WEBVTT 00:00.400 --> 00:02.456 anything in front of us , and that's 00:02.456 --> 00:04.622 what we're all about in our business . 00:04.622 --> 00:06.733 I do want to thank Mayor Tommy battle 00:06.733 --> 00:08.900 for being an ally in missile defense . 00:08.900 --> 00:11.067 And , of course , thanks to Lieutenant 00:11.067 --> 00:12.900 General Dick Formica , Mr Ronnie 00:12.900 --> 00:15.067 Chronis , Ter and the entire symposium 00:15.067 --> 00:17.233 Committee for inviting me to speak and 00:17.233 --> 00:19.067 putting together this event . So 00:19.067 --> 00:21.289 there's one thing I love . It's telling 00:21.289 --> 00:23.456 See stories so severe with me here for 00:23.456 --> 00:25.511 a quick one . So you should know . I 00:25.520 --> 00:27.710 bristle when I hear the Department of 00:27.710 --> 00:30.140 Defense being accused of being stuck in 00:30.140 --> 00:32.570 a Cold War . And that happens , right ? 00:32.570 --> 00:35.170 Tickling my mission sets . There's 00:35.170 --> 00:37.460 probably only a few 100 of us left on 00:37.460 --> 00:39.560 active duty , even served during the 00:39.560 --> 00:42.220 Cold War . I was one of them . One of 00:42.220 --> 00:43.998 you I got tell you , as a young 00:43.998 --> 00:46.050 lieutenant , I can assure you , my 00:46.050 --> 00:48.190 focus was on getting qualified , 00:48.190 --> 00:50.910 getting my dolphins . And I'm pretty 00:50.910 --> 00:53.750 sure I didn't begin to grasp the up geo 00:53.750 --> 00:56.150 strategic implications of that struggle 00:56.150 --> 00:58.400 at the time , right ? A grass . One 00:58.400 --> 01:01.310 thing we did business very differently . 01:01.310 --> 01:03.590 Back then . We knew it each and every 01:03.590 --> 01:05.257 time we went underway . I'm a 01:05.257 --> 01:07.720 submariner , and we knew we did that it 01:07.720 --> 01:10.030 could happen . It could go down . And 01:10.030 --> 01:12.560 it could be for all the marbles . War 01:12.560 --> 01:14.671 could break out with little warning , 01:14.740 --> 01:17.140 and it could easily go nuclear . So we 01:17.140 --> 01:20.470 trained every day for that fight . We 01:20.470 --> 01:22.803 had the enemy order of battle memorized , 01:22.880 --> 01:25.047 and everything started with a threat . 01:25.220 --> 01:27.560 Dual the emitters , all the sonars , 01:27.570 --> 01:30.020 all the weapons systems . M . Khan was 01:30.020 --> 01:32.131 the norm . I didn't know my submarine 01:32.131 --> 01:34.076 had a radar for a year , so it has 01:34.076 --> 01:36.750 never turned it on . Opsec was the norm . 01:37.240 --> 01:39.129 Every time I turned over his duty 01:39.129 --> 01:41.073 officer , officer of the deck , it 01:41.073 --> 01:43.129 included a review of what our shifts 01:43.129 --> 01:45.351 assignment was gonna be if the war went 01:45.351 --> 01:47.980 down on that watch , like in the next 01:47.980 --> 01:50.270 six hours . And I assert , I submit 01:50.740 --> 01:53.770 this nation in our military has not had 01:53.770 --> 01:56.580 to seriously consider competition 01:56.830 --> 01:58.790 through crisis and possible armed 01:58.790 --> 02:02.160 conflict with a nuclear capable peer in , 02:02.160 --> 02:05.290 like , nearly 30 years . Look , I know , 02:05.570 --> 02:07.570 and I certainly know this isn't the 02:07.570 --> 02:09.681 Cold War all over again . I tell that 02:09.681 --> 02:11.848 story to explain why we need to return 02:11.848 --> 02:14.170 to a mindset where it all starts with a 02:14.170 --> 02:17.020 threat . Coal is over and we're having 02:17.020 --> 02:18.909 a sustainment phase on the war on 02:18.909 --> 02:21.080 terror . But we're now in an era of 02:21.080 --> 02:23.302 great competition , and I'll tell you , 02:23.302 --> 02:25.524 that's our national security strategy , 02:25.524 --> 02:27.636 sells us that , and we are engaged in 02:27.636 --> 02:30.530 great power competition . So we , as a 02:30.530 --> 02:33.410 nation of military need to focus on the 02:33.420 --> 02:35.400 threats in front of us . And those 02:35.400 --> 02:37.622 threats go all the way down to the gray 02:37.622 --> 02:39.456 zone that area below traditional 02:39.456 --> 02:42.550 conventional armed conflict . We cannot 02:42.550 --> 02:44.772 wait for conventional conflict to break 02:44.772 --> 02:46.828 out . Before we start thinking about 02:46.828 --> 02:48.994 nuclear deterrence , we have to go all 02:48.994 --> 02:50.994 the way into the gray zone to deter 02:50.994 --> 02:52.939 actions and compete . Make sure an 02:52.939 --> 02:54.994 adversary doesn't miscalculate where 02:54.994 --> 02:57.106 they believe they can win with a jump 02:57.106 --> 02:59.320 in escalation . This is like us 02:59.320 --> 03:01.980 strategic command exists . We are here 03:01.980 --> 03:04.620 to deter great power war in this year 03:04.620 --> 03:07.100 of great power competition . At the end 03:07.100 --> 03:09.640 of my tours , Commander of Stratcom , I 03:09.640 --> 03:11.362 want to be able to say what my 03:11.362 --> 03:13.418 predecessor , General Heighten , and 03:13.418 --> 03:15.473 his predecessor , Admiral Haney , in 03:15.473 --> 03:17.696 back to general paler , want to be able 03:17.696 --> 03:19.850 to say we deterred strategic attack . 03:20.540 --> 03:22.262 So my three priorities for the 03:22.262 --> 03:24.429 Commander straightforward and have not 03:24.429 --> 03:26.300 changed about all else . We will 03:26.300 --> 03:28.680 provide strategic deterrence . And if 03:28.680 --> 03:30.736 deterrence fails , we're prepared to 03:30.736 --> 03:32.580 deliver a decisive response . Is 03:32.580 --> 03:34.636 general heightened ? Used to say , I 03:34.636 --> 03:36.890 mean decisive in every possible way . 03:37.280 --> 03:39.613 We're going to do this with a resilient , 03:39.613 --> 03:41.800 equipped , trained and combat ready 03:41.800 --> 03:44.160 force . This is what it's all about . 03:44.220 --> 03:46.387 The Nuclear Posture Review states that 03:46.387 --> 03:48.340 the highest US nuclear policy and 03:48.340 --> 03:51.240 strategy priority is to deter potential 03:51.240 --> 03:53.740 adversaries from nuclear attack of any 03:53.740 --> 03:56.700 scale , are always ready to execute our 03:56.700 --> 03:58.960 mission on a moment's notice . We can 03:58.960 --> 04:01.127 Onley accomplish both of those because 04:01.127 --> 04:03.450 of the 150,000 soldiers , sailors , 04:03.460 --> 04:05.830 airmen , Marines and civilians across 04:05.830 --> 04:08.320 the globe performing our mission each 04:08.320 --> 04:10.570 and every day . I also have three 04:10.570 --> 04:12.348 tenants for the command to help 04:12.348 --> 04:14.403 accomplish my priorities , these air 04:14.403 --> 04:16.514 more time dimensional , if you will , 04:16.680 --> 04:18.840 the person to be ready to man battle 04:18.840 --> 04:20.660 stations and I forgive the Navy 04:20.660 --> 04:22.771 reference there . But what that means 04:22.771 --> 04:25.100 is we all need to do whatever it takes 04:25.100 --> 04:27.510 to ensure that we , as individuals , 04:27.740 --> 04:30.100 can execute our mission with NASCAR . 