richard taking the time to record 469 00:17:26,732 --> 00:17:28,732 those X sexual comments . And we're 470 00:17:28,732 --> 00:17:30,677 very grateful and thankful for his 471 00:17:30,677 --> 00:17:32,732 leadership in Stratcom doing what he 472 00:17:32,732 --> 00:17:34,843 does to protect our nation's security 473 00:17:35,370 --> 00:17:37,690 Lieutenant Car Blur . And his role is 474 00:17:37,690 --> 00:17:39,690 the commanding general of the Joint 475 00:17:39,690 --> 00:17:41,523 Functional Combatant Command for 476 00:17:41,523 --> 00:17:43,468 Integrated missile Defense . And a 477 00:17:43,468 --> 00:17:45,468 direct report to Admiral Richard in 478 00:17:45,468 --> 00:17:47,579 this role will now take any questions 479 00:17:47,579 --> 00:17:50,250 that you may have . Hey , thanks , 480 00:17:50,250 --> 00:17:52,460 Ronnie . If I could just like to 481 00:17:52,460 --> 00:17:54,571 highlight just a couple of comments , 482 00:17:54,700 --> 00:17:57,540 uh , after Evan Richards , uh , talk 483 00:17:59,230 --> 00:18:01,341 First off , coming into this job well 484 00:18:01,341 --> 00:18:03,619 prior to coming to this job , you know , 485 00:18:03,619 --> 00:18:05,619 I got to serve . Ah is the chief of 486 00:18:05,619 --> 00:18:07,563 staff of Stratcom for almost three 487 00:18:07,563 --> 00:18:07,260 years working for general heightened , 488 00:18:07,740 --> 00:18:10,000 and ah , and then Advil . Richard was 489 00:18:10,000 --> 00:18:12,620 the deputy commander . So , uh , so 490 00:18:12,620 --> 00:18:14,787 really , that that background and that 491 00:18:14,970 --> 00:18:17,340 experience really prepared me ? Well , 492 00:18:17,340 --> 00:18:19,350 I think for ah for what ? The 493 00:18:19,350 --> 00:18:21,572 challenges that we face here . It s and 494 00:18:21,572 --> 00:18:24,120 D . C with particular to , uh , missile 495 00:18:24,120 --> 00:18:27,310 defense . He heard ever Richard talk 496 00:18:27,310 --> 00:18:29,810 about the risk of strategic two turns , 497 00:18:29,810 --> 00:18:33,200 failure , analysis that that goes on 498 00:18:33,210 --> 00:18:35,900 there at Stratcom and here , Jiffy I m 499 00:18:35,900 --> 00:18:38,680 d and with an S and D . C . That 500 00:18:38,680 --> 00:18:41,090 analysis is something that we're doing 501 00:18:41,090 --> 00:18:43,360 all the time from the missile defense 502 00:18:43,360 --> 00:18:45,850 side . As Admiral Richard said , many 503 00:18:45,850 --> 00:18:48,017 times we talk about stratcom , we only 504 00:18:48,017 --> 00:18:50,017 think about the nuclear triad , But 505 00:18:50,017 --> 00:18:52,017 strategic deterrence is really more 506 00:18:52,017 --> 00:18:55,510 thin . Just the nuclear triad , Uh , in 507 00:18:55,510 --> 00:18:57,630 its basics , strategic deterrence is 508 00:18:57,630 --> 00:19:00,330 about imposing unacceptable costs , 509 00:19:00,540 --> 00:19:02,870 denying the adversary benefit and then 510 00:19:02,880 --> 00:19:05,390 providing incredible capability . And 511 00:19:05,390 --> 00:19:07,430 that second part about denying the 512 00:19:07,430 --> 00:19:09,870 adversary benefit is what what we're 513 00:19:09,870 --> 00:19:11,814 doing every day within the missile 514 00:19:11,814 --> 00:19:14,330 defense arena and so part of our risk 515 00:19:14,330 --> 00:19:16,108 of strategic deterrence failure 516 00:19:16,108 --> 00:19:18,052 analysis is making sure that we're 517 00:19:18,052 --> 00:19:20,219 understanding the threats that are out 518 00:19:20,219 --> 00:19:22,163 there on that our capabilities are 519 00:19:22,163 --> 00:19:23,880 ready now and that our future 520 00:19:24,090 --> 00:19:26,146 capabilities are gonna address those 521 00:19:26,146 --> 00:19:28,201 feature threats that the adversaries 522 00:19:28,201 --> 00:19:30,260 can present . So it is just a great 523 00:19:30,260 --> 00:19:32,316 honor to be able to work for Admiral 524 00:19:32,316 --> 00:19:34,500 Richard again . Ah , in my , uh , my 525 00:19:34,500 --> 00:19:36,640 job here is the S and D . C , c G and 526 00:19:36,640 --> 00:19:39,540 the Commander for Ah J F C C . I indeed . 527 00:19:39,730 --> 00:19:41,841 So with that , I'll look forward your 528 00:19:41,841 --> 00:19:44,063 questions . I will tell you that I will 529 00:19:44,063 --> 00:19:46,063 answer questions within the missile 530 00:19:46,063 --> 00:19:48,286 defense lane . Nuclear policy questions 531 00:19:48,286 --> 00:19:50,452 with us reserved for Strat comment and 532 00:19:50,452 --> 00:19:53,560 another venue . Thank you . Thank you . 533 00:19:53,560 --> 00:19:55,893 General Carver , this is Joe Fitzgerald . 