WEBVTT

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I embrace aboard and thank you for

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joining us today with the election

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security panel with defense . This is a

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really momentous occasion bringing this

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many federal agencies all together . On

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one hand , the timing is perfect .

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There is a huge election coming up here

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in the United States in 2020 elections

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happening around the world . And I

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think that's a key thing for us to

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understand is that while this panel is

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talking about the U . S . Federal

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government , how we are responding to

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our American election , we look at the

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broader forces that are aligned against

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democracy in the world . Now it comes

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down to trust in the system for the

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democracy work , and those forces are

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working against places for us and some ,

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while this is going to be the U . S .

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Government discussing this , I think

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citizens all over the world and hackers

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all over the world will be able to take

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something away from that Just quick

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logistics . Q and A will be available

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through the def con discord . So if you

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quit your questions in the voting

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village step con discord , those will

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make it their way up here to me on the

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stage and we will answer them as best

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as we can . Starting off , we have

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Cynthia Kaiser . Hello . I'm Sylvia

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Kaiser of an assistant second sheet

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with the FBI Cyber Division . And what

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that really means is I lied analysis

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among multiple groups for the FBI .

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That includes election threats , mostly

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in the side . And that's by design . I

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saw what happened in 2016 and I knew

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that there was no worlds I want to be

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and then working right here

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with people that I get to see all the

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time . That s o for the FBI in the

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election stay centered . Way to think

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about it is early , focused on the

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threat . So we work hand in hand with

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RG adjust counterparts , and they're

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really focused on the risk to the

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systems of communication on those

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systems . But when it comes to the

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response of incidents or looking at

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investigations into melodic foreign or

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investigations into election crimes

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like ballot fraud , that's where the

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FBI will be plays in the space . David ,

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were you now from the National Security

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Agency straight to be with you today s

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election security leak ? Most of you

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are familiar with Esa's mission really

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divided up into two components are

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foreign signals intelligence mission ,

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which is all about figuring out what

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the adversaries robbed . Two . And then

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we have the cyber security component ,

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which is all about preventing and

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eradicating rats of the national

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security systems and figure out how we

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can attack bot networks in the life .

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Really , a lot of power from as a comes

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with combining transmissions . You

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knowing what the threat is in combining

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that with the technical analysis of

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mitigations . In order for us to be a

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boat , deploy those into my classified

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space from election security standpoint ,

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I oversee all the activities and

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partnerships that s a has on election

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security . I also Kobe something called

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the Election Security Group along with

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your heart men . Here , we'll get into

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a lecture on the panel on That's a

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joint s a cyber man task force for

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protecting your watches a little bit

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about me and grew up in Chicago .

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That's one representing here , Mr Bark

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shirt , White Sox and I have also in

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the craft cocktails I supplied and

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typical Def Con tradition . Ah ,

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cocktail black men . And for everybody

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on , I'd like to give a shout out to

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Johnny Carl for hosting me at Cocktail

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Con this Tuesday . Really great event .

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And a community in terms to get the

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info section unity together . Cocktails

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talk about security . I also appreciate

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it . Appreciate it off , folks for

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happens here . Hey , I'm Joe Hart . May

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not command the cyber National Mission

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Force s so far the U . S . Cyber

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command as day said Khalid , Theologian

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security group with him . And , you

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know , the election security group is

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really partnered with all the agencies

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you see represented here , and others

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in defense of the 2020 election were

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the part of the U . S . Government that

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focuses only away game . So we're

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looking at foreign adversaries . Russia ,

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China , Iran . Any other foreign

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adversaries has attempted to interfere

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with our elections , were looking for

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them in foreign space . And we're

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partnered with DHS and FBI in order to

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ensure that we share information that

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we find abroad . That makes us safer

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here in the United States . I'm really

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glad to be here today looking for your

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questions . It was more his Turner I'm

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senior adviser for the executive

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director at the U . S . Election

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Assistance Commission were relatively

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small agency compared to the ones you

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heard from earlier today . But our

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mission is focused . We help make sure

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that Americans all across the country

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and all across the world have the

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ability to participate in elections .

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Whether they're gonna be in one of the

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50 states , six territories were

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stationed overseas . So our focus is

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really How do we make sure that those

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voters have access to the polls and

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that bacon boat safely securely and

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make sure they're both counts ?

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And I'm Matt Masterson . I'm the

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designated survivor that was held back

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from the federal panel . So if anything

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happens , uh , we can maintain federal

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continuity of operations on election

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security . I'm in a secret skiff out in

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the Midwest somewhere . Appreciate the

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voting village for inviting me and the

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feds to participate . So thankful Ah ,

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to Bryson for organizing . And if , uh ,

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I know we're going to address the

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question of what ? What's the greatest

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area progress since 2016 . Where have

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we improved ? I mean , the fact that

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you have , ah , unified federal effort

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working to help support state local

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election officials on this mission .

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Space , I think , speaks volumes . I

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work for the , uh , cyber security and

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infrastructure Security agency or sista

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the election security lead Their Prior

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to that I was a commissioner at the A C

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where Maurice now sits . Ah , And

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before that , I was an election

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official in the state of Ohio . So come

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from an election administration

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background have had to learn the

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intricacies of both the sista Ah , in

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the i c . And I'm so thankful to

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everyone sitting up on that stage for

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their patients with me and working with

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me and sista to make sure we're

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supporting the almost 8800 state local

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election officials across this country ,

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let alone the private sector that we

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work very closely with . Ah , and

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members of academia and not a

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nonpartisan organization are focusing

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system eyes to get information support

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services , everything from penetration

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testing ah to routine cyber hygiene

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scans the incident response out to the

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state local election officials to help

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support them . Ah , and , uh , engaging

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with their voters . The reality is ,

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American elections are run at the state

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local level . Uh , and we want to do

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everything we can , uh , so that those

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state local officials could talk to

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their voters about why the process is

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secure . Ah , and why they should have

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confidence that their votes counted his

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cast really thankful for this panel and

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super excited to have this discussion

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to that . Now that's a That's a great

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Segway trust . Is he

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to the infrastructure , right ? The

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process were collecting votes to

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determine our democracy starts with

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that trust , and that begins with

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transparency and accountability , Which

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is why that are so critical that have

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this panel here for the government to

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talk about . Okay , what's happened and

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what have you done ? So 2016 is when I

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think this really grew into the

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consciousness as a significant issue

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that everybody understood what exactly

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happened in 2016 ?

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Uh , well , uh , on the cyber side in

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2016 Russia compromise multiple

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different election networks . I that

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include the state network that two

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counties and I It's a part of that .

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I we possessed that they

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really sought to a t least enough

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reconnaissance against all 50 states to

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try to figure out where it was most

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vulnerable and where they could get in .

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Now . They didn't We don't think that

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had any effect on election . Have no

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intention that they did . And really ,

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where they were focused on but couldn't

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have . But within that is obviously

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troubling because that's an attack on

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our election systems . It's attacking

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critical infrastructure , and it's

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something that now looking at that

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moving forward . But that's why we

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partnered with everybody here toe focus

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on How do we a hardened networks ? So

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that can't happen . And how do we work

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toe counter adversary so they don't

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want ? And how do we ensure that we can

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be as transparent as possible ? And

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that's included . Some various measures ,

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like both FBI and CISA , will

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now tell a chief state election

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officials if anything happens on a

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local election network , that's a

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change from 2016 . And it's a necessary

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change for the transparency .

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Yeah , I mean , I think since you

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covered the cyber side pretty well from

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influence side of ankle spokes tragedy ,

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the infamous Internet research agency

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controlled farm . So in terms of social

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media operations , they were conducting

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twice 16 and 2018 also hacking

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operations there are always to be very

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damaging when we look at in terms of

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kind of evolution between 2016 2018 and

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2020 um , you know , mostly fell to

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stop Russia it's 2016 . Find the

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elephant fried is broader . That right ?

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It's 2020 . We're looking at the

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spectrum of all of our adversaries .

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Russia , China , Iran , ransomware ,

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actors off . There's more people in the

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game morning for each other .

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Influences . Chief game . Get out now .

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Social media does . It costs a lot of

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money . I tried a water you're near .

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It is hotline . That's so

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that's something we're not

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right for us . In 2016 . Um ,

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election security really wasn't a party

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mission . It just wasn't something that

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we have previously focused on heavily

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involved in in other operations . And

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so , while we were focused on on other

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operations , Russians obviously way

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learned from that in 2018 between cyber

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com . And then it's a way formed what

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was called the Russia Small Group

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Really laser focused on Russian

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interference in the 2018 election . You

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know , for us that never stopped . So ,

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you know , I got back to the command

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about a year ago . 2019 and we didn't

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start up . You know , this thing called

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the election security that was already

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on it . Never stopped working for from

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2018 way . Think we're in a much better

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position now . Certainly , there were

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in 2016 . The big change between

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16 to 18 out of 20 really started with

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the critical infrastructure designation .

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That allowed all these federal partners

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to come together in a way that we'd be

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able to better protect our election

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infrastructure . And I think that that

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really is the key to all of this ,

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which is information sharing , making

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sure that information it shared amongst

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a disease but also to the state and

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local partners as well . The books were

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actually running their own networks

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around infrastructure , and so that's

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where the A C comes in . We have a

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relationship for building those

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relationships with the state and locals

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to make sure that they understand the

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information that's coming through the

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federal partners and that they realize

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that they're part of the solution to

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the information up to the federal

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partners . It's half asshole works .

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It's not just keeping those information

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notices in a silo on keeping the local

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level . It's a sharing up and down the

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back to make sure that the

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infrastructure is protected because it

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may not just be attack that happens on

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the single ST or single county that

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might be happening . Other places if

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we're sharing information and partners

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don't know that that tradition is going

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on . Yeah , just to build off what some

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of the other Panelists said . For me ,

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the biggest change has really been that

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level of coordination and support with

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state local election officials azi many

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people know when the critical

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infrastructure designation was made in

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2017 . There's a lot of resistance ,

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understandably , from state local

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election officials and skepticism . Ah ,

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and we sat there on in 2018 on had

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relationships with all 50 states had

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information flowing , were deploying

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Albert sensors . We sit here now on the

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brink of 2020 . We not only have Albert

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sensors , so intrusion detection

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sensors deployed across networks in all

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50 states . Uh , we have a nice sac and

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information sharing and analysis center .

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We're close to 3000 state local

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partners receiving information ,

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pushing information back to us . We're

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now deploying endpoint protection in

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many of the states and across

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localities have additional insight .