04:30.110 --> 04:32.580 Hits stopped like efficiency . That's 04:32.580 --> 04:35.730 what we focus on today . Next , we need 04:35.730 --> 04:38.320 to follow the shot basketball reference 04:38.570 --> 04:40.459 on programs and initiatives we've 04:40.459 --> 04:42.514 started . It doesn't matter how many 04:42.514 --> 04:44.626 things we start . It matters how many 04:44.626 --> 04:47.100 things we complete . And finally we 04:47.100 --> 04:49.290 need to forge 21st century strategic 04:49.290 --> 04:51.760 deterrence . The strategic environment 04:51.760 --> 04:54.020 has changed from the Cold War , through 04:54.020 --> 04:56.180 the war on tower and now into great 04:56.180 --> 04:58.670 power competition . We need to ensure 04:58.670 --> 05:01.190 our strategies , plans , capabilities 05:01.190 --> 05:03.700 and operations are integrated across 05:03.710 --> 05:05.910 all domains . On the full spectrum of 05:05.910 --> 05:08.550 conflict , we must home in our 05:08.550 --> 05:10.606 capabilities based on the threats we 05:10.606 --> 05:12.800 face or frankly , we run . The risk of 05:12.800 --> 05:14.856 developing and fielding capabilities 05:14.856 --> 05:17.400 will just never use risk not using 05:17.400 --> 05:19.400 advanced capabilities , because our 05:19.400 --> 05:21.400 adversary may escalate the conflict 05:21.400 --> 05:23.567 with nucular used before we even get a 05:23.567 --> 05:25.960 chance . We may think escalation is 05:25.960 --> 05:28.030 linear , but I tell you , it is not 05:28.350 --> 05:30.072 particularly in a room full of 05:30.072 --> 05:32.183 engineers and scientists . You know , 05:32.183 --> 05:34.128 when you have opposing forces in a 05:34.128 --> 05:36.183 closed system is anything but linear 05:36.860 --> 05:38.971 with discontinuities . And we have to 05:38.971 --> 05:40.916 be prepared for our adversaries to 05:40.916 --> 05:43.027 think that maybe a jump in escalation 05:43.027 --> 05:45.138 is the only way to win . So just like 05:45.138 --> 05:47.138 my predecessors , Admiral Haney and 05:47.138 --> 05:49.304 General heightened stress the security 05:49.304 --> 05:51.027 environment we live in is very 05:51.027 --> 05:53.360 different than the security environment , 05:53.360 --> 05:55.310 our strategic concepts originally 05:55.310 --> 05:57.780 designed for when they were originally 05:57.780 --> 05:59.800 designed . It was for a bipolar 05:59.800 --> 06:01.760 environment . We must tailor our 06:01.760 --> 06:03.982 strategies , plans and capabilities for 06:03.982 --> 06:06.240 the full spectrum of conflict in a 06:06.240 --> 06:08.190 world with more than one nuclear 06:08.190 --> 06:10.830 capable Pierre , make no mistake , the 06:10.830 --> 06:13.052 Triad and his capabilities are robust , 06:13.052 --> 06:14.997 have been useful in ways that they 06:14.997 --> 06:17.163 weren't necessarily designed for . The 06:17.163 --> 06:19.330 fact that our Triad still provides the 06:19.330 --> 06:21.552 flexibility to address changing threats 06:21.552 --> 06:23.663 in this new era is a testament to its 06:23.663 --> 06:25.886 original designers and everyone who has 06:25.886 --> 06:28.430 maintained , operated and sustained it . 06:28.430 --> 06:30.486 Over the lifetime of these systems , 06:30.730 --> 06:32.930 we're in a different world . Russia , 06:32.940 --> 06:35.107 for example , has been modernizing its 06:35.107 --> 06:37.540 strategic forces for almost 20 years 06:37.740 --> 06:40.210 and is about 70% complete . They're 06:40.220 --> 06:41.776 modernizing their try it of 06:41.776 --> 06:43.887 intercontinental ballistic missiles , 06:43.887 --> 06:45.887 nuclear missile submarines and long 06:45.887 --> 06:47.887 range bombers , and the command and 06:47.887 --> 06:49.442 control for those systems . 06:49.442 --> 06:51.331 Additionally , they're developing 06:51.331 --> 06:53.553 hypersonic glide vehicles . They vote , 06:53.553 --> 06:55.776 reported open press . They have them on 06:55.776 --> 06:55.720 alert . They have nuclear armed and 06:55.720 --> 06:57.664 nuclear power torpedoes and cruise 06:57.664 --> 06:59.664 missiles , and all of these weapons 06:59.664 --> 07:01.664 systems upgrades are in addition to 07:01.664 --> 07:03.720 their non treaty accountable nuclear 07:03.720 --> 07:05.664 weapons stockpile numbering in the 07:05.664 --> 07:07.664 thousands . Obviously , it would be 07:07.664 --> 07:09.553 easier for me to list the systems 07:09.553 --> 07:11.609 Russia is not modernizing instead of 07:11.609 --> 07:13.850 the ones they are now with China . You 07:13.850 --> 07:15.961 have to watch what they do , not what 07:15.961 --> 07:18.128 they say and look at what they've done 07:18.128 --> 07:20.183 with their conventional arsenal . If 07:20.183 --> 07:22.128 you go back to 2010 they've almost 07:22.128 --> 07:24.294 doubled the number of I C B . M's from 07:24.294 --> 07:26.510 50 to 90 . By our highest estimates , 07:26.510 --> 07:28.399 they have more than tripled their 07:28.399 --> 07:30.177 number of short range ballistic 07:30.177 --> 07:32.010 missiles from 400 to 1500 . They 07:32.010 --> 07:33.810 designed and built two aircraft 07:33.810 --> 07:35.866 carriers for the first time in their 07:35.866 --> 07:38.088 history . This is one of my favorites . 07:38.088 --> 07:40.310 They created from scratch a Coast Guard 07:40.310 --> 07:43.050 in 2013 and they already have 07:43.050 --> 07:46.820 255 Coast Guard ships . Crime 07:46.820 --> 07:49.450 example of China's Gray's own actions , 07:49.710 --> 07:51.821 where they're using this new fleet to 07:51.821 --> 07:53.821 enforce contested maritime claims . 07:53.821 --> 07:56.240 Beneath the level of open conflict in 07:56.240 --> 07:58.990 the South and east China seas , they're 07:58.990 --> 08:00.934 also taking significant strides to 08:00.934 --> 08:02.879 expand and modernize their nuclear 08:02.879 --> 08:05.101 capability . They're expected to double 08:05.101 --> 08:07.212 in size of their nuclear stockpile of 08:07.212 --> 08:09.212 next decade , there soon gonna have 08:09.212 --> 08:11.157 their version of a triad when they 08:11.157 --> 08:13.157 complete their long range strategic 08:13.157 --> 08:15.379 bomber . They're improving Their silo , 08:15.379 --> 08:17.268 based on Road Mobile I C B M . Is 08:17.268 --> 08:19.434 working . Increased the range of their 08:19.434 --> 08:21.546 slbm , his command and control . It's 08:21.546 --> 08:23.601 the whole thing . If you look at the 08:23.601 --> 08:25.712 writing on the wall , nuclear is just 08:25.712 --> 08:27.712 the next thing on the Chinese to do 08:27.712 --> 08:29.823 list , and it is likely to follow the 08:29.823 --> 08:29.700 same pattern as their conventional 08:29.700 --> 08:32.960 forces . And just like Russia , China 08:32.960 --> 08:34.960 spending significant resource is on 08:34.960 --> 08:37.182 advanced capabilities like hyper sonics 08:37.200 --> 08:40.180 space and cyber capabilities is a 08:40.180 --> 08:42.600 mistake to consider China as some 08:42.600 --> 08:44.740 smaller , lesser included case of 08:44.740 --> 08:48.170 Russia . The list goes on . North Korea 08:48.170 --> 08:50.003 continues his illicit pursuit of 08:50.003 --> 08:52.003 nuclear weapons are advancing their 08:52.003 --> 08:54.380 missile systems as you more than most , 08:54.380 --> 08:56.840 are acutely aware these capabilities 08:56.840 --> 08:58.951 threaten our forces and allies in the 08:58.951 --> 09:00.896 region . And beyond that , you are 09:01.360 --> 09:03.670 where the most . There I CVM test in 09:03.670 --> 09:05.614 the last few years and even pose a 09:05.614 --> 09:07.790 threat to our homeland . It was 09:07.890 --> 09:10.001 developed and fielded a large arsenal 09:10.001 --> 09:12.223 ballistic missiles in the Middle East . 