534 00:19:55,893 --> 00:19:57,949 I'll be asking you several questions 535 00:19:57,949 --> 00:19:59,893 that came in from our 10 days this 536 00:19:59,893 --> 00:20:01,900 morning . First off , thank you for 537 00:20:01,900 --> 00:20:04,011 agreeing to answer these questions on 538 00:20:04,011 --> 00:20:06,178 behalf of Capital Richards . We have a 539 00:20:06,178 --> 00:20:08,289 couple of questions here . How is the 540 00:20:08,289 --> 00:20:11,180 creation of space Force Affected the 541 00:20:11,180 --> 00:20:15,110 command space com and its capabilities 542 00:20:15,110 --> 00:20:19,070 and authorities . Hey , thanks , Joe . 543 00:20:19,070 --> 00:20:22,090 And so I'll go back and I'll put on my 544 00:20:22,100 --> 00:20:24,300 my former hat as the Stratcom chief of 545 00:20:24,300 --> 00:20:26,910 staff and we were in the throes of , 546 00:20:26,920 --> 00:20:29,000 well , let me back up . So So before 547 00:20:29,000 --> 00:20:32,120 Space Command stood up on its unified 548 00:20:32,120 --> 00:20:33,898 command plan , responsibility , 549 00:20:33,898 --> 00:20:36,130 Strategic Command had responsibilities 550 00:20:36,130 --> 00:20:38,780 for space . And those were all those . 551 00:20:38,780 --> 00:20:42,420 All came from when the original Space 552 00:20:42,420 --> 00:20:44,730 Command stood down in the early two 553 00:20:44,730 --> 00:20:46,820 thousands . So Stratcom took on the 554 00:20:46,820 --> 00:20:48,930 space role . If you ever listen to 555 00:20:48,940 --> 00:20:51,162 General Heighten , though he would talk 556 00:20:51,162 --> 00:20:53,710 about space was on its best . Day was 557 00:20:53,710 --> 00:20:55,710 only number three in his priorities 558 00:20:55,710 --> 00:20:57,821 because he had strategic deterrence , 559 00:20:57,821 --> 00:20:59,877 nuclear operations , and then he had 560 00:20:59,877 --> 00:21:01,932 space responsibilities . So in space 561 00:21:01,932 --> 00:21:04,043 com Space Command stood up . We did a 562 00:21:04,043 --> 00:21:06,260 lot of work within the Stratcom staff 563 00:21:06,640 --> 00:21:08,751 to help enable Space Command to stand 564 00:21:08,751 --> 00:21:11,770 up . We called it . We deemed it space 565 00:21:11,770 --> 00:21:13,492 East . So we had all the space 566 00:21:13,492 --> 00:21:15,326 expertise , expertise within the 567 00:21:15,326 --> 00:21:18,580 stratcom staff that instantly became 568 00:21:18,580 --> 00:21:20,580 part of space Commander . They work 569 00:21:20,580 --> 00:21:22,747 towards becoming part of space command 570 00:21:22,780 --> 00:21:24,836 eso that when Space Command formally 571 00:21:24,836 --> 00:21:27,500 established , it was it had a good head , 572 00:21:27,500 --> 00:21:30,330 good legs underneath it , um , the 573 00:21:30,330 --> 00:21:32,108 integration piece then became , 574 00:21:32,108 --> 00:21:34,108 Actually , it wasn't too tough them 575 00:21:34,108 --> 00:21:36,330 because you already had embedded in the 576 00:21:36,330 --> 00:21:38,441 different battle rhythms in different 577 00:21:38,441 --> 00:21:40,441 different events that were going on 578 00:21:40,441 --> 00:21:42,441 within Stratcom . They were already 579 00:21:42,441 --> 00:21:44,552 practised by that Stratcom staff that 580 00:21:44,552 --> 00:21:46,719 now was supporting space command . And 581 00:21:46,719 --> 00:21:48,886 then we helped establish the structure 582 00:21:48,886 --> 00:21:51,108 there in Colorado Springs , where space 583 00:21:51,108 --> 00:21:53,570 com currently has had . So , uh , um it 584 00:21:53,570 --> 00:21:55,514 was a lot of teamwork that went in 585 00:21:55,514 --> 00:21:57,570 there . We had a lot of support from 586 00:21:57,570 --> 00:21:59,570 from all the services to provide to 587 00:21:59,570 --> 00:22:02,240 provide structure and forces into stand 588 00:22:02,240 --> 00:22:05,290 up space command . Um , and again that 589 00:22:05,430 --> 00:22:07,630 that that integration and then flow 590 00:22:07,630 --> 00:22:09,741 from stratcom to space com from those 591 00:22:09,741 --> 00:22:11,830 mission sets actually went pretty . 592 00:22:11,830 --> 00:22:13,997 Well , then we had different exercises 593 00:22:13,997 --> 00:22:16,108 that were able to participate in Teoh 594 00:22:16,108 --> 00:22:18,830 to show our readiness . Thank you , 595 00:22:18,830 --> 00:22:20,997 General Cooper . We have several other 596 00:22:20,997 --> 00:22:22,997 questions . Hope you don't mind . I 597 00:22:22,997 --> 00:22:25,163 hope you have time this morning . Um , 598 00:22:25,240 --> 00:22:27,018 I really appreciated the utmost 599 00:22:27,018 --> 00:22:29,760 comments on integration , which is also 600 00:22:29,760 --> 00:22:32,350 a part of this year's symposium theme . 