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But really , that ability to coordinate

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across the federal government to push

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information back down to the state

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locals has improved so much . The

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federal government , I think , is

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working in a way around election threat

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information that that I don't know that

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it it did around . Other issues were

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able now to take information and state

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locals or sharing all kinds of

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reporting with us and push it across

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the interagency , the folks that you

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see sitting up on the stage here . Ah ,

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and then push out alerts and warnings

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through the I stack broadly to the

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community on . And that's just a

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function that wasn't there . Certainly

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in 2016 and is really being honed and

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improved upon from 2018 to 2020 . Ah ,

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and that broad reach . And so that

13:48.690 --> 13:50.640
ability to really work with the

13:50.640 --> 13:52.862
election officials to understand risk .

13:52.862 --> 13:55.170
Our risk understanding is much deeper

13:55.170 --> 13:58.600
than it was 2016 or 2018 to the point

13:58.600 --> 14:01.100
where as cove it is developed and kind

14:01.100 --> 14:03.570
of changed operations within elections

14:03.870 --> 14:05.770
offices . We've been able to be

14:05.770 --> 14:07.770
responsive and understand where the

14:07.770 --> 14:09.992
risk is shifting . Ah , and try to help

14:09.992 --> 14:12.214
gear our support or information sharing

14:12.510 --> 14:14.780
toe . Understand that risk , Jeff so

14:14.780 --> 14:16.836
they could take appropriate steps to

14:16.836 --> 14:18.891
mitigate that risk and really ensure

14:18.891 --> 14:20.947
the integrity election and then turn

14:20.947 --> 14:23.058
around and messages to voters , and I

14:23.058 --> 14:22.870
think that's a theme you're gonna hear

14:22.870 --> 14:25.092
throughout this conversation . Really ?

14:25.092 --> 14:27.640
Reach in that last Ah , that last step

14:27.640 --> 14:30.200
of talking to voters about their

14:30.210 --> 14:32.860
options about how they can vote about

14:32.870 --> 14:34.814
the process And security is really

14:34.814 --> 14:37.037
critical in an environment when we know

14:37.037 --> 14:39.037
adversaries are trying to undermine

14:39.037 --> 14:41.470
confidence in the process . The part of

14:41.470 --> 14:43.640
what we've learned , which stems from

14:43.640 --> 14:45.529
the problem and a lot of what the

14:45.529 --> 14:47.029
solution and then has been

14:47.029 --> 14:48.862
investigation . This is critical

14:48.862 --> 14:50.473
infrastructure . The federal

14:50.473 --> 14:52.529
collaboration of the fact that , you

14:52.529 --> 14:54.584
know , like this happened where this

14:54.584 --> 14:54.260
isn't the first time you're all meeting

14:54.260 --> 14:58.180
each other . You're pretty Well , I was

14:58.260 --> 15:00.260
stalking a brazen earlier that I've

15:00.260 --> 15:02.450
been on panels before with people in

15:02.460 --> 15:04.627
the government who are all working the

15:04.627 --> 15:06.682
same issue . And then you're meeting

15:06.682 --> 15:06.430
the person right before the panel

15:06.430 --> 15:08.486
starts . So what ? Price had reached

15:08.486 --> 15:10.374
out ? Seven . Having been a logic

15:10.374 --> 15:12.486
theory and I asked , OK , is gonna be

15:12.486 --> 15:14.819
on it started checking off names . Okay ,

15:15.110 --> 15:17.221
talk to the people multiple times for

15:17.221 --> 15:19.221
weaker , sometimes every single day

15:19.221 --> 15:21.710
today . So it really just shows like

15:21.730 --> 15:24.670
how deep the collaboration is spent a

15:24.670 --> 15:26.781
lot of time in counterterrorism . You

15:26.781 --> 15:28.948
think that's a mission that you know .

15:28.948 --> 15:30.837
It is a vision of that government

15:30.837 --> 15:33.059
rallies around by election security . I

15:33.059 --> 15:34.180
get water ,

15:38.840 --> 15:40.820
right ? I mean , there's no better

15:40.820 --> 15:42.920
example that this panel is a

15:42.930 --> 15:44.950
representation of what's already

15:44.990 --> 15:46.990
happening . This panel it's not the

15:46.990 --> 15:49.212
thing that is driving it right . We are

15:49.212 --> 15:51.434
capturing a moment in time . What's the

15:51.434 --> 15:53.434
college way had tried to do this in

15:53.434 --> 15:55.601
2016 ? We would have been spending the

15:55.601 --> 15:57.546
last 30 minutes , all shaking each

15:57.546 --> 15:58.546
other so

16:01.770 --> 16:04.350
that tell us about the big glass . Not

16:04.350 --> 16:06.628
like we've never heard of these things .

16:09.730 --> 16:11.674
How information sharing isn't just

16:11.674 --> 16:13.786
sharing information , right ? But the

16:13.786 --> 16:15.730
fact that the information is being

16:15.730 --> 16:17.897
shared so that missions are being exit

16:17.897 --> 16:19.897
things are happening with , right ,

16:19.897 --> 16:22.063
those risks are being assessed . Those

16:22.063 --> 16:24.063
actions are being taken . It is . I

16:24.063 --> 16:26.063
really like you phrase it right way

16:26.063 --> 16:28.341
game . I'll translate that . Everybody ,

16:28.341 --> 16:30.563
actually , why don't you translate with

16:30.563 --> 16:33.060
you waiting ? So So let me translate

16:33.060 --> 16:35.227
the away game at the end . I mean , if

16:35.227 --> 16:36.782
I could just talk about the

16:36.782 --> 16:39.004
collaboration , the relationships and a

16:39.004 --> 16:41.060
good example , is like the rehearsal

16:41.060 --> 16:43.227
that we did on suit . So look , I'm in

16:43.227 --> 16:45.560
the Army has been in the Army long time ,

16:45.560 --> 16:47.671
just like they spent a lot of time in

16:47.671 --> 16:49.893
the SETI fight . And , you know , a lot

16:49.893 --> 16:51.949
of times in panelled rooms in places

16:51.949 --> 16:51.820
like Afghanistan . And , you know , we

16:51.820 --> 16:54.042
operate out of these joint operations ,

16:54.042 --> 16:56.080
right ? And in the joint operation

16:56.080 --> 16:58.247
centers were sitting in there . As you

16:58.247 --> 17:00.413
can imagine , we love flat screen TV's

17:00.413 --> 17:02.469
lot of flat screen TVs on the wall ,

17:02.469 --> 17:04.524
and no unmanned aerial vehicles were

17:04.524 --> 17:06.469
flying around and other collection

17:06.469 --> 17:08.636
assets . All that data is being pumped

17:08.636 --> 17:10.802
into the room where you're immediately

17:10.802 --> 17:12.969
able to make sense of it and then make

17:12.969 --> 17:14.858
decisions . You know , allocating

17:14.858 --> 17:16.969
resources , send in forces doing what

17:16.969 --> 17:16.930
and , you know , super Tuesday , if you

17:16.930 --> 17:20.290
walked into the the room that we were

17:20.290 --> 17:22.401
using as a mission center , you would

17:22.401 --> 17:24.920
have seen cyber com personnel you could

17:24.920 --> 17:27.270
have seen in ESA personnel , and you

17:27.270 --> 17:29.326
would have looked in a chat room and

17:29.326 --> 17:31.270
almost every organisation that you

17:31.270 --> 17:33.381
could imagine involved in the federal

17:33.381 --> 17:35.850
government . Okay , and they are

17:35.850 --> 17:38.960
talking about in almost real time . If

17:38.960 --> 17:40.960
something goes on on state election

17:40.960 --> 17:43.127
infrastructure in North Carolina , you

17:43.127 --> 17:45.980
know there's unclassified chat going up

17:45.980 --> 17:48.890
the DHS drops it in a classified chat

17:48.900 --> 17:51.880
room . You've got analysts from ESA in

17:51.880 --> 17:54.550
cyber com and other government agencies

17:54.750 --> 17:57.400
immediately Comey hair databases and

17:57.400 --> 17:59.670
then almost instantaneously providing

17:59.680 --> 18:02.340
information back that says , Hey , this

18:02.340 --> 18:04.396
is something you should be concerned

18:04.396 --> 18:06.396
about . This is just normal traffic

18:06.396 --> 18:08.673
that we see on any day on the Internet .

18:08.673 --> 18:12.110
It looks anomalous , think also

18:12.120 --> 18:14.860
producing , you know , at the same time ,

18:14.990 --> 18:17.230
I've got defense of cyber elements that

18:17.230 --> 18:19.230
are sitting in things we call whole

18:19.230 --> 18:21.341
rooms and they're waiting on a call .

18:21.341 --> 18:23.452
You know , if there is something that

18:23.452 --> 18:25.508
happens that DHS D tell , you know ,

18:25.508 --> 18:27.910
they're praying they have collaborated

18:27.910 --> 18:30.077
in the past and we're ready to pick up

18:30.077 --> 18:31.966
the team . Additionally , we have

18:31.966 --> 18:34.188
elements that are that are sitting over

18:34.188 --> 18:36.188
another off centers . OK ? And they

18:36.188 --> 18:38.354
were prepared . If we see an adversary

18:38.354 --> 18:40.521
that's attempting to do something in a

18:40.521 --> 18:42.632
field , that election , you know , we

18:42.632 --> 18:42.500
have the ability to play the awakening ,

18:42.940 --> 18:44.996
so we have the ability to go out and

18:44.996 --> 18:47.380
forms face . Look what's going on . We

18:47.380 --> 18:49.269
have the ability to make you stop

18:49.269 --> 18:51.400
feeling next . Really , the focus off

18:51.640 --> 18:53.807
of what I think the federal government

18:53.807 --> 18:56.780
looks like from the local and state

18:56.780 --> 18:58.740
level , all the way up through the

18:59.100 --> 19:01.211
national level , to the Department of

19:01.211 --> 19:03.156
Defense . And you know , for me is

19:03.156 --> 19:05.378
American . Honestly , that was a pretty

19:05.378 --> 19:08.950
impressive take its life

19:08.960 --> 19:10.730
turn from that . I think it is

19:10.730 --> 19:12.750
important to call out collaboration

19:12.750 --> 19:14.972
that we have a government , but I think

19:14.972 --> 19:17.660
he's other revolution that's occurred

19:17.670 --> 19:19.860
is the engagement with industry .

19:20.070 --> 19:22.570
You're right , I sure way have a lot of

19:22.580 --> 19:24.413
people . Are you working for the

19:24.413 --> 19:26.636
federal government doll in here ? And I

19:26.636 --> 19:29.590
think that's been a pager . The shift

19:29.590 --> 19:31.812
in posture we have for election scary .