09:12.223 --> 09:13.890 The systems construct targets 09:13.890 --> 09:16.057 throughout the region and threaten our 09:16.057 --> 09:17.946 interests there and our unlearned 09:17.946 --> 09:19.946 lesson that I'm borrowing this from 09:19.946 --> 09:22.001 General Raymond hashtag space . It's 09:22.001 --> 09:24.057 hard when they attempted to launch a 09:24.057 --> 09:26.168 space vehicle earlier this year . Now 09:26.168 --> 09:28.168 they weren't fully successful . But 09:28.168 --> 09:30.112 they are trying to enter the space 09:30.112 --> 09:32.223 domain and increased the area they're 09:32.223 --> 09:34.112 trying to influence . So why am I 09:34.112 --> 09:36.057 summarizing the threats our nation 09:36.057 --> 09:38.223 faces ? You're all very aware of these 09:38.223 --> 09:40.520 threats . I just reiterated the threats 09:40.520 --> 09:43.050 to you because they're the why when we 09:43.050 --> 09:44.828 talk about the capabilities and 09:44.828 --> 09:46.994 integration we need in our warfighting 09:46.994 --> 09:49.550 strategies , plans and operations that 09:49.550 --> 09:51.606 was the commander of U . S Strategic 09:51.606 --> 09:53.510 Command . I am laser focused on 09:53.510 --> 09:55.340 modernizing our triad and its 09:55.340 --> 09:57.507 supporting infrastructure like nuclear 09:57.507 --> 09:59.673 command , control and communications . 09:59.673 --> 10:01.618 I also have an important role is a 10:01.618 --> 10:03.507 coordinating authority for global 10:03.507 --> 10:05.340 missile defense . Each region is 10:05.340 --> 10:07.284 focused on protecting their assets 10:07.284 --> 10:09.284 through a combination of active and 10:09.284 --> 10:11.340 passive defensive measures . And you 10:11.340 --> 10:13.451 are the best in the world at what you 10:13.451 --> 10:15.340 do . I'm here to increase missile 10:15.340 --> 10:17.062 depends integration and enable 10:17.062 --> 10:19.540 protection not just within a Naor , but 10:19.540 --> 10:23.290 across a Lars as well . I d c s is worn 10:23.290 --> 10:25.401 white . The missile defense community 10:25.401 --> 10:26.957 is working to integrate our 10:26.957 --> 10:29.068 capabilities when testing is complete 10:29.068 --> 10:31.179 and I BCS can link all of our missile 10:31.179 --> 10:33.401 defense systems together , that's gonna 10:33.401 --> 10:35.623 be an enormous step forward in the Jazz 10:35.623 --> 10:37.880 C two arena . In order to deter our 10:37.890 --> 10:40.440 adversaries in the 21st century , we 10:40.440 --> 10:42.420 need toe affect and alter their 10:42.420 --> 10:44.970 decision calculus . We need them to 10:44.970 --> 10:46.914 know that any attack on the United 10:46.914 --> 10:48.970 States , our allies will have little 10:48.970 --> 10:52.550 margin probability of success and that 10:52.550 --> 10:54.840 our response will result in a very bad 10:54.850 --> 10:58.330 day for them . We as a nation had 10:58.330 --> 11:00.550 become very comfortable operating in a 11:00.550 --> 11:02.660 permissive environment . We don't 11:02.660 --> 11:04.882 necessarily exercise their practice for 11:04.882 --> 11:06.549 conflict in a truly contested 11:06.549 --> 11:08.604 environment , and we need to prepare 11:08.604 --> 11:10.600 for that . We need to make sure 11:10.610 --> 11:12.721 capabilities provide adequate command 11:12.721 --> 11:14.888 and control for the times . We need it 11:14.888 --> 11:17.010 the most . So I understand the high 11:17.010 --> 11:18.954 altitude experts at Army Space and 11:18.954 --> 11:21.177 Missile Defense Center of Excellence is 11:21.177 --> 11:23.399 looking into technologies to supplement 11:23.399 --> 11:25.343 our existing capabilities . If our 11:25.343 --> 11:26.910 space assets are jammed or 11:26.910 --> 11:29.077 incapacitated for any period of time , 11:29.310 --> 11:31.477 I altitude assets can help provide the 11:31.477 --> 11:33.754 coverage on short notice and low costs , 11:34.280 --> 11:36.630 part of a concept called space in Depth . 11:37.410 --> 11:39.410 We need to follow the shot , ensure 11:39.410 --> 11:41.466 these high altitude capabilities air 11:41.466 --> 11:43.720 fully developed available , fielded and 11:43.720 --> 11:46.380 you wives . Our adversaries , as you 11:46.380 --> 11:48.547 know , are developing hypersonic glide 11:48.547 --> 11:50.547 vehicles and nuclear powered cruise 11:50.547 --> 11:52.500 missiles . We need ways to defend 11:52.500 --> 11:54.810 against these and normal technologies . 11:54.820 --> 11:56.987 We can't find our way to purse aid our 11:56.987 --> 11:58.987 emissaries to adjust their decision 11:58.987 --> 12:01.153 calculus . We may not be able to deter 12:01.153 --> 12:03.098 an attack . Have a serious develop 12:03.098 --> 12:05.264 these advanced weapons systems we need 12:05.264 --> 12:07.320 to develop in fuel capabilities . To 12:07.320 --> 12:09.209 counter these threats . I want to 12:09.209 --> 12:11.376 return to integration as I think it is 12:11.376 --> 12:13.598 one of the most important pieces of our 12:13.598 --> 12:15.764 strategies , plans and ops . While the 12:15.764 --> 12:17.500 phrase any sensor best shooter 12:17.500 --> 12:19.556 typically applies toe active missile 12:19.556 --> 12:21.790 defense , perhaps we should consider it 12:21.790 --> 12:24.012 as we endeavoured implement the missile 12:24.012 --> 12:26.123 defence reviews comprehensive missile 12:26.123 --> 12:28.179 defense strategy . We go to plan our 12:28.179 --> 12:30.512 options . We know what we're up against . 12:30.840 --> 12:33.062 We need to understand the effectiveness 12:33.062 --> 12:35.284 of offensive and defensive capabilities 12:35.284 --> 12:37.210 against an adversary before the 12:37.220 --> 12:39.610 conflict . That understanding enables 12:39.610 --> 12:41.443 commanders to make risk informed 12:41.443 --> 12:43.666 Decisions related to active and passive 12:43.666 --> 12:45.832 defense and offensive prelaunch attack 12:45.832 --> 12:48.480 operations are strategies , plans , 12:48.480 --> 12:50.702 policies and office will be affected by 12:50.702 --> 12:52.424 our ability to integrate these 12:52.424 --> 12:55.300 capabilities we failed to pursue . The 12:55.300 --> 12:57.220 MDR is recommended comprehensive 12:57.220 --> 12:58.776 approach to missile defense 12:58.776 --> 13:01.030 capabilities , which integrates offense 13:01.030 --> 13:03.086 and defense , I think is going to be 13:03.086 --> 13:05.141 next to impossible to keep up with a 13:05.141 --> 13:07.308 threat . Sweet Face is just relatively 13:07.308 --> 13:09.530 cheap for an adversary to shoot it us . 13:09.710 --> 13:11.766 But it is expensive and difficult to 13:11.766 --> 13:14.099 stop every single missile during flight . 13:14.450 --> 13:16.700 Simply put off initiative form defense 13:16.810 --> 13:19.340 vice versa . If we're confident , for 13:19.340 --> 13:21.340 example , that are active , missile 13:21.340 --> 13:23.451 defenses can shoot down adversaries . 13:23.451 --> 13:25.451 Missile A but not necessarily their 13:25.451 --> 13:27.618 missile . See , we know we must make . 13:27.618 --> 13:29.618 This will see a higher priority for 13:29.618 --> 13:31.840 offensive prelaunch attack operations . 