601 00:22:32,840 --> 00:22:35,170 What obstacles do you see in us 602 00:22:35,180 --> 00:22:37,013 achieving the rial integration ? 603 00:22:39,340 --> 00:22:42,960 Okay , you know , theon , you know , 604 00:22:42,960 --> 00:22:45,293 obstacles . You know there's challenges , 605 00:22:45,293 --> 00:22:47,571 and there's there's opportunities . Um , 606 00:22:48,540 --> 00:22:50,590 you know when when we look at 607 00:22:51,040 --> 00:22:53,207 integration and I have a saying I talk 608 00:22:53,207 --> 00:22:55,207 about we do integrated planning and 609 00:22:55,207 --> 00:22:58,460 synchronized operations . Um , so one 610 00:22:58,460 --> 00:23:01,530 of the first obstacles is overcoming 611 00:23:01,530 --> 00:23:03,697 the relationship barriers that are out 612 00:23:03,697 --> 00:23:06,660 there . And actually , this mornings , 613 00:23:06,670 --> 00:23:09,950 uh , this morning's speakers 614 00:23:10,540 --> 00:23:13,170 goes a long way towards overcoming some 615 00:23:13,170 --> 00:23:15,337 of those periods . When I look at Emma 616 00:23:15,337 --> 00:23:17,337 Richard and then John Shaw and then 617 00:23:17,337 --> 00:23:19,580 John Hill , many symposiums , you know 618 00:23:19,580 --> 00:23:22,080 we'll we'll , we'll put the speakers in 619 00:23:22,080 --> 00:23:24,247 there and it's kind of a pickup team . 620 00:23:24,247 --> 00:23:26,191 Well , those gentlemen that I just 621 00:23:26,191 --> 00:23:28,247 mentioned , we talk multiple times a 622 00:23:28,247 --> 00:23:30,200 week . So already within our 623 00:23:30,200 --> 00:23:32,311 organizations within the leadership , 624 00:23:32,340 --> 00:23:34,562 what were beaten down some of the stove 625 00:23:34,562 --> 00:23:36,673 pipes , or some of the firewalls that 626 00:23:36,673 --> 00:23:38,840 might be up there and integration just 627 00:23:38,840 --> 00:23:41,007 because our organizations ah , and the 628 00:23:41,007 --> 00:23:43,007 leaders , their relationships , and 629 00:23:43,007 --> 00:23:45,173 then and then at all that off trickles 630 00:23:45,173 --> 00:23:47,118 down then throughout the workforce 631 00:23:47,118 --> 00:23:49,451 throughout our processes , Rod are , ah , 632 00:23:49,520 --> 00:23:51,860 working groups are other battle rhythm 633 00:23:51,860 --> 00:23:54,700 events . Um , there's gonna be 634 00:23:54,700 --> 00:23:56,811 technological hurdles that we have to 635 00:23:56,811 --> 00:23:59,033 get over that we're gonna have to fight 636 00:23:59,033 --> 00:24:01,256 through whether those air inter service 637 00:24:01,256 --> 00:24:03,478 or whether those among services and and 638 00:24:03,478 --> 00:24:05,700 we just have to get through those . But 639 00:24:05,700 --> 00:24:05,660 when we have the concept and we all 640 00:24:05,660 --> 00:24:07,882 agree on the concept and the work , the 641 00:24:07,882 --> 00:24:10,104 role of the roll up our sleeves and get 642 00:24:10,104 --> 00:24:12,104 after it . We can do it and again , 643 00:24:12,104 --> 00:24:13,938 though , but it goes back to the 644 00:24:13,938 --> 00:24:15,549 relationships and within the 645 00:24:15,549 --> 00:24:17,604 organizations that are participating 646 00:24:17,604 --> 00:24:19,716 between senior leaders and you get no 647 00:24:19,716 --> 00:24:23,020 daylight between between us stratcom 648 00:24:23,020 --> 00:24:24,909 space come or the Missile Defense 649 00:24:24,909 --> 00:24:27,420 Agency . Thank you , General Copper . 650 00:24:28,300 --> 00:24:30,780 Another question . Speed is the name of 651 00:24:30,780 --> 00:24:32,610 the game speed of intelligence 652 00:24:32,620 --> 00:24:36,010 assessment and in our response , has 653 00:24:36,010 --> 00:24:38,232 that paradigm changed . And if so , how 654 00:24:38,232 --> 00:24:40,343 has it changed over the course of the 655 00:24:40,343 --> 00:24:43,050 last few years ? Yeah , sure . It sure 656 00:24:43,050 --> 00:24:46,530 has a the generation again , the the 657 00:24:46,540 --> 00:24:48,651 benefactor of three years working for 658 00:24:48,651 --> 00:24:50,830 him and , uh , he would always talk 659 00:24:50,830 --> 00:24:52,997 about . We have lost our ability to go 660 00:24:52,997 --> 00:24:55,219 fast . And so just with him making that 661 00:24:55,219 --> 00:24:57,274 statement during my time in Stratcom 662 00:24:57,274 --> 00:25:00,750 and carrying it on here is , um , you 663 00:25:00,900 --> 00:25:03,067 he's taking the governor off . He took 664 00:25:03,067 --> 00:25:05,289 the governor off its track common so we 665 00:25:05,289 --> 00:25:07,456 could go fast . And if we if we made a 666 00:25:07,456 --> 00:25:09,678 mistake , you know , he accepted that , 667 00:25:09,678 --> 00:25:11,789 and then , you know , we corrected it 668 00:25:11,789 --> 00:25:13,956 moved on eso So I do see us want to go 669 00:25:13,956 --> 00:25:16,289 faster the adversary isn't slowing down . 