19:31.860 --> 19:33.749
I mean , it's awesome when you're

19:33.749 --> 19:35.749
reading about disinformation , that

19:35.749 --> 19:37.527
being pulled out . Social media

19:37.527 --> 19:39.582
complicating is obviously the soccer

19:39.582 --> 19:41.804
security companies really focused , not

19:41.804 --> 19:43.804
election threats and trying to talk

19:43.804 --> 19:46.027
down half a series and what they're out

19:46.027 --> 19:48.027
to way . Can't wait . Can't do this

19:48.027 --> 19:50.110
mission without them . Industry help

19:50.120 --> 19:52.120
from the state state local election

19:52.120 --> 19:54.287
officials , but also start of security

19:54.287 --> 19:56.398
companies and how we can , you know ,

19:56.398 --> 19:58.564
see it off each other way . Learn from

19:58.564 --> 20:00.790
what industries putting out . Hopefully

20:00.860 --> 20:02.860
we're providing value as what we're

20:02.860 --> 20:05.720
putting out so people blunders that

20:06.070 --> 20:08.292
this is something sides they have right

20:08.370 --> 20:10.990
industry has a lot better inside . This

20:10.990 --> 20:14.230
case is so Erica critical partner .

20:16.310 --> 20:18.421
I think that taking it a step further

20:18.421 --> 20:20.880
in that individual local clever , not

20:20.890 --> 20:24.310
just a big corporate or company

20:24.320 --> 20:26.542
collaboration with federal government ,

20:26.542 --> 20:28.930
but of people who call in suspicious

20:28.930 --> 20:31.820
information because they were worried

20:31.820 --> 20:35.580
about it . And they called me Just call

20:35.580 --> 20:39.080
FBI that the calling of us and they

20:40.050 --> 20:42.272
are calling because they're worried and

20:42.272 --> 20:44.383
they want to do the right thing . And

20:44.383 --> 20:46.606
how's those people call majority of the

20:46.606 --> 20:48.661
information that really were able to

20:48.661 --> 20:51.220
get to state our goals since 2016 has

20:51.220 --> 20:53.442
been because people call us . They have

20:53.442 --> 20:55.442
said they were concerned about some

20:55.442 --> 20:55.140
things , looked at it and we said ,

20:55.140 --> 20:57.230
You're right and we got it out . So

20:57.240 --> 20:59.296
there's there's that element of that

20:59.296 --> 21:01.018
like that corporate industry ,

21:01.018 --> 21:02.962
responsibility and collaboration .

21:02.962 --> 21:04.573
There's a federal government

21:04.573 --> 21:04.260
collaboration , but there's an

21:04.270 --> 21:07.050
individual leverage to all of us that

21:07.050 --> 21:11.000
it really is working . Yep ,

21:11.000 --> 21:13.167
Bryson , if I can just really quick on

21:13.167 --> 21:15.740
on that , I think Cynthia raises really

21:15.740 --> 21:17.796
good point . It's appropriate here .

21:17.796 --> 21:20.320
Just the fact that there's now a guide

21:20.480 --> 21:22.147
for coordinated vulnerability

21:22.147 --> 21:24.147
disclosure for state local election

21:24.147 --> 21:26.313
officials in 2016 . As a member of the

21:26.313 --> 21:28.424
election community , I could tell you

21:28.424 --> 21:30.647
that was that was not a known commodity

21:30.647 --> 21:32.480
or something that they were even

21:32.480 --> 21:34.647
considering . And now we're progressed

21:34.647 --> 21:36.647
where folks like Jack Cable , who I

21:36.647 --> 21:38.313
know is on before , have bill

21:38.313 --> 21:40.536
relationships with election officials ,

21:40.536 --> 21:42.424
help them understand the value of

21:42.424 --> 21:44.591
vulnerability , disclosure and working

21:44.591 --> 21:46.647
Ah Teoh with independent researchers

21:46.647 --> 21:48.702
and security experts . In that way ,

21:48.702 --> 21:50.813
the fact that private industry within

21:50.813 --> 21:53.091
the elections community is rolling out ,

21:53.091 --> 21:55.258
ah , vulnerability disclosure policies

21:55.258 --> 21:57.480
and engaging in that conversation , not

21:57.480 --> 21:59.702
something that was going on in 2016 and

21:59.702 --> 22:01.480
so that the multiple avenues of

22:01.480 --> 22:03.258
information multiple avenues of

22:03.258 --> 22:05.424
collaboration are really encouraging .

22:05.424 --> 22:07.536
I think we have , ah , ways to go . I

22:07.536 --> 22:09.258
think there's lots of room for

22:09.258 --> 22:09.070
improvement , certainly on the federal

22:09.070 --> 22:11.430
side , to help coordinate on that a

22:11.430 --> 22:13.763
state local level , increasing capacity ,

22:13.763 --> 22:15.819
the ability , the intake and resolve

22:15.819 --> 22:18.152
and mitigate those vulnerabilities . Ah ,

22:18.152 --> 22:20.420
but it's a drastic improvement from

22:20.430 --> 22:22.597
from where we were even four years ago

22:22.597 --> 22:24.070
and really speaks to the

22:24.070 --> 22:26.292
professionalism of state local election

22:26.292 --> 22:28.730
officials in particular , uh , who care

22:28.730 --> 22:30.619
deeply about the security of this

22:30.619 --> 22:32.674
process in their systems and want to

22:32.674 --> 22:34.841
find ways to improve and talk to their

22:34.841 --> 22:37.063
voters about the steps they've taken to

22:37.063 --> 22:39.890
secure it have . This industry in this

22:39.890 --> 22:42.110
community has really matured very

22:42.110 --> 22:44.332
quickly compared to some others . And I

22:44.332 --> 22:47.060
think it's part due to events like this

22:47.060 --> 22:49.227
like that where researchers are coming

22:49.227 --> 22:51.393
together talking about you know what's

22:51.393 --> 22:53.671
going on , where their vulnerabilities ,

22:53.671 --> 22:55.616
what are some ways we can fix that

22:55.616 --> 22:57.782
taking a look at other industries like

22:57.782 --> 23:00.060
telecoms , aviation , things like that ,

23:00.060 --> 23:02.282
getting those best practices out of the

23:02.282 --> 23:04.393
way kind of quickly . And as Matt was

23:04.393 --> 23:06.671
saying , it's because individuals care .

23:06.671 --> 23:08.893
And I think that's probably the biggest

23:08.893 --> 23:10.949
part this that I want people to take

23:10.949 --> 23:12.893
away from . This is that elections

23:12.893 --> 23:15.060
happen in communities . I think that's

23:15.060 --> 23:15.040
really what it comes down to is

23:15.040 --> 23:17.207
everyone gets a sense of how important

23:17.207 --> 23:19.373
is that at the very local level , Then

23:19.373 --> 23:21.690
all that builds up to build a sense of

23:21.700 --> 23:23.950
national urgency importance about the

23:23.950 --> 23:27.800
issue and to see the election officials

23:27.800 --> 23:30.490
really get on board with this idea that

23:30.500 --> 23:32.722
they are part of the defense network to

23:32.722 --> 23:34.430
make sure that we don't have

23:34.560 --> 23:37.180
interference of playing , you know , in

23:37.180 --> 23:39.550
our elections and to see them . You get

23:39.560 --> 23:42.170
educated on the issues and really try

23:42.170 --> 23:44.690
to convey their own sense of confidence

23:44.700 --> 23:46.700
and their systems because they know

23:46.700 --> 23:48.756
what goes into running an election .

23:48.756 --> 23:50.978
It's not all just about cybersecurity .

23:50.978 --> 23:53.200
There are administrative tasks thinking

23:53.200 --> 23:55.422
todo their other task that some of them

23:55.422 --> 23:57.422
or even responsible for and so they

23:57.422 --> 23:59.644
care deeply about elections . They want

23:59.644 --> 24:01.700
to make sure that everyone who votes

24:01.700 --> 24:03.811
has level of confidence that they can

24:03.811 --> 24:05.756
feel when they go into the polling

24:05.756 --> 24:07.589
place or when they mail in their

24:07.589 --> 24:09.811
ballots . So follow questions . So it's

24:09.811 --> 24:12.760
Maurice and Matt Mr Type . This falls

24:13.060 --> 24:16.360
from a question from the Internet . On

24:16.380 --> 24:18.710
it is we're talking to a very unique

24:18.720 --> 24:21.110
fights today , right ? They are

24:21.110 --> 24:22.888
citizens of the world . They're

24:22.888 --> 24:25.110
American citizens . But their packers ,

24:25.110 --> 24:28.240
right ? This is the immune system of

24:28.250 --> 24:30.472
the Internet that's there to figure out

24:30.472 --> 24:32.583
what we're expecting , gives things .

24:32.583 --> 24:34.750
They're doing it today in the voting .

24:34.890 --> 24:37.112
They're doing it on the technology . We

24:37.112 --> 24:39.279
talked about industry involved that we

24:39.279 --> 24:41.446
have individuals willing to take their

24:41.446 --> 24:43.612
times actually did into the technology

24:43.612 --> 24:45.834
itself , understand what works and what

24:45.834 --> 24:48.001
doesn't , because that gives us better

24:48.001 --> 24:49.946
trust and that technical education

24:49.946 --> 24:52.112
system . And so the full question here

24:52.112 --> 24:54.370
is , when would we start potential and

24:54.370 --> 24:56.592
should have a prerequisite for entrance

24:57.390 --> 25:00.490
to the PTSD certification process that

25:00.490 --> 25:02.434
election system vendors adopt good

25:02.434 --> 25:04.570
vulnerability disclosure policies has

25:04.570 --> 25:07.120
called out today , so make them widely

25:07.120 --> 25:09.120
available for penetration testing .

25:10.610 --> 25:13.220
I'll take that since the sea is in

25:13.220 --> 25:15.109
charge of the development and the

25:15.109 --> 25:17.690
approval of the BBS key . So those air

25:17.700 --> 25:20.880
guidelines that are used by states on

25:20.890 --> 25:22.930
and it directs the manufacturers to

25:22.930 --> 25:24.930
meet certain requirements that they

25:24.930 --> 25:26.986
built their systems in a way that is

25:26.986 --> 25:29.240
accessible , insecure and usable . And

25:29.240 --> 25:31.250
so I think the idea of a voluntary

25:31.250 --> 25:34.070
disclosure policy being part of that

25:34.290 --> 25:36.410
would really just be the codification

25:36.410 --> 25:38.630
of industry best practices . Now

25:38.770 --> 25:40.910
manufacturers know that they're in

25:40.910 --> 25:44.390
competition to help bring a better

25:44.390 --> 25:47.630
level of security to these systems that

25:47.630 --> 25:49.574
are in use . And so I think that's

25:49.574 --> 25:51.519
already happening . We've seen the

25:51.519 --> 25:53.519
fruits of that labor already didn't

25:53.519 --> 25:56.080
need to come from a federal agency to

25:56.130 --> 25:58.280
help the process along .