13:31.840 --> 13:33.673 Achieving this level situational 13:33.673 --> 13:35.840 awareness is not easy , but we must be 13:35.840 --> 13:37.729 able to integrate our offense and 13:37.729 --> 13:39.951 defense capabilities to fully realize a 13:39.951 --> 13:42.530 comprehensive view of any sensor . Best 13:42.530 --> 13:44.620 shooter in the increasingly lethal 13:44.620 --> 13:47.300 missile defensive armour . In some 13:47.300 --> 13:49.411 respects , Missile Defense Command in 13:49.411 --> 13:51.522 control is the Pathfinder , where the 13:51.522 --> 13:53.744 department needs to go more broadly and 13:53.744 --> 13:55.911 command and control is showing the way 13:55.911 --> 13:57.967 ahead for Jazz C two . So keep doing 13:57.967 --> 14:00.810 what you're doing . So in the 21st 14:00.810 --> 14:03.032 century , deterrence is more a lot more 14:03.032 --> 14:04.977 than just nuclear . It's deterring 14:04.977 --> 14:07.088 multiple adversaries at all domains . 14:07.310 --> 14:09.310 Strategic deterrence is the highest 14:09.310 --> 14:11.421 priority mission in the Department of 14:11.421 --> 14:13.820 Defense is foundational to our national 14:13.820 --> 14:16.690 defense and underpins every US military 14:16.690 --> 14:19.370 operation around the wall . But this is 14:19.370 --> 14:21.037 based on the most fundamental 14:21.037 --> 14:23.259 assumption of all of our strategies and 14:23.259 --> 14:25.259 plans the assumption that strategic 14:25.259 --> 14:27.630 deterrence will hold . We like to think 14:27.630 --> 14:30.050 deterrence will hold , but will it hold 14:30.050 --> 14:32.700 in ways we haven't tested it in before ? 14:33.120 --> 14:35.231 This assumption is going to be tested 14:35.231 --> 14:37.650 in new ways , but I know a minimum for 14:37.650 --> 14:40.160 it to hold . We're gonna need that try 14:40.160 --> 14:42.780 at a recapitalized triad . We're gonna 14:42.780 --> 14:45.700 need combat ready forces and we're 14:45.700 --> 14:48.280 gonna need missile defense . Missile 14:48.280 --> 14:49.947 defense capabilities give our 14:49.947 --> 14:51.891 adversaries pause to rethink their 14:51.891 --> 14:54.280 decision Calculus . Effective missile 14:54.280 --> 14:56.058 defense deters adversaries from 14:56.058 --> 14:58.169 attacking because they know they have 14:58.169 --> 15:00.540 little chance for success and any 15:00.540 --> 15:02.818 potential response could be devastated . 15:03.230 --> 15:05.008 So we have to rethink how we do 15:05.008 --> 15:07.008 business in this era of great power 15:07.008 --> 15:08.952 competition . Fundamentals haven't 15:08.952 --> 15:11.063 changed incredibly denied benefit and 15:11.063 --> 15:13.840 impose costs . But we must change how 15:13.840 --> 15:16.730 we pursue these objectives and our 15:16.740 --> 15:18.740 current plans have about as much in 15:18.740 --> 15:20.740 common with the old Cold War Single 15:20.740 --> 15:22.740 integrated operational plan is your 15:22.740 --> 15:24.684 smartphone does with an old rotary 15:24.684 --> 15:27.520 telephone , but it isn't enough . We 15:27.520 --> 15:29.631 need to continue improving our Taylor 15:29.631 --> 15:31.687 to integrated approach to deterrence 15:31.850 --> 15:33.906 and missile defense capabilities are 15:33.906 --> 15:36.128 vital to deterrence strategy , and they 15:36.128 --> 15:38.183 must be integrated and tailor to the 15:38.183 --> 15:40.294 threats ahead of us . And you have to 15:40.294 --> 15:42.294 measure it . It's or how to measure 15:42.294 --> 15:44.517 that . Stratcom has developed a risk of 15:44.517 --> 15:46.739 strategic deterrence failure analysis . 15:46.739 --> 15:48.830 It's based on the idea of the many 15:48.840 --> 15:51.540 risks Commander must consider . You are 15:51.540 --> 15:54.550 so consequential they must be called 15:54.550 --> 15:56.730 out , specifically measured and acted 15:56.730 --> 15:59.070 upon it all times the risk of a 15:59.070 --> 16:01.580 strategic deterrence failure and inside 16:01.580 --> 16:03.469 that the bright line of a nuclear 16:03.469 --> 16:05.524 deterrence failure and the risk of a 16:05.524 --> 16:07.730 strike on the homeland we just dropped 16:07.730 --> 16:10.150 Tom , have a lead on the first risk and 16:10.150 --> 16:12.317 we're working , integrate planning and 16:12.317 --> 16:14.650 execution processes through competition , 16:14.650 --> 16:16.820 crisis and conflict . We want everyone 16:16.820 --> 16:19.180 across the department to continuously 16:19.180 --> 16:20.902 consider the risk of strategic 16:20.902 --> 16:23.540 deterrence failure . The progress you 16:23.540 --> 16:25.429 are making and the relations just 16:25.429 --> 16:27.429 between government and industry are 16:27.429 --> 16:29.470 important or national defense and 16:29.470 --> 16:31.690 integrated strategic deterrence . An 16:31.690 --> 16:33.523 integrated approach will help us 16:33.523 --> 16:35.357 acquire the best capabilities to 16:35.357 --> 16:37.523 achieve the national security strategy 16:37.523 --> 16:39.412 and the national defense strategy 16:39.412 --> 16:41.579 objectives in order to be successful , 16:41.579 --> 16:43.690 we need to make sure we integrate our 16:43.690 --> 16:45.746 efforts not just in the department's 16:45.746 --> 16:47.634 planning and execution , but with 16:47.634 --> 16:49.690 industry and the whole government as 16:49.690 --> 16:51.746 well . We must look at the strategic 16:51.746 --> 16:53.746 environment as it is not is what we 16:53.746 --> 16:55.970 want it to be . And I ask each of you 16:55.970 --> 16:58.137 to work with their counterparts across 16:58.137 --> 17:00.026 the department , inter agency and 17:00.026 --> 17:02.510 industry to find the best solutions for 17:02.510 --> 17:04.621 the complicated strategic environment 17:04.621 --> 17:07.810 we face . The threats are riel , and 17:07.810 --> 17:09.699 because of everything you all are 17:09.699 --> 17:12.410 working on , will be ready if conflict 17:12.410 --> 17:14.620 begins on our watch . Thank you , 17:24.510 --> 17:26.732 Atmel Richard taking the time to record 17:26.732 --> 17:28.732 those X sexual comments . And we're 17:28.732 --> 17:30.677 very grateful and thankful for his 17:30.677 --> 17:32.732 leadership in Stratcom doing what he 17:32.732 --> 17:34.843 does to protect our nation's security 17:35.370 --> 17:37.690 Lieutenant Car Blur . And his role is 17:37.690 --> 17:39.690 the commanding general of the Joint 17:39.690 --> 17:41.523 Functional Combatant Command for 17:41.523 --> 17:43.468 Integrated missile Defense . And a 17:43.468 --> 17:45.468 direct report to Admiral Richard in 17:45.468 --> 17:47.579 this role will now take any questions 17:47.579 --> 17:50.250 that you may have . Hey , thanks , 17:50.250 --> 17:52.460 Ronnie . If I could just like to 17:52.460 --> 17:54.571 highlight just a couple of comments , 17:54.700 --> 17:57.540 uh , after Evan Richards , uh , talk 17:59.230 --> 18:01.341 First off , coming into this job well 18:01.341 --> 18:03.619 prior to coming to this job , you know , 18:03.619 --> 18:05.619 I got to serve . Ah is the chief of 18:05.619 --> 18:07.563 staff of Stratcom for almost three 18:07.563 --> 18:07.260 years working for general heightened , 18:07.740 --> 18:10.000 and ah , and then Advil . Richard was 18:10.000 --> 18:12.620 the deputy commander . So , uh , so 18:12.620 --> 18:14.787 really , that that background and that 18:14.970 --> 18:17.340 experience really prepared me ? Well , 18:17.340 --> 18:19.350 I think for ah for what ? The 18:19.350 --> 18:21.572 challenges that we face here . It s and 18:21.572 --> 18:24.120 D . C with particular to , uh , missile 18:24.120 --> 18:27.310 defense . He heard ever Richard talk 18:27.310 --> 18:29.810 about the risk of strategic two turns , 18:29.810 --> 18:33.200 failure , analysis that that goes on 18:33.210 --> 18:35.900 there at Stratcom and here , Jiffy I m 18:35.900 --> 18:38.680 d and with an S and D . C . That 18:38.680 --> 18:41.090 analysis is something that we're doing 18:41.090 --> 18:43.360 all the time from the missile defense 18:43.360 --> 18:45.850 side . As Admiral Richard said , many 18:45.850 --> 18:48.017 times we talk about stratcom , we only 18:48.017 --> 18:50.017 think about the nuclear triad , But 18:50.017 --> 18:52.017 strategic deterrence is really more 18:52.017 --> 18:55.510 thin . Just the nuclear triad , Uh , in 18:55.510 --> 18:57.630 its basics , strategic deterrence is 18:57.630 --> 19:00.330 about imposing unacceptable costs , 19:00.540 --> 19:02.870 denying the adversary benefit and then 19:02.880 --> 19:05.390 providing incredible capability . And 19:05.390 --> 19:07.430 that second part about denying the 19:07.430 --> 19:09.870 adversary benefit is what what we're 19:09.870 --> 19:11.814 doing every day within the missile 19:11.814 --> 19:14.330 defense arena and so part of our risk 19:14.330 --> 19:16.108 of strategic deterrence failure 19:16.108 --> 19:18.052 analysis is making sure that we're 19:18.052 --> 19:20.219 understanding the threats that are out 19:20.219 --> 19:22.163 there on that our capabilities are 19:22.163 --> 19:23.880 ready now and that our future 19:24.090 --> 19:26.146 capabilities are gonna address those 19:26.146 --> 19:28.201 feature threats that the adversaries 19:28.201 --> 19:30.260 can present . So it is just a great 19:30.260 --> 19:32.316 honor to be able to work for Admiral 19:32.316 --> 19:34.500 Richard again . Ah , in my , uh , my 19:34.500 --> 19:36.640 job here is the S and D . C , c G and 19:36.640 --> 19:39.540 the Commander for Ah J F C C . I indeed . 19:39.730 --> 19:41.841 So with that , I'll look forward your 19:41.841 --> 19:44.063 questions . I will tell you that I will 19:44.063 --> 19:46.063 answer questions within the missile 19:46.063 --> 19:48.286 defense lane . Nuclear policy questions 19:48.286 --> 19:50.452 with us reserved for Strat comment and 19:50.452 --> 19:53.560 another venue . Thank you . Thank you . 19:53.560 --> 19:55.893 General Carver , this is Joe Fitzgerald . 19:55.893 --> 19:57.949 I'll be asking you several questions 19:57.949 --> 19:59.893 that came in from our 10 days this 19:59.893 --> 20:01.900 morning . First off , thank you for 20:01.900 --> 20:04.011 agreeing to answer these questions on 20:04.011 --> 20:06.178 behalf of Capital Richards . We have a 20:06.178 --> 20:08.289 couple of questions here . How is the 20:08.289 --> 20:11.180 creation of space Force Affected the 20:11.180 --> 20:15.110 command space com and its capabilities 20:15.110 --> 20:19.070 and authorities . Hey , thanks , Joe . 20:19.070 --> 20:22.090 And so I'll go back and I'll put on my 20:22.100 --> 20:24.300 my former hat as the Stratcom chief of 20:24.300 --> 20:26.910 staff and we were in the throes of , 20:26.920 --> 20:29.000 well , let me back up . So So before 20:29.000 --> 20:32.120 Space Command stood up on its unified 20:32.120 --> 20:33.898 command plan , responsibility , 20:33.898 --> 20:36.130 Strategic Command had responsibilities 20:36.130 --> 20:38.780 for space . And those were all those . 20:38.780 --> 20:42.420 All came from when the original Space 20:42.420 --> 20:44.730 Command stood down in the early two 20:44.730 --> 20:46.820 thousands . So Stratcom took on the 20:46.820 --> 20:48.930 space role . If you ever listen to 20:48.940 --> 20:51.162 General Heighten , though he would talk 20:51.162 --> 20:53.710 about space was on its best . Day was 20:53.710 --> 20:55.710 only number three in his priorities 20:55.710 --> 20:57.821 because he had strategic deterrence , 20:57.821 --> 20:59.877 nuclear operations , and then he had 20:59.877 --> 21:01.932 space responsibilities . So in space 21:01.932 --> 21:04.043 com Space Command stood up . We did a 21:04.043 --> 21:06.260 lot of work within the Stratcom staff 21:06.640 --> 21:08.751 to help enable Space Command to stand 21:08.751 --> 21:11.770 up . We called it . We deemed it space 21:11.770 --> 21:13.492 East . So we had all the space 21:13.492 --> 21:15.326 expertise , expertise within the 21:15.326 --> 21:18.580 stratcom staff that instantly became 21:18.580 --> 21:20.580 part of space Commander . They work 21:20.580 --> 21:22.747 towards becoming part of space command 21:22.780 --> 21:24.836 eso that when Space Command formally 21:24.836 --> 21:27.500 established , it was it had a good head , 21:27.500 --> 21:30.330 good legs underneath it , um , the 21:30.330 --> 21:32.108 integration piece then became , 21:32.108 --> 21:34.108 Actually , it wasn't too tough them 21:34.108 --> 21:36.330 because you already had embedded in the 21:36.330 --> 21:38.441 different battle rhythms in different 21:38.441 --> 21:40.441 different events that were going on 21:40.441 --> 21:42.441 within Stratcom . They were already 21:42.441 --> 21:44.552 practised by that Stratcom staff that 21:44.552 --> 21:46.719 now was supporting space command . And 21:46.719 --> 21:48.886 then we helped establish the structure 21:48.886 --> 21:51.108 there in Colorado Springs , where space 21:51.108 --> 21:53.570 com currently has had . So , uh , um it 21:53.570 --> 21:55.514 was a lot of teamwork that went in 21:55.514 --> 21:57.570 there . We had a lot of support from 21:57.570 --> 21:59.570 from all the services to provide to 21:59.570 --> 22:02.240 provide structure and forces into stand 22:02.240 --> 22:05.290 up space command . Um , and again that 22:05.430 --> 22:07.630 that that integration and then flow 22:07.630 --> 22:09.741 from stratcom to space com from those 22:09.741 --> 22:11.830 mission sets actually went pretty . 22:11.830 --> 22:13.997 Well , then we had different exercises 22:13.997 --> 22:16.108 that were able to participate in Teoh 22:16.108 --> 22:18.830 to show our readiness . Thank you , 22:18.830 --> 22:20.997 General Cooper . We have several other 22:20.997 --> 22:22.997 questions . Hope you don't mind . I 22:22.997 --> 22:25.163 hope you have time this morning . Um , 22:25.240 --> 22:27.018 I really appreciated the utmost 22:27.018 --> 22:29.760 comments on integration , which is also 22:29.760 --> 22:32.350 a part of this year's symposium theme . 22:32.840 --> 22:35.170 What obstacles do you see in us 22:35.180 --> 22:37.013 achieving the rial integration ? 22:39.340 --> 22:42.960 Okay , you know , theon , you know , 22:42.960 --> 22:45.293 obstacles . You know there's challenges , 22:45.293 --> 22:47.571 and there's there's opportunities . Um , 22:48.540 --> 22:50.590 you know when when we look at 22:51.040 --> 22:53.207 integration and I have a saying I talk 22:53.207 --> 22:55.207 about we do integrated planning and 22:55.207 --> 22:58.460 synchronized operations . Um , so one 22:58.460 --> 23:01.530 of the first obstacles is overcoming 23:01.530 --> 23:03.697 the relationship barriers that are out 23:03.697 --> 23:06.660 there . And actually , this mornings , 23:06.670 --> 23:09.950 uh , this morning's speakers 23:10.540 --> 23:13.170 goes a long way towards overcoming some 23:13.170 --> 23:15.337 of those periods . When I look at Emma 23:15.337 --> 23:17.337 Richard and then John Shaw and then 23:17.337 --> 23:19.580 John Hill , many symposiums , you know 23:19.580 --> 23:22.080 we'll we'll , we'll put the speakers in 23:22.080 --> 23:24.247 there and it's kind of a pickup team . 