670 00:25:16,289 --> 00:25:18,233 Every Richard laid out many of the 671 00:25:18,233 --> 00:25:20,456 threats there in his talk , so we can't 672 00:25:20,456 --> 00:25:22,400 afford to be complacent . We can't 673 00:25:22,400 --> 00:25:24,456 afford to go slow . We have got a go 674 00:25:24,456 --> 00:25:26,456 faster . Gotta be willing to assume 675 00:25:26,456 --> 00:25:28,456 some risk . Underwrite that risk so 676 00:25:28,456 --> 00:25:30,400 that we can maintain pace with our 677 00:25:30,400 --> 00:25:32,178 adversaries . Thank you , sir . 678 00:25:34,670 --> 00:25:36,781 There's been talk of reorganizing the 679 00:25:36,781 --> 00:25:39,650 various J FCC says has or is that 680 00:25:39,650 --> 00:25:42,350 happening ? If so , what will be the 681 00:25:42,510 --> 00:25:44,732 outcome ? What ? What functions will it 682 00:25:44,732 --> 00:25:48,150 before ? Yes . So , uh , so we're 683 00:25:48,150 --> 00:25:50,261 always taking a look at Ah , you know 684 00:25:50,261 --> 00:25:52,920 how we most efficient helping optimize 685 00:25:52,920 --> 00:25:55,550 our organizations ? Whenever Richard 686 00:25:55,550 --> 00:25:57,820 came into commander of Stratcom , he 687 00:25:57,820 --> 00:25:59,653 wanted to take a look across the 688 00:25:59,653 --> 00:26:01,376 organization as well . We were 689 00:26:01,376 --> 00:26:03,320 fortunate again because he was the 690 00:26:03,320 --> 00:26:05,487 deputy . He had a lot of background at 691 00:26:05,487 --> 00:26:07,487 Stratcom , where general heightened 692 00:26:07,487 --> 00:26:09,710 normalized stratcom to look like other 693 00:26:10,000 --> 00:26:12,167 combat commands . So instead of the 18 694 00:26:12,167 --> 00:26:15,750 subordinate past forces in JFC sees 695 00:26:15,750 --> 00:26:18,000 that run any stratcom , he normalize it 696 00:26:18,000 --> 00:26:20,420 with the J fac with the maritime 697 00:26:20,420 --> 00:26:22,630 component he established the space 698 00:26:22,630 --> 00:26:26,570 component . Andi kept a Jiffy Chi MD So 699 00:26:26,580 --> 00:26:29,650 So instead of 18 different That's and 700 00:26:29,650 --> 00:26:31,483 talks . If you will reporting up 701 00:26:31,483 --> 00:26:33,483 through General heightened where he 702 00:26:33,483 --> 00:26:35,594 became the integrator just because of 703 00:26:35,594 --> 00:26:37,817 the breath of ah , of all the different 704 00:26:37,817 --> 00:26:39,761 mission sets that were that he was 705 00:26:39,761 --> 00:26:41,872 responsible for you put four stars in 706 00:26:41,872 --> 00:26:43,970 charge or Pacific Ivy case of three 707 00:26:43,970 --> 00:26:47,110 star in charge . And for all those 708 00:26:47,650 --> 00:26:49,594 problems , supporters to report up 709 00:26:49,594 --> 00:26:52,280 through , which really helped out again 710 00:26:52,280 --> 00:26:54,447 putting on my chief of staff had again 711 00:26:54,447 --> 00:26:56,613 it really helped out . So then , as we 712 00:26:56,613 --> 00:26:58,947 had , folks come into Stratcom officers , 713 00:26:58,947 --> 00:27:01,780 NGOs or civilians , we looked normal 714 00:27:01,780 --> 00:27:03,780 compared to how you know , compared 715 00:27:03,780 --> 00:27:07,210 with our fellow combatant commands . 716 00:27:07,330 --> 00:27:09,552 And so that was that was very helpful . 717 00:27:10,340 --> 00:27:13,040 I could joke work . Are there plans for 718 00:27:13,040 --> 00:27:15,400 a Midwest interceptor range with North 719 00:27:15,400 --> 00:27:17,790 Dakota Be a prime option for such a 720 00:27:17,790 --> 00:27:20,690 sight . You know , I just don't have 721 00:27:20,690 --> 00:27:23,550 any knowledge of ah of any of that . So 722 00:27:24,380 --> 00:27:26,160 I don't know . And they 723 00:27:28,340 --> 00:27:30,229 what would you say are the budget 724 00:27:30,229 --> 00:27:32,007 challenges of the challenges to 725 00:27:32,007 --> 00:27:33,729 modernization to meet our peer 726 00:27:33,729 --> 00:27:35,896 adversaries modernization objectives , 727 00:27:35,896 --> 00:27:38,550 given the impact , but it impacts of 728 00:27:38,640 --> 00:27:42,430 cove it in the pandemic . It is 729 00:27:42,430 --> 00:27:45,300 critical that we maintain sustained 730 00:27:45,310 --> 00:27:48,810 budgets , uh , at their predictable 731 00:27:49,220 --> 00:27:51,350 