25:59.600 --> 26:01.780
So to answer your question , it's

26:01.780 --> 26:04.710
already happening . And so as the

26:04.720 --> 26:06.887
industry continues to mature , I think

26:06.887 --> 26:08.498
that we'll see more and more

26:08.498 --> 26:10.609
wonderfully disclosure policies . And

26:10.609 --> 26:12.831
I'm hoping that you folks out there get

26:12.831 --> 26:14.998
interested in this sector and actually

26:14.998 --> 26:17.109
use them . You find that legal way of

26:17.109 --> 26:19.220
record of doing the research and then

26:19.220 --> 26:21.276
reporting and responsibility to make

26:21.276 --> 26:20.990
sure that the problems actually get

26:21.000 --> 26:23.330
fixed . This isn't about a big bug

26:23.330 --> 26:25.441
bounding that you're going after this

26:25.441 --> 26:27.719
isn't about trying to embarrass anyone .

26:27.719 --> 26:29.497
This is about strengthening our

26:29.497 --> 26:31.052
democracy literally through

26:31.052 --> 26:33.590
strengthening our systems . Bryson ,

26:33.590 --> 26:36.470
just just add a little bit . Maurice Ah

26:36.480 --> 26:38.647
really tackled the meat of the issue ,

26:38.647 --> 26:40.950
but I agree . I mean , we have had

26:41.520 --> 26:43.780
several vendors election system vendors

26:43.780 --> 26:45.836
come through our penetration testing

26:45.930 --> 26:47.930
process . What we call our critical

26:47.930 --> 26:50.620
product evaluation process . Uh , up in

26:50.770 --> 26:52.910
Idaho , uh , we have seen the private

26:52.910 --> 26:55.077
sector embrace that Now we're starting

26:55.077 --> 26:57.132
to see , I think , the fruits of the

26:57.132 --> 26:58.966
work of , of not just the voting

26:58.966 --> 27:01.077
village . Ah , but the private sector

27:01.077 --> 27:03.188
companies to understand the value and

27:03.188 --> 27:05.188
frankly , the marketplace dictating

27:05.188 --> 27:07.354
that that improved security Ah , steps

27:07.354 --> 27:09.354
towards coordinated vulnerability .

27:09.354 --> 27:11.410
Disclosure processes are going to be

27:11.410 --> 27:13.632
good for business . Ah , and that's why

27:13.632 --> 27:15.799
you see a reflection in progress being

27:15.799 --> 27:18.190
made . The private sector is hearing

27:18.450 --> 27:20.650
from customers is responding , and I

27:20.650 --> 27:23.590
think we'll continue to see progress

27:23.590 --> 27:26.360
made on that level . I think one step

27:26.360 --> 27:28.304
we need to take and I know the A C

27:28.304 --> 27:30.471
takes this very seriously , and states

27:30.471 --> 27:32.527
need to be thinking about it , too .

27:32.527 --> 27:34.860
But to the extent it involves equipment ,

27:34.860 --> 27:34.780
whether he pulled books are voting

27:34.780 --> 27:37.002
systems that they certify , you have to

27:37.002 --> 27:39.310
be ready to respond and adjust

27:39.320 --> 27:43.040
certification , quickly , adapt to

27:43.050 --> 27:45.272
those type of processes . So I think we

27:45.272 --> 27:47.494
have a maturing to do sort of in the ah

27:47.670 --> 27:50.690
ah , bureaucratic lane to make sure

27:50.690 --> 27:52.857
that we can support the private sector

27:52.857 --> 27:55.180
as they're changing and evolving and

27:55.190 --> 27:59.090
accepting . Ah , this approach that we

27:59.090 --> 28:01.110
support them , ah , in our

28:01.110 --> 28:03.180
certification processes and the way

28:03.180 --> 28:04.847
that systems need to be field

28:08.000 --> 28:10.460
so that all ties back to that . What is

28:10.460 --> 28:13.320
the threat China , Iran ? Russia had

28:13.330 --> 28:15.810
mentioned . How are they a threat ?

28:16.000 --> 28:18.167
What are they doing ? And are they the

28:18.167 --> 28:20.222
only threat that we would be worried

28:20.222 --> 28:23.900
about ? So I'll start with that one up ,

28:24.070 --> 28:26.237
I would say those are the mean friends

28:26.237 --> 28:28.403
were facing again . I think Ransomware

28:28.403 --> 28:30.403
is like one of those wild cards out

28:30.403 --> 28:34.380
there that should be fielded by anyone .

28:35.010 --> 28:36.450
Theory critical actors .

28:39.250 --> 28:43.230
That s o Russia . I think in terms

28:43.230 --> 28:45.530
up in evolution what we've seen , we

28:45.530 --> 28:47.863
talked about the research agency . What ?

28:47.863 --> 28:49.697
They did it kind of social media

28:49.697 --> 28:52.970
accounts , troll farms in terms of 2020

28:52.980 --> 28:55.890
shift seen a ship or words used proxies .

28:56.150 --> 28:58.720
I got such amazing intermediaries gonna

28:58.730 --> 29:00.841
remember in a technology crowd . Sort

29:00.841 --> 29:04.180
of saying Rockies , So , you know ,

29:04.950 --> 29:07.810
using again I mentioned before

29:07.810 --> 29:09.866
laundering information through other

29:09.866 --> 29:13.340
individuals into the media space IRA

29:13.350 --> 29:16.470
seen seeing death ship tactics . They

29:16.470 --> 29:19.060
had set up something in Africa I got in

29:19.070 --> 29:22.060
terms of trying having people . They're

29:22.060 --> 29:24.170
trying to put stuff online . Most

29:24.180 --> 29:26.790
things about socially divisive issues

29:27.600 --> 29:31.570
using covert , absolutely spot sites

29:31.820 --> 29:33.987
to feel that get their narrative out .

29:34.190 --> 29:36.468
So those that's kind of a shift attack ,

29:36.468 --> 29:39.060
it seems Russia side , China I think

29:39.060 --> 29:42.160
you scale is something that

29:42.840 --> 29:45.007
has been matched in terms of them is a

29:45.007 --> 29:47.118
fried balls of a cyber standpoint and

29:47.390 --> 29:49.112
from an influence standpoint ,

29:49.112 --> 29:51.223
certainly on insolence is very active

29:51.223 --> 29:53.480
in their regions . Want

29:55.130 --> 29:57.297
becoming potentially more aggressive ,

29:57.297 --> 30:00.040
U S . Bases , something that monitor

30:00.600 --> 30:03.160
prepare for but you know , inside for

30:03.170 --> 30:05.790
China cyber threat . You know , they're

30:05.790 --> 30:07.901
a little bit different in terms . Off

30:07.901 --> 30:10.160
scale rats with targets . They right

30:10.710 --> 30:13.770
Every U S . Citizen is targeting China .

30:13.780 --> 30:17.480
Just big data ki i I there sitting ,

30:17.490 --> 30:20.360
collecting , obviously everyone's i d

30:20.360 --> 30:22.530
threat on the sides of standard

30:22.530 --> 30:25.370
intelligence type targets . So I think

30:25.370 --> 30:27.640
that's that's that your heart that ,

30:27.650 --> 30:29.817
you know , I ran just getting into the

30:29.817 --> 30:31.983
game to write in terms of trying to do

30:34.580 --> 30:36.247
according to what the other .

30:39.690 --> 30:42.750
Yeah . So you know Russia . You know

30:42.750 --> 30:44.806
what ? All for everyone . You should

30:44.806 --> 30:46.861
read the work that came out from the

30:46.861 --> 30:48.972
State Department couple days ago . 77

30:48.972 --> 30:51.139
pages , you know , call the pillars of

30:51.139 --> 30:53.390
disinformation about various sites

30:53.390 --> 30:55.723
operated by Russian . Just ask yourself ,

30:55.723 --> 30:58.640
you know why in Russia , you know a

30:58.650 --> 31:00.594
country where a few people read or

31:00.594 --> 31:02.372
write English , you know , they

31:02.372 --> 31:04.594
continue to put out a tremendous amount

31:04.594 --> 31:07.870
of English language news on these on

31:07.870 --> 31:10.037
these French news outlets , you know ,

31:10.037 --> 31:12.092
that really involved divisive issues

31:12.092 --> 31:15.390
that us face . So , you know , again ,

31:15.390 --> 31:17.501
a tremendous amount of platforms that

31:17.790 --> 31:20.950
that the Russians investing CNN ran a

31:20.960 --> 31:24.510
great news expose in April of 2020

31:24.840 --> 31:28.070
about the organization that Dave

31:28.840 --> 31:32.470
they reference . So 80 trolls and Ghana ,

31:32.480 --> 31:35.540
led by God himself . Wired is who grew

31:35.540 --> 31:39.440
up in Ghana educated in Russia on and

31:39.450 --> 31:41.617
appears to have been on the payroll of

31:41.617 --> 31:43.617
the production network . So again ,

31:43.617 --> 31:45.728
it's about a seven minute watch . CNN

31:45.728 --> 31:47.783
did a fantastic job , and that could

31:47.783 --> 31:50.670
just provide you some insight into what

31:50.670 --> 31:52.670
the Russians were doing there . And

31:52.670 --> 31:54.614
then , you know what we talk about

31:54.614 --> 31:56.726
private industry , you know , whether

31:56.726 --> 31:58.781
it's Facebook , Google , Microsoft ,

31:58.781 --> 32:01.003
you know you there . Dozens of articles

32:01.003 --> 32:03.059
about how these technology companies

32:03.059 --> 32:05.281
have identified this malicious behavior

32:05.281 --> 32:07.930
on their on their platforms that they

32:07.930 --> 32:10.097
were able to link back to the nation .

32:10.097 --> 32:12.430
State adversaries Russia , China , Iran .

32:12.430 --> 32:14.597
So , you know , I would tell everybody

32:14.597 --> 32:16.541
there's a ton , a ton of stuff out

32:16.541 --> 32:18.486
there . You know , when we put the

32:18.486 --> 32:20.708
cyber com then I say we want we want to

32:20.708 --> 32:22.763
focus on that classified cyber box .

32:22.763 --> 32:22.760
But I'll tell you , there is a

32:22.770 --> 32:24.937
tremendous amount of great information

32:24.937 --> 32:27.310
already out there on the Internet . A

32:27.310 --> 32:29.590
lot of insight , you know , as a

32:29.600 --> 32:32.320
Cynthia talked about . You know , we

32:32.330 --> 32:34.980
you know , the U S government for you

32:35.250 --> 32:37.640
experts that are out there you know if

32:37.640 --> 32:39.970
you see suspicious activity , Healthy

32:39.970 --> 32:42.850
hs tell the FBI you know , we the

32:42.860 --> 32:45.082
government will do something about it .