23:24.247 --> 23:26.191 Well , those gentlemen that I just 23:26.191 --> 23:28.247 mentioned , we talk multiple times a 23:28.247 --> 23:30.200 week . So already within our 23:30.200 --> 23:32.311 organizations within the leadership , 23:32.340 --> 23:34.562 what were beaten down some of the stove 23:34.562 --> 23:36.673 pipes , or some of the firewalls that 23:36.673 --> 23:38.840 might be up there and integration just 23:38.840 --> 23:41.007 because our organizations ah , and the 23:41.007 --> 23:43.007 leaders , their relationships , and 23:43.007 --> 23:45.173 then and then at all that off trickles 23:45.173 --> 23:47.118 down then throughout the workforce 23:47.118 --> 23:49.451 throughout our processes , Rod are , ah , 23:49.520 --> 23:51.860 working groups are other battle rhythm 23:51.860 --> 23:54.700 events . Um , there's gonna be 23:54.700 --> 23:56.811 technological hurdles that we have to 23:56.811 --> 23:59.033 get over that we're gonna have to fight 23:59.033 --> 24:01.256 through whether those air inter service 24:01.256 --> 24:03.478 or whether those among services and and 24:03.478 --> 24:05.700 we just have to get through those . But 24:05.700 --> 24:05.660 when we have the concept and we all 24:05.660 --> 24:07.882 agree on the concept and the work , the 24:07.882 --> 24:10.104 role of the roll up our sleeves and get 24:10.104 --> 24:12.104 after it . We can do it and again , 24:12.104 --> 24:13.938 though , but it goes back to the 24:13.938 --> 24:15.549 relationships and within the 24:15.549 --> 24:17.604 organizations that are participating 24:17.604 --> 24:19.716 between senior leaders and you get no 24:19.716 --> 24:23.020 daylight between between us stratcom 24:23.020 --> 24:24.909 space come or the Missile Defense 24:24.909 --> 24:27.420 Agency . Thank you , General Copper . 24:28.300 --> 24:30.780 Another question . Speed is the name of 24:30.780 --> 24:32.610 the game speed of intelligence 24:32.620 --> 24:36.010 assessment and in our response , has 24:36.010 --> 24:38.232 that paradigm changed . And if so , how 24:38.232 --> 24:40.343 has it changed over the course of the 24:40.343 --> 24:43.050 last few years ? Yeah , sure . It sure 24:43.050 --> 24:46.530 has a the generation again , the the 24:46.540 --> 24:48.651 benefactor of three years working for 24:48.651 --> 24:50.830 him and , uh , he would always talk 24:50.830 --> 24:52.997 about . We have lost our ability to go 24:52.997 --> 24:55.219 fast . And so just with him making that 24:55.219 --> 24:57.274 statement during my time in Stratcom 24:57.274 --> 25:00.750 and carrying it on here is , um , you 25:00.900 --> 25:03.067 he's taking the governor off . He took 25:03.067 --> 25:05.289 the governor off its track common so we 25:05.289 --> 25:07.456 could go fast . And if we if we made a 25:07.456 --> 25:09.678 mistake , you know , he accepted that , 25:09.678 --> 25:11.789 and then , you know , we corrected it 25:11.789 --> 25:13.956 moved on eso So I do see us want to go 25:13.956 --> 25:16.289 faster the adversary isn't slowing down . 25:16.289 --> 25:18.233 Every Richard laid out many of the 25:18.233 --> 25:20.456 threats there in his talk , so we can't 25:20.456 --> 25:22.400 afford to be complacent . We can't 25:22.400 --> 25:24.456 afford to go slow . We have got a go 25:24.456 --> 25:26.456 faster . Gotta be willing to assume 25:26.456 --> 25:28.456 some risk . Underwrite that risk so 25:28.456 --> 25:30.400 that we can maintain pace with our 25:30.400 --> 25:32.178 adversaries . Thank you , sir . 25:34.670 --> 25:36.781 There's been talk of reorganizing the 25:36.781 --> 25:39.650 various J FCC says has or is that 25:39.650 --> 25:42.350 happening ? If so , what will be the 25:42.510 --> 25:44.732 outcome ? What ? What functions will it 25:44.732 --> 25:48.150 before ? Yes . So , uh , so we're 25:48.150 --> 25:50.261 always taking a look at Ah , you know 25:50.261 --> 25:52.920 how we most efficient helping optimize 25:52.920 --> 25:55.550 our organizations ? Whenever Richard 25:55.550 --> 25:57.820 came into commander of Stratcom , he 25:57.820 --> 25:59.653 wanted to take a look across the 25:59.653 --> 26:01.376 organization as well . We were 26:01.376 --> 26:03.320 fortunate again because he was the 26:03.320 --> 26:05.487 deputy . He had a lot of background at 26:05.487 --> 26:07.487 Stratcom , where general heightened 26:07.487 --> 26:09.710 normalized stratcom to look like other 26:10.000 --> 26:12.167 combat commands . So instead of the 18 26:12.167 --> 26:15.750 subordinate past forces in JFC sees 26:15.750 --> 26:18.000 that run any stratcom , he normalize it 26:18.000 --> 26:20.420 with the J fac with the maritime 26:20.420 --> 26:22.630 component he established the space 26:22.630 --> 26:26.570 component . Andi kept a Jiffy Chi MD So 26:26.580 --> 26:29.650 So instead of 18 different That's and 26:29.650 --> 26:31.483 talks . If you will reporting up 26:31.483 --> 26:33.483 through General heightened where he 26:33.483 --> 26:35.594 became the integrator just because of 26:35.594 --> 26:37.817 the breath of ah , of all the different 26:37.817 --> 26:39.761 mission sets that were that he was 26:39.761 --> 26:41.872 responsible for you put four stars in 26:41.872 --> 26:43.970 charge or Pacific Ivy case of three 26:43.970 --> 26:47.110 star in charge . And for all those 26:47.650 --> 26:49.594 problems , supporters to report up 26:49.594 --> 26:52.280 through , which really helped out again 26:52.280 --> 26:54.447 putting on my chief of staff had again 26:54.447 --> 26:56.613 it really helped out . So then , as we 26:56.613 --> 26:58.947 had , folks come into Stratcom officers , 26:58.947 --> 27:01.780 NGOs or civilians , we looked normal 27:01.780 --> 27:03.780 compared to how you know , compared 27:03.780 --> 27:07.210 with our fellow combatant commands . 27:07.330 --> 27:09.552 And so that was that was very helpful . 27:10.340 --> 27:13.040 I could joke work . Are there plans for 27:13.040 --> 27:15.400 a Midwest interceptor range with North 27:15.400 --> 27:17.790 Dakota Be a prime option for such a 27:17.790 --> 27:20.690 sight . You know , I just don't have 27:20.690 --> 27:23.550 any knowledge of ah of any of that . So 27:24.380 --> 27:26.160 I don't know . And they 27:28.340 --> 27:30.229 what would you say are the budget 27:30.229 --> 27:32.007 challenges of the challenges to 27:32.007 --> 27:33.729 modernization to meet our peer 27:33.729 --> 27:35.896 adversaries modernization objectives , 27:35.896 --> 27:38.550 given the impact , but it impacts of 27:38.640 --> 27:42.430 cove it in the pandemic . It is 27:42.430 --> 27:45.300 critical that we maintain sustained 27:45.310 --> 27:48.810 budgets , uh , at their predictable 27:49.220 --> 27:51.350 so that as we as the program managers 27:51.350 --> 27:53.470 and CEO's lay out their programs . To 27:53.480 --> 27:55.424 be able to have that predictable , 27:55.424 --> 27:57.702 sustained budget is just critical . Um , 27:58.060 --> 28:00.171 you know , we're operating within the 28:00.171 --> 28:02.630 Kobe 19 environment right now . We're 28:02.630 --> 28:04.630 doing very well , but we understand 28:04.630 --> 28:06.352 that the challenges are to the 28:06.352 --> 28:08.352 industrial base , uh , that are out 28:08.352 --> 28:11.340 there again . Having that predictable , 28:11.350 --> 28:15.200 sustained budgets for our programs 28:15.400 --> 28:17.456 is important . So you know , we will 28:17.456 --> 28:19.622 continue to keep an eye on the budgets 28:19.622 --> 28:21.844 and make sure that it is . Our programs 28:21.844 --> 28:24.178 go forward , they state budget informed . 