so that as we as the program managers 732 00:27:51,350 --> 00:27:53,470 and CEO's lay out their programs . To 733 00:27:53,480 --> 00:27:55,424 be able to have that predictable , 734 00:27:55,424 --> 00:27:57,702 sustained budget is just critical . Um , 735 00:27:58,060 --> 00:28:00,171 you know , we're operating within the 736 00:28:00,171 --> 00:28:02,630 Kobe 19 environment right now . We're 737 00:28:02,630 --> 00:28:04,630 doing very well , but we understand 738 00:28:04,630 --> 00:28:06,352 that the challenges are to the 739 00:28:06,352 --> 00:28:08,352 industrial base , uh , that are out 740 00:28:08,352 --> 00:28:11,340 there again . Having that predictable , 741 00:28:11,350 --> 00:28:15,200 sustained budgets for our programs 742 00:28:15,400 --> 00:28:17,456 is important . So you know , we will 743 00:28:17,456 --> 00:28:19,622 continue to keep an eye on the budgets 744 00:28:19,622 --> 00:28:21,844 and make sure that it is . Our programs 745 00:28:21,844 --> 00:28:24,178 go forward , they state budget informed . 746 00:28:26,440 --> 00:28:28,384 We have another question for you , 747 00:28:28,384 --> 00:28:30,107 General . Can you provide your 748 00:28:30,107 --> 00:28:32,218 perspectives on innovations needed in 749 00:28:32,218 --> 00:28:34,440 space control and counter space areas ? 750 00:28:35,840 --> 00:28:39,410 Yes . So you Joe Biden would talk 751 00:28:39,410 --> 00:28:41,890 about how many times he and General 752 00:28:41,890 --> 00:28:44,630 Raymond were the only two that would be 753 00:28:44,630 --> 00:28:46,840 able discuss any kind of programs and 754 00:28:46,840 --> 00:28:48,784 how four stars , many clouds , the 755 00:28:48,784 --> 00:28:50,951 action officers . So one of the things 756 00:28:50,951 --> 00:28:53,007 that we've got to talk about General 757 00:28:53,007 --> 00:28:52,970 Dixon talked about it in his 758 00:28:52,970 --> 00:28:56,010 confirmation hearing is ah is his 759 00:28:56,010 --> 00:28:58,121 classification levels and making sure 760 00:28:58,121 --> 00:29:00,080 that capabilities that we have out 761 00:29:00,080 --> 00:29:02,080 there aren't classified . It's such 762 00:29:02,080 --> 00:29:04,302 extreme levels that then planners and , 763 00:29:04,302 --> 00:29:06,750 uh , and folks that have to executed 764 00:29:07,360 --> 00:29:11,200 are unaware capabilities . Eso that 765 00:29:11,260 --> 00:29:13,630 again we can apply them as we need to 766 00:29:13,640 --> 00:29:15,751 on the battlefield . So that would be 767 00:29:15,751 --> 00:29:17,751 probably one of the one of the main 768 00:29:17,751 --> 00:29:19,862 here is that we should take a look at 769 00:29:19,862 --> 00:29:22,029 and a thank you , sir . I have another 770 00:29:22,029 --> 00:29:23,918 question . Really appreciate your 771 00:29:23,918 --> 00:29:25,862 comments on possible competitors , 772 00:29:25,862 --> 00:29:27,862 particularly with hyper sonics . Is 773 00:29:27,862 --> 00:29:30,110 there talking OSD acceleration ? But 774 00:29:30,110 --> 00:29:31,943 this seems far behind Russia and 775 00:29:31,943 --> 00:29:33,999 China's current path . What are your 776 00:29:33,999 --> 00:29:35,888 views on how we proceed with high 777 00:29:35,888 --> 00:29:38,054 percentage ? Yeah , again . So this is 778 00:29:38,054 --> 00:29:40,166 about going fast and making sure that 779 00:29:40,166 --> 00:29:42,860 we meet , uh , we've got to , uh , keep 780 00:29:42,860 --> 00:29:45,027 up with our adversaries air going that 781 00:29:45,027 --> 00:29:47,138 would ask you So John Hill , we'll be 782 00:29:47,138 --> 00:29:49,304 talking later on this morning , Really 783 00:29:49,304 --> 00:29:51,471 save that question for him and because 784 00:29:51,471 --> 00:29:53,527 that's that's really his expertise . 785 00:29:53,527 --> 00:29:55,582 And he certainly has , ah , lot more 786 00:29:55,582 --> 00:29:57,749 depth of knowledge and talk talk about 787 00:29:57,749 --> 00:30:00,082 that much better than I get . Thank you . 788 00:30:00,082 --> 00:30:02,249 Sure . Another question for you . What 789 00:30:02,249 --> 00:30:04,360 are some of the specific measures are 790 00:30:04,360 --> 00:30:06,527 metrics you're looking at is part of a 791 00:30:06,527 --> 00:30:08,582 risk of strategic deterrence failure 792 00:30:08,582 --> 00:30:11,330 analysis . That's a great question . So 793 00:30:11,340 --> 00:30:13,229 Well , first off , we look at the 794 00:30:13,229 --> 00:30:15,396 threat . We got to see what the threat 795 00:30:15,396 --> 00:30:17,562 is doing out there . We take a look at 796 00:30:17,562 --> 00:30:19,673 them . It Ah , at our current ready , 797 00:30:19,673 --> 00:30:21,729 just in our posture . And then ? And 798 00:30:21,729 --> 00:30:23,896 then we take a look at the long game . 