32:45.082 --> 32:47.249
You know , if it's a domestic threat ,

32:47.249 --> 32:49.360
those organizations will address it .

32:49.360 --> 32:51.582
If it's a foreign threat , they'll tell

32:51.582 --> 32:51.440
us . And I don't mean no . Tell us ,

32:51.440 --> 32:53.496
like , six months from now , they'll

32:53.496 --> 32:55.662
tell us that day . Don't tell us early

32:55.662 --> 32:57.884
the next morning . You know , we had an

32:57.884 --> 32:59.884
incident the other night that , you

32:59.884 --> 33:01.996
know , I heard at 1 42 in the morning

33:02.090 --> 33:03.979
and , you know , about six in the

33:03.979 --> 33:06.201
morning . We had cyber teams looking at

33:06.201 --> 33:08.312
the activity . And so again , for you

33:08.312 --> 33:10.534
experts out there , you know , uh , you

33:10.534 --> 33:12.479
know better than anybody else . If

33:12.479 --> 33:14.590
something is weird is going on on the

33:14.590 --> 33:16.812
Internet on , I would just ask , get it

33:16.812 --> 33:19.330
to share that way The government and I

33:19.330 --> 33:21.510
say to just for about a cyber aspect ,

33:21.520 --> 33:23.420
because there were a lot of anger

33:26.450 --> 33:28.920
leveraging trust relationships . I know

33:29.130 --> 33:32.400
it's contacting right , so some of

33:32.400 --> 33:34.289
these networks that they might be

33:34.289 --> 33:36.456
interested in are very well defended ,

33:36.456 --> 33:38.789
just like beauty , right ? But you know ,

33:38.789 --> 33:40.900
cos sometimes outsource the marketing

33:40.900 --> 33:43.122
department's . There's other other soft

33:43.122 --> 33:45.289
targets out there . Think takes . That

33:45.289 --> 33:47.400
could be lucrative even from an Intel

33:47.400 --> 33:49.456
destructive . You know , thanks . Do

33:49.456 --> 33:51.511
policy work for our politicians have

33:51.511 --> 33:53.844
contacts with officials . So , you know ,

33:53.844 --> 33:55.789
sometimes going outside bull's eye

33:56.630 --> 33:58.519
again . A lot of a lot of this is

33:58.519 --> 34:00.574
compensating , explaining publicly .

34:00.574 --> 34:03.220
Don't see these bastards sprayings your

34:03.230 --> 34:05.880
fishing , you name it . They're they're

34:05.880 --> 34:08.102
using showdown with these groups week .

34:08.102 --> 34:10.324
They're they're using those tools , get

34:10.324 --> 34:13.800
access that is inside a bullseye

34:13.810 --> 34:15.990
leverage that leverage in Macau number

34:15.990 --> 34:18.320
connection getting a target going out

34:19.150 --> 34:21.372
of an important point that that sort of

34:21.372 --> 34:24.550
a parting isn't stuff . It was from

34:26.910 --> 34:30.390
spearfishing for looking for those

34:33.680 --> 34:37.000
more That's been continuing apace and

34:37.010 --> 34:39.232
we were talking a lot of incidents even

34:39.232 --> 34:42.410
right now on and the good news with all

34:42.410 --> 34:44.680
those incidents is we have any

34:44.990 --> 34:48.310
widespread attacks from those . But

34:48.650 --> 34:51.040
it's interesting because that tracking

34:51.040 --> 34:54.320
lot of incidents can feel scary , but

34:54.320 --> 34:56.710
it also it gives me a lot of

34:59.040 --> 35:01.207
it makes me feel better almost because

35:01.207 --> 35:04.120
I know that we're detecting And , uh ,

35:05.940 --> 35:07.829
that means we have a lot of false

35:07.829 --> 35:09.773
positives that we follow up on . I

35:09.773 --> 35:11.884
travel back then , not knowing things

35:11.884 --> 35:13.718
were out there But it also means

35:13.718 --> 35:15.829
beautiful or a picture . And you know

35:15.829 --> 35:18.162
that Fulham picture , as Dave mentioned ,

35:18.162 --> 35:21.370
is cycle for most and not just

35:21.370 --> 35:24.250
ransomware . Other types of

35:26.650 --> 35:28.730
incidents as well and an actor swell

35:28.730 --> 35:30.980
and way really have to be on guard ,

35:30.980 --> 35:33.091
not just if it's coming from Russia ,

35:33.091 --> 35:35.540
China , Iran , a host of other groups

35:35.540 --> 35:37.940
but a threat to its election network

35:37.950 --> 35:41.170
for a campaign that is a friend and way

35:41.170 --> 35:44.070
need toe be ableto flexible in

35:44.070 --> 35:47.390
addressing that , and I getting in

35:47.390 --> 35:49.446
front of that head on so that we can

35:49.540 --> 35:52.010
make sure that come Election Day .

35:52.020 --> 35:54.298
We're not dealing with a lot of pop up ,

35:54.298 --> 35:56.409
for instance , spending a lot of time

35:56.409 --> 35:59.270
trying to grow . Yeah , I think that

35:59.280 --> 36:01.950
that's this cyber and cyber threats and

36:02.240 --> 36:04.462
threats , and it is a dangerous space .

36:04.462 --> 36:07.950
We know about actively intact ,

36:08.940 --> 36:12.550
potentially populism opinions .

36:13.900 --> 36:16.430
But no way . We're just talking before

36:16.430 --> 36:18.540
this panel . I think it turns up

36:20.140 --> 36:22.370
using influence have made people

36:22.650 --> 36:25.530
distrust either electoral outcome , so

36:25.530 --> 36:28.750
you could have a ransomware incident in

36:28.750 --> 36:31.110
a local level that actually doesn't

36:31.110 --> 36:34.810
even impact like the elections

36:35.010 --> 36:38.240
county or any of that someone could

36:38.240 --> 36:40.296
that spin an influence campaign that

36:40.296 --> 36:42.650
gets reported to make you think it has

36:42.660 --> 36:44.716
had an impact and that knocks . Russ

36:45.000 --> 36:46.944
results , right ? So that's one of

36:46.944 --> 36:49.222
those things that I think is worrisome ,

36:49.240 --> 36:51.018
even if the cyberattack doesn't

36:51.018 --> 36:53.000
actually have to have a measurable

36:53.300 --> 36:56.640
impact conflict . If you want to vote

36:56.650 --> 36:59.630
tallies , it's . But if something

36:59.640 --> 37:01.640
people take that , try to stand off

37:01.640 --> 37:03.190
information operations .

37:07.200 --> 37:09.520
That point , let's like drive home is

37:09.520 --> 37:12.920
that it's not just about you know what

37:12.920 --> 37:15.142
actually happened . Word votes actually

37:15.142 --> 37:17.364
change . That's incredibly difficult to

37:17.364 --> 37:19.642
do at scale . Wait , it's undetectable .

37:19.642 --> 37:21.642
But if you can put that message out

37:21.642 --> 37:23.698
there that causes people to question

37:23.698 --> 37:23.520
and in their local election officials

37:23.530 --> 37:25.752
picks up that phone call and they don't

37:25.752 --> 37:27.863
have a good response , for that could

37:27.863 --> 37:29.974
be just the imaging eyes . That's why

37:29.974 --> 37:32.197
Eddie A . C . We feel so strongly about

37:32.197 --> 37:33.974
making sure that local election

37:33.974 --> 37:35.863
officials have the tools have the

37:35.863 --> 37:38.030
training they need to partner with the

37:38.030 --> 37:40.086
Center for Tech in Civic Life . Taxi

37:40.086 --> 37:39.980
provide that basics intermediary ,

37:40.720 --> 37:42.770
intermediate level of cybersecurity

37:42.770 --> 37:44.937
training so that they understand , you

37:44.937 --> 37:47.048
know , why is it important ? Have two

37:47.048 --> 37:49.103
factor authentication ? What does it

37:49.103 --> 37:51.048
mean to actually have a password ?

37:51.048 --> 37:50.490
Managers were not reusing your

37:50.500 --> 37:53.560
passports basics that most books that

37:53.560 --> 37:55.727
are watching us right now are thinking

37:56.140 --> 37:58.240
anybody not know how to do that ? I

37:58.290 --> 38:00.234
have never been taught that if you

38:00.234 --> 38:02.401
don't have understanding of the impact

38:02.401 --> 38:04.401
of that , then it might be too much

38:04.401 --> 38:06.623
work . But once you understand how much

38:06.623 --> 38:08.734
bad stuff that actually prevent , you

38:08.734 --> 38:10.568
recognize it's actually not that

38:10.568 --> 38:12.679
difficult . Sex is pretty easy to use

38:12.679 --> 38:14.790
it . If you are familiar with tools ,

38:14.790 --> 38:17.012
and then it gives you the confidence to

38:17.012 --> 38:19.346
stand up and say , You know what ? Yeah ,

38:19.346 --> 38:18.420
we heard about the Ransomware , or

38:18.420 --> 38:20.531
maybe we got hit with some ransomware

38:20.531 --> 38:22.864
but you know , the town down the street .

38:22.864 --> 38:25.031
But we're ready . These are the things

38:25.031 --> 38:26.920
that we're doing . Russell . It's

38:26.920 --> 38:26.810
another thing to talk about . Here is

38:26.810 --> 38:28.810
some of the big things , high level

38:28.810 --> 38:30.977
things that we're doing to be prepared

38:30.977 --> 38:33.199
so that if we do get a phishing email ,

38:33.199 --> 38:35.310
you know how to spot it . We know how

38:35.310 --> 38:37.477
to stop it . We can recover from those

38:37.477 --> 38:39.532
back ups that we actually do get hit

38:39.532 --> 38:39.200
with it . And so I think that's why

38:39.200 --> 38:41.380
it's so important that the local

38:41.380 --> 38:43.213
election officials I have little

38:43.213 --> 38:45.436
confidence thinking , then reflect back

38:45.436 --> 38:47.436
on to their voters when it comes to

38:47.436 --> 38:50.510
elections . Yeah , just just real quick

38:50.510 --> 38:52.740
on that . Maurice raises some really

38:52.740 --> 38:54.851
good points . And it's why we spent a

38:54.851 --> 38:57.073
lot of time insist on something we call

38:57.073 --> 38:58.907
the Last Mile project , which is

38:58.907 --> 39:00.907
literally a poster project offering

39:00.907 --> 39:03.120
both risk assessment and then

39:03.130 --> 39:06.230
mitigation advice to the local level .