28:26.440 --> 28:28.384 We have another question for you , 28:28.384 --> 28:30.107 General . Can you provide your 28:30.107 --> 28:32.218 perspectives on innovations needed in 28:32.218 --> 28:34.440 space control and counter space areas ? 28:35.840 --> 28:39.410 Yes . So you Joe Biden would talk 28:39.410 --> 28:41.890 about how many times he and General 28:41.890 --> 28:44.630 Raymond were the only two that would be 28:44.630 --> 28:46.840 able discuss any kind of programs and 28:46.840 --> 28:48.784 how four stars , many clouds , the 28:48.784 --> 28:50.951 action officers . So one of the things 28:50.951 --> 28:53.007 that we've got to talk about General 28:53.007 --> 28:52.970 Dixon talked about it in his 28:52.970 --> 28:56.010 confirmation hearing is ah is his 28:56.010 --> 28:58.121 classification levels and making sure 28:58.121 --> 29:00.080 that capabilities that we have out 29:00.080 --> 29:02.080 there aren't classified . It's such 29:02.080 --> 29:04.302 extreme levels that then planners and , 29:04.302 --> 29:06.750 uh , and folks that have to executed 29:07.360 --> 29:11.200 are unaware capabilities . Eso that 29:11.260 --> 29:13.630 again we can apply them as we need to 29:13.640 --> 29:15.751 on the battlefield . So that would be 29:15.751 --> 29:17.751 probably one of the one of the main 29:17.751 --> 29:19.862 here is that we should take a look at 29:19.862 --> 29:22.029 and a thank you , sir . I have another 29:22.029 --> 29:23.918 question . Really appreciate your 29:23.918 --> 29:25.862 comments on possible competitors , 29:25.862 --> 29:27.862 particularly with hyper sonics . Is 29:27.862 --> 29:30.110 there talking OSD acceleration ? But 29:30.110 --> 29:31.943 this seems far behind Russia and 29:31.943 --> 29:33.999 China's current path . What are your 29:33.999 --> 29:35.888 views on how we proceed with high 29:35.888 --> 29:38.054 percentage ? Yeah , again . So this is 29:38.054 --> 29:40.166 about going fast and making sure that 29:40.166 --> 29:42.860 we meet , uh , we've got to , uh , keep 29:42.860 --> 29:45.027 up with our adversaries air going that 29:45.027 --> 29:47.138 would ask you So John Hill , we'll be 29:47.138 --> 29:49.304 talking later on this morning , Really 29:49.304 --> 29:51.471 save that question for him and because 29:51.471 --> 29:53.527 that's that's really his expertise . 29:53.527 --> 29:55.582 And he certainly has , ah , lot more 29:55.582 --> 29:57.749 depth of knowledge and talk talk about 29:57.749 --> 30:00.082 that much better than I get . Thank you . 30:00.082 --> 30:02.249 Sure . Another question for you . What 30:02.249 --> 30:04.360 are some of the specific measures are 30:04.360 --> 30:06.527 metrics you're looking at is part of a 30:06.527 --> 30:08.582 risk of strategic deterrence failure 30:08.582 --> 30:11.330 analysis . That's a great question . So 30:11.340 --> 30:13.229 Well , first off , we look at the 30:13.229 --> 30:15.396 threat . We got to see what the threat 30:15.396 --> 30:17.562 is doing out there . We take a look at 30:17.562 --> 30:19.673 them . It Ah , at our current ready , 30:19.673 --> 30:21.729 just in our posture . And then ? And 30:21.729 --> 30:23.896 then we take a look at the long game . 30:23.896 --> 30:26.229 And what are modernization efforts ? Uh , 30:26.229 --> 30:28.340 are how they're progressing , be able 30:28.340 --> 30:32.020 to provide , uh , the capabilities to 30:32.020 --> 30:34.187 counter what the adversaries are doing 30:34.187 --> 30:36.710 in the future . So so threat , Current 30:36.710 --> 30:38.950 readiness , end of in future posture . 30:41.240 --> 30:43.351 Sir , we have another question . What 30:43.351 --> 30:45.573 are what new challenges that cove in 19 30:45.573 --> 30:47.530 has Kogan 19 brought to threat 30:47.530 --> 30:48.350 assessment . 30:50.840 --> 30:54.520 Um , so So my my my 30:54.520 --> 30:56.890 intelligence . And I know we we worked 30:56.890 --> 30:58.946 very closely with the Strack . I'm j 30:58.946 --> 31:01.850 two . They the threat doesn't sleep , 31:02.440 --> 31:04.480 and so are our intel experts And 31:04.480 --> 31:06.702 distract I'm intel experts . They still 31:06.702 --> 31:09.160 work 24 7 So ? So Thoko video may 31:09.160 --> 31:12.460 challenge us . Um , I know that that 31:12.460 --> 31:14.571 our intelligence professionals are up 31:14.571 --> 31:16.738 to the task , making sure that we stay 31:16.738 --> 31:18.682 on top of what the adversaries air 31:18.682 --> 31:22.230 doing . Thank you , sir . Sure . Really 31:22.230 --> 31:24.452 appreciate your time this morning . And 31:24.452 --> 31:26.619 I hope you stay with us for a few more 31:26.619 --> 31:29.070 minutes . So , but you have a few more 31:29.070 --> 31:31.237 questions for you ? How do you see the 31:31.237 --> 31:33.680 Titan capability integrating the spice 31:33.680 --> 31:35.402 layer into the tactical edge ? 31:38.010 --> 31:40.232 Gonna be critical . I mean , you got to 31:40.232 --> 31:42.399 be able to see the threat . You got to 31:42.399 --> 31:44.510 be able to attribute where the threat 31:44.510 --> 31:44.250 came from so that you can counter the 31:44.250 --> 31:46.310 threat . The integration of Titan , 31:46.310 --> 31:49.260 then into ah to our capabilities is 31:49.260 --> 31:51.930 going to be critical right down to the 31:51.930 --> 31:54.152 tattle edge . And that really shows the 31:54.152 --> 31:57.210 importance of space to army formations 31:57.210 --> 31:59.760 and and army space capabilities 31:59.760 --> 32:02.230 critical to the Ted . You said , as the 32:02.230 --> 32:04.119 question said , Joe , down to the 32:04.119 --> 32:06.850 tactical edge . Thank you , sir . 32:08.790 --> 32:11.012 This may be a This may be a hardball or 32:11.012 --> 32:13.123 maybe a softball . I don't know , but 32:13.123 --> 32:15.068 I'm gonna have a sketch because my 32:15.068 --> 32:17.290 friend asked the question . Well , much 32:17.290 --> 32:19.290 baseball back in season , Joe . Say 32:19.290 --> 32:21.346 what ? New organizations ? My hunt . 32:21.346 --> 32:23.512 Still particularly Redstone Restaurant 32:23.512 --> 32:25.568 Arsenal wants for gain over the next 32:25.568 --> 32:29.360 few years . Yeah , so , uh , you 32:29.360 --> 32:32.210 know , I don't know . Um you know , 32:32.220 --> 32:34.442 every day that I come to work for us in 32:34.442 --> 32:36.387 D . C . I make sure that we're but 32:36.387 --> 32:38.609 we're doing here with the workforce has 32:38.609 --> 32:40.776 provided our nation's our capabilities 32:40.776 --> 32:42.942 in space , and missile defense has two 32:42.942 --> 32:42.410 new organizations that are coming in 32:42.410 --> 32:45.000 here . You know , we on the arsenal , 32:45.000 --> 32:46.944 you know , we see the construction 32:46.944 --> 32:48.778 going around Gate nine , the FBI 32:48.778 --> 32:50.944 headquarters that came in . But as far 32:50.944 --> 32:52.778 as that , I really don't want to 32:52.778 --> 32:54.944 speculate on future missions or future 32:54.944 --> 32:57.000 organizations coming into the coming 32:57.000 --> 32:59.160 into the arsenal . Thank you , sir , 33:00.940 --> 33:03.051 while we wait for another question or 33:03.051 --> 33:05.218 two coming in . Would you like to make 33:05.218 --> 33:07.162 any comments or remarks about this 33:07.162 --> 33:09.107 morning's about Admiral Richards ? 33:09.107 --> 33:12.160 Everything or any Mike is your sir ? 