799 00:30:23,896 --> 00:30:26,229 And what are modernization efforts ? Uh , 800 00:30:26,229 --> 00:30:28,340 are how they're progressing , be able 801 00:30:28,340 --> 00:30:32,020 to provide , uh , the capabilities to 802 00:30:32,020 --> 00:30:34,187 counter what the adversaries are doing 803 00:30:34,187 --> 00:30:36,710 in the future . So so threat , Current 804 00:30:36,710 --> 00:30:38,950 readiness , end of in future posture . 805 00:30:41,240 --> 00:30:43,351 Sir , we have another question . What 806 00:30:43,351 --> 00:30:45,573 are what new challenges that cove in 19 807 00:30:45,573 --> 00:30:47,530 has Kogan 19 brought to threat 808 00:30:47,530 --> 00:30:48,350 assessment . 809 00:30:50,840 --> 00:30:54,520 Um , so So my my my 810 00:30:54,520 --> 00:30:56,890 intelligence . And I know we we worked 811 00:30:56,890 --> 00:30:58,946 very closely with the Strack . I'm j 812 00:30:58,946 --> 00:31:01,850 two . They the threat doesn't sleep , 813 00:31:02,440 --> 00:31:04,480 and so are our intel experts And 814 00:31:04,480 --> 00:31:06,702 distract I'm intel experts . They still 815 00:31:06,702 --> 00:31:09,160 work 24 7 So ? So Thoko video may 816 00:31:09,160 --> 00:31:12,460 challenge us . Um , I know that that 817 00:31:12,460 --> 00:31:14,571 our intelligence professionals are up 818 00:31:14,571 --> 00:31:16,738 to the task , making sure that we stay 819 00:31:16,738 --> 00:31:18,682 on top of what the adversaries air 820 00:31:18,682 --> 00:31:22,230 doing . Thank you , sir . Sure . Really 821 00:31:22,230 --> 00:31:24,452 appreciate your time this morning . And 822 00:31:24,452 --> 00:31:26,619 I hope you stay with us for a few more 823 00:31:26,619 --> 00:31:29,070 minutes . So , but you have a few more 824 00:31:29,070 --> 00:31:31,237 questions for you ? How do you see the 825 00:31:31,237 --> 00:31:33,680 Titan capability integrating the spice 826 00:31:33,680 --> 00:31:35,402 layer into the tactical edge ? 827 00:31:38,010 --> 00:31:40,232 Gonna be critical . I mean , you got to 828 00:31:40,232 --> 00:31:42,399 be able to see the threat . You got to 829 00:31:42,399 --> 00:31:44,510 be able to attribute where the threat 830 00:31:44,510 --> 00:31:44,250 came from so that you can counter the 831 00:31:44,250 --> 00:31:46,310 threat . The integration of Titan , 832 00:31:46,310 --> 00:31:49,260 then into ah to our capabilities is 833 00:31:49,260 --> 00:31:51,930 going to be critical right down to the 834 00:31:51,930 --> 00:31:54,152 tattle edge . And that really shows the 835 00:31:54,152 --> 00:31:57,210 importance of space to army formations 836 00:31:57,210 --> 00:31:59,760 and and army space capabilities 837 00:31:59,760 --> 00:32:02,230 critical to the Ted . You said , as the 838 00:32:02,230 --> 00:32:04,119 question said , Joe , down to the 839 00:32:04,119 --> 00:32:06,850 tactical edge . Thank you , sir . 840 00:32:08,790 --> 00:32:11,012 This may be a This may be a hardball or 841 00:32:11,012 --> 00:32:13,123 maybe a softball . I don't know , but 842 00:32:13,123 --> 00:32:15,068 I'm gonna have a sketch because my 843 00:32:15,068 --> 00:32:17,290 friend asked the question . Well , much 844 00:32:17,290 --> 00:32:19,290 baseball back in season , Joe . Say 845 00:32:19,290 --> 00:32:21,346 what ? New organizations ? My hunt . 846 00:32:21,346 --> 00:32:23,512 Still particularly Redstone Restaurant 847 00:32:23,512 --> 00:32:25,568 Arsenal wants for gain over the next 848 00:32:25,568 --> 00:32:29,360 few years . Yeah , so , uh , you 849 00:32:29,360 --> 00:32:32,210 know , I don't know . Um you know , 850 00:32:32,220 --> 00:32:34,442 every day that I come to work for us in 851 00:32:34,442 --> 00:32:36,387 D . C . I make sure that we're but 852 00:32:36,387 --> 00:32:38,609 we're doing here with the workforce has 853 00:32:38,609 --> 00:32:40,776 provided our nation's our capabilities 854 00:32:40,776 --> 00:32:42,942 in space , and missile defense has two 855 00:32:42,942 --> 00:32:42,410 new organizations that are coming in 856 00:32:42,410 --> 00:32:45,000 here . You know , we on the arsenal , 857 00:32:45,000 --> 00:32:46,944 you know , we see the construction 858 00:32:46,944 --> 00:32:48,778 going around Gate nine , the FBI 859 00:32:48,778 --> 00:32:50,944 headquarters that came in . But as far 860 00:32:50,944 --> 00:32:52,778 as that , I really don't want to 861 00:32:52,778 --> 00:32:54,944 speculate on future missions or future 862 00:32:54,944 --> 00:32:57,000 organizations coming into the coming 863 00:32:57,000 --> 00:32:59,160 into the arsenal . Thank you , sir , 864 00:33:00,940 --> 00:33:03,051 while we wait for another question or 865 00:33:03,051 --> 00:33:05,218 two coming in . Would you like to make 866 00:33:05,218 --> 00:33:07,162 any comments or remarks about this 867 00:33:07,162 --> 00:33:09,107 morning's about Admiral Richards ? 