39:06.240 --> 39:08.160
Almost 6000 local jurisdictions

39:08.760 --> 39:10.593
specific to their state in their

39:10.593 --> 39:12.816
jurisdictions so that they can not only

39:12.816 --> 39:14.816
take the steps , whether it's multi

39:14.816 --> 39:16.982
factor authentication or penetration ,

39:16.982 --> 39:19.149
testing or fishing campaign resilience

39:19.149 --> 39:21.260
or creating incident response plans ,

39:21.260 --> 39:23.482
which we really focused on but then can

39:23.482 --> 39:25.704
go and talk to their voters . And we've

39:25.704 --> 39:27.871
seen some cool approaches to this . We

39:27.871 --> 39:29.871
saw one state , the state of Iowa ,

39:29.871 --> 39:32.093
take their posters after the state fair

39:32.093 --> 39:34.093
so that they could talk to their to

39:34.093 --> 39:33.990
their voters directly about steps they

39:33.990 --> 39:36.212
were taking . We saw the state of Rhode

39:36.212 --> 39:38.434
Island work with their libraries to put

39:38.434 --> 39:40.546
it up in the library system that they

39:40.546 --> 39:42.379
could talk to voters through the

39:42.379 --> 39:44.490
library's about this and in the end .

39:44.490 --> 39:46.712
And you know , I think they've raises a

39:46.712 --> 39:48.546
really important point . There's

39:48.546 --> 39:50.323
resilience to cyber intrusion ,

39:50.323 --> 39:52.434
resilience and the ability to recover

39:52.434 --> 39:54.546
from incidents . But then there's the

39:54.546 --> 39:56.879
resilience that we need to install . Uh ,

39:56.879 --> 39:59.046
in talking to the American voter way ,

39:59.046 --> 40:01.046
need voters that they're prepared ,

40:01.046 --> 40:03.212
right ? That understand the registry .

40:03.212 --> 40:05.434
Am I registered ? What's on my ballot ?

40:05.434 --> 40:05.070
What are my voting options ,

40:05.070 --> 40:07.550
particularly amongst Cove . It s so

40:07.550 --> 40:09.606
that they can have confidence on how

40:09.606 --> 40:11.717
they're going to engage the process .

40:11.717 --> 40:13.883
We need ah , voter , that is patient .

40:13.883 --> 40:16.050
That understands that perhaps election

40:16.050 --> 40:18.272
night results won't be is complete eyes

40:18.272 --> 40:19.939
what we're used to in a given

40:19.939 --> 40:22.106
jurisdiction in that ah , the accuracy

40:22.106 --> 40:22.040
of the vote count is the most important

40:22.040 --> 40:24.400
thing regardless of the time it takes

40:24.570 --> 40:26.681
Ah , and then we need ah , voter that

40:26.681 --> 40:29.630
participates that engages , we need ah ,

40:29.640 --> 40:32.800
you know , 250,000 arm or whole workers

40:32.800 --> 40:34.967
across this country in preparation for

40:34.967 --> 40:37.189
November in the midst of covert when we

40:37.189 --> 40:39.210
have a poll workers that , uh , you

40:39.210 --> 40:41.432
know , we're gonna be unwilling to work

40:41.432 --> 40:43.543
either because their age or high risk

40:43.543 --> 40:45.766
nature . Ah , and , uh so having people

40:45.766 --> 40:47.932
engaged in participating the rally for

40:47.932 --> 40:50.099
the for those folks that are listening

40:50.099 --> 40:50.030
no one told me anyone would be

40:50.030 --> 40:52.252
listening to this . So now I'm a little

40:52.252 --> 40:54.419
worried , but anyone that is listening

40:54.419 --> 40:56.530
go sign up to be a poll worker if you

40:56.530 --> 40:58.641
want to understand the process . Matt

40:58.641 --> 41:00.530
Place hits this every time . He's

41:00.530 --> 41:02.641
exactly right . If you have questions

41:02.641 --> 41:04.752
if you have concerns . If you want to

41:04.752 --> 41:06.919
help secure the process , start off by

41:06.919 --> 41:09.030
being an election worker . You're not

41:09.030 --> 41:11.141
gonna get turned down . We need you .

41:11.141 --> 41:13.141
Ah , and it's the best way to learn

41:13.141 --> 41:15.086
where the resiliency exists in the

41:15.086 --> 41:14.790
process where improvements could be

41:14.790 --> 41:17.012
made . Ah , in order to get involved if

41:17.012 --> 41:19.012
you can't be a poll worker , if you

41:19.012 --> 41:21.012
can't take on that risk , there are

41:21.012 --> 41:23.012
opportunities to watch pre election

41:23.012 --> 41:25.123
testing of systems . We run elections

41:25.123 --> 41:26.790
at the local level so you can

41:26.790 --> 41:29.012
participate directly with those who run

41:29.012 --> 41:31.179
the process . So go get your questions

41:31.179 --> 41:31.160
answered , go engage with them and see

41:31.160 --> 41:33.493
what kind of support they're in need of ,

41:33.493 --> 41:35.438
in particular serving his election

41:35.438 --> 41:37.604
worker . It really is the best path to

41:37.604 --> 41:39.660
doing this and the best way to learn

41:39.660 --> 41:41.993
the process . But if we can have voters ,

41:41.993 --> 41:44.271
the voters are last line of resilience .

41:44.271 --> 41:46.327
Is director Krebs says . They're the

41:46.327 --> 41:48.160
ones that that can really ensure

41:48.160 --> 41:50.160
responsive resilience , a resilient

41:50.160 --> 41:52.104
process when attempts to undermine

41:52.104 --> 41:54.970
confidence or there . There is no such

41:54.970 --> 41:57.090
thing as a secure system , right ? We

41:57.090 --> 41:59.257
never hit a plateau where it's like up

41:59.257 --> 42:01.790
for good . We cannot back home to take

42:01.790 --> 42:04.340
the next year off . So quick question

42:04.350 --> 42:07.830
from a lot of interested

42:08.250 --> 42:10.417
citizens who want to get involved ties

42:10.417 --> 42:12.639
to the fact around . OK , so you talked

42:12.639 --> 42:14.639
about detection being a key part of

42:14.639 --> 42:16.861
that system where exactly they supposed

42:16.861 --> 42:19.194
to go figure out where to say something ?

42:20.000 --> 42:22.000
Well , you can go to your local FBI

42:22.000 --> 42:25.940
field office . You could go on Teoh FBI

42:25.950 --> 42:29.270
backup and find out contacts or eye

42:29.920 --> 42:32.590
contact our FBI . So I watched directly

42:33.650 --> 42:36.690
and you could go to multiple other

42:36.690 --> 42:38.634
agencies as well , because what we

42:38.634 --> 42:40.857
really said is call the ones felt all ,

42:40.950 --> 42:44.720
and that's how I we are ensuring that

42:44.720 --> 42:47.490
there's that information sharing across .

42:49.800 --> 42:53.430
So there was that . Yeah , I was just

42:53.430 --> 42:56.310
gonna say Cynthia's exactly right . You

42:56.310 --> 42:58.532
know , we first of all , if you know of

42:58.532 --> 43:00.310
something within your community

43:00.310 --> 43:02.143
engaging directly with the local

43:02.143 --> 43:04.366
election officials , really critical to

43:04.366 --> 43:06.477
help understand did you actually find

43:06.477 --> 43:08.588
something or eyes ? Something they're

43:08.588 --> 43:10.910
aware of ? Otherwise , Uh , the second

43:10.910 --> 43:12.743
part is engaging with your state

43:12.743 --> 43:14.966
officials . They're prepared to take it

43:14.966 --> 43:16.966
on . They're the ones that know the

43:16.966 --> 43:19.077
process . Know their systems can talk

43:19.077 --> 43:21.188
to the vendors if it's a vendor issue

43:21.188 --> 43:23.132
on and then the I sacking this for

43:23.132 --> 43:25.354
exactly this reason is , Well , there's

43:25.354 --> 43:27.521
an avenue . Ah , and it happens fairly

43:27.521 --> 43:27.390
commonly that if you report to the

43:27.390 --> 43:29.501
Election Infrastructure , Information

43:29.501 --> 43:31.501
Sharing Analysis Center or directly

43:31.501 --> 43:33.723
into system uh , we now have the points

43:33.723 --> 43:35.890
of contact that we didn't have in 2016

43:35.890 --> 43:38.057
to be able to get valuable information

43:38.057 --> 43:40.057
to state . Local election officials

43:40.057 --> 43:41.779
said they could take action on

43:41.779 --> 43:43.779
something that's identified so that

43:43.779 --> 43:45.779
there are avenues again . The state

43:45.779 --> 43:48.001
local officials know their systems that

43:48.001 --> 43:50.112
best prepared to mitigate a problem .

43:50.112 --> 43:52.279
But if you're not finding success that

43:52.279 --> 43:54.250
route that the ice axis FBI field

43:54.250 --> 43:56.680
office are available to help you get

43:56.680 --> 43:58.847
there . Ah , and understandably , some

43:58.847 --> 44:00.847
folks may not want to go out of the

44:00.847 --> 44:02.958
federal government , which is why the

44:02.958 --> 44:02.760
ICE Act really offers a nice , safe

44:02.760 --> 44:05.660
place to begin that reporting offer up

44:05.670 --> 44:07.726
the A C as well . You consider email

44:07.726 --> 44:09.614
the security at the a c dot gov .

44:09.614 --> 44:11.670
Obviously , we have connections with

44:11.670 --> 44:13.726
all manufacturers . If you're having

44:13.726 --> 44:15.781
trouble with particular manufacturer

44:15.781 --> 44:15.680
having trouble with particular agency ,

44:15.680 --> 44:17.791
every local official , or just not in

44:17.791 --> 44:19.958
the response you want , we're happy to

44:19.958 --> 44:22.540
help facilitate that conversation . And

44:22.550 --> 44:24.772
just from a cyber constant , one of the

44:24.772 --> 44:26.772
big changes for us is you know , we

44:26.772 --> 44:28.772
historically had been focused , you

44:28.772 --> 44:30.939
know , working inside skips and one of

44:30.939 --> 44:32.772
the things we've really done and

44:32.772 --> 44:34.828
supported 2020 years . You know , we

44:34.828 --> 44:36.772
have organizations now that living

44:36.772 --> 44:38.883
outside skills there on Nipper Net or

44:38.883 --> 44:40.828
unclassified Internet , you know ,

44:40.828 --> 44:42.717
they're in slack channels there ,

44:42.717 --> 44:44.939
talking to the FBI . They're talking to

44:44.939 --> 44:47.106
be a jest . They're talking to private

44:47.106 --> 44:49.328
industry partners in there , you know ,

44:49.328 --> 44:51.494
they're living in that same eco system

44:51.494 --> 44:53.606
that many of hopes that are listening

44:53.606 --> 44:55.661
to this presentation . Or so we have

44:55.661 --> 44:57.606
really tried toe adapt some of our

44:57.606 --> 44:59.939
behaviors . So we're able to , you know ,

44:59.939 --> 45:02.050
in real time , flat rate our partners

45:02.050 --> 45:04.050
across government , you know , on a

45:04.050 --> 45:06.217
little different time scheduled in the

45:06.217 --> 45:08.272
traditional military one . Because I

45:08.272 --> 45:10.494
know most of you are probably not up at

45:10.494 --> 45:13.020
5 30 in the morning . Just like so ,

45:13.030 --> 45:14.919
Bill Vanina , the director of the

45:14.919 --> 45:17.030
National Counterintelligence Security

45:17.030 --> 45:18.919
Center , just recently put out an

45:18.919 --> 45:21.086
official statement today talking about

45:21.086 --> 45:23.141
the very threat that work here . But

45:23.490 --> 45:25.712
all the threats were basically laid out

45:25.712 --> 45:28.046
in an equal manner . Would you say that ?