33:13.490 --> 33:15.590 Yeah , you know , you're just in the 33:15.590 --> 33:18.330 missile defense side of what we do , 33:18.330 --> 33:20.108 what we provide for strategic , 33:20.108 --> 33:22.441 strategic deterrence and having Richard . 33:22.760 --> 33:24.927 He's a big fan for missile defense and 33:25.010 --> 33:27.177 were able to brief I was able to brief 33:27.177 --> 33:29.890 the SEC def on our missile defense 33:29.890 --> 33:32.160 contributions to strategic deterrence 33:32.500 --> 33:34.389 and the SEC def kits that natural 33:34.389 --> 33:36.167 Richard gets it . So within the 33:36.167 --> 33:38.389 department we have we have a tremendous 33:38.389 --> 33:40.389 support for what we do with missile 33:40.389 --> 33:42.389 offenders , both from from homeland 33:42.389 --> 33:44.611 missile defense as well as our regional 33:44.611 --> 33:46.833 missile defense , And I couldn't be any 33:46.833 --> 33:50.490 prouder of what our forces do . 24 7 I 33:50.500 --> 33:52.722 get . You know , every morning I get my 33:52.722 --> 33:54.944 option . Intel update . And I looked at 33:54.944 --> 33:57.056 what our missile defenders were doing 33:57.056 --> 33:56.280 around the world . Whether it's in 33:56.280 --> 33:58.800 Centcom or end up a calmer you come and 33:58.800 --> 34:00.950 and I could be more proud of what 34:00.950 --> 34:03.172 they're doing in support of Stratcom in 34:03.172 --> 34:05.339 its in its mission . Thank you , sir . 34:05.340 --> 34:07.507 We have a couple of more questions and 34:07.507 --> 34:09.673 we'll wrap this up . If you don't mind 34:09.673 --> 34:12.140 an awareness of f d o challenges . How 34:12.140 --> 34:14.029 can the integration of allies and 34:14.029 --> 34:16.084 partners , including foreign liaison 34:16.084 --> 34:19.180 officers , be improved ? Yeah . And , 34:19.190 --> 34:23.090 um so we work very hard . It 34:23.090 --> 34:25.230 was It was a bad day at Stratcom and 34:25.230 --> 34:27.341 again . So I'm gonna channel Stratcom 34:27.341 --> 34:29.063 because they have the Stratcom 34:29.063 --> 34:31.008 commanders discussion . A bad days 34:31.008 --> 34:30.800 track that when I was the chief of 34:30.800 --> 34:33.410 staff was when somebody said , Well , 34:33.410 --> 34:35.521 we're gonna have to excuse the allies 34:35.521 --> 34:37.354 out of the room . Generally , it 34:37.354 --> 34:39.354 wouldn't tolerate it . So we had We 34:39.354 --> 34:41.521 worked very hard to make sure that our 34:41.521 --> 34:43.299 allies were in every discussion 34:43.299 --> 34:45.243 permissible , uh , because they're 34:45.243 --> 34:47.880 major contributors to what we do as the 34:47.880 --> 34:50.460 chief during exercises . I would have 34:50.460 --> 34:52.670 my own separate meeting with our with 34:52.670 --> 34:55.360 our Ellen knows just them and myself . 34:55.360 --> 34:57.190 And I would explain to them 34:57.200 --> 35:00.900 contextually um uh , different things 35:00.900 --> 35:03.011 that were going on so that they could 35:03.011 --> 35:05.233 understand the operating environment in 35:05.233 --> 35:07.122 this situation . If we were in an 35:07.122 --> 35:09.430 exercise , for example , eso . So even 35:09.430 --> 35:12.110 though there was for disclosure fto , 35:12.240 --> 35:14.462 you know , things that required them to 35:14.462 --> 35:16.684 go out of the room , I would I would at 35:16.684 --> 35:18.796 least take the time to follow up with 35:18.796 --> 35:20.907 the Allies to give him some context , 35:20.907 --> 35:23.018 Of course , not breaking into the FTO 35:23.018 --> 35:22.770 rules but just making sure the Allies 35:22.770 --> 35:24.881 knew that they were still part of the 35:24.881 --> 35:27.500 team . And eight , sir , According to U . 35:27.500 --> 35:29.500 N reports , North Korea is probably 35:29.500 --> 35:31.940 developed miniaturized nuclear devices 35:32.080 --> 35:33.858 to fit into the warheads of its 35:33.858 --> 35:35.691 ballistic missiles . What is the 35:35.691 --> 35:37.913 strategy ? If you're able to comment on 35:37.913 --> 35:40.290 that , a missile defense specifically 35:40.290 --> 35:42.300 against North Korea's ballistic 35:42.300 --> 35:45.120 missiles ? Well , because we have a 35:45.120 --> 35:47.287 hard time determining what's what's on 35:47.287 --> 35:49.453 what's on every warhead . We've got to 35:49.453 --> 35:51.509 treat every every missile that comes 35:51.509 --> 35:53.676 out of North Korea as the um , highest 35:53.676 --> 35:55.898 consequence threat . That's why we have 35:55.898 --> 35:58.120 to have trained and ready forces in the 35:58.120 --> 36:00.176 best capabilities within our missile 36:00.176 --> 36:02.880 defense interceptors . Thank you , sir . 36:05.330 --> 36:07.360 How much of a concern is there with 36:07.360 --> 36:09.027 respect to the anti satellite 36:09.027 --> 36:11.840 capabilities of China and Russia to our 36:11.840 --> 36:14.510 space based assets for the US revive ? 36:14.510 --> 36:16.843 It's a sad program from the 19 eighties , 36:18.630 --> 36:20.463 so we know our adversaries . Air 36:20.463 --> 36:23.130 contestant US in space . Uh , John 36:23.130 --> 36:25.074 Dickerson talked about that in his 36:25.074 --> 36:27.074 confirmation hearing . John Raymond 36:27.074 --> 36:28.741 talks about it . Um , unusual 36:28.741 --> 36:30.408 disturbing behavior is how he 36:30.408 --> 36:32.297 characterized Ah , Russian , Ah , 36:32.530 --> 36:35.420 Russian operations on orbit . And so 36:35.420 --> 36:37.780 we're always keeping an eye on what the 36:37.780 --> 36:40.090 adversaries air doing in space . Um , 36:40.630 --> 36:42.686 we stayed concerned about it because 36:42.686 --> 36:44.463 again , we know that were being 36:44.463 --> 36:46.519 contested in space all the time from 36:46.519 --> 36:48.741 our adversaries . Thank you . Serving . 36:50.330 --> 36:52.497 It's that one final question here , If 36:52.497 --> 36:54.663 you don't mind . Is there any planning 36:54.663 --> 36:56.886 for system sustainment with the organic 36:56.886 --> 36:59.760 industrial base ? Whenever , whenever 36:59.760 --> 37:02.760 we build any programs , you always have 37:02.760 --> 37:04.927 to build in . This is sustainment line 37:04.927 --> 37:06.927 into that . So so absolutely , it's 37:06.927 --> 37:09.260 it's critical for what we're doing . So , 37:09.260 --> 37:12.440 um , you know , I think we'll have Rob 37:12.440 --> 37:15.810 Brashear later on . Is one of the panel 37:15.820 --> 37:18.800 members asking that question on how we 37:18.800 --> 37:20.522 build it in there . But what's 37:20.522 --> 37:22.900 sustaining lines are critical on And 37:23.080 --> 37:25.136 making sure that the industrial base 37:25.136 --> 37:27.358 stays healthy to support those lines is 37:27.358 --> 37:29.413 of great importance to us because it 37:29.413 --> 37:31.524 will contribute to readiness Indeed . 37:31.524 --> 37:33.469 Thank you , sir . General Carver . 37:33.469 --> 37:35.469 Thank you for agreeing . Dance with 37:35.469 --> 37:37.247 questions from Admiral Richards 37:37.247 --> 37:39.469 briefing this morning . Your experience 37:39.469 --> 37:41.136 and keen insights are greatly 37:41.136 --> 37:43.302 appreciated . Thank you for taking the 37:43.302 --> 37:45.524 time out of your valuable schedule this 37:45.524 --> 37:47.524 morning to be with us . And we look 37:47.524 --> 37:46.930 forward to your space . The missile 37:46.930 --> 37:49.220 Defense Command update later this 37:49.220 --> 37:51.580 morning . Thank you , sir . Great . 37:51.580 --> 37:52.150 Thanks , Joe .