868 00:33:09,107 --> 00:33:12,160 Everything or any Mike is your sir ? 869 00:33:13,490 --> 00:33:15,590 Yeah , you know , you're just in the 870 00:33:15,590 --> 00:33:18,330 missile defense side of what we do , 871 00:33:18,330 --> 00:33:20,108 what we provide for strategic , 872 00:33:20,108 --> 00:33:22,441 strategic deterrence and having Richard . 873 00:33:22,760 --> 00:33:24,927 He's a big fan for missile defense and 874 00:33:25,010 --> 00:33:27,177 were able to brief I was able to brief 875 00:33:27,177 --> 00:33:29,890 the SEC def on our missile defense 876 00:33:29,890 --> 00:33:32,160 contributions to strategic deterrence 877 00:33:32,500 --> 00:33:34,389 and the SEC def kits that natural 878 00:33:34,389 --> 00:33:36,167 Richard gets it . So within the 879 00:33:36,167 --> 00:33:38,389 department we have we have a tremendous 880 00:33:38,389 --> 00:33:40,389 support for what we do with missile 881 00:33:40,389 --> 00:33:42,389 offenders , both from from homeland 882 00:33:42,389 --> 00:33:44,611 missile defense as well as our regional 883 00:33:44,611 --> 00:33:46,833 missile defense , And I couldn't be any 884 00:33:46,833 --> 00:33:50,490 prouder of what our forces do . 24 7 I 885 00:33:50,500 --> 00:33:52,722 get . You know , every morning I get my 886 00:33:52,722 --> 00:33:54,944 option . Intel update . And I looked at 887 00:33:54,944 --> 00:33:57,056 what our missile defenders were doing 888 00:33:57,056 --> 00:33:56,280 around the world . Whether it's in 889 00:33:56,280 --> 00:33:58,800 Centcom or end up a calmer you come and 890 00:33:58,800 --> 00:34:00,950 and I could be more proud of what 891 00:34:00,950 --> 00:34:03,172 they're doing in support of Stratcom in 892 00:34:03,172 --> 00:34:05,339 its in its mission . Thank you , sir . 893 00:34:05,340 --> 00:34:07,507 We have a couple of more questions and 894 00:34:07,507 --> 00:34:09,673 we'll wrap this up . If you don't mind 895 00:34:09,673 --> 00:34:12,140 an awareness of f d o challenges . How 896 00:34:12,140 --> 00:34:14,029 can the integration of allies and 897 00:34:14,029 --> 00:34:16,084 partners , including foreign liaison 898 00:34:16,084 --> 00:34:19,180 officers , be improved ? Yeah . And , 899 00:34:19,190 --> 00:34:23,090 um so we work very hard . It 900 00:34:23,090 --> 00:34:25,230 was It was a bad day at Stratcom and 901 00:34:25,230 --> 00:34:27,341 again . So I'm gonna channel Stratcom 902 00:34:27,341 --> 00:34:29,063 because they have the Stratcom 903 00:34:29,063 --> 00:34:31,008 commanders discussion . A bad days 904 00:34:31,008 --> 00:34:30,800 track that when I was the chief of 905 00:34:30,800 --> 00:34:33,410 staff was when somebody said , Well , 906 00:34:33,410 --> 00:34:35,521 we're gonna have to excuse the allies 907 00:34:35,521 --> 00:34:37,354 out of the room . Generally , it 908 00:34:37,354 --> 00:34:39,354 wouldn't tolerate it . So we had We 909 00:34:39,354 --> 00:34:41,521 worked very hard to make sure that our 910 00:34:41,521 --> 00:34:43,299 allies were in every discussion 911 00:34:43,299 --> 00:34:45,243 permissible , uh , because they're 912 00:34:45,243 --> 00:34:47,880 major contributors to what we do as the 913 00:34:47,880 --> 00:34:50,460 chief during exercises . I would have 914 00:34:50,460 --> 00:34:52,670 my own separate meeting with our with 915 00:34:52,670 --> 00:34:55,360 our Ellen knows just them and myself . 916 00:34:55,360 --> 00:34:57,190 And I would explain to them 917 00:34:57,200 --> 00:35:00,900 contextually um uh , different things 918 00:35:00,900 --> 00:35:03,011 that were going on so that they could 919 00:35:03,011 --> 00:35:05,233 understand the operating environment in 920 00:35:05,233 --> 00:35:07,122 this situation . If we were in an 921 00:35:07,122 --> 00:35:09,430 exercise , for example , eso . So even 922 00:35:09,430 --> 00:35:12,110 though there was for disclosure fto , 923 00:35:12,240 --> 00:35:14,462 you know , things that required them to 924 00:35:14,462 --> 00:35:16,684 go out of the room , I would I would at 925 00:35:16,684 --> 00:35:18,796 least take the time to follow up with 926 00:35:18,796 --> 00:35:20,907 the Allies to give him some context , 927 00:35:20,907 --> 00:35:23,018 Of course , not breaking into the FTO 928 00:35:23,018 --> 00:35:22,770 rules but just making sure the Allies 929 00:35:22,770 --> 00:35:24,881 knew that they were still part of the 930 00:35:24,881 --> 00:35:27,500 team . And eight , sir , According to U . 