45:28.046 --> 45:30.101
That's equal ? What would you say is

45:30.101 --> 45:33.260
the biggest life ? I don't think we

45:33.260 --> 45:35.427
need to take any of the threats , like

45:35.690 --> 45:38.090
right ? I think statement in terms of

45:38.100 --> 45:41.150
what you saw out there , it lays out

45:41.470 --> 45:44.110
out . Each adversary is approaching

45:44.400 --> 45:48.010
problems . Certainly . Russia , China ,

45:48.010 --> 45:51.960
Randy , they all have attending the

45:51.960 --> 45:55.950
audio activities . Maybe

45:55.960 --> 45:58.071
your unanswered , your best interests

45:58.071 --> 46:01.590
here . So , um , you know , I don't

46:01.590 --> 46:03.800
think I would say like one is scarier

46:03.800 --> 46:07.190
than the other per se . Certainly

46:07.880 --> 46:09.930
some of these adversaries are more

46:09.930 --> 46:12.290
experienced at this in terms about time

46:12.880 --> 46:16.160
they've been working doing

46:16.160 --> 46:19.830
operations . But , you know , from our

46:19.830 --> 46:21.941
perspective , you know , I care about

46:21.941 --> 46:23.941
all those threats . I take them all

46:23.941 --> 46:26.850
seriously because I guess I'm not some

46:26.850 --> 46:28.961
of the stuff . It's very cheap to get

46:28.961 --> 46:32.870
into , so I wouldn't

46:32.880 --> 46:36.070
do a value judgment this first . I

46:36.080 --> 46:38.302
couldn't agree more on that and I think

46:38.302 --> 46:40.413
that it's really important . Remember

46:40.413 --> 46:43.360
that Are great pictures always informed

46:43.370 --> 46:47.080
by collect what we know

46:47.090 --> 46:50.700
And you know we don't have pictures and

46:51.020 --> 46:53.242
how we really have to approach all this

46:53.242 --> 46:56.230
is what could be the effect from

46:56.350 --> 46:58.700
various grills . What could happen

46:58.700 --> 47:01.790
closer September October ? Because it

47:01.800 --> 47:05.340
still is a few months away and way . We

47:05.340 --> 47:07.173
need to be prepared for a lot of

47:07.173 --> 47:09.451
different things happening within that ,

47:09.451 --> 47:12.550
and I foot stop again . You know , it

47:12.560 --> 47:15.290
doesn't just after the big three b I

47:16.830 --> 47:20.750
other non state actors , I or criminal

47:20.750 --> 47:23.750
groups in the light that are going toe

47:23.760 --> 47:26.000
undermined people's confidence in our

47:26.440 --> 47:28.800
system . And really , if you ask me ,

47:28.810 --> 47:31.130
the biggest threat is it's these

47:31.140 --> 47:35.110
constant from or equals campaigns that

47:35.270 --> 47:38.060
are going to make people feel there

47:38.060 --> 47:40.227
must happen in our system . And that ,

47:41.860 --> 47:43.804
and that's really near your eyes .

47:46.480 --> 47:48.480
Hey , Price . And just real quick .

47:48.480 --> 47:50.702
Everyone in the bedroom actually has to

47:50.702 --> 47:52.758
take a drink cause the Fed said foot

47:52.758 --> 47:54.924
stomp . So that's actually one sip for

47:54.924 --> 47:57.930
everyone in the bedroom . Thanks ,

47:59.320 --> 48:01.820
but here I can't help but feel like

48:01.830 --> 48:04.163
you're cheating the system a little bit .

48:04.163 --> 48:06.274
Uh , if you don't have a drink . I've

48:06.274 --> 48:08.330
been drink . I've been drinking this

48:08.330 --> 48:10.497
whole panel . Don't worry , I'm good .

48:12.470 --> 48:14.526
Hey , put up or shut up . Shows your

48:14.526 --> 48:17.380
drink . It's in a water bottle . But

48:19.930 --> 48:21.930
so we're coming close to our end of

48:21.930 --> 48:24.650
time . So I want to ask you a final

48:25.080 --> 48:27.310
back questions to each of you .

48:29.000 --> 48:30.111
Have about a minute

48:33.610 --> 48:36.360
you get not Internet connected . Want

48:36.810 --> 48:38.730
magic wand ? Wait , What did you

48:38.740 --> 48:42.090
someone that The magic it is ? Yes .

48:42.100 --> 48:44.211
That is how it is wireless but wire .

48:45.330 --> 48:48.710
And one thing happens for your agency .

48:50.770 --> 48:52.770
I don't know . This isn't reality ,

48:52.770 --> 48:54.992
right ? This isn't Oh , if only I could

48:54.992 --> 48:57.103
get $20 million to claim that this is

48:57.103 --> 48:59.840
what do you wish they process ? How did

48:59.840 --> 49:03.490
that ? Okay , so 2020 is almost Britain .

49:04.600 --> 49:07.220
Yellen , ballots start . People start

49:07.220 --> 49:10.200
story start happening . 2024 is our

49:10.200 --> 49:13.640
next . What is one good thing ? And one

49:13.640 --> 49:15.862
thing we really need to worry about the

49:15.862 --> 49:19.800
future . See , I feel like I

49:20.220 --> 49:22.690
do the shortstop . Right . Next . I ,

49:22.700 --> 49:25.130
um I like you the most . Okay ,

49:27.970 --> 49:31.390
I So I thinking about

49:32.130 --> 49:35.450
I how what I really wish we had more

49:35.460 --> 49:38.910
off is I wish we had

49:39.280 --> 49:43.080
more people right now with the

49:44.070 --> 49:47.200
settler skill set that he could hire

49:47.760 --> 49:50.650
quickly and get him on on so that we

49:50.650 --> 49:53.880
could . I just expand our scope and

49:53.880 --> 49:56.200
scale on speed in which we're

49:56.200 --> 49:58.311
addressing threats . And I think that

49:58.311 --> 50:00.256
that goes towards you know , we're

50:00.256 --> 50:02.478
putting so much about the haves against

50:02.478 --> 50:04.700
election , and I feel really good about

50:04.700 --> 50:06.756
where we're at on it . But what does

50:06.756 --> 50:09.470
that work that you know that the words

50:09.470 --> 50:11.820
mean ? And I'd like us to know that we

50:11.830 --> 50:15.490
have people coming to us ,

50:15.500 --> 50:17.500
that I want to do the right thing ,

50:17.910 --> 50:20.490
that I want to protect America and have

50:20.500 --> 50:23.250
those skills . Siri Teoh

50:25.950 --> 50:27.600
as it was 2024 . Whatever .

50:29.400 --> 50:32.450
So I hope we keep guys collaboration

50:32.460 --> 50:35.170
and the focus alive . I know in my

50:35.180 --> 50:37.347
remarks I get a real quick overview of

50:37.347 --> 50:39.513
what the bad guys that you know . Part

50:39.513 --> 50:42.420
of it is part of that . It was not a

50:42.420 --> 50:44.198
cyber investigations looking at

50:44.198 --> 50:46.309
influence Side who developed the Ford

50:46.309 --> 50:50.030
Influence Task Force . And that

50:50.090 --> 50:52.312
effort , I think , has really helped us

50:52.312 --> 50:54.900
focus . I'm It's not just a cyber issue .

50:54.910 --> 50:57.430
It's not just a criminal Justin

50:57.430 --> 50:59.597
influence if you like , see how it all

50:59.597 --> 51:01.597
works together internal getting the

51:01.597 --> 51:05.460
China crime people and looking at it

51:05.460 --> 51:09.430
as I want it , that's new

51:10.500 --> 51:14.060
with really consider that station in

51:14.170 --> 51:17.680
life moving forward . I think that

51:20.260 --> 51:22.538
yeah , that's Do you know your visions ?

51:22.538 --> 51:26.330
Yes , Spectrum of of a few years . So

51:26.790 --> 51:30.570
but yeah , and I hope we all stay in

51:30.570 --> 51:32.420
touch after way .

51:34.650 --> 51:36.761
You don't stay in touch them the next

51:36.761 --> 51:40.380
panel before I think

51:40.380 --> 51:43.140
that the wand answer is pretty easy for

51:43.140 --> 51:45.740
me . Perfect insight and necessary

51:45.740 --> 51:47.851
attention . Operations is obviously I

51:47.980 --> 51:50.950
think you're not supposed to say

51:50.950 --> 51:55.320
Teoh .

51:59.420 --> 52:01.690
Oh , hitting a little bit out since his

52:01.690 --> 52:04.460
point , going back a bit to accommodate

52:04.460 --> 52:06.627
me before working counterterrorism . A

52:06.627 --> 52:08.793
lot of fighting the last war , right ?

52:09.210 --> 52:11.500
Someone tries that love playing with

52:11.500 --> 52:13.444
printer cartridges like government

52:13.444 --> 52:15.778
swarms that figure out how to stop that .

52:15.778 --> 52:19.000
Then the officer , You know the same

52:19.000 --> 52:22.190
thing you're seeing adversaries of all

52:22.430 --> 52:26.250
we've seen adversaries come in . So

52:26.260 --> 52:28.316
there's always don't worry about you

52:28.316 --> 52:30.490
know what , you don't know . But what

52:30.490 --> 52:33.260
I'm confident in is that we are

52:33.270 --> 52:35.437
position a lot better position now for

52:35.437 --> 52:37.492
agility in terms of responding these

52:37.492 --> 52:39.900
rest because of the systems we set out

52:39.910 --> 52:42.200
the partnerships have . That is

52:42.200 --> 52:44.650
certainly something for 2024 we didn't

52:44.650 --> 52:47.710
get building on and not who's excited

52:47.710 --> 52:49.821
it when problems come up , you know ,

52:49.910 --> 52:51.910
not making sure this remains a boat

52:51.910 --> 52:53.854
because I think the def con voting

52:53.854 --> 52:56.021
village is very important to keep this

52:56.021 --> 52:58.243
running . People's health from Dennis a

52:58.243 --> 53:00.610
specifically way , Have a much we're

53:00.610 --> 53:02.980
investing off or in a white damn brand

53:03.170 --> 53:05.890
white , half grand . Excuse me , but it

53:05.900 --> 53:08.380
s a cyber Twitter account . Follow it .