931 00:35:27,500 --> 00:35:29,500 N reports , North Korea is probably 932 00:35:29,500 --> 00:35:31,940 developed miniaturized nuclear devices 933 00:35:32,080 --> 00:35:33,858 to fit into the warheads of its 934 00:35:33,858 --> 00:35:35,691 ballistic missiles . What is the 935 00:35:35,691 --> 00:35:37,913 strategy ? If you're able to comment on 936 00:35:37,913 --> 00:35:40,290 that , a missile defense specifically 937 00:35:40,290 --> 00:35:42,300 against North Korea's ballistic 938 00:35:42,300 --> 00:35:45,120 missiles ? Well , because we have a 939 00:35:45,120 --> 00:35:47,287 hard time determining what's what's on 940 00:35:47,287 --> 00:35:49,453 what's on every warhead . We've got to 941 00:35:49,453 --> 00:35:51,509 treat every every missile that comes 942 00:35:51,509 --> 00:35:53,676 out of North Korea as the um , highest 943 00:35:53,676 --> 00:35:55,898 consequence threat . That's why we have 944 00:35:55,898 --> 00:35:58,120 to have trained and ready forces in the 945 00:35:58,120 --> 00:36:00,176 best capabilities within our missile 946 00:36:00,176 --> 00:36:02,880 defense interceptors . Thank you , sir . 947 00:36:05,330 --> 00:36:07,360 How much of a concern is there with 948 00:36:07,360 --> 00:36:09,027 respect to the anti satellite 949 00:36:09,027 --> 00:36:11,840 capabilities of China and Russia to our 950 00:36:11,840 --> 00:36:14,510 space based assets for the US revive ? 951 00:36:14,510 --> 00:36:16,843 It's a sad program from the 19 eighties , 952 00:36:18,630 --> 00:36:20,463 so we know our adversaries . Air 953 00:36:20,463 --> 00:36:23,130 contestant US in space . Uh , John 954 00:36:23,130 --> 00:36:25,074 Dickerson talked about that in his 955 00:36:25,074 --> 00:36:27,074 confirmation hearing . John Raymond 956 00:36:27,074 --> 00:36:28,741 talks about it . Um , unusual 957 00:36:28,741 --> 00:36:30,408 disturbing behavior is how he 958 00:36:30,408 --> 00:36:32,297 characterized Ah , Russian , Ah , 959 00:36:32,530 --> 00:36:35,420 Russian operations on orbit . And so 960 00:36:35,420 --> 00:36:37,780 we're always keeping an eye on what the 961 00:36:37,780 --> 00:36:40,090 adversaries air doing in space . Um , 962 00:36:40,630 --> 00:36:42,686 we stayed concerned about it because 963 00:36:42,686 --> 00:36:44,463 again , we know that were being 964 00:36:44,463 --> 00:36:46,519 contested in space all the time from 965 00:36:46,519 --> 00:36:48,741 our adversaries . Thank you . Serving . 966 00:36:50,330 --> 00:36:52,497 It's that one final question here , If 967 00:36:52,497 --> 00:36:54,663 you don't mind . Is there any planning 968 00:36:54,663 --> 00:36:56,886 for system sustainment with the organic 969 00:36:56,886 --> 00:36:59,760 industrial base ? Whenever , whenever 970 00:36:59,760 --> 00:37:02,760 we build any programs , you always have 971 00:37:02,760 --> 00:37:04,927 to build in . This is sustainment line 972 00:37:04,927 --> 00:37:06,927 into that . So so absolutely , it's 973 00:37:06,927 --> 00:37:09,260 it's critical for what we're doing . So , 974 00:37:09,260 --> 00:37:12,440 um , you know , I think we'll have Rob 975 00:37:12,440 --> 00:37:15,810 Brashear later on . Is one of the panel 976 00:37:15,820 --> 00:37:18,800 members asking that question on how we 977 00:37:18,800 --> 00:37:20,522 build it in there . But what's 978 00:37:20,522 --> 00:37:22,900 sustaining lines are critical on And 979 00:37:23,080 --> 00:37:25,136 making sure that the industrial base 980 00:37:25,136 --> 00:37:27,358 stays healthy to support those lines is 981 00:37:27,358 --> 00:37:29,413 of great importance to us because it 982 00:37:29,413 --> 00:37:31,524 will contribute to readiness Indeed . 983 00:37:31,524 --> 00:37:33,469 Thank you , sir . General Carver . 984 00:37:33,469 --> 00:37:35,469 Thank you for agreeing . Dance with 985 00:37:35,469 --> 00:37:37,247 questions from Admiral Richards 986 00:37:37,247 --> 00:37:39,469 briefing this morning . Your experience 987 00:37:39,469 --> 00:37:41,136 and keen insights are greatly 988 00:37:41,136 --> 00:37:43,302 appreciated . Thank you for taking the 989 00:37:43,302 --> 00:37:45,524 time out of your valuable schedule this 990 00:37:45,524 --> 00:37:47,524 morning to be with us . And we look 991 00:37:47,524 --> 00:37:46,930 forward to your space . The missile 992 00:37:46,930 --> 00:37:49,220 Defense Command update later this 993 00:37:49,220 --> 00:37:51,580 morning . Thank you , sir . Great . 994 00:37:51,580 --> 00:37:52,150 Thanks , Joe .