53:08.390 --> 53:10.612
You're gonna see more good stuff coming

53:10.612 --> 53:12.540
out of that . But you continue to

53:12.580 --> 53:14.524
develop on . That's the incredible

53:14.524 --> 53:18.310
thing . I can tell you how

53:18.310 --> 53:20.680
excited something people were in our

53:20.680 --> 53:22.870
building . Likely saying this .

53:22.870 --> 53:25.280
Substrate advisory on the g r u

53:26.470 --> 53:28.790
vulnerability . Seeing you know it ,

53:28.790 --> 53:30.846
least five different soccer security

53:30.846 --> 53:33.080
felonies take that information , did it

53:33.080 --> 53:35.136
on the indicators in their and their

53:35.136 --> 53:37.136
own data sets , figuring out things

53:37.136 --> 53:40.840
that you getting about to uncover more

53:41.990 --> 53:44.990
adversary operation so that not people

53:44.990 --> 53:48.570
excited building . And that's something

53:48.580 --> 53:50.802
you want to do more of it ahead against

53:50.802 --> 53:52.802
sitting on that partnership in that

53:52.802 --> 53:54.780
dynamic about using each other's

53:54.780 --> 53:57.560
information and building that security

53:57.560 --> 53:59.671
of the enterprise raising all those .

53:59.671 --> 54:01.449
It sounds kind of Pollyannish .

54:04.930 --> 54:07.330
Hey , Bryce . Bucket wave A magic wand .

54:07.340 --> 54:09.396
I would leave it , and then we would

54:09.396 --> 54:12.150
get killed 19 under control . You know ,

54:12.150 --> 54:14.317
I just got to tell you , there's great

54:14.317 --> 54:16.539
collaboration , but we could do so much

54:16.539 --> 54:18.594
more . We could do so much more with

54:18.594 --> 54:20.817
our partners here . We could do so much

54:20.817 --> 54:23.500
more overseas if you could get the

54:23.510 --> 54:25.732
pendant that controlled . So , please ,

54:25.732 --> 54:27.843
where you're basking helps the second

54:27.843 --> 54:30.177
piece , you know , where do we see this ?

54:30.177 --> 54:32.288
In 2024 ? You do get past questions ,

54:32.288 --> 54:34.454
but I get the answer you want . So you

54:34.454 --> 54:37.640
know , I would rather focus on 2020 20

54:37.640 --> 54:39.751
is not a foregone conclusion . We can

54:39.751 --> 54:42.060
have a safe , secure , but bullets ,

54:42.630 --> 54:44.920
you know , as as an American people we

54:44.920 --> 54:47.142
need to mobilize . You know , there are

54:47.142 --> 54:48.587
thousands of smart people

54:49.020 --> 54:51.131
extraordinarily technically capable ,

54:51.131 --> 54:53.298
that are watching things session right

54:53.298 --> 54:55.710
now . Please will work at the polling

54:55.710 --> 54:58.650
stations . Please talk DHS , please

54:59.140 --> 55:02.630
talk to the FBI again . You know , we

55:02.630 --> 55:04.574
are all ends . We got down . Since

55:04.574 --> 55:06.686
people are going to work every day in

55:06.686 --> 55:08.852
order to support safe , secure vitamin

55:08.852 --> 55:10.830
election . And Alan just ask for

55:10.960 --> 55:14.890
everybody . Everybody

55:14.890 --> 55:16.890
appreciate that . There's a greater

55:16.890 --> 55:19.057
sense of where we all are in the world

55:19.057 --> 55:21.279
today . If I could wait my match one on

55:21.279 --> 55:23.501
the A C . I said that we would be doing

55:23.501 --> 55:26.220
better to get TVBS G

55:27.340 --> 55:29.940
more , more flexible and faster

55:29.940 --> 55:32.740
responding to this idea that if we

55:32.740 --> 55:34.962
could get you researchers interested in

55:34.962 --> 55:37.073
election of the structure and several

55:37.073 --> 55:38.629
vulnerabilities report them

55:38.629 --> 55:40.407
responsibility , and we get the

55:40.407 --> 55:42.629
manufacturers to patch and get those at

55:42.629 --> 55:44.840
midfield on much fast turnaround . I

55:44.850 --> 55:46.950
really , I think , get a much better

55:46.950 --> 55:49.117
position . We're working toward that .

55:49.117 --> 55:51.172
It's still a process . Yeah , I take

55:51.172 --> 55:53.394
some time . I think we can get there by

55:53.394 --> 55:56.050
2024 just to recognize that federal

55:56.050 --> 55:58.161
elections over two years . But locals

55:58.161 --> 56:00.383
are running elections every few weeks ,

56:00.383 --> 56:02.890
and so there's a bigger stake at play

56:02.900 --> 56:05.067
because every election that's run is a

56:05.067 --> 56:06.844
chance to show that we could do

56:06.844 --> 56:08.900
democracy , right ? We're gonna keep

56:08.900 --> 56:11.122
doing it and it's done very well . Most

56:11.122 --> 56:13.289
of the time . It's just this few times

56:13.289 --> 56:15.511
for this will stick ups way , have some

56:15.511 --> 56:17.511
trouble and it starts to erode that

56:17.511 --> 56:19.456
confidence so better we get at hit

56:19.456 --> 56:21.511
those patches . Much better articles

56:21.511 --> 56:25.330
this more . Yeah . So the magic wand .

56:25.330 --> 56:27.620
I got two answers . I think on I had

56:27.620 --> 56:29.953
the advantage of time , which is useful .

56:30.100 --> 56:33.360
The first is if there was a way for

56:33.360 --> 56:37.110
sista Teoh . Ah , push out . Ah ,

56:37.120 --> 56:39.342
service agreements or whatever the case

56:39.342 --> 56:41.680
may be too . Upgrade election systems .

56:41.690 --> 56:43.801
Not just voting systems were motion .

56:43.801 --> 56:46.360
The focus goes , but election systems

56:46.360 --> 56:48.138
including workstations , off of

56:48.138 --> 56:50.600
outdated on supported , uh , software .

56:50.670 --> 56:52.781
Uh , I I absolutely want to do that .

56:52.790 --> 56:54.901
Ah , you know , it's not just windows

56:54.901 --> 56:57.234
seven we're talking older on , you know ,

56:57.234 --> 56:59.290
It's not that the the local election

56:59.290 --> 57:01.512
officials or state officials don't want

57:01.512 --> 57:03.623
to upgrade uh , that they lack either

57:03.623 --> 57:05.790
that the eye t supporter resource is ,

57:05.790 --> 57:05.770
And I'd love to be able to give that to

57:05.770 --> 57:08.570
them . The second is getting to 100%

57:08.570 --> 57:11.270
audit ability across the nation on

57:11.270 --> 57:13.381
having efficient , effective audits .

57:13.381 --> 57:16.600
For 2020 we're gonna be upwards of 92

57:16.600 --> 57:19.090
plus percent of honorable records . But

57:19.090 --> 57:21.257
we need a good , efficient , effective

57:21.257 --> 57:23.790
audits . Teoh that are transparent . I

57:23.800 --> 57:25.578
mean , Neil McBurnett asked the

57:25.578 --> 57:27.689
question earlier . He's making it his

57:27.689 --> 57:29.856
mission in life to get to this , and I

57:29.856 --> 57:31.800
so appreciate it . If we can if we

57:31.800 --> 57:31.600
could provide that public , that

57:31.600 --> 57:33.878
transparent auditing process efficient ,

57:33.878 --> 57:36.920
effective , I think it would be real

57:37.180 --> 57:39.320
success . Looking forward , there's

57:39.320 --> 57:41.209
something in elections called the

57:41.209 --> 57:43.209
Election wall , where you literally

57:43.209 --> 57:45.376
lack the ability to look past the next

57:45.376 --> 57:47.487
election . You try and you don't even

57:47.487 --> 57:49.709
know what life looks like beyond that .

57:49.709 --> 57:52.360
But if I had to to really ah , you know ,

57:52.360 --> 57:54.860
push myself through that it would be

57:55.120 --> 57:57.064
increasing the amount of support .

57:57.064 --> 57:59.231
Resource is Ah , and I don't just mean

57:59.231 --> 58:01.398
money to state local officials to help

58:01.398 --> 58:03.453
them meaningfully manage the risk to

58:03.453 --> 58:05.520
their systems . Ah , and really take

58:05.520 --> 58:07.687
some of the innovative steps that they

58:07.687 --> 58:09.631
want to take . Ah , that they that

58:09.631 --> 58:11.853
they're unable to , either because of a

58:11.853 --> 58:13.964
lack of I support a resource ing that

58:13.964 --> 58:15.909
otherwise would allow them Teoh to

58:15.909 --> 58:17.909
serve voters . And then finally , I

58:17.909 --> 58:20.131
know I'm cheating . Ah , but but a more

58:20.131 --> 58:22.187
resilient American public , a deeper

58:22.187 --> 58:24.298
understanding of how elections work .

58:24.298 --> 58:26.520
Ah , deeper understanding of what their

58:26.520 --> 58:29.360
options are , how ballots , uh , reach

58:29.360 --> 58:31.527
them or how they can interact with the

58:31.527 --> 58:34.220
process . And then , uh , how we reach

58:34.220 --> 58:36.890
our final certified elections again

58:36.890 --> 58:39.090
that that prepared patient and

58:39.090 --> 58:41.312
participating voters everything . As we

58:41.312 --> 58:45.010
look at 2020 I feel the same way .

58:45.020 --> 58:47.187
That as well . It's organized . You're

58:47.187 --> 58:49.298
deft . Can't look past this weekend .

58:51.000 --> 58:53.190
Thank you to all the Panelists for

58:53.320 --> 58:57.040
sharing at this age is

58:58.100 --> 59:00.322
a lot better understanding the level of

59:00.322 --> 59:02.250
cooperation , transparency on the

59:02.260 --> 59:04.260
fallibility and the improvement and

59:04.260 --> 59:06.470
very much before . But what we do we

59:06.470 --> 59:08.880
are all citizens on our voices should

59:08.890 --> 59:12.190
be heard . Thank you .

59:13.090 --> 59:13.400
Thanks .